

**Victor Damasceno Toscano Costa**

**Politics of Police and Violence:  
Narratives from Rio de Janeiro**

Dissertation presented to the Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais of the Instituto de Relações Internacionais, PUC-Rio, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Mestre em Relações internacionais.

Advisor: Prof. James Casas Klausen

Rio de Janeiro,  
September 2022

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The author graduated in International Relations at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (IRI/PUC-Rio) in 2019, having participated in several academic projects, among which the following stand out: tutoring in 20th Century International System, Problems of War and Peace, International Terrorisms, Contemporary IR Theories, and Introduction to International Relations (PIUES/PUC-Rio); teaching internship in Contemporary International Conflicts, Democratic Theory, and International Terrorisms; and PIBIC research. His research is at the intersection of Public Security and International Security, with a focus on policing, arrests and incarcerations; violence and constitution of subjectivities; and identities, particularly masculinities, whiteness, and national identities.

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## **Abstract**

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Based on interviews with police officers in Rio de Janeiro, this research aims to investigate the uneasy relationship between Police and violence. With the interviews, it is noted that police officers avoid and resist discussions about violence and the word “violence” itself. Instead, they use “war” as a rhetorical device to claim authorization and leniency for the exercise of violence in police duty. Positioning violence as part of the police’s discretionary power, itself the result of an inescapable tension between law, which they should follow, and order, which they should impose, the research shows that the same structure of criticism of violence as “excess” supports and reiterates the possibilities of employment of extrajudicial violence by police officers. The police officers, in turn, present this violence with concealment and duplicity, in addition to the use of euphemisms, denials and silences, in contrast and tension with the use of war rhetoric. Finally, the research presents the police function as an impossible job. Acting on the tensions and paradoxes between law and order, and between the authorization for the use of violence and the rejection of violence, police officers respond to contradictory demands using the rhetoric of “war”, but recognize that this “war” will never cease, that they are “drying ice”.

## **Keywords**

Police; violence; Rio de Janeiro; war; interviews.

## **Resumo**

Costa, Victor Damasceno Toscano; James Casas Klausen (Orientador). **Políticas de Polícia e Violência: Narrativas do Rio de Janeiro**. Rio de Janeiro, 2022. 297p. Dissertação de Mestrado – Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

A partir de entrevistas com policiais do Rio de Janeiro, esta pesquisa tem por objetivo investigar a relação tensa que há entre Polícia e violência. Com as entrevistas, nota-se que os policiais evitam e resistem a discussões sobre violência e à própria palavra “violência”. Em vez disso, empregam “guerra” como instrumento retórico para pleitear autorização e leniência para o exercício de violência na função policial. Posicionando a violência como parte do poder discricionário da polícia, ele mesmo resultado de uma tensão inescapável entre lei, que deveriam seguir, e ordem, que deveriam impor, a pesquisa apresenta que a mesma estrutura das críticas da violência como “excesso” respalda e reitera as possibilidades de emprego de violência extrajudicial por policiais. Os policiais, por suas vezes, apresentam essa violência com ocultação e dubiedade, além de pelo uso de eufemismos, negações e silêncios, em contraste e tensão com o uso da retórica de guerra. Finalmente, a pesquisa apresenta a função policial como um trabalho impossível. Atuando nas tensões e paradoxos entre lei e ordem, e entre autorização de emprego da violência e rejeição à violência, policiais respondem às demandas contraditórias com o uso da retórica de “guerra”, mas reconhecem que essa “guerra” nunca vai cessar, que estão “enxugando gelo”.

## **Palavras-chave**

Polícia; violência; Rio de Janeiro; guerra; entrevistas.

## 1. Introduction

It is commonly stated that Brazil has the police force that both kills the most and that is the most killed. Researchers (FLAUZINA, 2017, p. 132; MANSO; LIMA; BUENO, 2021), police officers' associations (MENDONÇA, 2016), journalists (MARTÍN, 2017), and NGO's assert this claim. Although a lot has been written on police and violence, little has been based on conversations with the police officers. This thesis is an effort at listening. And it is also an effort at preservation both of first-hand accounts on the police and of literature on police in Rio de Janeiro that might interest future researchers. In this sense, I have conducted semi-structured interviews with seven police officers and, although I didn't anticipate where the research would lead me, the police officers themselves, in their answers to my questions, pointed me towards discussion I had not imagined.

My original project for this thesis was to explore how two broad arguments by Charles Tilly (TILLY, 1975, 1985, 1990) and Richard Ashley (ASHLEY, 1989) about statecrafting, warcrafting and mancrafting could be thought together through the words of police officers from Rio de Janeiro. Particularly, I had hoped to ask them about violence, considering that it is a central feature of their job and, following Max Weber (WEBER, 2004, p. 33, see also: 1978, p. 54, 314, 901), that it is also central for the state and for the discipline of International Relations (for a discussion on Weber and IR, see: GUZZINI, 2017). However, as I explain in section 3.1., I soon realized that police officers were resistant to discuss violence and even avoided using the word when discussing their actions and duties. I was also struck with some shared tropes and narratives that emerged in the interviews, particularly with the unanimous description of policing in Rio de Janeiro as a scenario of war and the dissatisfaction of police officers with Brazilian Justice, among others that, due to the circumstances surrounding the making of this thesis, had to be left out of the discussion (these are listed in section 7., with the accompanying excerpts from the interviews).

These unravelings, together with the suggestions from my thesis' defense committee, led me to rework my approach, leaving behind the more general state-making argument. My research interests have always been centered on the

intersections of public security and international security (TOSCANO, 2019), but I had not yet researched the Brazilian police specifically, therefore I made an effort to try and understand it. This thesis is the partial result from this effort, focused on contextualizing police/violence in Rio de Janeiro's and Brazil's history (sections 2.1. and 2.2.) to understand the place of violence in a localized way. Despite many differences among the police officers, the conversations I had with them revealed some striking commonalities that were hard to ignore. However, I emphasize that the narratives that will be presented are not necessarily the narrative of any police officer in particular nor do I claim that it represents the (un)official discourse of the police institutions composed by them. Instead, this is how Rio de Janeiro's police discourse spoke through the participants. The story this braided narrative tells gives support to some arguments about the police, undermine others, and, in some cases, lead to new propositions about the issue at hand.

The description of violence in the city as war, the estranged relationship between the police and the judiciary, the plea for latitude and discretion, the purposes of fear in policing, the similarities of complaints of impunity and demands for law with arguments for extrajudicial punishment. These are some of the themes I encountered in my conversations and that I have tried to contextualize and put in dialogue with the academic literature. This literature was not bounded by the academic confines of International Relations, encompassing contributions from many other disciplines, specially from History, Sociology, Anthropology, and others. Hopefully the historical reconstruction, the interview material, and the accompanying literature used to theorize policing in Rio de Janeiro will prove useful to researchers to come.

Research on violence, in general, has most often focused on the targets of violence – its victims, that is, if using the commonly accepted categories of “victim” and “perpetrator” (HUGGINS; HARITOS-FATOUROS; ZIMBARDO, 2002, p. 28; LUFT, 2020, p. 2) – and rarely on those that participated in such violence, particularly when they are tasked with employing it. Mitton remarks that current scholarly debates on violence tend to have “an incomplete and misleading understanding of what drives individuals to commit brutal violence” precisely “because so few scholars of conflict had actually spoken to perpetrators themselves,

for various reasons which include the sensitivity of the topic and the presumed difficulty of making contact” (MITTON, 2021, p. 177; see also: HUSAIN, 2007, p. 9). Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros and Zimbardo note that many scholars refrain from even considering any research on participants in violence to be legitimate, mostly because of the difficult moral questions elicited by such research (HUGGINS; HARITOS-FATOUROS; ZIMBARDO, 2002, p. 26; see also: HUGGINS, 2002, p. 204–205; LIFTON, 2017, p. xi). Gallaher also found that researching what she calls “repellent populations”, including perpetrators and participants in violence, was not commonplace when she first started engaging with these questions, and it still isn’t (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 127, 136).

When it comes to studying the police, research talking about participants in violence is even harder to come by (COLEMAN, 2016, p. 76) and police violence, particularly, entails specific difficulties that hamper academic efforts to understand and produce knowledge about the phenomenon. One reason is the police officers’ caution around researchers, particularly in the Humanities and Social Sciences. My interlocutors often presumed that academics are hostile to the police, as other researchers have also mentioned (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 206; BRETAS; ROSEMBERG, 2013, p. 163), which led to and was confirmed by what they perceive as an overwhelmingly anti-police bias in academic settings and scholarship (SILVA, 1985, p. 27).

**Larrey:** You studied at PUC, maybe you have your experience in this regard, but like, I did a master’s degree at [University 1]. When I said I was from the Police, the people... rejected me! I did my master’s at the Faculty of Medical Sciences. It wasn’t in History, no. And the people [asked]: “are you from the Police? But you’re so... smart... You’re so cute...” As if being from the police was a presupposition for me being \*stupid\*... for me being ugly, stupid, I don’t know what other disqualifications more I was assigned. [...] And that generates that “if [the police officer] was shot, it’s fine. Died, poor thing.”

**Larrey:** Você estudou na PUC, talvez você tenha sua experiência em relação a isso, mas assim, eu fiz mestrado na [Universidade 1]. Quando eu falava que era da Polícia as pessoas... me rechaçavam! Eu fiz mestrado na Faculdade de Ciências Médicas. Não foi em História não. E as pessoas: “tu é da Polícia? Mas você é tão... inteligente... Você é tão bonitinha...” Como se ser da Polícia fosse um pressuposto pra eu ser \*burra\*... pra eu ser feia, burra, sei lá mais quais outras desqualificações que eram atribuídas. [...] E isso aí gera que “se [o policial] foi baleado tá bom. Morreu, tadinho.” Então não tem essa

So there's no personification of the police. The guy doesn't understand. The guy \*medicine student\* who will be at the hospital rescuing the person doesn't understand the police officer as a person. [...] And then your work is important because it \*brings\* to the academic environment a discussion [police victimization] that until then was refuted by the academic environment. That's why I said [in a conversation prior to starting the interview] "it's kind of sensitive". Because I suffered this. I entered to give a lecture at [University 2], in Medicine at [University 2], [and] all the students left. Only the organizers stayed, the students from the league who were organizing the event, the director... so, about 10 people. About 40, 50 left, but they left when I went to speak. And I went uniformed in a somewhat provocative attitude, because I went to talk about intra-hospital care in Rio de Janeiro... And then in a provocative attitude for them to understand that Rio de Janeiro has several... several nuances in rescue in Rio de Janeiro and the police officer is a nuance.

personificação da polícia. O cara não entende. O cara \*aluno de medicina\* que vai estar no hospital socorrendo a pessoa não entende o policial como uma pessoa. [...] E aí é importante o teu trabalho porque ele \*traz\* pro meio acadêmico uma discussão que até então era refutada pelo meio acadêmico. Por isso que eu falei [em uma conversa antes de começarmos a entrevista] "é meio sensível". Porque eu sofri isso. Eu entrei pra dar uma palestra na [Universidade 2], na medicina da [Universidade 2], todos os alunos saíram. Ficaram só os organizadores, os alunos da liga que tavam organizando o evento, o diretor... assim, umas 10 pessoas. Uns 40, 50 saíram, mas saíram na hora que eu fui falar. E eu fui fardada numa atitude um pouco provocativa mesmo, porque eu fui falar de [cuidado] intra-hospitalar no Rio de Janeiro... E aí numa atitude provocativa pra eles entenderem que o Rio de Janeiro tem várias... várias nuances no socorro do Rio de Janeiro e o policial é uma nuance.

After another interlocutor mentioned criticisms of police violence coming from the press, NGOs, and human rights associations, I asked him about how he understood the way that society, the press, and the researchers saw police work:

**Silva:** Damn, they see in the worst way. Because they don't need it and they don't know what it's like. And at the same time, they don't have the courage to do the work. Do you understand? They don't judge impartially. They are \*partial\*. Do you understand? "Ah, the *bandido* is a victim. Ah, the addict is sick... The pedophile is sick...". Do you understand?

**Silva:** Porra, veem da pior forma. Porque não precisam e não sabem como é que é. E ao mesmo tempo não têm coragem de fazer o trabalho. Entendeu? Eles não avaliam imparcialmente. Eles são \*parciais\*. Entendeu? "Ah, o bandido é vítima. Ah, o viciado é doente... O pedófilo é doente...". Entendeu?

Besides the weariness around scholars, Coleman points to a plethora of other difficulties when researching the police, such as police resistance and reactivity to having researchers accompany them in the field, the staging of policing for onlookers, the lack of extensive data sets and data-keeping practices, the low quality and fidelity of the existing data, the deep methodological difficulties of establishing intent and causality in respect to discriminatory police policies (COLEMAN, 2016, p. 79–82), and the self-reinforcing bias of the “ratchet effect”:

the circular, compounding effect of policing as a practice and the biopolitical specificity of the data that this practice produces, which in turn hails additional rounds of policing. In this way, policing practice and data specific to where policing practice takes place generates layer upon layer of increasingly spatially pooled data which follows from and guides layer upon layer of policing practice (COLEMAN, 2016, p. 84).

On the subject of interviews, conversations and meetings with high-ranking police officials are frequently hard to secure, as per Coleman’s experience, only being possible after “multiple callbacks, emails, rounds of rescheduling, and in some cases impromptu site visits” (COLEMAN, 2016, p. 78). After getting past this first barrier of police research, Coleman remarks that these interviews are often limited by the risk of losing access because of the tougher questions about policing and in the end he laments that they are not enough to document the practice of police work (COLEMAN, 2016, p. 78). Even when successful, Coleman warns that “interviews with high-ranking police officials provide but a very narrow window onto the world of policing” (COLEMAN, 2016, p. 77), playing “out as controlled public relations exercises on the where and how of policing which are highly selective on details” (COLEMAN, 2016, p. 78).

Indeed, Barnes agrees that “existing research within political science [...] has generally relied on public security statistics, journalistic accounts, and interviews with security officials, bureaucrats, and politicians”, adding that “the perspectives of state officials and mainstream media sources often elide the state’s abusive or corrupt activities while blaming ‘criminals’ for any violence or crime” (BARNES, 2021a, p. 2). For Coleman, in other words, “accepted qualitative and quantitative approaches to studying the police constitute, rather than problematize, the blue wall of policing, or[, as he calls it,] ‘state power in blue’” (COLEMAN, 2016, p. 77). As he argues,

what the police sciences give us as accepted ways of generating data about the police, and assessing it, [...] constitute the ‘blue wall’ – that is, a hard to qualify, or quantify, uneventful landscape of weak state killing with no definite address or authorship (COLEMAN, 2016, p. 85).

Also, as Manning warns,

[c]ommitments to research for the police may require differential revelation of facts and findings, suppression of contradictions and impediments, and a willingness to please the police audience more than an academic or scholarly audience (MANNING, 2005, p. 30).

These difficulties are also applicable when researching police and violence in Brazil and, specifically, Rio de Janeiro. Indeed, they have led to a shortage of such studies and to many gaps in our knowledge about police practices, specially from police officers’ perspectives. Besides the security reasons (BARNES, 2021b, p. 36; GONÇALVES FILHO, 2007) that make research on participants in violence more difficult, “Rio’s public security apparatus, which was never reformed following the transition to democracy in the 1980s, has actively prevented greater levels of transparency and accountability” (BARNES, 2021a, p. 4), and, if not because of the participants in violence and their facilitators’ exertion of influence and power – and violence – to keep accounts under wraps, at the very least they are frequently very resistant to disclosing their statements about what happened (HUGGINS; HARITOS-FATOUROS; ZIMBARDO, 2002, p. 26).

In their study of Brazilian “police torturers and murderers”, for instance, Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo mention having “learned very quickly that interviews with police would be extremely difficult to obtain and that finding police who were willing to admit to having tortured would be almost impossible” (HUGGINS; HARITOS-FATOUROS; ZIMBARDO, 2002, p. xii). Their solution to these difficulties was “to cast a broad net – requesting interviews with any police officers who had served during Brazil’s military period – and hope that some torturers would end up in the net” (HUGGINS; HARITOS-FATOUROS; ZIMBARDO, 2002, p. xii). Indeed, some police officers take part in activities that are often clandestine, or at the very least socially abhorred, which leads these police officers to try and keep their identities and their participations in such activities hidden from the public and from the authorities that could prosecute them. As such, “[t]he history and operations of these organizations are seldom written down and,



for the most part, exist only in the minds and memories of members and their close associates” (BARNES, 2021a, p. 4), making interviews with them all the more valuable because of that secrecy. These difficulties and mutual resistances between police and researchers lead to “a significant blind spot for this research agenda while also bringing into doubt existing theoretical claims and policy prescriptions” (BARNES, 2021a, p. 2). Specifically, as Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo say,

[t]he relative lack of storytelling scholarship on violence perpetrators [...] makes storytelling information about perpetrators very useful for fleshing out social memory about state violence” (HUGGINS; HARITOS-FATOUROS; ZIMBARDO, 2002, p. 27).

To remedy the lack of research on this subject, I follow Lifton’s remarks that “the best way to learn about [participants in violence] [i]s to talk to them” (LIFTON, 2017, p. 6). Indeed, this was also stressed by some of the research’s participants.

**Pereira:** You are a political scientist, and I think you even have a duty of fluctuating between ideologies, for you, right? Never stick to just one view of the thing, okay? Go to the other side, ideally you have both parameters to substantiate yours. So you have to listen to both sides, okay?

**Pereira:** Você é um cientista político, e eu acho que você tem até o dever de flutuar entre as ideologias, pra você, né? Nunca se atenha só uma visão da coisa não, tá? Vá na outro lado, o ideal é você ter os dois parâmetros pra você fundamentar o teu. Então você tem que ouvir os dois lados, tá?

**Nunes:** There is no magic formula. [You have to] change the society and that takes a long time. To begin with, for us to start to get better, we must end polarization. We must roam to the same path. It is not to love the police, nor to hate the police. It is not to love the *favelado*, nor to hate the *favelado*. It is not right and nor [is it] left. It is a balance, *pô*. My brother, there are things from the left that are good and there are things from the right that are good. [We] have to start thinking both ways, [we] have to know how to listen. We don’t know how to listen. The society does not want to listen. You are doing the rare [thing]. Listen. [You’ll listen] here, but you

**Nunes:** Não tem fórmula mágica. É mudar a sociedade e isso demora muito tempo. Pra começar, pra gente começar a melhorar, a gente tem que acabar com a polarização. A gente tem que rumar pro mesmo caminho. Não é amar a Polícia, nem odiar a Polícia. Não é amar o favelado, nem odiar o favelado. Não é direita e nem esquerda. É um equilíbrio, *pô*. Meu irmão, tem coisa da esquerda que é boa e tem coisa da direita que é boa. Tem que começar a pensar das duas formas, tem que saber ouvir. A gente não sabe ouvir. A sociedade não quer ouvir. Você tá fazendo o raro. Ouvir. Aqui, mas você vai ouvir do outro lado. Tá certo, *pô*! Porque

will listen from the other side. You are right, *pô!* Because you have to weigh that which is important. *Pô*, there will be things from my talk here that you will think that are stupid. But there will be things that you will agree and from the other side there will be things that you will agree and will disagree.

você tem que pon- sopesar o que que é importante. *Pô*, vai ter coisas da minha fala aqui que você vai achar que é idiota. Mas vai ter coisa que você vai concordar e do outro lado vai ter coisa que você vai concordar e vai discordar.

Following this effort to listen and understand, in sections 2.1. through 2.3., I review the literature on the History of Police as both a concept and as an institution, trying to present the emergence of the concept and its development until its arrival in Brazil, and, following from this point forward, I summarize the history of the Police in Rio de Janeiro until its current form. In section 2.4., I present the armed landscape of Rio de Janeiro, including not only the police, but the other actors of violence, the *milícias* and drug trafficking factions, as well. In chapter 3, I discuss and contextualize the tropes and narratives identified from the interviews. Starting in section 3.1., I discuss the war rhetoric that permeates the discourse of police and violence in Rio de Janeiro. I propose that “war” serves four different purposes for different interlocutors. For the police themselves, “war” is a description of their daily jobs. For human rights’ organizations, reports, and researchers, among others, “war” is an explanation for the high incidences of violence in Rio de Janeiro. I argue that a third purpose is to justify violence. As police officers resist and reject “violence” as a part of their jobs, they use “war”, the environment for violence *par excellence*, to make it justifiable and justified for themselves and others. Finally, the fourth purpose is to protest police violence by those who are its usual targets in Rio de Janeiro. In section 3.2., I present the police officers’ estranged relation with Brazilian Justice and the tension between law and order which characterizes police work. As I argue, demands for “justice” after occurrences of police lethal violence follow the same logic that leads to police lethal violence itself. In section 3.3., I present what I call “Pedagogies of Violence and Fear”. These refer to the enduring practices of violence that are implicitly or unconsciously taught to police officers in the exercise of their duties and to the “pedagogical” role violence exerts in criminals, according to the police officers.

My conclusion, based on the modern abhorrence of violence (discussed in section 3.1.), on the expressed frustrations of the police officers, and on the inherent tensions between law and order, actualized in the form of discretionary power (discussed primarily in section 3.2.), is that policing in Rio de Janeiro is an impossible job, or, as they say, is an effort at “drying ice”.

**Silva:** It's \*an example\* that the police officer does the job... Right? And in the end the work goes down. Where's the lust? It kills the lust for you to do anything. Ah, what am I going to do? Am I going to make- leave my family, work risking death, risking being crippled, risking being imprisoned... to do a beautiful job and in the end for it to come down? Do you understand? All of this is discouraging. Everywhere – I already got to the Federal Police... but in the Civil Police it's the same and in the PM it's the same... It's the “to dry ice”.

**Silva:** É \*um exemplo\* de que o policial faz o trabalho... Né? E lá na frente o trabalho vai por terra. Cadê o tesão? Acaba o tesão de você fazer qualquer coisa. Ah, eu vou fazer o quê? Vou fazer- largar minha família, trabalhar arriscado a morrer, arriscado a ficar aleijado, arriscado a ficar preso... pra fazer um trabalho bonito e no final vir por terra? Entendeu? Isso tudo desanima. Todo lado – já cheguei na Polícia Federal... Mas na Polícia Civil é a mesma coisa e na PM é a mesma coisa... É o enxugar gelo.

### 1.1. Notes on the Interviews

The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted from April to June 2022. After having secured the university's IRB permission to start the interviews in late March 2022, I managed to schedule my first interview in a few days. The first interview I conducted was with a family acquaintance who had vowed to help me in my research. My initial idea was to have him introduce me to other police officers with whom I could talk, which he willingly disposed himself to do. I imagined he would be my only source of participants, which had the risks, even if unintentionally, of having him gatekeep and/or filter the access to the participants, of weakening internal anonymity, and of influencing what they should say. I ended up not using his help, however, because despite the literature's overwhelming consensus that interviews with police officers are hard to obtain, I was pleasantly surprised with the ease with which I found willing participants.

After asking some family members if they knew anyone who would be willing to talk to me, I was told that a distant family member is a retired police officer. He was my second participant. Around the same time, my sister was invited

to a party and, sharing an Uber ride on the way there, she heard from a friend that his cell phone had been stolen and that it was recovered with the help of a friend's stepfather. My sister then asked if she could have his contact information and he ended up being my third participant. My fourth participant was introduced to me by an acquaintance, as they had studied together, and he had volunteered himself to help me. He insisted that I met him in the battalion he works in, which I resisted at first, thinking that being close to colleagues could inhibit some of his answers and that my presence there might be discomforting, but I eventually conceded and my concerns were allayed. His answers were apparently unimpeded by either the environment or by the presence and circulation of police officers in the room we were meeting, and, in his willingness to help, he, unexpectedly, arranged another interview for me on the same day. A few days later he contacted me again telling me that he had talked with another police officer who was willing to be interviewed. These were the only participants I met through snowballing. Finally, my seventh participant was the buyer of my mother's old car. Having mentioned that he was a police officer when he came to retrieve it, I introduced myself, had a quick conversation and asked if he would be willing to talk to me, to which he promptly agreed. That I didn't have clear criteria for the selection of participants mattered, but this is also testament to the fact that in fieldwork there are many ways of finding participants outside the usual routes. Keeping an open mind, and keeping both eyes and ears open, led me to finding participants where I did not expect.

### **List of Research Participants**

in alphabetical order (pseudonym)

<b>Pseudonym</b>	<b>Institution</b>	<b>Rank</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Service Time (Years)</b>	<b>Date of Interview</b>
<b>Assis</b>	Military Police	<i>Primeiro Tenente</i>	33	10	May, 2022
<b>Larrey</b>	Military Police	<i>Major</i>	45	20	June, 2022
<b>Nogueira</b>	Military Police	<i>Segundo Sargento</i>	39	21	April, 2022
<b>Nunes</b>	Military Police	<i>Aspirante a Oficial</i>	37	3	May, 2022
<b>Pereira</b>	Military Police	<i>Sub-Tenente</i>	48	27	June, 2022
<b>Rodrigues</b>	Military Police (retired)	<i>Sub-Tenente</i>	59	30	April, 2022
<b>Silva</b>	Civil Police (retired)	<i>Inspetor de Sexta</i>	55	34	April, 2022

I started every interview by presenting the participant with a copy of the consent form and a written statement detailing the research for their later reference. These are attached in sections 8.1. and 8.2. for future researchers' referral. For security reasons, I abdicated from collecting their signatures, relying solely on their verbal consent, so I made sure to reserve a few minutes before turning the audio recorder on to explain the terms and answer any questions that might arise. I was struck by my participants' disregard with these procedures. Most didn't care to read the material I gave them, nor seemed to have any questions, jumping straight into the conversation. Regardless, or, precisely because of that, I made sure to explain the most important issues regarding consent, anonymity and confidentiality, safety measures, and reinforced that they could refuse to answer any questions and withdraw their participation at any moment. After this, I asked for the participant's permission to record the conversation, to which all participants agreed, and started the interview. The sole exception to this widespread disregard was Larrey, who didn't know me beforehand and was weary of me, as a scholar, and of my intentions. Nonetheless, after my introductory procedure, having answered her questions to her liking, she was a willing and enthusiastic participant.

Despite making clear that I was working with interviews, I explained that I did not follow a strict questionnaire and that my aim was that we engaged in a conversation. This is an idea I adopted from Penny Dick's Ph.D. dissertation (DICK, 2000, p. 93–94). This wielded good results, in that the answers and interactions seemed to flow more freely. Without the strict boundaries of the questions, the participants sometimes seemed to forget I was a researcher and spoke more spontaneously about issues they might have avoided otherwise. The conversational method also facilitated the emergence of discussions that I had not included in my questionnaire. This was a double-edged sword: while it led me to learn things I might have missed otherwise, it also meant that some discussions arose with some participants and not with others, making comparisons and analyses difficult. The biggest shortcoming for this conversational structure for the interview, however, is that I had a hard time trying to elicit the participant's engagement in some issues. Indeed, if finding participants was easy, it was quite hard getting them to talk about certain topics.

I quickly realized that if I was to lead the conversation into discussions about violence I had to try and avoid using the word “violence” altogether. I knew for a fact that one participant was extraordinarily knowledgeable of the workings of police violence and of the state/crime divide. When I first contacted him, still unofficially, he unashamedly shared stories of murder, violence, and corruption. When I asked for his help, he warned me that I should be prepared to listen to first-hand accounts of violences perpetrated in the name of security, order, profit or pleasure. When we started our official interview, however, I quickly noticed a change in speech patterns and vocabulary from what I had learned to expect from my interlocutor: his usual – off the record, in informal preliminary conversations – seemingly boastful and uninhibited remarks about violence became highly reserved and self-effacing. I attributed this refrainment to the fact that the interview was being recorded, an effect that other researchers had warned about (CASTAÑEDA, 2021, p. 279; MCAULEY, 2021, p. 137). In this particular situation, I didn’t share Barnes’ experience that participants that had been previously sentenced tended to be open about their transgressions (BARNES, 2021a, p. 25). I cannot assert if this is because there is still risk of prosecution for the participant or if he was weary of how his and the police’s activities would be portrayed, but regardless of the reason the participants are correct in following their instincts of self-protection. I decided not to insist on it; trying to stimulate his usual forward sincerity might have meant risking the loss of a participant. I then continued with the conversation, picking cues from his answers that might prompt new avenues of discussion and new questions.

The difficulty in discussing “violence” was not exclusive to this interview, however. In the other interviews I noticed the same uneasiness around the word and the discussions it could inspire. I believe this can be attributed to my interlocutors’ caution around researchers, whom they feel that mostly produce biased anti-police literature, and the negative connotation attributed to “violence” itself – particularly when attached to “police”, as is often the case in news reports and academic literature – which will be discussed later. This difficulty led me to adapt my consent form and remove the references to violence and put “the necessary means to policing” – which was a participant’s way of talking about violence without saying the word – in its place.

Although being identified as a researcher – an outsider, therefore (HERBERT, 2001) – led to some resistances in my interlocutors and subsequently to adaptations in their narratives and in my procedures, it was not always an obstacle. Even though interviews with police officers from the Military Police should only happen after being authorized by the commander (COELHO, 2017, p. 15; COSTA et al., 2021, p. 24), neither the IRB requested that I got this authorization, nor did the police officers deny talking to me in its absence. In one interview the participant did mention it was necessary but assumed that since it was a master's thesis – “something informal”, therefore – it would be exempt. The only other participant that mentioned the authorization said he only had to let his sub-commander know as a matter of courtesy. In some instances, that I was a researcher was interpreted as a sign of good will: by not following their expectations that researchers would only listen to each other and repeat the same arguments against the police, they seemed happy to have someone from “the outside” interested in listening to what they had to say. With some participants I even felt that they enjoyed being in the position of the expert and were enthusiastic to share their knowledge.

To gain their trust I did, indeed, listen intently and closely to what they had to say, asking them questions and, when appropriate, making comments that supported their sentiments. Whenever I disagreed or even condemned their narratives, I was careful to not express my disapproval in any way, as it might have discouraged their openness in other issues as well. I was also careful to not incentivize harmful and prejudicial arguments, including homophobia, misogyny, and racism. That I had easy access to the police officers, police facilities, and that they felt comfortable – or at least sufficiently care-free – to share such harmful and prejudicial arguments is inextricably tied to my position as a white man. I might never have had such ease of access to police officers willing to be interviewed otherwise, and even if I did the answers to my questions would be quite different.

The locations of the interviews were chosen in agreement with the participants. Three of them happened in my house's living room, which was the most private place of all, despite occasional interruptions by my house's pets. One happened in a shopping mall's coffee stand and was subject to the barista's

interruptions and to loud noises both from people circulating and from the heavy rain that was pouring outside. Despite being in a public place, this interview was quite private, as the loud noises around us protected the conversation from prying, curious ears (CASTAÑEDA, 2021, p. 288), but affected the audio recording's quality, meaning some parts were rendered inaudible, a consequence that was minimized by the quality of the recorder I used and by audio enhancing software.

The other three interviews happened in a police battalion, which I will not specify to avoid identification of the participants. When I contacted the police officer who invited me there, I tried to arrange the meeting somewhere else, arguing that a neutral place would be better so he would feel comfortable to share criticisms or disagreements that could be inhibited by being in a police building. I was also concerned that I would not be welcome and that I could get in trouble for not having an official authorization from police authorities to conduct the interviews. The participant insisted that I met him there, arguing that it might be good for my research, and I agreed. My fears were quickly allayed as he showed me around the battalion and introduced me to other police officers, including the high-ranking official who would be responsible for authorizing my interviews, and all seemed interested in my research, even the high-ranking official. I felt that he saw my research as an opportunity to present the police in a good light. After finishing this interview, I got to interview one of the police officers I met that day. Since I had only prepared for one interview, I didn't have copies of the consent form and of the written statement to give him, but I did my best to inform him of everything and started walking with extra copies on me from then on. The interviews I conducted at the battalion were not private, as there was always at least another police officer working in the same room and we were constantly interrupted by other police officers coming and going. This did not seem to inhibit the participants' answers, which were quite detailed and sometimes critical of the institution. Indeed, sometimes the interruptions provided opportunities and hooks for some of the participants' answers.

When devising my project, I had a lot of difficulties trying to think of questions that would help me get to the discussions I wanted. Not only I lacked experience with research using interviews, but also the literature that does work



with interviews – particularly those focused on the issues I wanted to explore, such as policing, crime, and violence – rarely shares the questions that were used. The notable exceptions to this trend were Penny Dick’s aforementioned thesis (DICK, 2000), which inspired some of the questions I prepared, and the book *Interview Research in Political Science*, which included an appendix with some of the materials used by its contributors (MOSLEY, 2013). My first script, therefore, had a quite extensive list of questions, organized into topics with main questions and possible follow-up questions for these, most of which I never asked. This was both because they did not fit the conversations and because some topics were brought up by the participants themselves. Having the script on hands, however, was important so I was never caught without something to say. Even if the question was not particularly interesting or if it only fit awkwardly in the conversation, just having something to ask was enough to inspire the participants to share stories about other issues and to generate more cues for questions that I could explore. After the first interviews, I used my newly acquired experience to revise the script, excluding the questions I didn’t ask and including some new ones that had been explored by previous participants. For future reference of researchers attempting fieldwork, I have attached the materials I used to the appendix (section 8) of the thesis, including the list of questions, even if unscripted, I asked in the interviews.

Conducting the interviews as conversations and not following the script strictly ended up being extremely valuable. Some of the most important insights that emerged from the interviews came from discussions that the participants introduced spontaneously – “the serendipity factor” (PEABODY et al., 1990, p. 454; see also: MARTIN, 2013, p. 119; MITTON, 2021, p. 178). Even if sometimes not asking directly, trying to avoid further resistances, meant that some issues would go unattended, having less direct questions opened space for them to bring discussions I would not have thought of inquiring. Sometimes I eschewed my participants’ resistances to some topics by simply not asking about them and letting them appear as their answers developed, which also gave me more room for exploration as, since they introduced the topics themselves, they didn’t feel cornered or pressed to talk about sensitive issues.

The free form of the conversation also meant that the interviews were as long or as short as they could or needed to be. My shortest interview had around 70 minutes, while my longest went on for almost three hours. Some of the longer conversations had the advantage of greater openness from my participants, either because they felt increasingly more comfortable with me, or because they could not keep their answers tamed and restrained for too long. Still, I tried not to encumber my participants by taking too much of their time, going with it as long as the conversation felt comfortable and spontaneous. Sometimes they had to be cut short because of the participants' time constraints, but most reached their logical end naturally.

After finishing my questions, I always gave my participants the opportunity to add something that they thought was important to be mentioned, even though most didn't feel the need to. In an effort of good will I also let them choose their pseudonyms, which some did, but not all. After this moment I told them that I would turn off the recorder and thanked them for their help. Sometimes this led to other conversations, as usually happens in these situations (MITTON, 2021, p. 181; PARKER, 2004, p. 53), which frequently included remarks that were relevant to my research. For this reason, I started delaying turning off the recorder as much as possible, but I always inevitably lost something interesting. My participants were all quite helpful, sympathetic, and polite. I had planned of scheduling follow up interviews with the participants to try and better develop some issues that were brought up and we didn't give enough attention during the conversations, to inquire about issues brought by other participants, and to delve deeper into the more sensitive discussions of my research, but due to time constraints and to the strenuous effort required after the interviews, particularly with transcribing the recordings, I could not meet them again, despite their willingness.

I also found out that transcribing the interviews is often the hardest and most time-consuming step of the process. As soon as I had access to my computer, I transferred the audio files to an audio editing software (Audacity) which allowed me to blank sensitive information, erase bathroom breaks and interruptions, and enhance the audio quality when needed. In the end I also distorted the voices to add an extra layer of identity protection. What often made the process so time

consuming was that speech is usually full of stutters, mistakes, mispronunciations, interrupted sentences, unusual phrasal structures, peculiar speech patterns, mumbled utterances, niche expressions, Freudian slips, and many others. I tried my best to transcribe the recordings full verbatim, trying to capture everything, as even the silences and mistakes might be useful data (FUJII, 2010). In some instances, I chose to transcribe clean verbatim or to edit short parts for clarity, as they would be almost incomprehensible otherwise.

In the main text of the thesis, I decided to translate the answers as closely to the original as possible, which is untenable, as English and Portuguese have different grammatical structures and many expressions do not have direct translations or even equivalents with similar meanings. Profanities fall into this category, as Portuguese has a wider variety of swear words than English, and each has its own diversity of meanings and usages. I chose, however, to try and translate them to the closest possibilities in English, even if it meant losing a lot of their weights. I also decided to keep a few words in Portuguese, mostly those referring to criminals and armed groups in Rio de Janeiro, as translating them would make them lose their original meanings and weights. The word “*bandido*”, for example, could be translated as “bandit”, but its meaning would be distorted, as they are similar, but have starkly different connotations in both languages. Alternatives such as “crook” or “thug” would also evoke different interpretations for foreign readers. “*Bandido*” is more than a somewhat direct description, as is the case with “criminal”/“*criminoso*”, because it has a heavy pejorative connotation, especially in the context of Rio de Janeiro and even more when used by police officers. “*Vagabundo*”, which is another word used to describe lawbreakers, but particularly drug dealers, is even more negative than “*bandido*”. I also placed the original transcription along with the English translation so researchers can know the original answers and evaluate for themselves the precision and appropriateness of my translations.

I was careful when using fragments and excerpts from the interviews in the thesis’ text so as not to misrepresent or distort whatever the police officers had said. I tried my best to convey the full context of what was being said and didn’t extrapolate from their words into new meanings. I made sure to analyze their

narratives fairly, respectfully, and generously. What was said was then counterposed with what the academic literature and the media reports interpret of the same situations. This is an ethical effort to make sure that the path to research with police officers is not closed by my research. I wanted to make them feel like their narratives were properly presented, even if they disagree with my conclusions.

Finally, as an advice for future researchers, so that they don't make the same mistakes as I did, I suggest being always extra cautious when approaching potential participants in researches about violence. Violence does not obey boundaries, rules, and roles. As such, those who employ it are also its usual targets. This is especially true for the police. When talking about my research with an acquaintance, he told me that his company had recently hired a former police officer and volunteered himself to talk to him and see if he would be willing to participate in my research. Following this, I gave my acquaintance a copy of my research's written statement and consent forms, and waited to see if this former police officer would be willing to be interviewed. A few days later my acquaintance contacted me and sent me the contact information for this former police officer. I approached him as I had done with all the others, by sending him a message introducing myself, my research, and asking if he would be willing to talk to me.

**Victor, WhatsApp, 4/7/2022:**

Good night, [police officer], how are you?

I'm Victor Toscano, friend of [acquaintance].  
He gave me your contact information.

I am a master's student in International Relations at PUC-Rio and would like to invite you for an interview. My dissertation is about policing in Rio de Janeiro and hearing your story would be of great help to me.

Do you mind if I call you so we can talk for 10-15 minutes about this?

**Victor, WhatsApp, 07/04/2022:**

Boa noite, [policial], tudo bem?

Sou Victor Toscano, amigo do [conhecido].  
Ele me passou seu contato.

Sou mestrando em Relações Internacionais pela PUC-Rio e gostaria de convidá-lo para uma entrevista. Minha dissertação é sobre policiamento no Rio de Janeiro e ouvir sua história me seria de grande ajuda.

Se importa se eu te ligar para conversarmos por 10 a 15 minutos sobre isso?

Let me know the day and time that works best for you, please.

Me avise o dia e horário que forem melhores para você, por favor.

In the conversation I can explain the entire project to you and answer any questions you might have.

Na conversa posso te explicar todo o projeto e tirar quaisquer dúvidas que tiver.

Then, if you accept, we can schedule the interview in a place of your choice.

Depois, caso aceite, podemos marcar a entrevista em um local de sua preferência.

Everything you say will be kept secret, your information and your privacy will be guarded, and everything will be anonymized, according to the strategies set out in the Consent Forms, which I asked [acquaintance] to give you.

Tudo que você disser será mantido em segredo, suas informações e sua privacidade serão guardados, e tudo será anonimizado, conforme estratégias dispostas no Termo de Consentimento Livre e Esclarecido, que pedi ao [conhecido] para te entregar.

Thank you for your attention, [police officer]. Hope all is well over there.

Agradeço pela atenção, [policial]. Espero que esteja tudo bem por aí.

I am available to clarify anything either through this number or through my e-mail: [e-mail]. I'm waiting for your answer.

Estou disponível para esclarecer qualquer coisa tanto por esse número, quanto pelo meu e-mail: [e-mail]. Aguardo resposta.

Hugs,

Abraços,

Victor Toscano

Victor Toscano

On the next day my acquaintance contacted me and told me that this police officer was too traumatized after being shot in a confrontation, which was the reason for his exit from the police. My acquaintance apologized to this former police officer and let me know he would not participate. Ten days after my original message, the former police officer sent me a message apologizing for taking long to answer me and told me that when he consented to sharing his contact information he was not aware that this was still a sensitive issue for him. I asked him not to worry about apologizing and I apologized myself.

**Victor, WhatsApp, 4/17/2022:**

Please don't worry about it.

I am very sorry that my invitation caused you harm. I thank you for your willingness and I hope you get better. If there's anything I can do to make up for it, please let me know. Big hug and have a nice day

**Victor, WhatsApp, 17/04/2022:**

Por favor, não se preocupe com isso.

Sinto muito que meu convite lhe tenha causado malefícios. Agradeço pela sua disposição e torço para que fique bem. Se houver algo que eu possa fazer para compensar, me avise, por favor. Forte abraço e tenha um bom dia

This is a warning on the ethical imperative of doing no harm, as it can come unexpectedly when researching violence and its participants.

## **2. Police and Violence as Subjects of Inquiry**

### **2.1. History Literature on The Brazilian Police**

Historiographical interest in the police is relatively recent, becoming a matter of scholarly discussion, although only scarcely, in the 1960s (BRETAS; ROSEMBERG, 2013, p. 163). While the social unrests of the decade led to an upsurge of social history and, with it, to a greater interest in research into the history of crime and criminal justice elsewhere (EMSLEY, 2017, p. 77), in Brazil such studies took longer to develop. One of the reasons for this delay may lie in the animosity that the police and the universities nurtured for each other, particularly as the general interest in the police's history coincided with the height of the Military Dictatorship in Brazil. At that time, both scholars and the police refused any possible approximations. If studies about the history of the police were undesirable, they are also nearly unfeasible, since the police were, as they still are (BRETAS; ROSEMBERG, 2013, p. 164), highly cautious and suspicious of researchers, and often imposed insurmountable barriers to information (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 206; BRETAS; ROSEMBERG, 2013, p. 163).

From the late 1970s, particularly, the emergence of NGO's in Brazil led to a rearticulation of the intellectual and political fields, and, with it, to a heightened relevance to the subject of violence and criminality (ZALUAR, 1999, p. 3–4). The bases for the historiography of the police in Brazil were laid in this decade (BRETAS; ROSEMBERG, 2013, p. 164). If in the 1960s the Military Dictatorship was an obstacle to research on the police, in the 1980s it became its driving force, with research focusing on the state's use of violence in its various judicial and extrajudicial forms. This coincided with a renewed interest in criminality as an academic issue, especially as both the public and the press were increasingly aware of its rise (ZALUAR, 1999, p. 9; see also: BRETAS, 1997d, p. 80, 1997a, p. 206). In the 1990s, according to Francis Albert Cotta, Brazilian historiography on the police further intensified (COTTA, 2009, p. 2).

More than sixty years have since passed and if the literature on the history of the police as an institution in general now constitutes a vast corpus, the same cannot be said about the police in Brazil, which is sorely lacking in accounts of its

history. In the words of Julita Lemgruber, “[a] lot is said about the police. Little is written about the institution. Less still is it researched” (LEMGRUBER, 1985a, p. 5, my translation). Indeed, this lack of scholarly interest on the Brazilian police was noticed as recently as 2019 (KANT DE LIMA, 2019, p. 9). It must be noted, however, that it may in fact be a self-fulfilling prophecy: shortage of studies leads to lack of interest, which leads to less studies on the police. Another reason for the unimpressive literature about the history of the police in Brazil lies in the fact that the police in Brazil is not one institution. Instead, what is meant by “the police” in Brazil is a relatively recent ensemble of institutions. Each state in Brazil has its own Civil and Military polices, which answer to both the federal and the state governments (ZAVERUCHA, 2010, p. 52), with each states’ polices having their own histories, each with different genealogies and influences. As Rosemberg argues,

Although the rise of the police machinery can be traced back to the country’s constitution, it is not possible to carry out a generalisable study of its formation, given the idiosyncrasies of each of Brazil’s states. As a force with a provincial character, the development of the police is linked to the socio-economic realities of each locale (ROSEMBERG, 2017, p. 58).

Thus, although the police institutions of Rio de Janeiro are among the country’s oldest, and even as some similarities may hold true, Rio’s experiences differ widely from other states and should not be taken as the model for other police developments elsewhere in Brazil (BRETAS, 1997b, p. 16–17; COTTA, 2012, p. 84; HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 1–2, 335; NEDER; NARO, 1981, p. 229). The many public security institutions that were developed in Brazil from the early 19<sup>th</sup> century were only reorganized and assembled under one heading starting in the 1930s, a process which accelerated in the 1960s (BRETAS; ROSEMBERG, 2013, p. 166–167).

As the first capital of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro and its police forces, the oldest in the country, are of particular interest, especially as it took on a privileged position in relation to the other Brazilian regions constituted in the process of the country’s colonization (CAVALCANTE; MATTOS; CARVALHO, 1981, p. 5). As such, Rio de Janeiro is privileged as the subject for histories of the police. Historians from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro published in 1981 three volumes



presenting the history of the police as a history of the construction of imperial and, then, bourgeois orders (BRETAS; ROSEMBERG, 2013, p. 165). Despite some shortcomings that later researchers mention and try to overcome (see, for instance: BRETAS, 1997b, p. 73, 1997a, p. 207; HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 308, 326; BRETAS, 1985, p. 53), these books are among the most important for discussions of the history of Rio de Janeiro's police, but copies are hard to find and increasingly rarer. Another classic source on Rio de Janeiro's police, focusing on its development throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century, is Thomas Holloway's *Policing Rio de Janeiro* (HOLLOWAY, 1993, 1997). Despite being one of the most comprehensive books on the subject, its focus on "repression and resistance" privileges the institutions related to the contemporary Military Police. As for the early Republic, Marcos Luiz Bretas' books *A Guerra das Ruas* (BRETAS, 1997b) and *Ordem na Cidade* (BRETAS, 1997a) provide important insights. Finally, Elizabeth Cancelli's dissertation (CANCELLI, 1991) on the political police of the Vargas Era (1930-1945) helps fulfill a gap on the literature of the 20<sup>th</sup> century police in Rio de Janeiro.

Despite the existence of these and other books, most are virtually unavailable. Most were printed on short runs decades ago and the remaining copies are either in university libraries – where researchers are more likely to find them –, in private collections, or in used books stores, where these rare finds are expensive to secure. Curiously, most of these books were originally written as academic theses for masters and doctoral programs, and some (e.g., BRETAS, 1995; CANCELLI, 1991)<sup>1</sup> can be found online, offering a way around this editorial scarcity. Other theses and dissertations are also valuable for this research and help fill the gaps left by the academic editorial market.

Sadly, I could not find books discussing the changes and developments in the police throughout most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. There is a serious shortage of historical studies of the police in Rio de Janeiro after 1930, since

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<sup>1</sup> A book based on Cancelli's thesis was published, but I could not manage to secure a copy, illustrating the problem I am describing.

as the state's presence was more heavily and directly felt, and organized resistance to it became more salient, academic interest shifted to the police's political roles (BRETAS, 1997b, p. 16). Texts on the period often focus on specific themes, such as violence, human rights, or militarization. A more complete history of the police from the colony to the 21<sup>st</sup> century, although less detailed, is found in a book written in celebration of the 200<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Military Police in Rio de Janeiro (LEAL; PEREIRA; FILHO, 2010), but it understandably eschews discussions on the history of the Civil Police and predictably avoids controversial topics. Remarkably, focus on the history of the Civil Police is often neglected in the literature (BRETAS; ROSEMBERG, 2013, p. 171). Because of these difficulties, I rely on fewer sources than advisable. As such, the developments that will be presented do not exhaust the many organizations concerned with police in Rio de Janeiro throughout its history, nor do they properly represent every organization with the importance they may deserve.

## **2.2. Police as a Concept and an Institution**

The literature on the history of the police is often told following one of two paths, either as a critical genealogy, reflecting on the various ways through which the states' security forces were constituted and in which they acted, or in a conceptual history, focusing on the changes the concept underwent through the centuries and in its consequences in discourse and in society (DE VALLERA, 2019, p. 19–20). The first centers on the police as the modern uniformed officers concerned with law enforcement and crime prevention, and the second, inspired by Foucault's studies on governmentality (FOUCAULT, 2009a), argues that "police and policing should not be identified with the police, and that one must stifle the impulse to equate police with men in uniform" (NEOCLEOUS, 2000a, p. xi) since the original police mandate extended far beyond mere crime and law, encompassing any and everything related to "good order" (MLADEK, 2007, p. 2–3). Although scholars working on the latter path have provided valuable insights and inspired a rich and large scholarship of the police "as a form of analysis and reflection" (FOUCAULT, 2009b, p. 316), their works are not without shortcomings. This "structuralist" position is criticized for its determinism/fatalism (EMSLEY, 1983,

p. 7; IGNATIEFF, 1978, p. 220) and for running the risk of leaving the current police institutions and their practices unattended (SEIGEL, 2018, p. 6).

This dual path for research may come from the difficulty scholars face when trying to define what is the “police” they wish to study. Indeed, scholars often note that “police” is a multivocal and ambiguous term (DUBBER; VALVERDE, 2006, p. 4). As José Luiz Werneck da Silva succinctly puts it, “[...] the social semantic [of ‘police’] takes us, inevitably, to the confluence of the administrative, with the judicial and with the political” (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 3, my translation). Using Reinhardt Koselleck’s temporal arrangement of social and political terms, Arnold J. Heidenheimer (HEIDENHEIMER, 1986, p. 20) could place “police” as an example of “those concepts whose content has changed so radically that despite the existence of the same word as a shell the meanings are barely comparable, and can only be recovered historically” (KOSELLECK, 1982, p. 417). This helps explain Micol Seigel’s complaint that “police” is “one of the least theorized, most neglected concepts in the lexicon of reformers and activists today” (SEIGEL, 2018, p. 4), and leads some scholars to make rather arbitrary choices in their definitions to avoid this semantic mess.

Clive Emsley, for instance, takes “combatting crime and maintaining public order as the rather rough and ready functions” to define the police, but also notes the difficulties with this approach “since policemen perform so many other functions” (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 3). While Emsley defines the police by their ends, Egon Bittner acknowledges these difficulties (BITTNER, 1970, p. 38–39) and defines the police by their means (EMSLEY, 1996, p. 3), arguing, instead, that “[i]t makes much more sense to say that the police are nothing else than a mechanism for the distribution of situationally justified force in society” (BITTNER, 1970, p. 39). Bittner’s approach is not without its issues, however, since the police are not the only “people whose work is undergirded by the premise and the promise of violence” (SEIGEL, 2018, p. 12), a fact he notes himself (BITTNER, 1970, p. 42). David Bayley describes brilliantly the diversities that “police” effaces when he remarks that “[o]rganizations called police perform different functions in different countries; different organizations in the same country carry out police duties; police

units handle nonpolice duties just as police duties are handled by nonpolice personnel” (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 328). As Seigel asserts,

Police both overflow and fail to fill their container. Police do things that do not need to be violence work – so much more – and violence work is done by more people than the uniformed public police – so very many more (SEIGEL, 2018, p. 12).

As Marcos Luiz Bretas remarks, this generalization of the name “police” in Western countries is misleading also because many institutions varying in forms and functions are designated by the same term, effectively shrouding each police’s specificities and making the concept seem deceptively obvious (BRETAS, 1997d, p. 80).

Any major concept has a history made out of its usages, a history that also informs its present meanings. Moreover, important concepts have no single history since they are embedded in the political and cultural contexts of different environments. [...] Languages carry different ontological contexts (GUZZINI, 2020, p. 3).

As David Bayley shows, “[n]ational police systems are constituted in importantly different ways; each one exhibits unique features requiring explanation” (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 329). The police as we know it did not emerge as it is, nor did each national variety develop in the same way and at the same time. Some characteristics developed earlier than others and most matured over time. As Bayley shows, the characteristics of today’s police systems emerged and developed over a period of about two centuries (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 340–341), and its emergence as a concept in Europe precedes the police institutions by more than that.

Despite the ubiquity of the organization and its officers, therefore, definition of the term “police” is a challenge scholars face when researching the subject, both when it refers to a concept and when it refers to an institution. The word comes from the Greek *politeia* (see also: CHEBABI, 1985, p. 144–145; HEIDENHEIMER, 1986, p. 4; LEMGRUBER, 1985b, p. 207; MEIER, 1990; PINHEIRO, 1998, p. ix), meaning all matters affecting the survival and welfare of the *polis* – the state. The word and the idea were further developed by the Romans: their *politia* (Latin for “state”) was a unique association, as it had the right to uphold limits on both public and private behavior, which were prescribed by regulations issued under the authority of the emperor and enforced by magistrates, patrolmen and various other public officials. As the Roman Empire disappeared, so did the

system. Some of its ideas, however, were then resurrected in medieval universities to justify the authority of a prince over his territories<sup>2</sup> (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 2, 1996, p. 3).

As noted by Heidenheimer, from the fifteenth well into the sixteenth century, “terms like *policy/police* and *politie/polity*”, derivatives of the Greek *polis/politeia*, spread to English and to Continental European languages via the French (FRIEDRICH, 1950, p. 91; HEIDENHEIMER, 1986, p. 12; NEOCLEOUS, 2000a, p. 1), then the principal language through which classical learning from Latin was conveyed to northern parts of Europe (DURKIN, 2009, p. 150). At the time, these words, with their various spellings, “were used in rather undifferentiated but broadly parallel ways” (HEIDENHEIMER, 1986, p. 10), with their meanings encompassing matters of government, public administration, order, and regulation (HEIDENHEIMER, 1986, p. 11). As Heidenheimer argues,

the differences between the usage of terms like *policy*, *polizey*, *polity* seem to have been much less apparent in the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries as between English, French, and German, than they became later (HEIDENHEIMER, 1986, p. 10).

From this undifferentiated beginning, the derivatives *policey* and *police* soon became identified in the states then emerging in Continental Europe “with the patterns of urban and domestic regulation, and later sometimes almost became a synonym for state” (HEIDENHEIMER, 1986, p. 10). Assessing the word “police”, Foucault remarks that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the term meant: first, a form of community conducted by a public authority, a meaning that would last until the beginning of the seventeenth century; second, the set of actions that would conduct said community; and third, the positive and valued results of the appropriate conduction (FOUCAULT, 2009b, p. 312–313; see also: NEOCLEOUS, 2000a). These meanings would later be separated in the words “polity”, “policy”,

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<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that despite my best efforts I did not find any source but a YouTube video to back up this claim, which Emsley states without references.

and “police”, respectively (HEIDENHEIMER, 1986; see also: FOUCAULT, 2009c, p. 353–354).

Although Foucault identifies “police” as a distinct term from the 15<sup>th</sup> century, the story may not be as simple. Spellings in European languages had not yet been standardized and in its medieval-French origins, although Neocleous only focuses on “*policie*” and other police-related spellings (NEOCLEOUS, 2000a, p. 1), four morphological variants of terms derived from *Polis* and *Politeia* emerged: “*policie*”, “*pollicie*”, “*politie*”, and “*policité*” (NAPOLI, 2003, p. 30). Heidenheimer also notes that both “*policie*” and “*politie*” were used “[i]ntensively into 16th century”, which was to be expected since “there was much variability in customary spellings, [sic] into the 19th century” (HEIDENHEIMER, 1986, p. 11). Thus Heidenheimer argues that these terms – which we now separate into “police”, “policy”, “polity” and “politics” – were rather undifferentiated (HEIDENHEIMER, 1986, p. 10) and Napoli argues that “police, at first sight, seems to be synonymous with politics, at least in certain texts” (NAPOLI, 2003, p. 1, my translation). Police, polity, and policy – an English word with no precise counterpart in other European languages –, therefore, were already used at least since the sixteenth century, with some of their meanings eventually shifting from the seventeenth century into what continental European languages call “politics”. It was then that “the terms *policey* and *police* became identified with the patterns of urban and domestic regulation, and later sometimes almost became a synonym for state” (HEIDENHEIMER, 1986, p. 10).

According to Foucault, from the seventeenth century, “police” acquired a new meaning concerning the set of means through which it was possible to strengthen the state while keeping it well-ordered (FOUCAULT, 2009b, p. 313). Foucault claims that this new conception of “police” is closely related to the balance of power in Europe, as good police would maximize the growth of the state’s forces while keeping it internally ordered. If, on the one hand, the states had to maximize their power, on the other, they could never grow beyond the others, lest risking the maintenance of equilibrium. This led to the states “policing” each other, ensuring that the development between each police was relatively parallel (FOUCAULT, 2009b, p. 314–315). This is not to say that the police project took the same form,

had the same theoretical characteristics, or provided itself with the same instruments in the different states, as Foucault rightly noted: “police is neither reflected nor institutionalized in the same way in different European countries” (FOUCAULT, 2009b, p. 316). To claim that the development between each police was relatively parallel, however, may mislead into the belief that their developments occurred close to one another. Instead, Bayley finds that

the police systems of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy developed recognizable modern features with respect to structure, control, and organizational units during a period bounded by 1660 and 1888. The emergence of these features in each country followed a different plan (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 348).

Bayley also warns that the emergence of stateness and the establishment of police systems in such “states” did not directly accompany each other either (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 364).

Scholars often give France a prominent role in the history of police development because of the precocity of its police institutions (EMSLEY, 1999, p. 32), as the current structure and bureaucratic organization of its police system became recognizable in the late seventeenth century, with the organization of a unique police command in Paris (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 340–341, 343–344). In 1667, Louis XIV, in a fitting effort at strengthening his own power, created the post of *Lieutenant Général de Police de la Ville* (Lieutenant of Police) (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 344; EMSLEY, 1983, p. 8). Understandably, French historians mark the year of 1667 as the birthdate of the police (EMSLEY, 2021, p. 3–4). The Lieutenant of Police, as a royal officer, was not responsible to the *Parlement* of Paris, but to the king (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 344). As suited the time, the Lieutenant of Police was responsible for a broad variety of functions, which included “supervising markets, food supply, commerce and manufactures, and [...] repressing crimes, vagrancy and prostitution” (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 9). As well as chief policeman, the Lieutenant was also an administrator of the city (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 38). As a representative of the royal council, the Lieutenant of Police also acted as judge, occasionally hearing serious offences, but often resolving disputes or infringements of his own regulations (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 9).

The king's efforts at centralization, however, were not absolute, and the Lieutenant of Police did not have absolute control within the city. Just as the Lieutenant of Police issued *ordonnances*, so did the *Parlement* issue *arrests*, both relating to the administration of Paris. Despite shared competencies and conceptions of "order", the *Parlement* regarded the Lieutenant of Police as a mere "subordinate magistrate functioning within its jurisdiction" (EMSLEY, 1999, p. 12–13). In a further development, a royal *ordonnance* of 1699 established *lieutenants généraux de police* for the principal towns, but these did not have the same kind of authority in their municipalities as the original Lieutenant of Police had in Paris (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 344; EMSLEY, 1983, p. 19).

By the late seventeenth century, therefore, France already had full-time police functionaries under the direction of the central government (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 345). In the exercise of his functions, the Lieutenant of Police had many forces under his command. Two or three *commissaires* were assigned to each of Paris' twenty *quartiers*, where they held the functions of judge, coroner, investigator, and arbiter of petty quarrels. The city's principal deterrents were the guard, an armed and militarily equipped unit, who patrolled the streets and were tasked with arresting offenders and promptly taking them to the nearest *commissaire*, whatever the hour. Alongside the *commissaires*, each *quartier* had an *inspecteur*, who examined the daily registers of hotels and lodging houses, and the records kept by second-hand goods dealers. The *inspecteurs* had assistants that the public disparagingly called *mouches* or *mouchards* (literally "flies"), some of them working undercover as what the police themselves called *observateurs* (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 9–12). Outside of Paris, in the rural areas, police authority was at the hands of the provincial *Intendants*, the predecessors of today's Prefects (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 344), who could "judge rebels, military offenders and tax evaders", and were "charged with the execution of royal orders, the general administration of a *généralité* and the maintenance of order" (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 17–18). Finally, there was the *Maréchaussée*, a mounted military constabulary responsible for providing police services in rural areas (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 344), with their tasks including the patrolling the roads, fairs and festivals, the apprehension of offenders, and the surveillance of foreigners (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 13).



During the eighteenth century, the Lieutenant of Police's administration of Paris and the *Maréchaussée* attracted favorable comment in much of Continental Europe (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 8). Many regarded Paris under the Lieutenant of Police and his men as the safest city in Europe, and the *Maréchaussée* apparently offered a unique degree of protection outside the capital (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 20). From the eagerness of eighteenth-century French Lieutenants of Police in sharing their advices to foreign powers about municipal policing, this early seemingly successful experience of development of police institutions in France led to “a pronounced demonstration effect among absolutist states” (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 360; see also: BRETAS, 1997d, p. 80). As Bayley says, “[t]he practice and philosophy of bureaucratic centralization under an absolute sovereign fertilized police development” (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 360) and the model was then imported to St. Petersburg in 1718, to Berlin in 1743, and to Vienna in 1751 (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 360). The circulation of treatises about the police around continental Europe, the suggestions coming from foreigners and visitors, and the assimilation of the new administrative ideals that circulated in the main European courts by diplomats, nobles, and intellectuals also made Portugal part of this mid-eighteenth century spread of police institutions (COTTA, 2012, p. 101; DE VALLERA, 2019, p. 362; EMSLEY, 2021, p. 62).

On November 1<sup>st</sup>, 1755, an earthquake hit Lisbon and the destruction and chaos left in its aftermath led King José I to issue a royal decree on June 25<sup>th</sup>, 1760, establishing the *Intendência Geral de Polícia da Côrte e do Reino* (General Police Intendency of the Court and of the Kingdom) (FERNANDES, 2012, p. 454; ROCHA GONÇALVES, 2014, p. 7). The Intendancy was an institution commanded by an *Intendente Geral de Polícia* (General Intendant of Police) and kept under the supervision of the kingdom's Secretariat of State of Affairs. To protect the capital, the security of Lisbon's neighborhoods, each with two thousand houses, would be guaranteed by Police Commissioners, assisted by Police Corporals appointed annually by the Intendant. It was this police, the Intendancy, that would then be taken to Rio de Janeiro in 1808, when the Portuguese Court took refuge in Brazil from the invasion of Portugal by Bonaparte's armies (FERNANDES, 2012, p. 456).

The new system did not suffice, however, and Pina Manique, who had been appointed Intendant of Police in 1780, decided to set up a police force based on retired army personnel and consisting of infantry and cavalry. The new police force was publicly presented on August 11<sup>th</sup>, 1793, and was so effective in fighting crime and keeping public peace that on December 10<sup>th</sup>, 1801, it was regularly established in Lisbon under the name of *Guarda Real de Polícia* (Royal Guard of Police) (FERNANDES, 2012, p. 454–456). The Royal Guard was organized and modelled after the *gendarmerie*, the direct descendant of the *Maréchaussée* that had been established in provincial France in 1791 (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 40), and was put under the command of the Earl of Novion, a French aristocrat who fled to Portugal following the French Revolution (FERNANDES, 2012, p. 456).

As mentioned, French scholars commonly elect the Edict of 1667 and the creation of the post of Lieutenant of Police to demarcate between the modern police and previous ordering institutions. Drawing from Foucault, the Italian Paolo Napoli (NAPOLI, 2003) identifies a law of 12 *nivose*, an IV (2 January, 1796), which separated policing from internal administration, as the turning point in the development of modern policing. British scholars, however, seem to neglect the early uses of the term “police” and the institutional developments occurring in Continental Europe, focusing instead on the creation of the Metropolitan Police in London as the starting point for the “new” police (EMSLEY, 2021, p. 3–4, see also: 1999, p. 32; BITTNER, 1970, p. 15).

England, contrary to states in continental Europe, strongly resisted both the term “police” (HEIDENHEIMER, 1986, p. 13) and the French police system (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 1, 1996, p. 3). According to Bayley, in England, “[p]rofessional policing was associated with the tyrannous practices of continental absolutism” (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 372). The reason seemed to lie in the country’s overall administration. In England’s constitutional monarchy, a police force functioning as an arm of executive government was regarded as a threat to the delicate balance that kept King, Lords and Commons simultaneously in check (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 8), ultimately risking the suppression of civil liberties (BITTNER, 1970, p. 16). The military character of the French police institutions didn’t fit with England’s civil government. Attempts at establishing police

institutions in England, therefore, “foundered at least partly on traditional notions of liberty and the fear of military institutions” (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 21), worries that didn’t concern French royal bureaucrats (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 30, 139). Thus, the development of the British police in the 1820s occurred in part as a reaction to the abhorred French police system, ironically maintaining the French model as a referent (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 39, 1997d, p. 80; EMSLEY, 1983, p. 2).

In 1829, after a few shy attempts that came short of what we now understand as policing, in special the Bow Street Police Office in London and its magistrates, thief-takers and constables (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 26–27), “the first uniformed constables of the Metropolitan Police took to the streets” (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 53). London’s Metropolitan Police “was a civilian force, unarmed, uniformed in top hat and tails, and with orders to prevent crime” (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 1, see also: 61). As Emsley notes, their sheer size and appearance marked a discontinuation from the past (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 53):

By May 1830, when the force was completely operational, there were 3200 men wearing the blue tailed-coat and top hat of the Metropolitan Police; and while stipendiary magistrates and constables from the old police offices continued to function, they were overwhelmingly outnumbered by the new force (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 59).

The creation of the Metropolitan Police was driven by concerns around crime and public disorder, which many feared were increasing. Once it was established, however, the institution soon amassed many of the administrative tasks that the French police had been performing for the previous two centuries (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 63, 67, 126, 1996, p. 3). By the middle of the 1840s the Metropolitan Police was already well established, even if it was still not operative in the entire country. Regardless of being widely criticized and resisted in England, the new civilian, preventative model of police was attracting foreign interest (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 75). Thus, less than a century after the spread of France’s police throughout Continental Europe, London’s Metropolitan Police became the model police force which other countries sought to emulate (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 1).

As Emsley remarks, however, in the eighteenth century neither was England an unpoliced society, nor was France as policed as others took her to be. Despite their obvious differences, “[t]he functions of combatting ‘crime’ and disorder were

common to both countries” (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 30). Since the Middle Ages there had been night watches and day constables that provided a rudimentary and mostly ineffective prototype of what we now call “public security” (MONKKONEN, 1992, p. 549; see also: COTTA, 2012, p. 57; EMSLEY, 1983, p. 135). These and other preceding organizations (EMSLEY, 2021; LEAL; PEREIRA; FILHO, 2010, p. 14) cannot be put under the “police” umbrella, but the reasons as to why, however, vary among scholars. De Vallera argues that the separation is warranted since the police attributions had not yet been grouped together and concentrated in a single institution bound by the term “police” and did not conform to what we now understand as “public order maintenance” (DE VALLERA, 2019, p. 32–33). For Francis Albert Cotta, “as an institutional artifact of the state, the police would result from the efforts of construction of a conception of state oriented by the enlightenment ambition of producing and sustaining peace by peaceful and civilized means” (COTTA, 2012, p. 45). Holloway separates the modern police by its “institutional structure of professional, uniformed police separate from the judicial system and military units” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 28).

Emsley warns, however, that the impetus for demarcating a clear separation between the modern police and other antedated institutions and practices of social ordering often comes from a legacy of nineteenth-century imperialism with its creed of indigenous barbarity and backwardness. The implicit claim is that indigenous peoples, having no other system for dealing with disorder and transgression, could only abstain from resolving contentions with violence after the introduction of proper police institutions by the Europeans. Setting a specific starting date for the police also demarcates a temporal other, suggesting that modern policed societies are different from earlier political communities, supposedly characterized by the violence from either unruly crowds or capricious rulers. Finally, starting dates allow for a teleological account of the police, in which it follows a linear and progressive development culminating in its contemporary presentations (EMSLEY, 2021, p. 5). The fact remains that the development of the police has often been messy, discontinuous, multidirectional, and unpredictable.

As Foucault stresses, “from the seventeenth to the end of the eighteenth century, the word ‘police’ had a completely different meaning from the one it has

today” (FOUCAULT, 2009b, p. 312). From the second half of the eighteenth century, “police” would begin to morph from its broad and positive conception into policing in the narrow and negative sense. In other words, the meaning of “police” shifted from welfare and administration (NEOCLEOUS, 2000a, p. 32), commerce and taxation (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 356), and “patterns of urban and domestic regulation”, embracing “much of domestic rulemaking” (HEIDENHEIMER, 1986, p. 10), to refer to law enforcement, order maintenance, and the forces concerned with them (MONKKONEN, 1992, p. 556). This period between the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century saw the development of institutional and ideological movements that led to the clear divergence on the terms “police” and “policy” (HEIDENHEIMER, 1986, p. 15), in a shift that correlates to the emergence of enlightenment ideas. Immanuel Kant, along with other critical thinkers of the time, rejected the Aristotelian premises perpetuated in the “police” concept that the state should advance the welfare of its citizens. Instead, the well-being of the state must not be confused with that of the citizenry. This view indirectly encouraged the shift from the broader to the narrower “police” concept, which focused on security and the prevention of danger (HEIDENHEIMER, 1986, p. 17). This rationale would be extended to the emergence of preventive policing, since there was a demand “for the replacement of extreme punishments for a few offenders with the certainty of punishment for all” (EMSLEY, 1983, p. 119). If police, from the fifteenth to the early eighteenth century, having emerged in reference to *polis/politeia*, inherited from its Latin and Greek predecessors a positive connotation, it would then come to denote “the most unpleasant reality of politics: those who are entitled to arrest us” (SARTORI, 1962, p. 855).

### **2.3. Historical Excursus on The Police in Rio de Janeiro**

Police, as shown, is an international project from the outset. Being an international project, to trace the development of “police” in both its conceptual and institutional forms serves to highlight the influences that impinged on the police in Brazil. This is not to say, however that French and British models were the only influences on the police institutions that developed in Brazil and elsewhere, nor that these models themselves were homogenous and internally coherent. For instance,

Emsley remarks that “[t]here have never been two clear models of police, a British one [...] and a European one” (EMSLEY, 1999, p. 31), and Bretas points out that this traditional opposition between the French and British models is simplistic, since both European powers adapted their police forces to the situations in which they were employed, including their colonial and imperial enterprises (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 40, 1997d, p. 90; see also: BROGDEN, 1987; EMSLEY, 1999, 2014). The various police institutions, therefore, change and morph both in their various uses and in their various translations to other countries, either in Europe or elsewhere.

Furthermore, “[n]ineteenth-century states did not, of course, exist in individual vacuums but side-by-side observing each other’s developments sometimes seeking to emulate, sometimes seeking to avoid the experience or practice of a neighbour” (EMSLEY, 1999, p. 41). This circulation of ideas, which were then adapted to the varying contexts that borrowed them (EMSLEY, 1999, p. 41), “was made possible by the communication revolution which facilitated the circulation of people and information” (ROCHA GONÇALVES, 2014, p. 6–7). This characterized the nineteenth century as a moment of major police reform processes across Europe and elsewhere. As the century progressed, the reform of police systems became an increasingly interlinked process (ROCHA GONÇALVES, 2014, p. 6). If reformers frequently looked to France and England for their police systems, local circumstances and traditions directly shaped the form that each police would take (EMSLEY, 1999). As such, the development of the police in different countries did not follow the same trajectories. Instead, as Bayley points out,

[...] one finds a remarkable variety in patterns of development. The essential point is that nations develop characteristic solutions to police problems in response to different factors. Very different things were going on in each country when its police force emerged in recognizably contemporary form (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 360).

In the case of Brazil, as Bretas puts it, “it is likely that few countries had the history of their formations so connected to the development of its criminal justice as Brazil” (BRETAS, 1998, p. 219). Indeed, the origin of the Brazilian military and

paramilitary police institutions is connected to the very constitution of the Brazilian state. However, Da Silva warns that

It is a fundamental premise that the social trajectory of the studied police institutions, as well as that of the state they serve, is part of the general movement of a society of predominantly slave labor relations, but articulated to the totality of the formation of capitalism (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 1, see also: 36).

The double constitution of the police and the Brazilian state, therefore, occurs in a mercantile, slavocratic and colonial context, characteristics that such process attempted to reproduce (CAVALCANTE; MATTOS; CARVALHO, 1981, p. 5).

However, as Cotta claims,

One of the great contradictions of a society that intended to have *police* [in the broad sense] was the maintenance of slavery. Therefore, the option of maintaining *order* and control through repressive mechanisms in an environment in which persons were considered things thwarted the development of institutions responsible for *police* while safekeepers of the rights of men and citizens (COTTA, 2012, p. 70–71, emphasis in the original).

In an effort to mark the separation from the canonical and well-established French and English models, this is what Cotta calls the “Lusobrazilian System of Police” (COTTA, 2012, p. 43): a dual system in which the major Portuguese cities, such as Lisbon, Porto and Coimbra, had a police focused on government for the common good, while the cities in Portuguese America, particularly Rio de Janeiro, had a police concerned with “the slave society, the need for domination, the conservation of power, the territorial dimensions, and the resources limitations” (COTTA, 2012, p. 43).

It is also important to note, as Bayley puts it, that “today’s police systems, diverse in character, replaced systems of marked longevity that were equally diverse” (BAYLEY, 1975, p. 349). One of these institutions was the *quadrilheiros*, instituted first in 1532, in São Vicente, the first Portuguese settlement in the lands that would later be called Brazil, and later, in 1626, in Rio de Janeiro, reproducing the social organization already existing in Portugal (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 11; EMSLEY, 2021, p. 133; LEAL; PEREIRA; FILHO, 2010, p. 14–15). These *quadrilheiros* were “inferior justice officials” (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 11; LEAL; PEREIRA; FILHO, 2010, p. 14) or “neighborhood inspectors” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 29), a counterpart of the Portuguese institution created by the Royal Charter

of 12 September 1383 to ensure the security of Lisbon on behalf of the King (FERNANDES, 2012, p. 452).

In the rural outskirts of the city there were the *Capitães-Mores de Estradas e Assaltos*, colloquially known as “*Capitães-do-Mato*” (“bush captains”) (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 11). Working as a proto-police force, these professional slave hunters “had been an important part of the system of maintaining control over slaves in Brazil” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 51) at least since the seventeenth century (LARA, 1988, p. 299). The role was publicly bestowed, being conceded either through an election or by answering a call issued by the local administration, after which the candidates would be summoned to swear an oath and take office (LARA, 1988, p. 304). As Silvia Lara explains,

such men constituted a group always at the disposal of the lordship, standing halfway between the public and the private. Their appointment, length of stay in office, area of activity and value of their work were delimited and controlled by the Chamber. [...] At the same time, however, who paid them was not the government but the master of the slave that had been caught (LARA, 1988, p. 308).

In the city of Rio de Janeiro, being better paid and, because of that, more numerous, the *capitães-do-mato* would often be called by the Senate to fulfill the roles of the frequently insufficiently numbered *quadrilheiros* (EMSLEY, 2021, p. 141; LEAL; PEREIRA; FILHO, 2010, p. 16). In Colonial Brazil’s prestate administrative system, semiprivate institutions such as the *capitães-do-mato* “helped the government achieve objectives considered of public utility with a minimum of direct expense or administrative burden” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 52; see also: CAVALCANTE; MATTOS; CARVALHO, 1981, p. 150). The *capitães-do-mato* were only eliminated from Rio de Janeiro in the 1820’s, in a moment of widening of state authority, as their existence eventually became a threat to the system they had formerly assisted in maintaining (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 51–53).

The *Alcaides* (constables) were positioned above both the *quadrilheiros* and the *capitães-do-mato*, and were tasked with guarding the city day and night, and with other specific duties, particularly concerning the arrests of transgressors, either when they were caught during the criminal act or through a judicial warrant (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 11; LEAL; PEREIRA; FILHO, 2010, p. 16). This system of public order and security composed of *alcaides*, *quadrilheiros* and *capitães-do-mato*,



charged with the preventive/repressive enforcement of laws would last until the end of colonial times (COTTA, 2012, p. 55; LEAL; PEREIRA; FILHO, 2010, p. 15).

Portugal during the same time was also ordered through the roles of the *Alcaides*, the royal force in charge of defense and security established in the late 13<sup>th</sup> century, and of the *quadrilheiros*, the municipal forces in charge of public security (COTTA, 2012, p. 54–55; FERNANDES, 2012); the *Capitães-Mores de Assaltos e Estradas* were a Brazilian peculiarity, enabled and required by the slavocratic character of Brazilian society. Despite its longevity, neither in Brazil nor in Portugal did the system work as expected (COTTA, 2012, p. 57; EMSLEY, 2021, p. 133; FERNANDES, 2012, p. 454). In 1760, in the aftermath of the 1755 earthquake in Lisbon, the *Intendência Geral de Polícia* was instituted, modelled after the French police system that was spreading among absolutist countries in the 18<sup>th</sup> century (COTTA, 2012, p. 57–58; EMSLEY, 2021, p. 62; FERNANDES, 2012, p. 454, 456; HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 32; ROCHA GONÇALVES, 2014, p. 7).

It must be noted, however, that the use of military forces in police activities in Portugal does not stem solely from the transfer of the French system. There was also a “permanence of the [Portuguese] militarized model in institutions concerned with the police” (COTTA, 2012, p. 101–102), coming from “a *military culture* that was formed through the transit of informations and practices during the consolidation of the Lusitanian Ultramarine Empire, as well as with the dialogue established with other European nations” (COTTA, 2012, p. 105). These “transoceanic bellicose dialogues” would enable, according to Cotta, the construction of a corpus of knowledge that was then made available and applicable to the realities and demands, however diverse, of the Portuguese settlements in America. Therefore, it was not the case of a single model applied in every Portuguese colony, but a set of tools that were made available to the colonial authorities in each socio-historical context (COTTA, 2012, p. 106).

After its introduction in Portugal, the Intendancy system arrived in Brazil with the Portuguese Court as they took refuge in Rio de Janeiro to try and escape from Napoleon Bonaparte and his armies (COTTA, 2012, p. 65–66; DA SILVA, 1981, p. 16; FERNANDES, 2012, p. 456; HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 31–32). This

police institution did not escape the parallelism, or even mimesis, with the Portuguese institutions that characterized the implementation of the Joanine administration in Rio de Janeiro (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 22). Instituted by the Decree of 10 May 1808, the *Intendência Geral da Polícia da Corte e do Estado do Brasil* had the same form, the same jurisdiction and the same scope of missions as its Portuguese counterpart (COTTA, 2012, p. 66; FERNANDES, 2012, p. 456; HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 27; see also: DA SILVA, 1981, p. 23). The Intendancy still followed the broad and positive conception of “police”, as the Intendant had broad powers that encompassed the services that later would be given to the Mayor, beyond the roles of Judiciary and Administrative police (CAVALCANTE; MATTOS; CARVALHO, 1981, p. 91–92). The diverse “police” attributions that concerned the colonial authorities, among them the *alcaldes mores* and *menores*, the *quadrilheiros*, and the *capitães mores de estradas e assaltos* – including the apprehension of fugitive slaves (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 52) –, were also centralized under the new police institution (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 22). Da Silva points out that “[s]uch broad attributions were consistent with the social semantics of the term *police* at the beginning of the 19th century” (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 23). As Holloway explains, the intendant “represented the authority of the absolute monarch, and consistent with colonial administrative practice his office combined legislative, executive (police), and judicial powers” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 32).

One year after the institution of the Intendancy in Rio de Janeiro, in May 1809, the prince regent issued a decree creating the *Divisão Militar da Guarda Real da Polícia* (Military Division of the Royal Guard of Police), replicating another Portuguese institution (COTTA, 2012, p. 68–69, 93; DA SILVA, 1981, p. 24; HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 33–34). If the *Intendência Geral de Polícia* could be considered the “nucleus” of a bureaucratic “Civil Police”, then the *Guarda Real de Polícia* was the nucleus of a vigilant “Military Police” (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 24). It was “a full-time police force organized along military lines and given broad authority to maintain order and pursue criminals” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 33). Complementing the Intendancy’s administrative character, the Royal Guard functioned as its intervention force (COTTA, 2012, p. 68).

The *Intendência Geral de Polícia* and the *Guarda Real de Polícia* both represent the formalization of practices instituted in the colonial era and set the precedents, respectively, for the civil and military polices of the empire (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 65). Being direct counterparts to police organizations coming from Lisbon, the Intendancy and the Royal Guard do not inaugurate nor break from the logics imbued in the preceding Portuguese institutions concerned with police. However, they are not exact copies either: being transposed to a slavery-based society, these police institutions installed in Rio de Janeiro were adapted to the local demands of the time (COTTA, 2012, p. 33–34). As Cotta argues, the installation of the Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro started a process which, assumed by the Intendancy of Police, intended to “civilize the city, organize its spaces and discipline the habits of its population, according to the paradigm of European civilization” (COTTA, 2012, p. 67).

The social movements that led to the independence of Brazil and that propelled its aftermath, being driven by Liberal ideologies, are important. In April 1821, King João VI returned to Portugal and his son, Pedro, became prince regent. As Holloway describes, “Pedro was more decisive and authoritarian than his father, but he fancied himself a promoter of liberal political principles through measures he presumed to impose by royal fiat” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 43). Less than a month after assuming the regency, Pedro started his efforts to introduce due process into police and judicial practices:

He decreed that no one could be arrested except by a judicial warrant or in flagrante, that formal charges had to be brought against all detainees within 48 hours of arrest, that no one could be imprisoned without being convicted through due process in open court, and that shackles, chains, and torture could not be used as punishment. Two weeks later he decreed that a similar list of protections from the liberal Portuguese constitution would be enforced in Brazil (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 43).

After the Declaration of Independence in 1822, the seigniorial class took for themselves the responsibility to organize the newly formed state – the “slaves and free rabble” had no part in the political process of independence and on its aftermath (CAVALCANTE; MATTOS; CARVALHO, 1981, p. 54; HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 44). The liberal institutions and legal texts then enacted served this purpose (CAVALCANTE; MATTOS; CARVALHO, 1981, p. 55).

Despite such liberal efforts, however, the contradiction previously mentioned by Cotta, i.e., the maintenance of slavery in a society concerned with police (COTTA, 2012, p. 70–71), was not resolved, being instead further complexified in the transition from colony to Empire. The first legal text of importance for the discussion is the Brazilian Constitution of 1824, which defined the Empire as “the political association of all Brazilian Citizens”. Despite the amplitude of criteria considered to distinguish those who were Brazilian citizens, these were further discriminated over their right to vote. Those who could vote and run for public offices were considered active Brazilian citizens, in opposition to non-active, Brazilian citizens. The right to vote, however, was largely based on economic criteria: almost all voting citizens were men of property. Therefore, the Empire was divided into three classes of inhabitants: the wealthy, voting, active citizens; the non-voting, non-active citizens; and, by process of elimination, the non-citizens, the category reserved almost exclusively for slaves and indigenous people (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 48–50; see also: CAVALCANTE; MATTOS; CARVALHO, 1981, p. 55–57, 66). The rights supposedly guaranteed by the rule of law, thus, have never been universally distributed throughout the Brazilian population, nor could they be. At the time of the liberal reforms a major part of this population was composed of slaves, whom the civil laws considered merely “*semoventes*” (literally “self-moving”, the same category reserved for wildlife, the Brazilian equivalent of “chattel”) (KANT DE LIMA, 2019, p. 22).

Some principles that were set forth in the 1824 Constitution were then specified with the Criminal Code of 1830, which deepens the liberal contradiction. One of the main targets for the liberal reformers during the transition was the arbitrariness that characterized the absolutist legal and judicial system. Under the old system, the intendant of police and various other judicial and administrative officials had the authority to issue regulations determining the illegality of any action or activity (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 58). After a transgression had been determined and caught, the criminal charges against a defendant, the basis for conviction, and the nature and extent of the sentence were left to the discretion of the presiding magistrate. If the judge was either the intendant of police or a criminal judge operating under his command, then the arrest and the sentencing were also at

the prerogative of the same authority. Under these circumstances, the suspect “was brought before the presiding authority, the arresting officer or a bailiff stated the charge and described the event, and the judge pronounced sentence”, after which the convict would then be thrown in prison. Once incarcerated, there were often no records of “why they were there, what their sentence was, or how much of it they had served” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 57). The Criminal Code of 1830, fulfilling a major objective of the liberal reformers, “replaced the arbitrary and inconsistent accretion of laws and regulations” of the old absolutist regime (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 58).

Despite being considered “a major improvement over the previous era” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 58), the Criminal Code did retain an important trace of arbitrariness. As discussed by Cavalcante, Mattos and Carvalho, while the purpose of the 1824 constitution was to regulate the relations among those deemed “active citizens”, the 1830 Criminal Code was composed to regulate the relations among the inhabitants of the Empire, i.e., among “active citizens”, “non-active citizens”, and “non-citizens” (CAVALCANTE; MATTOS; CARVALHO, 1981, p. 59). Therefore, while in the 1824 Constitution the slaves were marginalized as non-citizens, the 1830 Criminal Code made more specific references to this population, who were considered responsible for their actions and, as such, subject to punishment for virtually the same crimes as free people – the exception, the crime of “insurrection”, was exclusive to slaves. The major difference was in the form and severity of the punishment. As specified in Article 60, a slave sentenced with other than the capital punishment or with imprisonment in the *galés* (“galleys”), i.e., with lesser penalties, were to have their sentences converted to whipping (PACHECO, 2017, p. 60). While Art. 60 didn’t specify how many were to be administered – this was to be determined in the sentence –, it specified that the punishment could not exceed 50 lashes on a day and that the slave must be returned to his or her owner after the flogging. This punishment served a triple purpose:

It remained the degrading and brutal symbol of slave status, it ensured that the owners would be deprived of as little of the slave’s labor time as possible, and it was considered to hurt the slave to a degree similar to a prison term for a nonslave” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 60).

This triple purpose is attested by the fact that free people, including former slaves, were not to be subject to corporeal punishments, including whippings and torture (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 60). Therefore, if the slaves were considered objects to almost every branch of law – slaves had taxes and fees levied on them and if they were kidnapped the crime was considered a theft –, they were only taken as persons under criminal law (FLAUZINA, 2017, p. 67).

As Abdias Nascimento put it, “when Brazil, in 1822, became independent from Portugal, the same country remained enslaver of the African” (NASCIMENTO, 2016, p. 71). As such,

The strongly authoritarian character of the Criminal Code would also mark other legal texts, despite the effort of many to highlight the liberal content of the legal body and of the imperial institutions. In these terms, the authoritarian component should not be understood as an anomaly, but rather as the very way in which relations between the components of a society whose ultimate determination resided in the adoption of compulsory forms of work were effected (CAVALCANTE; MATTOS; CARVALHO, 1981, p. 64).

Being “[p]art of the transition from absolutism to the rule of law,” the liberal efforts and the transformations they occasioned on the police and the criminal justice system did not mean an alleviation of the violence and repression, but a regulation of arbitrariness under a veneer of legality (see also: CAVALCANTE, 1985, p. 57). Afterall, in this transition the police shifted from being direct representatives of royal absolutism to “represent the will of a group held together by delicate consensus” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 44). As such, in the apt words of both Da Silva and Flauzina,

These institutions experienced, throughout the Monarchy, a fundamental contradiction: that of legitimizing as Liberal a State whose space of extreme exploitation of labor, based mainly on the slave, but also on the poor free man, presented itself, in practice, as the negation of the same liberal principles. Liberal ideas were not out of place, they were in the place that the hegemonic social segments destined them (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 37).

Immersed in the Enlightenment conception that, through the French Revolution, overflowed the European boundaries, it was not possible to camouflage the paradox of the coexistence between Liberalism and slavery in Brazil. In this scenario, the alternative was to live inside the contradiction, naturalizing it. [...] [T]here was nothing left to do beyond interpreting [liberal ideas] functionally, converting them in the symbolic shield of the current order (FLAUZINA, 2017, p. 66)

As Holloway says, “by the 1820’s patterns were established that informed later efforts” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 46), including the differential treatment based on supposedly egalitarian principles, in a tendency so enduring that led Roberto Kant de Lima to write in 1982 that “in Brazil, an egalitarian constitutional order is applied in a hierarchical manner by the judicial system” (KANT DE LIMA, 2019, p. 47).

The Intendancy and the Royal Guard, despite being legacies, albeit important legacies, of the colonial regime, persevered through the liberal transition of the 1820’s (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 62–63). They did not remain unscathed, however, as “[t]he authority of the intendant of police and the *Guarda Real* waned along with that of the monarch” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 65) – royal absolutism was, after all, embodied in the intendant and its associated police institutions (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 65). In this sense, the first significant break from the prior prevailing idea of judicial authority emanating from the monarch was the institution of a “locally elected lay judge”, the Justice of Peace, an institution that was first provisioned for in the 1824 Constitution, but was only approved in law in October 1827 (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 31; HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 49–50, see also: 46).

Just as the intendant of police had judicial powers, so did the justice of peace have police powers, as “[t]he law of 15 October 1827 did give the local elective judge broad powers to exercise vigilance over his jurisdiction, break up illegal gatherings, gather evidence of crimes, and arrest and judge violators” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 50). The justice’s police functions were considered central to its purpose and that its mandate overlapped the intendant’s was itself both a sign of the transition from absolutism to the rule of law (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 68), as the justice’s legitimacy came “from the people who elected him rather than from the monarch” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 50), and a continuation of a “colonial pattern, in which deliberately overlapping jurisdictions served as a sort of inefficient check on the arbitrary whims of individual office holders” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 50). It also marked one of the steps to the transition from police in the broad sense to police in the narrow sense, as some believed the justices could prevent infractions, rather than merely reacting to them in a repressive manner (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 50). Despite the expectations surrounding the justices of peace, their introduction was ridden with contradictions. Judicially, that

these elected local judges had no clear relationship to the appointed judicial authority represented an anomaly, and in creating the justices of peace the liberal ideologues in parliament did not also establish a functioning system of repression, thought necessary for their preventive efforts (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 50–51). Despite the shortcomings of the Intendancy and of the Royal Guard, repression was still in their hands. As Holloway puts it,

without control over a functioning police force the justice of the peace had no instrument by which to carry out his police mandate. It was like hiring a carpenter and providing him with a nail and a board; what was missing was the hammer (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 51).

This situation would only begin to change in March 1831, on the eve of Pedro I's abdication. As conflicts between radical nativists and the pro-Portuguese escalated in the streets of Rio de Janeiro, Manoel José de Souza França, then Minister of Justice, called the justices of peace, who had only been elected in 1830 (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 51), and instructed them to patrol the city's districts as police. This was an unprecedented expedient made necessary, according to the Minister, because the Intendancy was so discredited in public opinion that it would be incapable of bringing order to the streets (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 65–66). At the culmination of the turmoil that led to the abdication of Pedro I, "the justices of peace, who were among the few holders of public office not beholden to the emperor, had emerged as public leaders" (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 66).

Nearly two months after Pedro I's abdication, on 6 June 1831, the provisional regency's very first law was approved, giving the central government broad powers to define and maintain "public order". This law subjected the justices of peace to central authority while also strengthening their power, extending their authority over public order crimes and giving them "the power to deputize a delegate (*delegado*) and appoint up to six officers to form a proto-police staff in each of the sixteen judicial districts in the city" (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 67–68). Accompanying the expansion of police personnel under the justices of peace, the Law of 6 June 1831 also gave the same authority over public order offenses held by the intendant of police to the already existing criminal judges and to two additional criminal judges the law also created for Rio de Janeiro. This served as a



safeguard for the government, giving it the right to “step in and take over from the justices of the peace when it deemed necessary” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 68).

The law of 6 June 1831 also moved to “introduce civilian municipal guards as the mainstay of the police force in each local judicial district” in place of the soldiers then exercising this role (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 68–69). The municipal guard was officialized in regulations issued by the regency on June 14<sup>th</sup>. As Holloway explains,

In each justice-of-the-peace district, the guards were to be formed into squads of 25 to 50 men each. They were to be organized by and under the operational command of the justices of the peace, who would in turn operate under instructions from the government or “other criminal or police authorities” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 69).

Tasked with the maintenance of public security and the arrest of malefactors, the guards had to surveil the population and report any occurrences relating to public security to their district’s justice of peace. It was, therefore, “in its founding charge and its day-to-day operation [...] a police force intended to repress common crime and violations of public order” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 70). The municipal guards were explicitly established as a temporary expedient, installed to answer to the public order problem as it was seen by the regency’s legislators until the organization of a paramilitary national guard, which had been under discussion from at least as early as November 1830. According to Holloway, the municipal guards “anticipated the paramilitary national guard authorized in August 1831” in several ways (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 69). Despite only existing for a few months in 1831, the institution played an important role in the political disturbances of that year (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 70).

The effort to replace the soldiers performing guard duties in the city with the civilian municipal guards was a consequence of concerns regarding the power of armed groups to affect political events (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 67) and the loyalty of military units (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 71; LEAL; PEREIRA; FILHO, 2010, p. 63). In November 1830, a few months prior to Pedro I’s abdication, parliament had passed a law reducing the size of the army from 30.000, a number reached during the Cisplatine War (1825-1828), to 12.000. This probably contributed to Pedro I’s abdication, as it may have provided the reasons and

incentives for officers to join the protests and conflicts on the nativists' side. The soldiers were not spared under the new government, however, as among the provisional regency's first actions was a decree of 4 May 1831 confirming the army's reduction. As a result,

Many rank-and-file soldiers were summarily dismissed from service in the process of reducing the size of the army. But cutting the army by more than half deprived many officers of the basis for their status and influence: the presence of troops under arms (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 66).

On 12 July 1831, the fears shared by the leaders of the provisional regency were justified, as the 26<sup>th</sup> infantry battalion of the regular army, which was among the units scheduled for dissolution under the decree of May 4<sup>th</sup>, initiated an open rebellion. Diogo Antônio Feijó, whom the regency government had appointed as minister of justice a week before the revolt, quickly mobilized 600 armed civilians of the newly authorized municipal guards to surround the rebel barracks. Seeing Feijó's response and the government's promise that the soldiers would not suffer retaliations if they accepted the unit's transfer from the capital, the troops agreed to stand down. Although an immediate crisis was averted, the situation was still delicate, and, trying to avoid another more organized rebellion while transportations were being prepared, the government separated the soldiers in small units and used them for guard duty in the city on the night of July 13<sup>th</sup>, the eve of their scheduled departure for Bahia. The government's efforts, however, backfired.

On July 14<sup>th</sup>, as ships sailed with the former rebels away from Rio de Janeiro, most of the troops of the *Guarda Real de Polícia*, who routinely patrolled the streets and, therefore, had had ample opportunity to discuss the situation with the rebellious soldiers in guard duty, "left their barracks against orders and stormed through the city, looting businesses, attacking passersby, by some reports killing several people, and generally 'spreading panic and terror'" (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 71). Demanding the return of the transferred troops and an end to corporeal punishment in the military, the rampage soon grew to include a crowd of civilians. In the next morning, the government's efforts to quell the rampage by ordering regular army units to intimidate the soldiers of the Royal Guard also backfired, "as most of the army troops joined their police colleagues in opposing the government" (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 71). The crowd soon added up to some four thousand

people, among them “[t]he majority of the military units in Rio, including its police force, [...] civilian advocates of radical liberalism and anti-Portuguese nativism, as well as many sympathetic onlookers” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 71). Mere two days after they had been just barely strong enough to face the troops of the 26<sup>th</sup> infantry, the poorly armed and undisciplined municipal guards withdrew in fear, as Feijó noted, unable to reestablish order (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 87; HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 73).

At the height of the crisis, on July 15<sup>th</sup>, Feijó convened a General Assembly that stayed in continuous session for 6 days, until July 20<sup>th</sup>.

Feijó called upon the two houses of the legislature, the cabinet, and the council of state to meet together in the downtown imperial palace, where the child emperor and his tutors were also lodged for the duration of the crisis. The entire hierarchy of the national government was thus collected in one building, virtually besieged (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 72).

Once assembled, trying to stall, the government asked for the rebels’ demands in writing, claiming their requests would be duly considered by the extraordinary session of Parliament (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 72). The municipal guard’s incapacity during the crisis led the Parliament to attempt a reorganization of the institution on July 17<sup>th</sup> by appointing a general commander and taking operational control away from the justices of peace in each district. In another emergency measure, Feijó agreed to the creation of an ad hoc unit composed of volunteering trusted officers to patrol the city, which became known, among other names, as the Battalion of Officer-Soldiers (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 73).

Their first priority was to establish control over the strip of public buildings along Rio’s main waterfront area, stretching from Calabouço point and the army arsenal to the navy arsenal at the base of São Bento hill – both of which contained crucial supplies of arms and ammunition – and including the imperial palace, chamber of deputies, and the customshouse with its adjacent port and warehouse facilities (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 74).

Once safe, the Parliament waited as the revolting crowd, each group for its own reasons, dispersed and dwindled over the next few days. The officers of the volunteer unit were soon joined by the reorganized and reassured civilians of the municipal guard in patrolling the city. The threat posed by the remaining rebels, leaderless and increasingly isolated, but still bearing arms, thus lessened considerably. On July 19<sup>th</sup> the Parliament passed a resolution rejecting the demands

presented by the rebels and on the next day moved and arrested those who remained (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 74).

On July 17<sup>th</sup>, 1831, in response to the collective insubordination and to the ensuing crisis, the general assembly approved a law abolishing the *Guarda Real da Polícia*. With little choice but to disband the unit, Feijó was left with the problem of having “to replace the policing function the Guarda Real had fulfilled for more than twenty years, while the city had grown and changed” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 75), and the breakdown of institutions in mid-1831 demonstrated to the political leaders the necessity for a regularly and effectively implemented repressive response. The crisis provided ample evidence that the municipal guard was not very effective at the time it was most needed. Thus, as a direct response to the political turmoil in Rio de Janeiro, Parliament authorized on August 18<sup>th</sup>, 1831, the establishment of the *Guarda Nacional* (“National Guard”) (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 77–81; HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 82).

The National Guard would be, as the name suggests, a national organization, but “it was formed first and most effectively in the capital of the empire” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 82). Envisioned to be better armed and militarily organized, the National Guard would replace the paramilitary militias and *ordenanças* that endured in the city from colonial times and the civilians of the Municipal Guard who, in a “short-lived institutional experiment” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 69), had helped keep order in Rio de Janeiro since early July. Only the colonial organizations were immediately disbanded, however, as the Municipal Guard would still remain active in the city (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 83). In contrast with many guards operative elsewhere, the national guardsmen in the city of Rio de Janeiro were, indeed, “reasonably well armed and equipped if not well trained” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 85), and many had previously served in the soon-to-be obsolete militias, *ordenanças* and municipal guard. As for the duties bestowed upon the guard, according to the law authorizing its creation, it was to assist the army in defending the nation’s borders and, as an internal police force, to “maintain obedience to the law, and preserve or reestablish order and public tranquility” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 83). As such, some of their duties coincided with those entrusted to the Municipal Guard, but others were more broadly defined (DA

SILVA, 1981, p. 80). In contrast with the police institutions from the beginning of the century, the National Guard “was to be an instrument, not an agent of authority” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 83). Therefore, in Rio de Janeiro, as the capital of the empire, the National Guard was formally and directly subordinated to the civilian minister of justice “and put under the control of regional and local political and judicial appointees of the central government and the justices of the peace” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 83). This was another break with the past, as the National Guard was not institutionally connected with the military nor with the ministry of war (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 83).

Authorization for the creation of the National Guard came just in time, as the newly installed and not-yet fully organized force had to be mobilized to suppress another seditious uprising coming in the aftermath of the crisis in July (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 85). On September 25<sup>th</sup>, when rebels arrested in July and recently released joined protestors already expressing their discontents in the streets, a major demonstration took place. On the 28<sup>th</sup>, a large group of municipal guardsmen fired on a crowd of these political demonstrators, killing three and injuring many others. A week after the massacre, liberal militants imprisoned at Ilha das Cobras (“Snake Island”) convinced the military garrison guarding them to release the prisoners being held in the Island’s fortress and in a prison ship anchored nearby and join them in revolt. The government was aware that such attempt at revolt might be made and, on the night of October 6<sup>th</sup>, ordered municipal guards to protect streets and installations on the mainland adjacent to the Island. In response to the rebels’ attacks and demands in the morning of October 7<sup>th</sup>, the government tasked the Officer-Soldier Battalion, a force of about 400 municipal guards, and about 200 members of the still partially organized national guards with retaking Ilha das Cobras. At the end of the assault 200 rebels had been taken and locked up, with several other being exiled from the politically turbulent capital city (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 86–87).

Despite being successful in retaking Ilha das Cobras, Feijó didn’t expect that the National Guard would suffice in reestablishing the institutional basis of repression after the dissolution of the *Guarda Real*. Such force of part-time volunteers, having little incentives and plenty reservations regarding guard service,

could not be sufficiently relied on to permanently police the city (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 88). Therefore, on August 30<sup>th</sup>, 1831, in the short interval between the law of August 18<sup>th</sup> authorizing the creation of National Guard and the October incident, Feijó “had taken the initiative to establish a militarized, permanent, professional replacement for the civilian municipal guards” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 88). As Holloway remarks, in Brazil, “improved administration of police patrols by armed and uniformed men began in 1831, contemporary with similar institutional developments in Western Europe and earlier than in the United States” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 5). The institution he is referring to, the *Corpo de Guardas Municipais Permanentes* (“Permanent Municipal Guards Corps”), was approved by law on October 10<sup>th</sup>, 1831, and on November 29<sup>th</sup>, 1831, the *permanentes*, the force’s soldiers’ informal moniker, received instructions to begin patrol duty (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 88; HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 88–89).

The *Corpo de Guardas Municipais Permanentes* is arguably the most important development in the history of police in Rio de Janeiro so far, as they are the “direct, lineal predecessors” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 95, see also: 280) of the state’s current *Polícia Militar*. Officially, the *Polícia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro* (PMERJ – “Military Police of the state of Rio de Janeiro”) traces its origins to the *Guarda Real de Polícia*, as evidenced by the year “1809” embroidered in the badge adorning their uniforms (DOS SANTOS, 1985, p. 17; KANT DE LIMA, 2019, p. 25). This apparent continuity brushes aside the dissolution of the *Guarda Real da Polícia* after their collective insubordination on July 17<sup>th</sup>, 1831, and the three-months gap until the creation of the *Corpo de Guardas Municipais Permanentes*, which replaced the monarchical police institution (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 322). Interestingly, the timeline provided in a book commemorating the 200<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Rio de Janeiro’s Military Police, a celebration that depends on such uninterrupted continuity, mentions that the *Corpo de Guardas Municipais Permanentes* was created in 1831 to replace the *Guarda Real da Polícia*, but omits its unsavory dissolution. When the event is finally mentioned in the text, the Royal Guard is said to have been merely “temporarily discontinued” (LEAL; PEREIRA; FILHO, 2010, p. 64). From this perspective, Leal, Pereira and Filho (2010) identify

17 name changes in the military police from the Royal Guard to the PMERJ<sup>3</sup> (see also: DA SILVA, 1981, p. 176; SILVA, 1985, p. 28–29). For consistency's sake, Holloway refers to the *Corpo de Guardas Municipais Permanentes* and its subsequent iterations, therefore excluding the *Guarda Real da Polícia*, simply as “the military police” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 88).

The militarization of the *Corpo de Guardas Municipais Permanentes* also merits attention, as its features endure in the military police's contemporary form. The police's militarization, according to Holloway, comes partly from tradition, giving continuity to the precedent established by the *Guarda Real de Polícia* (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 94), but not from “unthinking tradition” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 152). Instead, the *Corpo de Guardas Municipais Permanentes* was an organization directly molded by the experiences and demands in public order maintenance from the city's preceding years.

The Guarda Real had shown that the unchecked and brutal exercise of arbitrary authority on the part of the institutions created to maintain order could become disruptive and add to the problem it was supposed to help resolve. The experience of the last years of the first empire, and particularly the anarchy of the early regency, showed the dangers of laxity. The more recent experiment with municipal guards, giving propertied civilians the responsibility to police the city on a part-time, voluntary basis, showed how important the hierarchy and discipline of a professional military organization was (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 91).

The necessities identified in the historical moment surrounding its creation, when undisciplined and unchecked units of the regular army greatly contributed to public disorder themselves and the threat of social uprising were always on the horizon, made the *Corpo de Guardas Municipais Permanentes* significantly different from the *Guarda Real de Polícia* it was created to replace (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 94).

As Holloway argues, “[t]he military police represented a deliberate effort to provide as close to a precision instrument for ensuring control as could be achieved, given the raw material there was to work with and the problem to be resolved”

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<sup>3</sup> For a list of names, see: PMERJ. Resumo histórico da Polícia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. Available at: <<https://sepm.rj.gov.br/resumo-historico-da-policia-militar-do-estado-do-rio-de-janeiro/>>. Last access on: 4 mar. 2023.

(HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 152). Thus, while the *Guarda Real* was subordinated to the intendant of police and to the minister of war, the *Corpo de Guardas Municipais Permanentes*, like the *Guarda Nacional* before it, was subordinated to the civilian minister of justice. Its soldiers were not army conscripts, but volunteers who enrolled for a career in the Corps, which provided better wages and better living conditions than what was available to most army troops. Finally, the Corps' soldiers were disciplined not by corporeal punishment, but "by an array of psychological techniques to ensure obedience and a commitment to duty [...] backed by harsh prison sentences for violators" (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 88–89). In other words, the Permanent Corps' militarization was both directly and indirectly "a mechanism to ensure a certain level of efficiency and discipline in dealing with the unruly lower strata of society, who were both the objects of repression and the source of the rank and file of police troops" (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 94; see also: CAVALCANTE; MATTOS; CARVALHO, 1981, p. 68, 165; BRETAS, 1997a, p. 43). It must be noted, however, that the major difference between militarization in the military police then and now is in how it is primarily cast and understood. Then, to say that the police was militarized meant that it was subject to military discipline, a positive label, particularly as it was the proposed solution to the public order conundrum (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 152). Now, added to this first meaning, to say that the Brazilian police is militarized means that it is subordinated and structurally similar to the Armed Forces, and the term is often brandished as a criticism.

On November 29<sup>th</sup>, 1832, a new Code of Criminal Procedure was approved, sweeping "aside the overlapping and vaguely defined judicial positions inherited from the old regime" (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 101). The new code eliminated the office of police intendant and created a new official in its place, the chief of police, transferring the staff previously administered by the intendant to the new authority. On March 27<sup>th</sup>, 1833, Eusébio de Queiroz took office as Rio de Janeiro's first chief of police (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 102–104). The Secretariat of Police, the marginal and stagnated office staff previously under the intendancy, was soon given new purposes by the new chief of police, turning it into the seed for the future civil police (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 109). "By early 1833, with the chief of police installed, the elements of a new structure of repression were in place in Rio de Janeiro. Its



three parts were the national guard, the military police, and the lower-level judicial officials” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 107).

In 1831, when the *Corpo de Guardas Municipais Permanentes* was created, the military police coexisted with several other organizations with complementary, if not overlapping, missions, such as the ad hoc Battalion of Officer-Soldiers, the civilian Municipal Guard, the Justices of Peace, and the paramilitary National Guard. If their coexistence “reflected the prestate institutional environment of the early regency” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 94–95), soon the military police would emerge as the sole keeper of the tasks once shared by these competing organizations. The overlapping jurisdictions of the Permanent Corps and of the National Guard, particularly, led to many covert and overt conflicts between the organizations, but “the national guard was eventually relegated to an auxiliary and then vestigial role in policing the city, while the military police moved in to fulfill that task on a fuller and more consistent basis” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 99).

The next major development in the history of the police is the reform to the 1832 criminal code brought about by the Law of 3 December 1841 (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 42). The 1841 reform “confirmed the principle that authority should be centralized in the hands of the appointed police chief” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 166), and stripped the justice of peace of “all police authority and nearly all authority in civil cases” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 167). The reform of 1841 exacted an important reversal: if previously police activities were subordinated to judicial authorities, after the Law of 3 December judicial activities were subordinated to police authorities, embodied particularly in the figure of the chief of police (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 114–115). This represented a remarkable return to the administrative practices from the beginning of the nineteenth century, when appointed police officials were granted ample judicial powers. Under the 1841 law, “[f]or all but the most serious crime, the police chief or his appointed delegate down to the neighborhood level became accuser, investigator, arresting officer, and prosecutor, as well as judge, jury, and jailer” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 168). As Da Silva says,

The ample attributions of the Chief of Police, of the *Delegado* and of the *Subdelegado*, all dependent on the central power, emptied, just in the

judicial-criminal field, as in the police field, the competence of the previously omnipresent Justice of Peace (DA SILVA, 1981, p. 117).

Thus, “the justice of peace became a vestigial remnant of the original 1827 model” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 167). After the 1841 reform, the police and judicial system of Rio de Janeiro would remain virtually unchanged until 1866 (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 166), with the creation of the *Guarda Urbana* (“Urban Guard”).

The *Guarda Urbana* was a force of paid policemen instituted as the solution to the shortage of military police officers, as hundreds of its infantry soldiers had been sent in 1865 to fight in the Paraguayan War. Inspired by the English police, the Urban Guard was uniformed, but nonmilitarized, and was directly controlled by the civilian chief of police, while the military police was under separate command (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 231–233).

The military police, according to the original plan, would be held in readiness in case of public emergency or other extra duty or to be engaged in large-scale police operations that the urban guards would not be available for because they would stay with their assigned beat (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 233).

The main focus of the urban guards were “[v]ictimless threats against public order, whether real or potential” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 234), that is, any activity that, while not criminal or illegal, were thought to lead to actual crimes. The logic for the urban guards’ duty was that their mere presence patrolling a circumscribed beat in the neighborhood where they lived, knowing the other residents and their habits, should inhibit criminal activity. Instead, this provided ample opportunities for taking and providing advantages based on their authorities, and their lack of discipline and supervision led to brutality. As a result, in 1884 the chief of police recommended the extinction of the *Guarda Urbana*, and it was finally abolished after 19 years of service on March 7<sup>th</sup>, 1885. Six months after their disbandment, the military police was reorganized and expanded to assume the space left in their absence (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 234–239).

Since the passing of the 1841 reform, liberals had objected to the accumulation of police and judicial powers in the hands of the chief of police, and had often proposed bills “to separate police functions from judicial authority” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 246). This confusion of police and judicial authorities would come to an end with the judicial reform of 1871 (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 43).

Under the 1871 law the police chiefs retained their task of gathering evidence to form a legal case against the accused, but they were no longer responsible for passing judgement based on this evidence. Instead, the results of their investigations should be delivered to public prosecutors or judges, who would then evaluate the charges and decide on the appropriate punishment, if necessary. If previously the *delegados* and *subdelegados* were members of the structure of judicial authority, they then became agents outside the structure but ultimately in its service, a development that curtailed police officials' authorities and that they would thus frequently criticize and protest (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 247–249). Regardless of the police officials' sentiments, “[t]his was a major step toward the professionalization of Brazil’s police and judicial system, by which those who held distinct positions in the hierarchy exercised functions that were more discrete and specialized” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 248).

As Rio de Janeiro grew in population in the final decades of the empire, so did its police grow in numbers, however restricted its powers became – a sharp contrast with the wide authorities delegated to police institutions at the time of their inception in the beginning of the century (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 45). The new republican regime, to prove its superiority over the fallen imperial regime, promptly moved to reform Rio de Janeiro’s police organizations in light of the positivist scientific thought then fashionable among intellectuals. From these initiatives and influences, a new Criminal Code was quickly redacted and put into effect by the republican authorities, substituting, in October 11<sup>th</sup>, 1890, the Criminal Code that, reformed in 1832, 1841, and 1871, had organized the judicial and police systems for the previous 60 years (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 43–44).

Established in the 1830s and consolidated in the 1840s and 1850s (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 179), by the 1860s, the functions and distinctions of the military and civil police were already well delimited, and these two institutions would remain active through the abolition of slavery, in 1888, and the ensuing transition from empire to republic, in 1889. Being the two main police forces in the capital city, the early years of the republic saw both undergoing transformations, with the Civil Police being the subject of broader basic reforms through most of the republican experience, from 1891 to 1924 (CAVALCANTE, 1985, p. 70). Until

1905, the military police's transformations concerned mainly matters of internal organization, recruitment requirements, and the quality of training (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 43–45). The civil police, for its part, progressively increased in importance, as did the position of chief of police, providing those in the role ample opportunities to gain political and professional advantages. As for its agents, there is little information available to trace their profiles, but contemporary comments were often negative, frequently emphasizing the widespread practice of using their occupations in the organization and its accompanying discretionary powers to obtain illicit advantages, often in the form of bribes and extorsions (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 46–49).

In the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the military police was vastly unpopular, an unsurprising result of the violent methods it employed in the enforcement of its duties (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 46, 53, 1997b, p. 56). This was made explicitly and urgently clear with its ineffectiveness to suppress the *Revolta da Vacina* (“Vaccine Revolt”) in November 1904 (NEEDELL, 1987). In 1905, in an effort to lower the public's hostility toward patrols and attempting to create a force more adequate to the recently reformed and modernized capital city, a new uniformed police institution, the *Guarda Civil* (“Civil Guard”), created by decree of February 5<sup>th</sup>, 1903 (BRETAS, 1985, p. 49, 1997a, p. 54, 1997b, p. 53), was made operational (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 49).

The *Guarda Civil* was initially idealized as a substitute for the distrusted military police in the reformed central areas of Rio de Janeiro and, put directly under the chief of police, it represented an attempt to avoid tensions between the civilian chief of police, who was the highest police authority (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 50), and the commander of the military police (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 54), who answered directly to the Minister of Justice (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 51). The new organization was successful in attracting a more positive appreciation, but ultimately failed to supplant, and even compete with, the bigger, more traditional, more powerful, and better organized military police, as insufficient investments in the *Guarda Civil* curtailed its growth until, starting in 1927, it was reorganized in military lines (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 56–57).

In 1907, a comprehensive reform of the police was elaborated and implemented. From then on, the police had jurisdiction over the area of the Federal District, then divided in 28 police districts, and was under the authority of the chief of police, himself assisted by three *delegados auxiliares* (“auxiliary delegates”) and by 28 *delegados distritais* (“district delegates”), each responsible for a district (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 50–51). For the more general policing duties of the city (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 53), the Civil Police depended on the uniformed forces of the military police and of the *Guarda Civil*, both responsible for patrolling the city, and on the *Corpo de Investigação* (“Investigation Corps”), composed of undercover detectives responsible for investigation, vigilance and oversight (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 57–58).

The Investigation Corps was itself a result of the 1907 police reform (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 58), coming from the institutional precedents of the secret police of the empire. In 1838, Eusébio de Queiroz instituted a discretionary secret fund that, left at the disposal of the chiefs of police, was used through the end of the empire to pay investigators, informers and spies loosely affiliated to the police institutions whenever deemed needed. In 1890, the first minister of justice of the recently instituted republic ordered the end of the discretionary fund and put 35 secret agents on a regular salary (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 171–173, 240–241). The role of detective of police was then created in 1892 (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 58).

The detectives of the *Corpo de Investigação*, unlike the officers of the military police and of the *Guarda Civil*, worked undercover and were authorized to work in the entire Federal District and, when allowed by the Inspector supervising them, elsewhere. In contrast with the *Guarda Civil*, which was successful and well-regarded, but failed to develop and grow, the *Corpo de Investigação* was ill-famed and efforts at improving its public image were futile, but it amassed an increasingly prominent role. Reformed in 1915, when it was renamed as the *Inspetoria de Investigação e Capturas*, in 1920, when it was elevated to be the *Inspetorias de Investigação e Segurança Pública*, and in 1922, when it was transformed in the 4<sup>a</sup> *Delegacia Auxiliar*, the “*Polícia Política*” (“Political Police”), as it was known, soon became indispensable for the authorities (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 57–60; see also: DOS SANTOS, 1985, p. 18).

In October 1930, a military coup interrupted the early republican experience and installed Getúlio Vargas in the presidency, initiating a process of profound centralization of the police forces in the country (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 210–211; BRETAS; ROSEMBERG, 2013, p. 166–167; CANCELLI, 1991, p. 97). Vargas promptly initiated a comprehensive reorganization of the police, seen at the time as the mainstay of the regime (CANCELLI, 1991, p. 99–100). The first chief of police of the new regime, the physician Batista Luzardo, immediately substituted all auxiliary *delegados*, but one, and exonerated many district *delegados* (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 51, 211; CANCELLI, 1991, p. 99). Vargas also replaced chiefs of police from the entire country – a right instituted in the Proclamation of the Republic, giving continuity to the prerogative previously held by the Emperor –, and, in January 10<sup>th</sup>, 1933, he decreed that the police in the capital were to be put under his supreme authority and, at the same time, should be overseen by the Ministry of Justice, effectively bypassing the latter and allowing direct presidential control (CANCELLI, 1991, p. 101–102). In the same year, the 4<sup>a</sup> *Delegacia* became the *Delegacia Especial de Segurança Política e Social* (DESPS) (CANCELLI, 1991, p. 108; DOS SANTOS, 1985, p. 18), which then enlarged to become the *Divisão Política e Social* (DPS) with countrywide jurisdiction in 1944, a structure it would maintain until 1960, when Rio de Janeiro lost its status as capital city. The Political Police would be the main police force of the Vargas Era (PACHECO, 2010, p. 129, 2022, p. 236).

The many police institutions in the country, historically subordinated to the governing authorities of the states of Brazil, were progressively put under the direct command of the Police in Rio de Janeiro, effectively placing them under federal control (CANCELLI, 1991, p. 103). On July 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1934, a decree by Vargas represented the most comprehensive restructuration of the police yet, extending the power of the capital's police to the entire country (CANCELLI, 1991, p. 123–124). Writing about the effects of this decree, Cancelli says that

The centralization of various exceptional powers in the hands of the Police of the DF [Federal District] allowed the exercise of police action without the necessity of any act of convincing. Coercion became so absolute and sufficient that the decree brought many transformations of centralizing order in the very interior of police organization (CANCELLI, 1991, p. 126–127).

As consequence of the decrees and of the importance given to the police as upholder of the regime, in the course of the 1930s and 1940s the chief of police effectively supplanted the administrative structure of the Ministry of Justice and exercised direct control over the state and the federal institutions of repression (CANCELLI, 1991, p. 106).

The other major change that occurred post-1930 was the promulgation of a new Criminal Code. Hastily written and issued, the 1890 Criminal Code was ridden with crass imperfections and was, thus, heavily criticized and frequently altered, further hampering its applicability. Furthermore, as a piece of legislation directly and purposively concerned with regulating the police, it represented an explicit hindrance to its operation. For the purposes of the regime, the law should not safeguard the rights of individuals, nor should it unnecessarily restrict the police, the regime's upholder – the law mattered only insofar as it protected the state. Finally, the 1890 Criminal Code didn't properly conform to the lived reality of the police, of the criminal authorities, and of the rationale for governing that had been installed in Brazil, all heavily informed by positivist thought. Considering these inadequacies, one of Vargas' initial acts was the reformulation of the Criminal Code, signing the *Consolidação das Leis Penais* ("Criminal Laws Consolidation") in 1932, and in 1940 a new Criminal Code was approved, being put in effect in 1942 (CANCELLI, 1991, p. 157–160).

The police organizations of the time moved constantly to perfect their practices of social repression, using the necessity to protect the institutions – particularly from communists (see also: BRETAS, 1997a, p. 60) and foreigners – as the excuse for the growth of their repressive capabilities (CANCELLI, 1991, p. 222–223). During the 1930s, with these justifications, the police was modernized with *rádio-patrulhas* ("radio patrols", police cars equipped with communicators), criminology schools, and tear gas to be used against manifestations (CANCELLI, 1991, p. 233–234). In early 1936, after an attempted communist coup in 1935, Vargas declared a *Estado de Sítio* and, 90 days later, a *Estado de Guerra* – the harshest state of exception (CANCELLI, 1991, p. 238). The exceptional police measures created for the occasion were incorporated into the strategies for power

maintenance until the end of Vargas' presidency in 1945 (CANCELLI, 1991, p. 234).

Despite allegations otherwise, police vigilance and repression were enhanced not to oppose communists and foreigners, but Brazil's population itself (CANCELLI, 1991, p. 302). Post-1930, denunciations and protests against police abuse, accompanied by accounts of massacres, assassinations, disappearances, torture of detainees, illegal arrests, and invasion of unions and associations, became commonplace (CANCELLI, 1991, p. 227). In short, the police of the period was

[...] nothing less than the element that sustained the power of Vargas, because it maintained the terror in the streets, made so that the society as a whole felt impotent, chose the new enemies to be persecuted, and followed, blindly, the guidelines imposed by Getúlio Vargas [...] (CANCELLI, 1991, p. 438–439).

So crucial was the police for the maintenance of the *Estado Novo* that in its final moments, needing full control over the forces of repression that had secured his government, Vargas substituted the chief of police for his own brother, Benjamim Vargas (LEAL; PEREIRA; FILHO, 2010, p. 122; OLIVEIRA, 2010, p. 60). The controversial move, however, failed to prevent Vargas' deposal, and his brother left the role of chief of police the very day of his installation (CANCELLI, 1991, p. 105).

The structure of repression that had developed in Brazil during Vargas' Era, centering on the Political Police, would remain virtually unchanged during the democratic interlude beginning in 1946 (PACHECO, 2022, p. 237). In 1946, as part of the transition to the new social and political context in the country, two commissions attempted to investigate the authoritarian and violent practices of the Political Police in the previous regime, but, despite amassing ample evidences and testimonies of various forms of abuse, it ultimately failed as a tool of justice and accountability (PACHECO, 2022, p. 238–240). While the regime changed, the structure, the personnel, and the procedures of the police were kept the same, with virtually no consequences for those responsible for abuses committed during the Vargas dictatorship (PACHECO, 2022, p. 242–248). The main difference, according to Pacheco, was that



there was no longer a dictatorial figure that established the parameters of Nation and Security under which the Political Police should act. On the contrary, with Fundamental Rights provided for in the 1946 Constitution and with the alternation of presidents from direct elections, the organization should be restricted to legal limits and, at the limit, to the agenda of the president in office (PACHECO, 2022, p. 249, my translation).

With no one to direct its will and with no efforts to reign it in, the police became increasingly independent from authority, constantly ignoring the democratic constitution supposedly binding its activities and moving frequently against the elected presidents of the period whenever it suited their corporate interests (PACHECO, 2022, p. 249–250, 254–255). The police practices developed in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, thus, endure through the republic and are then further entrenched and ingrained during the military dictatorship beginning on March 31<sup>st</sup>, 1964.

The Military Regime, informed by the “*Ideologia de Segurança Nacional*” (“National Security Ideology”) (BICUDO, 1985, p. 129, 135), a direct spawn of the Cold War and of the United States’ foreign policy of the period (HUGGINS, 1998; PINHEIRO, 1998, p. xi), effected organizational, legal, and ideological changes to the police institutions in the country that are often identified as the major causes for the police practices of today. The transformations enacted to and by the police prior to the dictatorship, however, must not be downplayed or forgotten, as they are direct enablers of the objectives set forth by the Brazilian authorities in 1964 (PINHEIRO, 1991, p. 47, 1998, p. xv). For instance, the Political Police of the Vargas Era, restructured in 1963, at the twilight of the 1946 Republic, as the *Departamento de Ordem Política e Social* (DOPS – “Department of Political and Social Order”), plays an integral role in the system created by the dictatorship, geared towards intelligence and direct repression of those the regime considered subversive (see also: LEAL; PEREIRA; FILHO, 2010, p. 157). Despite the change of the capital to Brasília, the DOPS was subordinated to the *Secretaria de Segurança Pública do*

*Estado da Guanabara*<sup>4</sup> (“Guanabara State Public Security Office”) due to its central role in coordinating the intelligence efforts of the country in the preceding decades (PACHECO, 2010, p. 131–132).

From the start of the dictatorship, the military rulers issued *Atos Institucionais* (AIs – “Institutional Acts”), the “*de facto* ‘Constitution’ of the new military regime” (HUGGINS, 1998, p. 140), to consolidate their power, curtailing democratic prerogatives, severely weakening civil and political rights, and expanding executive powers at the expense of other branches of government (HUGGINS, 1998, p. 149–151). On December 13<sup>th</sup>, 1968, after the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro fired indiscriminately at a crowd of demonstrators, killing the 16-year-old student Edison Luís and sparking large demonstrations in the entire country followed by violent reactions by the government, the infamous AI-5, widely regarded as the most authoritarian Institutional Act of the dictatorship, was promulgated, subjecting to governmental violence many groups that had never been the security forces’ targets (BARANDIER, 1985, p. 115; HUGGINS, 1998, p. 165, 168–172; LEAL; PEREIRA; FILHO, 2010, p. 158–159).

Brazil’s police system during the first years of the military dictatorship was still relatively decentralized, with the states exercising considerable influence over their own police forces. This was a liability: just as the governors of Guanabara and Minas Gerais had put their states’ security forces at the disposal of conspirator groups in the eve of the 1964 *coup*, the military authorities feared that the decentralization could eventually turn against their rule, threatening the military regime’s hegemony. Decreed in 1967, Law 317, also known as the “*Lei Orgânica da Polícia*” (“Organic Law of the Police”) subjected the police system to a more predictable and centralized control. If prior to 1964 each state’s Police Commander was chosen by the State Governor and each city’s chief of police by the Mayors, Law 317 subjected the regional and municipal police forces to the *secretário*

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<sup>4</sup> State created with the transfer of the capital to Brasília in 1960 and reincorporated to the State of Rio de Janeiro in 1975.

*estadual de Segurança Pública* (“Public Security state secretary”), who was appointed by the military authorities presiding the country, and established that the Public Security secretaries were responsible for defining the functions and jurisdictions of their states’ Civil and Military Polices (HUGGINS, 1998, p. 151–152).

Law 317 was also the first of a series of transformations in policing that would characterize one of the most crucial features of contemporary policing: the primacy of the Military Police over its Civil counterpart. Prior to the 1964 regime, with the prominence accredited to the Civil Police starting in the early Republic and amplified in the Vargas Era, the Military Polices were peripheral and incidental to matters of public security, being kept for the most part inside their barracks in the country’s main capitals. Ostensive, investigative, and judicial duties were delegated to the other, civil, police institutions (ZAVERUCHA, 2010, p. 56). Law 317 provisioned that the Military Police would become the main responsible for the ostensive patrolling of the streets and the Civil Police, which had its control over certain aspects of street policing diminished, would become the sole responsible for criminal investigations (HUGGINS, 1998, p. 153). It was not successful in coordinating and centralizing the state polices, however, and, by the time AI-5 was promulgated and the *Lei de Segurança Nacional* (“National Security Law”) was decreed, in 1968 and 1969, respectively, at the height of political repression, Brazil’s polices were not properly prepared to enforce the ever expanding security legislation (HUGGINS, 1998, p. 174–175). The increased activity of armed organizations fighting the regime, a direct consequence of AI-5, heightened the urgency of security measures (LEAL; PEREIRA; FILHO, 2010, p. 159).

The Military Police, thus, had its activities expanded with the *Decreto-Lei n° 667* (see also: SILVA, 1985, p. 32), of July 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1969, and with the *Decreto n° 66.862*, of July 8<sup>th</sup>, 1970, which gave them the radio-patrol services and the uniformed ostensive patrol duties that were still left with the Civil Police. As it was previously organized, the police encompassed both civil and military branches under one direction. These legislations, then, accentuated their separation (DOS SANTOS, 1985, p. 19–20). The *Guarda Civil*, the uniformed unit of the Civil Police created in 1903 to eventually replace the Military Police, was extinguished around

this time with the *Decreto-Lei nº 1.072*, of December 30th, 1969, which transferred the Civil Guard's prior attributions to the Military Police (LEAL; PEREIRA; FILHO, 2010, p. 160; ZAVERUCHA, 2010, p. 56–57). These efforts represented a shift in the significance of the two police organizations. While in dictatorship of the *Estado Novo* the Civil Police was the primary wielder of repressive power, in the 1964 military regime this prerogative was given to the Military Police at the direct expense of the former. The uniformed units of the Civil Police were extinguished and the state Military Polices, then subordinated to the Armed Forces, became exclusively responsible for preventive and ostensive policing (ZAVERUCHA, 2010, p. 57).

In 1969, as part of the effort to better coordinate the police institutions, with the objective of locating and capturing subversive groups, the secret *Operação Bandeirantes* (OBAN – “Bandeirantes Operation”) was created in the city of São Paulo. One year later it was expanded countrywide as the security organization DOI/CODI (*Departamento de Ordem Interna/Centro de Comando das Operações de Defesa Interna* – “Internal Order Department/Internal Defense Operations Command Center”), tasked with finding and neutralizing terrorists (HUGGINS, 1998, p. 175,189; LEAL; PEREIRA; FILHO, 2010, p. 160). For the regime, such institution, composed of agents from the country's various Civil and Military police units, was necessary since the military officers lacked training and experience in collecting intelligence data, in interrogation, and in internal security operations. The agents of the DOI were divided in three squads: “search and capture”, tasked with finding and arresting suspects; “information and interrogation”, tasked with collecting data and interrogating prisoners; and “information”, tasked with analyzing information obtained from interrogations and with infiltration of associations. The intelligence collected was then sent to CODI's intelligence and planning analysts, which then returned their conclusions to DOI to inform its search and capture agents. DOI/CODI's agents became infamous for the torture techniques systematically and ubiquitously employed in the fulfilment of their duties (HUGGINS, 1998, p. 190–194; PACHECO, 2010, p. 131–133).

Another development of the police that happened during the military dictatorship was the institution of elite police units. The institutional precedent for

the elite units of Rio de Janeiro's Civil and Military Polices, CORE (*Coordenadoria de Recursos Especiais* – “Special Resources Coordination”) and BOPE (*Batalhão de Operações Especiais* – “Special Operations Battalion”), respectively, is the *Polícia Especial* (“Special Police”). Created in the early 1930s as the elite unit of Rio de Janeiro's Civil Police, it was composed of athletes and handpicked police officers who received specialized training and were employed in exceptional situations. It was dissolved in 1960 with the transfer of Brazil's capital and its members were reassigned as detectives for the Civil Police of the newly separated state of Guanabara (PACHECO, 2013, p. 119–122). During the military dictatorship, in 1969, the idea of an elite unit was recovered and the GOE (*Grupo de Operações Especiais* – “Special Operations Group”) of the Civil Police was created (HUGGINS, 1998, p. 170). In 1971 it was expanded and transformed into the *Serviço de Operações Especiais* (SERESP – “Special Operations Service”). In 1975, with the fusion of Rio de Janeiro and Guanabara, it became the *Divisão de Operações Especiais* (DOE – “Special Operations Division”). It finally received its current name, CORE, in 2002 (PACHECO, 2013, p. 122).

As for the military police, there have been previous attempts at reserve forces at the ready for emergencies, but these were usually employed for routine service. Holloway relates these special units to the Military Police *Batalhão de Choque* (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 262), literally translated as the “Shock Battalion”; in the context, however, as Holloway notes, another possible translation is “Confrontation Battalion” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 333). On January 19<sup>th</sup>, 1978, the first elite unit of the military regime's Military police was created as the *Núcleo de Operações Especiais* (NuCOE – “Special Operations Center”). In 1982 it was renamed as *Companhia de Operações Especiais* (COE – “Special Operations Company”) and was installed in the barracks of the *Batalhão de Polícia de Choque* (BPChq), mentioned previously by Holloway. In 1988 it was renamed as the *Companhia Independente de Operações Especiais* (“Independent Special Operations Company”), and on March 1<sup>st</sup>, 1991, it was renamed as BOPE (PACHECO, 2013, p. 125). Created during the military regime as special units

employed to repress demonstrations and political subversives, these specially trained and heavily armed units are still employed to this day.

In 1988, after Brazil's democratization in 1985, a new constitution was written, substituting the military regime's 1967 Constitution and its 1969 amendment (LEAL; PEREIRA; FILHO, 2010, p. 163–164; ZAVERUCHA, 2010, p. 41). Despite the social and political changes reflected in the new text, the 1988 Constitution, written under the strict supervision of military authorities, preserved the clauses regarding the armed forces, the state Military Polices, the military judicial system and the public security system in general virtually unaltered from the previous authoritarian constitutions (ZAVERUCHA, 2010, p. 45, 67). Therefore, the repressive institutions inherited during the transition to democracy are still organized as the military rulers had mobilized them during the dictatorship, making this one of the many continuities in the history of the police in Brazil, and specially in Rio de Janeiro, as the former and longest-lasting capital city (PINHEIRO, 1991, p. 51; ZAVERUCHA, 2010, p. 55).

For instance, while the police in democracies is usually governed by civil institutions, in Brazil the state Military Police institutions are still partially subordinated to the Armed Forces (ZAVERUCHA, 2010, p. 46, 61–62, 69), and are subject to military instruction, military regulations, and military justice, a configuration initiated by president Médici and reiterated by the 1988 Constitution (ZAVERUCHA, 2010, p. 53–54, 57; see also: HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 94, 281). The democratic Constitution went as far as erasing the expression “*policia militar*” (“military police officer”) from its text, an expression that was present in the military regime's Constitution, substituting it for “*militar estadual*” (“state military”), in contrast with the Armed Forces, kept under federal control (ZAVERUCHA, 2010, p. 69).

Therefore, in the words of Zaverucha, “if in other countries we have the police force with a military structure, but which is not military police, in Brazil what we witness is a military structure doing the role of police. That is, more troop than police” (ZAVERUCHA, 2010, p. 53). Given this peculiarity, it is not surprising that Holloway, writing in English to a foreign audience, felt necessary to explain that

Despite the literal translation of the name, the *Polícia Militar* should not be confused with the internal police of the army, called military police in the armies of the United States and other countries, which in Brazil is called the *Polícia do Exército* (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 321, emphasis in the original).

As he explained elsewhere,

Uniforms were different from those of the army, but the ranks, titles, statuses, and sense of corporate identity have been very similar to those of the regular professional military. *Polícia* eventually became part of the formal designation of the corps, but there have never been any policemen in the organization. There have been soldiers, corporals, sergeants, lieutenants, captains, majors, and colonels (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 94, emphasis in the original).

Zaverucha argues that police, as the organization tasked with prevention and repression of criminal misconducts, is, by definition, a civil institution. “There is no need to add the word military to the noun police. Adding the term civil is a pleonasm” (ZAVERUCHA, 2010, p. 57). The structure of the police apparatus, organized by the military rulers and left undisturbed since (PINHEIRO, 1991, p. 51, 2000, p. 122; ZAVERUCHA, 2010, p. 55), makes these clarifications necessary, however uncomfortable they may be. The Military Police is the biggest police organization in Rio de Janeiro today. Its importance to the military authorities in repressing dissent and exercising control over society during the military regime led to its strengthening and to the Civil Police’s marginalization. Despite the professed purposes of the democratic regime being markedly different than those of the military regime, the Military Police still preserves its predominance – expressed mainly in terms of manpower, training, and weaponry – over the Civil Police, which was stripped of many attributions throughout the dictatorship (ZAVERUCHA, 2010, p. 56–57). The redundancy of “Civil Police” in Brazil is not only a matter of linguistics, but also a political consequence of the military regime and of the transition.

#### **2.4. The Participants in Violence in Rio de Janeiro**

In the 1950s, the arrival of weapons in the hands of criminals made armed robberies more commonplace in Rio de Janeiro. This led to an increase in demands from the press and businesses for more security. In 1958, feeling the pressure, army

general Amaury Kruel directed the chief police *delegado*, Cecil Borer, to organize a handpicked group of police officers to be led by Rio de Janeiro's Civil Police inspector Milton Le Cocq de Oliveira with a mandate to kill "dangerous criminals". Le Cocq's squad was a *Esquadrão Motorizado* ("Motorized Squad") and became known by the acronym "EM". 11 years after its institution, in 1969, the police unit had murdered on average one person per week. Despite general Kruel's later denial that the group had been a death squad, the group was identified as such regardless (COELHO, 2017, p. 25–26; HUGGINS, 2002, p. 207–208).

This police unit had ample discretion, official support, and institutional legitimacy, and even with such latitude for their actions, its police officers also carried out their murders when off-duty. In 1958, Inspector Le Cocq, the unit's leader, assembled his own parallel death squad – in Portuguese, "*Esquadrão da Morte*", or "EM", coincidentally. This group was financially compensated by businesses and justice officials in their extralegal pursuit of armed criminals. Multiple victims were found with the death squad's imprint – a skull and crossbones – carved in their bodies and notes signed "EM" were pinned to them describing their wrongdoings. The publicity of the punishment was amplified by the death squad's "official" radio broadcasts reporting the murders. Inspector Le Cocq was murdered in 1964 by an associate of the *jogo do bicho* known as Cara de Cavalo. In his honor, police officers established the "Scuderie Le Coqc", a club of police officers that sworn to avenge police officers' deaths by carrying out off-duty murders (COELHO, 2017, p. 25–26; HUGGINS, 2002, p. 208–209; MANSO, 2020, p. 131–135). Other death squads would be formed and act in Rio de Janeiro and elsewhere in the following two decades.

The most salient transformation of the police's use of violence during the Brazilian Military Dictatorship, and the main reason as to why scholars often place *the* turning point of police violence in this period, is that, "[w]hile crime and its violent repression have always been constant in Brazil's poor areas, they did not begin to affect the [white] upper classes until the 1980s" (HUSAIN, 2007, p. 55). If the police was conceived and have operated as "a standing army fighting a social war", with its goal being "repression and subjugation, the maintenance of an acceptable level of order and calm, enabling the city to function in the interest of



the class that made rules and created the police to enforce them” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 37), from the *Estado Novo*, inaugurated by Getúlio Vargas, the police amassed the role of protecting the state, particularly against its political enemies, a new function that reached its peak during the Military Dictatorship initiated in 1964 (HUSAIN, 2007, p. 57).

In an effort to destabilize and break the guerrilla groups that had started robbing banks and jewelries to finance an insurgency, the military hardliners decided to try all robbers in the same military tribunal, leading to their imprisonment in the *Instituto Penal Cândido Mendes*, a corrective colony localized in Ilha Grande, Rio de Janeiro. The infamous Ilha Grande prison housed a mostly black incarcerated population of common criminals when the insurgents were put there. Inside the prison, the political criminals organized themselves into a group known as *O Coletivo* (The Collective) in order to protect themselves, obtain food, and to gain their freedom. From this successful experience of governance, the common prisoners organized themselves in a similar group to defend themselves from the prison guards and from other inmates. The first group’s political ideology then spread throughout the inmates, forming in 1979 what was then known as the *Falange Vermelha*, the precursor to the *Comando Vermelho*. The prisoners’ successful experience in collective security and governance led to their growth and strengthening. One night in the same year, members of the *Falange Vermelha* murdered a number of their enemies and took control of the prison. The massacre’s survivors later to join forces with other prison gangs and found the *Terceiro Comando*, *Comando Vermelho*’s greatest adversary to this day (HUSAIN, 2007, p. 60–61; PACHECO, 2017, p. 65–66).

In the 1980s, the initial leaders of the *Comando Vermelho* secured the *favelas*’s and other low-income populations’ support for their criminal and subversive activities by contributing to the *comunidades*’ needs. To finance this social fund, the faction had to resort to new income sources, as the bank robberies that had financed them in the past were riskier and not profitable enough. The introduction of cocaine into Brazilian society in the late 1970s provided them with the perfect money source. The organization then aimed at controlling the drug selling points, known in the city as *bocas de fumo*, which created the need for

weapons and personnel to help secure their profits and their territories. With their new found strength, the *Comando Vermelho* conquered new *favelas* and provided the territories with services that are commonly associated with the state, including funding for culture and entertainment, medical and financial aid to residents in need, and protection from both violent gangs and police violence (HUSAIN, 2007, p. 62).

In 1985, the first elected governor after the redemocratization was Leonel Brizola, a left-wing politician with a revolutionary past and who had been forced into exile during military rule (HUSAIN, 2007, p. 64; MANSO, 2020, p. 148). His government was characterized by a strong focus on education and on a bold public security policy for that time, determining that the Military Police could only enter the *favelas* with a judicial warrant. This was well received by the *favela* residents, but highly criticized by the rest of the population at large, who shunned him as an ally for the criminals. His government also coincided with a moment of expansion of the drug trade and the drug trafficking factions in Rio de Janeiro expanded with it (HUSAIN, 2007, p. 64; MANSO, 2020, p. 248–249).

During the 1980s, the death squads that had been acting since the late 1950s went through a reconfiguration. Because of being subject to more exposure by the media in the context of political reopening and democratization, the death squads began a process of autonomization: police officers from both branches – the civil and the military – that worked in the death squads progressively turned into agents for the groups, being still involved, but now in a more competitive environment in which other groups dealt in executions (ALVES, 2002, p. 62). Because of this dynamic of greater exposure by the media and an increasingly higher number of killings in such competitive environment, the death squads created the artifice of the “*Mão Branca*” [White Hand], a fake death squad intended to have the killings of various other groups attributed to it, so as to deflect responsibility and hide the participation of the real death squads (ALVES, 2002, p. 82; MANSO, 2020, p. 83). During these decades the most common discourse used to justify the existence and the operation of these groups was that they killed *bandidos* in defense of the workers (MANSO, 2020, p. 83).

In the 1990s, the original leaders of the *Comando Vermelho* started being substituted by younger criminals. While the older leadership had family and social ties to the *comunidades* and controlled them with social assistance, their successors often came from other *favelas* and maintained control through fear and coercion. Their focus on increasing revenue, coupled with Rio de Janeiro's location on the transatlantic drug route and the ease of acquiring guns, meant that the drug trade in the city didn't take long to become particularly violent, especially as the *Comando Vermelho* became increasingly fragmented after the deaths of its previous leaders, increasing the number of factions violently competing for control of the *comunidades* and for a share of the trafficking profits (HUSAIN, 2007, p. 62). One of these new factions, known as *Amigo dos Amigos*, is the third prominent drug trafficking organization in Rio de Janeiro, and was founded by Uê and his associates. In 1994, Uê plotted the ambush that killed Orlando Jogador, the *Comando Vermelho* affiliated leader of drug trafficking in the *favelas* known as Complexo do Alemão. This attack led to a violent and enduring conflict among the factions (COELHO, 2017, p. 24).

Regarding the *milícias*, in the early 1950s, families coming from rural zones and from the northeastern region of the country occupied the private area that would later form the community of Rio das Pedras, in the West Zone of the city. Once the region was settled, the residents organized themselves in residents' commissions, associations, and communitarian entities, and started claiming the ownership of the lands from the authorities. From the very beginning, the authorities relinquished, either by omission or by permission, the responsibility of governing the area, giving the opportunity for some residents to accumulate capital and power. In 1982, a formal communitarian entity, led by Octacílio Bianchi, was created. During his time in charge of the community the punishment of criminals was executed by a violent local death squad, like others that were formed in other parts of the city in the same period. After Octacílio's murder in 1989, his wife, Dinda, took over until her own murder in 1995. Following a trend in the 1990s, in which the policemen came back to the fore, the Rio das Pedras community command, in the form of the presidency of the communitarian association, was then taken, with the support of several policemen, by the civil police inspector Félix Tostes, and then to the military

police sergeant Dalmir Pereira Barbosa and a cohort of supporting civilians, including his brother, and other policemen, which led to the group being backed by local battalions and police stations (MANSO, 2020, p. 80–86).

Two other important regions for the development of the *miliícias* as protagonists in the armed disputes in Rio and as an alternative model of governing are the neighborhoods of Campo Grande and Santa Cruz, but in these the emergence of the groups that would then become the *milícias* differed from the process that happened in Rio das Pedras. In these two neighborhoods irregular transportation cooperatives were established around 1996 to profit from the lack of means of transportation inside the *favelas*, and from the omission of the state to provide such means of transportation from these neighborhoods to the center of the city, where many people worked, and back. Because of the competition between these irregular providers over the most profitable routes and schedules, they started hiring policemen to protect them from the possibility of ensuing violence. Soon these police officers realized that they stood to profit more if, instead of merely providing security for hire, they organized the clandestine enterprise themselves. As time went, they started accumulating management roles over the region, exercising authority through organizations providing social work (MANSO, 2020, p. 90–91). The group that ruled the region through the end of the 1990's into the 2000's was known as *Liga da Justiça* [“Justice League”], and it was led by another police inspector, Natalino José Guimarães, and his brother, Jerônimo Guimarães Filho, also known as “Jerominho” (Ibid., p. 85).

In the early 2000's the experiences gathered from the death squads formed simultaneously with the military police, from the resident's associations of Rio das Pedras, and from the transportation cooperatives from Santa Cruz and Campo Grande had evolved into a hybrid of a business model, a way of governance, and a paramilitary organization now collectively known as *milícias*, that started proliferating to neighborhoods close to the pioneering ones. The expansion first occurred in the direction of *comunidades* considered “neutral”, that is, not yet dominated by drug traffickers, but confrontations also did occur quite frequently (Ibid. 88-89). The expansion was made much easier by the frequent cooperation between the *milicianos* and the police officers: both helped each other in driving

the drug traffickers out of communities that the *milícias* then could take control over (MANZO, 2020, p. 86).

## 2.5. Conclusions and Remarks

This historical excursus on the police institutions and other armed actors in Rio de Janeiro shows that the arrival of Lisbon's police institutions in Rio de Janeiro does not constitute a "misguided transfer from the core countries to the periphery but [...] a process to be understood on its own terms" (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 5). As Holloway says, "[i]nstitutions initially copied from Europe [...] were eventually rejected in favor of homegrown organizations and procedures" (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 5; see also: KANT DE LIMA, 2019, p. 203). Despite the many institutional exchanges and imports from Europe and elsewhere, the contemporary police institutions in Rio de Janeiro are the result of local and national circumstances. The experiences that didn't work, given expectations and resources, were marginalized and eventually abandoned in favor of other, perhaps more resilient or adaptative, experiences (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 278–279). One such experience, the military police, emerged in 1831 from the social upheavals and institutional public security efforts that characterized the early 19<sup>th</sup> century and remains in remarkable continuity to this day. Its historical similarities to other militarized police forces, however, are coincidental, rather than the result of deliberate emulation, and its development also proves to be unique (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 280).

That the contemporary police institutions show remarkable endurance also does not mean that their histories are linear or easily confined. The police did not develop its expertise as a concerted, intentional, and rational incremental effort that, accumulating from its previous experiences since its inception in the beginning of the 19th century, culminated in a robust and consolidated arsenal of techniques. Instead, its history is marked by arbitrariness, disjunctive and partial control, and ample individual agency. Left to their own devices in the streets, the knowledge informing police practice is the result of discretion and improvisation. Therefore, the police was formed just as much through interactions on the streets, contests with other police and security institutions, and disagreements and negotiations with

authorities and population, as it was by legislative attempts at reform (BRETAS, 1985, p. 53, 60, 1997b, p. 114–115, 1997a, p. 16, 115, 145, 206–209).

This process of “learning by doing” that characterizes police expertise in Rio de Janeiro spawned other armed actors in the city, in a process that Huggins calls “devolution” (HUGGINS, 2002) and that led to what Misse calls a “process of social accumulation of violence” (MISSE, 2009) which, starting in the 1950s in Rio de Janeiro, is an unresolved issue to this day. In this sense, many authors researching police and violence in Rio de Janeiro argue that, even though Brazil followed a process of modernization from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century that was contemporaneous with the modernization processes in countries in Western Europe, the transition was never complete (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 4–5, 289, 307; KANT DE LIMA, 2019, p. 25; MISSE, 2009, p. 374). Thus,

Rather than a generalized transition from personal and individualized mechanisms of control to impersonal and standardized systems, in Brazil the two hierarchies of power – traditional and private on the one hand and modern and public in the other – remained complementary and mutually reinforcing (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 116).

Added to this incomplete modernization, the police institutions in Brazil also underwent an incomplete transition from the dictatorships of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to the post-1985 democratic regime. The arbitrary and violent practices that were accumulated in the police institutions’ histories were effectively and efficiently instrumentalized by the governments of the *Estado Novo* and of the military dictatorship (BRETAS, 1997b, p. 114, 1997a, p. 213; HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 282–284), but were never reformed to function appropriately in a democracy.

This chapter reconstructed a history of the police in Rio de Janeiro with a dual purpose. First, it is an effort of providing a comprehensive, although partial and incomplete, history of Rio de Janeiro’s current police institutions for future researchers. Hopefully the sources cited here might aid others in understanding how the current police practices and configurations came to be. Second, it provides resources for contextualizing the analyses of the next chapter. We ended with a section on the other participants in violence in Rio de Janeiro to show that histories of violence are intertwined inextricably. Violence not only harms and hurts, nor does it only break bonds. It is also a web that connects various actors and histories

in complex and largely unforeseeable ways. Violence in its varied iterations – criminality, policing, war making – exist in a continuum (HUGGINS, 2002; LOKANEETA, 2016, p. 1010; TILLY, 1985, p. 170), and in more ways than one. This historical background will allow us to see how the themes that come up in the officers' interviews fit into a longer tradition of order as social control and violent repression. At the same time, the frustrations that the police officers also express quite openly has to do with the often overlapping and often competing roles of the police and judicial authorities that were discussed previously. The police's practices have never been effectively determined and its mandate has always been contested. Thus, I argue in the conclusion of this thesis that policing seems to be an impossible job. Ridden with paradoxes and contradictions, police officers are often the targets of efforts of control and regulation, but are also required to bring about results that are sabotaged by the very means allowed them in this undertaking.

### 3. Politics of Police and Violence

#### 3.1. The Cops Who Cried “War”

Police officers frequently claim that Rio de Janeiro is a city in war. Despite its ubiquity as an epithet for confrontations in the city, I was still surprised by how fast mentions of war appeared in the discussions with the research’s participants. None of the questions I had prepared for the interviews inquired about police work in terms of war. Yet, the war motif was expressed spontaneously by every interviewee. After all, to speak of war is not to merely employ a metaphor. For the police officers I interviewed it is the most accurate depiction of their daily jobs.

**Nogueira:** Because today we live in Rio de Janeiro a war, right? Urban. Which is a war that ravages all of Rio de Janeiro. It is a war that is happening today between Ukraine and Russia, that happened in Israel, and it is the same war that we live. But then people don’t observe that this war here sometimes kills more than the very war itself, declared, do you understand? Because [Rio de Janeiro] is the only state today that you see a... the *bandido* – right? –, the parallel state, with weapons of war, practicing acts of war. Right? So I think that Rio de Janeiro, when it comes to violence, is very differentiated in relation to the other states. And that’s why I tell you that today we live an urban war daily in Rio de Janeiro.

**Nogueira:** Porque hoje a gente vive no Rio de Janeiro uma guerra, né? Urbana. Que é uma guerra que assola todo o Rio de Janeiro. É uma guerra que está acontecendo hoje entre Ucrânia e Rússia, onde aconteceu em Israel, e é a mesma guerra que a gente vive. Mas aí as pessoas não observam que essa guerra aqui às vezes mata mais que a própria guerra em si, declarada, entendeu? Porque é o único estado hoje que você vê um... o bandido, né, o Estado paralelo, com armamento de guerra, praticando atos de guerra. Né? Então eu acho que o Rio de Janeiro, em relação à violência, é muito diferenciado em relação aos outros estados. E por isso eu te falo que hoje a gente vive uma guerra urbana diariamente no Rio de Janeiro.

This reality is imposed on the police officers as soon as they finish training.

**Nunes:** ‘Cause here on the Police it’s like this: you graduate, you go to war. [...] It is our life. I have a family, I have a son, and it is a big mistake of society to think that every police officer likes war. Not every police officer likes war. Every police officer likes to do his service and get home. [...] So this is a thing that, as much as the military training was to create the warrior ethos, just in

**Nunes:** Que aqui na Polícia é assim: você se forma, você vai pra guerra. [...] É a nossa vida. Eu tenho família, eu tenho filho, e é um ledor engano da sociedade achar que todo policial gosta de guerra. Nem todo policial gosta de guerra. Todo policial gosta de fazer o seu serviço e chegar em casa. [...] Então isso é uma coisa que, por mais que o treinamento militar fosse pra criar o ethos do



practice that you will know what you're going to do or not. Will you hide, will you run, will you cry, will you call your wife, will you ask "for the love of God", will you pray or will you go to the combat? This only [comes] with practice. And you learn this not on the [police] academy, you learn with the praças that are already ten, fifteen years [in the police]. "No, boss, don't break cover now. No, boss, let's go over there. No..." There is always a police officer more modern than you, in the case a praça, a soldado, that is living this for ten, fifteen years, this war, and that will guide you and calm you. So this is a thing that I learned here in practice. On my first day of service, they already shot our car. On the second day a police officer died. On the third day we had to succor a police officer rescued inside of the favela. And like this [Nunes snaps his finger, indicating it happened in an instant], three days and I thought that I wouldn't see combat, I thought I wouldn't see shots fired. On my first service they shot back at us, when we were passing beside the favela in Grajaú they shot our car. On the second day a police officer died. So, like this, you start to live that reality of \*war\* \*really quickly\*. \*Really quickly\*. Really quickly. Really quickly.

As Terine Husek Coelho also noticed in her interviews with the police, there is a widespread belief among police officers that they live a war in Rio de Janeiro, a war which existence is confirmed by police victimization and which informs their practices of policing (COELHO, 2017, p. 19; see also: HUSAIN, 2007).

**Larrey:** There is a study by *Coronel Cajueiro*, I will even send it to you, I don't know if you already have it, that he studied the last 20 years, but stopped his study in 2017, more or less, 2018... So he studied [from] 2004 to 2018, if I'm not mistaken... [He studied] around 20 years. And then he

guerreiro, só na prática que você vai saber o que que você vai fazer ou não [rindo]. Você vai se esconder, vai correr, vai chorar, vai ligar pra mulher, vai pedir pelo amor de Deus, vai orar ou você vai pro combate? Isso só a prática. E isso você aprende não na academia, você aprende com os praças que já tão há dez, quinze anos. "Não, chefe, não bota a cara agora não. Não, chefe, vamo pra lá. Não..." Sempre tem um policial mais moderno que você, no caso um praça, um soldado, que tá vivendo isso aí há dez, quinze anos, essa guerra, e que vai te orientar e vai te acalmar. Então isso aí é uma coisa que eu aprendi aqui na prática. Meu primeiro dia de serviço já deram tiro na minha viatura. No segundo dia morreu um policial. No terceiro dia a gente teve que socorrer um policial resgatado dentro da favela. E assim [estala os dedos, indicando que foi em um instante] três dias e eu pensei que eu não ia ver combate, pensei que não ia ver tiro. No meu primeiro serviço devolveram tiro, passando do lado da favela no Grajaú deram tiro na nossa viatura. No segundo morreu um policial. Então, assim, tu começa a viver aquela realidade de \*guerra\* \*muito rápido\*. \*Muito rápido\*. Muito rápido. Muito rápido.

**Larrey:** Existe um estudo do *Coronel Cajueiro*, vou até te mandar, não sei se você já tem, que ele estudou os últimos 20 anos, mas parou o estudo dele em 2017, mais ou menos, 2018... Então ele estudou 2004 a 2018, se não me engano... Fez em torno de 20 anos. E aí ele viu que foi mais perigoso pelo

saw that it was more dangerous by the number of casualties, the number of active officers, the number of people that went to wars, it was more dangerous, 765 times more dangerous, to be a police officer in Rio de Janeiro than to having combated in any one of the wars. The lethality is really high, the morbidity is really high, that is, many wounded, a lot of deaths...

número de baixas, número de policiais na ativa, número de pessoas que foram pras guerras, foi mais perigoso, 765 vezes mais perigoso ser policial no Rio de Janeiro do que ter combatido em qualquer uma das guerras. A letalidade é altíssima, a morbidade altíssima, ou seja, muitos feridos, muitos óbitos...

(A presentation of the study mentioned by Larrey can be found on YouTube: Coronel Cajueiro - “A Guerra Urbana do Rio de Janeiro e seus efeitos na Polícia Militar”. 17 jun. 2020. Available at: <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qIjkH2bTJ9w>>. Last access on: 6 set. 2022)

According to Márcia Pereira Leite, the development of Rio de Janeiro’s depiction as a city in war occurred during the 1990s as a reaction to a series of violent episodes happening in the city at the time (LEITE, 2000, p. 75, 2012, p. 378–379; see also: OLIVEIRA, 2017, p. 62). These violent episodes themselves were the result of the expansion of drug trafficking and the import of weapons to the city beginning in the 1950s and accelerating in the 1970s and 1980s (MISSE, 2009, p. 375, 378).

**Rodrigues:** Whoever wants to have a weapon here, even more so here in Rio de Janeiro, man. I think that Rio de Janeiro is the city with the most wrong [irregular] guns in all of Brazil, I think it’s inside here [interviewee laughs]. Because you see, now- In the past you saw those guys coming down to rob, like this, here on the outside, they came with revolvers, with “thirty-eight” (.38), with a pistol. Now you see the guy coming to rob with an assault rifle, to rob a cellphone. You get tired of seeing in the television. The guy comes in a motorcycle, [and] puts an assault rifle like this to take a cellphone! You see that the assault rifle is... is [circulating] freely there in the *favelas*.

**Rodrigues:** Quem quiser ter arma aqui, ainda mais aqui no Rio de Janeiro, cara. Acho que o Rio de Janeiro é a cidade que mais tem arma errada no Brasil todo, acho que é aqui dentro [rindo]. Porque você vê agora- Antigamente você via esses caras descendo pra assaltar, assim, aqui fora, vinha com revólver, com trinta e oito, com a pistola. Agora tu vê o cara vindo pra assaltar com um fuzil, pra assaltar um celular. Tu cansa de ver na televisão. O cara vem de moto, bota um fuzil assim pra tomar um celular! Tu vê que fuzil tá... tá à revelia ali nas favelas. Toda favela que tu vai é um fuzil. [...] Tá cheio de fuzil rapaz. Onde você vai no Rio de Janeiro, qualquer favela tu vê fuzil. Entendeu? Aqui tem muita arma.

Every *favela* you go to, [there] is an assault rifle. [...] It is full of assault rifles, boy. Wherever you go in Rio de Janeiro, any *favela* you see assault rifles. Do you understand? There are a lot of weapons here.

Indeed, police victimization is not the only criteria employed by police officers to prove that they live in war. That Rio de Janeiro is a city in war is also characterized by the weapons used by drug traffickers in confrontations.

**Pereira:** I'll tell you in the level of weaponry, a weapon that is extremely violent and heavy, an American weapon called Barrett. It is called a "dot fifty" (.50). Have you heard of it? It was used a lot in the war in Iraq. You have this armament today in the war [in the *favelas*], it takes down a helicopter, a plane. It pierces armored cars and such, it is a very violent weapon. The Police doesn't have a Barrett like this. Understand? But the fellows have it. So... you see that they are always on top of us in... in the question of war power, right?

**Pereira:** Vou te falar a nível de armamento, uma arma que é extremamente violenta e pesada, uma arma americana chamada Barrett. É uma chamada ponto cinquenta. Já ouviu falar? Ela foi usada muito na guerra lá do Iraque. Hoje você tem esse armamento na guerra [nas favelas], ela derruba um helicóptero, um avião. Ela fura um blindado e tal, é uma arma violentíssima. A Polícia não tem uma Barrett dessa. Entendeu? Mas os caras têm. Então... você vê que estão sempre acima da gente em... na questão de poderio bélico, né?

**Assis:** And... he [drug trafficking] could also bring the \*assault rifle\* to defend these territories [*favelas*]. Which is a weapon of \*war\*, with a long \*reach\*, with the capacity to breach... with a lot of localized shots breach armoring, or even bore through cars and everything, which is different from a pistol or revolver shot, which doesn't have this capacity, doesn't have this capacity of a supersonic ammunition that bores through a car. So they brought the assault rifles, specially the AK-47, to Rio de Janeiro. [...] They explode grenades, and we almost never explode-

**Assis:** E... ele também foi possível trazer o \*fuzil\* pra defender esses territórios. Que é uma arma de \*guerra\*, de um grande \*alcance\*, com a capacidade de vazar... com muitos tiros localizados vazar blindagens, ou até mesmo atravessar carros e tudo mais, que é diferente de um tiro de pistola ou de revólver, que não tem essa capacidade, não tem essa capacidade de uma munição supersônica que atravessa um carro. Então eles trouxeram os fuzis, em especial a AK-47, pro Rio de Janeiro. [...] Eles explodem granadas e a gente quase não estoura- Granada letal nem faz

Lethal grenades don't even make part of our arsenal. Of Rio de Janeiro's arsenal, which is the most armed Police in Brazil, there's no arsenal of lethal grenades. What we do use: moral effect grenades. Tear-gas or light and sound [stun grenades]. The *bandido*, he throws grenades... lethal, diverted from the... from the Army or stolen from the Army, they use... homemade grenades using bike pegs with gunpowder and nails, [they] wrap it up and throw at us [...]

parte do nosso acervo. Do acervo do Rio de Janeiro, que é a Polícia mais armada do Brasil, não existe o acervo de granadas letais. O que a gente usa: granadas de efeito moral. Lacrimogêneo ou luz e som. O bandido, ele taca granadas... letais, desviadas do... do Exército ou roubadas do Exército, eles usam... granadas de fabricação caseira usando 'calicas' de bicicleta com pólvora e pregos, enrolam, e tacam na gente [...]

However, police officers are not alone in seeing Rio de Janeiro as a territory in war and the meaning and purpose of this claim varies widely. Other times, "war" is not used to describe a state of violence, as when used by the police, but to explain it. In other words, it is not that a high number of deaths attests to the veracity of policing in Rio de Janeiro as war, but that policing exercised as war leads to a high number of deaths (HUGGINS, 2010, p. 77–78). For instance, Amnesty International's report *You Killed My Son* points out that "[i]n Brazil, federal and state government representatives have, for years, maintained a discourse that encourages a *warlike* approach to public security actions" (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2015, p. 25, emphasis added). After visiting Brazil in a mission in late 2007, United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, Dr. Philip Alston, wrote that

In Rio de Janeiro, on-duty police are responsible for nearly 18% of the total killings, and kill three people every day. Extrajudicial executions are committed by police who murder rather than arrest criminal suspects, and also during *large-scale confrontational "war" style policing*, in which *excessive use of force* results in the deaths of suspected criminals and bystanders (ALSTON, 2009, p. 9, emphasis added).

If in the past, as Rodrigues described, criminals only used low-caliber weapons, but are now using weapons of war, the police has also adapted to this scenario.

**Rodrigues:** The Police's weaponry is [their] equal. They have assault rifles, the Police

**Rodrigues:** Os armamentos da Polícia tá de igual pra igual. Eles têm fuzil, a Polícia foi se

adapted itself, right, because in the past there weren't so many assault rifles in the favela. The Police too... *Vagabundo* started carrying assault rifles a lot, the Police is carrying assault rifles. [...] It's all according to the situation of the neighborhood there. Do you understand? Now, in the *favela* the guys are there with assault rifles, they have to put the Police there to work with assault rifles. Do you understand? Now, when there weren't in the *favelas*, there weren't so many assault rifles, the Police worked with sub-machine guns, with shotguns, with revolvers. Then as the number of assault rifles increased a lot there, the Police also has to work equal to equal there, right?

adequando, né, porque antigamente não tinha tanto fuzil na favela. A polícia foi também... Vagabundo começou a andar com muito fuzil, a Polícia tá andando com fuzil. [...] É tudo de acordo com a situação dali do bairro. Entendeu? Agora, na favela os cara tão lá de fuzil, eles têm que botar a Polícia lá pra trabalhar com fuzil. Entendeu? Agora, quando não tinha nas favela, não tinha tanto fuzil, a Polícia trabalhava com metralhadora, com escopeta, com revólver. Aí que foi crescendo muito o número de fuzil lá, a Polícia também tem que trabalhar de igual pra igual com eles lá, né?

It must be noted, however, that after the audio recorder was turned off, Rodrigues started telling stories and said that in the past “*a gente era mais polícia*” – “[they] were more of a police” – and that they walked around “*de 38 na cintura, os caras com fuzil e tinham medo porque o tempo ia fechar pra eles*” – “with a thirty-eight in their waists, [while] the guys had assault rifles and [still] they were afraid because things would get ugly for them”. Regardless, the use of war rhetoric itself helps justify the funding of the police and the purchase of weapons of war for their use (LEITE, 2012, p. 380; PAIXÃO, 1982, p. 79) – the same “weapons of war” that, killing both criminals and police officers alike, were denounced both by the participants of this research and critics of the police's tactics, as is the case of a public defender interviewed by the Amnesty International:

Depending on the rifle, the projectile can travel up to a kilometre in two seconds. It's stupid; those types of weapons should not be allowed. *That's a weapon of war* and shouldn't be used for policing a densely populated urban area. It's thoroughly unacceptable. As long as the police continue to patrol with rifles, those incidents will keep happening (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2015, p. 55, emphasis added).

Despite its uses as either an accurate description of a state of affairs or as an explanation for the violence in Rio de Janeiro, the war is not confined to these usages. War, instead, is used to justify the exercise of violence.

Representing social conflict in large cities as a war has implied triggering a symbolic repertoire in which sides/groups in confrontation are enemies

and extermination, at the limit, [is] one of the strategies for victory, as it is easily admitted that exceptional situations – of war – require measures that are also exceptional and foreign to institutional and democratic normality. (LEITE, 2000, p. 79, my translation).

In the interviews I conducted, claims that Rio de Janeiro is in war, therefore, were often demands for latitude and official authorization, including legal protection, for the police's exertion of lethal violence.

**Assis:** Because of that, one of the points that I even propose you regarding your research, is that the non-recognition in Rio de Janeiro of this reality – and when I talk about “recognition”, I mean *\*juridical\** recognition of this reality – brings a juridical insecurity for the action of the police. Because *\*here\** we should be acting with the constitutional exceptions which are about *\*war\**. We are living a civil war and I am providing to you what are the elements that would make a serious federal government understand this reality as a civil war. [...] And it is a shame that we as a country don't recognize this civil war. That is, we have to act in war, [but] answering to laws of peace. And this brings an enormous juridical insecurity to police work. Enormous.

**Larrey:** Because the American soldier that is fighting the war in Iraq, he is under a *\*war\** legislation. The Brazilian police officer, the *carioca* police officer, which is in a *comunidade*, in Jacaré, he is not in a war legislation. He is in a peace legislation. We live in a peace legislation in Brazil, so he answers to a peace legislation, under the light of a peace legislation. And then we had to adapt items from this protocol because of that. So you'll understand: when the American, in this protocol, has one of his soldiers injured, what does he do? The other that visualized that fires ahead at will so that

**Assis:** Por isso, um dos pontos que eu até te coloco em relação à sua pesquisa, é que o não reconhecimento no Rio de Janeiro dessa realidade – e quando eu falo de “reconhecimento”, eu falo de reconhecimento *\*jurídico\** dessa realidade – traz uma insegurança jurídica pra atuação das polícias. Porque *\*aqui\** nós deveríamos estar agindo com as exceções constitucionais que se tratam sobre *\*guerra\**. Nós estamos vivendo uma guerra civil e eu tô te respaldando quais são os elementos que fariam um governo federal sério entender essa realidade como uma guerra civil. [...] E é uma vergonha nós como país não reconhecermos essa guerra civil. Ou seja, nós temos que agir em guerra, respondendo a leis de paz. E isso traz uma insegurança jurídica pro trabalho policial muito grande. Muito grande.

**Larrey:** Porque o militar americano que está combatendo a guerra no Iraque, ele tá sob uma legislação *\*de guerra\**. O policial brasileiro, o policial carioca, que tá numa comunidade, no Jacaré, ele não tá numa legislação de guerra. Ele tá numa legislação de paz. A gente vive numa legislação de paz no Brasil, então ele responde por uma legislação de paz, à luz de uma legislação de paz. E aí a gente teve que adaptar itens desse protocolo por causa disso. Pra você entender: quando o americano, nesse protocolo, tem um militar dele ferido, que que ele faz? O outro que visualizou isso atira à frente à vontade

a third and a fourth go rescue him to a place where the shots don't hit him, 'cause they are in a sheltered area, and then [they] start to effect the first aid. In Rio de Janeiro I can't say- do that. Fire ahead at will – “pá, pá, pá” [onomatopoeia for shots being fired] – so we can cease the threat, that is, neutralize the enemy. I can't say that. Imagine me saying that in an instruction here in Rio de Janeiro. The impact this will make. That I will neutralize the enemy, fire ahead at will. Our Judiciary doesn't understand this.

pra que um terceiro e um quarto vão resgatar ele pra um ponto onde os disparos não atinjam ele, que eles estão numa área abrigada, e aí comece a efetuar os primeiros socorros. No Rio de Janeiro eu não posso falar- fazer isso. Tiro à frente à vontade – “pá, pá, pá” [onomatopoeia] – pra cessar a ameaça, ou seja, neutralizar o inimigo. Não posso falar isso. Você imagina eu falando isso numa instrução aqui no Rio de Janeiro. O impacto que isso vai ser. Que eu vou neutralizar o inimigo, tiro à frente à vontade. O nosso Judiciário não entende isso.

When Assis says that in Rio de Janeiro the police officers “should be acting with the constitutional exceptions which are about \*war\*”, he is referring to Article 5 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, which prohibits the death penalty, with the exception being in case of declared war. As for Larrey, although sanitized, to “neutralize the enemy” “carrie[s] the unequivocal meaning *to kill*” (SALEM; LARKINS, 2021, p. 71, emphasis in the original).

**Silva:** There's people that say: “ten [criminals] die, twenty [criminals] are born”, but there don't remain thirty, right? There will only be left the twenty that were born [interviewee laughs], the ten [that died] won't be a problem anymore. And this is in an exchange of fire, okay? In a daily war. So it happens like this. The Police works like this.

**Silva:** Tem gente que diz: “nasce- morre 10, nasce 20”, mas não fica 30, né? Só vão ficar só os 20 que nasceram [rindo], que os 10 não vão mais ser problema. E isso na troca de tiro, tá? Numa guerra diária aí. Então é desse jeito que acontece. A Polícia funciona assim.

“War”, as a rhetorical device, is a way around the modern abhorrence of violence. Indeed, as Nunes' account illustrates, for the police officers, “war” authorizes violence. Outside war, as he concurs, violence should be avoided.

**Nunes:** For example, you're going to make an approach... then you stopped at the approach two people in a motorcycle leaving a *comunidade*. And automatically they say

**Nunes:** Por exemplo, você vai fazer uma abordagem... aí você parou na abordagem de moto duas pessoas saindo de uma comunidade. E automaticamente eles falam

they have nothing. When you see, there's a drug inside there, in his pocket. And then there's always a more energetic police officer who will come and slap the guy. [Slaps the table] "See, you bastard? This and that. You have drugs here!" I ask you: is it necessary? \*You\* will say it's not. Because you have a civilian world already formed. I, as a lawyer, will say no, that this is wrong. But a military police officer with ten years, fifteen years [in the Police] living a "*chucraria*" all the time, thinks that's normal. Thinks that's how you impose yourself. I heard a *caveira* the other day talking and I found him reasonable. 'Cause I was in a *balaria* [exchange of fire], right, in a confrontation with the drug dealers, and suddenly they stopped shooting. And a sergeant told him: "*pô*, boss, shoot there in the woods." "Why?" "Shoot there in the woods." He shot in the woods. And then the shooting stopped. "See, boss? The enemy must always be uncomfortable." I agree with this thinking of his. In war. In war, in an operation. Now, in an approach that has two citizens leaving the *favela*, even if he's a drug user, even if one or the other had a [criminal] record. They are already surrendered. Is it necessary to hit?

que não têm nada. Quando vê, tem uma droga ali dentro, no bolso dele. E aí tem um policial sempre mais enérgico que vai chegar e vai dar um tapa no cara. [Dá um tapa na mesa] "Tá vendo, seu safado? Isso e aquilo. Você tá com uma droga aqui!" Eu te pergunto: precisa disso? \*Você\* vai falar que não. Porque você tem um mundo civil já formado. Eu, como advogado, vou falar que não, que isso é errado. Mas policial militar com dez anos, quinze anos vivendo uma *chucraria* o tempo todo, acha isso normal. Acha que se impõe assim. Eu ouvi outro dia um *caveira* falando e eu dei razão pra ele. Que tava numa *balaria*, né, num confronto com os traficantes, e do nada pararam de atirar. E um sargento falou pra ele "*pô*, chefe, dá tiro ali na mata." "Por quê?" "Dá tiro ali na mata." Ele deu tiro na mata. E aí parou o tiroteio. "Tá vendo, chefe? O inimigo tem que estar sempre desconfortável." Eu concordo com esse pensamento dele. Na guerra. Na guerra, numa operação. Agora, numa abordagem que tá dois cidadãos saindo da favela, por mais que ele seja usuário de droga, por mais que um ou outro tinha passagem. Já estão rendidos. Precisa bater?

The usage of war as a way around "violence", however, traps the police officer in a dilemma: since absolute pacification, in the form of total renunciation of violence in society, is unattainable, the solution that best approximates the ideal is to endow a restricted cadre with the authority to legitimately employ it (BITTNER, 1970, p. 36–37). But, as Egon Bittner ponders, "[h]ow can we arrive at a favorable or even accepting judgment about an activity which is, in its very conception, opposed to the ethos of the polity that authorizes it?" (BITTNER, 1970, p. 46). He then proposes two answers that could be acceptable:

One defines the targets of legitimate force as enemies and the coercive advance against them as warfare. [...] The other answer involves an altogether different imagery. The targets of force are conceived as practical objectives and their attainment a matter of practical expediency. [...] Thus,



our policemen are exposed to the demand of a conflicting nature in that their actions are supposed to reflect military prowess and professional acumen (BITTNER, 1970, p. 47).

However, as he explains, this nonetheless taints police work:

the taint that attaches to police work refers to the fact that policemen are viewed as the fire it takes to fight fire, that they in the natural course of their duties inflict harm, albeit deserved, and that their very existence attests that the nobler aspirations of mankind do not contain the means necessary to insure survival (BITTNER, 1970, p. 8).

As Dick points out, “members of ‘tainted’ occupations will nevertheless be aware of how their activities and tasks are viewed by the wider public” (DICK, 2005, p. 1369). Early in my fieldwork I noticed a widespread uneasiness in my interlocutors around the word and the discussions it could inspire. Thus, if I was to lead the conversations into discussions about violence I had, counterintuitively, to try and avoid using the word “violence” altogether, since “violence” – as a word, as a concept, and as a practice – is by itself negatively charged and it taints those it is attached to.

Claire Thomas, for instance, makes the argument that although “[t]he study of International Relations (IR) is said to be predominantly about violence” (THOMAS, 2011, p. 1815) the word itself is rarely used in the discipline’s literature and many alternatives are written in its place, hypothesizing that “the rarity of its use may be due to the implied illegitimacy of violence, when scholars are focusing on ‘legitimate’ state uses of violence” (THOMAS, 2011, p. 1817). If using “violence” to describe the harmful actions of states and other actors may delegitimize the described action, its alternatives

are not just a creative use of vocabulary. They keep at bay the harmful, destructive, personal nature of violence. They hide the fact that an individual (or usually, many individuals) are being hurt by the use of violence. This makes the use of violence more palatable, even making it sound like the right, ‘statesman-like’ thing to do (THOMAS, 2011, p. 1816).

As Carol Cohn once stated, with these substitutions “there seems to be no graphic reality behind the words” (COHN, 1987, p. 690). For Cohn, the use of euphemistic vocabulary is a means of alleviating the imagery the words would otherwise evoke, allowing for the distancing and removal necessary to make working with violence possible, its consequences forgettable, its occurrence seem (deceptively)

controllable, and of deflecting both the accountability and the responsibility for the effects of these discourses (COHN, 1987, p. 698, 703–704, 715; see also: BRISON, 2002). War, however, is not euphemistic, but hyperbolic. Still, war, in the case of Rio de Janeiro’s police, serves these same purposes.

Indeed, if “violence” is often understood to be illegitimate in itself, as one of the effects of modernity, that might explain why it is usually reserved to describe either non-state actors and their actions (THOMAS, 2011, p. 1819), or those whose actions one does not approve. Michel Misse, for instance, argues that “violence” is not a concept, “it is a category that, when it stops being merely descriptive (and, in this case, polysemic), becomes necessarily performative, normative and accusatory” (MISSE, 2016, p. 47). This is something I noticed in my interviews: the only actors who were described or referenced as “violent” by my interlocutors were drug addicts either during withdrawal (Silva), or under the influence (Nogueira), criminals (Rodrigues), the city of Rio de Janeiro (Nunes and Pereira), the confrontations with increasingly better armed *milícias* and drug trafficking factions (Larrey), the weapons used by drug dealers (Pereira), and the unprepared and unchecked police officers of the past (Pereira). “Violence”, for its part, was reserved to describe a state of things (in society, during the Brazilian Dictatorship, in the *favelas*, as a synonym for crime...) and was never used as something that was done by someone. In other words, “violence” was used to refer to the opposite of order (THOMAS, 2011, p. 1822), which the police is supposed to maintain.

That the police officers eschew using “violence” as a description for many of their actions is well illustrated by an interaction I had with a participant. After the conversation reached a conclusion, I turned off the audio recorder, thanked the interviewee and we started talking about other issues before parting ways. The post-interview conversation eventually circled back to the subject of the research and the participant started talking about how “violence exists” (“*violência existe*”), about how “it is embedded” (“*tá embutida*”) and about how it is the Police’s job to prevent it from happening. In this moment I asked him if I could turn the recorder on again and ask a few more questions, to which he consented. The following is his answer to the question of how he would call the confrontations with criminals and other instances of aggression if by any name other than “violence”:

**Silva:** Necessary means, *pô* [Brazilian interjection]. It's what I told you from the beginning. They are the necessary means that you have... For example, it's moderated violence... *A slap is not violence, but... it's called violence.* But moderated, for you to reach an objective. If you don't do it, you won't reach. [...] The necessary means may be simply a scolding. It can be a smack. It can be a threat. Get it? [emphasis added]

**Silva:** Meios necessários, *pô*. É o que eu te falei desde o início. São os meios necessários que você tem... Por exemplo, é violência moderada... *Uma tapa não é uma violência, mas... chama-se de violência.* Mas moderada, pra você alcançar um objetivo. Se você não fizer isso, não vai alcançar. [...] Os meios necessários podem ser simplesmente um esporro. Pode ser uma porrada. Pode ser uma ameaça. Entendeu? [Ênfase adicionada]

If “violence” in itself taints those it is attached to, it may not be a coincidence that Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros and Zimbardo decided to use “violence workers” – the title of their book – not to designate the police as a whole, but particularly those police officers that have tortured and/or participated in death squads (HUGGINS; HARITOS-FATOUIROS; ZIMBARDO, 2002, p. xxi, 7). Noting this semantic economy, Micol Seigel borrows and employs “violence workers” to refer to all police officers, remarking that this “is not intended to indict police officers as bad people, vicious in personality or in their daily routines. It is simply about what their labor rests upon and therefore conveys into the material world”. As he notes, “[i]t takes work to represent and distribute state violence” (SEIGEL, 2018, p. 10–11).

Indeed, that “violence” and “violent” are exclusively reserved for others is in direct tension with the fact that police work is defined by its ability to exercise coercive authority (DICK, 2005; MINGARDI, 2015, p. 16–17). As Robert Cover says, “legal interpretation is as a practice incomplete without violence [...] because it depends upon the social practice of violence for its efficacy” (COVER, 1986, p. 1613). Violence, after all, is the most direct way of achieving compliance: “coercion works; those who apply substantial force to their fellows get compliance” (TILLY, 1990, p. 70, emphasis on original). As Cover illustrates, after a convicted defendant is sentenced, he can either walk, even if escorted, to his confinement, or be jailed nonetheless after being beaten and forcefully dragged towards his cell (COVER, 1986, p. 1607–1608).

The imposition of a sentence thus involves the roles of police, jailers or other enforcers who will restrain the prisoner (or set him free subject to

effective conditions for future restraint) upon the order of the judge, and guards who will secure the prisoner from rescue and who will protect the judge, prosecutors, witnesses and jailers from revenge. [...] The judge's interpretive authorization of the "proper" sentence can be carried out as a deed only because of these others; a bond between word and deed obtains only because a system of social cooperation exists (COVER, 1986, p. 1618–1619).

In other words, as explained by Seigel, "[p]risons can be built and laws passed, but without the lever of police, no bodies will find themselves in cages" (SEIGEL, 2018, p. 185).

This insurmountable tension between the police as "the only institution with the legitimate right to use deadly violence against citizens" (BONNER, 2018, p. 3) and violence as instinctively negative, led Penny Dick to offer the concept of "dirty work" as a way of explaining the police officer's "moral ambiguity that accompanies the potential to use coercive force against citizens" (DICK, 2005, p. 1364–1365; see also: DE CAMARGO, 2019). Police work can be identified as "dirty work" for a number of reasons. First, police officers have to deal with "all manner of 'dirt', including rotting corpses" (DICK, 2005, p. 1366). Second, "dirt" does not need to refer to disposable matter in the material sense, but also to entities of social origin, such as criminals or others considered "bad" elements in society. Finally, "dirt" also refers to transgressions of the moral order (DICK, 2005, p. 1367), such as the employment of violence and the inevitable harm it causes in other.

The use of war metaphors, nevertheless, is always an uncomfortable choice. As Jonathan Simon explains, "[e]ven victorious wars tend to be remembered by populations through the lens of sacrifice, death, hunger, and deprivation generally" (SIMON, 2007, p. 259). Their allure, according to Cynthia Enloe, is often the result of cherry-picking wars and cherry-picking which experiences of these wars are remembered at the expense of all other suffering that comes with them (ENLOE, 2020). But war metaphors can also be effective not because of the positive sentiments of unity and mutual support for a shared goal, but precisely because of the "proximity to danger" such rhetoric conjures (SIMON, 2007, p. 260). Indeed, as Bittner says, the expression "war on crime"

is supposed to indicate that the community is seriously imperiled by forces bent on its destruction and it calls for the mounting of efforts that have

claims on all available resources to defeat the peril. [...] We no longer face losses of one kind or another from the depredations of criminals; we are in imminent danger of losing everything! (BITTNER, 1970, p. 48)

Fear for one's life, as is also the case, can be a powerful impulse for more violence but, as pointed out by Neocleous, the fear of societal death is always also looming: "the terror of death can be thought of as a terror of social death – the death of civil society itself" (NEOCLEOUS, 2000b, p. 12). In this sense, such fear of untimely death becomes a tool a sovereign can deploy to regulate its subjects (CONNOLLY, 2002, p. 18). The idea of "war", thus, is often conjured up by those willing to emphasize the gravity or urgency of a given situation, and, in this sense, the concept is frequently applied to Rio de Janeiro (LESSING, 2015, p. 1487; RAMOS; PAIVA, 2007, p. 57).

**Nogueira:** I'll tell [you], we live an urban war where... where the police officer can keep the order and keep society within the possibilities, inside a tranq-, within the possibilities, a safety. Because when there are no more police officers, Rio de Janeiro is taken. Rio de Janeiro was not taken because the three factions haven't united yet. [...] Because if you get *Comando Vermelho*, *Terceiro Comando Puro*, *Amigo dos Amigos*, get all these factions together... the weaponry they have... You lose Rio de Janeiro. [...] Then you have the *milícia*, now. The *milícia* appeared, paramilitary. Imagine if these forces get together. Because the only thing that holds it is the *Polícia Militar*. [...] Which is its function! Alright, it is its function. But what I tell you is the following: today this here doesn't become an anarchy because the *Polícia Militar* is here holding. Because if these forces get together... Rio de Janeiro closes its doors and the last one out turns the lights off.

**Nogueira:** Eu vou falar, a gente vive uma guerra urbana aonde... aonde o policial consegue manter a ordem e manter a sociedade dentro do possível, dentro de uma tranq-, dentro do possível, uma segurança. Porque a hora que não tiver policial, o Rio de Janeiro é tomado. O Rio de Janeiro não foi tomado porque as três facções ainda não se uniram. [...] Porque se você botar *Comando Vermelho*, *Terceiro Comando Puro*, *Amigo dos Amigos*, juntar essas facções todas... o armamento que eles têm... Você perde o Rio de Janeiro. [...] Aí você tem a *milícia*, agora. Surgiu a *milícia*, paramilitar. Imagina se essas forças se juntarem. Porque hoje a única coisa que segura isso é a *Polícia Militar*. [...] Que é a função dela! Beleza, é a função dela. Mas o que eu te falo é o seguinte: hoje isso aqui não vira uma anarquia é porque a *Polícia Militar* tá aqui segurando. Porque se juntar essas forças... o Rio de Janeiro fecha a porta e o último que sair apaga a luz.

**Silva:** One time, some years ago, in Espírito Santo, the police stopped [went on strike]. They pillaged all businesses in the state,

**Silva:** Uma vez, uns anos atrás, em Espírito Santo a polícia parou. Eles saquearam todos os comércios do estado, invadiram,

invaded, broke... remember this? And everyone was asking the police to come back. “No, we’re not coming back, because we can’t come back, because it’s a lot of violence and such...” Then they stopped everything, started idolizing the police, the police came back, the problem was over. Without the police it can’t be.

quebraram... lembra disso? E todo mundo pedindo pra polícia voltar. “Não, não vamos voltar não, porque a gente não pode voltar, porque é muita violência e tal...”. Aí pararam tudo, começaram a idolatrar a polícia, a polícia voltou, acabou o problema. Sem polícia não dá.

Michel Foucault argues that crime is too useful for people to dream of a society without crime – a dream that is crazy and dangerous, according to him. If there was no crime, the presence and the control exerted by the police would not be tolerable. Just fear of the criminal can justify the presence of these uniformed, armed, demanding, prowling men (FOUCAULT, 1980, p. 47). As Mladek says, “[f]ear, fantasy, and paranoia not only decide political elections, they also prop up the power of the police” (MLADEK, 2007, p. 249). Conversely, the punishments exerted on the criminals serve a similar disciplining and ordering purpose. By containing and controlling those that violate the laws of society, particularly if they are already marginalized people, punishment creates a predator class that, when returned to the streets, is useful to the state because it “frightens and disorganizes communities, effectively driving poor and working people into the arms of the state, seeking protection. Thus both crime control and crime itself keep people down” (PARENTI, 1999, p. 241). In a paradox of governmentality, “the overcoming of fear requires the institutionalization of fear” (CAMPBELL, 1992, p. 65).

If violence is abhorred, but it must be employed in the exercise of their duties, war is the perfect opportunity for police officers to find moral justification for their actions. As Tzvetan Todorov explains,

Wars force the peoples to abandon their multiple and malleable identities, reducing them to a single dimension: this way, each one commits its being entirely in the fight to win the enemy (TODOROV, 2010, p. 125).

Since the police officers are fighting a war, they must be turned into warriors and the drug traffickers they are fighting must be turned into enemies.

**Larrey:** Our Judiciary still has an archaic thinking that if I fire \*two\* shots I will cease the enemy's aggression. When I know, proved by various ballistics' studies, that two shots, unless they are in a certain region of the brain, I don't cease the enemy's activity. And that person, he "stopped being a citizen" [interviewee makes quotation signs with her hands] and turned into an enemy. And if he is shooting against the police officer, he is shooting against the state, is shooting against society. But our Judiciary does not understand that.

**Larrey:** O nosso Judiciário ainda tem um pensamento arcaico de que se eu der \*dois\* disparos eu vou cessar a agressão do inimigo. Quando eu sei, provado por vários estudos de balística, que dois disparos, exceto se forem numa região determinada do cérebro, eu não cesso a atividade do inimigo. E aquela pessoa, ela deixou de ser um cidadão [entrevistada faz sinal de aspas com as mãos] e passou a ser um inimigo. E se ele tá atirando contra o policial, ele tá atirando contra o Estado, tá atirando contra a sociedade. Mas o nosso Judiciário não entende isso.

When Coelho argues that, to police officers, police victimization confirms the existence of a war, which, in turn, informs their practices of policing (COELHO, 2017, p. 19), she is referring to revenge operations. Her research shows that there is a 125% increase in the probabilities that the Police will kill a civilian in the week following a police officer's death in an operation (COELHO, 2017, p. 67). Whenever a police officer is killed during an operation, the war is reaffirmed, the enemies are demarcated, and the subsequent actions of the police officers are absolved.

**Pereira:** Also, this time it was the *chacina* of- called of Vigário Geral. You have already heard, *Chacina de Vigário Geral*. It was ninety-two, if I'm not mistaken. [...] So there was a *chacina* there, because there were four police officers who died in a given moment there during patrol and then the guys [police officers] went there... in a given moment without uniforms and did this- went out killing a lot of people and such. This happened a lot, man, in the past. Unfortunately... It's a side... It's a sad time, you know, of... [the Police].

**Pereira:** Inclusive, nessa época foi a *chacina* da- chamada de Vigário Geral. Você já ouviu falar, *Chacina de Vigário Geral*. Foi noventa e dois, se eu não me engano. [...] Então houve lá uma *chacina*, porque foram quatro policiais que morreram em determinado momento lá no patrulhamento e depois os caras vieram lá... em determinado momento à paisana e fizeram essa- saíram matando um montão de gente e tal. Acontecia muito isso, cara, antigamente. Infelizmente... É um lado... É um período triste, sabe, da... [Polícia].

“*Chacina*”, once described in a Washington Post article as “the most chilling word in Brazil”, “derives from the killing of pigs in slaughterhouses, and it literally means slaughter or massacre” (SIMS, 2016), being used to describe occurrences when the police kill multiple people at once. After Pereira told me about his view for the *Chacina de Vigário Geral*, occurred in 1992, I asked him what made it different from an operation that had happened in Jacarezinho in 2021 and was also labeled as a *chacina*.

**Pereira:** This one from the past, notoriously, was a revenge. Because the majority there, maybe eighty, ninety percent weren’t evil people, let’s put it this way, right? They [victims] weren’t involved [in drug trafficking], they [police] were killing randomly. It was *chacina*. They didn’t have criteria. That was a revenge, properly called. Not here. This one, which is called a *chacina*, right? [...] I know that there... maybe there were one or two people that I will call “collateral damage”, right, who were hit, but there, man, between ninety, ninety-nine percent of individuals who died there [Jacarezinho] were drug traffickers. [...] In these last two that happened they were drug traffickers, do you understand?

**Pereira:** Essa do passado, notoriamente, foi uma vingança. Porque a maioria ali, talvez oitenta, noventa por cento não eram pessoas do mal, vamos dizer assim, né? Não eram envolvidos, eles tavam matando aleatoriamente. Foi *chacina*. Não se tinha aquele critério. Ali foi uma vingança, propriamente dito. Aqui não. Essa, que é chamada de *chacina*, né? [...] Eu sei que ali... talvez teve uma ou duas pessoas que vou chamar de “danos colaterais”, né, que tenham sido atingidas, mas ali cara, entre noventa, noventa e nove por cento de indivíduos que morreram ali eram narcotraficantes. [...] Nessas duas últimas que houveram aí, eram narcotraficantes, entende?

According to David Campbell, when war is used to demarcate identities,

[...] our complicity in evil is erased, responsibility for evil is assigned to another, and an agent capable of bearing blame is constituted. In these terms, we can argue that war – perhaps more clearly than other political practice – manifests a moral economy of culpability that simultaneously condemns and absolves (CAMPBELL, 1993, p. 3).

One of the most surprising narrative dissonances from the police officers I interviewed is a direct consequence of this moral economy of war: that whenever the police killed someone, it was an accident, but whenever someone was killed by the police, the dead were not innocent.



**Rodrigues:** Just like at Jacarezinho. There was now, not so long ago, I don't know if it was the year before last, it was before the pandemic, they killed a Civil Police officer there. And then the Police killed I believe... I don't know if it was eighteen *bandidos*... But inside they were exchanging shots with *bandidos* all day long, man. The *bandidos* made barricades and all... Do you understand? And then the people went to the streets thinking that... Right? The people from PSOL [Socialism and Liberty Party] said: "ah, the police killed, committed excesses." They didn't commit anything. But what about the police officer that got shot in the head inside there? Do you understand? They had barricades, they had concrete walls with holes to shoot at the Police. But the Police goes in a bigger number, they had mapped everything before, that thing I told you too about the resident [informants], which gives the coordinates, the Police went and... got [them] and killed [them], right? Then the press sometimes sees only this side, sees only the side that "ah, [they] killed eighteen," but doesn't see what happened inside there. [...] Then this happens a lot. You can see. When this happens, you see the criminal record of the guy that dies so you'll see. Do you understand? How he has a lot of crimes, a lot of things. [...] The majority, man – trust me –, the majority, ninety-nine percent [of the dead] when it happens that the Police killed, I don't know what, the guy is really *vagabundo*. [The Police] didn't kill innocents, no. Do you understand? It is very difficult. Unless it is a stray bullet. It is very different if a stray bullet hits a person that was on the other side than [if it hits] a person that was there in the midst of the *bandido* that died there. "Ah, he was a worker, I don't know what..." Do you understand? It is very different [from when] a bullet- the guy is there, 200 meters from there, from a group

**Rodrigues:** Igual lá no Jacarezinho. Teve agora há pouco tempo lá, não sei se ano retrasado, foi antes da pandemia, mataram um policial civil lá. Aí a Polícia matou acho que... não sei se foi dezoito *bandido*... Mas lá dentro eles estavam trocando tiro com *bandido*, o dia todo, cara. Os *bandidos* fizeram barricada, tudo... Entendeu? Aí o povo foi pra rua achando que... Né? A pessoal do PSOL falou "ah, polícia matou, cometeu excesso." Cometeu nada. Mas e o polícia que tomou um tiro na cabeça lá dentro? Entendeu? Eles tinham barricada, eles tinham umas paredes de concreto furada pra atirar na Polícia. Mas a Polícia vai um número maior, antes disso já mapeou tudo, aquele lance que eu te falei também do morador, que já as coordenadas, a Polícia foi lá e... pegou e matou, né? Aí a imprensa às vezes só vê esse lado, só vê o lado que "ah, matou dezoito", mas não vê o que que aconteceu lá dentro. [...] Aí acontece muito isso. Tu pode ver. Quando acontece isso, tu vê a ficha regressa do cara que morreu pra você ver. Entendeu? Como é que tem um monte de crime, um monte de coisa. [...] A maioria, cara, – vai por mim – a maioria, noventa e nove por cento quando acontece isso que a Polícia matou, não sei o quê, o cara é *vagabundo* mesmo. Não matou inocente não. Entendeu? É muito difícil. A não ser quando tem uma bala perdida. É muita diferente se uma bala perdida pega uma pessoa que tava no outro lado do que uma pessoa que tava ali no meio do *bandido* que morreu ali. "Ah, ele era trabalhador, não sei o quê..." Entendeu? É muito diferente uma bala- o cara tá lá, duzentos metro de lá de um grupo que tá ali e o cara tava ali no meio. O pessoal que tá ali é o que eu te falei, eles são.. os traficantes é que mandam, né? "Desce lá, taca fogo no ônibus. Vai. Faz tumulto. Para o trânsito!" Entendeu? Aí a imprensa vai, aí entrevista o morador "ah, eles vieram aqui, bateram, mataram,

that is there, and the guy is there in the midst. The people that are there are what I told you, they are... the drug dealers that ordered them, right? “Go down there, set fire to the bus. Go. Make a ruckus. Stop the transit!” Do you understand? And then the press goes, then [they] interview a resident: “ah, they came here, assaulted, killed, invaded my home...” But none of it happened.

**Pereira:** [...] So an operation is set up, but unfortunately... sometimes you have some kind of collateral damage. Right? But get it, man, ninety-five to ninety-nine percent of who dies there is involved [in drug trafficking]. Do you understand? Because this is not the- Ah, and there is a lot- a lot of things are the following, Victor: sometimes the guy, the individual there, the citizen involved there in drug trafficking dies and... – this has already happened many times –, the guy comes- when the poli- then he shoots, the guy is shooting here, you shot him there, the guy falls. Until you get to him there, the weaponry- they already took his weaponry and put \*many times\* a lunchbox [in its place]. Or an umbrella. “*Pô*, he had an umbrella in his hands...” Or a pizza. “*Pô*, he was a pizza delivery man...” Are you understanding? They mask... there the criminal’s life... right? And transform him in a “*pô*, poor man, I don’t know what...”, but the guy had a criminal record, the guy had everything and was there, do you understand? Nobody is- It doesn’t exist this idea that “ah, the Police came shooting”, it doesn’t exist, man, it [the Police] will counter the unjust aggression, like I told you. Do you understand?

invadiram minha casa...”, mas não aconteceu nada disso.

**Pereira:** [...] Então monta-se uma operação, mas infelizmente... você às vezes tem algum tipo de dano colateral. Né? Mas bota aí cara, noventa e cinco a noventa e nove por cento de quem morre ali tem envolvimento. Entendeu? Porque não é essa- Ah, e tem muita- muita coisa é o seguinte, ô Victor: às vezes o cara, o indivíduo lá, o cidadão envolvido lá no tráfico morre e... – isso já aconteceu muitas vezes –, o cara chega- quando o poli- aí ele atirou, o cara tá atirando aqui, você atirou nele lá, o cara caiu. Até você chegar nele lá, o armamento- já tiraram o armamento dele e botaram \*muitas vezes\* uma quentinha. Ou um guarda-chuva – “*pô*, ele tava com um guarda-chuva na mão...” – ou uma pizza – “*pô*, ele era entregador de pizza...”, tá entendendo? Eles mascaram... ali a vida do criminoso... né? E o transformam num “*pô*, coitado, não sei o que...”, mas o cara tinha passagem, o cara tinha tudo e tava lá, entende? Ninguém é- Não existe essa ideia de “ah, a Polícia entrou atirando”, não existe, cara, ela vai revidar a injusta agressão, como eu te falei. Entende?

The deliberate killing of people with criminal records, either by vigilante groups or off-duty moonlighting police officers, is a widespread practice in Brazil (MALLART; GODOI, 2017).

The matter of innocence and intentionality is inexorably tied to war. As discussed by Nadia Abu El-Haj, the accidental, unintentional killing of civilians in war is not illegal, being instead accounted for as “collateral damage” whenever these deaths occur in the “pursuit of a legitimate military objective and the number of deaths is ‘proportional’ to that objective” (EL-HAJ, 2014). This might be one of the intended results of war rhetoric for police operations in Rio de Janeiro. Civilians, when considered as such (EILBAUM; MEDEIROS, 2015), are collateral damages, or, as Silva defended, nothing more than a work accident.

**Silva:** Of course, no police officer wants that [“an upstanding citizen gets hurt”]. Now, in the necessity of invading a *favela*, if, unfortunately, the shot hits someone, the police officer is \*arrested\* for an \*intentional\* crime. This is not possible. It is unacceptable... It was unintentional! It was an accident! He didn’t aim at a resident and shot him, which the \*vagabundos\* do! The *vagabundos*, when the police officer enters the *morro*, they shoot \*at\* the resident so that the police officer \*stops\* and rescues, and also get blamed for that shot... for that death or not. It is hard, Victor. [...] Now, during an exchange of shots, Vict- It didn’t exist... Justice itself didn’t see it like this. It is nothing more than a work accident, Victor. Because he is doing his job and unfortunately, in an exchange of shots, the shot he fired \*at the bandido\* hit someone. Because many *bandidos* order the population to go to the street. Exactly so that the police officer doesn’t shoot them [drug dealers] and they can shoot at the police officer. Do you understand? And a lot of *vagabundo* residents, that has a *bandido* in the family, they also go willingly! Go to the streets, right, after someone dies... [Making a high-pitched voice, mockingly] “But- ah, they killed the *bandido*, killed the friend, killed the...” –

**Silva:** Claro, nenhum policial quer isso [“que alguma pessoa de bem venha a se ferir”]. Agora, na necessidade de você invadir uma favela, se, infelizmente, o tiro pegou alguém, policial é \*preso\* por crime \*doloso\*. Não é possível. É inadmissível isso... Foi culposo! Foi um acidente! Ele não mirou um morador e deu um tiro, o que os \*vagabundos\* fazem! Os *vagabundos*, quando policial entra no morro, eles dão tiro \*no\* morador pra o policial \*parar\* e socorrer, e ainda ser culpado por aquele tiro... por aquela morte ou não. Tá difícil, Victor. [...] Agora, numa troca de tiro, Vict- Não existia isso... A própria justiça não via assim. Via como um trabalho policial. Como é que é o nome disso? \*Acidente de trabalho\*. Nada mais é do que um acidente de trabalho, Victor. Porque ele tá fazendo o trabalho dele e infelizmente, em troca de tiro, o tiro que ele deu \*no bandido\*, pegou em alguém. Porque muitos *bandidos* mandam a população ir pra rua. Justamente pra que o policial não dê tiro neles e eles possam dar no policial. Entendeu? E muito morador *vagabundo*, que tem *bandido* na família, eles também vão por vontade própria! Vão pras ruas, né, depois que morre alguém... [Fazendo voz fina, de desdém] “Mas e- ah, mataram o *bandido*, mataram o amigo, mataram o...” - porra, não existe isso. Rio de Janeiro tá entregue.

fuck, this doesn't exist. Rio de Janeiro is given.

However, as Bittner says, the “effects [of rhetorical figures of speech in public life] are not easily confined. Insofar as they involve exaggeration, they appear to sanction more than calculating advocates intend” (BITTNER, 1970, p. 49). Just as the “war” is confirmed by the weapons of war used by criminals, so it justifies the purchase of weapons of war for the police, making police operations increasingly lethal for civilians, criminals, and police officers alike. After all, “the policization of war can imply the eradication of the distinction between combatants and civilians in a ‘total war’ through the wholesale criminalization of the enemy” (DUBBER; VALVERDE, 2006, p. 13). As W.E.B. Du Bois argues, “[t]he cause of war is preparation for war” (DU BOIS, 1917, p. 446). If the *favelas* are theaters of war, any resulting deaths are then justified. “Soldiers”, both enemy and ally, die as part of the normality of the engagements. This way, if the war rhetoric justifies the necessity and the consequences of police violence, it also banalizes police victimization.

As one high-ranking civil police officer said in response to a journalist's question about a recent police operation in a north zone *favela* that had left innocent people dead: ‘*na guerra, quem morre não é inocente*’. ‘In war, those who die are not innocent’ (HUSAIN, 2007, p. 272).

Finally, even if these deaths are unintentional, most are also predictable (EL-HAJ, 2014), therefore preventable. “War”, in this context, can be used in a fourth way. Not as a description of violence, as when the police narrate their work, neither as an explanation of violence, as when reports propose reforms, nor as a justification for violence, as I have argued it is used in Rio de Janeiro. To claim that Rio de Janeiro is in war is also often a protest of the police's constant exertion of lethal violence. For instance, as Ana Luiza Pinheiro Flauzina argues,

The high degree of lethality with which [the police, as agency holder of an expressive degree of discretionary power,] operates can be demonstrated by the data of its intervention, in numbers that get close to situations of war (FLAUZINA, 2017, p. 133; see also: HUGGINS, 2010, p. 75).

On the eve of her untimely assassination in the streets of Rio de Janeiro, councilwoman Marielle Franco tweeted words that have been often repeated since:

“*Quantos mais vão precisar morrer para que essa guerra acabe?*” “How many more will have to die for this war to end?” (MARIELLE FRANCO, 2018).

### 3.2. From Law as Limit, to the Limits of the Law

During the interviews, the police officers presented an estranged relationship to justice: instead of letting the police officers do their jobs, the Judiciary forbids their operations and punishes their actions.

**Silva:** It is like they say, right? No one believes in God and [everyone] hates the Police, right? But when [someone] is under the sights of a *bandido*'s gun, prays to God and clamors for the Police [laughing], do you understand? But this is normal, this, we are even used to it. But today we can't take it anymore. Today we can't. Today it's hard- the police officer is afraid- the police officer dies with a weapon on his hands because he is afraid of shooting, Victor. \*Is afraid\* of shooting! Because [of] this shot [he] can be condemned for firing at random... According to their [the Justice's, the media's, the people's] understanding, right? “Ah, there was no need to fire this shot”. “Pô, but I shot up, to draw attention.” “No, this shot will fall somewhere... [You] shouldn't...” And then you hit someone, right, who is not the *bandido*. “No, you are guilty, it was a random shot, it was... an intentional crime! You had the will to hurt or kill that person.” Pô, and of course it's not. Do you understand? The guy- police officer is working. Unfortunately, the shot he fired at the *\*bandido\** didn't hit the *bandido* but hit the person over there. But he aimed at the *bandido*. And what about when it hits the *bandido*? [Laughs in disbelief] And he is guilty of hitting the *bandido*? Will he go to a custody hearing? 'Cause this is how it works today. We are here now, a *bandido* comes in, I shoot him... and then he goes to

**Silva:** É como dizem aí, né? Ninguém acredita em Deus e [todo mundo] odeia a polícia, né? Mas quando tá sobre mira de arma de bandido, reza a Deus e clama pela polícia [rindo], entendeu? Mas é normal, isso, a gente tá até acostumado com isso. Mas hoje não dá pra aguentar mais. Hoje não dá. Hoje tá difícil- o policial tem me- o policial morre com arma na mão porque tem medo de dar tiro, Victor. \*Tem medo\* de dar tiro! Porque esse tiro pode ser condenado por ter dado um tiro a esmo... Segundo o entendimento deles, né? “Ah, não tinha necessidade de ter dado esse tiro”. “Pô, mas eu dei pro alto, pra chamar atenção”. “Não, esse tiro vai cair em algum lugar... não deveria...”. Aí você acerta alguém, né, que não seja o bandido – “não, você é culpado, foi um tiro a erro, foi... crime doloso! Você teve a intenção de ferir ou matar aquela pessoa”. Pô, e claro que não é. Entendeu? O cara- policial tá trabalhando. Infelizmente o tiro que ele deu no *\*bandido\** não acertou no bandido, mas acertou a pessoa lá atrás. Mas ele mirou no bandido. E quando acerta o bandido? [Risada de incredulidade] E ele é culpado por ter acertado o bandido? Ele vai pra uma audiência de custódia? Que hoje é assim que funciona. A gente tá aqui agora, entra um bandido, eu dou um tiro nele... aí foi lá pro hospital e tal, ou não, ou tomou de raspão, prendeu o bandido, vai pra uma audiência de custódia, aí o juiz vai sentar

the hospital and such, or not, it was grazed, [you] arrest the *bandido*, [he] goes to a custody hearing, and then the judge will sit you, police officer, and the *bandido*. The *juíza* [female judge], or *juíz* [male judge], will look – the judgment – will look at the *bandido*, [and will] talk like this: “are you okay, sir?” “Anh, I am.” “What has happened?” And then you, beside [him], will say: “your honor, I am the police officer responsible for the arrest... can I speak?” “You, sir, wait for me to talk to you. I am talking to the victim.” It is like this, Victor. Can one be a police officer like this? We can’t. Will I talk to the victim- [Freudian slip]: “do you, sir, feel or have you felt coerced? Did he utter profanities? Have you, sir, felt threatened?” \*This\* is how the Justice talks to *bandidos*. How can one be a police officer nowadays? It can’t be, Victor. You can’t be a police officer.

você, policial, e o bandido. A juíza, ou o juiz, vai olhar – o juízo, né? – vai olhar pro bandido, fala assim: “o senhor está bem?”. “Anh, estou”. “O quê que aconteceu?”. Aí você, ao lado, vai falar: “excelência, eu que sou o policial responsável pela prisão... eu posso falar?”. “O senhor aguarde eu me dirigir ao senhor. Eu to falando com a vítima”. É desse jeito, Victor. Dá pra ser policial assim? Não dá. Eu vou falar com a vítima: “o senhor se sente, ou se sentiu, constrangido?”. “Ele proferiu palavras de baixo calão?” “O senhor se sentiu ameaçado?” “O senhor se sente ameaçado?”. É \*assim\* que a justiça fala com bandido. Como é que vai ser polícia hoje em dia? Não pode, Victor. Não pode ser polícia.

This was also found by a recently published research by the *Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública* (“Brazilian Forum of Public Security”) (FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA, 2023). This harshness that they protest, however, is in stark contrast to what the literature about police violence documents (BITTNER, 1970, p. 38; MISSE; GRILLO; NERI, 2015, p. 60). Police officers are rarely investigated. When they are, prosecution rarely follows. If it does, they are rarely punished or held accountable (see: PINHEIRO, 2000, p. 129). As Loader argues, “[o]ne does not have to believe that prosecuting officers is the key to reducing the number of deaths in police [actions] to see that there is something here that stands in need of explanation” (LOADER, 2020, p. 14).

Amnesty International’s *You Killed My Son* describes many layers of the justice system’s complicity and negligence. Those are often the reasons why

Those who die after police contact find several roadblocks in the way of successfully achieving such status [victim]. There is ample evidence over the years of such roadblocks having been erected by the police (LOADER, 2020, p. 8).

For instance, deaths in police operations that are not registered as resulting from police intervention are unlikely to lead either to the identification of the person who fired the shots, or to accountability for whoever is responsible (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2015, p. 55), and in cases that are registered as killings resulting from police intervention the investigation process is seriously flawed and rarely lead to sentencing (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2015, p. 67). For the Amnesty International, “This impunity feeds back into the cycle of violence and reveals problems in the criminal investigation and in the criminal justice system as a whole, which includes the Civil Police, the Public Prosecution Service and the Judiciary” (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2015, p. 67).

The same report presents the results of an examination of the 220 proceedings that were opened by the Civil Police in 2011 to investigate killings resulting from police intervention or resistance followed by death. Four years had passed, and 183 investigations were still underway, 12 had their shelvings requested and 5 of these were due to lack of evidence or witnesses. Out of these 220 proceedings, only one has led to the police officers involved being prosecuted by the Public Prosecution Service (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2015, p. 69). When there are investigations, they are often delayed indefinitely in a process “in which the police station refers the inquiry to the Public Prosecution Service, which then sends it back to the police station with new requests for information, and so on” (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2015, p. 69). Finally, even when investigations lead to charges being filed against police officers, the judiciary itself may prevent the trial:

In one of the cases that Amnesty International has documented, the judge used the arguments of “self-defence” and “criminal resistance” to reject the charges filed by the Public Prosecution Service and prevent the homicide committed by a Military Police officer from going to court (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2015, p. 72)

For a prosecutor that has worked in cases like this, “said judges were being conniving with the excesses committed by the police against the population that resides in *favelas*” (MISSE; GRILLO; NERI, 2015, p. 60). As such, Juliana Farias insists “that we don’t lose sight of the [governmental] machinery [that manages these deaths]” (FARIAS, 2020, p. 204).

The police officers I interviewed are also hardly unaware of practices of concealment of responsibility and obstruction of investigations. During our interview, Larrey shared an outraged disbelief at the investigation for procedural fraud of a Military Police unit that, according to her, were being accused of tampering with a confrontation scene when trying to administer first aid to wounded criminals. This protest included the counterfactual that had they left the criminals without care and the scene, therefore, untampered, there would still probably be an investigation about their negligence, proving the justice's harshness against the police.

**Larrey:** We have a unit from the *Batalhão de Choque* that is answering for procedural fraud for having rescued individuals who were criminals, [who] were shooting at them, but that they had [first aid] knowledge, rescued, but when you \*rescue\*, you tamper with the place. So they are answering for procedural fraud. But what if they hadn't rescued? Would they answer for failure to help? So what does the Justice expect from the police officer? [...] It is easy for us to discuss here sitting down, calm. But the guy that is under fire there, I must give him legal safeguards as well.

**Larrey:** A gente tem uma guarnição do Batalhão de Choque que tá respondendo por fraude processual por ter socorrido indivíduos que eram criminosos, tavam atirando contra eles, mas que eles tinham conhecimento, socorreram, só que no que você \*socorre\*, você desfaz o local. Então eles estão respondendo por fraude processual. Mas se eles não tivessem socorrido? Iam responder por omissão de socorro? Então o que que a Justiça espera do policial? [...] É fácil a gente discutir aqui sentado, calmo. Mas o cara que tá sob tiro lá, eu preciso dar salvaguarda jurídica pra ele também.

However, the removal of bodies under the pretext of administering care is a common practice after executions and *chacinas* in the *favelas*, being one of the ways in which police officers add weight to the claim that the deaths occurred in a confrontation. When they arrive at a hospital with the alleged criminal's lifeless body stowed in the back of the police car – in violation of police protocols ordering that any removal must be made only with specific ambulances –, they claim the death occurred on the way to the hospital, adding extra layers of deniability (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2015, p. 72–73; FARIAS, 2020, p. 200–201; MISSE; GRILLO; NERI, 2015, p. 52).



Another practice of obstruction is exemplified by Pereira, who, for his part, made the claim that the police doesn't enter the *favelas* shooting and, instead, will only "counter the unjust aggression."

**Pereira:** It doesn't exist this idea that "ah, the Police came shooting", it doesn't exist, man, it [the Police] will *counter the unjust aggression*, like I told you. Do you understand? [Emphasis added]

**Pereira:** Não existe essa ideia de "ah, a Polícia entrou atirando", não existe, cara, ela vai *revidar a injusta agressão*, como eu te falei. Entende? [Ênfase adicionada]

To "counter unjust aggression" was the same reason another participant offered for his employment of violence in a distressing situation.

**Rodrigues:** I worked a long time, boy. I got to where I am, man, because I always worked right. Do you understand? \*Always\* worked right. Never- I was never one to act with truculence... Yeah... There is that case, as well, that you *counter... unjust aggression*. You are going into a situation... Once I went to... to a bar inside Jacarezinho, there. There was a complaint there that drugs were being sold. Then we got there, the guys... Twenty came- It was me and three colleagues more, only, and there was a group with more than ten. They came at us, we had to... right? Take a stance, right? To arrest them. We fired some shots up, surrounded [them]...

**Rodrigues:** Trabalhei muito tempo, rapaz. Eu cheguei até onde cheguei, cara, porque eu sempre trabalhei certo. Entendeu? \*Sempre\* trabalhei certo. Nunca- nunca fui de agir com truculência... É... Existe aquele caso, também, de você *revidar... injusta agressão*. Você tá entrando numa situação... Uma vez eu fui num... num bar lá dentro do Jacarezinho, lá. Tinha uma denúncia lá que tava vendendo droga. Aí chegamos lá, os cara... Vieram vinte- Era eu e mais três colega, só, e tinha um grupo de mais de dez. Vieram pra cima da gente, a gente teve que... né? Tomar uma atitude, né? Pra prender eles. Demos uns tiros pro alto, cercamos...

This choice of words is not inoffensive. When police officers register a casualty as an *auto de resistência* [resistance followed with death] – an infamous procedure often used to legitimize police violence and avoid investigation (COSTA JÚNIOR, 1985, p. 97–98; EILBAUM; MEDEIROS, 2015; OLIVEIRA, 2017, p. 67) – they must fill out a *Registro de Ocorrências* ("Occurrence Register"), detailing what happened, and, alongside with it, every officer involved must present their *Termos de Declaração* ("Declaration Terms"), describing the situation as its witnesses. The content of these testimonials are almost always virtually identical, the only changes

being the authors' names and their specific participations (MISSE; GRILLO; NERI, 2015, p. 49–50).

In most of the analyzed cases, the *Termos de Declaração* said that the police officers were in a routine patrol or in an operation, next to or in a locality dominated by armed groups of drug dealers, when they were sprayed with bullets and, therefore, *countered the “unjust aggression”* (MISSE; GRILLO; NERI, 2015, p. 50, emphasis added)

I do not claim that these police officers have murdered citizens and legitimized their violences after the fact using *autos de resistência*, but that the exact same words were found by other researchers in these documents and spoken by different interlocutors during the interviews I conducted should show the extent to which the police's socialization on justifications of violence is pervasive.

Conversely, I have also encountered instances in which the police officers project the practices of concealment to the criminals and their accomplices.

**Pereira:** Ah, and there is a lot- a lot of things are the following, Victor: sometimes the guy, the individual there, the citizen involved there in drug trafficking dies and... – this has already happened many times –, the guy comes- when the poli- then he shoots, the guy is shooting here, you shot him there, the guy falls. Until you get to him there, the weaponry- they already took his weaponry and put \*many times\* a lunchbox [in its place]. Or an umbrella. “Pô, he had an umbrella in his hands...” Or a pizza. “Pô, he was a pizza delivery man...” Are you understanding? They mask... there the criminal's life... right? And transform him in a “pô, poor man, I don't know what...”, but the guy had a criminal record, the guy had everything and was there, do you understand? [...] And that's what I tell you, some [say] “ah, but not my son, my son wasn't, my son...” ‘Cause there's this thing, that the guy sometimes until you get there, the guy undid that configuration, does away with the armament and put it there, you know, like... Or sometimes the press itself. There's the

**Pereira:** Ah, e tem muita- muita coisa é o seguinte, ô Victor: às vezes o cara, o indivíduo lá, o cidadão envolvido lá no tráfico morre e... – isso já aconteceu muitas vezes –, o cara chega- quando o poli- aí ele atirou, o cara tá atirando aqui, você atirou nele lá, o cara caiu. Até você chegar nele lá, o armamento- já tiraram o armamento dele e botaram \*muitas vezes\* uma quentinha. Ou um guarda-chuva – “pô, ele tava com um guarda-chuva na mão...” – ou uma pizza – “pô, ele era entregador de pizza...”, tá entendendo? Eles mascaram... ali a vida do criminoso... né? E o transformam num “pô, coitado, não sei o que...”, mas o cara tinha passagem, o cara tinha tudo e tava lá, entende? [...] E é o que eu te falo, alguns [dizem] “ah, mas meu filho não, meu filho não era, meu filho...” Que tem esse lance, que o cara às vezes até você chegar lá, o cara desfez aquela configuração, some com o armamento e coloca ele ali, entende, como... Ou às vezes a própria mídia. Tem lá a foto do

guy's photo there, but it [the press] deletes it – Globo did that a lot, they erase the gun there, erase it and stuff. cara, mas ela apaga – a Globo fez muito isso, ela apaga lá a arma, apaga e tal.

In this single excerpt, Pereira mentions separate occasions in which police officers killed citizens and later tried to explain their deaths by claiming to have mistaken everyday objects with weapons: on October 21<sup>st</sup>, 2021, a 17-year-old deliveryman holding a lunchbox was shot dead by Civil Police officers in São Paulo; and on September 17<sup>th</sup>, 2018, a 26-year-old man holding an umbrella to wait for his kids on a rainy day was shot dead by police officers from the UPP. Other objects have also been allegedly mistaken by police officers, resulting in many other deaths (RAMOS, 2023; YAHOO NOTÍCIAS, 2021).

When trying to defend the police, Nunes used the number of incarcerated officers to support his claim that the police are not more prone to violence than the rest of society. Even if we accept that the number of people jailed is a good indicator of the incidence of some crime – which I don't –, Nunes' data undermine his colleagues claim of unfair persecution by the justice system.

**Nunes:** Of course that it's not all police officers [that are aggressive], otherwise we would have an enormous number of police officers there [incarcerated]. If you go to DEPEN [National Penitentiary Department] now, there are 130 police officers incarcerated in a universe of 150 thousand Military Police officers. They are very few. Very few.

**Nunes:** É claro que não são todos os policiais [que são agressivos], se não a gente tava tendo um número enorme de policiais aí [presos]. Se você for no DEPEN [Departamento Penitenciário Nacional] agora, tem 130 policiais presos num universo de 150 mil policiais militares. É muito pouco. Muito pouco.

This account of the number of incarcerated police officers, if accurate, may even provide further evidence that police prosecutions are rare, if not virtually unfeasible. As Holloway says, “[i]t is a fundamental methodological fallacy to assume that records of arrests and reported events reflect the incidence of crime. What these data measure is the functioning of the police system” (HOLLOWAY, 1993, p. 78). With limited resources, the police routinely chooses which occurrences to prioritize

and initiate investigative and judicial procedures. It stands to reason that, when opportune, they can also deliberately neglect to do so (BRETAS, 1997a, p. 24). If very few military police officers are jailed, it is not far-fetched to suspect of police disregard.

Ian Loader argues that police officers, seeing themselves as having been allocated society's dirty work, feel like they have an unconscious mandate, which the rest of us bestowed upon them, to do what is necessary to manage disorderly elements on our behalf (see also: FASSIN, 2019, p. 559). This belief comes from their view that their jobs is dangerous, but that they are willing to face the risks in order to protect us and keep chaos at bay, which imbues police work, in their own eyes, with a righteous and heroic quality. As such, their sacrifice needs honoring, they believe, and this means limiting what can legitimately be said and done in criticism of the police when things go wrong (LOADER, 2020, p. 12–13). From this cognitive lens, any criticism is too much criticism. Accountability, then, verges on persecution.

**Silva:** This is what I am telling you. That he [police officer] is kept from working dignifiedly because he is answering to an inquiry. “Ah, I won’t promote him,” I killed a dangerous *vagabundo*... “Ah, no, I won’t [promote him] because he is answering to an inquiry.” But, *pô*, he took part in that arrest, took part in the death of that *bandido*. Just because he is answering to an inquiry, so what? But he went there, he put his body, put his face, did the job... But won’t [get promoted]. This is what happened to me. Do you understand? Today I earn this low salary... relatively low, right? Because I could be earning *\*triple\**. Do you understand? Because I *\*did\**. Produced. Do you understand? But... Yeah... It’s no use, it’s the system. Do you understand? So this system has to change *\*a lot\**.

**Silva:** É isso que eu tô falando. Que ele é impedido de trabalhar dignamente porque tá respondendo inquérito. “Ah, eu não vou promover ele”. Eu matei um vagabundo perigoso... “ah não, eu não vou [promovê-lo] porque ele tá respondendo inquérito” – mas, *pô*, ele participou daquela prisão, participou da morte daquele bandido. Só porque ele tá respondendo inquérito, e aí? Mas ele foi lá, ele botou o corpo, botou a cara, fez o trabalho... Mas não vai. Isso que aconteceu comigo. Entendeu? Hoje eu ganho esse salário baixo... razoavelmente baixo, né? Porque eu poderia tá ganhando o *\*triplo\**. Entendeu? Porque *\*fiz\**. Produzi. Entendeu? Mas... É... não adianta, é o sistema. Entendeu? Então tem que mudar *\*muito\** esse sistema.

But there are other things at play here. The very demands for accountability make part of, and reinforce, the ideological and institutional structure that allow and,

indeed, demand police violence, particularly when articulated in terms of war (LEITE, 2000, p. 79).

Whenever a new case of police violence emerges, it is presented and denounced as an instance of “abuse” or “excess” (BONNER et al., 2018). As Fassin argues, to present police violence simply as being “an excess in the use of force, [...] is how authorities often tend to minimize such incidents”, and when it is translated to legal language, that it “would be inappropriate and disproportionate use of coercion”, it becomes a simple matter of a lawsuit “which [...] the defendants’ lawyers try to dismiss” (FASSIN, 2019, p. 547), something that is quite easily done, as discussed. Regardless, as it is presented as an excess, the outrage is then followed by demands for justice, understood as investigation, prosecution, punishment – not unlike the police officers’ process for the dispensation of extralegal justice (FASSIN, 2019, p. 542–543). There are also demands for more accountability for the police and for legislative measures to curb police violence. In short, demands that police power is limited by law. If police officers are acting above, beyond, or outside the law, they must then be reined in, brought back to the bounds of law. As Neocleous says, “[a] number of writers on the police have responded to the problems identified above by demanding a ‘return to legality’ and the imposition of a properly functioning rule of law” (NEOCLEOUS, 2000a, p. 106), as “the general assumption is that there is some sharp divide between discretion, as the exercise of power on an everyday level, and the rule of law” (NEOCLEOUS, 2000a, p. 107). From this assumption, which Ronald E. Ahnen traces to liberal philosophy, leftist analysts and politicians “emphasize [...] protecting the rights of individuals apprehended by the police and the need to reduce and punish possible excess use of force against citizens by police officers” (AHNEN, 2007, p. 147). Therefore, “law becomes a mystical answer to the problems posed by power. In the process, the problems inherent in law are ignored” (NEOCLEOUS, 2000a, p. 107–108).

This faith in the justice system is widespread. Reports by NGOs, for instance, are great documentations of violence, but they too fall for the impunity hypothesis. Human Rights Watch report *Lethal Force* asserts that “[t]he surest way to curb unlawful police killings is to ensure that the officers who commit them are

brought to justice” (DELGADO, 2009, p. 6). The follow-up report, *Good Cops are Afraid*, calls impunity one of the “main factors responsible for perpetuating the unlawful use of lethal force by police” (MUÑOZ ACEBES, 2016, p. 98) and argues that:

Participation in unlawful killings or cover ups, particularly when there is no accountability, can have an insidious impact on police officers’ overall conduct. [...] A Rio officer who can successfully rationalize his own misconduct may find it easier to cross the line the next time, perpetuating a cycle of violence on the street [...]. After officers kill with impunity, they are more likely to engage in corruption and other crimes [...] (MUÑOZ ACEBES, 2016, p. 84–85).

Following the same logic, Amnesty International’s *You Killed My Son*, argue that

The lack of proper investigations and punishment of those responsible for killings resulting from police intervention sends out a message that those deaths are permitted and tolerated by the authorities. The high level of impunity feeds the spiral of violence (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 2015, p. 86).

Scholars are not exempt from following this logic. For Pinheiro, the “common denominator of all these cases [of police violence] is impunity. The failure of not enforcing the law [...] [j]ust feeds back the circle of officially sanctioned violence” (PINHEIRO, 1997, p. 44–45). He’s not alone in this regard (HUGGINS, 2002, p. 212; HUGGINS; HARITOS-FATOUROS; ZIMBARDO, 2002, p. xvii; MENA, 2015, p. 20, 22). Curiously enough, this is the same logic underpinning police extrajudicial activity. The justice is too lenient with the criminals, which makes them more violent, and then harsher penalties are required. As Martha Huggins proposes, “death squads are encouraged on the one hand by the state’s seeming failure to control violence and on the other by pressures, explicit or implicit, against the state using certain kinds of violence” (HUGGINS, 2002, p. 211). The limits of the law must, then, be enforced (and reinforced) (BRETAS, 1997b, p. 115). “This is the theory, now hegemonic, that violence stems from impunity and fear (or lack thereof)” (DUNKER, 2015, p. 48, my translation).

According to Loader, these demands stem from the same liberal discourse that enable such actions, a discourse “rooted in the idea of the police as a rule-bound, governed and reform-able institution” (LOADER, 2020, p. 5). As he shows, these reports of police conduct often follow the same pattern: “[i]ts recurrent features include the identification of the same failings, the regurgitation of broadly

similar remedies, the failure to implement those remedies and the bemoaning of that failure” (LOADER, 2020, p. 6; see also: SILVA; SANTOS; RAMOS, 2019, p. 20), which spurs “a meta-recommendation: a recommendation to set up a body to ensure that previous recommendations are monitored and acted upon” (LOADER, 2020, p. 7). Even if it was the case that the liberal discourse is right, the police have a wide range of strategies and techniques of concealment and obstruction of investigations and prosecutions, which lead to an astoundingly low number of cases that lead to the arrest or to other forms of accountability of police officers, as discussed previously. Any occurrences of punishment or accountability for the police, however rare, that do happen

are an apparatus of oversight aimed at stopping the spread of contagion and putting the symbolic order back together. The breach in the liberal order is managed and repaired in ways that leave unchanged the underlying authority relation in which police are fetishized as vital to the reproduction of the social and protected as such (LOADER, 2020, p. 8).

In this sense, both legalism and the idea of democratic accountability are both, at the same time, legitimizers and concealers of the discretionary and extrajudiciary powers of the police (LOADER, 2020, p. 16).

In arguing that the solution to police violence is to reassert the rule of law, hoping that it returns affairs to a state of “normality” – which may itself be unbearable (FASSIN, 2019; SEIGEL, 2019, p. 523) – “law becomes a mystical answer to the problems posed by power. In the process, the problems inherent in law are ignored” (NEOCLEOUS, 2000a, p. 107–108). As he says, “[i]f there is something wrong with the system of law, then, the problem lies in its administration, personnel or simply the passing of bad laws, and not with Law itself” (NEOCLEOUS, 2000a, p. 109). As a consequence, “criticisms of and challenges to the police are turned into debates about individual acts of individual officers and whether they used their discretion in the most ‘reasonable’ way” (NEOCLEOUS, 2000a, p. 104). What this line of thinking misses, however, is that police discretion is not the root cause of police violence, nor is discretion the reason why “excesses” and “abuses” occur. Discretion, instead, is the logical and inevitable effect of the law and of the police mandate of preserving order.

As Misse says, “in modernity, no one can like violence” (MISSE, 2016, p. 47). Indeed, “the quest for peace by peaceful means is one of the culture traits of modern civilization” (BITTNER, 1970, p. 36). As Bittner continues, “[t]he banishment of all forms of violence from the criminal process, as administered by the courts, has as a corollary the legalization of judicial proceedings”, including the adoption of a method for judgment “in which all decisions are based on exhaustively rational grounds involving the use of explicit legal norms. Most important among those norms are the ones that limit the powers of authority and specify the rights of defendants” (BITTNER, 1970, p. 45). Despite such modern efforts of pacification, however, the necessity of the maintenance of order requires a certain degree of disorder so that the criminal process can be set into motion. In approaching suspects and in demanding their conformity to the rules, rationality must be eschewed in favor of intuition, the legal norms must be sufficiently unclear to warrant and enable action, the powers of authority must be virtually limitless, and the rights of defendants must be eventually breached (BITTNER, 1970, p. 45). Scott explains this well:

Total clarity and predictability in the exercise of power (never fully achieved, of course) would, if achieved, mean zero discretion for the [police] and hence, zero personal power. [...] the actual exercise of power depends on a measure of discretion; the greater the discretion, the greater the (unaccountable) power (SCOTT, 2021, p. 513)

Talking about the police’s discretionary powers (PAIXÃO, 1985, p. 175–176), Neocleous remarks that it is this latitude that shapes the way the police behave, more than legal codes do, as the law is sufficiently flexible for their actions to fall under the rule of “reasonable suspicion” (NEOCLEOUS, 2000a, p. 100–102). As Neder and Naro argue, “[...] where the law didn’t penetrate was precisely inside the field of ‘order’. And law, due to being ambiguous, allowed a broad interpretation by those who were responsible for good order” (NEDER; NARO, 1981, p. 260–261). In the words of Julita Lemgruber,

In the moment that the criminal justice system is set into motion, it is in the hands of the police that rests the interpretation of the law. In the last instance, it depends exclusively on the police officer the decision of arresting or not, charging an individual or not, decree a *flagrante* or not. Furthermore, differently from other actors of the criminal justice system such as prosecutors, judges, etc., the police officer makes legal decisions



in a context of low visibility, which, naturally, favors arbitrariness (LEMGRUBER, 1985b, p. 207).

If violence must be banished and legality must be strictly observed, purity can only be maintained if force and intuition are rejected; if force and intuition are rejected, however, the police can't coerce and impose order (BITTNER, 1970, p. 45). In addition, having the legitimate state prerogative to employ violence in the exercise of their functions, there is a demand that they will do so, in such a way that "the police *gain* legitimacy from inflicting harm" (HARKIN, 2015, p. 48). As Bittner puts it,

police work can, with very few exceptions, accomplish something for somebody only by proceeding against someone else. [...] Admittedly, few of us are constantly mindful of the saying, "He that is without sin among you, let him cast the first stone . . .", but only the police are explicitly required to forget it. The terms of their mandate and the circumstances of their practices do not afford them the leisure to reflect about the deeper aspects of conflicting moral claims. [...] the policeman hazards violating his duty by letting generosity or respect for appearances govern his decisions (BITTNER, 1970, p. 8–9).

The lack of clarity surrounding the police authority to use violence and the demand – from the state, society, and the police themselves (FASSIN, 2019, p. 551) – that it must be used, therefore lead to a paradox (BITTNER, 1970, p. 45, 47; PAIXÃO, 1982, p. 66) that is resolved in the form of discretionary power. Thus, Bittner rightly remarks that

the frequently heard talk about the lawful use of force by the police is practically meaningless and, because no one knows what is meant by it, so is the talk about the use of minimum force. [Thus,] our expectation that policemen will use force, coupled by our refusals to state clearly what we mean by it (aside from sanctimonious homilies), smacks of more than a bit of perversity (BITTNER, 1970, p. 38)

As such, "the police are nothing else than a mechanism for the distribution of situationally justified force in society" (BITTNER, 1970, p. 39) and their discretionary powers are "incidental", and inseparable, "to their authority to use force" (BITTNER, 1970, p. 38). After all, "[t]he order mandate is useless unless combined with the potential use of coercion and it is the police institution that has inherited part of the monopoly of the means of violence possessed by the state" (NEOCLEOUS, 2011, p. 118). Law is rendered to the police officers not as a tool for social control, but as an obstacle to their jobs. If they must protect society from

dangerous criminals, they must not be bothered with such formalities (PINHEIRO, 1997, p. 49).

Loader and Mulcahy define the police's powers of discretion as "extra-legal determinants of practice" (LOADER; MULCAHY, 2003, p. 41). Here, I might add, the prefix "extra" must not equal "illegal", nor must it mean "outside" the law, but "complementing" law. As Bateson argues, "[e]xtralegality requires that an action go beyond the law, which implies an action that is moving in the same direction as the law, but exceeding its scope or severity" (BATESON, 2021, p. 927). Although it "exceeds [the law's] scope or severity", the important point here is that extralegal violence, the inevitable conclusion of the demand that the police enforce the rule of law, still moves "in the same direction as the law". In short, law is reinforced by it. The rule of law enables and requires discretionary violence; discretionary violence signals the demand that law needs to be reinvigorated. As Carr says, "[n]o matter how one approaches the issue, more and better law always seems to be the answer" (CARR, 2016, p. 158). In demanding that "excessive" police violence is reined in, thus, a double effect ensues: the accepted, "non-excessive", police violence is authorized (FASSIN, 2019; SEIGEL, 2019, p. 523, 526), and the state, the source of the police's legitimacy for the use of violence, is absolved and reinforced (SEIGEL, 2019, p. 531), as discretionary power is the perfect excuse for the blame for any condemnation of police violence to fall on the individual police officer who employed it (KANT DE LIMA, 1995, p. 5; NEOCLEOUS, 2011, p. 104). As Neocleous argues, "[t]he primary value to which all law has been dedicated has been order. To maintain the rule of law at all costs is to therefore defend the permanence of this order" (NEOCLEOUS, 2000a, p. 110). The rule of law, thus, is not an unqualified human good, a goal that should be uncritically pursued at all costs, as it is impossible to see the rule of law separately from the practices of executive power, discretionary acts and police decisions (NEOCLEOUS, 2000a, p. 108).

### 3.3. Pedagogies of Violence and Fear

The police officer's reservations with the justice system are not caused only by the Judiciary's supposed enmity towards the police, allegedly manifested in the severity and frequency of punishments that are imposed on them. The other reason for the estrangement is that the police claim that in the exercise of their jobs they are constantly sabotaged: instead of properly punishing the criminals, the laws and the judges are too lenient with them.

**Silva:** No, the intention of the Police is to reduce crimes. Right? However, when the Police does the job – be it Military or Civil – in the Justice everything goes down. Do you understand? You spend two years investigating a gang such and such, then you go and get to catch them all. Including the 01. After a while, 01 is on the street. This has happened a lot. But a lot, a lot, a lot.

**Silva:** Não, a intenção da Polícia é reduzir os crimes. Né? Porém, quando a Polícia faz o trabalho – seja Militar ou Civil – na Justiça vai tudo por terra. Entendeu? Fica-se investigando dois anos uma quadrilha tal, aí você vai e consegue pegar todos. O 01 inclusive. Passa um tempo, 01 tá na rua. Isso tem acontecido muito. Mas muito, muito, muito.

**Rodrigues:** Because what's happening there, the rampant violence, the Police is arresting and arresting a lot, man, it's what I told you. But if you see, most of these *\*bandidos\** who are doing it, committing crimes, are repeat offenders. Guy who went out [of jail] on *saidinha* on Christmas pardon, Father's Day, Mother's Day, Easter... In the pandemic [they] released a lot of *bandidos*... Do you think they came back? Have all the *bandidos* who were released in the pandemic come back? Didn't come back. So the Police- the Police they work right, they arrest, but the Brazilian justice... it has to change, it has to change some articles there, man. [...] The police service in Rio de Janeiro, in all of Brazil, has been this lately. [They] arrest, everyone works, they arrest a lot, but... justice lets them go, the judge lets them go because it's within the law, right, it's in Brazilian law, right?

**Rodrigues:** Porque o que tá acontecendo aí da violência desenfreada, a Polícia tá prendendo e prendendo muito, cara, é o que eu te falei. Mas se você ver, a maioria desses *\*bandido\** que tão fazendo, cometendo crime, são reincidentes. Cara que saiu na *saidinha* de indulto de Natal, dia dos pais, dia das mães, páscoa... Na pandemia soltou um monte de bandido... Tu acha que voltou? Os bandidos todos que foram soltos na pandemia voltaram? Não voltou. Então a Polícia- a Polícia ela trabalha certo, ela prende, mas a justiça brasileira... ela tem que mudar, tem que mudar alguns artigos ali, cara. [...] O serviço da Polícia do Rio de Janeiro, do Brasil todo, ultimamente tem sido isso. Prende, todo mundo trabalha, prende pra caramba, mas... a justiça solta, o juiz ele solta porque tá ali dentro da lei, né, tá na lei brasileira, né?

Indeed, as Bittner says, “having cases dismissed in court is no small matter. Many kinds of police activity have, after all, the sole objective of setting the criminal process into motion” (BITTNER, 1970, p. 26; see also: BRETAS, 1997c, especially 63, 70). This lament is not particular to Brazil, as Didier Fassin has often heard from police officers during patrols in France: ““We arrest criminals and the next day they are outside again. The judges have freed them. One wonders what we work for”” (FASSIN, 2019, p. 549). It is not particular to the current moment in democratic Brazil, either, as Luiz Antônio Paixão had already noticed in 1982:

For the police officers, the legal instruments “tie the police’s hands”: “we don’t have legal support with which to fight them (the outlaws) without serious risks, while they confront us with the law of the bullet and of the machete, under the pallium of human rights” (PAIXÃO, 1982, p. 74).

Their claims of leniency with criminals, however, fit uneasily with the fact that Brazil’s jail population is now over 900 thousand inmates, 45% of these being temporary detainees – people still waiting for trial, therefore serving a sentence without being condemned to it. These numbers are a record for the country which is now the third biggest jailer in the world (ABBUD, 2022).

Having encountered the same kinds of narratives from police officers that I have, Fassin found an explanation for their misperceptions and misdirections: “the reason the police believe that judges are sabotaging their work is that they often arrest suspects without minimal proof” (FASSIN, 2019, p. 549). Indeed, police officers tend to believe that “corrective arrests” are required for the effectiveness of their jobs, as one of Paixão’s interviewees explains: ““to be successful, the inquiry starts from back to front, with the detention of the suspects”” (PAIXÃO, 1982, p. 75). This reversal of due process may account for their perceptions of leniency, which then feedbacks and reinforces police justifications for their extrajudicial activities (KANT DE LIMA, 1995, p. 87).

For Fassin, the police’s misrepresentation, in disqualifying the judges as merciful, performs the important social function of morally legitimizing their own dispensation of justice. They do not only try to mask their violent practices, as with the *autos de resistência*, for instance, because they fear being punished by their hierarchy or the judges (FASSIN, 2019, p. 548–550); they consider themselves entitled to use their discretionary powers to punish and instill fear in those they

deem deserving of punishment and that would not be punished otherwise (FASSIN, 2019, p. 553–554), often justifying their actions as retribution – in Rio de Janeiro, particularly, retribution for police victimization (COELHO, 2017). As Fassin says, “in the eyes of law enforcement agents as well as, in many cases, from the perspective of their institution, the excessive use of force can find its justification as a legitimate, if not legal, way to dispense justice on the street” (FASSIN, 2019, p. 543). The following answers from Silva illustrate this logic.

**Silva:** *Vagabundo* must have respect – which [he] doesn’t, but we don’t care about his respect, because he is *bandido*, we are police. It is cat and rat. [He] doesn’t have to have respect. But the *bandido* must be \*afraid\* of the forces. He is not anymore [hitting the table for emphasis]. Nowadays it’s inverted – a certain percentual, which I have no way of telling you now –, but the \*police officer\* is afraid of exchanging shots with the *bandido*.

**Silva:** Vagabundo tem que ter respeito – que não tem, mas a gente não tá preocupado com o respeito dele, porque ele é bandido, a gente é polícia. É gato e rato. Não tem que ter respeito. Mas o bandido tem que ter \*medo\* das forças. Ele não tem mais [Batendo na mesa para ênfase]. Hoje em dia se inverteu – um certo percentual, que eu não tenho como te falar agora –, mas \*o policial\* tem medo de trocar tiro com o bandido.

**Silva:** There was an Army General, Toquinho- no, General Cerqueira, he started giving the “Far West Gratification”. What was the Far West Gratification? It was like a bravery... but he gave this name “Far West Gratification” because we live a Far West, right? So [if] in an exchange of shots [you] killed a *vagabundo*, [you] win a *moral* [reward]. *Moral*- Win a *moral* [laughing]. [Still laughing] And then the folks killed so much... that they then decided – the press... right? All of it, right? Life’s NGOs... Right? The human rights associations... “Ah, you can’t, and such.” My brother, the amount of *vagabundos* that died... Just like kidnapping. What happened to kidnapping. There is no more kidnapping in Rio de Janeiro. You didn’t live this time. Ask your mother. Your mother wouldn’t come home because she was kidnapped [fictitious example]. And they were asking for the family to pay one million

Teve um general de Exército, Toquinho- não, General Cerqueira, ele que começou a dar a “gratificação faroeste”. O quê que era a gratificação faroeste? É como se fosse uma bravura... mas ele deu esse nome “gratificação faroeste” porque a gente vive um faroeste, né? Então numa troca de tiro matou um vagabundo, ganha uma moral. Moral- Ganha uma moral [rindo]. [Ainda rindo] Aí o pessoal matou tanto... que aí decidiram – a imprensa... né? Toda, né? As ONGs da vida... Né? As associações de direitos humanos... “Ah, não pode, e tal”. Meu irmão, o que morria de vagabundo... Como o sequestro. Cadê o sequestro? Não tem mais sequestro no Rio de Janeiro. Você não viveu essa época. Pergunta à tua mãe. Tua mãe não chegava porque foi sequestrada [exemplo fictício]. E ‘tavam’ pedindo pra família pagar 1 milhão de reais, cem mil, quinhentos mil, o que fosse. Enquanto isso

*reais*, a hundred thousand, five hundred thousand, whatever. Meanwhile she was somewhere kept in a shack, tied up, muzzled... and one month, two months, three months in captivity for you to get and pay a kidnap. And then what happened: these kidnap[per]s were unlucky and died, right? 'Cause it was- it was really bad for their health [laughing]. So when the *Antissequestro* [Anti-Kidnapping Police] came, or any police officer that blew up a captivity, they [criminals] had to exchange shots, because they knew, right, that the crime is heinous... right? And it would be bad for them. So they exchanged shots with us and we ended up... winning the war. So... 90% of who kidnapped, died. Kidnapping ended. [...] Even if there still are kidnappers... [they] \*don't have assholes\* [are too afraid] for kidnapping. That's that, they are afraid. Of kidnapping that's that, they are afraid. There they are afraid. So it's where I tell you, how fear is good. Do you understand? It's really welcome.

ela 'tava' em algum lugar guardada num barraco, amarrada, amordaçada... e um mês, dois meses, três meses no cativeiro pra você pegar e pagar um sequestro. Aí quê que aconteceu: esses sequestros eles davam o azar de morrerem, né? Que era muito- fazia muito mal à saúde deles [rindo]. Então quando vinha a Antissequestro, ou qualquer policial que se- estourava um cativeiro, eles tinham que trocar tiro, porque eles sabiam, né, que o crime é hediondo... né? E ia ficar ruim pra eles. Aí eles trocavam tiro com a gente e a gente acabava... ganhando a guerra. Então... 90% de quem sequestrava, morria. Acabou o sequestro. [...] Mesmo que ainda exista sequestrador... \*Não tem cu\* pra sequestrar. É aquela coisa, eles têm medo. De sequestro é aquela coisa, eles têm medo. Ali eles têm medo. Então é onde eu te digo, como o medo faz bem. Entendeu? É muito bem-vindo.

As some of my interlocutors complained, the leniency of the Brazilian Supreme Court with the criminals reached its apex with the ADPF63, which prohibits the operations in the *favelas*. In May 2020, after a series of police operations in *favelas* resulted in the deaths of many people, including children, had been protested by residents and human rights activists, Brazilian Federal Supreme Court's [STF] minister Edson Fachin ruled a decision [ADPF 635] to prohibit operations in the *favelas* without prior communication. In a report published by the *Grupo de Estudos de Novas Ilegalidades* ("Study Group on New Illegalities") [GENI – Uff], the authors affirm that "one can certainly celebrate the STF's decision as an important turning point, being the most important in recent years, in the sense of imposing democratic limits to state violence" (HIRATA et al., 2021, my translation). The police officers do not share this sentiment.

**Silva:** But the minister Fachin prohibited the ascent to the *morros*. I was \*pissed\*. I can say “pissed” here, right?

**Victor:** Freely.

**Silva:** So, I was \*fucking pissed\* – just to aggravate the “pissed” a little. Brother... Then a friend of mine, older police officer, more *cascudo* [tougher] – then I was commenting with him: “how can Fachin have prohibited to go up a *morro*? What is this? How does he not want [us] to work?”

**Silva:** Mas o ministro Fachin proibiu a subida aos morros. Eu estava \*puto\*. Pode falar “puto” aqui, né?

**Victor:** À vontade.

**Silva:** Então, eu tava \*puto ‘pa’ caralho\* – só pra dar um agravantezinho no “puto”. Irmão... Aí um amigo meu, policial mais velho, mais cascudo – aí eu comentando com ele: “como é que pode o Fachin ter proibido subir morro? O que é isso? Como é que não quer que trabalhe?”

The STF’s leniency, in their narratives, leads to a situation of heightened lawlessness. Their belief is that Minister Edson Fachin’s decision to prohibit operations in the *favelas* during the Covid-19 pandemic allows opportunities for the criminals to get stronger and more dangerous, driving criminality and violence up.

**Larrey:** Since there was not a lot of Police interference in these *comunidades*, these terrains, huh, inaccessible to public power, there was an... an exacerbated growth of criminality there, including the import of criminals, right? So people come from outside, [they] increase this war power of the criminals inside these territories taken by the... by the drug traffickers, by the *milícias*... and then our projection is that these confrontations [will] get increasingly more violent and that lethality tends to grow. [...] [W]e are already glimpsing an increase of the morbimortality of police officers because of the increase of these drug traffickers’ war power \*soon\*. So when you, perhaps, talk of... uh, talk like this of the possibilities and such... I don’t know if other people already told you, but this may be a reality very... very close to starting to happen. Of an increase-a \*new\* increase in the mortality of the police officers and \*of the citizens\*, because when a drug trafficker fires

**Larrey:** Só que ficou um hiato aí, até por conta de Covid também, em que houve uma proliferação, muito- como não tinha muita interferência da Polícia nessas comunidades, nesses terrenos, é, inacessíveis ao poder público, houve uma... um crescimento exacerbado da criminalidade ali, inclusive com importação de criminosos, né? Então vêm pessoas até de fora, vão aumentando esse poderio bélico dos criminosos dentro desses territórios dominados pelas... pelos narcotraficantes, pelas milícias... e aí a nossa projeção é que esses confrontos fiquem cada vez mais violentos e que a letalidade tenda a crescer. [...] a gente já tá vislumbrando um aumento da morbimortalidade dos policiais por causa do aumento do poderio bélico desses narcotraficantes \*em breve\*. Então quando você, de repente, fala de... é, falar assim das possibilidades e tal... Não sei se outras pessoas já falaram, mas talvez seja uma realidade muito... bem próxima pra começar a acontecer. De um aumento re- um

a shot, he fires a shot. [He] doesn't want to know if behind the cop there's a popcorn seller, if there's a child... he doesn't care about that. This is required a lot of us – even because, in the case, we are professionals in this, right? But the drug trafficker isn't, so... I believe, too, that it will increase this morbimortality of citizens.

\*novo\* aumento da mortalidade dos policiais e \*de cidadãos\*, porque quando um traficante atira, né, faz um disparo, ele faz um disparo. Não quer saber se atrás do policial tem um pipoqueiro, tem uma criança... ele não quer saber isso. Isso é muito exigido de nós – até porque, no caso, a gente é profissional disso, né? Mas o traficante não, então... creio eu, também, que vai aumentar essa morbimortalidade dos cidadãos.

**Pereira:** There is the political idea behind this question, right? They don't want to solve the problem, man. And what happens? Society pays for that, man. The elite pays for that, didn't you see there the shopping mall [referring to a shooting in an upper-class shopping mall in June 2022]? The guys from high elite were there... fuck. Who would think that that was going to happen there? But the guy up there [STF Minister Edson Fachin] prohibits the Police from entering the *comunidade*, just like Brizola did, do you understand? So [this] gives a chance for the guys [*bandidos*] to strengthen themselves somehow.

**Pereira:** Tem a ideia política por trás dessa questão, né? Eles não querem resolver o problema, cara. E o que acontece? A sociedade paga por isso, cara. A elite paga por isso, não viu lá no shopping [se referindo aos tiros disparados no shopping Village Mall em junho de 2022]? Tava lá os caras da alta elite, lá... porra. Quem ia pensar que ia acontecer isso ali? Mas o cara lá em cima ele proíbe de que a Polícia entre na comunidade, igual o Brizola fez, entende? Então dá uma chance pros caras se fortalecerem de alguma forma.

For Fassin, that the police has trivialized and normalized extrajudiciary punishment is a major unrecognized fact in contemporary societies, so much so that extrajudicial punishment “could even be deemed part of the judicial system” (FASSIN, 2019, p. 555). For him, “[t]he informal and even illegal judicial system is thus much more extended than the formal and legal one. But the two are not separated” (FASSIN, 2019, p. 555). As argued previously, the prefix “extra” must not equal “illegal”, as Fassin does, and one reason for that is, for Neocleous, that

this has a direct parallel in the development of the police institution: as a form of political administration the police also act in a quasi-judicial manner. More decisions of a judicial type, in the form of interpreting and determining the rule of law, are made by the police than by the judiciary and courts (NEOCLEOUS, 2000a, p. 104).



As he says, “[t]he law is a resource for dealing with problems of disorder rather than a set of rules to be followed and enforced” (NEOCLEOUS, 2000a, p. 112), but, as Paixão complements, “the meaning of law and of order is determined in the routine and quotidian encounters of the police officer and its clientele in the streets” (PAIXÃO, 1982, p. 65). As Roberto Kant de Lima says, “in the systematic application of its discretionary powers”, “the police judge cases and punish criminals, making use of different principles and criteria from the ones used by the Judiciary” (KANT DE LIMA, 1995, p. 1). He continues by saying that, therefore, “police practices are a complement of the judicial system and not a violation or degradation of it” (KANT DE LIMA, 1995, p. 2, see also: 103).

Because of this extrajudicial quality of the police’s discretionary powers, Kant de Lima argues that “the police activities are organized according to the principles of ‘*police ethics*’, an extra-official set of rules produced and reproduced by the traditional process of knowledge transfer” (KANT DE LIMA, 1995, p. 9, emphasis added). Coincidentally, Pereira claims that in the past “there was an \*ethics\* in police criminality”, by which he means that the *polícia mineira* [“‘mining’ police”] and the *milícias* didn’t sell drugs, which they now do.

**Pereira:** Then the issue of the *milícia*, right, it evolved, evolved, evolved and it wasn’t anymore – it’s like I told you, in the beginning the idea was to maintain order in that place, because the guy lived in the *favela*, unfortunately. I think police officers shouldn’t live in a dangerous place. They lived. So they got together to, shall we say, protect. [...] And then, boy, we see something today that has become like... today the *milícia* even sells drugs, so... Something that never was... In fact, it wasn’t even... it didn’t exist. [...] Let’s put it this way, there was an \*ethics\* in police criminality, let’s say. Right? [Laughing slightly] There was at that moment an ethics that the guy didn’t... [...] But the guys never accepted selling drugs. Do you understand? Anyway, and over time it migrated and today you see what’s

**Pereira:** Aí a questão da *milícia*, né, ela foi evoluindo, evoluindo, evoluindo e já não era mais – é como eu te falei, no início a ideia era de manutenção da ordem daquele local, porque o cara morava na favela, infelizmente. Policial acho que não deveria morar num lugar perigoso. Ele morava. Então, eles se juntaram pra, vamos dizer, proteger. [...] E aí enfim, rapaz, a gente vê algo hoje que virou tipo... hoje a *milícia* vende até drogas, então... Algo que jamais era... Inclusive, não era nem... não existia isso. [...] Vamos dizer assim, existia uma \*ética\* na criminalidade policial, vamos dizer. Né? [Rindo levemente] Existia nesse momento uma ética que o cara não... [...] Mas os caras não aceitavam nunca de vender droga. Entende? Enfim, e com o tempo foi migrando e hoje você vê o que tá aí, entende? Deu pra entender mais ou

there, you know? Did you understand more or less? In relation to the police officer of old and the police officer of today? Do you understand, Victor? And I lived a transition phase. Do you understand? \*I\* lived a transition phase between the old Police and the new Police. Do you understand? I saw this over this entire time.

menos? Em relação ao policial da antiga e o policial de hoje? Entende, ô Victor? E eu peguei uma fase de transição. Entende? \*Eu\* peguei uma fase de transição entre a velha Polícia e a nova Polícia. Entende? Eu vi isso ao longo do tempo todo.

But if for Pereira the police, when disobeying the law, still acted ethically, for Lima the process is reversed: the police ethics coerces the police officer to disobey the law (KANT DE LIMA, 1995, p. 85). “The police is caught in a dilemma: either it enforces law and abdicates of its ethics, its traditions and its authority, or imposes its ethics and affirms its authority, necessarily distorting or disobeying the law” (KANT DE LIMA, 1995, p. 112). This also came up during the interviews:

**Silva:** [...] For instance, now, in this cop’s group of mine we have 500 police officers. Out of these 500, let’s say that we have \*a hundred\* that were expelled [from the Police]. Okay? But what is the reason for his expulsion? [...] Sometimes the guy hit someone... got expelled. Had a cold [irregular] gun... got expelled. Killed someone... got expelled. Do you understand? \*Me\* [hitting the table for emphasis]... \*Me\*... The first opportunity I have with the governor [Cláudio Castro] [...] \*I\* would say that. Try... to bring [them] back, because \*excellent\* cops, Victor. They are police officers that criminality is \*afraid\* of. I won’t tell you names here now, but like, the police officer such: “what’s this?”... The Pavuna Police Station, for example, 39 DP. \*There\*, put a heavy team there! To see if they won’t reduce [criminality]. “Look, who is there is the group such and such”. Okay? Okay, then. Marina Maggessi... who was a police officer who was federal deputy. My friend, my partner. Then... she spent a long time in the

**Silva:** [...] Por exemplo, agora, nesse meu grupo de policiais nós temos 500 policiais. Desses 500, vamo botar que nós temos \*cem\* que foram expulsos. Tá? Mas qual o motivo do que ele foi expulso? [...] Às vezes o cara bateu em alguém... foi expulso. Tava com uma arma fria... foi expulso. Matou alguém... foi expulso. Entendeu? \*Eu\* [batendo à mesa para ênfase]... \*Eu\*... Na primeira oportunidade que eu tiver com o governador [Cláudio Castro] [...] \*eu\* falaria isso. Tenta... recolocar, porque \*excelentes\* policiais, Victor. São policiais que a criminalidade tem \*medo\*. Eu não vou te falar nomes aqui agora, mas tipo assim, o policial tal: “que é isso?”... A Delegacia da Pavuna, por exemplo, 39 DP. \*Lá\*, bota uma equipe de peso lá! Pra ver se eles não vão reduzir. “Ó, quem tá lá é o pessoal tal”. Tá? Então tá bom. Marina Maggessi... que era uma policial que foi deputada federal. Minha amiga, minha parceira. Aí... ela ficou muito tempo no setor de inteligência da Polícia Civil. Então ela era bem respeitada. Por

intelligence sector of the Civil Police. So she was very respected. By *vagabundo*. “Ih, Marina? Mrs. Marina? Pô.” Why? A lot of great jobs she’s done. She arrested \*big\* drug dealers. She traveled to the interior of Brazil or abroad to arrest a really “top” *vagabundo*. Do you understand? So she was respected. The police station she was in – one of the last ones was at 39 DP, which was a very dangerous area – see if anyone messed with her, with her team? See if it wasn’t managed? Now, of the people who worked with her, there are some who were expelled, for some various reasons. Put these people back to work! “\*Ih\*, who’s ba-” – Marina died, that’s why I can talk about her. [...] “Look who’s at the police station!”. “Damn, these guys are *pica* [“awesome”], huh? These guys really catch, arrest... if you face [them] head on, they’ll exchange shots... and yadda yadda yadda. [...]

**Victor:** You mentioned now, then, the “excellent police officers that criminality is afraid of.” [...]

**Silva:** Yeah, no, the best are the worst. [...] A \*good cop\* is the one that’s the worst for crime. Right? It’s the guy, like, in the area over there, at 39 DP, which is an extremely conflagrated area, where Chapadão is. Have you ever heard of Chapadão? So. So it’s very dangerous there... okay? So you have a team at 39 DP, which is the police station of the area, which is not respected. Right? Why? Because they’re the nice cops. They are good. They keep the investigation up to date... They treat the parties with sympathy... [...] Then [the *Corregedoria*] will arrive at this police station: “wow, perfect, huh? Everything updated, everything in order, everything organized, everything in progress, yadda yadda yadda...”. But they’re \*not\* respected, on the street it’s a \*mess\*.

*vagabundo*. “Ih, Marina? Dona Marina? Pô”. Por quê? Muitos trabalhos *tops* que ela fez. Prendeu \*grandes\* traficantes. Viajava pro interior do Brasil ou pro exterior pra prender *vagabundo top* mesmo. Entendeu? Então ela era respeitada. A delegacia que ela estivesse – uma das últimas foi na 39 DP, que era uma área muito perigosa – vê se alguém mexia com ela, com a equipe dela? Vê se não era administrado? Agora, dessa galera que trabalhou com ela, tem alguns que foram expulsos, por alguns vários motivos. Volta esse pessoal pra trabalhar! “\*Ih\*, quem vo-” – a Marina morreu, por isso que eu posso falar dela. [...] “Olha quem tá na delegacia!”. “Caralho, essa galera é pica, hein? Essa galera pega mesmo, prende... se bater de frente vai trocar tiro... e ba ba ba. [...]

**Victor:** Você mencionou agora, então, os “excelentes policiais que a criminalidade tem medo”. [...]

**Silva:** É, não, os melhores são os piores. [...] Um \*bom policial\* é o que é o pior pro crime. Certo? É o cara, tipo assim, na área ali, na 39 DP, que é uma área conflagrada ao extremo, onde fica o Chapadão. Já ouvi falar em Chapadão? Então. Então lá é perigosíssimo... tá? Então você tem uma equipe na 39 DP, que é a delegacia da área, que não é respeitada. Né? Por quê? Porque são os policiais bonzinhos. Eles são bons. Eles mantêm o inquérito em dia... Eles atendem com simpatia as partes... [...] Então [a *Corregedoria*] vai chegar nessa delegacia: “nossa, perfeito, hein? Tudo em dia, tudo organizadinho, tudo em andamento, ba ba ba ba ba ba...”. Mas não tem moral \*nenhuma\*, na rua tá uma \*bagunça\*.

As noticed by Lima, police ethics, the extra-official set of rules that organize police activities, are passed down from older police officers to newcomers (KANT DE LIMA, 1995, p. 9). This is a process that was also mentioned by Paixão, who noticed in 1982 that police officers generate and share knowledges about the proper way of conducting the police mandate, along with typifications that organize their knowledge of crimes and criminals.

Typifications are generated in the police districts informally (they are not written down and are not stored in archives), just as [they] are informally incorporated to the practical activity of new police officers [...] In other words, typifications about the nature and composition of the *marginal* [criminal] clientele, about competent sources of information and ways of processing suspects constitute the culture of the organization and the professional socialization means the competent use of this culture (PAIXÃO, 1982, p. 78).

40 years after Paixão described and documented this police socialization, Silva explained the process to me in our interview:

**Silva:** \*Experience\*. Right? Experience. Practice, right? Practice is something else. You \*know\* how to do a job. You know if you should do that kind of job or not. So much so that when we enter the police – we always said that – “[you] must listen to the *cascudo* [tough, older police officer], huh? The *cascudo* is the one who knows, huh?” “Look, don’t go there, no, ‘cause it’s trouble, huh? Over there is good.” Do you understand? [...] Because you listen, listen, listen, you learn. So much so that the police officers, the new ones, “Nutellas” [soft, inexperienced]- ‘cause those who have 30 years of police, who joined with us, we, as inspectors too, listened \*a lot\*, boy. Damn, this group of *brabos* [brave, tough cops] of ours only has old cops. Fuck, everybody know- The cops who arrested are there. I’m telling [you]: the bad [cops] who were good. Do you understand? So the guys are good, brother. The guys know what to do. Were there some who messed up? There were. Yeah... Are there ex-cops? There are. But still, [laughing]

**Silva:** A \*experiência\*. Né? A experiência. Prática, né? Prática é outra coisa. Você \*sabe\* como fazer um trabalho. Você sabe se deve fazer aquele tipo de trabalho ou não. Tanto que quando a gente entra pra polícia – a gente sempre falou isso – “tem que ouvir o cascudo, hein? O cascudo é que sabe, hein?”. “Ó, não vai ali não que é furada, hein? Ali é bom”. Entendeu? [...] Porque você ouvindo, ouvindo, ouvindo, você vai aprendendo. Tanto que os policiais, os novos, Nutellas – que os que têm hoje 30 anos de polícia, que entraram junto com a gente, nós, como inspetores também, ouvimos \*muito\*, rapaz. Porra, esse nosso grupo de brabos só tem policial antigo. Porra, todo mundo sa- Os policiais que prendiam estão ali. Eu tô falando: os ruins que eram bons. Entendeu? Então a galera é boa, irmão. A galera sabe o que fazer. Tiveram uns que fizeram besteira? Tiveram. É.. Tem ex-policiais? Tem. Mas ainda assim, [rindo] eu acredito que se falasse pra esse cara: “ó, vou te dar essa oportunidade” – igual a filmes... quando tem

I believe that if you told this guy: “look, I will give you this opportunity-” – just like in movies... when it happens – “look, you’re retired, or you were expelled, but you are good. I will give you this opportunity. I need [you] to do this work here now. Can you go?”. You must have seen a movie like this, right? Then you take a guy out of there – Rambo was like that several times, right? [laughing] Damn, then [inaudible] go there? Okay, then. Go there and solve everything. Do you understand? It’s more or less like this. But what is it? It’s what we call “antiquity is post”. The guy has antiquity. Whoever has arrived now has to learn, has to listen, has to... lower his head to the *cascudo* and listen. And it works much better. Because the new one doesn’t know anything, damn. He doesn’t know anything.

aí – “ó, você tá aposentado, ou você foi expulso, mas você é bom. Eu vou te dar essa oportunidade. Tô precisando fazer esse trabalho aqui agora. Dá pra tu ir?”. Tu já deve ter visto algum filme desse, né? Aí tira um cara de lá – o Rambo foi várias vezes assim, né? [rindo] Porra, aí [inaudível] vai lá? Então tá. Vai lá e resolve tudo. Entendeu? É mais ou menos por aí. Mas é o que isso? É o que a gente chama “antiguidade é posto”. O cara tem a antiguidade. Quem chegou agora tem que aprender, tem que ouvir, tem que... baixar a cabeça pro cascudo e ouvir. E dá muito mais certo. Porque o novo não sabe nada, porra. Não sabe de nada.

That the same process is explained 40 years apart is testament to the longevity and endurance of police culture. It is also one of the reasons why many discursive tropes and police practices of violence have remained for decades, despite government changes, constitutional changes, regime changes, and several attempts at reform. There is a double pedagogy of violence at work here. On the one hand, the police officers learn through this police socialization that to be effective they must exert violence extrajudicially, and, on the other hand, this violence is exerted as a social tool of teaching those blamed for disorder where they belong. As argued above, the police’s discretionary/discriminatory powers are used to impose a hierarchical order. Using Lima’s vocabulary, the police officer must be either an unethical law enforcer, or an ethical lawbreaker; using Silva’s, he must be either a good cop who is bad, or a bad cop who is good.

#### 4. Conclusion: When the Ice Stops Melting

Police officers frequently claim that the police is engaged in a war of some sort. Nogueira, for instance, claims that this war is similar in kind to the war happening in 2022 between Ukraine and Russia, or the wars in which Israel has/is engaged. Nogueira's claim is not only based on analogies, however, as this supposed war in Rio de Janeiro could be seen as a war proper also by the criteria of the number of casualties, an argument supported by Larrey, who quotes a study conducted and presented by a Military Police *Coronel* ("Coronel Cajueiro - 'A Guerra Urbana do Rio de Janeiro e seus efeitos na Polícia Militar'", 2020) claiming that it is hundreds of times more dangerous to be a police officer in Rio de Janeiro than to be an American soldier fighting a war. Nogueira connects this war-like mortality to the *bandidos*' "weapons of war" and "acts of war". Assis, for his part, argues that in Rio de Janeiro we live a "civil war" that is not recognized as such. This leads to a double bind: the police officers must wage war but are not safeguarded in their actions and its consequences. Police officers should be operating under exceptional laws of war, he argues. Instead, the police are kept from taking the necessary measures because Brazil, but particularly Rio de Janeiro, is governed under a peace legislation, an argument that is supported by Larrey. As Larrey protests, the Brazilian Judiciary's archaic understanding sets the stage for the police officers to live a tragedy, at risk of either death or punishment. If American soldiers fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan can fire ahead at will to rescue a wounded colleague without being punished for it, so should Brazilian police officers be exempt from accountability for the consequences of their actions in the war against crime.

Despite being sent to fight a war, the police officers shared the frustration of not being given the appropriate equipments for their tasks. Even with some investments made recently to equip them with newer cars, weapons, and installations, they complain that the vehicles they drive don't have adequate maintenance, the radio for their communication doesn't work, their weapons jam and fail when needed, their bulletproof vests, when available, are often old and torn. When two wounded police officers needed to be rescued from a *favela* under heavy fire from criminals, they didn't have armored cars to spare, and the one they

managed to borrow was not guaranteed to reach them due to its poor maintenance conditions. Added to these disadvantages, they also complain of low salaries, improper accommodations, and being served spoiled, inedible food. The resources available to the police officers are contrasted with the weaponry that compose the criminals' arsenal. If in the past the criminals had only smaller, lower-capacity weapons at their disposal – pistols, revolvers, “thirty-eights” (.38) –, now their arsenal includes heavy, high velocity, extremely violent weapons – AK-47s, Barretts (.50), “dot-thirties” (.30), AR-15s – and lethal grenades, both homemade and military-grade.

With these weapons, according to the police officers, the criminals managed to conquer and fortify the *morros* that are a defining feature of Rio de Janeiro's geography. Because of this, the criminals are presented as having multiple strategic advantages against the police: the uphill *favelas* are hard to traverse, the paths are monitored with CCTV and blocked with barricades, the criminals know their way around, while the police do not, the alleys and corners are often used for ambushes, and, having the high ground, the criminals can see and shoot at the police without being shot by them. These war conditions (or the conditions of this war), in the police officers' depictions, make Rio de Janeiro an exceptional city in Brazil and in the world.

If the police officers worry that they must fight a war without the legal immunity that they would be granted by a legislation of war, the criminals don't share the preoccupation. As the police officers protest, while they are bound by law and need to answer to it, the criminals, being outside legality altogether, are free to engage in violence as they wish. More than simply being transgressors, however, the police officers complain that the criminals are actively safeguarded, as Brazil's justice system covers the criminals with a “veil of protection”. The police officers protest that they do their jobs as best as they can, i.e., arrest many criminals, and the justice, using one of its many devices – *medida cautelar*, *audiencia de custódia*, “*saidinha*” –, lets them go, often right in front of the arresting officer. Even when these criminals are sentenced and jailed, they are set free way too soon, since the penalties imposed on them are too short and light. And while the sentenced criminals are incarcerated, they still have access to drugs and sex, they can still

administer their criminal operations, they can make new contacts and connections with other criminals, they can learn more criminal activities, and they can turn their time in jail into a badge of honor.

For the police officers, while the justice system protects the criminals, it is often overly harsh with their actions, frequently punishing the police for doing their jobs. If in their day-to-day duties they need to exert coercion through physical violence, the police feel their hands are tied. As Silva explained, they can't hit or shoot people, lest they be punished for torture, for firing at random, or for an intentional homicide. In his opinion, any collateral damages resulting from police actions should be treated as they are: work accidents. Silva tells that because of this, police officers hesitate to fire their weapons in confrontations and are killed by the criminals, a claim supported by other interviewees. Even when the police try to administer first aid care to criminals they wounded in confrontations, as Larrey shared, they are investigated for procedural fraud, risking being punished for tampering with the scene. As Nunes says, their mistakes can impede promotions in the career, lead to arrests or even expulsions from the police. The justice's leniency towards the criminals, together with the work conditions described above, lead to the police officers' feelings of discouragement and fear. Having to do a meaningless job for a thankless society while risking being either killed by empowered criminals or punished by an ignorant justice, the police officers often describe their jobs as "drying ice".

**Nogueira:** And then the Justice today, the police officer, it takes a lot of energy from the police officer. [For] you to arrest and soon after, you- one year, two years, six months pass, you see the guy free. And then you bump into the guy and the guy [says] "*pô*, will you arrest me again?" Look at this situation. Then you think: "*pô*, I'm drying ice." I'm drying ice.

**Nogueira:** E aí a Justiça hoje, o policial, isso tira muita energia do policial. Você prender e logo após, você- passa um ano, dois anos, seis meses, tu vê o cara solto. E aí tu bate com o cara, o cara: "*pô*, tu vai me prender de novo?". Olha que situação. Aí tu pensa: "*pô*, tô enxugando gelo". Tô enxugando gelo.

The existence of the police brings with it an implicit promise that order is achievable. However, as Bittner affirms, "the conceit that [crime] can be ultimately



vanquished, which is the implicit objective of war, involves a particularly trivial kind of utopian dreaming” (BITTNER, 1970, p. 49; see also: MLADEK, 2007, p. 225; WILLIAMS, 2003, p. 3). War, present in the idea of the police, promising the elimination of the enemy and with it the establishment of order, riddles police work with paradoxes. Indeed, the war/peace binary is often mapped onto the disorder/order binary, leading to the logical conclusion that war/violence is necessary for the maintenance of order (BARKAWI, 2016, p. 206). In a world that is bound to fail in its effort to do away with violence, these make perverse pairings. Order is necessary to restrain violence, but violence is necessary to maintain order (SOFSKY, 2003, p. 72). Violence is, thus, presented as both disorder and a necessary pre-requisite of order (SCHINKEL, 2010, p. 11–12). If, on one hand, the promise of order legitimizes the police use of violence, on the other hand, the police’s violence itself frustrates its fulfillment. Indeed, that many of my interlocutors described their work as “drying ice” is a strong testament to this.

**Nogueira:** Now, to put the police officer to solve that violence that is happening in a certain place, put the police officer to repress with violence... And do you know who is a victim of this? It is the police officer, the place’s society, and the victim of this cycle. Which is a cycle that comes and goes, comes and goes, comes and goes, comes and goes... It stays in this little cycle, comes and goes. A police officer who represses, the guy who commits the violence, the police officer who represses... An ice drying there. You don’t see the solution of that ice drying.

**Nogueira:** Agora, botar policial pra resolver aquela violência que tá ocorrendo em determinado local, botar o policial pra reprimir com violência... E sabe quem é vítima disso? É o policial, a sociedade do local, e a vítima desse ciclo. Que ele é um ciclo que vai e volta, vai e volta, vai e volta, vai e volta... Fica nesse ciclozinho aí, vai e volta. Um policial que reprime, o cara que comete a violência, o policial que reprime... Um enxuga gelo ali. Você não vê a solução daquele enxuga gelo.

**Pereira:** And then the fellow that didn’t- that broke the law we took to the precinct. But the legislation is too soft, man. The guy signed there a *termo circunstanciado*, you see, and... and was released, literally, man. Do you understand? And the guy went back to doing it [breaking the law]. [...] Do you understand? In the following days [he] was

**Pereira:** E aí o camarada que não- que infringia a lei a gente levava pra delegacia. Só que a legislação é muito branda, cara. O cara assinava lá um termo circunstanciado, entende, e... e era solto, literalmente, cara. Entende? E o cara voltava a fazer. [...] Entende? Nos dias seguintes tava lá fazendo a mesma coisa. Então aí já- E aí já não é culpa

there doing the same thing. So this- And then this is not the Military Police's fault anymore, man. It is what I told you, the thing of "drying ice", because you don't have a specific legislation that will punish the guy there so that the guy won't go back to doing it.

da Polícia Militar, cara. É isso que eu te falei, o lance do "enxugar gelo", porque você não tem uma legislação específica que vai punir ali o cara pro cara não voltar a fazer.

The expression "to dry ice", in Portuguese "*enxugar gelo*", which is used in Brazil to designate useless, meaningless work, was most often used as their preferred analogy for the tension between law and order that characterizes policing, especially when it is thought of as war. Like Sisyphus' boulder inevitably rolling down the hill as he attempts to push it to the top, one can never successfully dry ice as it keeps constantly melting. However, if their job is "to dry ice", as the police officers allege, this is done with violence. For them, if they don't exert violence (during "war"), borrowing from Assis' words, "society freezes".

**Assis:** They [left-wing politicians] don't do it [decriminalize drugs] because today it is *\*very\** profitable. Including for [political] campaigns from inside organized crime. You profit a lot. So the truth is that today there is no interest because society as it is, Brazilian society as it exists, it is reliant on the existence of organized crime. And the police officer, in his vocation, which is to defend society, he does what we popularly call "to dry ice." But we must dry this ice, otherwise society freezes.

**Assis:** [Políticos de esquerda] Não fazem [descriminalização das drogas] porque hoje se lucra *\*muito\**. Inclusive pra campanhas de dentro do crime organizado. Você lucra muito. Então a verdade é que hoje não tem interesse porque a sociedade como ela está, a sociedade brasileira como ela existe, ela está respaldada na existência do crime organizado. E o policial em sua vocação, que é de defender a sociedade, ele faz o que a gente fala popularmente que é enxugar gelo. Mas a gente precisa enxugar esse gelo senão a sociedade congela.

Policing is an impossible job. It is premised on the use of violence even as it is increasingly despised. They are tasked with upholding law and order, which are inherently incompatible with each other, concurrently. The solution for the dilemma, the allegation of war, which provides them with an excuse and a justification for violence, makes their lives disposable and their deaths banalized. They know they are given an impossible job. I am reminded of Nunes' words:

**Nunes:** Being a police officer in Rio de Janeiro is to have us, uh, reducing the impact. We will never solve the war. What do we have to decrease? The size of the conflicts. I see it like this. I already understood that. There are things that we *\*will\** do, there are things we won't do. I'm not going to remove those drug dealers with a rifle that have a .30 there. I will not solve the *milícia* problem. Ah, but this *miliciano* *\*here\** that is bothering person X, we can? So this one we're going to do. Ah, that demonstration over there, that there's going to be a little problem they don't want? Nice. Does *Carnaval* have to have all the police there on the outskirts of the *morro*? Cool, I got the message. Come here. We know that they use the Police for that. [It's] very complicated being a police officer in Rio de Janeiro. Very complicated.

**Nunes:** Ser policial no Rio de Janeiro é a gente, é, diminuir o impacto. A gente nunca vai resolver a guerra. A gente tinha que diminuir o quê? O tamanho dos conflitos. Eu vejo assim. Eu já entendi isso. tem coisa que a gente *\*vai\** fazer, tem coisa que a gente não vai fazer. Eu não vou tirar aqueles traficantes com um fuzil que tem uma .30 ali. Eu não vou resolver o problema da milícia. Ah, mas esse miliciano *\*aqui\** que tá incomodando a pessoa X, esse a gente pode? Então esse a gente vai fazer. Ah, aquela manifestação ali, que vai ter um probleminha que não querem? Beleza. O Carnaval tem que ter toda Polícia lá pra beira do morro? Beleza, entendi o recado. Vem cá. A gente sabe que eles usam a Polícia pra isso. Bem complicado ser polícia no Rio de Janeiro. Muito complicado.

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## 6. Supplementary Materials

### 6.1. Interviews

For this research I conducted semi-structured interviews with active-duty and former police officers. Interviews are valued because they allow for the collection of information that may not or cannot be found in documents or other sources (MUYLAERT et al., 2014, p. 186). “If no documents are available, the memories of the protagonists and witnesses of those tragic events hold clues” (CASTAÑEDA, 2021, p. 282). As Zamora says,

The quality of the stories will provide information that could not be obtained just by reading the theoretical material. You want witnesses, you want to hear the discourse about the subject, the practices that this discourse brings, what this discourse reflects, what values are sustained in that discourse, how that person sees the world. You don’t want superficial, but consistent information (ZAMORA, 2021, p. 97).

The creative potential of interviews is explained by Rogers:

Such subjective accounts may bring new ideas and concepts to the attention of a researcher. Interviews therefore provide opportunities for discovering data that may lead to new or updated frameworks for understanding concepts, such as group consciousness, that revolve around how minorities [and other groups] define themselves and view the political world (ROGERS, 2013, p. 234).

At the same time these interviews are useful techniques “for assaying the depth of the concept or taking stock of its properties in its contemporary form” (ROGERS, 2013, p. 231).

The hybrid configuration of semi-structured interviews, particularly, which combine previously planned questions with open topics that emerge from the conversation (ZAMORA, 2021, p. 94), frees both researcher and participant from the rigidities of a structured script, which could affect the naturalness of the participant’s contribution, while still maintaining the focus of the conversation on the researcher’s designed project (MUYLAERT et al., 2014, p. 188). With the interviews, therefore, the researcher can lead a dialogue (HEMMING, 2009, p. 33) to tease out how the participants see the world (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 142) – “an entry into the issues, concerns, and stories that motivate, compel, and capture the lives of others” (MARTIN, 2013, p. 119) – and learn and adapt the research from it (HEMMING, 2009, p. 24). Following the lines of a conversation (HEMMING,



2009, p. 24, 28–29), and not of an interrogation (CASTAÑEDA, 2021, p. 283; GUEVARA; POOPUU, 2021, p. 71; KÄIHKÖ, 2021, p. 212)<sup>5</sup> – which might put the participants on the defensive –, allows for familiarity and comfort for the interviewee, easing the exchange (ROGERS, 2013, p. 233). This format of interviewing is permissive both to a degree of plausible expectations over the information that the research is designed to uncover and to the emergence of unexpected insight – what Peabody calls “the serendipity factor” (PEABODY et al., 1990, p. 454; see also: MARTIN, 2013, p. 119; MITTON, 2021, p. 178) – and nuance in the participants views and stories (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 142; NORMAN, 2009, p. 90), which is crucial when researching violence – nuance that a rigid set of survey questions defined prior to the research may not allow to surface (HEMMING, 2009, p. 24). As Cathie Jo Martin says,

The trick is to retain sufficient indeterminacy in the interview to allow for unanticipated insights, even while using interview data to test for findings obtained through quantitative statistical tests. In an ideal research world, one balances one’s need for specific information with space for the stories, surprises, and synchronicity that an interview has to offer (MARTIN, 2013, p. 110).

As Rogers says, “an appropriately structured qualitative research program culminating with interviews is an effective method for capturing processes that are still unfolding or unsettled” (ROGERS, 2013, p. 232). The “thick description of interviews” (MARTIN, 2013, p. 122) may then provide the information needed “to construct analytic narratives to reveal the underlying rational choice games that structure incentives and produce action” (MARTIN, 2013, p. 118) – an urgent task given the current distribution of violence in Rio de Janeiro. As MacLeod says, “[i]nterviews are not solely about remembering. Rather, they can invoke narratives about the past as a means of supporting hopes for the future” (MCLEOD, 2019, p. 674).

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<sup>5</sup> For a discussion of the similarities between police interrogations and other types of interviews, see also: (HEYDON, 2005, p. 38–39).

### 6.1.1. Participants, Access, and Sampling Strategy

The choice of using semi-structured interviews is but the first choice in many that such research design entails. A decision that must be made, following this first choice, regards how to choose and contact the participants of the research, or, as Thomson says, the choice “about which voices are heard and whose knowledge counts” (THOMSON, 2009, p. 112). This is not a decision to be taken lightly. Depending on the context and on the conditions of the research some strategies may be more effective than others (MITTON, 2021, p. 176), and each will have its own advantages, difficulties, risks, and unanticipated consequences, all of which will influence the following phases of the research (NORMAN, 2009, p. 79; THOMSON, 2009, p. 109; ZAMORA, 2021, p. 92).. Since police officers, particularly when one is researching violence, are a group whose access to may be quite limited (BARNES, 2021a, p. 30; HUGGINS; HARITOS-FATOUROS; ZIMBARDO, 2002, p. 29; MITTON, 2021, p. 177; NORMAN, 2009, p. 74; ZALUAR, 1999, p. 6–7), having a trusted intermediary who can introduce you to research participants and vouch for you is one of the most valuable assets a researcher can have.

When one finds a point of entry into the group that one wants to research, a suggested strategy is to try and get referrals and contacts of other people to whom the researcher could talk. This is a strategy referred to in the literature as “snowball sampling” (BARNES, 2021b, 2021a; MITTON, 2021; NORMAN, 2009; SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015):

the researcher starts with an initial core group of individuals willing to be interviewed (often identified by a local contact or organization), and then asks subjects to identify others who might be willing to participate” (NORMAN, 2009, p. 79).

This is a strategy that other researchers studying violence and its employers have found effective (BARNES, 2021b, p. 11, 2021a, p. 28; HUGGINS; HARITOS-FATOUROS; ZIMBARDO, 2002, p. 31; LIFTON, 2017, p. 7; MITTON, 2021, p. 180). On one hand, this strategy has the advantage of helping with establishing trust by association (BRETT, 2021, p. 274; MCAULEY, 2021, p. 136; NORMAN, 2009, p. 79), which means it comes faster – important when time is a concern – and more

easily. On the other hand, it also comes with risks, particularly having the contact filter, even if unknowingly and not deliberately, the participants and, therefore, the data and information gathered, and making the protection of privacy and anonymity (what is often called “internal confidentiality”) of the participants harder (MARTIN, 2013, p. 115, 122–123; NORMAN, 2009, p. 78–79; SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015, p. 619). These risks and their safeguards will be discussed further.

### **6.1.2. Trust**

Establishing a relationship with an intermediary is “just the first step of many in gaining access, and each additional step require[s] additional re-negotiations of trust relationship” (NORMAN, 2009, p. 76). As Mitton reminds us, trust is essential in research involving interviews:

I learned the lesson that it isn’t always necessary to have abundant time, or to build up relationships with the those being interviewed, in order to reach substantive depth when discussing sensitive topics. Each situation demands sensitivity to context. But trust, whether invested directly in the researcher or in an intermediary, does seem essential (MITTON, 2021, p. 184).

“[I]t is crucial, not only to identify appropriate ‘gatekeepers’, but to establish a positive relationship with them in the hope that they w[ill] convey a message of openness and my willingness to meet other individuals and groups – no easy task” (MCAULEY, 2021, p. 135). Norman lays out the steps: first, the development of a trust relationship with the contact and/or institutions that will help with access (both to the site of the interviews and to the interviewees themselves); second, developing cognizance of security, confidentiality, privacy, anonymity, participation, and transparency issues to gain the trust and subsequent access to the participants directly; and finally, having access to the participants, there is the need of establishing a deeper sense of trust with them so that they feel safe and comfortable to share their experiences (NORMAN, 2009, p. 85; ZALUAR, 1999, p. 6–7). These stages of trust building matter because trust is not something that is either present or absent in a relation. Rather, it develops and builds-up sequentially in its multiple

dimensions, all of them feeding of and building upon one another (NORMAN, 2009, p. 71–72, 86).

As a multi-layered sentiment, trust has many dimensions to be considered. Cognitive trust is its rational dimension, meaning it is established through the participant's rational assessment of the researcher's assurance of good intentions and of the safety of the responses shared. It might be established in practice through Institutional Review Boards' standard requirements and other simple attitudes, such as providing participants with written statements describing the safety measures in place, the strategies for ensuring anonymity and confidentiality, and the nature and purposes of the research, properly securing informed consent, and taking time to answer any questions the participants might have (CASTAÑEDA, 2021, p. 283; NORMAN, 2009, p. 81; THOMSON, 2009, p. 110) [see Appendixes]. Emotional trust is, by its own nature, less predictable but can be developed by measures such as having conversations with participants in both formal and informal settings and by being cognizant of indications of both trust, such as relaxation and comfortable engagement with questions, and distrust, such as defensive behavior, bodily tension and other body language signs (see also: CASTAÑEDA, 2021, p. 287–289), and avoidance (CASTAÑEDA, 2021, p. 279; GALLAHER, 2009, p. 142; NORMAN, 2009, p. 84, 85; THOMSON, 2009, p. 115). These bodily and linguistic signs of trust and distrust are encompassed in what Norman calls "behavioral trust". Finally, there is relational trust, which is required even before the participants agree to being interviewed and is facilitated by a contact who can vouch for the researcher, hence its name. In some settings, a contact's referral and vouching is more important and more valued to the participants than cognitive trust. The help from a former officer and the choice of snowballing as the main method to find the participants facilitates the development of relational trust greatly (BARNES, 2021a, p. 17; BRETT, 2021, p. 274; HUGGINS; HARITOS-FATOUROS; ZIMBARDO, 2002, p. 31; LIFTON, 2017, p. 7; NORMAN, 2009, p. 72–74). As Norman says, "[t]hough distinct, these cognitive, emotional, and behavioural dimensions overlap as interpenetrating and mutually supportive aspects of the one, unitary experience and social imperative that we simply call 'trust'" (NORMAN, 2009, p. 74).

Nurturing relationships with contacts early on the process, prior to the beginning of the fieldwork, can help with gaining access and with establishing trust, which can extend to the participants (THOMSON, 2009, p. 111), but trust can only be maintained if it is anchored in the practical security considerations that this kind of research demands. As Norman says, “[e]nsuring the security of participants is a cardinal task to begin to build trust (cognitive in this case) between the researcher and the researched” (NORMAN, 2009, p. 77).

### **6.1.3. Positionality and Resistances**

One of the complicating aspects of trust-building is that it depends on elements outside of the researcher’s control, e.g., the researcher’s personal identity: “attributes such as nationality, gender, age, religion, race, or ethnic background” (NORMAN, 2009, p. 83; see also: CRONIN-FURMAN; LAKE, 2018, p. 610; HUGGINS; HARITOS-FATOUROS; ZIMBARDO, 2002, p. 31–32; LIFTON, 2017, p. 10–11; MCAULEY, 2021, p. 135) – something referred to in the literature as positionality. As Norman says, positionality “may present additional challenges to developing trust and gaining access to communities” (NORMAN, 2009, p. 83). This happens because the participants may regard the researcher, by virtue of the researcher’s attributes, as a collaborator of an opposing group, someone unworthy of respect, someone that should not be taken seriously, someone suspicious and untrustworthy overall, among many other possible resistances (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 142; MCAULEY, 2021, p. 137; NORMAN, 2009, p. 76; see also: CASTAÑEDA, 2021, p. 283; HUME, 2021, p. 310; MERTUS, 2009, p. 172). These resistances might pose new challenges and make the research more difficult, as they may be wary of the researcher. Gallaher, however, points out that this difficulty may be overstated:

some of my informants probably knew I disagreed with them while others thought I was curious or even sympathetic. The silence on the issue seemed, however, to suit us both. It allowed me to figure the movement out without undue suspicion of my motives by the group. And, it allowed the movement to suspend its suspicion of me and explain itself to an outsider who agreed to take it seriously (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 142).

The “chasm between us as researchers and our life experiences and the person sitting opposite us and their life experiences” is similarly bridged by our thoughtful and attentive questions, as “[t]hey also prove our interest in the details of the respondent’s life” (CASTAÑEDA, 2021, p. 292). This issue may also be negated by the contact’s vouching and referral of the researcher to the participants, as was discussed earlier, as it transfers [relational] trust and legitimizes the researcher’s presence and activities (BRETT, 2021, p. 274; MCAULEY, 2021, p. 139). The greater the proximity of the researcher to the contact and to the participants, the easier the process, since, as noted by Huggins, “if those interviewing police are recognized as insiders – with police themselves, of course, being the most legitimate of such insiders – the interviewer will be more readily accepted by prospective police interviewees” (HUGGINS; HARITOS-FATOUROS; ZIMBARDO, 2002, p. 32).

Besides the researcher’s attributes, the interviewer’s attribute as researcher may also be a point of contention, but there is disagreement in the literature if that is indeed the case. Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros and Zimbardo state that being an academic opens some doors when interviewing police officers. They note that “at least half of the[ir] interviewees remarked that they would accept being interviewed by the researcher because, as an academic, she was objective” whilst for them journalists and human rights activists were not (HUGGINS; HARITOS-FATOUROS; ZIMBARDO, 2002, p. 32). Other researchers, however, report that academics were put in the same category as journalists and human rights activists (VINUTO, 2019, p. 33–34) – that is, that journalists, activists, and academics are biased against the police just the same. Vinuto states that her interviewees – socioeducational agents working with interned teenagers – for example, believed that “people connected to what they named as theoretical knowledge always sided with the interned teenagers and, therefore, against the professionals” (VINUTO, 2019, p. 34, my translation).

Considering the difficulties discussed above, it is wise to follow Gallaher’s advice that “[t]he first and most important thing a researcher can do to ensure their safety is to be honest about who they are and what they are doing” (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 138) and to share, “truthfully, that I want [...] to get beyond the stereotypes

[...] to gain a better understanding” (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 142) of their motives, their reasoning, and their logics. Still following Gallaher’s advice, however, it is also wise to not divulge upfront any information that may cause contention unless it is pertinent, although one shall not lie if someone asks outright about such potentially contentious issues (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 142). It must be noted, however, that Gitta Sereny did tell her interviewee – Franz Stangl, the former Commandant of Treblinka, the largest Nazi extermination camp – “that he had to know from the start that [she] abhorred everything the Nazis had stood for and done” (SERENY, 1983, p. 23), which is the opposite of what Gallaher advises. Despite Sereny’s blunt honesty being rewarded with frank and extensive interviews with a participant of violence, it may be prudent to still adhere to Gallaher’s advice but also incorporate Sereny’s commitment to “write down exactly what [the participants say], whatever it would be, and that I w[ill] try – my own feelings notwithstanding – to understand without prejudice” (SERENY, 1983, p. 23–24; see also: BARNES, 2021a, p. 29; LIFTON, 2017, p. 11).

Regardless of potential stereotypes and the possibility of them causing mutual resistances between police officers and academics, this approach comes from the understanding that both scholars and police officers, as individuals, and the institutions in which we take part are inexorably complex and, because of that, inexorably ambiguous (CAMPBELL, 1992 throughout, but particularly p. 55; CONNOLLY, 1987, p. xi, 2002, p. 18; see also: LIFTON, 2017, p. 4–5). As such, this research and its interviews may aid in dispelling misconceptions that the police and academia may have about each other. Just as Universities produce diverse knowledges that often are put in conversations and debates to further our understanding of events and phenomena, the Police and the police officers are also diverse and represent multiple views, even if these may often seem to some, especially when departing from commonplace stereotypes, to be hidden under a veneer of apparent discursive cohesiveness and consensus. Having this research and its interviews as sites of honest, sympathetic, curious and engaging conversations between scholars and police officers may be a powerful tool in bridging the gap that is often presented between intellectuals and practitioners. Moving from the so-called ivory tower of academia to the so-called “real” world of policemen might

steer way stereotypes from both and lead to new conceptions and reformulations of old narratives about the academia and about the police, while also possibly leading to novel explanations and theories about violence and its employment and legitimization.

## **6.2. Ethical Care and Ethics Considerations**

Ashis Nandy expertly remarks that “knowledge without ethics is not so much bad ethics as inferior knowledge” (NANDY, 1998, p. 113), but inferior knowledge is neither the only nor the worst consequence of bad ethics in research. Discussions about ethics in science usually talk about the gross human rights violations that characterized Nazi Germany’s medical experimentations during World War II (LIFTON, 2017, p. 9) and about the continuing disregard for human subjects in both bio-medical and social sciences researches well into the second half of the twentieth century (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 130–131; HEMMING, 2009, p. 24). The concerns of the researchers during these times were about the scientific method: “testable hypotheses, ‘clean’ data, and replicable experiments. Ethics was not a priority for scholars doing research on human subjects” (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 130). The creation and establishment of ethical codes of conduct for human subjects research and Institutional Review Boards are a response and an attempt to prevent research from doing harm to test subjects and research participants (COSTA et al., 2021, p. 8; GALLAHER, 2009, p. 130; HEMMING, 2009, p. 34):

Both historic and contemporary IRBs are charged with protecting researchers and participants alike, as well as assessing the merit of the research project. They are the vanguard to not repeating the previous atrocities and mistakes by safeguarding against inflections on unsuspecting research participants from unscrupulous researchers (HEMMING, 2009, p. 34).

Despite such measures for upkeeping ethical standards, these are still subject to problems, some of which ironically mimic the ethical disregard that characterized past researches and their sole concern for method, such as defining ethics “in narrow, largely methodological terms – informed consent, respect for traditional institutions, responsibility to future researchers, legal approval by host nations, and so on” (BOURGOIS, 1990, p. 43; see also NORMAN, 2009, p. 75).



Instead, researchers working with violence, particularly, should consider their choices and its impacts more fully, not focusing solely on “issues of insurance and accountability ([ethics with a] small ‘e’)” (MILLAR, 2015, p. 147).

Responsible research is undergirded by three ethical principles: respect for persons, beneficence, and justice (BARON; YOUNG, 2021, p. 1). The first, respect for persons, means that the welfare, the rights, the customs, and other aspects of importance for the participants must be kept safe. Beneficence means that risks of harm or discomfort must be minimized. Finally, justice refers to the consideration of who benefits from the research, if the researcher and his university, solely, or if the participants and their communities. The practical measures and safeguards to be implemented before, during and after the fieldwork stem from these three categories (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 131; HEMMING, 2009, p. 25, 31).

The first directive stemming from this framework for ethical research is that of informed consent. In contrast to past researches that upheld information or didn't even inform the participants that they were, indeed, participating, current consent imperatives “requires that researchers explain the nature of their research to potential subjects and that potential subjects be given the opportunity to provide (or withhold) their consent to participate” (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 131–132). The second is disclosure of risk, under which the researchers must assess the risks they and their participants may be subject to in the execution of the research. This assessment must then be presented to the participants so they can decide if they want to proceed with the research. The risk assessment and its presentation are crucial to the first directive. Finally, there is the directive of the protection of vulnerable populations, which were disproportionately studied and often subjected to experimentation in ways other groups were not. This was done precisely because of their vulnerability: they were easier to access and provided little to no resistance to the researchers whims, many times being unable to even decide for themselves if they wanted to take part in the study or not (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 132). In sum,

The framework requires identification of potential risks, both physical and mental, to research subjects, that participation of research subjects is to be voluntary and with informed consent, and that confidentiality and anonymity are to be respected unless participants have consented to disclosure, and that harm to participants must be avoided (SRIRAM, 2009a, p. 58).

Even though “the basic necessity for the protocol’s ethical acceptability is the researcher’s skill, experience and the [social] scientific quality of the proposal” (HEMMING, 2009, p. 31), the basic requirements of research ethics must still permeate the entire research process and include decisions about how to best engage with interviewees, how to maintain privacy, anonymity, and confidentiality of participants and study materials, and how to preserve the necessary care after the fieldwork ends, during publication and after. In some research situations the consequences of negligence with ethical standards may put both researcher and participants in great danger, and they should thus be treated with the necessary responsibility and gravitas (SRIRAM, 2009a, p. 66). Being cognizant of the possible security risks and deciding for the proper means of access, methods employed, and topics to be dealt with are crucial both methodologically and ethically, as these decisions shape the trust relationships and, hence, the extent of the access to information (NORMAN, 2009, p. 80–81). As with Hemming, “[d]ue to the nature and subject matter of my research, I [am] acutely aware that there [are] numerous potential ethical issues” (HEMMING, 2009, p. 26). All of these will be considered in the following sections.

### **6.2.1. Security Concerns and Risk Assessment**

Safety is usually, in the eyes of the participants, the most important aspect to be observed by the researcher. In conversations with the participants, we worked collaboratively to think about the concerns and risks that may arise both to me and to them (HEMMING, 2009, p. 28; NORMAN, 2009, p. 80) and how to prevent and negate these risks. This is what is called a

‘localized ethic’ whereby researchers follow the advice and recommendations of trusted people in determining how, where and when to conduct the research. Relying on local knowledge should better ensure the safety and security of both the participants and the researcher (HUME, 2021, p. 313).

This is a cautionary measure for the ethical imperative of doing no harm by designing the safest research project possible, but it also helps with establishing trust by making the participants feel that they are safe sharing their stories with me, knowing that whatever they say will not be shared with others.

The literature highlights the importance of confidentiality in these kinds of research, as the information that the participants share with the researcher may be used against them if shared with others (NORMAN, 2009, p. 81, 83). “Indeed, one of the most significant yet unacknowledged problems relating to participant safety is ‘the issue of security breaches arising from researchers’ confidentiality lapses” (NORMAN, 2009, p. 81). The major concern of participants in studies about violence concerns fear of judicial prosecution (BROWNING, 1998, p. xvi; CASTAÑEDA, 2021, p. 279; HUGGINS; HARITOS-FATOUROS; ZIMBARDO, 2002, p. 29–30). There is both an awareness of how they and their actions will be represented on the research (see also: GALLAHER, 2009, p. 140–141) and, even more urgent, of the risk of indictment and arrest because of the violences perpetrated (SRIRAM, 2009a, p. 62), since they may feel that their statements are evidence of guilt (CASTAÑEDA, 2021, p. 279). Indeed, Barnes notices that interviewees that had been previously incarcerated were more open to sharing information about their activities since they had already been prosecuted and were not subject to being again (BARNES, 2021a, p. 25). Still, when interviewees’ fears and worries are allayed (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 138), researchers note that participants often speak in great detail about violences committed (BARNES, 2021a, p. 25, 29; CASTAÑEDA, 2021; GALLAHER, 2009, p. 138). But researchers should keep in mind that “[h]owever willing they may be now to speak with relative frankness, there must always be an element of self-protection” (SERENY, 1983, p. 82).

There is also reason for concern when it comes to the psychological damage that individuals that have been directly involved in violence, either as participants or victims (and sometimes both), must endure. The trauma of conflict may still be present at the time of the interviews (NORMAN, 2009, p. 84). Scholars researching violence often note that participants are willing to participate in studies because of the therapeutic benefits they can reap by talking to others about violence. Thomson says that “respondents who agreed to participate in the research understood its risks and some weighed this against the therapeutic benefits of having a sympathetic outsider to talk to” (THOMSON, 2009, p. 115) and Barnes highlights that participants like both “telling their own experiences [...] and the opportunity to

think more deeply about” the issues that concern them (BARNES, 2021a, p. 27) as they are intimately familiar “but seldom have the opportunity to speak openly about” them (BARNES, 2021a, p. 27). Indeed, as Martin says, “the adept interviewer is something like a psychotherapist, framing the questions to address the core concerns of the interviewee, even while gathering the information essential to making a diagnosis” (MARTIN, 2013, p. 124). Finally, as Lifton observes, “some part of these men wish[...] to be heard: they ha[ve] things to say that most of them ha[ve] never said before, least of all to people around them” (LIFTON, 2017, p. 8).

The researchers are also not immune to emotional fallout, particularly with the emotions that may emerge during the fieldwork when listening to stories of violence and when revisiting these stories in the process of writing. Barnes, for instance, mentions never having felt insecure or afraid during the 18 months of fieldwork researching drug trafficking gang members in Rio, but he identifies the participants’ penchant for describing a variety of violent and illegal acts in detail (BARNES, 2021a, p. 29) as one of the reasons for his mental health deteriorating and manifesting stress, anxiety and other distresses (BARNES, 2021a, p. 34). “Intense interviews on sensitive topics are grueling for respondent and researcher alike and while it is necessary to accommodate the preferences of respondents, it is also important to protect yourself” (THOMSON, 2009, p. 120).

That “[f]ieldwork is exhausting – often physically and almost certainly emotionally” (HUME, 2021, p. 309) – is often mentioned by researchers of violence (BARNES, 2021a, p. 34; LIFTON, 2017, p. xiii, 12; MCAULEY, 2021, p. 142; THOMSON, 2009, p. 120; MERTUS, 2009, p. 166; see also: BARON; YOUNG, 2021, p. 3; HUGGINS; HARITOS-FATOUROS; ZIMBARDO, 2002, p. 25). Thomson says that spending most of the days “listening to the narratives of individuals who survived the genocide, had been raped, or tortured, or had witnessed killings, or who had killed”, although allowing her to obtain “significant and intimate details of people’s lives that could have been otherwise unobtainable”, was personally difficult and meant she was subject to “an added layer of stress” (THOMSON, 2009, p. 115). Gallaher points out that it was perhaps her biggest problem:

Before starting my project, I had assumed I could keep an emotional distance from the hateful, conspiratorial things I would hear. I was surprised, however, by the intensity of my reactions. Sometimes I felt angry and wanted to tell my informants just how wrong I thought they were. Other times I felt queasy and anxious. I wanted to leave a meeting even though I knew I was getting ‘good’ data (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 128).

That this is a common occurrence also means that these researchers had to develop strategies to cope with the emotional fallout of violence research. These strategies, from the most deep to the most trivial, might help: creating safe spaces (THEIDON, 2014, p. 8) in which one can speak emotionally about the research (HUME, 2021, p. 309, 312); scheduling the interviews on times and dates that allow for enough time during the day to rest and recuperate if necessary (THOMSON, 2009, p. 120); taking breaks and scheduling time for leisure and rest (HUME, 2021, p. 314); writing about one’s feelings both for their own elaboration and for the development of the research (GINTY; BRETT; VOGEL, 2021, p. 12; HUME, 2021, p. 311); keeping in contact with friends and family (HUME, 2021, p. 314), both for overall support and for a better – i.e., external – assessment of the potential impacts of the research on the researchers well-being (MERTUS, 2009, p. 173); taking notes to avoid exposing reactions or having to look someone in the eyes when listening to something galling (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 128); practicing other physical or mental activities, such as meditation, outside of the research and fieldwork (BRETT, 2021, p. 277); and others. Thinking seriously about the impacts of the research on the researcher matters not least because of the ethical consequences: “[c]are of the self is integrally related to care for others” (MERTUS, 2009, p. 166).

The researcher and the research design must be thorough but also resourceful and flexible enough to adapt to fieldwork’s rapid changing conditions. That is to say that the methods, participants, strategies of collection and protection of information, and others are thought out during research design, but finetuned during fieldwork (THOMSON, 2009, p. 110, 121). This is particularly important when researching violence and its participants (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 128), as the Institutional Review Boards’ ethical standards may have evolved to protect the subjects from unscrupulous researchers (HEMMING, 2009, p. 34), but is often ill-prepared to protect the researcher in situations where the power of harm rests at the

participant's hands (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 136, 143). As Hemming says, the "assumption of [researchers'] 'power over' [participants] is intellectually bereft" (HEMMING, 2009, p. 30). Hemming emphasizes that "the researcher has no authority, no coercive power to chastise or capability to insist on their [the participants'] cooperation" (HEMMING, 2009, p. 30), and it is this lack of power that makes the participants more willing to take part in the research and that only without such power this participation can be truly voluntary (HEMMING, 2009, p. 30). But that the researchers do not have power over participants and that participants may have the power of harm does not mean that either are safe from danger, but that the risks both researcher and participants face may be more symmetrical than often assumed, even if they may be dissimilar (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 136). As Gallaher says,

research is not a unidirectional process. It is relational and transactional. Emotions (anger, laughter, ambivalence), expectations (honesty, fairness, a quid pro quo arrangement), and things (information, gifts, contacts) can flow both ways, whether properly or not (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 134).

### **6.2.2. Ensuring Voluntary Participation and Informed Consent**

As argued, it is the researcher's lack of power over the participants that ensures that participation is truly voluntary (HEMMING, 2009, p. 30), particularly when keeping in mind the gross ethical violations that characterized many researches in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and earlier, most of which were conducted on already vulnerable populations that were unable to give their consent (GALLAHER, 2009, p. 131–132; HEMMING, 2009, p. 34). Lack of power, therefore, is necessary, but it is not sufficient. For truly informed consent it is also necessary that the objectives and procedures of the research are transparent and clearly presented to the participants (NORMAN, 2009, p. 81). Following the experiences of other researchers studying violence, it is advisable to open the interviews with an explanation of

the reasons for conducting the interview, the topics we would talk about, the confidentiality agreement and its scope, and a series of rules that would be followed, such as the duration of the interview, the need to record the material and make notes on some but not all of the topics discussed, the possibility of switching the recorder off when certain subjects came up in

the conversation, the procedure that would be followed when the respondent did not wish to answer a particular question, how the information would be used, my commitment to provide the respondent with a copy of the transcribed interview, [...] among other issues (CASTAÑEDA, 2021, p. 283).

To make sure the participants have a clear understanding, a good protocol is to provide them with a written statement of the research's objectives in a concise and clear language, together with contact information, and then use a few minutes to answer any questions they may have (NORMAN, 2009, p. 86; THOMSON, 2009, p. 111) and to reassure that they can withdraw their participation at any time (HEMMING, 2009, p. 30). As for the consent form – although researchers doing fieldwork in conflict situations have defended the use of verbal consent, as the forms might be a source of risk in these situations (BOURGOIS, 1990, p. 51; HEMMING, 2009, p. 30, 33–34; NORMAN, 2009, p. 81, 89) –, it can be written without the collection of their signature, being solely for their reference, and include a range of permissions so that the participants know precisely what they are consenting to, along with a set of options from which they can opt in or out (SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015, p. 628).

### **6.2.3. Confidentiality**

As explained by Saunders, Kitzinger and Kitzinger, “‘confidentiality’ is a generic term that refers to all information that is kept hidden from everyone except the primary research team” (SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015, p. 617). Anonymity and privacy, in turn, refer to specific forms of confidentiality that must be preserved during research (NORMAN, 2009, p. 81): while anonymity is about safeguarding the confidentiality of the participants' identities, privacy is about safeguarding the information shared by the participants (SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015, p. 617). Preserving confidentiality is crucial to gaining trust and keeping the participants safe and failing to observe its maintenance can put the validity of the data gathered through interviews in jeopardy and the entire research with it (NORMAN, 2009, p. 81).

This is a particularly sensitive issue when using snowballing as the method for finding and contacting participants, since the participants may be connected and

know each other (NORMAN, 2009, p. 78–79; SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015, p. 619), and these close connections may facilitate the identification of networks or subgroups of people (NORMAN, 2009, p. 80). This risk may be prevented, however, by being cautious of the informations that are shared with the participants, particularly when trying to verify accounts, and by expanding the network of participants into a number of networks, something that may happen naturally when snowballing (BARNES, 2021a, p. 43; NORMAN, 2009, p. 80).

Still, countless safeguards and strategies can be employed to keep the confidentiality of the participants and of the research material safe. Using codes (MERTUS, 2009, p. 173) and/or pseudonyms (BARNES, 2021b, p. 25) when identifying sources and other sensitive data (SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015), recording only the necessary demographic details for each participant (THOMSON, 2009, p. 118), not recording any revealing information in the fieldnotes and using new notebooks for each meeting, for example, ensure that the respondents' identities will be kept safe even if the material is lost or confiscated. (THOMSON, 2009, p. 113–114). That “[a]ny piece of information discovered in the possession of the researcher is subject to being confiscated, read and misused against the researcher and the research subjects” (MERTUS, 2009, p. 173) is a common concern and it is suggested that “researchers should plan on leaving behind phone books, research notes and other work product that could lead to harassment and abuse should it fall into the wrong hands” (MERTUS, 2009, p. 173).

Regarding recordings and digital files, safeguards include making a preliminary anonymization of transcripts by blanking names and other potentially revealing data recorded in the audio tapes (THOMSON, 2009, p. 113–114), not keeping much information on computers, and using secure e-mails (MERTUS, 2009, p. 173), for example. Both digital and physical research material must therefore be guarded during the entire process of research, writing, and publication, and after (NORMAN, 2009, p. 82; SRIRAM, 2009b), as confidentiality and, as a consequence, security may be at risk as long as there is unedited and not



anonymized research material available. Having this in mind, the specific safety and confidentiality strategies will be laid out further on later.

#### **6.2.4. Preserving Anonymity**

Anonymity, as discussed earlier, is about safeguarding the confidentiality of the participants' identities. As simple as this definition of anonymization might seem, this is a multi-layered process that entails many strategies and procedures to try and “balance two competing priorities: maximising protection of participants' identities and maintaining the value and integrity of the data” (SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015, p. 617). This means that sometimes the integrity or the completeness of the data may have to be sacrificed in order to maximize anonymity and vice versa (SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015, p. 627). As discussed earlier, exercising care in the handling of identities and information is crucial to both establishing and maintaining trust with respondents and keeping everyone safe. That stories about violence are always sensitive means that anonymization is one of the most important steps in interview research. With this in mind I will endeavor to keep their identities hidden “through changing their names and the names of anyone else they mention [...], as well as disguising place names and particular identifying details” (SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015, p. 619).

Although assigning pseudonyms is the most common form of anonymization discussed in the literature (SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015, p. 620), places, occupations, religions and other identifying features may be changed to preserve anonymity, and each interview may have its own potentially identifying specificities (SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015, p. 627). To manage all these and balance both protection of identities and integrity of the data there is a plethora of strategies that can be employed. When referring to the interviewees, one can either change their names or make reference to general characteristics, such as age and gender, but the latter comes with a loss of clarity in the narrative and will be avoided whenever possible (SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015, p. 621). Making reference to the

general characteristics may also be a source of risk (SRIRAM, 2009b, p. 63) if the participants pool is not large enough, as it provides enough information to allow for the identification of the respondents through their statements (BARNES, 2021a, p. 43).

If a respondent, however, specifically asks to be identified, it is advisable to try and negotiate with them to accept receiving a pseudonym, as their name together with their statements may be enough to identify others in the research. The problem of “jigsaw identification” (SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015, p. 627) – that is, that two or more separate statements by a same respondent may together provide sufficient details to compromise their anonymity – can be managed by creating a “smoke screen by attributing different pseudonyms to each extract” (SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015, p. 621). This is a compromise in relation to the integrity of the data, but it is imperative, particularly when there is the possibility that they describe contentious activity – such as unwarranted violence –, and at the same time it may allow for more information to be disclosed without risk of identification, making for a richer account (SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015, p. 621–622).

When it comes to locations, if necessary, these may be substituted by codes and numbers (such as “Street X” or “Police Station 1”), for example. As for religion, culture, or ethnicity, these can be replaced by similar, unrelated items, or by general descriptions (“Interviewee’s religious faith”), but only if it is both necessary and not crucial to the contextualization or to the understanding of the narrative (SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015, p. 623), and each case must be handled accordingly. Once again, “[s]uch anonymisation represents yet another compromise to the integrity of the data as anonymising places can result in decontextualisation, limiting the scope for analysis” (SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015, p. 623). Other strategies include managing the information of the people mentioned in the statements by changing some details, such as genders, to avoid identification (SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015, p. 627).

These strategies can be employed in collaboration with the participants, as they have knowledge about their particular contexts and situations and can help identify potential hazards and new strategies for anonymization. This has already been

discussed elsewhere in this project and is suggested by some researchers working with interviews (SAUNDERS; KITZINGER; KITZINGER, 2015, p. 626; 629) and, particularly, with interviews with participants of violence (BARNES, 2021b, p. 25).

## 7. Future Research Materials

Many tropes and narratives that were identified from the interviews had to be left unattended in this thesis. They are listed here, alongside the excerpts that compose the themes for future reference and research. The themes are not distinctly separate, most overlap. The separation I propose is simply for organizational purposes.

### 7.1. Rio de Janeiro as an Exceptional City

**Assis:** Here in Rio de Janeiro the organized crime understood itself as the \*owner\* of the morro. Right? When he understands himself as the owner of the morro everything becomes more difficult, right? You... Actually, what is happening is – let's go: you have paramilitary groups... right? And acting against the three big foundations of national sovereignty. Which are: the territory, the people, and the laws. They take the territory of the country, they set up barricades, they build arrow slits, they put... What do we call "arrow slits"? They are very thick walls with a little space where they put their assault rifles, they shoot at the... They take the high ground – so if you have a foot on "geekiness" you have probably seen the movie Star Wars, in which Obi Wan tells Anakin that "look, I am in the high ground, it's no use coming at me.... 'cause you will lose! I already taught you that!" And what we deal with, right, when entering a comunidade, is that the bandido is already at the high ground, seeing us going up, shooting at us until we can reach him. Because he has already created ways of setting up traps, of installing CCTV, of watching our movements through the entire favela, and \*fear\* staying to kill us. Because we are going to make any kind of verification. The truth is that if there is a threat that a woman is being raped in the favela, we can't

**Assis:** Aqui no Rio de Janeiro o crime organizado se entendeu como \*dono\* do morro. Né? Quando ele se entende como dono do morro fica tudo muito mais difícil, né? Você, é... Na verdade, o que tá acontecendo é – vamo lá: você tem grupos paramilitares... né? E agindo contra as três grandes bases a soberania nacional. Que é: o território, o povo e as leis. Eles tomam o território do país, eles botam barricadas, eles botam seteiras, eles botam... O que a gente chama de seteira? São muros muito grossos, com um pequeno espaço onde eles colocam o fuzil ali, eles dão tiro nas... eles tomam terreno alto – então se você tem um pezinho na "nerdice" você já deve ter visto o filme do Star Wars que o Obi Wan fala pro Anakin que "olha eu tô no terreno alto, não adianta vir pra cima de mim... que você vai perder! Eu já te ensinei isso!" E o que a gente lida, né, ao entrar numa comunidade, é que o bandido já tá no terreno alto, vendo a gente subir, dando tiro na gente até a gente conseguir alcançar ele. Porque ele já criou formas de armadilhar, de instalar circuito de câmera, de vigiar a nossa movimentação por toda a favela, e \*temem\* ficar pra matar a gente. Porque a gente tá indo fazer qualquer tipo de verificação. A verdade é que se tem uma ameaça de que tem uma mulher sendo estuprada na favela, a gente não consegue ir

go [there] without facing the organized crime because they believe that over there is theirs. The law is theirs. If someone robs your house, we can't go solve your house's robbery. If someone is feeling ill, we can't go without their authorization or that we open a war against that.

**Assis:** Today I understand the organized crime as a cancer that's already instituted. You will need to have some radical measures to be able to eradicate this cancer. You will need to act in a somewhat more violent way against them, in a sense. So you need to recognize today as a civil war. Am I talking about all of Brazil? No, I am talking about Rio de Janeiro. The reality of Rio de Janeiro is a completely separate reality.

**Larrey:** Everything [is different] [laughs]. Ah, the geography of Rio de Janeiro is very peculiar, right? So, we have hills, right? [...] It's that sloped terrain and that is already very bad, because the Police comes from below, so who is on top has a privileged view. The terrain is too rough, [it has a] very difficult evolution, progression in the terrain, it already is a hardening factor in relation to Rio de Janeiro... This to talk geographically. Socially, since governor [Leonel] Brizola, there has been a disordered growth... social, right? Urban. A disordered urban growth. This hardens, too, the Police's work, because there are no streets where the access is easy with a police car or even with a motorcycle... no, there are places where you can only really pass on foot, and even so really cramped. Alleys, lanes... So this rough terrain of the disordered urban growth since Brizola's time was really bad. The question of the *bandidos*, right, that, like this, a growth... Can it happen anywhere? It can. But, like this, they have a \*veil\* of protection from the Judiciary that in other places is a question less visualized. [...]

sem enfrentar o crime organizado porque eles acreditam que aquilo ali é deles. A lei é deles. Se alguém roubou a sua casa a gente não consegue ir resolver o roubo da sua casa. Se alguém tá passando mal a gente não consegue ir sem que eles autorizem ou que a gente abra uma guerra contra aquilo.

**Assis:** Hoje eu entendo o crime organizado como um câncer que já tá instituído. Você vai precisar ter algumas medidas radicais pra poder erradicar esse câncer. Você vai precisar agir de forma um pouco mais violenta contra eles, de certa forma. Então vocês precisa reconhecer hoje como uma guerra civil. Eu tô falando de Brasil todo? Não, eu tô falando de Rio de Janeiro. A realidade do Rio de Janeiro é uma realidade completamente à parte.

**Larrey:** Tudo [é diferente] [risos]. Ah, a geografia do Rio de Janeiro ela é muito peculiar, né? Então a gente tem morros, né? [...] É aquele terreno de aclive e aí isso já é muito ruim, porque a Polícia vem de baixo, então quem tá em cima tem uma visão privilegiada. O terreno ele é muito acidentado, muito difícil evolução, progressão no terreno, já é um fator dificultoso em relação ao Rio de Janeiro... Isso pra falar geograficamente. Socialmente, desde o governador Brizola houve um crescimento desordenado... social, né? Urbano. Um crescimento urbano desordenado. Isso dificulta, também, a Polícia de trabalhar, porque não tem ruas onde o acesso seja fácil com viatura ou mesmo que seja moto... não, tem locais que você só passando mesmo a pé, e mesmo assim apertadinho. Vielás, becos... Então essa- esse terreno acidentado do crescimento urbano desordenado desde a época de Brizola foi muito ruim. A questão dos bandidos, né, que, assim, um crescimento... Isso pode ter em qualquer lugar? Pode. Mas, assim, eles

We have a reality in Rio de Janeiro very- The geography, the disordered urban growth... This generates a terrain, a space for action that's very hard, a very hard mode of operation for the Police to act.

**Pereira:** So the geography of Rio today makes it a peculiar state in comparison to the rest of the country. Right? Why? I don't know if you've had the opportunity to go up a *favela*... You had, right? You have seen how that is a... *pô*, man, is an *\*alley\**, that if you enter there you get lost. It is a pile of houses, of irregular buildings, often. Right? With no conditions of sanitation and sewage, [no] basic conditions of survival there. And then started the question of... of drug selling. Right? Which is something that society consumes. And there, since it is a very difficult place to access, the drug traffickers started using these spaces to conceal themselves, to hide. Right? And make the... their sales there. Yeah... one of the peculiarities of the state today is this, it is the difficulty that you have... of the state's geography.

**Pereira:** So... it's... the geographical issue, right? Very difficult. If you look at other places in the country... basically, what I remember, it's only Rio de Janeiro that has this geographic configuration of hills, you know, and *favelas* on hills... São Paulo, the *favelas* are all flat... right? In Goiás... most states. So today what I see is the following: it's one of the worst states, it's a huge violence, it's... if- Another thing that also catches my attention: you have there, okay, the *Comando da Capital* there in São Paulo, which is a very well-structured traffic it's... very well set up, a traffic... It's not just trafficking, it's an organized crime. You have bank robberies... there are other things, right?

têm um *\*véu\** de proteção do Judiciário que outros lugares é uma questão menos visualizada. [...] A geografia, o crescimento urbano desordenado... Isso gera um terreno, um local de atuação muito difícil, um modo de operação muito difícil pra Polícia atuar.

**Pereira:** Então a geografia do Rio hoje faz ele ser um estado peculiar em relação ao restante do país. Né? Por quê? Eu não sei se você já teve a oportunidade de subir uma favela... Já, né? Cê já viu como que aquilo ali é um... *pô*, cara, é um *\*beco\**, que se você entrar ali você se perde. É um apinhamento- um apinhado de casas, de construções irregulares, muitas vezes. Né? Sem condições de saneamento e esgoto; condições básicas de sobrevivência ali. E aí começou-se a questão da... da venda de drogas. Né? Que é algo que... que a sociedade consome. E ali, por ser um local de muito difícil acesso, os traficantes começaram a usar esses espaços pra se homizar, se esconder. Né? E fazer o... a venda deles ali. É... uma das peculiaridades do estado hoje é essa, é a dificuldade que você tem... da geografia do estado.

**Pereira:** Então... é... a questão geográfica, né? Muito difícil. Se você ver em outros lugares do país... basicamente, o que eu me lembro, é só o Rio de Janeiro que tem essa configuração geográfica de morros, né, e favelas em morro... São Paulo as favelas são todas planas... né? Em Goiás... a maioria dos estados. Então hoje eu vejo o seguinte: é um dos piores estados, é uma violência altíssima, é... se- Outra coisa também que me chama a atenção: você tem lá, tudo bem, o Comando da Capital lá em São Paulo, que é um tráfico muito bem estrut- é... muito bem montado, um tráfico... Não é só tráfico, é um crime organizado. Você tem assalto a banco... tem outras coisas, né? Os caras são... Agora...

The guys are... Now... let's say like this, in combat really, violent, there on a daily basis... I think that the Police here in Rio, man... Rio de Janeiro is perhaps the worst of the states, you understand? Due to this \*mostly\* geographic issue... mostly. Okay? Because it's one thing to go up a hill, it's another thing to go to a flat *favela*, where you have where to enter, where to leave and such, it's different, you know?

**Rodrigues:** \*This\* the drug dealers take advantage of the situation, of the *favela*'s geography, to be able to do those bad things there. Because the *favela* there is [an] alley, is full of alleys, it's hard for the Police to get in... Then they keep selling the-, doing the bad things, the drug. Do you understand? You don't see them coming to the *asfalto* [literally "asphalt", a slang used by police officers to refer to the streets, places that are not *favelas*], here, to set up *boca de fumo* [drug selling spots] here and such, because it's easy for the police to get [them]. So they go inside [the *favelas*], threaten the residents...

**Silva:** That the problem in Rio de Janeiro is security, right, Victor. It's nothing more. School, education has always been a problem, as it will always be in Brazil. Health too. Now, here, our security is completely lacking. Other places you have more police officers. And why is it lacking? Because the *vagabundos* are powerful... \*and\* our numbers just dwindle. Do you understand? While we had 50 thousand civil police officers and \*100\* thousand military police officers, today we must have at all 50 thousand. It's \*half\*. Do you know what half is? And, \*of that\* half, many on leave... many without the desire to work... many just counting time... Got it? So effective, on the street, very little.

vamos dizer assim, no combate mesmo, violento, ali do dia a dia... acho que a Polícia daqui do Rio, cara... o Rio de Janeiro é talvez o pior dos estados, entende? Devido a essa questão \*principalmente\* geográfica... principalmente. Tá? Porque uma coisa é você subir um morro, uma outra coisa é você ir numa favela plana, que você tem onde entrar, onde sair e tal, é diferente, entende?

**Rodrigues:** \*Isso\* os traficantes aproveita da situação, da geografia da favela, pra poder fazer essas coisas ruim lá. Porque a favela lá é beco, é cheio de beco, é difícil da Polícia entrar... Aí que eles ficam vendendo as-, fazendo as coisa ruim, a droga. Entendeu? Tu não vê eles vindo aqui pro asfalto, aqui, pra botar boca de fumo aqui e tal, porque é fácil da polícia pegar. Então eles vão lá pra dentro, ameaçam os moradores...

**Silva:** Que o problema do Rio de Janeiro é a segurança, né, ô Victor. Não é nada mais. Escola, educação sempre teve problema, como vai sempre ter no Brasil. Saúde também. Agora, aqui, a nossa segurança é deficitária total. Outros lugares você tem mais policiais. E tá deficitária por quê? Porque os vagabundos estão poderosos... \*e\* o nosso número só diminui. Entendeu? Enquanto nós tínhamos 50 mil policiais civis e \*100\* mil policiais militares, hoje a gente deve ter em tudo 50 mil. É \*metade\*. Você sabe o que é metade? E, \*dessa\* metade, muitos de licença... muitos sem tesão pra trabalhar... muitos só contando tempo... Entendeu? Então efetivo, na rua, pouquíssimo.

**Silva:** Brazil is another thing, Rio de Janeiro is out of this world.

**Silva:** Brasil é outra parada, Rio de Janeiro é outro mundo.

## 7.2. Police Officers and/or Policing in Rio de Janeiro as “Madness”

**Nunes:** [Story starts and continues in section 7.11.] I, yesterday, was walking close to a community and saw four *bandidos* armed with an assault rifle and I had passed them by car. And they even made the *Terceiro Comando* gang sign to me. *Pô...* As every citizen that is a police officer will think – or who joins the Police – “oh, let’s go there get those *bandidos*, arrest those *bandidos*!” And then the guys [other police officers]: “no, boss, you don’t understand. You can’t go there.” I said: “why not?” “Because there, where they are, on top there’s a hill that has a .30 pointed over here. If you go in with the car they will \*rake\* the car and everyone will die.” I said: “that’s crazy.”

**Nunes:** The Polices from other states they don’t... the *bandidos* don’t walk around with assault rifles like [they do] here, right? They don’t attack the polices like [they do] here, right? [...] Here it is normal for a police officer to get shot and die. Normal. Normal, like this, normal. “Boss, prepare the burial of police officer so-and-so.” “One more, right?” “Yeah, one more.” Normal. What was not supposed to be normal. My brother, if an armed police officer dies, do you think you won’t die? In an approach [by a criminal]? Here Rio de Janeiro the community is too violent. The *Comando Vermelho* here is too strong. The repression is too great. *Pô*, special operations, the BOPE... *pô*, they have war scenarios. They are not common. Do you understand? It is a training... of war really, to be commandos. The police officer from other countries comes here and keeps looking to the

**Nunes:** [História continua e termina na seção 7.11.] Eu, ontem mesmo, tava andando ali perto de uma comunidade e eu vi quatro bandidos armados com fuzil e eu tinha passado de carro. E eles ainda fizeram o sinal do Terceiro Comando pra mim. *Pô...* Como todo cidadão que é policial vai pensar – ou que entra na Polícia – “ih, vamo lá, vamo pegar esses bandidos, prender esses bandidos!” Aí os caras “não, chefe, tu não tá entendendo. Tu não pode chegar ali.” Falei: “por que não?” “Porque ali, onde eles estão, em cima tem um morro que tem uma .30 virada pra lá. Se tu entrar com o carro eles vão \*varar\* o carro e vai morrer todo mundo.” Falei: “que loucura.”

**Nunes:** As Polícias dos outros estados elas não... os bandidos não andam de fuzil como aqui, né. Eles não atacam polícias como aqui, né? [...] Aqui é normal polícia ser baleado e morrer. Normal. Normal, assim, normal. “Chefe, prepara aí o enterro do policial aí e tal.” “Mais um, né?” “É mais um.” Normal. O que não era pra ser normal. Meu irmão, se um policial armado morre, tu acha que não vai morrer? Na abordagem? Aqui o Rio de Janeiro a comunidade é muito violenta. O Comando Vermelho aqui é muito forte. A repressão é muito grande. *Pô*, operações especiais, o BOPE... *pô*, eles têm cenários de guerra. Eles não são comuns. Entendeu? É um treinamento... de guerra mesmo, pra ser comandos. O policial de outros países vem aqui e fica olhando pro treinamento dos BOPE e fica “meu Deus, isso aqui é igual... sei lá, os SEALs da Europa [sic]. É igual à



BOPE's training and keeps [saying] "my God, this is just like... I don't know, the SEALs from Europe [sic]. It is just like the special forces there from Iran, from Israel." The training *\*is\** different. And the other forces from other states look to the Military Police from the state of Rio de Janeiro as if we were the God! Do you know why? Because we do a lot with a little! Even entering with a dog inside the *favela* and exchanging shots. Imagine that. We do that. Jump- enter- from a plane in the fucking *favela* knowing that there is a guy there with a .30 firing shots. Here we do that. There are police officers even so crazy that they approach [suspects] without a vest. Because he is used to it.

**Nunes:** I think this one from Cidade Alta was a bizarre thing. Bizarre. Because I was on duty on Avenida Brasil, I received a report on the radio that two police officers from the BPVE [Highway Police Battalion] had entered the *favela* and had been shot by *bandido* in the favela. And then, at the time, all the BPVE radios were calling, we heard about them in "*maré*" [police radio frequency] and went on their radio and it was "let's go there, let's help". I called a team from Avenida Brasil and said "let's go too, let's help these police, let's help the police officer." In the time [you] think of the police, we are police, we create a brotherhood and everyone goes to defend the police. When we got there in Cidade Alta, the *bandidos* were on top of the walkway. When the BPVE vehicles passed with the sirens turned on – *pô*, more than fifteen vehicles – they fired a lot of bullets at us. But a lot of shots. Everyone disembarked, had to stay under cover, a lot of shots. I've never heard so much gunfire in my life. [...] I went to meet the police officers, right? Up to the point and there were audacious, sagacious police officers, but there were also police officers

força especial lá do Irã, do Israel." O treinamento *\*é\** diferente. E as outras forças dos outros estados olham pra Polícia Militar do estado do Rio de Janeiro como se a gente fosse o Deus! Sabe por quê? Porque a gente faz muito com pouco! Até entrar com um cachorro dentro da favela e trocar tiro. Imagina isso. A gente faz. Pular- entrar- de avião na porra da favela sabendo que ali tem um cara com um .30 dando tiro. Aqui a gente faz. Tem policial ainda tão louco que aborda sem colete. Porque tá acostumado.

**Nunes:** Eu acho que essa da Cidade Alta foi uma coisa bizarra. Bizarra. Porque eu tava de serviço na Avenida Brasil, recebi no rádio o informe que dois policiais do BPVE [Batalhão de Policiamento em Vias Expressas] tinham entrado na favela e tinham sido baleados por bandido na favela. E aí, na época, todas as rádios da BPVE tavam chamando, a gente ouviu na "*maré*" [frequência de rádio policial] deles e foi no rádio deles e foi "vamo lá, vamo ajudar". Liguei pra uma equipe da Avenida Brasil e falei "vamo também, vamo ajudar esses policiais, vamos socorrer o policial." Na hora pensa no policial, somos policiais, a gente cria uma irmandade e vai todo mundo defender o policial. Quando a gente chegou lá na Cidade Alta, os bandidos estavam em cima da passarela. Quando as viaturas do BPVE passaram com o giro ligado – *pô*, mais de quinze viaturas – eles deram muito tiro na gente. Mas muito tiro. Todo mundo desembarcou, teve que ficar abrigado, muito tiro. Nunca ouvi tanto tiro na minha vida. [...] Fui ao encontro dos policiais, né? Até o ponto e tinham policiais audaciosos, sagazes, mas também tinham policiais que ficaram com

who were afraid, who were almost run over because they got out of the car and did not put the handbrake on, they were almost run over, and then when I got there on the stage, I started to understand this context and the perception of the normality of the situation shocked me. We had a hundred police officers... behind the wall, we couldn't walk forward to enter the *favela*. Without dying. Because they had all the *bandidos* with arrowslits pointing to a street entrance. And we couldn't move forward.

**Pereira:** The SWAT came here and made operations with the BOPE. And they said like this: “man, you are crazy. You are crazy.” Because how will you go up a *morro* where... Look, you are going up here. Look, you are going up here. The guy is over here seeing you. Do you understand? The enemy is here, look. He is shooting at you. So the guys said “*pô*, you are crazy, man.” Do you understand? And at the time they came [our] weaponry wasn't this one, no, it was quite inferior, it was- it was still revolvers, it was something quite outdated, really.

**Rodrigues:** Boy, Rio de Janeiro's Police, you come – I travel a lot, like I told you. When I arrive in Minas [Gerais], man: “man, you are crazy, you are police there in Rio” – they talk just like this. You arrive in São Paulo, anywhere that you arrive they talk just like this, man. They see the situation in Rio de Janeiro here how it is. Because Rio de Janeiro, what is Rio de Janeiro? A city surrounded by *favelas*. Rio de Janeiro is an island. All the rest are *favelas*. Wherever you go, you see that there's a *favela*. You are here, there's a *favela*. There there's a *favela*, there... You pass in *Linha Amarela*, how many *favelas* there are in *Linha Amarela*. You pass in *Linha Vermelha*, go to *Zona Sul*... Do you understand? Then when you

medo, que quase foi atropelado porque saiu da viatura e não puxou o freio de mão, quase foi atropelado, e aí quando eu fui chegando lá no cenário eu fui entendendo esse contexto e me chocou a percepção da normalidade da situação. Távamos cem policiais... atrás do muro, não podíamos andar pra frente pra entrar dentro da favela. Sem morrer. Porque eles tavam todos os bandidos com seteira apontando pra uma entrada de uma rua. E a gente não tinha como avançar.

**Pereira:** A SWAT veio aqui e fez operações com o BOPE. E eles falaram assim, “cara, vocês são maluco. Vocês são maluco.” Porque como é que você vai subir um morro onde... Olha só, você tá subindo aqui, oh. Olha só, você tá subindo aqui. O cara tá aqui em cima te vendo. Tá entendendo? O inimigo tá aqui, ó. Ele tá atirando em você. Então os caras falaram “*pô*, vocês são doidos, cara.” Entendeu? E na época que eles vieram o armamento não era esse não, era bem inferior, era- ainda era revolver, era coisa bem retrógrada mesmo.

**Rodrigues:** Rapaz, a Polícia do Rio de Janeiro, você chega – eu viajo muito, igual eu te falei. Quando eu chego em Minas, cara: “cara, vocês são doidos, vocês são polícia lá no Rio” – eles falam assim mesmo. Você chega em São Paulo, qualquer lugar que tu chega eles falam assim mesmo, cara. Eles veem a situação do Rio de Janeiro aqui como que é. Que o Rio de Janeiro, o que que o Rio de Janeiro é? Uma cidade cercada por favela. O Rio de Janeiro é uma ilha. O resto tudo favela. Onde você vai, você vê que tem favela. Você tá aqui, tem favela. Ali tem favela, ali... Tu passa na *Linha Amarela*, quantas favelas que tem na *Linha Amarela*. Passa na *Linha Vermelha*, vai na *Zona Sul*... Entendeu? Aí quando tu chega, quando eles

arrive, when they see on the news, the *vagabundo* with assault rifles, heavy weaponry, grenades... Then you come to these police there from Minas, there from São Paulo, they [say] “man, you are crazy, you are police there in Rio”. Even the Americans when they come here. The BOPE- There are police officers from the United States that come to train with the BOPE here. They get crazy, man. With the training that BOPE has.

**Silva:** SWAT came here... and got desperate. They said: “*pô*, you go to the *morro* [dressed] like this, like this” – like you are [I was wearing jeans and a shirt]. [We] go up the *morro* like this. They had helmets, special glasses, knee pads, elbow pads, bulletproof vests... a special boot... *Pô*, and we go up in any way, sometimes only with a pistol. Right? We went up that time. They were saying: [forcing an American accent] “no, you are crazy, it can’t [be like this]”.

veem na reportagem, o vagabundo tudo de fuzil, armamento pesado, granada... Aí chegam nessas polícia aí de Minas, aí de São Paulo, eles “cara, cês são doido, cês são polícia lá no Rio”. Até os americanos quando vêm aqui. O BOPE- tem polícia dos Estados Unidos que vem fazer treinamento com o BOPE aqui. Eles ficam malucos, cara. Com o preparo que o BOPE tem.

**Silva:** SWAT veio aqui... e desesperou. Aí falou: “*pô*, cês vão no morro assim, assim” – como tá, como você tá [estava de calça jeans e camisa]. Sobe o morro assim. Eles de capacete, de óculos especial, de joelheira, cotoveleira, colete à prova de bala... um boot especial... *Pô*, e a gente sobe de qualquer maneira, às vezes só de pistola. Né? Subia essa época. Eles falando: [fingindo sotaque americano] “não, cês ‘son’ maluco, não pode”.

### 7.3. Police Officers’ Complaints of Precarity

**Nogueira:** The police officer today, he, many times, he doesn’t have a... he doesn’t have an equipment, he doesn’t have a support today. From the *Secretaria da Polícia Militar*. Support in everything. Many times, the police car breaks down in the middle of the street, the police officer has to push the car. The radio doesn’t work. The weaponry falters. Sometimes there is a big, bulky occurrence... and sometimes [we] don’t have the support [we] should have.

**Nogueira:** Sometimes the weaponry, it jams, it “gags”, it doesn’t have maintenance. Our cars today are [Toyota] Corollas, but in the past were [Volkswagen] Gol completely wasted. And today our Corolla rides 24 hours a day. There comes a time it needs

**Nogueira:** O policial hoje, ele, muita das vezes, ele não tem uma... ele num tem um equipamento, ele num tem um suporte hoje. Da Secretaria da Polícia Militar. Suporte em tudo. Muitas das vezes a viatura enguiça no meio da rua, o policial tem que empurrar a viatura. O rádio não funciona. O armamento dá problema. Às vezes tem uma ocorrência de- vultuosa, de grande... e às vezes não tem o suporte que deveria ter.

**Nogueira:** Às vezes o armamento, ele trava, ele engasga, não tem manutenção. As nossas viaturas hoje são [Toyota] Corollas, mas antigamente era [Volkswagen] Gol todo caído. E hoje o nosso Corolla roda 24 horas por dia. Chega uma hora que precisa

maintenance, and it doesn't have maintenance. After some time, it is all broken, everything turns to junk. So we have to have the maintenance of our vehicles of the Military Police. We... [interlocutor starts speaking quietly] have a *rancho* [dining hall] that is \*awful\*. There are ranchos from battalions there that the police has to pay from his pocket to eat [someplace else] because he can't eat the food from the *rancho*. *Pô*, the accommodations of the battalion... The accommodations of the battalion- There are battalions' accommodations there that are shameful, there are rats even. This is shameful. The battalions, now, are being renovated and everything, but this was supposed to be happening... [Interlocutor snaps his fingers repeatedly, insinuating this should have happened long before.] The governor gives a payment raise, but this is a raise that was blocked for more than two years! He's not doing anything funny. This was blocked for more than two years, and he is covering today what was... because of the pandemic and such. The Military Police officer, there is the pandemic, no one could go out, but the police officer was on the streets. The nurse was, the physician was. Do you understand? To provide a service that we... we went through civil service examinations to provide. But I think that if you see the payment of the police officer, today, in Rio de Janeiro, and compare with the other states you will see that it is shameful. You will see that the police officer today, he doesn't have a proper weaponry, he doesn't have a proper vehicle, doesn't have a proper accommodation, doesn't have a nice meal, and even still he provides a good service for society. If you compare the starting salary of a police officer in Brasília, in other states, you will see that the starting salary of the Civil Police officer of Brazil, here of Rio de Janeiro, is shameful.

manutenção e não tem manutenção. Passa um tempo, tá tudo quebrado, vira tudo sucata. Então a gente tem que ter manutenção dos nossos- do- do nossos automóveis da Polícia Militar. A gente... [falando baixo] tem um rancho [refeitório] que é \*péssimo\*. Tem rancho de batalhão aí que policial tem que tirar dinheiro do bolso pra comer porque ele não consegue comer a comida do rancho. *Pô*, os alojamento do batalhão... Os alojamento do batalhão- tem alojamento de batalhão aí que dá até vergonha, passa até rato. Isso é vergonhoso. Os batalhões, chega agora, estão tendo mais reformas e tudo, mas isso aí já deveria estar acontecendo [estalando os dedos para dizer que deveria estar acontecendo há muito tempo]. O governador dá um aumento salarial, mas já era aumento que já tá travado mais de dois anos! Ele não tá fazendo nenhuma gracinha, não. Isso aí já tá travado mais de dois anos e ele está hoje cobrindo o que tava... por causa de pandemia e tal. O policial militar, tá a pandemia, ninguém podia sair, mas o policial tava na rua. O enfermeiro tava, o médico tava. Entendeu? Prestar um serviço que a gente... que a gente fez concurso pra prestar. Mas eu acho que se você ver o salário hoje do policial, hoje, de Rio de Janeiro, e comparar com os outros estados, vai ver que é vergonhoso. Vai ver que o policial hoje, ele não tem um armamento digno, ele não tem uma viatura digna, não tem um alojamento digno, não tem uma alimentação maneira, e mesmo assim ele presta um bom serviço pra sociedade. Se você for comparar o salário inicial do policial de Brasília, de outros estados, você vai ver que é vergonhoso o salário do policial civil do Brasil, aqui do Rio de Janeiro.

**Nogueira:** I once heard from a friend “there is no such thing as good and cheap police”. Does not exist. There is no good and cheap police. Today you see – of course this is a set of things, right? You see today a police officer from the United States, a police officer – I won’t even say the United States because we’re talking about another country, I’ll take a police officer from São Paulo. The guy has a car – let’s get a police officer from the South –, the guy has an excellent car, weapons, a vest. The guy has accommodations, the guy goes to the *rancho* for lunch, at lunchtime, there is excellent food – you arrive here at the *rancho*, sometimes the food is spoiled. What is that? Why don’t you get food – because there is “food” inside the paycheck. It’s a hundred *reais*. Do the following: give 600 *reais* and the police officer eats wherever he wants, or takes his own food. Now, [he] arrives at a *rancho*, sometimes the food is spoiled... Where are we, this is in the 21st century, man. In the state with a violence index that is the highest in the co- which is the highest in Brazil. This is not worse because the police are there acting, they are there blocking, if not absurd numbers would have already been passed, you know?

**Nunes:** [...] Rio de Janeiro. Two recently graduated police officers from the BPVE [Highway Policing Battalion], from the Police, two *soldados*, worked at the BPVE... ‘Cause here in the Police it’s like this: you graduate, you go to war. Got the police car, were in the *PATAMO* [Mobile Tactical Patrol], had to make a displacement. Did they know the road map? Did they know Rio de Janeiro? They didn’t. The police officer didn’t even know how to drive an automatic car. And most cars from the Police are automatic. This I saw. They got in, made their way, entered the wrong place, didn’t know the *comunidade*, entered inside the *favela*.

**Nogueira:** Eu escutei uma vez de um amigo “não existe polícia boa e barata”. Não existe. Não existe polícia boa e barata. Hoje você vê – claro que isso é um conjunto de coisas né? Você vê hoje policial dos Estados Unidos, um policial – não vou falar nem Estados Unidos que a gente tá falando de outro país, vou pegar um policial de São Paulo. O cara tem uma viatura – vamo pegar um policial do Sul –, o cara tem uma excelente viatura, um armamento, um colete. O cara tem um alojamento, o cara vai no rancho almoçar, na hora do almoço, tem uma excelente comida – tu chega aqui no rancho, às vezes tem comida estragada. O que é isso? Por que não pega alimentação – porque existe dentro do contracheque “alimentação”. É cem reais. Faz o seguinte: dá 600 reais e o policial come onde ele quiser, ou leva a comida dele. Agora, chega num rancho, às vezes, a comida estragada... Onde a gente tá, no século XXI isso, cara. No estado com um índice de violência que é maior do es- que é a maior do Brasil. Isso não é pior porque a polícia tá aí agindo, tá aí travando, se não já tinha passado números absurdos, entendeu?

**Nunes:** [...] Rio de Janeiro. Dois policiais recém-formados do BPVE [Batalhão de Policiamento de Vias Expressas], da Polícia, dois soldados, trabalhavam no BPVE... Que aqui na Polícia é assim: você se forma, você vai pra guerra. Pegaram a viatura, tavam no *PATAMO* [Patrulhamento Tático Móvel], tiveram que fazer um deslocamento. Eles conheciam o roteiro? Conheciam o Rio de Janeiro? Conheciam nada. Policial não sabia nem dirigir carro automático. E a maioria dos carros da Polícia são automático. Isso eu vi. Entraram, fizeram o caminho, entraram errado, não conheciam a comunidade, entraram dentro da favela – porque as favelas,

When they realiz- took the first shot, in their fright [they] tried to get out, [they] hit the front [of the car], hit the back [of the car], the car got wrecked in their exit, trying to desperately get out in the street. They [criminals] sprayed the entire car [with bullets]. One got hit in the leg, the other got hit in the chest. The guy- one will lose his leg – I think he’s 29 years old – will lose a leg because [the bullet] hit his knee, and the one [that got shot] on the chest didn’t die by chance. Chest and a graze on the face. Deformed, even, his face got burned. The *bandidos* themselves saw that they were crazy because two cops wouldn’t enter a *favela*. Sent an Uber to take them to the hospital. Look at this scenario. Meanwhile, in that whole shooting, we were not able to get in, the *coronel* who is in his house and doesn’t even know what is going on says what? “Go there and get the Police car that is inside. Don’t allow this to happen.” How can we get in without an armored car? The armored car was in another operation, I called the colleague from the other operation: “can you let the armored car go?” “Man, I will let it go, but the armored car is not even working properly. I don’t know if it will get there.” I told the *coronel* [this], the *coronel* [said]: “Find a way. If you can’t find a way, hold it, because the BOPE can’t go.” Just to get the dignity of the Police, that is the police car that is there. [Story continues in section 7.11.]

**Nunes:** And then we are generators [I believe he meant “administrators”] of chaos, right, because we have limited resources from the state – [the] Police is too big, [and the] state sometimes has money, sometimes doesn’t... but we manage. Then look, look at this scenario [pointing at the room we were in]. [These] are not the best physical facilities, [the ones] we have. And people make it move. It doesn’t look like it, [but] today there are more than two hundred of our men in the

às vezes, tu nem sabe que é favela. Quando dera- tomaram o primeiro tiro, no susto tentaram sair, bateram na frente, bateram a traseira, o carro ficou todo quebrado na saída deles tentando sair em desespero na rua. Alvejaram a viatura toda. Um tomou um tiro na perna, o outro tomou um tiro no peito. O cara- um vai perder a perna, acho que é de 29 anos, vai perder uma perna porque acertou no joelho, e o do peito não morreu por sorte. Peito e um de raspão no rosto. Deformou, até, o rosto dele ficou queimado. Os próprios bandidos viram que eles tavam maluco porque dois policiais não iam entrar numa favela. Mandou um Uber levar eles pro hospital. Olha o cenário. Nisso, aquele tiroteio todo, a gente não conseguindo entrar, o coronel que tá lá na casa dele e não sabe nem o que tá acontecendo fala o quê? “Vai lá e pega o carro da Polícia que tá lá dentro. Não deixa isso acontecer.” Como é que a gente entra sem um blindado? O blindado tava em outra operação, liguei pro colega da outra operação “tem como liberar o blindado?” “Cara, eu vou liberar, mas o blindado nem tá funcionando direito. Não sei se vai chegar até aí.” Falei pro coronel, o coronel “dá um jeito. Se não der um jeito, segura, porque o BOPE não tem como ir.” Só pra pegar a dignidade da Polícia, que é o carro da Polícia que tá lá. [História continua na seção 7.11.]

**Nunes:** E aí a gente é gerador [acredito que quis dizer “gerenciador”] de caos, né, porque a gente tem um recurso limitado do Estado – Polícia é grande demais, Estado aí tem hora que tem dinheiro, hora não tem... mas a gente administra. Aí ó, olha esse cenário [apontando para a sala em que estávamos]. Não são as melhores instalações físicas, que nós temos. E o pessoal faz andar. Parece que não, [mas] hoje tem mais de duzentos homens nossos na rua. Pra gerir todo esse maquinário

street. To manage all this machinery is a full responsibility, [these] are lives, [these] are families, everything paid for by the state.

**Pereira:** I'm going to get to the main point I wanted to get to, which I even talked to you the other day... We're going from the seventies to the present day, right? The evolution of crime. This is important because- for you to know the structure of crime so you know the structure of how the police faces crime, and how it also had to... update itself. However, interesting, the police updates itself \*much\* less- Not now, but a while ago the *bandido* already had a rifle, [while] the police still had a revolver. Do you understand?

**Pereira:** Someone may tell you, "ah, but why didn't you shoot him in the leg and all"? Look, for you to say something like that, first you have to be a marksman. The peculiarity of a good shot is hard, man. Don't you think shooting is easy, no. Even for us it's difficult, that is why there's training, and this training should be much more constant than it is. Then there is that problem, the [police] corporations don't have money for the equipment, many times we buy our own material. When the police officer wants to adapt, he wants to become a professional, he buys the material and trains shooting at the range. We have a stand, but we don't have the material for that. And ammunition is expensive, but it's- well, one piece of ammunition for me today in a private booth here, to take a shooting class, one piece of ammunition costs six *reais* and fifty. For the police, I think it drops to three or four *reais*, but it's still a value, right? And the ideal is that we would, let's say, every six months, do a recycling. The ideal is that every month we shoot. Then you improve the quality of the police officer, of a mistake, because the

é toda uma responsabilidade, são vidas, são famílias, tudo custeado pelo Estado.

**Pereira:** Eu vou chegar no ponto principal que eu queria chegar, que eu até falei contigo outro dia... A gente tá andando da década de setenta pra os dias de hoje, né? A evolução do crime. Isso é importante porque- você conhecer a estrutura do crime pra você conhecer a estrutura de como a polícia enfrenta o crime, e como que, também, ela teve que se... se atualizar. Só que, interessante, a polícia se atualiza \*muito\* menos- Agora não, mas um tempo atrás o bandido já tava com um fuzil, [enquanto] que a polícia ainda tava com revólver. Entende?

**Pereira:** Alguém pode te falar assim, "ah, mas por que que cê não atirou na perna e tal"? Veja bem, pra você falar um negócio desse, primeiro você tem que ser atirador. A peculiaridade de um bom tiro é difícil, cara. Não pensa você que atirar é fácil, não. Até pra gente é difícil por isso que há um treinamento, e deveria ser muito mais constante esse treinamento do que é. Aí passa por aquele problema, as corporações não têm dinheiro pro equipamento, muitas vezes a gente compra o nosso próprio material. Quando o policial quer se adequar, ele quer se profissionalizar, ele compra o material e treina tiro lá no estande. Nós temos estande, mas não temos material pra isso. E a munição é cara, mas é- bom, uma munição hoje pra mim num estande particular aqui, pra fazer uma aula de tiro, uma munição custa seis reais e cinquenta. Pro policial acho que cai pra três ou quatro reais, mas mesmo assim é um valor, né? E o ideal é que a gente fosse, vamos dizer assim, de seis em seis meses, fazer uma reciclagem. O ideal é que todo mês a gente atirasse. Aí você melhora a qualidade

mistake can happen. [Story continues in section 7.7.]

**Pereira:** And then you had a lot of casualties too. Okay? I'll tell you this, the police died like flies [a lot], man. Because you had many casualties, why? You had, first, a horrible work material, which was a revolver, you didn't have a vest, you didn't have technique, you didn't have \*anything\*! And crime was growing, man. So, the police officer started to exchange fire with a *bandido* with a rifle and he had the revolver. So it was one of the times that the most police died. Died... by the flies. Do you understand?

**Pereira:** Oh, before we, literally, had our own weapons, and I remember that, that was in ninety-five when I joined, a little before, ninety-two, ninety-three, ninety-four, the government, the Public Ministry authorized us when, huh... there was an incursion- and at that time a lot of weapons arrived... for drug trafficking. And there is – I remember, I remember, I was a recruit in this- we call it “new recruit”, right? It was weaponry I've never seen, man. A pistol this size [gestures] called the Desert Eagle. Desert Eagle is an Israeli pistol, which is called “*águia do deserto*” [Portuguese translation of “desert eagle”]. Forty caliber, the nine millimeter caliber, I don't remember. Desert Eagle. There was another one that was “Llama”. The Llama, if I'm not mistaken, was... Chilean. Or Bolivian. It was also a beautiful gun, big, high caliber too, nine millimeters. Man, they were weapons, like, that we had never seen. We used revolvers. Those who used- those who always used pistols were the Armed Forces, they always had them, but they never passed them on to us, not even rifles. And then... the public authorities began to authorize... When we gave the- we did there- we had access, right? To the weapons armory and such,

de do policial, de um erro, porque o erro pode acontecer. [História continua na seção 7.7.]

**Pereira:** E aí você tinha muitas baixas também. Tá? Eu vou te falar isso, a polícia morria como mosca, cara. Porque você tinha muitas baixas, por quê? Você tinha, primeiro, um material horrível de trabalho, que era um revólver, você não tinha colete, você não tinha técnica, você não tinha \*nada\*! E a criminalidade foi crescendo, cara. Então, o policial começou a trocar tiro com um bandido de fuzil e ele tava com o revólver. Então foi uma das épocas que mais morreu policial. Morria... às moscas. Entende?

**Pereira:** Ah, antes de, literalmente, a gente ter o nosso armamento próprio, e eu lembro disso, isso foi em noventa e cinco quando eu entrei, pouquinho antes, noventa e dois, noventa e três, noventa e quatro, o poder público, o Ministério Público autorizava a gente quando, é... fazia uma incursão- e nessa época chegava muito armamento... pro tráfico. E existe- eu lembro, eu lembro, eu era recruta nessa- a gente chama de “recruta novo”, né? Eram armamentos que eu nunca vi, cara. Uma pistola desse tamanho [gesticula] chamada Desert Eagle. Desert Eagle é uma pistola israelense, que é chamada “*águia do deserto*”. Calibre quarenta, o calibre nove milímetros, não lembro. Desert Eagle. Tinha outra que era “Llama”. A Llama, se eu não me engano, ela era... chilena. Ou boliviana. Também era uma arma linda, grandona, calibre alto também, nove milímetros. Cara, eram armas assim que a gente nunca tinha visto. A gente usava revólver. Quem usava- quem sempre usou pistola, eram as Forças Armadas, sempre teve, mas nunca passou pra gente, nem os fuzis. E aí... o poder público começou a autorizar... Quando a gente dava a- fazia lá- tinha acesso, né? Ao paiol de armas e tal,



[when we] managed to dismantle the structure, that we used [these] weapons, this weaponry to try to make a front against the *bandidos*, you know? Which until then was a revolver, man. Then the vests started to arrive... The Public Ministry authorized us to use the rifles. And it was- you had an AR-15 rifle...

**Victor:** So the things you apprehended became...

**Pereira:** Apprehended. Victor- Because [we] didn't have, Victor, didn't have rifles. Interesting, man. The *bandidos* already had war rifles, American, and the public power did not. There was the twelve gauge I told you about. Right? And that they are short-range weapons. You had a machine gun... INA, which is a weapon that you don't have shooting accuracy, and you had a revolver, man, which is a thirty-eight that, fuck, average range there is ten meters, five to ten meters maximum. The guy is shooting at you with a rifle, man, so it was like that, it was something... literally... it was a war... it wasn't like war, it wasn't on an equal footing, right? And then the government authorized us to use this equipment, right? Then, as they had few, it was a rifle, an assault rifle like that for each PATAMO garrison and such, you know? And then... then an agreement was formed with the Armed Forces, the Armed Forces started donating rifles to us, you know? The army started- I myself worked with an army rifle, which the Military Police didn't have yet, you know? Rifles from IMBEL, which is the Brazilian Military Material Industry. And rifles began to be passed around, sometimes they were old rifles and such and we had to do maintenance, sometimes they didn't work properly... And then we started to have equal power, you know? Because [until] then there wasn't, man. The casualties of the PM were very big. Horrible wages, very low wages, you know?

conseguia desmontar a estrutura, que a gente usasse armamento, esse armamento pra tentar fazer uma frente com os bandidos, entende? Que até então era revólver, cara. Aí começou a chegar os coletes... O Ministério Público autorizou a gente a usar os fuzis. E era- você tinha fuzil AR-15...

**Victor:** Então as coisas que vocês apreendiam viravam...

**Pereira:** Apreendia. Victor- Porque não se tinha, ô Victor, não tinha fuzil. Interessante, cara. Os bandidos já estavam com fuzis de guerra, americanos, e o poder público não tinha. Tinha lá a calibre doze que eu te falei. Né? E que são armas com alcance curto. Você tinha uma metralhadora... INA, que é uma arma que você não tem precisão de disparo, e você tinha um revólver, cara, que é um trinta e oito que, porra, alcance médio aí de dez metros, cinco a dez metros no máximo. O cara tá atirando de fuzil em você, cara, então era assim, era algo... literalmente... era uma guerra... não era igual a guerra, não estava em pé de igualdade, né? E aí o poder público autorizava a gente a usar esse equipamento, né? Aí como tinham poucas, era um rifle, um fuzil desse pra cada guarnição de PATAMO e tal, sabe? E aí... aí formou-se convênio com as Forças Armadas, as Forças Armadas começaram a doar fuzis pra gente, entende? O exército começou- Eu mesmo trabalhei com fuzil do exército, que a PM ainda não tinha, sabe? Fuzis da IMBEL, que é a Indústria de Material Bélico brasileira. E começou-se a passar fuzis, que às vezes eles eram fuzis velhos e tal e a gente tinha que fazer manutenção, às vezes não funcionava direito... E aí a gente começa a ter um poder de igualdade, entende? Porque então não se tinha, cara. As baixas da PM eram muito grandes. Salários horríveis, salários baixíssimos, sabe? Sem condição nenhuma de trabalho, sem colete, sem fuzil, sem nada. Infelizmente, cara. Era, assim, era algo que

Without any conditions of work, without a vest, without a rifle, without anything. Sadly, man. It was, like, it was something that anyone who survived that time... has to be- is a hero, has to be decorated.

**Pereira:** If the guy is intoxicated, you have to have at least a little pepper spray there, something like that, which is a means- they are called non-lethal weapons, \*or better\*, of low lethality, okay? Because if I stick the thing right here in him, at some point the guy will suffocate. So it's not that he's not lethal; low lethality. So, and another thing, then I ask you like this, a police officer with low lethality equipment he could employ [it] on several occasions and perhaps avoid using the most lethal weapon. Then I ask you: do I receive, do I get this from the corporation? No.

**Rodrigues:** Improved a lot. The police cars, you see, air conditioning, uh... [Toyota] Corolla... In my time it was the *Fusca* [Volkswagen Beetle], man [laughing]. We worked with a *Fusquinha* [affectionate, but belittling, nickname to the VW Beetle]. It was. *Fusquinha*, the seat [was] torn, then we had to take a pillow from home to put on the seat. Do you understand? It broke down, we pushed it, we found a way... It was really a \*fusquinha\*. Now the guys are in a Corolla with air conditioning, hydraulic steering, then don't even have to shift gears, it is automatic... *Pô*, it improved a lot for the police officer. The service, now. [...] The Police has maintenance, the Police's weapons. The Police's weaponry is [their] equal. They have assault rifles, the Police adapted itself, right, because in the past there weren't so many assault rifles in the *favela*. The Police too... *Vagabundo* started carrying assault rifles a lot, the Police is carrying assault rifles.

quem sobreviveu essa época... tem que ser- é um herói, tem que ser condecorado.

**Pereira:** Se o cara tá alterado, você tem que ter no mínimo lá um sprayzinho de pimenta, alguma coisa assim, que é um meio- são chamados armamentos não letais, \*ou melhor\*, de baixa letalidade, tá? Porque se eu enfiar o negócio do coisa direto aqui nele, uma hora o cara vai sufocar. Então não é que ele não seja letal; baixa letalidade. Então, e outra coisa, aí eu te pergunto assim ó, um policial com um equipamento de baixa letalidade ele poderia empregar em diversas ocasiões e evitar talvez usar o armamento mais letal. Aí eu te pergunto: eu ganho, recebo isso da corporação? Não.

**Rodrigues:** Melhorou muito. As viaturas, tu vê, ar-condicionado, é... [Toyota] Corolla... Na minha época era Fusca, cara [rindo]. Trabalhava com Fusquinha. Era. Fusquinha, o banco rasgado, aí tinha que levar uma almofada de casa pra botar no banco. Entendeu? Enguiçava, a gente empurrava, a gente dava o nosso jeito... Era \*fusquinha\* mesmo. Agora os cara tão num Corolla com ar-condicionado, direção hidráulica, não precisa nem passar marcha, é automático... *Pô*. melhorou muito pro policial. O serviço, agora. [...] A Polícia tem manutenção, as armas da Polícia. Os armamentos da Polícia tá de igual pra igual. Eles têm fuzil, a Polícia foi se adequando, né, porque antigamente não tinha tanto fuzil na favela. A polícia foi também... *Vagabundo* começou a andar com muito fuzil, a Polícia tá andando com fuzil.

**Silva:** The police officer is poorly prepared today. There is no decent academy for the police officer to go to the streets. Often times [he] doesn't even shoot. Doesn't even fire shot. How is he going to fire the \*first\* shot? He will be afraid, or he will shoot, the gun will fall...

**Silva:** O policial é mal preparado hoje. Não tem uma academia digna pra policial ir pra ruas. Muitas vezes nem atira. Nem dá tiro. Como é que ele vai dar o \*primeiro\* tiro? Vai ter medo, ou vai dar tiro, a arma vai cair...

#### 7.4. Police Officers' Complaints of Brazilian Justice

**Larrey:** So we have a- are in a growing relaxation of legislation. A Judiciary interfering in public security policy all the time, with a relaxation of measures... I don't even know if "relaxation of measures", but with... I don't even know the correct term to use here, but like this, with one...

**[Another police officer who was in the room contributes]** Interference.

**Larrey:** Yeah, an interference... in public safety policy. All this was done, each one with their share of guilt, creating... chaos, anarchy in Rio de Janeiro. [...] The Judiciary interfering in this, not letting the Police play its role and the community as a whole wanting the Police to play their role and all the entities that failed to do theirs, and the police they are also under this financial impact, without receiving their salary properly, without receiving the appropriate PPE... In other words, it was a melting pot of factors that exploded. [Decreases voice volume] And with scrapped weapons... ammunition is not adequate... lack of ammunition... [Returns to normal volume] So... And even if you have ammunition and the police do something, the Judiciary comes and... hits that hammer. So, a set of factors that bubbled up social chaos, which impacted where? Not so much on the asphalt, but mostly in *comunidades*. And where the police

**Larrey:** Então a gente tem- tá num crescente relaxamento da legislação. Um Judiciário interferindo na política de segurança pública o tempo todo, com um relaxamento de medidas... Não sei nem se "relaxamento de medidas", mas com... não sei nem o termo correto pra te usar aqui, mas assim, com uma...

**[Outro policial que estava na sala contribui]** Interferência.

**Larrey:** É, uma interferência... na política de segurança pública. Tudo isso foi fazendo, cada um com a sua parcela de culpa, fazendo... um caos, uma anarquia no Rio de Janeiro. [...] O Judiciário fazendo uma interferência nisso, não deixando a Polícia fazer o seu papel e a comunidade como um todo querendo que a Polícia faça o papel dela e de todos os entes que deixaram de fazer o seu, sendo que o policial também tá sob esse impacto financeiro, sem receber o salário adequadamente, sem receber os EPIs adequados... Ou seja, foi um caldeirão de fatores ali que explodiram. [Diminuiu o volume da voz] E com armamento sucateado... munição não é adequada... falta munição... [Volta ao volume normal] Então assim... E que mesmo que tenha a munição e o policial fizer alguma coisa, o Judiciário vem e... dá aquela martelada. Então assim, um conjunto de fatores que fez borbulhar o caos social, que impactou onde? Não tanto no asfalto, mas principalmente nas

officer he went to he was shot at... anyway. And then the victimization increased a lot.

**Nogueira:** Today we have a situation of... 48 hours. What is that? Yeah, in 48 hours- you arrest a person, if [this person] has- [this person] practices an act, a criminal offense, like a robbery. If [this person] has no antecedents, has permanent housing, is studying... in 48 hours [this person] is released. She goes out in the [*medida cautelar*] [“precautionary measure”, alternatives to imprisonment on first offense]. Sometimes a minor of- an offending minor practices many acts of criminal offense and... 48 hours, you take him to the precinct, he leaves in front of you. [These] are... are laws that should be hardened. How? If the person practices [an offense] once, practiced the second [time], we have to harden the law a bit. In 48 hours [this person] practiced an offense, a 157 [article 157 of the Brazilian Criminal Code – “Subtracting another person’s movable property, for himself or for others, through serious threat or violence to the person”], an armed robbery, of great violence, putting the life of another in risk. When [the person] practiced the first [offense], the second... in si[x months], depending, [this person] is released... in the *cautelar*. It’s what I told you: the... violence is not solved with violence. Violence is solved by giving structure, giving education, giving basic sanitation, giving assistentialism, in health, giving sport... Otherwise we won’t be able to take the youth that are in *comunidades* out, because they stay- they stay there, uh... thinking that the drug dealer is the best man in the world, ‘cause he sees [the drug dealer] with the best car, ‘cause he sees with gold, ‘cause he sees with sneakers, sees with [a] beautiful woman, with alcohol, he thinks that that is his world,

comunidades. E o policial aonde ia era recebido a tiros... enfim. E aí a vitimização aumentou muito.

**Nogueira:** Hoje a gente tem uma situação de... de... é... 48 horas. O quê que seria isso? É, em 48 horas você prende uma pessoa, se ela tiver- ela pratica um ato, uma infração penal, tipo um assalto. Se ela for réu primária, tem moradia fixa, tá estudando... em 48 horas ela é solta. Ela sai na cautelar. Às vezes um menor de- um menor infrator pratica vários atos de infrações penais e... 48 horas, você leva ele na delegacia, ele sai na sua frente. São... são leis que deveriam ser endurecidas. Como? Se a pessoa pratica uma vez, praticou a segunda, a gente tem que endurecer um pouco a lei. Em 48 horas ela praticou um ato, um 157 [subtração de bem móvel alheio mediante grave ameaça ou violência], um assalto a mão armada, de grande violência, botando a vida do próximo em risco. Quando ela praticou a primeira, praticou a segunda... em sei[s meses], dependendo aí, já tá solto aí... na cautelar. É aquilo que eu falei pra você: a... violência não se resolve com violência. A violência se resolve dando estrutura, dando educação, dando saneamento básico, dando assistencialismo, na saúde, dando o esporte... Senão a gente não vai conseguir tirar os- os jovens que estão em comunidade, porque eles ficam- eles ficam ali, é... achando que o traficante é o melhor homem do mundo, que vê com o melhor carro, que vê com ouro, que vê com tênis, vê mulher bonita, com bebida, ele acha que aquilo ali é o mundo dele, aquilo ali ele quer ser. E aí ele vem pra cá pra fora pra praticar atos... e ele pratica um ato ali, é solto... pratica, é solto... Aí ele fala: “ah, a Justiça é mole, a justiça não... não castiga”. Se você te- tiver uma lei mais dura ele vai pensar duas vezes se ele vai praticar aquele ato. “Pô, se eu praticar esse ato eu posso- eu

that [is what] he wants to be. And then he comes out here to practice offenses... and he practices an offense there, is released... practices, is released... And then he says: “ah, the Justice is soft, the Justice doesn’t... doesn’t punish.” If you have a tougher law, he will think twice if he is going to practice that offense. “*Pô*, if I practice this offense I can- I can suffer this, this, this. I will not practice this offense.” And [he] will reflect about the actions he can practice. [...] And people don’t... [people say:] “yeah, no, because there’s nothing to do.” Yes, there is something to do, you must harden laws, yes. For the person to reflect: “no, if I do this, I can receive this as a punishment. I won’t do it.” And society... who suffers with this is society, it is the police agent and society itself.

**Nogueira:** People have to make law projects, the congressmen, they have to make law projects regarding the situation that is going on, because over time the crimes- the crimes keep changing, right? Today there is, example – today, *\*today\**, there is, example: a guy that clones you credit card. Right? A... swindler, that clones your credit card, he does this, does that... he *\*wrecks\** your life in a matter... of days. He wrecks your life. Right? This guy is arrested. [In] less than six months, *\*less than six months\**, he is released. Do you think he will be... he will be resocialized? Can it happen? It can, but he found some easy money, found an easy moment. What does he do? He goes back to that same function, practices the same actions... then he is arrested, stays six months, and is released. Is arrested, stays six months and is released. [...] So, I’ll give you an example. It’s been two weeks, this report made with me, in Lagoa- in Gávea, in the Dumont de Andrade Square [interviewee meant “Santos Dumont Square”]. The girl went down from her building with her headphones on, with... an

posso sofrer isso, isso, isso. Eu não vou praticar esse ato”. E vai refletir sobre os atos que ele pode praticar. [...] E as pessoas não... “é, não, porque não tem o que fazer”. Tem o que fazer sim, tem que endurecer a lei sim. Pra pessoa refletir: “não, se eu fizer isso eu posso receber isso aqui de punição. Não vou fazer”. E a sociedade... que quem sofre isso é a sociedade, é o agente policial e a sociedade em si.

**Nogueira:** As pessoas têm que fazer projetos de lei, os deputados federais, eles têm que fazer projetos de lei em relação à situação que tá ocorrendo, porque ao longo do tempo os crimes- os crimes vão mudando, né? Hoje você tem, exemplo – hoje, *\*hoje\**, você tem, exemplo: um cara que clona o seu cartão. Né? Um.. es- um estelionatário, que ele clona o seu cartão, ele faz isso, faz aquilo... ele consegue *\*arrasar\** tua vida em frações... de dias. Ele arrasa tua vida. Né? Esse cara é preso. Menos de seis meses, *\*menos de seis meses\**, ele é solto. Acha que ele vai ser... ele vai- ele vai se ressocializar? Pode acontecer? Pode, mas ele achou um dinheiro fácil, achou um momento fácil. Quê que ele faz? Ele volta pr’aquela mesma função, pratica os mesmos atos... aí é preso, fica seis meses e é solto. Vai preso, fica seis meses e é solto. [...] Então, vou te dar um exemplo. Tem duas semanas isso, a ocorrência feita comigo, na Lagoa- na Gávea, na Praça Dumont de Andrade [entrevistado se referia à Praça Santos Dumont]. A menina desceu do prédio com o fone de ouvido, com... iPhone 13. Dois- dois

iPhone 13. Two- two boys, one was nineteen, the other eighteen, came, stole an Uber, the girl was at the bus stop, the girl had headphones, didn't- didn't listen... He [said]: "give me your cellphone, give me your cellphone." She didn't give it to him, she didn't listen, because she had headphones... He shot the girl's shoulder! It hit her shoulder, and what if it hit her face? It would kill the girl. The nineteen-year-old girl. Took the cellphone and left. Look at this situation. The girl was leaving to go to the club. This guy, if left unchecked, in less than a year, less than two years, he is free. Will he answer for a murder attempt? Yes. Will answer some... He will. But in less than a year, two years... at the latest two years, three years, he is free. And we see that... my brother, the law must be tougher. \*Must\* be tougher. Both for crimes that... of grave violence and threat, and white-collar crimes. Law must be fair for all, the article 5<sup>th</sup> [of the Federal Constitution] says. Principle of equality, the isonomy and enforcing article 5<sup>th</sup>. May it be tough, but tough for everyone. In a minor action, as much as in a major action. May it be tough for everyone, do you understand? I think that's it.

**Rodrigues:** That's what I think had to change, that's it, it's the laws, right? The politicians there had to see this there. I'm not saying "ah, [people] should be arrested for anything". No. If jailed, avoid letting go for nothing. Send here on Father's Day, Mother's Day, that guy who really deserves it. Right? That's there with good behavior. Guy who really deserves it. This is not the guy the law lets loose. "The law wanted to release three hundred. Come on, send three hundred away." This is happening. Most of the prisoners that are out there, yeah, all the guys who are doing stupid things, are guys who were already in prison and got a Christmas pardon, pardon- these pardons. Now- Will

garoto, um de dezenove, outro de dezoito, vieram, roubaram um Uber, a menina tava no ponto de ônibus, a menina tava com fone de ouvido não- não escutou... Ele: "me dá o celular, me dá o celular". Ela não deu, ela não escutou, porque ela tava de fone... Ele deu um tiro no ombro da menina! Pegou no ombro, [mas] e se pega no rosto? Ia matar a menina. A menina de dezenove anos de idade. Pegou o celular e levou. Olha que situação. A menina saindo pra ir pro clube. Esse cara, se der mole, ele em menos de um ano, menos de dois anos, tá solto. Vai responder uma tentativa de homicídio? Sim. Vai responder uns... Vai. Mas menos de um ano, dois anos... No mais tardar, dois anos, três anos tá solto. E a gente vê que... meu irmão, a lei tem que ser mais dura. \*Tem\* que ser mais dura. Tanto pra crimes que... de grave violência e ameaça, como crimes de- de colarinho branco. A lei tem que ser justa pra todos, o artigo 5º [da Constituição Federal] fala. Princípio da igualdade, a isonomia e fazendo cumprir o artigo 5º. Que ela seja dura, mas seja dura pra todos. Num ato menor, como num ato maior. Que seja dura pra todos, entendeu? Eu acho que é isso.

**Rodrigues:** É isso que eu acho que tinha que mudar, é isso, é as leis, né? Os políticos lá tinha que ver isso aí. Eu num tô dizendo que "ah, tem que qualquer coisa prender". Não. Se prendeu, evita de soltar à toa. Manda pra pra cá no dia dos pais, dia das mães, aquele cara que realmente merece. Né? Que tá ali com bom comportamento. Cara que realmente merece. Não é o cara que a lei solta. "A lei quis soltar trezentos. Vambora, manda embora trezentos". Tá acontecendo isso. Maioria dos presos que estão aí fora aí, é, tudo os cara que tá fazendo besteira, é cara que já tava preso e saiu num indulto de Natal, indulto- esses indulto. Agora- Vai sair agora na Páscoa, vai sair um montão. Vai passar em

come out now at Easter, a lot will come out. Will spend [the holiday] at home to come back later on Monday. Will [they] return? They won't, boy. Out of every hundred, two, three come back, if [they] come back.

**Rodrigues:** Nowadays, man, what happens? The... After the creation of this thing of... *audiência de custódia* [custody hearings], this got a lot in the way of police work. Do you understand? Yesterday – I don't have my cellphone here –, I got, I saw a publication on my cellphone – the colleagues sent [me] –, I don't know where it happened, man, I don't know if it was in the Northeast, [the] police- they entered a hangar, apprehended 700 kilos of cocaine. And then... I don't know if it was the judge, who did it... he didn't- he didn't- he ordered the release of the drug traffickers because the police didn't have a warrant to get in there. [Laughing in disbelief] To- to be able to apprehend the drug. Do you understand? So it's like this. Sometimes you go- the guy will speak in the custody hearing. You go, the guy [is] arrested red-handed, everything. And then in the custody hearing the authority lets them go. Yeah. Now I don't know if it's because- because of [lack of] vacancy in the prison system. I don't know why it is, right? But this is happening a lot: custody hearing, the guy arrested red-handed, there is the *flagrante* [evidence], but he will answer in liberty. [They] release. This is not only... crimes of robbery, no, it is crime of rape... domestic violence... *Pô*, sometimes the guy will go to the custody hearing. And then he gets there, someone releases. [Story continues in section 7.5.]

## 7.5. Leonel Brizola/ADPF 635

**Assis:** So, once you have this logic introjected starting with the *Falange*

casa pra voltar depois na segunda-feira. Vai voltar? Num volta não, rapaz. Em cada cem, volta dois, três, se voltar.

**Rodrigues:** Hoje em dia, cara, o que que acontece? O... Depois que... que foi criado esse negócio de... de audiência de custódia, isso aí atrapalhou muito o serviço da polícia. Entendeu? Ontem mesmo – é que eu não tô com meu celular aqui –, eu peguei, eu vi uma publicação no celular – os colegas mandaram –, não sei onde é que foi aí, cara, não sei se foi no Nordeste, polícia- entraram num galpão, apreenderam 700 quilos de cocaína. Aí... não sei se foi o juiz, quem foi, é... não- não- mandou soltar os traficantes porque os polícia não tinha mandato de busca pra entrar lá. [Rindo em descrença] Pra- pra poder prender a droga. Entendeu? Aí tá assim. Às vezes você vai- o cara vai falar na audiência de custódia. Você vai, o cara preso em flagrante, tudo. Aí chega na audiência de custódia e a autoridade libera. É. Agora não sei se é porque, por causa de vaga no sistema prisional. Não sei por que que é, né? Mas tem acontecido muito isso: audiência de custódia, o cara preso em flagrante, tá ali o flagrante, mas vai responder em liberdade. Libera. Não é só, é... crimes de roubo, não, é crime de estupro, é... violência doméstica. *Pô*, as vezes o cara vai pra audiência de custódia. Aí chega lá, alguém libera. [História continua na seção 7.5.]

**Assis:** Então, uma vez que você tem essa lógica imiscuída a partir da *Falange*

*Vermelha*, which \*evolves\* and becomes *Comando Vermelho* in the 1980s... When does he start- does he evolve into *Comando Vermelho*? When Leonel Brizola does what we are experiencing today. Leonel Brizola, he understands that education is what will solve the future and he understands that it takes us nowhere to enter the *comunidades* so we fight organized crime. So he becomes the father of education as a governor and... I don't take his merit for all the questions of education. [...] But on the public security side he committed an aberration. At the time, the *bandido* worked with a pistol, a revolver. And basically sold marijuana and opium. With the prohibition [to enter the *favelas*] they [drug traffickers] managed to organize themselves to the point of bringing cocaine to Rio de Janeiro, which was a wealthy drug dealer's product. They brought cheap cocaine to Rio de Janeiro and cocaine derivative forms, because we don't have pure cocaine, much less pure marijuana in Rio de Janeiro. Right? [...] But they put cocaine, with the profit from cocaine they managed to bring territorialism, take territories to prevent the state from retaking those regions... Then the territories occupied by trafficking expanded \*a lot\* in Rio de Janeiro... And metropolitan region... And... he [drug trafficking] could also bring the \*assault rifle\* to defend these territories [*favelas*]. Which is a weapon of \*war\*, with a long \*reach\*, with the capacity to breach... with a lot of localized shots breach armoring, or even bore through cars and everything, which is different from a pistol or revolver shot, which doesn't have this capacity, doesn't have this capacity of a supersonic ammunition that bores through a car. So they brought the assault rifles, specially the AK-47, to Rio de Janeiro. So... the truth is that a lot of territory was taken because of this. It starts in the 1970s with the idea of territorializing and having a space to train the *Exército Vermelho* ["Red Army"],

*Vermelha*, que \*evolui\* e se torna *Comando Vermelho* na década de oitenta... Quando que ele começa- ele evolui pra *Comando Vermelho*? Quando o Leonel Brizola faz o que a gente tá vivendo hoje. Leonel Brizola ele entende que a educação é o que vai resolver o futuro e ele entende que não leva a nada entrar nas comunidade pra poder combater o crime organizado. Então ele se torna o governador pai da educação e... não tiro o mérito dele em todos as questões de educação. [...] Mas na parte da segurança pública ele cometeu uma aberração. Na época, o bandido ele trabalhava com pistola, revólver. E basicamente vendia maconha e ópio. Com a proibição eles conseguiram se organizar a ponto de trazer a cocaína pro Rio de Janeiro, que era artigo de traficante rico. Eles trouxeram a cocaína barata pro Rio de Janeiro e formas de desdobramento da cocaína, porque a gente não tem cocaína pura, muito menos maconha pura no Rio de Janeiro. Né? [...] Mas eles botaram a cocaína, com o lucro da cocaína eles conseguiram trazer territorialismo, tomar territórios pra evitar que o estado retome aquelas regiões... Então se expandiu \*muito\* os territórios ocupados pelo tráfico no Rio de Janeiro... E região metropolitana... E... ele também foi possível trazer o \*fuzil\* pra defender esses territórios. Que é uma arma de \*guerra\*, de um grande \*alcance\*, com a capacidade de vazar... é... com muitos tiros localizados vazar blindagens, ou até mesmo atravessar carros e tudo mais, que é diferente de um tiro de pistola ou de revólver, que não tem essa capacidade, não tem essa capacidade de uma munição supersônica que atravessa um carro. Então eles trouxeram os fuzis, em especial a AK-47, pro Rio de Janeiro. Então... a verdade é que se- tomou-se muito território por conta disso. Começa na década de 70 com a ideia de territorializar e ter um espaço pra treinar o Exército Vermelho, depois evolui pra essa forma que o... que o, de forma irresponsável



then it evolves into this form that... irresponsibly and based on a guesswork, and not based- or based on his own ideals, Governor Leonel Brizola did this with us. Yeah... And then Rio de Janeiro became a territory... of drug trafficking. We would say that 70% of, for example, the city of Rio de Janeiro is taken over by drug trafficking. What you live, what you transit, is 30% of Rio de Janeiro. Right? If you stop to look at the size of Rocinha, the size of \*Alemão\*, which is much bigger than Rocinha, you begin to understand that as far as the eye can see you can see territories taken over by drug traffic. Right? [...] And today we are living it. Today we're living a second wave of this.

**Assis:** Oh! Sorry. I was just finishing talking about the issue of the STF. With this prohibition [ADPF 635] we are already having a great evoluti- The chances that we have another big wave of violence that will have to be controlled by laws... uh... more complicated – for example, Marcello Alencar [Governor from 1995 to 1999], when he takes office right after Leonel Brizola, practically, I don't know if it was right after or two governments later, he had to create certain... certain methods, like, for example, the... the creation of- we call it- it's an internal law called \*"pecúnia"\*. They were bonuses for the police officers who killed *bandidos*. We called it, popularly, "gratificação faroeste" [Far West Gratification]. [It] increased up to 150% the *soldo* [salary] of whoever killed a bandido. In confrontation. This is not going to happen again because nowadays we- there is a respect over the life of the other. The social morality was modified, right? But at the time this type of action was necessary because the *bandidos*, they started to rob, to increase crime, and to expand their possibilities... to rob banks left and right, kill citizens... without worries. So we will have

e baseado num achismo, e não baseado- ou baseado nos seus próprios ideais, o governador Leonel Brizola fez isso com a gente. É... E aí o Rio de Janeiro se tornou um território... do tráfico. A gente diria que 70% da, por exemplo, da cidade do Rio de Janeiro é tomada pelo tráfico. O que você vive, o que você transita, é 30% do Rio de Janeiro. Né? Se você for parar pra olhar o tamanho da Rocinha, o tamanho do \*Alemão\*, que é muito maior do que a Rocinha, você começa a entender que a perder de vista você vê territórios tomados pelo tráfico. Né? [...] E hoje a gente tá vivendo isso. Hoje tá vivendo uma segunda onda disso.

**Assis:** Ah! Desculpa. Eu tava terminando de falar sobre a questão do STF. Com essa proibição a gente já tá tendo uma a grande evoluçã- As chances de nós termos outra grande onda de violência que vai ter que ser controlada por leis... é... mais complicadas – por exemplo, o Marcelo Alencar, quando ele assume logo depois de Leonel Brizola, praticamente, eu não sei se era logo depois ou um ou dois governos depois, ele teve que criar certas... certos métodos, como, por exemplo, a... a criação da- a gente chama isso- é uma lei interna chamada de \*pecúnia\*. Eram gratificações pelos policiais que matavam bandidos. A gente chamava isso de, popularmente, de gratificação faroeste. Que subia em até cento e cinquenta por cento o soldo de quem matasse um bandido. Em confronto. Isso não vai voltar mais acontecer porque hoje em dia a gente- existe um respeito sobre a vida do outro. A moral social foi modificada, né? Mas em época foi necessário esse tipo de atuação porque os bandidos eles começaram a roubar, a aumentar o crime, e expandir suas possibilidades... a assaltar bancos torto e direito, matar cidadão... sem preocupação.

another wave of violence like this at any moment, and it is already beginning. Right? But at any moment we will have another wave of violence like that because what the STF is doing will replicate what Leonel Brizola did.

**Pereira:** So, what does Brizola do? [...] Just like the guy [Minister Edison Fachin] did now, recently. Do you know what Brizola does? In eighty-four? Forbids. \*Prohibits\* the PATAMO, which was our mobile tactical patrol, is that- would be the “*camburão*” in the old days, right? Which, let’s put it this way, would be our most combative troop that we had at the time, right? Resistance, a troop a little more specialized than the Radio Patrol, you know? A little more operational. He \*forbids\*. It literally prohibits rifles from being flaunted- at the time there were no rifles yet. They were machine guns, right? They were machine guns called INA and an older one called Pazan. Nine-millimeter ammo. But something very... old, still, and obsolete, right? For the evolution of traffic. I told you that the drug trade at that time begins to arrive with weapons from abroad. The AR-15, AR-Baby... right? Begins to receive armament from abroad. And here, let’s say, the heaviest weaponry we had was a twelve, a twelve gauge, or a machine gun like that. But you didn’t have a rifle, you know, which had a greater impact. Then he arrives and forbids the police to go up the *morro*. At that moment, Victor, there is a social phenomenon of \*strengthening\* crime. Like never seen before. Imagine, you... We make a parallel with grass. We, today, in the police, we make a parallel with grass, right? An abandoned land. If you don’t scythe the grass, doesn’t the grass grow, doesn’t it become an absurd wasteland? We made this parallel, you know? No one else could scythe the grass, so the grass grew in an absurd way, it became a wasteland. And so was the growth of... an

Então a gente vai ter outra onda de violência dessa a qualquer momento, e já tá começando a ter. Né? Mas a qualquer momento a gente vai ter outra onda de violência dessa porque o que o STF tá fazendo vai replicar o que o Leonel Brizola fez.

**Pereira:** Aí, o que que Brizola faz? [...] Assim como o cara [Ministro Edison Fachin] fez agora, recentemente. Sabe o que que o Brizola faz? Em oitenta e quatro? Proíbe. \*Proíbe\* o PATAMO, que era o nosso patrulhamento tático móvel, é aquele- seria o camburão antigamente, né? Que, vamos dizer assim, seria a nossa tropa mais combativa que tinha à época, né? De resistência, uma tropa um pouco mais especializada do que a Rádio Patrulha, entende? Um pouco mais operacional. Ele \*proíbe\*. Proíbe, literalmente, de que os fuzis fossem ostentados- na época não era fuzil ainda. Eram metralhadoras, né? Eram metralhadoras chamada INA e uma mais antiga chamada Pazan. Munição de nove milímetros. Mas algo bem... antigo, ainda, e obsoleto, né? Pra evolução do tráfico. Que eu te falei que o tráfico nessa época começa a chegar armamento do exterior. O AR-15, AR-Baby... né? Começa a receber armamento do exterior. E aqui, vamos dizer, o armamento mais pesado que a gente tinha era uma doze, o calibre doze, ou uma metralhadora dessa. Mas você não tinha um fuzil, né, que tinha um impacto maior. Então ele chega e proíbe a polícia de subir o morro. Nesse momento, ô Victor, acontece um fenômeno social de \*fortalecimento\* do crime. Como nunca antes visto. Imagina, você... A gente faz um paralelo com um mato. A gente, hoje, na polícia, a gente faz um paralelismo com um mato, né? Um terreno abandonado. Se você não capinar o mato, o mato não cresce, não fica um matagal absurdo? A gente fez esse paralelo, entende? Ninguém mais podia capinar o mato, então o

exponential growth in terms of weapons... capital – because they started to rob banks, there were- at that time there were a lot of bank robberies and kidnappings. [...] So, man, in the Brizola governments – I think it was one or two governments, I think there were two Brizola governments, I think that was it – crime grew a lot and the glamorization of crime grew, this whole thing, you understand? Crime has been growing, growing exponentially, you know? In all areas. And it was like- And then the police, from then on, Victor, we- I say that, the following, we started to dry ice. What is the idea of drying ice? You dry it and soon it's wet. Dry, soon... Why? There was no more... First, they began to advance in armament. It was no longer a revolver, they started using pistols, then rifles... What about the Military Police? The PM continued to use a revolver, which we called a “*canela fina*” [“thin shin”]. Simple revolver, thirty-eight, you know? With ammunition that was sometimes old, ammunition that didn't- that failed, or the revolver itself was not properly maintained. There was no vest, it was open chest. There was no armored car, there was \*nothing\* to face this criminality, so the police kind of backed down. [We] already couldn't go up, [we] already couldn't do anything, so... we stayed like practically in ostensive service...

**Silva:** But the minister Fachin prohibited the ascent to the *morros*. I was \*pissed\*. I can say “pissed” here, right?

**Victor:** Freely.

**Silva:** So, I was \*fucking pissed\* – just to aggravate the “pissed” a little. Brother... Then a friend of mine, older police officer, more *casado* [tougher] – then I was

mato ele cresceu de uma forma absurda, virou um matagal. E assim foi o crescimento do... um crescimento exponencial em relação a armamento... ao capital – porque eles começaram a assaltar banco, tinha- nessa época tinha muito assalto a banco e muito sequestro. [...] Então, cara, nos governos do Brizola – acho que foi um ou dois governos, acho que foram dois governos do Brizola, acho que foi isso – cresceu-se muito a criminalidade e cresceu-se a glamorização do crime, essa coisa toda, entende? O crime veio crescendo, crescendo exponencialmente, sabe? Em todas as áreas. E era meio- E aí a polícia, daí pra frente, ô Victor, a gente- eu falo que, o seguinte, a gente começou a enxugar gelo. Que que é a ideia de enxugar gelo? Você enxuga e daqui a pouco tá molhado. Enxuga, daqui a... Por quê? Já não tinha mais... Primeiro, eles começaram a avançar no armamento. Já não era mais revólver, já começaram pras pistolas, depois os fuzis... E a PM? A PM continuava usando um revólver, que a gente chamava de canela fina. Revólvinho simples, trinta e oito, sabe? Com munição às vezes velha, munição que não- que falhava, ou o próprio revólver não tinha a manutenção adequada. Não se tinha colete nenhum, era peito aberto. Não tinha viatura blindada, não tinha \*nada\* pra enfrentar essa criminalidade, então meio que a polícia recuou. Já não podia subir, já não podia fazer nada, então... ficamos assim praticamente no serviço ostensivo...

**Silva:** Mas o ministro Fachin proibiu a subida aos morros. Eu estava \*puto\*. Pode falar “puto” aqui, né?

**Victor:** À vontade.

**Silva:** Então, eu tava \*puto\* ‘pa’ caralho\* – só pra dar um agravantezinho no “puto”. Irmão... Aí um amigo meu, policial mais velho, mais casado – aí eu comentando com

commenting with him: “how can Fachin have prohibited to go up a *morro*? What is this? How does he not want [us] to work-” Just like Brizola’s time. At the time of Brizola was like this. I was arrested in Brizola’s time, in 91, because we went up the *morro*... of Zona Sul. And the president of the residents’ association – the \*female\* president – called the governor. The governor ordered the commander from the battalion to go there. It was us working. Are you understanding? So- This was 91, okay? Brizola’s time. It was already like this. And then he [minister Fachin] came and did this – I was now already retired, huh? I said: “it’s not possible, how can one be a police officer like this? It doesn’t exist. How will this stop-” And then the tough cop told me: “oh, Silva, stop-” [interviewee pauses after noticing he had said his own name] – you redact this later [laughs] – “friend... colleague... police officer...” – [still laughing] – “stop being silly! Stop being silly, and you must thank. Because it is \*not\* worth it going up a *morro* anymore. Because you can fire a shot, this shot can hit someone – be it a *bandido* or not, you are already complicated –, or you can get shot. So what is the advantage of you going up the *morro*? Which is their home, which is their area, which he knows more than you. He enters any hole, and you don’t. He sees you from where you can’t see him.” Do you understand? I said: “fuck, this is really it, right, old man?” [He] said: “damn, brother, the best thing is to not go up the *morro*.” Doesn’t the *favela* resident like the *bandido*? Right? Of course that twenty percent \*at most\*. Maybe \*ten percent\*. Ninety, eighty percent don’t like. Is oppressed by crime, wouldn’t want to live a life like that, but there are some that like. He said like this, look: “don’t they like life there? Don’t they complain of the Police going in to try to protect them? So don’t go up anymore, damn. Best thing in the world.”

ele: “como é que pode o Fachin ter proibido subir morro? O que é isso? Como é que não quer que trabalhe”- igual a época do Brizola. A época do Brizola era assim. Eu fui preso na época do Brizola, em 91, porque nós subimos o morro... da Zona Sul. E o presidente da associação de moradores – \*a\* presidente – chamou o governador. O governador mandou o comandante do batalhão ir lá. Éramos nós trabalhando. Tá entendendo? Então- isso 91, tá? Época Brizola. Já era assim. Aí ele veio e fez isso – eu agora já aposentado, hein? Falei “não é possível, como é que vai ser policial assim? Não existe. Como é que vai parar-”. Aí o policial cascudo falou pra mim: “ô, Silva, deixa-” [pausa ao notar que havia citado o próprio nome] - isso tu falha depois [risada] - “amigo, ô colega, policial” - [ainda rindo] - “deixa de ser bobo! Deixa de ser bobo e você tem que agradecer. Porque \*não\* vale a pena você subir morro mais. Porque você pode dar um tiro, esse tiro pode pegar em alguém – seja bandido ou não, você já tá complicado – ou você pode tomar tiro. Então qual é a vantagem de você subir o morro? Que é a casa deles, que é a área deles, que ele conhece mais do que você. Ele entra em qualquer buraco e você não entra. Ele te vê de onde você não o vê”. Entendeu? Aí eu falei “porra, pior que é mesmo, né, velho?”. Falou: “porra, irmão, melhor coisa é não subir morro”. O morador de favela num gosta do bandido? Né? Claro que 20% \*no máximo\*. Talvez \*10%\*. 90, 80% não gosta. É oprimido pelo crime, não gostaria de viver uma vida daquela, mas tem uns que gostam. Falou assim, ó: “eles não gostam da vida lá? Eles não reclamam da polícia entrar pra tentar protegê-los? Então não suba mais, porra. Melhor coisa do mundo.”

## 7.6. Police Officers' "Lost Lust"

**Nogueira:** There are a lot of good cops, that want to work, that... but sometimes he is blocked by the system, that I tell you about militarism. That he doesn't have support, then he doesn't work, because if he works then something happens, he is hit, he gets a punishment, then he... Do you understand? And then you lose a very good police officer. I have a case with me. I arrested four... four *marginais*, two pistols, a cloned car... and... and in the end I ended up answering to an... an IPM, which is a Military Police Inquiry, because when the *meliante* jumped from the house there he got hurt and then... the *delegada* didn't think so. And then this takes your energy away, do you understand? It takes your fire away. [...] But because of that I answered to the IPM and because of that... This takes your energy, you understand? And you made the occurrence right, everything in order. Fuck. [...] And then because of that it formed an Inquiry, I had to answer... Then this takes your energy from wanting to work, do you understand? This takes a lot of energy. And then you have a flawed Justice, the guys all with criminal records for robbery, records for [stolen] cargo, stealing from passersby... and I think they are already free, even. This was two years ago. And then we say that our Legislative system doesn't make tough laws, that our Justice releases... and then you lose your energy, get it? You keep losing energy, your energy keeps getting consumed... And then you start to say: "fuck, my brother, do I need to do this? I already have 21 years of Police..." But you like to work, you keep pushing forward. But then you get some punishments, in this militarism, that then you say: "ah, man, I won't do anything else... I will do my part here and let go, each to his own." This is very... it's hard, right? Do you understand? It's hard.

**Nogueira:** Existe muito policial bom na Polícia. Existe muito policial bom. Existe muito policial bom. Existe muito policial bom, que quer trabalhar, que... mas é- às vezes ele fica bloqueado pelo sistema, que- que eu te falo do militarismo. Que ele não tem suporte, aí ele não trabalha, porque se ele trabalha aí acontece alguma coisa, ele toma uma porrada, ele toma uma punição, aí ele... Entendeu? E aí você perde um policial muito bom. Eu tenho um caso comigo. Eu prendi quatro... quatro *marginais*, duas pistolas, um carro clonado... e... e acabou que eu acabei respondendo um... um IPM, que é inquérito policial militar, porque na hora que o *meliante* pulou do- da casa lá ele se machucou e aí... a *delegada* achou que não. E aí isso tira a tua energia, entendeu? Isso tira teu fogo. [...] Mas por isso eu respondi o IPM e por isso... Isso tira energia, entendeu? E você fez a ocorrência certinha, tudo bonitinho. Porra. [...] E aí por isso conformou um inquérito, eu tive que responder... Aí isso tira a energia de você querer trabalhar, entendeu? Isso tira muita energia. Aí você tem uma justi- uma justiça falha, os cara todo mundo com passagem de roubo, com passagem de carga, roubando transeunte... e eu acho que já tão até solto. Isso tem dois anos atrás. E aí a gente fala que o nosso sistema legislativo não faz leis duras, que a nossa justiça libera... e aí tu vai perdendo a energia, sacou? Tu vai perdendo energia, tua energia vai sendo consumida... E aí tu começa a falar: "porra, meu irmão, será que eu preciso fazer isso? Já tô com 21 anos de Polícia...". Mas você gosta de trabalhar, você continua forçando a barra. Mas aí tu toma umas punições, nesse militarismo, que aí tu fala: "ah, cara, eu não vou fazer mais nada... Eu vou tocar minha bola de lado aqui e vou

deixar, cada um toca a sua”. Isso é muito... é duro, né? Entendeu? É duro.

**Rodrigues:** [Continuation of the story in section 7.4.] And then, sometimes, the police, he gets kind of discouraged. I have been feeling this in the folks. Do you understand? ‘Cause sometimes the fellow goes... there are some that are even shot to arrest a *bandido*. Right? Accidents happen with the police car, something, and then something gets there, the guy is released on the custody hearing. And then there’s a lot- there’s- This is not only it, there are many discouraging things, that have discouraged a lot the service of the police officers. Now, lately. Do you understand?

**Rodrigues:** [Continuação da história na seção 7.4.] Aí, às vezes, o polícia, ele fica meio desanimado. Tenho sentido isso aí no pessoal. Entendeu? Que as vezes o camarada vai... tem uns que toma até tiro pra prender um bandido. Né? Acontece acidente com a viatura, alguma coisa, aí chega lá algo, o cara é liberado na audiência de custódia. Aí tem muita- tem- Não é só isso também, tem muita coisa que desanima, que tem desanimado muito o serviço dos policiais. Agora, ultimamente. Entendeu?

**Silva:** [...] Then we were able to arrest and such. He was the 01. He was *\*matuto\** – “*matuto*” is the one who brings the drug from the outside to here, which we were arresting a lot, then he was one of the strongest *matutos*. He was the one who used to bring [drugs] to Uê [Ernaldo Pinto de Medeiros] and to Robertinho de Lucas. Yeah... then that was the arrest of the year. Then what happened? We arrested... Then there he says he gave us the money... Then we: “what? There is no such thing”. We went to Internal Affairs, when we arrived at Internal Affairs, the internal affairs officer said to us: “Oh, we already know that it’s a lie... and that something happened in Justice... that the guy-” – the judge said like this, look. I never forget. Judge said the following: “I’d rather acquit a guilty than blame an innocent”. That this is a very used expression, right? Then he said: “no, I’d rather acquit a guilty than blame an innocent” and released him. Then they say that the money actually went to the Justice, but no one has proved anything. We ran... The Inspector himself told us: “look, don’t worry. Congratulations on your work. You

**Silva:** [...] Aí conseguimos prender e tal. Ele era o 01. Ele era *\*matuto\** – “*matuto*” é quem traz a droga pra fo- de fora pra cá, que a gente tava prendendo muito, aí ele era um dos matutos mais fortes. Ele que trazia pro Uê [Ernaldo Pinto de Medeiros] e pro Robertinho de Lucas. É... aí foi a prisão do ano. Aí o quê que aconteceu? Prendemos... Aí ele lá diz que deu o dinheiro pra nós... Aí nós: “o quê? Não existe, tal”. Fomos pra Corregedoria, quando chegamos na Corregedoria o corregedor falou pra nós: “ó, já sabemos que é mentira... e que algo aconteceu na Justiça... que o cara-” – o juiz falou assim, ó. Nunca mais esqueço. Falou que memorável, né, não tem mais que es-. Juiz falou o seguinte: “prefiro absolver um culpado do que culpar um inocente”. Que esse é um jargão muito usado, né? Então falou: “não, prefiro absolver um culpado do que culpar um inocente” e liberou ele. Aí dizem que o dinheiro na verdade teria ido pra Justiça, mas ninguém provou nada. A gente correu... O próprio corregedor falou pra nós: “ó, fiquem tranquilos. Parabéns pelo trabalho. Vocês prenderam o 01 do Rio de

arrested Rio de Janeiro's 01. However, Justice... will do you the favor of releasing him". And... nothing came of it, he went to the street. [He] had I don't know how many kilos of cocaine... Fuck ton of cocaine. Closed. Package. And... they were released. Then what? The lust is lost. But in that time I was *\*too\** horny [laughing], so I couldn't lose it all. But *\*today\** I have no lust at all.

Janeiro. Porém, a Justiça... vai fazer o favor de soltá-lo". E... não deu em nada, foi pra rua. Tinha não sei quantos quilos de cocaína... Cocaína pra caralho. Pacote. Fechado. E... foram soltos. Aí o quê? Perde-se o tesão. Só que naquela época eu 'tava' com *\*muito\** tesão [rindo], aí não consegui perder todo. Mas *\*hoje\** tenho tesão nenhum.

### 7.7. Cops are too Afraid; Criminals are not Afraid Enough

**Assis:** Now let's talk about the penal aspect. The Brazilian Criminal Code it works in the South region. Works very well. Because the bandido from there is afraid of being arrested. The bandido from here *\*wants\** to be arrested. Because when he endures the prison, he gets connections and he... goes back with a better status in drug dealing. If he was arrested killing a police officer, he wants to be arrested even more. Because he will make connections and will grow in the status of crime. So the Brazilian Criminal Code doesn't work in Rio de Janeiro anymore. The Brazilian Criminal Code doesn't work regarding rape in the Northeast. But it works in Rio Grande do Sul. The rapist is afraid of being arrested. The truth is that we are a country with a very diverse culture, each state has an absolutely diverse culture from each other, and the penal reality should be different like it is, for example, in another country very similar [to Brazil], the United States. Each- There is a constitution that guides the values of that nation, but each state guides what is necessary for the penal application of their states. A life in prison sentence or a death penalty for certain things may be justified in Rio de Janeiro. Or great penalties. The guy being released after thirty

**Assis:** Agora vamos falar sobre aspecto penal. O código penal brasileiro ele funciona na região Sul. Funciona muito bem. Porque o bandido de lá ele tem medo de ser preso. O bandido daqui *\*quer\** ser preso. Porque quando ele banca a cadeia ele tem network e ele... volta com status melhor no tráfico. Se ele foi preso matando um policial, mais ainda que ele quer ser preso. Porque ele vai fazer network e vai crescer no status do crime. Então o código penal brasileiro ele não funciona mais no Rio de Janeiro. O código penal brasileiro não funciona em relação a estupro no Nordeste. Mas funciona no Rio Grande do Sul. O estuprador tem medo de ser preso. A verdade é que nós somos um país com cultura muito diversa, cada estado tem uma cultura absolutamente diversa uma da outra, e a realidade penal deveria ser diferente como é, por exemplo, num outro país muito parecido, o Estados Unidos. Cada- Existe uma constituição que norteia os valores daquela nação, mas cada estado norteia o que é necessário pra aplicação penal dos seus estados. Uma pena de prisão perpétua ou uma pena de morte pra certas coisas talvez se justificaria no Rio de Janeiro. Ou penas grandes. O cara ser solto com trinta anos podendo progredir de pena e ser solto com

years with the possibility of penalty progression and being released with less time, this is absurd. It is a gigantic absurd made in our Brazilian system. “Ah, so you can, uh... relieve the penal system.” So you create more... jails. Or create methods that make the guy *\*afraid\** of being arrested. More important than arresting is making that the other is *\*afraid\** or *\*apprehensive\** of being jailed.

**Pereira:** What determines your life is a fraction of a second. I told you about the American case, now I’m going to tell you about the Brazilian case, right? From the road police officers from Fortaleza. They were on patrol, then they were called by someone who was on the road there, to remove an element that was walking randomly in the middle of the street. Like a vagrant there, with strange, torn clothes, walking in the middle of the street, posing a danger to drivers. Then the police officer came, and as he should already have done that on several occasions, right? Approached an individual, apparently normal. And he was driving this individual to the breakdown lane. Then look, man, the individual suddenly took the gun from one of the police officers and now I don’t know, I don’t have the accuracy of the images themselves, but from what they commented, the other police officer pulled the gun and was in doubt if he [should] shoot or not. What happened? The guy shot the two cops and killed them both on the spot. The guys were about fifteen and sixteen years respectively in the police. Then the following hypothesis was raised: the police are afraid, afraid of using weapons for what reason? In function of the law, right? It’s a shame, right, legal, they’re scared, and it cost them their lives and we have a jargon that goes like this, man, it’s better for you to answer in court, but alive, than for you to die. So, look, Victor, if the guy

menos tempo, isso é um absurdo. É um absurdo gigantesco feito no nosso sistema brasileiro. “Ah, pra poder, é... desafogar o sistema penal”. Então você cria mais... cadeias. Ou cria métodos que façam o cara ter *\*medo\** de ser preso. Mais importante do que prender é fazer com que o outro tenha *\*medo\** ou *\*receio\** da prisão.

**Pereira:** O que determina a tua vida é fração de segundo. Te falei do caso americano, agora vou te falar do caso brasileiro, né? Dos policiais rodoviários lá de Fortaleza. Eles estavam em patrulhamento, aí foram chamados por alguém que estava na via ali, pra tirar um elemento que estava andando aleatoriamente no meio da rua. Tipo um um andarilho lá, com roupas estranhas, rasgadas, andando no meio da rua, oferecendo perigo aos condutores. Aí o policial veio, e como já deveria ter feito isso em várias ocasiões, né? Abordou um indivíduo, aparentemente normal. E foi conduzindo esse indivíduo para o acostamento. Aí olha só, cara, o indivíduo de uma hora pra outra pegou a arma de um dos policiais e agora eu não sei, não tenho a precisão das imagens em si, mas pelo que comentaram, o outro policial sacou a arma e ficou na dúvida se atirava ou não. O que ocorreu? O cara atirou nos dois policiais e matou os dois na hora. Os caras tinham uns quinze anos e dezesseis anos respectivamente de polícia. Aí levantou-se a seguinte hipótese: os policiais estão com medo, medo de vamos dizer assim, de usar o armamento em função de que? Em função da legislação, né? De uma pena, né, jurídica, estão com medo e isso custou-lhes da vida e a gente tem um jargão que fala o seguinte, cara, é melhor você responder na justiça, mas vivo, do que você morrer. Então, veja bem ô Victor, se o cara puxar uma arma pra mim, dependendo das



pulls a gun on me, depending on the circumstances, I'm going to shoot him. He doesn't even need to aim at me. I will shoot him. Depending on the circumstances. I tell you that if he shows any kind of reaction or if I think he's going to take it off, I would shoot him. In fact, we say neutralize, we are going to neutralize the enemy.

**Pereira:** If you ask me like this: “does the system today reinsert the individual in society?” It doesn't reinsert, it is a crime school there. I tell you more: the guy, when he goes there, he becomes worse. Because he arrives knowing... X things, he will come back knowing... X squared. Do you understand? It is a crime school there. So the system doesn't recover anyone. Do you understand? Not the current system. Do you understand? [...] Now, to say that it is enough to put the individual there and wait for five years, [for him] to come out, and think that is solved, it doesn't solve. See, he doesn't fear anymore the period he will stay inside there, even still because he has everything there. He has everything: he has money, he has drugs, he has weapons, he has... he has \*women\*, he has good food... he has everything. He is just there literally jailed, do you understand?

**Silva:** [...] Now, if needed today – “Look, Silva, look, there's going to be an operation and such, we really need a man here...”. I'm going \*on time\*, now, laughing.

**Victor:** And was it ever after you retired?

**Silva:** No, no. Never.

**Victor:** But have they invited you?

**Silva:** No... there is no such need, you know? That the police, today, are afraid of being police.

**Victor:** Why?

circunstâncias, eu vou atirar nele. Ele não precisa nem mirar em mim não. Vou atirar nele. Dependendo das circunstâncias. Te digo que se ele esboçar qualquer tipo de reação ou se eu imaginar que ele for fazer menção de tirar, eu atiraria nele. Na verdade, a gente fala neutralizar, a gente vai neutralizar o inimigo.

**Pereira:** Se você me perguntar assim: “o sistema hoje ele reinsere o indivíduo na sociedade?” Não reinsere, ali é uma escola de crime. Eu te digo mais: o cara quando vai pra lá ele se torna pior. Porque ele chega sabendo... X coisa, ele vai voltar sabendo... X ao quadrado. Entende? Ali é uma escola de crime. Então o sistema não recupera ninguém. Entende? O atual sistema não. Entende? [...] Agora, dizer que só colocar o indivíduo lá e esperar dar cinco anos, ele sair, e achar que resolveu, não resolve. Não é a... Ele não tem- Ele- Veja bem, ele não teme mais o período que ele vai ficar ali dentro, até porque ele tem tudo ali. Ele tem tudo: ele tem dinheiro, ele tem droga, ele tem arma, ele tem... ele tem \*mulher\*, ele tem comida boa... ele tem tudo. Ele só tá ali literalmente preso, entendeu?

**Silva:** [...] Agora, se precisar hoje – “ó, Silva, ó, vai ter uma operação e tal tal, tão precisando de homem aqui...”. Vou \*na hora\*, agora, rindo.

**Victor:** E já foi alguma vez depois de aposentado?

**Silva:** Não, não. Nunca mais.

**Victor:** Mas te convidaram?

**Silva:** Não... não tá existindo essa necessidade, entendeu? Que a polícia, hoje, tem medo de ser polícia.

**Silva:** Because you can't hit, you can't shoot, you can't- Many times you have to hit the guy to understand who's in charge, for the guy to start saying something... What if, hey, "I took this one, no I won't want to take any more... I say, look: 'João is there, in the house'". Did you understand? You're not going to be \*torturing\*. You're going to be using the means necessary for the guy to talk. So the guy has to be \*afraid\* of you. He has no respect for the Police. We are not even concerned about respect. We are worried about \*fear\*. That it is fear that will make them pass on the information. Did you understand? So I don't say beat up, none of that, but a beating... Many times, at the police station, the person sits there, full of power. When the chief [interviewee slaps the table hard] hits the table- "no, I say, sir". It even scares you. He says like this: "the next blow will be on me, right?"

**Silva:** Yeah, there are [places] where there's more and less [violence], right? As I told you about Switzerland. Does Switzerland have some violence or another? It does. But the armored car isn't even used, the weapons aren't even used... Why? First, the penalties are different. The penalties work there. They're \*afraid\* of the police, they're \*afraid\* of being arrested... Right? And second that the police officer there, \*if he kills\*, is honored. Right? [...] Here he is arrested, he becomes a criminal... Not there. There the police officer is honored. So how is the guy [criminal] going to fight a guy [police officer] like that? How is the guy going to expose himself to a police officer like that who can kill him at any time? Do you understand? And he doesn't want to. The *vagabundo*, he just wants profit. Here, for example. If he's arrested, whatever. He

**Victor:** Por quê?

**Silva:** Porque não pode bater, não pode dar tiro, não pod- Muitas vezes é necessário você dar uma porrada pro cara entender quem manda, pro cara começar a falar alguma coisa... Que se, pô, "tomei essa aqui, não vou querer tomar mais não... Eu falo, ó: 'o João tá ali, na casa tal'". Entendeu? Você não vai tá \*torturando\*. Cê vai tá usando os meios necessários pro cara falar. Então o cara tem que ter \*medo\* de você. Ele não tem que ter respeito pela Polícia. A gente não tá nem preocupado com respeito. A gente tá preocupado com \*medo\*. Que é o medo que vai fazer eles nos passar a informação. Entendeu? Então não digo espancar, nada disso não, mas uma porrada... Muitas vezes, na delegacia, a pessoa senta lá, cheia de poder. Quando o delegado [entrevistado deu um tapa forte na mesa] dá uma porrada na mesa- "não, eu falo, senhor". Toma até um susto. Fala assim: "a próxima porrada vai ser em mim, né?"

**Silva:** É, tem onde existe mais e menos [violência], né? Como eu te falei da Suíça. Suíça tem uma violência ou outra? Tem. Mas o carro forte nem é usado, o armamento nem é usado... Por quê? Primeiro que as penas são outras. As penas funcionam lá. Eles têm \*medo\* da polícia, têm \*medo\* de ser preso... Né? E segundo que o policial lá, \*se matar\*, é homenageado. Né? [...] Aqui é preso, passa a ser bandido... Lá não. Lá o policial é homenageado. Então como é que o cara vai lutar com um cara desse? Como é que o cara vai se expor pra um policial desse que pode matar ele a qualquer hora? Entendeu? E ele não quer. O vagabundo, ele quer lucro, só. O daqui, por exemplo. Se ele for preso, tudo-tanto faz. Ele sabe que vai sair, que a mulher dele vai na cadeia transar com ele... Mas ele, enquanto tá cometendo o crime, ele quer arrumar um dinheiro, é, pra ir pro boteco...

knows he's going to get out, that his wife is going to jail to have sex with him... But he, while he's committing the crime, he wants to get some money, yeah, to go to the bar... Do you understand? Go to the show with his girlfriend... Or even stay inside the favela, but like a king. With the money. Do you understand? Now, when he sees the possibility, as I told you earlier about kidnapping, he doesn't kidnap anymore, brother. Kidnapping ended in Rio de Janeiro. Now it's coming back with this express kidnapping of Pix [instantaneous bank money transfer], right? Do you understand? It's just that they [Police] haven't started killing yet. By the time you start killing them, they'll stop it. Do you understand? Because it is a kidnapping crime. For a short period of time, but it's a suffering that \*10\* minutes a human being muzzled, tied up, kidnapped in a *favela's* shack... Fuck. It's the worst thing in the world. Do you understand? So \*it is\* a kidnapping. So they have to start acting like that. They have to start reacting. Do you understand? React at the time of captivity to exchange shots... and [have them] come to death. Then this shit ends.

**Silva:** *Pô*, at that time we used to pick up \*at home\*, Victor. At that time we invaded – \*four\* police officers – invaded the Morro do Alemão and caught the *vagabundo* sleeping. “Brother, you lost. Wake up to go down. Let's go.” [We] took [them away]! And many times they didn't even see it – sometimes they saw it, they tried to exchange fire, and such – because we put our hand on the radio... in the same moment the helicopter came, everything came, everyone went up... It went like this, look: “priority”. Everyone came, brother. And it was fun. It was- *pô*, we were on the radio like this, look: “damn, it doesn't call a priority... it doesn't call a priority”. Then, a little while later, it was called on the

Entendeu? Ir pro showzinho com a namorada... Ou até ficar dentro da favela mesmo, mas de rei. Com o dinheiro. Entendeu? Agora, quando ele vê a possibilidade, como eu te falei anteriormente do sequestro, ele não sequestra mais, irmão. Sequestro acabou no Rio de Janeiro. Agora tá voltando com esse sequestro relâmpago do Pix, né? Entendeu? É que não começaram a matar ainda. Na hora que começar a matar eles, eles vão parar com isso. Entendeu? Porque é um crime de sequestro. Por um período curto, mas é um sofrimento que \*10\* minutos um ser humano amordaçado, amarrado, sequestrado num barraco de favela... Porra. É a pior coisa do mundo. Entendeu? Então \*é\* um sequestro. Então tem que começar a agir desse jeito. Eles têm que começar a reagir. Entendeu? Reagir na hora do cativo pra trocar tiro... e vir a óbito. Aí acaba essa porra.

**Silva:** *Pô*, nessa época a gente pegava \*em casa\*, Victor. Nessa época a gente invadia – \*quatro\* policiais – invadia o morro do Alemão e pegava o *vagabundo* dormindo. “Irmão, perdeu. Acorda pra rodar. ‘Vambora’”. Levava! E muitas vezes eles nem viam – às vezes até viam, tentavam trocar tiro, e tal – porque a gente metia a mão no rádio... na hora vinha helicóptero, vinha tudo, subia todo mundo... Botava assim, ó: “prioridade”. Vinha todo mundo, irmão. E ainda divertido. Era- *pô*, a gente ficava no rádio assim, ó: “porra, não toca uma prioridade... não toca uma prioridade”. Aí daqui a pouco tocava no rádio – ou era o Mario, ou era outro amigo que ficava no

radio – either Mario or another friend who was on the radio; we already knew each other, right? –: [Simulating radio distortion with his voice] “attention, attention, all vehicles, priority, priority. Exchange of fire with a colleague shot in Alemão”. [In a high-pitched voice] \*Fuck\*! [In an excited voice, higher pitch] “Positive, proceeding to location!”, “DRE proceeding to location!”, “39 proceeding to location!”, “Look, Defraudações proceeding to the location!”, “thi- 33 DP proceeding to the location! Yadda yadda yadda”. My brother! There was an \*abundance\* of police officers with desire of being police officers. With \*courage\*. With \*desire\* to work. Willingness to exchange fire – [they] could die and everything, be shot, but-. My brother, all the polices in Rio de Janeiro went, boy. Everyone went ahead. Ask for a priority today. First, they won’t be on the street. Second, they won’t go because of fear... you know, because the traffic is very dangerous, right? You go in a car, there they have 100 men with rifles shooting at you. Do you understand? Now schedule a decent operation. To be equal. 100 from here and 100 from there. Let’s see who loses. *Pô, vagabundo*, they chicken out and are cowards. They are cowards with any act they practice... Right? They are cowards. They come in the majority, with rifles, robbing in the street... Pu- killing someone, putting someone. And they chicken out when the real men arrive. Right? The men of- that will face them- Put the BOPE to go. See if any one of them stays. Yeah, it’s ‘cause they know that the BOPEs are inconsequential. They’re going to go in, they’re going to exchange fire, they’re going to kill, they’re going to die... There won’t be one left, brother. That’s where I tell you: fear. They have to go back to being afraid. BOPE. BOPE terrorizes them, brother. You can see all the news that have the BOPE. If anyone remains. For example, [to] invade the hill, who has to stay?

rádio; a gente já conhecia, né? –: [Simulando distorção de rádio com a voz] “atenção, atenção, todas as viaturas, prioridade, prioridade. Troca de tiro com o colega baleado no Alemão”. [Com voz aguda] \*Porra\*! [Com voz agitada, tom mais alto] “Positivo, procedendo para o local!”, “A DRE procedendo para o local!”, “39 procedendo para o local!”, “Ó, Defraudações procedendo para o local!”, “tr- 33 DP procedendo pro local! Ba ba ba”. Meu irmão! Era uma \*fatura\* de policial com vontade de ser policial. Com \*coragem\*. Com \*desejo\* de trabalhar. Vontade de trocar tiro – podia morrer e tudo, tomar tiro, mas-. Meu irmão, iam todas as polícias do Rio de Janeiro, rapaz. Todo mundo ia pra cima. Pede hoje uma prioridade. Primeiro que não estarão na rua. Segundo que não vão por medo... né, de que o tráfico até tá muito perigoso, né? Você vai uma viatura, lá eles têm 100 homens de fuzil te dando tiro. Entendeu? Agora marca uma operação decente. Pra ficar de igual pra igual. 100 daqui e 100 de lá. Vamo ver quem perde. *Pô, vagabundo*, eles se acovardam e são covardes. Eles são covardes com qualquer ato que pratiquem... Né? Eles são covardes. Eles vêm na maioria, de fuzil, assaltando na rua... Bo- matando alguém, botando alguém. E se acovardam quando chega os homens mesmo. Né? Os homens de- que vão bater de- Bota o BOPE pra ir. Vê se fica um deles. É, e que sabe que os BOPEs são inconsequentes. Vão cair pra dentro, vão trocar tiro, vão matar, vão morrer... Não fica um, irmão. É onde eu te digo: o medo. Eles têm que voltar a ter medo. O BOPE. O BOPE aterroriza eles, irmão. Pode ver todas as reportagens que têm o BOPE. Se fica um. Por exemplo, invadir o morro, tem que ficar quem? Fica o BOPE. Porque eles \*sabem\* quem é o BOPE, rapaz. É a mesma coisa tu botar um cachorro desse, da raça do teu [Akita] – que tem, né, um perfil de ser tranquilo – e bota só Pit Bull ali. É

BOPE stays. Because they \*know\* who BOPE is, boy. It's the same thing if you put a dog like that, of yours' breed [Akita] – which has, you know, a calm profile – and put only Pit Bulls there. It's just the same, boy. Yeah, that's what they lack: fear. They lost their fear.

**Silva:** In Brazil, brother... There is no jail. They are afraid of death. [...] They are afraid of \*dying\*. You will be arrested, [inaudible] will have intimate visitation... The family will be well... He will be smoking weed, snorting his cocaine, drinking *cachaça* inside the jail, will be speaking on the phone with the bitches, will be threatening people on the streets, getting money from inside the jail... For them it's an entertainment, there. They leave jail, Victor, talking like this, look: "I got 10 years of jail, brother, I took 20 yea-... I am awesome." He thinks he is awesome [laughing] because he got 20 years of jail.

**Silva:** Yeah, this is what they are missing: fear. They lost fear. And lose the fear of jail, too. The justice, today, releases him... He is arrested with 10 kilos of weed, with two assault rifles... Custody hearing, he goes to the street. When not, stays 10 days, a month, two months, three months... Jailed. Soon after he's on the street. [...] Then what does the police officer do? Loses the lust in arresting. Because [he] arrests, the Justice comes and releases. And when not, throws a lawsuit at the police officer. Do you understand? And the *bandido* is not worried with lawsuits. Now, the police officer is, right? The *bandido* already knows that his life is really this.

**Silva:** It was different that you had freedom, you were \*the\* police officer. The other side was \*the\* *bandido*. Do you understand? So

igualzinho, rapaz. É, falta isso a eles: medo. Eles perderam o medo.

**Silva:** No Brasil, irmão... Não existe cadeia. Eles têm medo da morte. [...] Eles têm medo é \*de morrer\*. Vocês vão ser presos, [inaudível] vai ter visita íntima... A família vai tá bem... Ele vai tá fumando a maconha, cheirando a cocaína dele, bebendo a cachaça dentro da cadeia, vai tá falando ao telefone com as piranha, vai tá ameaçando as pessoas na rua, arrumando dinheiro de dentro da cadeia... Pra eles é um lazer, lá. Eles saem da cadeia, Victor, falando assim, ó: "tirei foi 10 anos de cadeia, irmão, tirei foi 20 ano-... eu sou pica". Ele acha que é pica [rindo] porque tirou 20 anos de cadeia.

**Silva:** É, falta isso a eles: medo. Eles perderam o medo. E perde o medo da cadeia, também. A justiça, hoje, solta ele... Ele é preso com 10kg de maconha, com dois fuzis... Audiência de custódia, vai pra rua. Quando não, fica 10 dias, um mês, dois meses, três meses... Preso. Daqui a pouco tá na rua. [...] Aí o policial que faz o quê? Perde o tesão em prender. Porque prende, vem a Justiça e solta. E quando não, enfia um processo no policial. Entendeu? E o bandido não tá preocupado com processo. Agora o policial tá, né? O bandido já sabe que a vida dele é isso mesmo.

**Silva:** Era diferente que tu tinha liberdade, você era \*o\* policial. O outro lado era \*o\* bandido. Entendeu? Então \*o\* bandido tinha

\*the\* *bandido* had the fear... He was \*afraid\*. He put his head down. It's like in the past, in the so-called "dictatorship"... right? The- at the time of the dictatorship, right? In 1970, let's go. The dictatorship went on until... the dictatorship went on until 85, right? But the \*military\* dictatorship, in this case, lasted until 68... the 70s were a time of militarism in the so-called dictatorship, but it didn't have, right, the violence that they say existed in 64 to 68... 69, right? So the 70's – I heard it from \*a lot of\* tough [*cascudo*] cops who worked there... How did they do? They passed in the street in a [Chevrolet] *Veraneio* – which was that big car, *camburão* [colloquial name for police cars with a closed compartment in the back for the transportation of detainees] – \*two\* policemen passed. There were \*fifty\* *malucos* [literally "crazy"; slang for "individuals"] on the street there. They would stop, get out [of the car] without a weapon in hand, or anything... [Making his voice deeper] "Make a line there. Everyone with a document in hand. And head down, huh?" The \*fifty\* put their heads down, they couldn't be without documents, in which case that was vagrancy... They had to have their wallets in their pockets to be identified. Huh? Because from the moment you are on the street without a document, it's \*vagrancy\*. Today, this doesn't even exist anymore. So the \*fifty\* kept their heads down, 'cause they knew that if they did something against that police officer, damn, they would all die, it would become a newspaper, and there would be nothing left for them. So they were \*afraid\*. \*Fear\*. It's what worked. Since then, brother... From 20 years to now, then, when I was very active, from 25 years ago... My brother, it was something else. I even caught the \*last\* police. The last police. [Did I do] a lot of shit? I did a lot of shit... But, like, uh... manageable shit, let's say. You could manage one screw-up or another, one

o dito medo... Tinha \*medo\*. Baixava a cabeça. É como na antigamente, lá na chamada "ditadura"... né? O- na época da ditadura, né? Em 1970, 'vamo' lá. A ditadura foi até... a ditadura foi até 85, né? Mas a ditadura \*militar\*, no caso, foi até 68... os anos 70 era uma época de militarismo na chamada ditadura, mas não teve, né, a violência que dizem ter existido em 64 a 68... 69, né? Então os anos 70 – eu ouvi isso com \*vários\* policiais cascudos que trabalharam lá... Como é que eles faziam? Eles passavam na rua de Veraneio – que era aquele carro grandão, camburão – passavam \*dois\* policiais. Tinham \*cinquenta\* malucos na rua lá. Eles paravam, soltava sem arma na mão, nem nada... [engrossando a voz] "faz uma filinha aí. Todo mundo com documento na mão. E cabeça baixa, hein?". Os \*cinquenta\* abaixavam a cabeça, não podia estar sem documento, que aí era vadiagem... Eles tinham que tá com a carteira no bolso pra poder ser identificado. Né? Porque desde o momento que 'cê' tá na rua sem documento é \*vadiagem\*. Hoje em dia nem tem mais. Então ficavam os \*cinquenta\* de cabeça baixa, que eles sabiam que se fizesse alguma coisa contra aquele policial, porra, morreriam todos, viraria um jornal, e mais nada sobraria pra eles. Então, eles tinham \*medo\*. \*Medo\*. É o que funcionava. De lá pra cá, irmão... De 20 anos pra cá, então, quando eu tava bem na ativa, de 25 anos atrás... Meu irmão, era outra coisa. Eu ainda peguei a \*última\* polícia. A última polícia. Muita merda? Fiz muita merda... Mas, tipo assim, é... merdas administráveis, 'vamo' dizer. Você conseguia administrar uma besteira ou outra, uma bobeira ou outra. Mas você conseguia fazer polícia, entendeu? O bandido te respeitava... e tinha medo. Pode ter certeza. E tinha medo. O trabalho era outro.

silliness or another. But you could do police, you know? The *bandido* respected you... and was afraid. You can be sure. And was afraid. The work was different.

**Silva:** Yes, because as I told you, it started with *\*mineira\**. “*Polícia Mineira*” is the place that has several police officers and they don’t want that place to become a mess. Then a *vagabundo* would appear... died. Or else he warned: “look, if you come back here, you’ll die, huh? Go wherever you want”. Got it?

**Victor:** Then there was fear and he went away.

**Silva:** No, went away! That fear I told you about, remember? That I told you about fear back there? [That] respect isn’t enough? Today fear is gone, respect is gone. It’s gone, friend, there’s no more.

**Victor:** Do you think that this lack of fear of the *milícia* nowadays has to do with the lack of fear of the police?

**Silva:** *\*Exactly\** the same lack. But each to their own *modus operandi*, right? The police, if you’re not afraid, at most they’ll try to arrest you. If you react, you can die, you can kill... Now, not the *milícia*. The *milícia* goes there and kills you and that’s it. If a resident says: “I won’t pay and that’s it”. Oh! It’s over, brother. And the police are not like that. Do you understand? These are not the means of the police.

[Exchange continues in section 7.16.]

**Silva:** No, forget it. BOPE, [if] half a dozen BOPE [officers] come, [they] *\*end\** with three hundred of them. [Laughing] Half a dozen BOPE, brother, it’s *\*the devil\**, friend. The guys come with a backpack full of

**Silva:** É, porque como eu te disse, começou com *\*mineira\**. “*Polícia Mineira*” é o local que tem vários policiais e não querem que aquele local vire bagunça. Então aparecia um *vagabundo*... morria. Ou então ele avisava: “ó, se voltar aqui, morre, hein? Vai pra onde tu quiser”. Entendeu?

**Victor:** Aí tinha o medo e ia embora.

**Silva:** Não, ia embora! Aquele medo que eu te disse, lembra? Que eu te falei do medo lá atrás? Não basta o respeito? Hoje em dia acabou medo, acabou respeito. Acabou, amigo, não tem mais.

**Victor:** Você acha que essa falta de medo que se tem da *milícia* hoje em dia tem a ver com a falta de medo da polícia?

**Silva:** *\*Exatamente\** a mesma falta. Só que cada um no seu *modus operandi*, né? A polícia, se você não tiver medo, no máximo ele vai lá tentar te prender. Se você reagir pode morrer, pode matar... Agora, a *milícia* não. A *milícia* vai lá e te mata e acabou. Se um morador falar: “eu não vou pagar e acabou”. Ah! Acabou, irmão. E a polícia não é assim. Entendeu? Os meios da polícia não são esses.

[Conversa continua na seção 7.16.]

**Silva:** Não, esquece. O BOPE, vem meia dúzia de BOPE, *\*acabou\** com trezentos deles. [Rindo] Meia dúzia de BOPE, irmão, é o *\*catiço\**, amigo. Os cara vêm com a mochila cheia de munição, os cara não têm

ammo, the guys don't have brakes [are unstoppable]... The guys are good at shooting, they're good at the jungle... They're good at everything. [They] don't have fear.

freio... Os caras são bom de tiro, são bom de mata... São bom de tudo. Não têm medo.

## 7.8. Police Lethal Violence is a Consequence of the Officers' Nervous Systems

**Nogueira:** Ah, what I think is, this I'm telling you about twenty years ago, right? Twenty-one. I think [the training] has been improving, but it's still very flawed. Could be better. Could be better. Could be better. \*Has\* to be better. Do you understand? Because you're on the front. So it has to be, it has to have a course, the course has to have the minimum, the minimum of- it has to be massive in everything, because our... our nervous system, it... it assimilates the number of repetitions you make of a situation. The greater the repetition, when that is used, you will be able to use it, it will come out as automatic. A mobilization, an act of torsion... Do you understand? You- The more you do that, that already stays in your system, in your memory of you acting that way. So when you take a course in the Military Police, of Military Police, there are some courses and there are some- with some areas you have to be massive. Because you can use it at any time on the street. You have to shoot at any moment of [inaudible], an exchange of fire... An immobilization, many times you can't use a weapon, you can't immobilize... Got it? There are some very specific things that have to be very massive, there can be no mistakes. You can't have... "Ah, I'm going to make a half-half curve". No, it's the entire curve. Do you understand? [...] So, I'm telling you- when I mentioned the system- he [police officer] has to have a very good head, because in \*fractions of a second\*... between life and death. Depending on the occurrence, your

**Nogueira:** Ah, eu acho que assim, isso eu tô te falando de vinte anos atrás, né? Vinte e um. Eu acho que [o treinamento] vem melhorando, mas é muito falho ainda. Pode ser melhor. Pode ser melhor. Pode ser melhor. \*Tem\* que ser melhor. Entendeu? Porque você tá na ponta. Então tem que ser, tem que ter um curso, o curso tem que ter o mínimo, o mínimo de- de ter que ser maciço em tudo, porque o nosso... o nosso sistema nervoso, ele... ele assimila o número de repetições que você faz de uma situação. Quanto maior a repetição, quando for usado aquilo, você vai conseguir usar, vai sair como automático. Uma mobilização, um ato de uma torção... Entendeu? Você- Quanto mais você faz aquilo, aquilo já fica no sistema teu, na memória sua de você agir daquela forma. Então quando você faz um curso da Polícia Militar, de Polícia Militar, tem alguns cursos e tem algum- com algumas áreas que você tem que ser maciço. Porque você pode usar a qualquer momento na rua. Um tiro você tem que dar em qualquer momento da [inaudível], uma troca de tiros... Uma imobilização, muitas das vezes não dá pra usar arma, não dá pra imobilizar... Entendeu? São algumas coisas muito específica que tem que ser muito maciça, não pode ter erro. Não pode ter... "Ah, vou fazer meia- meia curva". Não, é a curva inteira. Entendeu? [...] Então, eu tô te falan- quando eu falei ali o sistema- ele tem que tá com a cabeça muito boa, porque em \*frações de segundo\*... entre a vida e a morte. Dependendo da ocorrência, a sua vida.



life. Depending on the occurrence, it is to save the life of another. So it's fractions of a second. Fractions of se- Only those who live it know.

**Nunes:** Also when I went to approach a car that nobody got out of the car... with window tint, and then? There's going to come a shot from inside. I started screaming, *pô*, rifle pointing all the time, when the guy got out, the guy even wanted to get in the car to get his cell phone – [pretending to shout] “come back, come back!” – because I thought he was going to get a gun. Then he said “calm down, what's that for?” “Calm down, what's that for?” No, open the door! And I don't know what else...” Then, when the tempers ended, I lowered the rifle and said “Damn it, man, this is me working, my brother, it's a matter of my safety. I don't know if you're going to pull a gun.” And it happens. Federal road police officer, the guy stole his gun and killed him, *pô*. You have to be always attentive. You can't go easy, because my life comes first. And of course that I'm not going to shoot the guy for anything. Do you understand? The other day, I was walking with the car, the police officer said to me “boss, there are two motorcycles coming next to you.” When I looked up to see, the two bikers stopped beside me and one lifted his shirt. I said: “they are going to shoot me”. [Pretending to yell] “Stop, stop, stop!” When I looked at him, he was just- “No, boss, I'm just showing you that I'm not armed”. [Scoffs] “My brother... You almost got shot, man. I thought you were going to pull out and take out a Glock and shoot me there.” Very quick question. It was in a troubled area, bordering the *favela*, they left the *comunidade*, and it was a motorcycle taxi with a passenger. He got scared, but so do we. Do you understand?

Dependendo da ocorrência, é salvar a vida do próximo. Então é frações de segundo. Frações de se- Só sabe quem vive.

**Nunes:** Também quando eu fui abordar um carro que ninguém saiu do carro... todo filmado, e aí? Vai vim um tiro lá de dentro. Comecei a gritar, *pô*, fuzil o tempo todo apontando, quando saiu o cara, o cara foi ainda querer entrar dentro do carro pegar o celular – [fingindo gritar] “volta, volta!” – porque eu pensei que ele ia pegar uma arma. Aí ele “calma, pra que isso?” “Calma, pra que isso?” não, abre a porta! E mais não sei o quê...” Aí quando acabou os ânimos eu abaixei o fuzil e falei “porra, cara, isso aqui eu tô trabalhando, meu irmão, é questão da minha segurança. Eu não sei se você vai puxar uma arma.” E acontece. Policial rodoviário federal, o cara roubou a arma dele e matou ele, *pô*. Tem que tá sempre atento. Não pode dar mole, porque a minha vida em primeiro lugar. E é claro que eu não vou dar um tiro no cara à toa. Entendeu? No outro dia, eu andando com a viatura, o policial falou pra mim “chefe, tá vindo duas moto aí do seu lado”. Quando eu olhei pra ver, os dois motoqueiro parou do meu lado e um levantou a camisa. Falei: “vão me dar um tiro”. [Fingindo gritar] “Para, para, para!” Quando eu olhei ele só tava- “Não, chefe, só tô mostrando que eu não tô armado”. [Exala em descrença] “Meu irmão... Tu quase tomou um tiro, cara. Pensei que tu ia puxar e tirar uma Glock e me dar um tiro aí.” Questão muito rápida. Tava numa área conflagrada, beirando a favela, eles saíram de dentro da comunidade, e era um mototáxi com passageiro. Ele ficou assustado, mas a gente também fica. Entendeu?

**Pereira:** [Continuation of story in section 7.3.] One thing, Victor, is for us to arrive and shoot at a static target. That over there is a target, I stay here aiming and shoot. Another thing is you in the heat of emotion, panting, with adrenaline, you shoot. [...] Just finishing saying what I told you about the shot in the legs, it's almost impossible, okay? So when you either shoot with a scope, right, let's put it like this, or an instinctive shot that is the instinctive one, you took it and shot it, you know more or less where you're going, you know? But to neutralize the individual, for example, an individual like that that the guy was a former *bandido* and such, a drug dealer, the guy was a wanderer on the street, but he has a history. Often, the streetwalker, he has a background in the past, the guy sometimes knows how to use martial arts, and such. So, man, the police service is a service you have to, let's say, is equal to Law, the law says so, every individual is... [...] It says so, every individual is innocent until proven otherwise, right? This is the essence of the law, yes, but with a police officer it is the opposite, every individual is a criminal, of course there are exceptions, right? Until proven otherwise. But we must start from this- have this question, do you understand, Victor? We must start from this doubt.

**Rodrigues:** There [Police academy] they don't prepare the police officer to get, to come here outside, [and] draw his weapon, fire shots, for anything. This that we sometimes see happening of a stray bullet, all of this, is an... exception... It is even sometimes a- a police officer who got kind of tense, kind of nervous, who saw a guy shooting at him, shot, there was that thing inside the *favela*, that thing, the guy shoots and... hits someone else. But that is not the orientation. The orientation, when you are in a situation, the guy shot, you get cover and wait to see what is happening, so you'll shoot

**Pereira:** [Continuação da história na seção 7.3.] Uma coisa, Victor, é a gente chegar e atirar num alvo estático. Aquilo ali é um alvo, eu fico aqui mirando e atiro. Outra coisa é você no calor da emoção, ofegante, com adrenalina, você atirar. [...] Só terminando de falar o que eu te falei do tiro nas pernas, é quase impossível, tá? Então quando você faz ou um tiro com mira, né, vamos dizer assim, ou um tiro instintivo que é o instintivo, você pegou e atirou, você sabe mais ou menos aonde que vai, entende? Mas pra neutralizar o indivíduo, por exemplo, um indivíduo desse que o cara era um ex-bandido e tal, traficante, o cara tava andarilho ali na rua, mas ele tem um histórico. Muitas vezes, o andarilho da rua, ele tem um histórico no passado, o cara às vezes sabe usar artes marciais, e tal. Então, cara, o serviço de polícia é um serviço que você tem que, vamos dizer assim, é igual ao direito, o direito fala assim, todo o indivíduo é... [...] Ele diz assim, todo indivíduo é inocente até que esse prove o contrário, né? Essa é a tônica do direito sim, com um policial já é o contrário, todo indivíduo é um criminoso, claro que tem suas exceções, né? Até que se prove contrário. Mas a gente tem que partir dessa- ter essa questão, tá entendendo, Victor? A gente tem que partir dessa dúvida.

**Rodrigues:** Lá [escola de Polícia] eles não preparam o policial pra pegar, pra chegar aqui fora, qualquer coisa tá sacando a arma, tá dando tiro. Isso que as vezes a gente vê acontecer aí de bala perdida, tudo isso, é uma... exceção... É às vezes até uma- um policial que ficou meio tenso, meio nervoso, que viu um cara atirando nele, atirou, teve aquela coisa dentro da favela, aquela coisa, o cara atirou e... acerta os outros. Mas a orientação não é essa. A orientação, quando você está numa situação, o cara atirou, você se abriga e espera pra ver o que que está acontecendo pra depois você atirar. Você não

later. You can't shoot at what you don't see. Do you understand? But this, right, we talk like this, but in the moment, too, it depends a lot on... that- on the moment, right? That guy is nervous, is agitated.

**Victor:** What I want to know now is specifically about the question of violence. When should violence be used and when \*is\* it used? Is there any difference between these two things?

**Silva:** No, because it is used when it must be used. Of course that there are some excesses that we see there, right? Police officer shooting at someone just because he accelerated a motorcycle... Right? The police officer ends up killing a guy that sometimes, just because he doesn't have a driver's license... and everything else. These are the excesses, but it's the police officer's nervous system. Do you understand? The police officer, brother, God forbid... Is a pressure cooker, brother. And it's always whistling. "Pshhhhh" [voices the sound of a pressure cooker blowing steam]. Always whistling. My brother, because you can be shot at any time, at any moment... You are a target there.

pode atirar naquilo que você não está vendo. Entendeu? Mas isso aí, né, a gente fala assim, mas na hora, também, depende muito da... daquele- do momento, né? Aquele cara tá nervoso, tá agitado.

**Victor:** O que eu quero saber agora é especificamente sobre a questão da violência. Quando que a violência deve ser usada e quando que ela \*é\* usada? Tem alguma diferença entre essas duas coisas?

**Silva:** Não, porque ela é usada quando tem que ser usada. É claro que existem alguns excessos que a gente vê aí, né? Policial dando tiro em alguém só porque acelerou a moto... Né? Aí o policial acaba matando um cara que às vezes, só porque não tem habilitação... e tudo mais. São os excessos, mas é o sistema nervoso do policial. Entendeu? O policial, irmão, Deus me livre... É uma panela de pressão, irmão. E fica apitando sempre. "Pshhhhh" [imitando som de panela de pressão]. Sempre apitando. Meu irmão, porque tu pode tomar tiro a qualquer hora, a qualquer momento... Tu é alvo ali.

## 7.9. Police Lethal Violence is Externalized

**Assis:** With the excuse of the pandemic, the STF prohibits us from doing our operations. Is there the question of collateral damage that happens? It happens. Yeah... Unfortunately, when you are exchanging shots, uh... Like I already told you, they don't care. We act caring to avoid collateral damage. They don't. They explode grenades, and we almost never explode- Lethal grenades don't even make part of our arsenal. Of Rio de Janeiro's arsenal, which is the most armed Police in Brazil, there's no arsenal of lethal grenades.

**Assis:** Com a desculpa da pandemia, o STF proíbe a gente de fazer as nossas operações. É... Existe a questão de dano colateral que acontece? Acontece. É.. Infelizmente, quando você tá trocando tiro, é.. de- Como eu já te disse, eles não se preocupam. A gente atua se preocupando pra evitar o dano colateral. Eles não. Eles explodem granadas e a gente quase não estoura- Granada letal nem faz parte do nosso acervo. Do acervo do Rio de Janeiro, que é a Polícia mais armada do Brasil, não existe o acervo de granadas letais.

What we do use: moral effect grenades. Tear-gas or light and sound [stun grenades]. The *bandido*, he throws grenades... lethal, diverted from the... from the Army or stolen from the Army, they use... homemade grenades using bike pegs with gunpowder and nails, [they] wrap it up and throw at us, and if this will hit a resident, citizen, they don't care. If this will cause damage to the house of a citizen, they don't care. They want to defend their business, their territory, and the *Comando Vermelho*, above all, still has the question of evolution inside their hierarchy, that if you kill a police officer you grow inside of the... the faction. So it is a very big logic of enemy, of confrontation.

**Larrey:** But there was a hiatus there, also because of Covid, in which there was a proliferation, very- as there was not much interference by the Police in these communities, in these lands, uh, inaccessible to the public authorities, there was a... an exacerbated growth of crime there, including the importation of criminals, right? So people come from outside, they increase the military power of criminals within these territories dominated by... by drug traffickers, by militias... and then the projection... our projection is that these confrontations will become increasingly violent and that the lethality tends to increase. [...] I don't know if other people already told [you], but maybe [this] is a reality very... quite close to beginning to happen. Of an increase- a *\*new\** increase of the mortality of police officers and *\*of citizens\**, because when a drug dealer shoots, right, fires a shot, he fires a shot. [He] doesn't want to know if behind the police officer there is a popcorn maker, there is a child... he doesn't want to know that. This is very demanded of us – even because, in the case, we are professionals of this, right? But

O que a gente usa: granadas de efeito moral. Lacrimogêneo ou luz e som. O bandido, ele taca granadas... letais, desviadas do... do Exército ou roubadas do Exército, eles usam... é... granadas de fabricação caseira usando 'calicas' de bicicleta com pólvora e pregos, enrolam, e tacam na gente, e se isso vai acertar morador, cidadão, eles não tão nem aí. É... se isso vai causar dano à casa de algum cidadão, eles não ligam. Eles querem defender o seu negócio, defender o seu território, e o Comando Vermelho, ainda por cima, ainda existe a questão de evolução dentro da hierarquia de lá, que se você mata um policial você cresce dentro do... da facção. Então é uma lógica de inimigo, de enfrentamento muito grande.

**Larrey:** Só que ficou um hiato aí, até por conta de Covid também, em que houve uma proliferação, muito- como não tinha muita interferência da Polícia nessas comunidades, nesses terrenos, é, inacessíveis ao poder público, houve uma... um crescimento exacerbado da criminalidade ali, inclusive com importação de criminosos, né? Então vêm pessoas até de fora, vão aumentando esse poderio bélico dos criminosos dentro desses territórios dominados pelas... pelos narcotraficantes, pelas milícias... e aí a projeção nossa é que esses confrontos fiquem cada vez mais violentos e que a letalidade tenda a crescer. [...] Não sei se outras pessoas já falaram, mas talvez seja uma realidade muito... bem próxima pra começar a acontecer. De um aumento re- um *\*novo\** aumento da mortalidade dos policiais e *\*de cidadãos\**, porque quando um traficante atira, né, faz um disparo, ele faz um disparo. Não quer saber se atrás do policial tem um pipoqueiro, tem uma criança... ele não quer saber isso. Isso é muito exigido de nós – até porque, no caso, a gente é profissional disso, né? Mas o traficante não, então... creio eu,

not the drug dealer, so... I believe, too, that [this] will increase this morbimortality of the citizens.

**Victor:** In the media, in recent years, there has been a lot of news about the use of police violence, right? That, anyway, young people who are killed and bodies that are discovered... Do you think this has gotten worse? Do you think this is media bias? What is your opinion on this sort of thing?

**Rodrigues:** No, there are a lot of things there that the press says that the Police did. Now you see that thing of *milícia* there. There's a lot of things that it is the *milícia* that is doing, man. The Police is in war. Everywhere that you go now you hear about "*milícia, milícia*", right? [The] *milícia* that did it. There are a lot of things that are [done by] the *milícia* too, right? They put the blame on the Police. They think there are people from... that the *milícia* is made up of police. It's not. There may even be some police officers in the *milícia*, but no it's not. And this thing, man, you see that it's wreaking havoc. They have to fight that because it's, *pô*... Do you understand? They are charging fees from residents, charging from businesses... This is something that... is also influencing a lot in the issue of public security in Rio de Janeiro. Do you understand? 'Cause only here in Rio do you see [people] talking about it. You go to São Paulo, you don't see it mentioned. Minas... Anywhere you go, Northeast, there is no such thing. It's only in Rio that there's this *milícia* thing, these things, right? Then, sometimes the fellow sees, the *milícia* kills a *bandido* from the area there, right? Then the resident, sometimes, so they don't blame the *miliciano*, says "ah, the police came here and shot, I don't know what." But not it's not. But there's, like, you said, right, "ah, police

também, que vai aumentar essa morbimortalidade dos cidadãos.

**Victor:** Na mídia, nos últimos anos, tem surgido muitas notícias sobre o uso da violência policial, né? Que, enfim, jovens que são mortos e corpos que são descobertos... Você acha que isso tem piorado? Você acha que isso é um viés da mídia? Qual é sua opinião sobre esse tipo de coisa?

**Rodrigues:** Não, tem muita coisa ali que tem muita coisa que a mídia fala que foi a Polícia que fez. Agora tu tá vendo negócio da *milícia* aí, ó. Tem muita coisa que é a *milícia* que tá fazendo, cara. A Polícia tá em guerra. Todo lugar que tu vai agora, tu vê falar "*milícia, milícia*," né? *Milícia* que fez. Tem muita coisa que é a *milícia* também, né? Eles botam culpa na polícia. Acham que tem gente da... que a *milícia* é formada por polícia. Não é. Pode até ter alguns policiais na *milícia*, mas não é não. E esse negócio aí, cara, tu vê que isso aí tá pegando geral. Eles têm que combater isso aí porque isso tá, *pô*... Entendeu? Eles tão cobrando taxa dos moradores, cobrando do comércio... Isso aí é uma coisa que... também tá influenciando muito na questão de segurança pública do Rio de Janeiro. Entendeu? Que só aqui no Rio que tu vê falar nisso. Tu vai em São Paulo tu não vê falar nisso. Minas... Qualquer lugar tu vai, Nordeste, não existe esse negócio. Só no Rio que tem negócio de *milícia*, essas coisas, né? Aí às vezes o camarada vê, a *milícia* mata um bandido lá da área lá, né? Aí o morador, às vezes, pra não culpar *miliciano*, bota "ah, a Polícia que veio aqui e atirou, não sei o quê." Mas não é não. Mas tem, tipo assim, você falou, né, "ah, violência da Polícia, violência...", mas tem muita coisa que a imprensa só vê um lado.

violence, violence...”, but there’s a lot that the press only sees one side.

### 7.10. Violent Police Officers are Externalized

**Pereira:** Because just as we acted there to do a good job, there are other... elements, that I can’t even call a colleague, right? Who are sometimes a guy, a bad element disguised as police officer, because he is not a police officer, he... he is a bad element, right?

**Pereira:** Porque assim como a gente agiu ali pra fazer um bom serviço, existem outros... elementos, que eu não posso nem chamar de colega, né? Que são às vezes um cara, um mau elemento travestido ali de policial, porque ele não é policial, ele... ele é um mau elemento, né?

**Pereira:** Today, you even have... So I won’t tell you that there are no police officers that do this kind of, let’s say, *chacina*. You do see. Now, they are increasingly sparse elements, you know? But they are criminals, are arrested and such... The guy killed... *pô*, I don’t know, for anger or... [someone] killed one of his colleagues, he went there, got revenge, do you understand? But then it’s not official, it’s unofficial, okay? And generally, these guys are caught, are arrested, they don’t... The corporation does not relieve regarding this, no. And [they] don’t even have... let’s put it this way, acquiescence from the peers, the... let’s say... what is the word?

**Victor:** Approval?

**Pereira:** Approval! [They] don’t have. We don’t approve crime, man. We work inside legality. And who approves crime, he will be caught at any moment. Are you understanding? He will be killed or he will be arrested... Do you understand? Or he will be caught at any moment, man. The police officer who works badly is not well regarded... in our midst. And he, nowadays, the police officer who works badly, he is kind of camouflaged. In the past he really was exposed. Not today, man. Do you

**Pereira:** Hoje, você até tem... Então eu não vou te dizer que que não há policiais que fazem esse tipo de, vamos dizer, *chacina*. Você vê. Agora, são elementos cada vez mais espaçados, sabe? Mas são criminosos, são presos e tal... O cara matou... *pô*, sei lá, por raiva ou... matou um colega dele, ele foi lá, se vingou, entende? Mas aí não é oficial, é oficioso, tá? E geralmente esses caras são pegos, são presos, não- não... A corporação não alivia em relação a isso aí não. E nem tem... vamos dizer assim, dos pares a aquiescência, a... vamos dizer... como é o termo?

**Victor:** Aprovação?

**Pereira:** Aprovação! Não tem. Nós não aprovamos o crime, cara. A gente trabalha dentro da legalidade. E quem aprova o crime, ele em algum momento vai ser pego. Tá entendendo? Ele vai ser morto ou ele vai ser preso... Entende? Ou ele vai ser pego em algum momento, cara. O policial que trabalha mal ele não é bem-visto... no nosso meio. E ele hoje em dia, o policial que trabalha mal, ele meio que tá camuflado. Antigamente ele era exposto mesmo. Hoje não, cara. Entende? Porque ele não é bem-visto pela tropa. E às vezes, quando sabe-se, ele é rejeitado. “Ah

understand? Because he is not well regarded by the troop. And sometimes, when it's known, he is rejected. "Ah, I don't want to work with that guy over there, that guy works badly and such". Do you understand?

**Victor:** And the bad police officer, how is he?

**Rodrigues:** The bad police officer? Ah, the bad police officer is a guy that sometimes he is like this from the crib, right? He comes- Sometimes the guy joins the police thinking he's going to get rich. Doing, uh... getting corrupted. But everyone I knew who- who went- left for this- for this thing there died or else were arrested. 'Cause nothing is covered up, always has, always... The wrong things, boy, everything will be found out one day. Do you understand? The thing, when you're doing something wrong, never- never- the mistake will always be discovered. I've never seen anyone get lucky. Within the police who bribed, who let themselves be led... into bribery, into corruption. So, the guy, this already comes from the family too, the guy who already comes with that "ah, I'm going to do this here", will do something wrong. He'll get screwed up, because in the police he's going to get burned. Do you understand? When you see a case happening there, soon you'll see the internal affairs department arresting [the corrupt police officer]. Do you understand? And did you know? That the Police is like this: if you, you're a guy that you're not- you don't work with the law, you're not a police officer.

**Victor:** You're mentioning, right, that nowadays it's impossible to be a police officer. In your time you still had a little more freedom, despite that period with Brizola...

**Silva:** [We] had support. Had support. Do you understand? Even during Brizola's time.

não quero trabalhar com aquele cara ali não, aquele cara trabalha mal e tal", entendeu?

**Victor:** E o policial ruim, como é que ele é?

**Rodrigues:** O policial ruim? Ah, o policial ruim é um cara que às vezes ele já vem de berço, né? Já vem- Às vezes o cara entra pra Polícia pensando que vai ficar rico. Fazendo, é... se corrompendo. Mas todos que eu conheci que se- que foram- partiram pra esse- pra essa parada aí morreram ou então foram presos. Que nada é encoberto, sempre tem, sempre... As coisa errada, rapaz, tudo um dia vão descobrir. Entendeu? A coisa, quando tá fazendo uma coisa errada, nunca- nunca- o erro sempre vai ser descoberto. Eu nunca vi ninguém se dar bem. Dentro da polícia que subornou, que deixou se levar... pro suborno, pra corrupção. Então, o cara, isso já vem de família também, o cara que já vem com aquilo "ah, vou fazer isso aqui", vai fazer coisa errada. Vai se estrear, porque na Polícia ele vai se dar mal. Entendeu? Vê aí acontecer um caso aí, daqui a pouco tu vê a corregedoria tá prendendo. Entendeu? E você sabia? Que a polícia é assim: se você, você é um cara que tu não é- tu não trabalha com a lei, tu não é policial.

**Victor:** Você tá mencionando, né, que hoje em dia tá impossível ser policial. Na sua época você ainda tinha um pouco mais de liberdade, apesar desse período do Brizola...

**Silva:** Tinha respaldo. Tinha respaldo. Entendeu? Na própria época do Brizola. O

Brizola just didn't let us enter the favela. Now, the rest, if it was a \*legal\* job... There are the many illegal jobs. Right? That the police officer goes by his own will, kidnaps the son or the wife of a drug dealer to get some money. Then he became a criminal, right? Then it's over.

Brizola só não deixava entrar na favela. Agora, o restante, se fosse um trabalho \*legal\*... Tem os vários trabalhos ilegais. Né? Que o policial vai por vontade própria, sequestra o filho ou a esposa de um traficante pra pegar um dinheiro. Aí ele virou criminoso, né? Aí acabou.

### 7.11. Police Officers Now and Then

**Victor:** Having all that, right, in mind, this panorama of this state of Rio de Janeiro, anyway, corruption and all these illicit agreements, what do you feel is most necessary to be a police officer?

**Nunes:** Man, the first thing I think [is] that a military police officer, unlike the older ones who came in with another bias, right – to be a murderer, a risk-taker, to kill –, he has to understand that the Military Police is not a place for him to get rich. [...] He must abandon that desire of believing himself to be the superhero, of believing himself to be the king of the street... This is over. This doesn't exist anymore in the Police. [A] military police officer can't arrive in a *pagoda* with a weapon on his waist showing to everybody. He must be [there] to protect society. [He] must stop being- wanting to get rich at the expense of the state, at the expense of schemes. If the military police officer starts becoming the least corrupt as possible, it already improves a lot of things in society.

**Victor:** You mentioned those who joined the Police to be a hero, to be rich, to be a killer, whatever, that's over...

**Nunes:** It's over.

**Victor:** But there was a time that still existed?

**Nunes:** There was. There was. There was a time when it was normal for you to go to war

**Victor:** Tendo tudo isso, né, em mente, esse panorama desse estado do Rio de Janeiro, enfim, a corrupção e todos esses acordos ilícitos, o que você sente que é mais necessário para ser policial?

**Nunes:** Cara, primeira coisa que eu acho que um policial militar, diferente dos mais antigos que entraram com outra viés, né – ser assassino, perigador, matar –, ele tem que entender que a Polícia Militar não é um lugar pra ele ficar rico. [...] Ele tem que tirar aquela vontade de [se] achar o super-herói, de se achar o rei da rua... Acabou isso. Isso não existe mais na Polícia. Policial militar não tem que chegar num pagode com arma na cintura mostrando pra todo mundo. Ele tem que estar pra proteger a sociedade. Tem que parar de ser- de querer enriquecer às custas do Estado, às custas do jeitinho. Se o policial militar começar a ser menos corrupto possível já melhora muito coisa na sociedade.

**Victor:** Você mencionou quem entrou na Polícia pra ser herói, pra ser rico, pra ser matador, o que fosse, isso acabou...

**Nunes:** Acabou.

**Victor:** Mas tinha uma época que ainda tinha?

**Nunes:** Tinha. Tinha. Tinha uma época que era normal você ir pra guerra pra ir pro



to go to combat, there was that culture of a police today having to be the *brabão* [tough guy], the killer, bloodthirsty. It existed. There are police officers here, still, who have this- who are from this generation. Nowadays we are living a TikTok police. Right? The blogger police officer, the police officer wants to take a picture, the police officer wants to be a model, the police officer who wants to appear in the [Brazilian television] series “*Arcanjo Renegado...*” Today is another generation. Will this generation be better? I don’t know. For war maybe not. We must have a middle ground. Do we have to strive for a proximity police? I agree. Do we have to be a less truculent police? I agree. But in a moment of war, of confrontation, we will need the harsh police officer, right?

**Nunes:** [...] the guys that are coming have a totally different thought from the old ones. We lived in a generation where human rights are much stronger.

**Pereira:** Do you remember... – I don’t know if you will remember, these are old things, but maybe you have heard over time – this word “running horses”?

**Victor:** No.

**Pereira:** Never heard this, right? Who were the running horses? Even, this- this time... the.... it was the *chacina* of- called Vigário Geral. You have heard, *Chacina de Vigário Geral*. It was ninety-two, if I’m not mistaken. Why were they called “running horses”? The police officers entered the *favela*... without any criteria. Running. Left running and such, and shooting and such... Didn’t have- Didn’t have this question of criteria, of... of a technical advance, of a... of a progression, do you understand? Of a, uh... tactical police progression, right? With the care of avoiding... shooting at random, right? And...

combate, existia aquela cultura de policial hoje ter que ser o brabão, o matador, sanguinário. Existia. Ainda tem policiais aqui, ainda, que tem essa- que são dessa geração. Hoje em dia a gente tá vivendo uma polícia TikTok. Né? O policial blogueiro, o policial quer tirar foto, policial quer ser modelo, o policial que quer aparecer no seriado *Arcanjo Renegado...* Hoje é uma outra geração. Essa geração vai ser melhor? Não sei. Pra guerra talvez não. A gente tem que ter o meio termo. A gente tem que buscar uma Polícia de proximidade? Concordo. A gente tem que ser uma Polícia menos truculenta? Concordo. Mas em um momento de guerra, de confronto, a gente vai precisar do policial ríspido, né?

**Nunes:** [...] a galera que tá vindo aí tem um pensamento totalmente diferente dos antigos. A gente viveu uma geração que direitos humanos é muito mais forte.

**Pereira:** Você lembra... – não sei se você vai lembrar, são coisas antigas, mas talvez você tenha escutado ao longo do tempo – essa palavra “cavalos corredores”?

**Victor:** Não.

**Pereira:** Nunca escutou isso não, né? Quem eram os cavalos corredores? Designavam- Inclusive esse- nessa época... a... foi a chacina da- chamada de Vigário Geral. Você já ouviu falar, Chacina de Vigário Geral. Foi noventa e dois, se eu não me engano. Por que que eram chamados de “cavalos corredores”? Os policiais eles entravam na favela, a... sem critério nenhum. Correndo. Saíam correndo e tal, e atirando e tal... Não tinha- Não se tinha essa questão de critério, de... do avanço técnico, de uma... de uma progressão, entende? De uma progressão ali, é... policial tática, né? Com o cuidado de

there, unfortunately, that time was like this, man. Were called “running horses” because they just got out of the car and went running. *Pô*, imagine, man. A troop that’s totally... unprepared, totally... And a lot of atrocities were committed. The guys were- had a... Police was literally a misery, man, do you understand? You had guys there extremely... violent, do you understand? You didn’t have a control- first, you didn’t have a corrective, effective, control, right? Corrections, levels of correction. For example, a strong internal affairs department, something that... So the guy was kind of free there, you know? The guy did... like this, you hold all the aces, then the guy did whatever he wanted. So there was a *chacina* there, because there were four police officers who died in a given moment there during patrol and then the guys [police officers] went there... in a given moment without uniforms and did this- went out killing a lot of people and such. This happened a lot, man, in the past. Unfortunately... It’s a side... It’s a sad time, you know, of... [the Police].

**Pereira:** Because, man, it’s like this... It’s what I’m telling you, Victor, I- you were lucky to meet a police officer... that’s distinguished, okay? [...] Imagine it like this: I was a good police officer thirty years ago, when most were bad, are you understanding? Not today. Most are good. Are you understanding? So I’m someone who was, let’s put it this way, out of my time. Let’s say it like this, right? I am timeless for that reality there. Do you understand? Even today... But I say like this, today most are good. Not in the past, most were bad. Or I don’t know, I don’t know how to measure. Because maybe the bad things are more publicized, and the good things are less, right? So that’s how it is, there were no statistics. I know that the idea... the

you avoid... throw the money, né? E... lá, infelizmente, essa época era assim, cara. Era chamado de “cavalos corredores” porque eles só desciam do carro e saiam correndo. *Pô*, imagina, cara. Uma tropa totalmente... despreparada, totalmente... E eram cometidas várias atrocidades. Os caras eram- tinham uma... Polícia era literalmente era uma miséria, cara, entende? Você tinha caras extremamente aí... violentos, entende? Você não tinha um controle- primeiro, você não tinha um controle corretivo, efetivo, né? Correições, níveis de correições. Por exemplo, uma corregedoria forte, alguma coisa que... Então o cara ficava meio que solto ali, sabe? O cara fazia... é tipo assim, você tem o queijo e o garfo- o queijo na mão e a faca, aí o cara fazia o que ele queria. Então houve lá uma *chacina*, porque foram quatro policiais que morreram em determinado momento lá no patrulhamento e depois os caras vieram lá... em determinado momento à paisana e fizeram essa- saíram matando um montão de gente e tal. Acontecia muito isso, cara, antigamente. Infelizmente... É um lado... É um período triste, sabe, da... [Polícia].

**Pereira:** Porque, cara, é assim... É o que eu tô te falando, Victor, eu- você deu sorte de conhecer um policial... diferenciado, tá? [...] Imagina assim: eu era um bom policial há trinta anos atrás, quando a maioria era ruim, tá entendendo? Hoje não. A maioria é boa. Tá entendendo? Então eu sou alguém que estava, vamos dizer assim, fora do meu tempo. Vamos dizer assim, né? Eu sou atemporal pra aquela realidade lá. Entende? Ainda hoje... Mas eu digo assim, hoje a maioria é boa. Antigamente não, a maioria era ruim. Ou sei lá, eu não sei como mensurar. Porque talvez as coisas ruins elas são mais divulgadas e as coisas boas são menos, né? Então é assim, não se tinha estatística. Eu sei que a ideia... a ideia flutuante a época era uma ideia que tu

floating idea at the time was an idea that you talked about, of vigilantism, of the thing... let's say, of the thing that escaped from the... the idea of correctness. Just to give you an idea, I... just to finish, once again, I once knew a fact, and I- this was not a fact, well, nobody's invention, of a time when the... when a garrison had literally ripped a drug dealer open from top to bottom like a pig... hanging from a soccer goalpost. This in a *favela*, I don't know, I don't remember which *favela* it is, I really don't know. These were stories that reached us, right? Because... they were very violent, shocking, stories and stuff, but they kind of... remember I told you that people saw it and thought it was normal? It was strange, too, because... because it was also that time, right? Even the people from the very *comunidade*... or they got used to that, thought that was normal, anyway, it didn't have. It also didn't have a telephone, there was no one also who dared to speak, right? But a... I know of a case like this, that the guy opened the drug dealer from top to bottom. Hanging there and such. So it existed... The microwave thing, right? The police officer would burn the *va-* the *bandido* in a tire... Man, there were many things like that, many atrocities.

**Rodrigues:** When you enter [the police] – even more so at the time I entered, time of militarism – you entered with that whole thing of “ah, I’m going to do it, I’m going to kill, I’m going to shoot, I don’t know what”, but when you come to work there [*favela*], you see that not everyone who is there – there who lives in that- who is in that situation there – is what you think. Do you understand?

**Silva:** [...] ‘Cause we say that nowadays anyone who joins the police wants to wear black. Wants to put on a black outfit, skintight, make poses, shave his beard at

falou, do justicamento, da coisa... vamos dizer, da coisa que fugia à... à ideia do correto. Pra você ter uma ideia, eu... só pra encerrar, mais uma vez, eu soube de uma vez de um fato, e eu- isso não era fato, assim, invenção de ninguém, de uma vez que o... que uma guarnição tenha literalmente aberto um traficante de cima embaixo como um porco... pendurado numa trave de futebol. Isso numa favela, não sei, não lembro que favela que é, realmente não sei. Isso eram histórias que chegavam pra gente, né? Porque... eram histórias muito violentas, chocantes e tal, mas que meio que... lembra que eu te falei que as pessoas viam e achavam isso normal? Era estranho, também, porque... porque também era aquele tempo, né? Até o pessoal da própria comunidade... ou eles se acostumaram com aquilo, acharam que era normal aquilo, enfim, não se tinha. Também não se tinha um telefone, não se tinha ninguém que também que ousasse a falar, né? Mas uma... Eu sei de um caso desse, que o cara abriu assim o traficante de cima embaixo. Pendurado lá e tal. Então existia... O tal do micro-ondas, né? O policial queimava o *va-* o bandido no pneu... Cara, teve muitas coisas assim, muitas atrocidades.

**Rodrigues:** Quando você entra – ainda mais na época que eu entrei, época do militarismo – você entrou com aquela coisa toda de “ah, eu vou fazer, vou matar, vou dar tiro, não sei o que”, mas quando você chega pra trabalhar lá, você vê que nem todo mundo ali que tá ali – ali que mora naquela- que tá naquela situação ali – é o que você pensa. Entendeu?

**Silva:** [...] que a gente fala que hoje em dia quem entra pra polícia quer vestir preto. Quer botar roupinha preta, coladinha, fazer pose, fazer a barbinha lá nesses barbeiros aí... né,

those barbershops there... right, charge 100 reais to shave, and put a gel in your hair, and draw your beard and the guy gets all... makes a pose with one arm, the other, with the rifle like that... That's the police officer now. \*Many\* of them, right, of course. It's joining [the Police] to wear black and make fun. When it's time to exchange shots, he won't go.

cobra 100 reais pra fazer a barba, e bota um gel no cabelo, e desenha tua barba e o cara fica todo... faz pose com um braço, outro, com fuzil assim... É esse que o polícia é agora. \*Muitos\* deles, né, claro. É entrar pra vestir preto e fazer graça. Na hora de trocar tiro, não vai.

## 7.12. Criminal Connections

**Victor:** You mention that you're here temporarily to learn about organized crime, about internal conflicts... What was the most important thing you learned about this?

**Assis:** The great crux of the matter is this situation that I put forward. I didn't have this view that... politics and organized crime are so interrelated. Right? Today I know who are many politicians who are interrelated with organized crime. [...] And then today one of the biggest understandings I see is this, right? It's you... It's the way politics is absurdly intertwined with organized crime and how many politicians and businessmen today profit from organized crime... Right?

**Victor:** Você menciona que tá aqui temporariamente pra aprender sobre crime organizado, sobre os conflitos internos... O que que você aprendeu de mais importante sobre isso?

**Assis:** O grande cerne da questão é essa situação que eu te coloquei. Eu não tinha essa visão de que o... a política e o crime organizado eles tanto se interrelaciona. Né? Hoje eu sei quem são muitos políticos que se interrelacionam com o crime organizado. [...] E aí hoje uma das maiores compreensões que eu vejo é essa, né? É o você... É a forma como a política se interliga absurdamente com o crime organizado e como hoje muitos políticos e empresários lucram com o crime organizado... Né?

**Larrey:** In other states, what I see from the outside is... there is an operation, a police officer dies, the governor is the first to give- "No, look, there will be an energetic operation for us to catch the bandido, and such... The bandido reacted, [got] killed? Everything's okay." In Rio de Janeiro we don't see that. The police officer died, there is not a proportionate answer from the state. So "ah, the police officer died, damn, we're so sorry, the Police is dismayed because the police officer died, the governor is dismayed alongside the family..." But then what? What

**Larrey:** Em outros estados o que eu vejo de fora, é... tem uma operação, um policial morre, o governador é o primeiro a dar- "não, olha só, vai ter uma operação enérgica pra gente pegar o bandido, tal... O bandido reagiu, matou? Tá tudo certo." No Rio de Janeiro a gente não vê isso. O policial morreu, não tem uma resposta do estado à altura. Então "ah, policial morreu, poxa, a gente lamenta, a Polícia tá consternada porque o policial morreu, o governador se consterna com a família..." Mas e aí? Qual é a resposta que ele dá? Talvez por interesse

is the answer that he gives? Maybe out of political interest he gives an answer because maybe in that community over there he has a lot of voters and he doesn't want to, especially in an election year, he doesn't want to displease, or he has other interests that I won't even mention here that he doesn't want... over there you won't be able to touch there. So these political interferences in the Police, these somewhat shady alliances that we see... you know, right? This interferes a lot and is very strong in Rio de Janeiro. We have [in] Rio de Janeiro, like, coexisting, cohabiting, things very... that we don't see in other places! We see the criminal cohabiting with the political. We see in the *sambódromo*, in the same box, the politician, the head of the executive power, and the... "*bicheiro*". Which is known to be a misdemeanor. It is known to be illegal. So we have a... I even lost the word, but it's... well, an intersection of agents that shouldn't happen. So all this contributes to Rio de Janeiro being the way it is, which we don't see in other states like that.

**Victor:** So you as a police officer, you working on the street, right, having this view from the inside, what is your assessment of the state of public security in Rio?

**Nunes:** *Pô...* precarious. Precarious. I confess that... I didn't have that vision. I was a civilian – three years ago I was a civilian, right? – and now, three years later, the number of situations that we see that we cannot do [anything], that the State is inert, is impressive. [Story in section 7.2.] We know they [drug dealers] are there but we can't do anything. And when not, we have police officers, sometimes, who report against the police. I was in a situation where I was trying to catch a *bandido* who was on the corner selling drugs and another police car came and said: "look, that *poli- bandido* over there we are already monitoring, you can't do

político ele dê uma resposta porque talvez naquela comunidade ali ele tenha muitos eleitores e não queira, principalmente num ano que é eleitoral, ele não quer desagradar, ou tem outros interesses que eu nem vou mencionar aqui que não quer... ali não vai poder mexer ali. Então essas interferência política na Polícia, essas alianças um pouco escusas que a gente vê... sabe, né? Isso interfere muito e é muito forte no Rio de Janeiro. A gente tem o Rio de Janeiro, assim, coexistindo, coabitando, coisas muito... que a gente não vê em outros lugares! A gente vê a contravenção coabitando com o político. A gente vê no sambódromo, no mesmo camarote, o político, o chefe do poder executivo, e o... bicheiro. Que é sabidamente contravenção. É sabidamente ilegal. Então a gente tem uma... Até perdi a palavra, mas é... assim, uma interseção de agentes que não deveria ter. Então isso tudo contribui pra um Rio de Janeiro tá do jeito que tá, que a gente não vê outros estados dessa forma.

**Victor:** Então você enquanto policial, você trabalhando na rua, né, tendo essa visão de dentro, qual é a sua avaliação do estado de segurança pública no Rio?

**Nunes:** *Pô...* precária. Precária. Eu confesso que... não tinha essa visão. Eu era civil – três anos atrás era civil, né? – e agora, três anos depois, é impressionante o número de situações que a gente vê e que a gente não pode fazer, que o Estado é inerte. [História na seção 7.2.] A gente sabe que eles estão ali mas a gente não pode fazer nada. E quando não, a gente tem policiais, às vezes, que dão informe contra a Polícia. Eu tava numa situação que eu tava querendo pegar um bandido que tava na esquina vendendo droga e veio um outro carro de Polícia e falou "olha, aquele polí- bandido lá a gente já tá monitorando, não pode fazer nada." A gente

anything.” We knew that this garrison had to be- it wasn’t from our unit, it was from another, it had to be sold. And we didn’t know what risk we were taking. So there are situations where you are... with your hands tied, right? And apart from the orders that we don’t understand. You go to a manifestation... with a political bias. You go there... because this is the political bias against the government. And you have to go there to do that number, do that oppression... just being there in the status of having the equipment, with a non-lethal weapon, you already \*inhibit\* the manifestation. On the counterpart, there is another demonstration with another political bias and that doesn’t even have policing. So we are pawns of the State? It was not supposed to be like this. The police must be for everyone. It’s way of acting has to be for everyone. So, uh... the *milícia* areas... *Pô*, we know that there are *milícia* areas, we can’t act, but why not? Because, *pô*, it’s the high level that’s messing with it. So, it’s... it’s not just the police, it’s the state, society, the large businessmen, it’s a whole movement that... I met the police officer who ordered the judge killed, right, Patrícia Acioli, there in prison. And I met some *milicianos* there at the prison. Fuck, talking to them is... surreal. The talk they talk about, on another level, corruption in the State is not- it’s not institutionalized in the Police, it’s endemic. It’s in every institution. Do you understand? Even for... Do you know there’s a slot machine in front of a battalion? Why don’t you close the slot machine? It’s crazy, right? Because there is someone there who is earning a lot of money there.

**Nunes:** [Continuation of Nunes’ story in section 7.3.] Out of nowhere, state of Rio de Janeiro. A *cracudo* [crack addict] comes to me. “Boss, they ordered your car to be released, but you, sir, *pô*! You’re not going to go up the *favela*, are you?” [Pauses. Scoffs]

sabia que aquela guarnição devia de estar- não era da nossa unidade, era de outra, devia de estar vendida. E a gente não sabia que risco que a gente tava correndo. Então tem situações que tu fica... de mãos atadas, né? E fora as ordens que a gente não entende. Você vai pra manifestação... com viés político. Vocês vai lá... porque esse é o viés político é contra o governo. E você tem que ir lá fazer aquele número, fazer aquela opressão... estar lá só no status de você estar com o equipamento, com arma não-letal, você já \*inibe\* a manifestação. Em contrapartida tá tendo uma outra manifestação com outro viés político e que não tem nem policiamento. Então a gente é manobra do Estado? Não era pra ser assim. A Polícia tem que ser pra todos. A forma de atuação tem que ser pra todos. Então, é... as áreas de *milícias*... *Pô*, a gente sabe que existem áreas de *milícias*, a gente não pode atuar, mas por que que não? Porque, *pô*, é o alto nível que tá mexendo com isso. Então, é... não é só a Polícia não, é o Estado, a sociedade, os grande comerciantes, é todo um movimento que... Eu conheci o policial que mandou matar a juíza, né, Patrícia Acioli, lá na prisão. E eu conheci alguns *milicianos* lá na prisão. Porra, conversa com eles é... surreal. O papo que eles falam, em outro nível, a corrupção no Estado não é- não é da institucional da Polícia, ela é endêmica. Ela tá em todos os órgãos. Entendeu? Até mesmo pra... Você sabe que tem na frente de um batalhão um caça-níquel? Por que que não fecha o caça-níquel? É loucura, né? Porque tem alguém ali que tá ganhando muito dinheiro ali.

**Nunes:** [Continuação da história na seção 7.3.] Do nada, estado do Rio de Janeiro. Me vem um *cracudo*. “Chefe, eles mandaram liberar o carro do senhor, mas os senhores, *pô*! Não vai subir a *favela* não, né?” [Pausa. Exala em descrença] Entregaram o carro. Um

They delivered the car. A resident there... delivered the car... at a critical point, two police officers still had to get in there a little bit, but they didn't shoot the police officers, they took the car all punctured with bullets, and what did the police do? Did they go up the *favela*? No. "Let's go. That's all we had to do." It caught my attention because of the impotence as a military police officer. Two police officers were shot because they got lost on the way and we just have to get the car so our dignity doesn't get in check. And in the end, the *bandidos*, the criminals, make a gentlemen's agreement, [and] deliver the car to us so we don't have another bloodbath. This is Rio de Janeiro. This isn't a... something like that, it's not an absurd thing, but it shocked me as a citizen. It shocked me because I've only been working for a short time, and I already realize that we have situations where we don't have to do anything. And that we end up literally negotiating with the *bandido*. Crazy.

**Pereira:** And then I ask you: why did the leftist governments, which stayed fourteen years in power, not do this? It's amazing, man. Didn't they always say that the right thing to do was this? But they didn't, man. So, it's a fallacy. Do you understand? The guys use the benefit argument, but when they're in power, they don't do [anything]. The traffic continued there. Why? Because that's a cycle. He can't put an end to drug trafficking there because drug trafficking is what makes him money. Do you understand how it works? It's a wheel, man, it's a wheel. They won't- The problem will never end. Because it feeds back, you know? See, do you remember that one from Rocinha? That one called... Nem? I think it was Nem, right, who was arrested and such. *Pô*, man, the guy has... like this, his payroll, I think it was one million a month, two million, I don't know, it was a lot of money. And you think this guy doesn't

morador lá... entregou o carro... num ponto crítico, dois policiais ainda teve que entrar um pouquinho lá, mas não deram tiro nos policiais, pegaram o carro todo furado de bala, e os policiais fizeram o quê? Subiram a favela? Não. "Vamo embora. Era só isso que tinha que fazer." Me chamou atenção pela impotência como policial militar. Dois policiais foram baleados porque se perderam no caminho e a gente tem que só pegar o carro pra não ficar a dignidade em cheque. E no final das contas os bandidos, criminosos, fazem um acordo de cavalheiros, entrega o carro pra gente não ter mais um banho de sangue. Esse é o Rio de Janeiro. Isso aí não é uma... uma coisa assim, não é uma coisa absurda, mas me chocou como cidadão. Me chocou porque eu tô há pouco tempo trabalhando, já, e já percebo que a gente tem situações que não tem que fazer nada. E que a gente acaba negociando literalmente com o bandido. Loucura.

**Pereira:** E aí eu te pergunto: por que que os governos de esquerda, que ficaram catorze anos no poder, não fizeram isso? É incrível, cara. Eles não sempre falaram que o certo era fazer isso? Mas não fizeram, cara. Então, é uma falácia. Entende? Os caras usam o argumento de benefício, mas quando eles estão no poder não fazem. Continuou aí o tráfico. Por quê? Porque aquilo é um ciclo. Ele não pode acabar com o tráfico de droga lá porque o tráfico é que dá dinheiro pra ele. Entende como funciona? É uma roda cara, é uma roda. Eles não vão- O problema nunca vai acabar. Porque ele se retroalimenta, entende? Ó, você lembra daquele da Rocinha? Daquele tal de... Nem? Acho que foi Nem, né, que foi preso e tal. *Pô*, cara, o cara tem... assim, a folha de pagamento dele, aquilo lá acho que era um milhão por mês, dois milhões, não sei, era muito dinheiro. E tu acha que esse cara não tem, é... vamos dizer

have it, uh... let's put it this way, doesn't his money go to high authorities? *Desembargador*, judge... do you understand? It's a very wide range of authorities who also live there from... sucks on the tits of trafficking, do you understand? It's too big, man.

**Silva:** The police had to force the [drug] traffic- There is a contact between the Police and the [drug] traffic. There is a contact of a relation- of a good relationship. Minimally possible, but it exists. For example, the \*badass\* cop at the police station, if there are robberies happening down there, he will talk to the owner of the *favela* through a *vagabundo* he arrested, or whom he had scolded down there. "What's up? No, man, I'm just the *aviãozinho* and all, yadda yadda yadda". "Okay, then. Then tell the guy over there that there's been a lot of robbery here. We don't want any more robbery". It is enough for the drug dealer to say: "look, I don't want robbery in the area". It's over. The Cidade de Deus forbade robberies. Have you seen robbery here? Because the *vagabundo* from Cidade de Deus forbade robberies. In the street. In Barra, in Recreio... The robberies are over. It was all the time, all the time. The guy forbade it. To stop the police from staying inside [the *favela*] looking for a phone, looking for a car, looking for a motorcycle, looking for the guy who shot someone... Do you understand? So the Cidade de Deus forbade it. Robbery. If I'm not mistaken, it's even a guy called "Sardinha". That he was one of the drug dealers there. Now. Recent. Now. Those months there. I think it's been since last year. Fuck. So, it has to be this way, friend.

**Silva:** As there is *vagabundo* also who has history. Right? There are *vagabundos* with a good history... "Look, he's a drug dealer, but

assim, o dinheiro dele não vai pras altas autoridades? Desembargador, juiz... entende? É uma gama muito grande de autoridades que vive ali também da... mama no- nas tetas do tráfico, entende? É muito grande, cara.

**Silva:** A polícia tinha que obrigar o tráfico- Existe um contato entre a Polícia e o tráfico. Existe um contato de um relacio- de um bom relacionamento. Minimamente possível, mas existe. Por exemplo, o polícia \*pica\* na delegacia, se tiver tendo assalto lá embaixo, vai falar com o dono da favela através de um *vagabundo* que prendeu, ou que deu uma dura ali embaixo. "Coé, não, pô, eu sou só o *aviãozinho* e tal, ba ba ba". "Então tá bom. Então avisa pro cara lá que tá tendo muito assalto aqui. A gente não quer mais assalto". Basta o traficante falar lá: "ó, não quero assalto na área". Acabou. A Cidade de Deus proibiu assalto. Tem visto assalto aqui? Porque o *vagabundo* da Cidade de Deus proibiu assalto. Na rua. Na Barra, no Recreio... Acabou assalto. Era toda hora, o tempo todo. O cara proibiu. Pra parar da polícia ficar lá dentro direto procurando telefone, procurando carro, procurando moto, procurando o cara que deu tiro em alguém... Entendeu? Então a Cidade de Deus proibiu. O assalto. Se eu não me engano é até um tal de "Sardinha". Que era um dos traficantes lá. Agora. Recente. Agora. Esses meses aí. Acho que é desde o ano passado pra cá. Porra. Então, tem que ser desse jeito, amigo.

**Silva:** Como tem *vagabundo* também que tem história. Né? Tem *vagabundo* com história boa... "Ó, ele é traficante, mas ele não



he doesn't shoot the police... he doesn't rob... he doesn't- he sells his drugs and that's it". Do you understand? There are some who were like that at the time, Fernandinho B-... Orlando Jogador was like that... Robertinho de Lucas was like that, Celsinho da Vintém was like that... Celsinho da Vintém is still alive. He's jailed. The... Several others, several others were like this, easy going, do you understand? So we talked. While there were some who weren't, who were... really enemies. If he got close, he would exchange shots, he would order his police officers [Freudian slip] to shoot... Not the others. We listened and knew. [They] said: "look, don't shoot the police, huh? [If] the police comes in, run. Hide. I don't want [you] shooting the police". Then it was less disturbed, right? Right? We went when we really had to go. Right? With information, with work... Now, \*others\* [we] have to go all the time, right? Because the guys confront, shoot, rob, [inaudible], you have to enter [the *favela*] all the time... That's what the *vagabundo* doesn't like, that the police are inside all the time. 'Cause it hinders their movement, right?

**Silva:** If today there's a- this supposed civil war that everyone has been saying for so long [that] is going to happen, right? Years, right? "Ih, the people will rebel", "the people will revolt", yadda yadda yadda, "no, but the *bandidos* will come to the streets", "the *Comando Vermelho* will join the *Terceiro Comando*..." Thank God they haven't joined forces yet. Thank God that until today they are imbeciles and make each their own army and are divided, right? Because there's a lot of ego, right? They haven't studied, they are nobody. They are somebody there in the *morro*, right? So they want to be somebody by themselves, right? Don't want to join.

dá tiro em polícia... ele não assalta... ele não vende a droga dele e acabou". Entendeu? Tem alguns que 'era' assim à época, o Fernandinho B- o... "tsc", Orlando Jogador era assim... o... Robertinho de Lucas era assim, o Celsinho da Vintém era assim... Celsinho da Vintém é vivo, ainda. Tá preso. O... "tsc", vários outros, vários outros eram assim tranquilos, entendeu? Então a gente falava. Enquanto tinha uns que não, que era... inimigo mesmo. Se chegasse perto ia trocar tiro, mandava os polícia [acredito que esse ato falho seja importante] dele dar tiro... Os outros não. A gente ouvia e sabia. Falava: "ó, não dá tiro em polícia, hein? Entrou polícia, corre. Se entoca. Não quero dando tiro em polícia". Aí era menos perturbado, né? Né? A gente ia quando tinha que ir mesmo. Né? Com informação, com trabalho... Agora, \*outros\* tem que ir toda hora, né? Porque os caras afrontam, dá tiro, assalta, [inaudível], tem que entrar toda hora... Isso que o vagabundo não gosta, que o polícia esteja toda hora lá dentro. Que atrapalha o movimento deles, né?

**Silva:** Se hoje tiver alguma- essa tal guerra civil que todos dizem há tanto tempo [que] tá pra acontecer, né? Anos, né? "Ih, o povo vai se rebelar", "o povo vai se revoltar", ba ba ba, "não, mas vão vir os bandidos pra rua", "o Comando Vermelho vai juntar com o Terceiro Comando"... Graças a Deus até hoje eles não juntaram. Graças a Deus até hoje eles são imbecis de fazerem cada um o seu exército e serem divididos, né? Porque tem muito ego, né? Eles não estudaram, eles não são ninguém. Eles são alguém ali no morro, né? Então eles querem ser o alguém sozinho, né? Não querem se juntar. Não tem aquela estratégia inteligente de se juntarem. Seriam muito fortes.

Don't have that smart strategy of joining forces. They would be very strong.

### 7.13. Criminal Governance

**Assis:** Because there is an issue, which is a strategy, which we call “conquering minds and hearts.” If the *bandido* is conquering minds and hearts through his own culture, through showing that he is there with the thing that the young man wants: money and women. If he can do that, we have to show through *\*posture\**, and [through] our personal stories, and [through] what we can expand of their horizons, what the possibilities are. Right? For example, when we implemented the UPP in Rocinha, many of those children had never seen *\*the beach\**, except from up there. They had never been down to the beach before. They grew up in Rocinha because Rocinha has *\*everything\**. It has banks, it has commerce, it has markets, it has everything. So the parents never went down to the beach with that child. We did, yeah... trips to the beach, to museums, to show what cinema has. We closed the cinema room to show the children. The perspective that many of the children had about... that there is more to the universe of the favela was very important. The UPP project, in its forty-two UPPs, made it possible for us to expand *\*a lot\** this issue of the *favelas*, do you understand? This issue of the vision of the local population with access to what it means to be a citizen *\*inserted\** in Rio de Janeiro. So I wouldn't say that the UPP project, for example, as many people say, failed. It failed because the original project did not go ahead. There was supposed to be a police station up there, a sub-prefecture, Light and CEDAE service stations and other things like that in each one of the UPPs... People would go up with *\*much\** more structure. Much better basic sanitation and... nothing went. They just

**Assis:** Porque existe uma questão, que aí é uma estratégia, que a gente chama de “conquistar mentes e corações”. Se o bandido está conquistando mentes e corações através da cultura própria, através de mostrar que ele tá ali com a coisa que o juvenzinho quer: dinheiro e mulheres. Se ele consegue isso, a gente tem que mostrar através da *\*postura\**, e das nossas histórias pessoais, e do que a gente pode expandir de horizonte deles, quais são as possibilidades. Né? Por exemplo, quando a gente implantou UPP na Rocinha, muitas daquelas crianças nunca tinham visto *\*a praia\**, a não ser de lá de cima. Nunca tinham descido pra ir à praia. Elas cresceram na Rocinha porque a Rocinha tem *\*tudo\**. Tem banco, tem comércio, tem mercado, tem tudo. Então os pais nunca desciam pra praia com aquela criança. A gente fez, é... passeios pra praia, pra museus, pra mostrar o que tem o cinema. A gente fechava a sala de cinema pra mostrar pras crianças. A perspectiva que muitas das crianças tiveram sobre... que existe mais coisa além do universo da favela foi muito grande. O projeto UPP, nas suas quarenta e duas UPPs, possibilitou a gente expandir *\*muito\** essa questão das favelas, entendeu? Essa questão da visão da população local com o acesso ao que é ser cidadão *\*inserido\** no Rio de Janeiro. Então não diria que o projeto UPP, por exemplo, como muitas pessoas falam, falhou. Falhou porque o projeto original não foi pra frente. Era pra ter delegacia lá em cima, subprefeitura, postos de atendimento da Light, da CEDAE e outras coisas assim em cada uma das UPPs... Pessoal ia subir com *\*muito\** mais estrutura. Saneamento básico muito melhor e... nada foi. Só jogaram o

threw the police officer in the middle of enemy territory, in a “find a way and conquer this population.”

**Assis:** Because they take over the territory. So we were talking, again, about territory, about... acting against the laws... Why? They make their own laws. They determine the penalties. So if you steal you will suffer such a thing. If you wear a red shirt and you are in a TCC community [I believe he is referring to the *Terceiro Comando*] you will be beaten. They dictate rules. So you’re acting against... against the laws. And acting against the people.

**Nogueira:** I say, it’s very funny, we have a street here – as you are a resident of Jacarepaguá, I’ll tell you. There is a favela here in Jacarepaguá, right? Which is the CDD [Cidade de Deus], right? There is a street, right? Which is Miguel Salazar, which is the main street, right? So we have our State, where you pay your tax, I pay mine, which is that street. From that street inside... is the parallel state; from the street to the outside... it is the democratic state of law, which is your state and which is my state. So it’s very... You start to ponder. You say: “fuck... so close.” Less than a hundred meters, less than a hundred and fifty meters, you already see an assault rifle. The main street and in less than a hundred meters you can already see an assault rifle, you can already see a barricade, you can already see... And you can see that there are two states. The State, society, and the parallel State, which is where it fulfills from the gas cylinder for an old lady, a basic basket... for a family that is in need... Then you see a medicine, then you see that the man makes a “gato” [irregular cable TV installation], let him make an energy

policial no meio do território inimigo, num “se vira e conquista essa população”.

**Assis:** Porque eles tomam o território. Então a gente tava falando, novamente, de território, de... agindo contra as leis... Por quê? Eles fazem as leis próprias. Eles determinam as penas. Então se você rouba você vai sofrer tal coisa. Se você usa uma camisa vermelha e você tá numa comunidade do TCC [acredito que se refira ao Terceiro Comando] você vai ser espancado. Eles ditam regras. Então você tá agindo contra... contra as leis. E agindo contra o povo.

**Nogueira:** Eu falo, é muito engraçado, a gente tem uma rua aqui – como você é morador de Jacarepaguá, eu vou te falar. Existe uma favela aqui em Jacarepaguá, né? Que é a CDD [Cidade de Deus], né? Existe uma rua, né? Que é a Miguel Salazar, que é a rua principal, né? Então a gente tem o nosso Estado, onde você paga o seu imposto, eu pago o meu, que é aquela rua. Aquela rua pra dentro... é o Estado paralelo; da rua pra fora... é o Estado democrático de direito, que é o seu Estado e que é o meu Estado. Então é muito... Tu começa a viajar. Tu fala: “caralho... tão perto”. Menos de cem metros, menos de cento e- cento e cinquenta metros, tu já vê um fuzil. A rua principal e em menos de cem metros você já vê um fuzil, já vê uma barricada, já vê... E tu vê que são dois Estados. O Estado, sociedade, e o Estado paralelo, que é onde ele cumpre desde o botijão de gás pra senhorinha, uma cesta básica... pra uma família que tá passando necessidade... Aí você vê um remédio, aí você vê que o cara faz um gato, deixa fazer um gato de luz... Aí o saneamento não existe... E aí você vê dois Estados.

“gato”... Then sanitation doesn’t exist... And then you see two states.

**Pereira:** Because we, if we go back there, it comes from the time... I don’t know if you’ve heard about the White Hand. You’ve heard about White Hand, right?

**Victor:** Yes, I have.

**Pereira:** What was White Hand? [When] I was little, I used to listen. What was White Hand, today, what do I understand it was? They were groups of vigilantes, vigilantisms. There was a scuderie called Le Cocq Scuderie, have you heard of it?

**Victor:** Le Cocq, yes.

**Pereira:** Pô, then you are deeply knowledgeable. Le Cocq Scuderie. Who was Le Cocq Scuderie? There were some exponents, some *delegados* at the time... Right? If I’m not mistaken, *delegado* Fleury, from São Paulo, isn’t that it? And some other exponents. They were nothing more than a group of vigilantism, you know? The White Hand, at the time was still the military period, if I’m not mistaken, in eighty-four, eighty-five, or it was a little earlier, it was eighty, right? If I’m not mistaken. It could also be or this type of group, right? Or groups from... from the Armed Forces that were carrying out some kind of clandestine operation, something along those lines. No- We have no idea what it was, but it was definitely some kind of vigilantism. Do you understand? He had it there, he put [a symbol of] a hand, right? There was a code there that he put there and... So at that time we had a lot of that. The *milícia* question, right? So this comes along through seventies, eighties, nineties, that’s in the popular imagination, right? That idea of Sivuca, right? You’ve heard of Sivuca, right? “Ah, the good bandido is a dead bandido and such”. So, there was this very well-defined idea, let’s say, in the older police officers...

**Pereira:** Porque a gente, se a gente for puxar lá atrás, vem do tempo... Não sei se você ouviu falar sobre o Mão Branca. Já ouviu falar sobre Mão Branca, né?

**Victor:** Sim, já sim.

**Pereira:** Que que era o Mão Branca? Que eu era pequeno, eu escutava. O que que era Mão Branca, hoje, que eu entendo que era? Eram grupos de justiceiros, justiçaamentos. Existia uma escuderia chamada Escuderia Le Cocq, já ouviu falar?

**Victor:** Le Cocq. Já.

Pereira: Pô, então tu tá bem aprofundado. Escuderia Le Cocq. Quem era a Escuderia Le Cocq? Tinha alguns expoentes, alguns delegados da época... Né? Se eu não me engano o delegado Fleury, de São Paulo, não é isso? E alguns outros expoentes. Que nada mais eram do que um grupo de justiçaamento, entende? O Mão Branca, na época ainda era o período militar, se eu não me engano, em oitenta e quatro, oitenta e cinco, ou foi um pouco antes, foi oitenta, né? Se eu não me engano. Poderia ser também ou esse tipo de grupo, né? Ou próprios grupos da... da Força Armada que faziam algum tipo de operação clandestina, alguma coisa nesse sentido. Não- A gente não tem noção do que era, mas com certeza era algum tipo de justiçaamento. Entende? Ele tinha lá, ele botava tipo uma mão, né? Tinha lá um código que ele botava lá e... Então nessa época a gente tinha muito isso. A questão da milícia, né? Então isso vem ao longo dessas décadas de setenta, oitenta, noventa, isso aí tá no imaginário popular, né? Aquela ideia do Sivuca, né? Já ouviu falar do Sivuca, né? “Ah, o bandido bom é bandido morto e tal”. Então tinha-se essa ideia muito bem definida, né, vamos dizer assim, nos policiais mais antigos... de

that they thought that it would have to be done... justice, right, with their own hands, right, because they believed that “ah, the fellow committed a crime, but he will go unpunished, such...” So there was this imaginary and many times, Victor, it started, let’s say so, in the sense of doing a social ethnic cleansing, right? Let’s nip the evil in the bud, in the literal sense of the word. But over time- Then came- The idea of this- What is the “*polícia mineira*” [“mining police”]? “*Polícia mineira*” because they come- there was this bond, I didn’t study it in depth in the Minas Gerais police, but we had this notion. And then it was created – it even started here in Jacarepaguá, in Rio das Pedras, I don’t know if you’re aware of it... In the eighties, if I’m not mistaken, seventies to eighties, or so. And then they said, “Oh, no, no...there’s the *polícia mineira* there and such...” What was the idea of the population about the *polícia mineira*? It’s that this p- would be a group of police officers who lived in the- Basically that was it. The police officer lived in that place, in the *comunidade*, and \*he\* got together with another, and with another, and with another, to not let organized crime set up its base there to sell drugs. Basically, the *milícia*’s main function was created in this sense, you know? Which is- the first idea was not even to call it *milícia*, it was called *polícia mineira*. [If] you look the history, you’ll see, *polícia mineira* there in Rio das Pedras. And there was a reputation that, *pô*... And then the guys who sometimes committed, of course, in the light of law, of justice, wrong things, right, man? Because, *pô*, sometimes... situations that... situations that literally were crimes of lesser potential and the guys really killed, killed the addict, killed... The guys extrapolated the idea, right? Even of vigilantism. And the idea was to keep the comunidade there, in a way... \*free\*, right? From... from the installation of drug trafficking there. This was in the eighties,

que achava-se que teria que ser feito... a justiça, né, com as próprias mãos, né, porque achava-se que “ah, o camarada cometeu um crime, mas vai ficar impune, tal...” Então tinha esse imaginário e muitas vezes, ô Victor, isso aí começou, vamos dizer assim, no sentido de fazer uma limpeza étnica social, né? Vamos cortar o mal pela raiz, no sentido literal da palavra. Mas ao longo do tempo- Aí surgiram- A ideia dessa- Que que é *polícia mineira*? *Polícia mineira* porque vem- existia esse vínculo, eu não estudei isso a fundo na polícia de Minas, mas a gente tinha essa noção. E aí criou-se – começou inclusive aqui em Jacarepaguá, na Rio das Pedras, não sei se você tem noção disso... Na década de... oitenta, se eu não me engano, setenta pra oitenta, por aí. E aí falavam “ah, não, não... lá tem a *polícia mineira* e tal...” Que que a ideia da população era a *polícia mineira*? É que essa p- seriam um grupo de policiais que moravam no- Basicamente era isso. O policial morava naquele lugar, na comunidade, e \*ele\* se juntava com outro, e com outro, e com outro, pra não deixar que o crime organizado montasse o seu- a sua base ali de venda de drogas. Basicamente, a função precípua da *milícia* foi criada nesse sentido, entende? Que é- a primeira ideia não era nem chamar de *milícia*, era chamado de *polícia mineira*. Você pegar história, você vai ver, *polícia mineira* lá em Rio das Pedras. E tinha-se uma fama de que, *pô*... E aí os caras que às vezes cometiam, claro, à luz do direito, da justiça, coisas erradas, né, cara? Porque, *pô*, às vezes... situações que... situações que literalmente eram crime de menor potencial e os caras tipo matavam mesmo, matavam o viciado, matavam... Os caras extrapolavam a ideia, né? Até do justicamento. E a ideia era manter ali a comunidade, de certa forma... \*livre\*, né? Da... da instalação do tráfico de drogas ali. Isso na década de oitenta, tá? E aí, ao longo do tempo, foi-se... a coisa foi ampliando pra outros lugares essa ideia, tá? E

okay? And then, over time, it went... the thing expanded to other places this idea, okay? And a lot of police officers got into it because they started seeing a way to make... money, right? Through... not the just offering of... a supposed security, right? But also, for example, selling gas, “*gatonet*” [irregular cable TV installation]... collecting money from Kombis, and irregular transportation... Irregular transportation, twenty years ago, also started in this. They were niches.

[The interviewee mistakenly assumed that “*mineira*” referred to the state of Minas Gerais, but it refers to the activity of mining]

**Pereira:** In fact, Victor, when the public power is not there... it does not occupy its social space, someone else will. This is very important to define it, okay? When the public power doesn’t make itself present... right? Some other kind of parallel power will occupy that space, be it *milícia*, be it *bandido*, be it whatever. Someone with eyes... uh... in the understanding of gains, right? Of earning gains, uh... irregularly, he’ll occupy that space over there. An example of this is the very idea of the *comunidades*, of the *favelas*. What was the idea of the UPPs [Pacifying Police Units]? This is also important, one of the points to highlight, what was the idea of the UPPs? It was this idea of occupying the public space there, which was literally abandoned, with police power.

**Rodrigues:** When I joined the Police, the *Terceiro Comando* didn’t exist... there was only the *Comando Vermelho*. What was the *Comando Vermelho*? *Comando Vermelho* wasn’t selling drugs, it didn’t sell drugs. The *Comando Vermelho*, he- he emerged there on Ilha Grande, in the time of political prisoners. Then, these guys started to rob banks, these things, kidnapping, to... to... I don’t know, take the story of the *Comando Vermelho*.

muitos policiais embarcaram nisso porque começaram a ver uma maneira de ganhar... dinheiro, né? Através da... não só do oferecimento de... uma suposta segurança, né? Mas também a, por exemplo, a vender gás, o *gatonet*... recolher dinheiro das Kombis, e transporte irregular... O transporte irregular, há vinte anos atrás, também começou nisso. Foram nichos.

[Entrevistado assumiu por engano que “*mineira*” se referia ao estado de Minas Gerais, mas se refere à atividade de mineração]

**Pereira:** Na verdade, ô Victor, quando o poder público não está... ele não ocupa o seu espaço social, alguém vai ocupar. Isso aí é muito importante a definição disso, tá? Quando o poder público não se faz presente... né? Algum outro tipo de poder paralelo vai ocupar esse espaço, seja a *milícia*, seja *bandido*, seja o que for. Alguém com olhos... é... no entendimento de ganhos, né? De auferir ganhos, é... irregulares, ele vai ocupar aquele espaço ali. Um exemplo disso é a própria ideia das comunidades, das favelas. Qual era a ideia das UPPs? Isso é importante também, um dos pontos de a gente destacar, qual era a ideia das UPPs? Era essa ideia de ocupar o espaço público ali, que era literalmente largado, com o poder policial.

**Rodrigues:** Quando eu entrei pra Polícia, não existia o *Terceiro Comando*... só tinha o *Comando Vermelho*. O que era o *Comando Vermelho*? O *Comando Vermelho* não era venda de droga, não vendia droga. O *Comando Vermelho*, ele- ele surgiu lá na Ilha Grande, na época de preso político. Aí dali esses camarada eles começaram a assaltar banco, essas coisas, sequestro, pra... pra... não sei, pega aí a história do *Comando Vermelho*.

Then these comrades inside the favela – like Meio Quilo [Paulo Roberto de Moura Lima], Escadinha [José Carlos dos Reis Encina]... – they were- they stayed- they were arrested there, on Ilha Grande. Then they, well... they were part of the *Comando Vermelho*. Then when they came to the favela, they started doing this, robbing banks... The *Comando Vermelho*, in the past, only robbed banks, kidnappings, that sort of thing. Then they started selling drugs. But the *Comando Vermelho*, at that time, they did not accept minors. There were no minors in crime at that time. I worked in Jacarezinho, there was a drug dealer there called Meio Quilo. This fellow there, man, he was a guy that he invested in the *comunidade*. The resident needed medicine, he paid for it. Basic food basket, book for the child... But he said: “look, if I see a minor with a cigarette in his mouth” –cigarettes really, regular – “you will lose money for medicine, you will lose everything”. Then the parents wouldn’t let the kids smoke and the kids were scared. [...] Meio Quilo he was the guy he- was a guy there in Jacarezinho that when he died they even made a bust for him there. Because he was a guy that he helped everyone there. He didn’t want minors in crime. Do you understand?

**Victor:** And specifically in Rio de Janeiro, there is a lot of talk about a certain competition that would exist between drug trafficking, the police, and the *milícia*, which would be three forms of governance that are competing for the territory of Rio de Janeiro. What do you think about this idea?

**Silva:** No, but I don’t understand... the police competing? But the police do not compete. The Police is the owner of order. Do you understand? It is the traffic that is disputing with the *milícia*. They are the direct enemies. Is the traffic wanting your- And, detail, the

Aí esses camaradas dentro da favela – tipo o Meio Quilo [Paulo Roberto de Moura Lima], Escadinha [José Carlos dos Reis Encina]... – eles eram- eles ficaram- foram presos lá, na Ilha Grande. Aí eles, pô... eles faziam parte do Comando Vermelho. Aí quando eles vinham pra favela, eles começaram a fazer isso, a assaltar banco... O Comando Vermelho, antigamente, só assaltava banco, sequestro, essas coisas. Depois começaram a vender droga. Mas o Comando Vermelho, naquela época, eles não aceitavam menor. Não tinha menor no crime naquela época. Eu trabalhei no Jacarezinho, tinha um traficante lá chamado Meio Quilo. Aquele camarada ali, cara, ele era um cara que ele investia na comunidade. O morador precisava de remédio, ele pagava. Cesta básica, livro pra filho... Mas ele falava: “ó, se eu ver um menor com cigarro na boca” – cigarro mesmo, comum – “vocês vão perder dinheiro pra remédio, vão perder tudo”. Aí os pais não deixavam os moleques fumar e os moleques ficavam com medo. [...] O Meio Quilo ele era o cara que ele- foi um cara lá no Jacarezinho que quando ele morreu aquele fizeram até um busto pra ele lá. Porque ele era um cara que ele ajudava todo mundo ali. Ele não queria menor no crime. Entendeu?

**Victor:** E especificamente no Rio de Janeiro se fala muito de uma certa competição que existiria entre o tráfico, a polícia, e a milícia, que seriam três formas de governança que tão competindo pelo território do Rio de Janeiro. O que você acha sobre essa ideia?

**Silva:** Não, mas não tô entendendo... a Polícia competindo? Mas a Polícia não compete. A Polícia é a dona da ordem. Entendeu? O tráfico é que tá disputando com a milícia. Eles que são os inimigos diretos. É o tráfico querendo tua- E, detalhe, o mais importante disso tudo: qual é o modus

most important thing of all: what is the *modus operandi* of the *milícia*? It's selling gas, it's charging the merchant, it's charging the candy seller... Right? This is the *modus operandi* of the *milícia*. The *modus operandi* of trafficking: selling their drugs and that's it. But now they've seen that it's profitable, yeah-, the vans, you know, the alternative transport... So what did they do: *\*both\** do everything. The *militia* is trafficking... and the traffic is charging vans, is charging candy sellers, is charging residents... So both- There was this basic difference between them. The *milí*- Remember the “*mineira*”? You don't remember 'cause it's not from your time. Rio das Pedras was “*mineira*”. What is *mineira*? The *mineira* wouldn't let *bandidos* get in there. For example, this condo of yours here. Only good people, calm and such... Then they found out that they were doing a “*estica*” – a “*estica*” is a drug sale outside the *favela* – there in the little house across the street, that there's an addicted kid, that his friends come all to get marijuana with him. What are you going to do? You're going to pay to get the guy out of there. In this case, calling the PM and saying that there is traffic there. Right? Now, in the *comunidade*, when someone arrived, the guys themselves got rid of the *vagabundo*. The resident himself took pleasure in saying: “Look, Mr. Zé” – who was the owner of the *militia* – “*pô*, Mr. Zé, there's my neighbor over there who's selling drugs, huh?” “Oh, yeah?”. It was “*pum*” [onomatopoeia of a gunshot]. “Look, there's my neighbor over there and I saw him with a gun”. Then the guy “*pum*”. Rio das Pedras was a jewel. Today there's even robbery inside Rio das Pedras. But then it became *milícia*... then it became those... right? It was the last one to get rotten. Then it became a *milícia*, charging everything... Then it closed [an agreement] with the drug trade... The *Terceiro Comando* closed with the *milícia*. Do you understand? So, like this: “look, you

operandi da *milícia*? É vender gás, é cobrar do comerciante, é cobrar do vendedor de bala... Né? O *modus operandi* da *milícia* é esse. O *modus operandi* do tráfico: vender a droga dele e acabou. Só que agora eles viram que dá lucro, é-, as vans, né, o transporte alternativo... Então o quê que eles fizeram: *\*ambos\** fazem tudo. A *milícia* tá traficando... e o tráfico tá cobrando van, tá cobrando baleiro, tá cobrando morador... Então ambos- Tinha essa diferença básica entre eles. A *milí*- Lembra da “*mineira*”? Você não lembra que não é do teu tempo. O Rio das Pedras era “*mineira*”. O quê que é *mineira*? A *mineira* não deixava bandido entrar lá. Por exemplo, esse teu condomínio aqui. Só pessoas de bem, tranquilas e tal... Aí souberam que estão fazendo um “*estica*” – um “*estica*” é uma venda de droga fora da favela – ali na casinha ali da frente, que tem um moleque viciado, que os amigos dele vêm tudo pegar maconha com ele. Quê que ‘cês’ vão fazer? Vão se cotizar pra tirar o cara dali. No caso, chamando a PM e dizendo que tá tendo tráfico ali. Né? Agora, na comunidade, quando chegava alguém, os próprios caras se livravam do *vagabundo*. O próprio morador tinha prazer em falar: “ó, seu Zé” – que era o dono da *milícia* – “*pô*, seu Zé, tem meu vizinho ali que tá vendendo droga, hein?”. “Ah, é?”. Era “*pum*” [onomatopoeia de tiro]. “Ó, tem meu vizinho ali que eu vi ele com uma arma”. Aí o cara “*pum*”. Rio das Pedras era uma uva. Hoje tá tendo até assalto lá dentro do Rio das Pedras. Mas aí virou *milícia*... aí virou aquelas... né? Foi a última a ficar estragada. Aí virou *milícia*, cobrar tudo... Aí fechou com o tráfico... O Terceiro Comando fechou com *milícia*. Entendeu? Então, tipo assim: “ó, você vem, cobra gás, cobra tudo e me dá o meu dinheiro, e eu fico no meu tráfico aqui, vocês fazem a *milícia* de vocês...”. Desse jeito. *\*Tudo\** em prol do dinheiro fácil. Dinheiro sujo e fácil.



come, charge for the gas, charge everything and give me my money, and I'll stay in my traffic here, you make your *milícia*...". It's this way. \*Everything\* for the sake of easy money. Dirty and easy money.

#### 7.14. Political/Power Interference

**Larrey:** [Lowering her voice tone] There is a very strong political interference in the Police. So the Police is too dependent on politics. The commander general today, ours, has the status of secretary of state. So the Military Police is a secretary of state. But regardless of that, the political influence is very strong because it is the governor of the state, regardless of who he is, whether it is the situation or the opposition, it is \*he\* who chooses the commander general. So it's very... skewed. If I chose you to stay here, you have to do what I want, so many times the commander general – I'm not talking about this one specifically, but over the years – he didn't have the autonomy to do the work of the Police as police, but the Police as the governor's will and then you stop being \*technical\* to be essentially political. [...] So I think general commanders lack that a bit. As they don't want to lose, perhaps, the position, situation, condition... they allow this political interference to be very strong, so this is very bad in decision-making \*of\* public security. This in Rio de Janeiro is something very strong. "Ah, but in other states are the Police not statal, isn't the commander general either...?" I don't have enough information to tell you "wow, there is less political interference there." I don't have. But in Rio de Janeiro this interference is very strong.

**Victor:** To what is owed this upward curve [of police victimization]?

**Larrey:** [Baixando o tom de voz] Tem uma interferência política na Polícia muito forte. Então a Polícia é muito dependente da política. O comandante geral hoje, nosso, tem status de secretário de estado. Então a Polícia Militar é uma secretaria de estado. Mas independente disso, a influência política é muito forte porque é o governador do estado, independente de quem seja, se é situação ou oposição, é \*ele\* que escolhe o comandante geral. Então fica uma coisa muito... enviesada. Se eu te escolhi pra você ficar aqui, você tem que fazer o que eu quero, então muitas vezes o comandante geral – não tô falando esse especificamente, mas ao longo dos anos – ele não tinha autonomia de fazer o trabalho de Polícia como polícia e sim a Polícia como a vontade do governador e aí você deixa de ser \*técnico\* pra ser essencialmente político. [...] Então acho que falta um pouco isso pros comandantes gerais. Como eles não querem perder, talvez, o cargo, situação, condição... eles deixam essa interferência política ser muito forte, então isso é muito ruim na tomada de decisões \*da\* segurança pública. Isso no Rio de Janeiro é algo muito forte. "Ah, mas nos outros estados as Polícias também não são estaduais, o comandante geral também não é...?" Não tenho essa informação suficiente pra te dizer "poxa, lá a interferência política é menos." Não tenho. Mas no Rio de Janeiro essa interferência é muito forte.

**Victor:** Ao que se deve essa curva ascendente [de vitimização policial]?

**Larrey:** To politics. So the policy of devaluing the police officer, of scrapping the Police... the economic issue in Rio de Janeiro was important, right? We come with Rio de Janeiro with abundant resources due to oil royalties, major events, the [World] Cup, the Olympics... And then that whole situation of... stealing of Rio de Janeiro, looting the public coffers... As a result, everyone- we suffered, we, as public servers, suffered this impact, and all government institutions suffered this impact as well. So that translated into scrapped vehicles, lack of PPE... do you understand? So, personal protection equipment, the vests, each one must have their own, they don't- they didn't have... So a series of factors related to political and economic issues came up- This I'm talking about only the Police.

**Nogueira:** And that, when it happens on their roof... This violence arrives at their door... Then they say "oops!". That's when you see the state acting. Why? It's reaching the upper middle class. "This is bothering me". Then it starts to bother... then who do they charge? The government, the legislators... Right? And then they charge, then it's a little chain. I'm the guy... I'm a businessman so and so. He charges the congressman he helped, the councilor he helped, this congressman charges the battalion commander, the battalion commander charges the police, the police go to the street... You see how the gear is. Why does it happen? Because it happened... the violence arrived at the door of his house. Then when it arrived at the door of his house he looks. But the thing... [snapping fingers] but the thing is already happening, look... [continues to snap] it's been happening for a long time. Do you understand?

**Larrey:** À política. Então da política de desvalorização do policial, de sucateamento da Polícia... a questão econômica do Rio de Janeiro foi importante, né? A gente vem com o Rio de Janeiro com recursos fartos por causa de royalties do petróleo, grandes eventos, Copa, Olimpíada... E depois toda aquela situação de... de roubo do Rio de Janeiro, saqueamento do cofre público... Com isso, toda- a gente sofreu, a gente, como servidor, sofreu esse impacto, e todas as instituições do governo sofreram esse impacto também. Então isso aí se traduziu em viatura sucateada, falta de EPI... entendeu? Então equipamento de proteção individual, os coletes, cada um deve ter o seu, não tem- não tinha... Então uma série de fatores relacionados à questões políticas e econômicas chegaram- Isso eu tô falando só de Polícia.

**Nogueira:** E isso, quando acontece no telhado deles... Essa violência chega na porta deles... Aí que eles "opa!". Aí que tu vê o Estado agindo. Por quê? Tá chegando na classe média alta. "Isso tá me incomodando". Aí começa a incomodar... aí eles cobram quem? O governo, os legisladores... Né? E aí eles cobram, aí é uma correntezinha. Eu sou o cara... Eu sou um empresário tal, fulano de tal. Ele cobra ao deputado que ele ajudou, o vereador que ele ajudou, esse deputado cobra ao comandante do batalhão, o comandante do batalhão cobra os policiais, os policiais vão pra rua... Tu vê como é a engrenagem. Por que isso acontece? Porque aconteceu... a violência chegou na porta da casa dele. Aí quando chegou na porta da casa dele é que ele olha. Mas o negócio... [estalando os dedos] mas o negócio já tá acontecendo, ó... [continua estalando] já tá acontecendo há muito tempo. Entendeu?

**Nunes:** There was one of our police officers who approached [redacted – Brazilian TV host]. [...] [TV host] was all wrong. A lot of drugs... More than usual for consumption. He could even be framed for trafficking. The police officer wanted to go ahead, he called the supervision officer, because when the police officer is cornered, he calls the supervision officer, the supervision went there. [TV host] on a call, I don't know who he called, the battalion colonel called the police officer. He ordered his release. The two police officers, both the *praça* and the police officer, were kicked to the interior of the state. They were just doing the right thing. And then [redacted – television network], this TV host himself, will be the first to beat up the police if it does something wrong, right? He himself uses the system.

**Victor:** For you, what are the biggest obstacles at work?

**Nunes:** The politics. The management... the Police should not be so- stay so at the mercy of politicians, of governors, of the legislature. This is bizarre, bizarre, bizarre stuff. We have colonels who do what the governor does. Or command, determine. It had to have a triple list. Had to have greater autonomy to manage. "Commander- hey... hey... Governor, I am Chief of Staff, Secretary of the Military Police elected by a triple list among the Colonels of the Military Police and I have the autonomy to talk about security. Do you want to invent a government program, the "*segurança presente*"? Nice. But now how the policing scenario will act, the distribution of policing, it is my duty, my expertise, which I will see through the criminal stain." But they use the Police as they please. And how do they use the Police? Either giving an increase, or putting- changing the command, or substituting the command. A military policewoman cannot criticize a journalist

**Nunes:** Teve um policial nosso que abordou o [suprimido – apresentador de televisão]. [...] [Apresentador de televisão] tava todo errado. Bastante drogas... Mais do que o normal do consumo. Ele poderia ser enquadrado até por tráfico. O policial quis ir pra frente, ligou pra supervisão de oficial, porque o policial quando fica acuado liga pra supervisão de oficial, a supervisão foi lá. [apresentador de televisão] numa ligação, não sei pra quem ele ligou, o coronel do batalhão ligou pro policial. Mandou soltar. Os dois policiais, tanto o *praça*, quanto o policial, foram bicado pro interior do estado. Eles só tavam fazendo o certo. E aí a [suprimido – emissora de televisão], esse próprio apresentador, vai ser o primeiro a malhar a Polícia se fizer alguma coisa de errado, né? Ele mesmo usa do sistema.

**Victor:** Pra você quais são os maiores obstáculos do trabalho?

**Nunes:** A política. A gerência... a Polícia não poderia ser tão- ficar tão à mercê dos políticos, dos governadores, dos legislativo. Isso é uma coisa bizarra, bizarra, bizarra. A gente tem coronéis que fazem o que o governador faz. Ou manda, determina. Tinha que ter uma lista tríplice. Tinha que ter uma autonomia maior pra gerenciar. "Comandante- ô... ô... Governador, eu sou chefe do estado maior, secretário de Polícia Militar eleito por uma lista tríplice entre os Coronéis de Polícia Militar e eu tenho autonomia pra falar de segurança. O senhor quer inventar um programa de governo, o segurança presente? Beleza. Mas agora como vai agir o cenário de policiamento, a distribuição de policiamento, é o meu dever, a minha expertise, eu que vou ver pela mancha criminal." Mas eles usam a Polícia ao bel-prazer. E como eles usam a Polícia? Seja dando aumento, seja botando- mudando o comando, seja trocando comando. Num pode

who makes an assumption, an absurdity that she was speaking on television, and the police colonel, who was a police spokesperson, criticize this journalist, the guy from [television network] call the governor and the governor on the same day remove this colonel from command. Can not happen. A police lieutenant can't not comply with the councilor's order and be kicked at Magé, given that the guy lived in Barra, his whole life in Barra. Are we at the mercy of politicians, of congressmen? The police is like that. If you are going to approach a person who is a councilor, you have to be more careful. If it is a congressman, another precaution. If it's \*the [TV host]\* you will be careful. If you're going to approach a colonel, you also have to be careful. We have a culture in Brazilian society that whoever is on top will oppress who is below. So this way of managing ends up disturbing the Military Police a lot. The Military Police has no autonomy. As has the Public Ministry, as has the Highway Police, the Federal Police. [...] What about the Military Police? If the Military Police does something against the government, the media will not attack the Police Command, it will attack the Governor. What does the governor do? Change the whole Police. The governor of the state changes, the entire leadership of the Police changes. It's like this. It's like this. So this ends up not favoring the Police very much. The police had to have more autonomy. As the Justice Tribunal has, as the Public Ministry, as the Public Defender has. This thing could not be plastered directly to the governor. It's not his arm, it's not an extension of him. This holds the Police back a lot. It's my vision.

**Rodrigues:** What had to change in the Police? The only thing that I think had to change in the Police is about that, man, the

uma policial militar criticar uma jornalista que fala uma ilação, um absurdo que ela foi falar lá na televisão, e a coronel de polícia, que era porta-voz da Polícia, criticar essa jornalista, o cara lá da Rede Globo ligar pro governador e o governador no mesmo dia tirar esse coronel do comando. Não pode acontecer. Não pode um tenente de Polícia não atender a ordem do vereador e ser bicado pra Magé, sendo que o cara morava na Barra, a vida toda na Barra. A gente fica à mercê dos políticos, dos deputados? A Polícia é assim. Se você for abordar uma pessoa que é vereador, tem que ter um cuidado maior. Se for deputado, outro cuidado. Se for \*o [apresentador de televisão]\* vai ter cuidado. Se for abordar um coronel também tem que ter cuidado. A gente tem uma cultura na sociedade brasileira de o que tá por cima vai oprimir o que tá embaixo. Então essa forma de gerenciar acaba atrapalhando muito a Polícia Militar. A Polícia Militar não tem autonomia. Como tem o MP, como tem a Polícia Rodoviária, a Polícia Federal. [...] E a Polícia Militar? Se a Polícia Militar fizer alguma coisa contrariada ao governo, a mídia não vai bater no comando da Polícia, vai bater no Governador. O que que o governador faz? Troca a Polícia toda. Mudou o governador do estado, muda toda a cúpula da Polícia. É assim. É assim. Então isso acaba não favorecendo muito a Polícia. A Polícia tinha que ter mais autonomia. Assim como o TJ tem, como o MP, como a Defensoria Pública tem. Não poderia ser essa coisa engessada direto ao governador. Não é um braço dele, não é extensão dele. Isso atrasa muito a Polícia. É a minha visão.

**Rodrigues:** Que tinha que mudar na Polícia? A única coisa que eu acho que tinha que mudar na Polícia é sobre isso aí, cara, o

command of the Police, which the governor chooses. There are a lot of colonels there who are old, who already have more experience to command the Police than a new guy. Sometimes the guy just got promoted, the governor knows his father, knows his family, or else someone there, his uncle, someone there who campaigned politically, you know, because he shares... “Oh, he met the commander.” Do you understand? Then the guy who is older, who has more experience, won’t go. I think that’s all. In my opinion this is what had to change.

comando da Polícia, que o governador ele escolhe. Aí tem muito coronel ali que é antigo, que já tem mais experiência pra comandar a Polícia do que um cara novo. Às vezes o cara acabou de ser promovido, o governador conhece o pai dele, conhece a família dele, ou então alguém lá, o tio dele, alguém lá fez campanha política, né, porque ele partilha... “Ah, ele conheceu o comandante.” Entendeu? Aí o cara que é mais antigo, que tem mais experiência, não vai. Eu acho que é só isso. Na minha opinião era isso que tinha que mudar.

### 7.15. Militarism

**Victor:** You were mentioning earlier, right, the militarism that exists in the Military Police. What is this militarism?

**Nogueira:** So, militarism is as follows. There are, within the Military Police, some rules, uh- guidelines that you must follow. That, over time, this... this is... is decreasing. I think the Military Police has to put an end to militarism. Do you understand? Militarism must end. The militarism immobilizes the Police a lot, the- the military police officer. I think that- I think we are in the 21st century, we can adopt other systems because... of a single police force. Of a single police force where you enter [as a] soldier and you can reach [the rank of] colonel. Why do I say this? Because, come on, I’m a police officer with twenty years of... of activity, right? Yeah... a boy comes in today with... – which used to be at UERJ [State University of Rio de Janeiro] – an 18-year-old boy comes in, graduates at 21 and is going to be my boss. I’m not saying it can’t be, but my police experience is much greater than his three years at the academy. And I think that- And a lot of times, as he’s a lieutenant and you’re a sergeant, you- sometimes he don’t- doesn’t

**Victor:** Você tava mencionando mais cedo, né, do militarismo que existe na Polícia Militar. O que é esse militarismo?

**Nogueira:** Então, o militarismo é o seguinte. Existe, dentro da Polícia Militar, algumas regras, é- diretrizes que você deve seguir. Que, ao passar do tempo, isso... isso tá... tá diminuindo. Eu acho que a Polícia Militar, ela tem que acabar com o militarismo. Entendeu? O militarismo- tem que acabar com o militarismo. O militarismo engessa muito a Polícia, a- o policial militar. Eu acho que- eu acho que a gente está no século XXI, a gente pode adotar outros sistemas porque... de polícia única. De uma polícia única onde você entra soldado e você pode chegar a coronel. Por que eu falo isso? Porque, vamos lá, eu sou um policial com vinte anos de... de atividade, né? É... entra um menino hoje com... – que antigamente era pela UERJ – entrava um menino com 18 anos, se formava com 21 e ia ser meu chefe. Não tô falando que não pode ser, mas a minha experiência policial é muito maior que os três anos dele de academia. E eu acho que- E muita das vezes, como ele é um tenente e você é um sargento, você- às vezes ele no- não entende

understand what you're passing on to him, what you're telling him from your experience that comes with you, and he thinks it's his way, and many times his way is wrong because at the academy it's a situation, on the street it's totally different. So I am of the thesis that the Police has to be [a] single [force]. [...] So I think that the Police, this militarism sometimes immobilizes the Police a lot, harms the military police officer a lot. Do you understand? And we... and sometimes we get caught up in this militarism, sometimes... There are police officers who... who don't- don't- – between quotes –, doesn't... doesn't do an act or doesn't- uh... [act in] a situation because – “no, because the colonel is going to punish me”, you know? It gets stuck a lot.

**Nogueira:** Because there are police officers who run from the occurrences. Sees a thing happening there, then he runs over here, because he doesn't want to get involved, because that there could cause another situation. Does it exist? It does exist! But there is the police officer who sees that there and says “no, because that is going to give me trouble... pô...”. Then the guy won't go because “fuck, no, I'm going to answer that...”. No, there are police officers who say “no, I'm going there”. It exists! I'm talking to you from inside the Police. Because there is this militarism, coined within... which is the police officer, they say: “ah, I won't do that because I can be punished for it”. Do you understand? It's hard as hell, man. It is a profession that- over time it is improving a lot, but it still has a lot to improve. There's a lot to improve, a lot \*really\*. Do you understand?

**Nunes:** [...] That's why I joined the Military Police. Which, I confess, was a reality check, right? Because... as I was... I came from a

o que você tá passando pra ele, o que você tá informando a ele pela sua experiência que você vem, e ele acha que é do jeito dele, e muita das vezes esse jeito dele tá errado porque na academia é uma situação, na rua é totalmente diferente. Então eu sou da tese que a Polícia tem que ser única. [...] Então eu acho que a Polícia, esse militarismo às vezes engessa muito a Polícia, prejudica muito o policial militar. Entendeu? E a gente... e às vezes fica preso a esse militarismo, às vezes... Tem policial que... que não- não- – entre aspa –, não... não pratica um ato ou então não faz uma- é... uma situação porque – “não, porque o coronel vai me punir”, entendeu? Fica muito preso.

**Nogueira:** Porque tem policial que corre da ocorrência. Vê um negócio ocorrendo ali, aí corre pra cá, porque não quer se envolver, porque aquilo ali pode ocasionar outra situação. Existe? Existe! Mas existe o policial que vê aquilo ali e fala “não, porque aquilo ali vai me dar trabalho... pô...”. Aí o cara não vai porque “porra, não, vou responder isso...”. Não, tem policial que vai “não, eu vou lá sim”. Existe! Eu tô te falando de dentro da Polícia. Porque existe esse militarismo, cunhado dentro... que é o policial, fala assim: “ah, eu não vou fazer isso porque eu posso tomar uma punição disso”. Entendeu? É difícil pra caramba, cara. É uma profissão que ca- que ao longo do tempo ela tá melhorando muito, mas ela ainda tem muita coisa pra melhorar. Tem muita coisa pra melhorar, muita coisa \*mesmo\*. Entendeu?

**Nunes:** [...] por isso eu entrei na Polícia Militar. O que, eu confesso, foi um choque de realidade, né? Porque... como eu fui... eu vim

humanities area in which we fight for people's rights and militarism transforms, especially the career of an official, it transforms and shapes that leadership profile a lot, but a leadership sometimes a little oppressive. [...] in the Police I became a leader and that my mission was to hammer the nail to make the wheel work and I do not agree with that thought. So I had a lot of trouble. And another difficulty I had [...] is the difficulty of communication, because in militarism we cannot dialogue, we cannot debate, we cannot question. It is simply "yes sir, it will be done" [...]. We want to ponder, we want to discuss, we want to articulate. We had a lot of problems with that, do you understand?

**Victor:** You were also mentioning militarism, right? What do you understand by "militarism" and how do you see it more present in your career?

**Nunes:** So, militarism has something very imbued with the issue of discipline, right? From the hierarchy. There is a lot of respect. Something I had never experienced. I confess to you that sometimes I need to assimilate this better, sometimes... I don't consider [myself] an excellent military man. I consider myself a good professional. But military, all the rules and everything, I indoctrinate myself a lot. Mainly because of pondering. If you ponder something, [if you] think "ah, this could be", I already have a jargon for that: "peacock" [Original is "*peruão*", "big [male] turkey" from "*perua*", female turkey, a commonly used slang that refers to loud, attention-seeking women]. You cannot be a peacock. And another thing, as an official, in the officer corps there is great respect for when a superior speaks, you cannot speak, everything you have to ask for permission. You can have the best idea, Victor, but you

de uma área de humanas na qual a gente luta pelos direito das pessoas e o militarismo ele transforma, principalmente a carreira de oficial, ele transforma e molda muito aquele perfil de liderança, mas uma liderança às vezes um pouco opressora. [...] na Polícia me transformei uma liderança e que a minha missão era apertar o prego pra roda funcionar e eu não compactuo com esse pensamento. Então eu tive muita dificuldade. E outra dificuldade que eu tive [...] é a dificuldade de comunicação, porque no militarismo a gente não pode dialogar, a gente não pode debater, a gente não pode questionar. É simplesmente "sim senhor, cumpra-se" [...]. A gente quer ponderar, a gente quer discutir, a gente quer articular. Tivemos vários problemas quanto a isso, entendeu?

**Victor:** Você tava mencionando também o militarismo, né? O que que você entende por "militarismo" e como você vê ele mais presente na sua carreira?

**Nunes:** Então, o militarismo ele tem uma coisa muito imbuída da questão da disciplina, né? Da hierarquia. Há um respeito muito grande. Uma coisa que eu nunca tinha vivido. Confesso pra você que às vezes eu preciso assimilar melhor isso, às vezes... Eu não [me] considero um excelente militar. Eu me considero um bom profissional. Mas militar, todas as regras e tudo mais, eu me doutrino muito. Principalmente pela questão da ponderação. Se você ponderar alguma coisa, achar "ah, isso aqui poderia ser", eu já tenho um jargão pra isso: "*peruão*". Você não pode ser peruão. E outra coisa, como oficial, no oficialato há um respeito muito grande de quando superior fala, você não pode falar, tudo você tem que pedir permissão. Você pode ter a melhor ideia, Victor, mas você não pode dar essa tua melhor ideia. Só no momento certo, momento oportuno e mesmo assim pedindo permissão. E lá no mundo civil

can't give your best idea. Only at the right moment, opportune moment and even then asking for permission. And there in the civilian world, it was very common for you to come and say something, you didn't need to ask permission to go out, to enter. Alright, I say good morning to my boss, I say good night to my boss. Now to bring an idea, I wasn't a peacock because of that. Present an argument, question it there and say "hey, boss, this is wrong". In militarism, if you question the boss, you have to do a whole lot of work for that. You have to present elements, you have to ask for permission to speak, you have to... so these dogmas... Apart from the drill commands, right? Which is a- There are several rites and traditions, right? Everything has ceremonies, there is [inaudible], there is salute, there are command handover rituals... So militarism is a way of life and it ends up staying forever. Once I'm in the military, if I go to the reserves, I'll continue. Do you understand? I answer militarily [to the Justice] even though I am retired, in this case, in quotes, retired, I respond as a military man. So it's for life, right? But there are interesting things and good things, right? Militarism brings discipline, it brings a hierarchy, it brings a sense of responsibility, a civic duty, a very great duty to your country. Our Military Police Anthem says, right, that even with the sacrifice of one's own life and that is a cultural thing for the military police. He knows he has to be combat ready at all times. [...] No one here wants to die. But many have been shot, have been arrested, have answered, sometimes, because they fired a shot badly. Didn't kill anyone but is answering and can be excluded [from the Police]. It is a very hard job. It is not a common job.

era muito comum você chegar e falar alguma coisa, não precisava pedir permissão pra sair, pra entrar. Tudo bem, eu dou bom dia pro meu chefe, dava boa noite pro meu chefe. Agora trazer uma ideia, não era peruão por causa disso. Apresentar um argumento, questionar ali e falar "pô, chefe, isso aqui tá errado". No militarismo se você questionar o chefe tem que ter todo um trabalho pra isso. Você tem que apresentar elementos, tem que pedir permissão pra falar, tem que... então essas dogmas... Fora a ordem-unida, né? Que é um- Tem vários ritos e tradições, né? Tudo tem cerimônia, tem [inaudível], tem continência, tem rituais de passagem de comando... Então o militarismo é um estilo de vida e ele acaba ficando pra sempre. Uma vez eu estando militar se eu for pra reserva eu vou continuar. Entendeu? Eu respondo militarmente mesmo sendo reformado, no caso, entre aspas, aposentado, eu respondo como militar. Então é pra vida toda, né? Mas tem coisas interessantes e coisas boas, né? O militarismo traz uma disciplina, traz uma hierarquia, traz um senso de responsabilidade, um dever cívico, um dever pátrio muito grande. Nosso Hino da Polícia Militar diz, né, que mesmo com o sacrifício da própria vida e isso é uma coisa cultural do policial militar. Ele sabe que ele tem que estar pronto pra combater o tempo todo. [...] Ninguém aqui quer morrer. Mas vários aí já foram baleados, já foram presos, já responderam, às vezes, porque deu um tiro mal-dado. Não matou ninguém, mas tá respondendo e pode ser excluído. É um trabalho muito difícil. Não é um trabalho comum.



**Nunes:** Now, society is what worries me the most. What society wants. Why does society, for example, ask for the end of the Military Police? Imagine if we weren't military. We could go on strike. What would that state be like? If I didn't have this sacrifice with my own life. Was I going to force a civil police officer to enter a *comunidade*? I wasn't going to force, I wasn't going to force. He can miss work, he will not be scolded. Military, you have controls, right, strict, over him. It has a military penal code. Is there a penal code for the Civil Police? No. Does not exist. Is there a criminal code of the judge? Judge's penal code? Journalist's criminal code? No, but there is a military penal code, if you have committed a crime, if you are in the military. You have more control, right?

**Pereira:** Yeah, the police mission is one thing and the military mission is totally different, okay? This is important, for you to have this idea. And then, one of the times when I was talking to you about the left, when it says, "ah, the military police is the continuity of the Armed Forces on the street", the Military Police- "the dictatorship ended and left the Military Police". These are fallacies, okay? In practice and in reality, that's not it, okay? It's not that. But the guys use whatever argument they want. You are free to say what you want.

[At the end of the next interview, after the tape recorder was turned off, the participant rescued the thesis that the Military Police would be a continuation of the Dictatorship during democracy, which he once rejected, and raised the possibility that this would indeed be the case, that the PM would have continued after the democratic transition, continuing the repression and the social punishment. If during the Dictatorship there was the mentality that "a good *bandido* is a dead *bandido*" and that there would be a need

**Nunes:** Agora, a sociedade é que me preocupa mais. Que que a sociedade quer. Por que a sociedade pede por exemplo o fim da Polícia Militar? Imagina se a gente não fosse militar. A gente poderia fazer greve. Como é que seria esse estado? Se eu não tivesse esse sacrifício com a própria vida. Eu ia obrigar um policial civil a entrar numa comunidade? Não ia obrigar, não ia obrigar. Ele pode faltar, não vai ser repreendido. Militar você tem controles, né, rigorosos em cima dele. Tem um código penal militar. Existe código penal da Polícia Civil? Não. Não existe. Existe código penal do juiz? Código penal do desembargador? Código policial do- penal do jornalista? Não, mas existe um código penal militar, se você cometeu um crime, se você for militar. Tem um controle maior, né?

**Pereira:** É, a missão policial é uma coisa e militar é totalmente diferente, tá? Isso é importante, você ter essa ideia. E aí, uma das vezes nesse momento que eu tava conversando contigo sobre a esquerda, quando ela fala assim, "ah, que a polícia militar é a continuidade das Forças Armadas na rua", a Polícia Militar- "saiu a ditadura e deixou a Polícia Militar". Isso são falácias, tá? Na prática e na realidade não é isso, tá? Não é isso. Mas os caras usam o argumento que eles querem. Você tem a liberdade de falar o que quer.

[Ao final da entrevista, após o gravador ter sido desligado, o participante resgatou a tese de que a Polícia Militar seria uma continuidade da Ditadura durante a democracia, outrora rejeitada por ele, e levantou a possibilidade de que esse seria sim o caso, de que a PM teria continuado após a transição democrática dando sequência à repressão e à punição social. Se na Ditadura havia a mentalidade de que "bandido bom é bandido morto" e de que haveria necessidade de justificação para a manutenção da ordem,

for vigilantism to maintain order, the Military Police at the time would have continued this thought and the repressive practices that characterize it, including practices such as *Polícia Mineira*, Death Squads, and, more recently, the *Milícia*. The participant concluded the thought by arguing that, just as the Police is a reflection of society at that moment, with the passage of time, generational changes, the imposition of educational requirements for entering the police career, and arrests and dismissals of offending police officers, the Police of today would be more adequate and more in line with Brazilian legislation]

**Victor:** And why did you decide on the Civil Police, specifically?

**Silva:** I don't like militarism very much, no. Civil Police makes you more comfortable, right?

**Victor:** And what is the difference, like, that you saw at that moment when you were choosing?

**Silva:** The basic difference is \*the militarism\*, right? You have to wear uniform, salute... A soldier a day older than you, you already owe him respect – not that you don't respect anyone in the civil police. It's quite different. You respect everyone. Now, there is a very excessive hierarchy there, right? In the civil police, it's equal to equal. There's not all that difference. You can dialogue with the *delegado* himself, even. Now, not in military life, right? If the sergeant wants to talk to you, the lieutenant, the captain... The colonel, then, you don't even get close. In the civil police, we speak directly with the *delegado*. "Doctor, come here... [let me] talk to you here". Do you understand?

a PM da época teria dado continuidade a esse pensamento e às práticas repressivas que o caracterizam, incluindo práticas como a Polícia Mineira, os Esquadrões da Morte, e, mais recentemente, a Milícia. O participante concluiu o pensamento argumentando que, assim como a Polícia é um reflexo da sociedade naquele momento, com a passagem do tempo, mudanças geracionais, imposição de requisitos educacionais ao ingresso na carreira policial, e prisões e afastamentos de policiais transgressores, a Polícia de hoje seria mais adequada e mais conforme com a legislação brasileira]

**Victor:** E por que você decidiu pela Polícia Civil, especificamente?

**Silva:** Eu não gosto muito de militarismo, não. Polícia Civil você fica mais à vontade, né?

**Victor:** E qual é a diferença, assim, que você via naquele momento que tava escolhendo?

**Silva:** A diferença básica é \*o militarismo\*, né? Você ter que andar fardado, bater continência... Um soldado com um dia a mais que você, você já deve, né, respeito a ele – não que não respeite ninguém na polícia civil. É bem diferente. Você respeita a todos. Agora, lá é uma hierarquia muito excessiva, né? Na polícia Civil é de igual pra igual. Não tem toda essa diferença. Até com o próprio delegado você consegue dialogar. Agora, na vida militar não, né? Se o sargento quiser falar contigo, o tenente, o capitão... O coronel, então, você nem chega. Na polícia civil a gente fala direto com o delegado. "Doutor, vem cá... [deixa eu] falar contigo aqui". Entendeu?

**Victor:** So, going a little further on this question of militarism, there are many proposals today for the demilitarization of the Police, right? What do you think about this kind of thing?

**Silva:** [Inhales] Yeah, I don't think it's a good one because the Military Police *\*needs\** to be militarized, right, as the name itself says, because a respected hierarchy is maintained, right? Imagine if it wasn't military! If there are already these messes that we see there, that we think is widespread, but it *\*isn't\**. It's not widespread, you can believe what I tell you. There is a lot of respect within the military, whatever it may be. Or the armed forces – Army, Navy, Air Force – or the Military Police. That they even have the same respect for each other, right? Be the military of the armed forces, or the military of the Military Police. The colonel is a colonel, the sergeant is a sergeant, the lieutenant is a lieutenant... So if you are a lieutenant in the military police, you owe respect to the captain of both the military police, obviously, and any other force. And inversely works the same way. If you are a lieutenant in the army, and here you have a captain... the hierarchy leads you to always be subordinate to the highest hierarchically, right? A higher post you have to respect, whatever it is. It's the military. So military life is very good in that sense. You manage much better.

**Victor:** Então, puxando um pouquinho pra essa questão do militarismo, tem muitas propostas hoje em dia de desmilitarização da Polícia, né? O que você acha sobre esse tipo de coisa?

**Silva:** [Inspira] É, eu num acho uma boa até porque a Polícia Militar *\*precisa\** ser militarizada, né, como o próprio nome já diz, porque mantém-se uma hierarquia respeitada, né? Imagina se não fosse militar! Se já tem essas bagunças que nós vemos aí, que a gente pensa que é generalizada, porém *\*não é\**. Não é generalizada, cê pode acreditar no que eu te digo. Existe muito respeito dentro da área militar, seja qual for. Ou as forças armadas – Exército, Marinha, Aeronáutica –, ou a Polícia Militar. Que, inclusive, eles têm os mesmos respeitos entre eles, né? Seja o militar das forças armadas, ou o militar da Polícia militar. O coronel é coronel, o sargento é sargento, o tenente é tenente... Então se você for tenente da polícia militar, você deve respeito ao capitão tanto da polícia militar, obviamente, quanto de qualquer outra força. Como inversamente funciona da mesma forma. Se você for tenente no exército, e aqui você tem um capitão... a hierarquia te leva a ser subordinado sempre ao hierarquicamente maior, né? Um posto maior você tem que respeitar, seja qual for. É o militar. Então a vida militar é muito boa nesse sentido. Você consegue administrar muito melhor.

## 7.16. Violence

**Nunes:** [...] BOPE has an interesting motto: “controlled aggressiveness”. That's it. You have to have the *\*aggressiveness\** at the right time in a controlled manner. And not... disproportionately. [...]

**Victor:** And what is your hypothesis for these police officers who carry out this

**Nunes:** [...] O BOPE tem um lema interessante: “agressividade controlada”. É isso. Tu tem que ter a *\*agressividade\** no momento certo controladamente. E não... desproporcionalmente. [...]

**Victor:** E qual é a sua hipótese pra esses policiais que fazem essa “agressividade não

“uncontrolled aggression”? Why are they still there... Why do they do this?

**Nunes:** In fact, controlled aggression is good. Because it's when you have a police officer that he knows how to be aggressive at the right time, it's the measured use of force. The problem is the truculent policeman at will, who thinks this is normal. There's no way for these cops. For these police officers it is a natural evolution, they will be recycled, they will leave, they will retire, they will be reformed. We have to change the culture. When we change culture, one culture leaves, the other comes in. There is no way. For these police officers- why does a BOPE police officer have controlled aggression, [why] do trained police officers have controlled aggression? Because they undergo operational training in which they are chastised, punished, oppressed... and the whole time you cannot hit the guy, you cannot attack, it has to be “yes, sir. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.” He became a prepared soldier. Not everyone takes this course. Do you understand? This kind of police that we expect a society one day. And society doesn't care. Society – whether from the BOPE, or the police officer from the conventional battalion –, it wants the guy not to attack him, not to be truculent... But it's not like this, it requires training, it requires preparation and the police is a common person.

**Rodrigues:** The guy who enters [the Police] because he's tough, because he's violent, because he hits... that's fine. It's his. But the guy who comes in to get from others, to steal, no, then not. Then he is worse than the *bandido*. [...] So the guy who joins the police [and] corrupts himself, he's sleazy, he's really a criminal. Who takes bribes... Those things.

controlada”? Por que que eles ainda tão aí... Por que eles fazem isso?

**Nunes:** Na verdade, a agressividade controlada é bom. Porque é quando você tem um policial que ele sabe ser agressivo no momento certo, é o uso ponderado da força. O problema é o policial truculento a bel-prazer, que acha que isso é o normal. Pra esses policiais não tem como. Pra esses policiais é evolução natural, eles vão ser reciclado, eles vão sair, vão se aposentar, vão se reformar. A gente tem que mudar a cultura. Quando a gente muda a cultura, uma cultura sai, a outra entra. Não tem como. Pra esses policiais- por que que um policial do BOPE tem agressividade controlada, os policiais cursados tem a agressividade controlada? Porque eles passam por um treinamento operacional que eles são fustigado, castigado, oprimidos... e o tempo todo não pode bater no cara, não pode agredir, tem que ser “sim, senhor. Sim, senhor. Sim, senhor.” Virou um soldado preparado. Não são todos que fazem esse curso. Entendeu? Esse tipo de policial que a gente espera uma sociedade um dia. E a sociedade não tá nem aí. Sociedade – seja do BOPE, seja policial ali do batalhão convencional –, ela quer que o cara não agrida ele, não seja truculento... Mas isso não é assim, isso requer um treinamento, isso requer um preparo e o policial é uma pessoa comum.

**Rodrigues:** O cara que entra porque ele é bravo, porque ele é violento, que ele bate... isso aí tudo bem. É dele. Mas o cara que entra pra acharar os outros pra roubar não, aí não. Aí ele é pior que o bandido. [...] Então o cara que entra pra polícia que ele se corrompe, ele é safado, ele é bandido mesmo. Que aceita suborno... Essas coisas.

**Rodrigues:** When there is a [soccer] game in Maracanã this [refrainment from the use of force] does not follow. Because in the Maracanã, let's suppose, when a crowd of fans is exiting [the stadium] to fight one another... There are five hundred [people] here with five hundred there [...]. We are a group of twenty police officers. You must separate, you must 'go' [insinuating indiscriminate aggression]... get it? You must separate that. You must do it. [...] You cannot come and [say] "stop, stop, for the love of God, stop it!". You can't. You must come and intervene with a baton promptly to separate. [...] This is not excessive use of force. This was necessary to be used there. [...] You are doing that to separate, really. [...] If you shout [telling them] to stop they won't care. But when [they] see that you are coming for them, they all start running.

**Rodrigues:** No, strength is necessary, but then there's that which you have to know, right? The use- There can be no excessive use of force. Because in the Police they teach us – let's say, I have one more... me with one more [I] can't search, approach three, only as a last resort. I must always have the advantage. If I have one more, I can only approach one. The other one takes care of it, to see if someone will arrive, if the guy moves, so I can search him. You always have to have superiority [in numbers]. To avoid this, not to use excessive force. Because if you have- you have three [suspects], there are two of you, the three of them, if they come at you, you'll have to shoot one in the leg. Then depending on how the judge will accept that, he may even sue you. "Look, he used it excessively, he shouldn't have shot the guy." But there, sometimes, the guy is- the three would join to take your gun, right? So that's why it's not advisable for you with... three,

**Rodrigues:** Quando é jogo no Maracanã, isso aí não entra não. Porque no Maracanã, vamos supor, quando tá saindo ali a torcida pra brigar uma com a outra... Tem quinhentos daqui com quinhentos de lá [...]. Nós somos um grupo de vinte policiais. Ali você tem que separar, você tem que sair [insinuando que deve agredir indiscriminadamente]... entendeu? Você tem que separar aquilo ali. Você tem que fazer isso. [...] Não tem como você chegar "para, para, pelo amor de Deus, para aí!" Não tem. Você tem que chegar e intervir já com o cassetete pra separar. [...] Aí isso aí não é uso excessivo da força. Isso aí precisou de ser usado aquilo ali. [...] Vai tá fazendo aquilo pra separar mesmo. [...] Se tu gritar pra parar eles não tão nem aí. Mas quando vê que tu está entrando pra cima deles ali, sai tudo correndo. Você vê na televisão. Às vezes usa bomba de gás, de gás de pimenta. Bomba de gás lacrimogênio. Aí já é distúrbio, a gente fala de distúrbio em massa.

**Rodrigues:** Não, a força é necessária, mas aí tem aquilo que você tem que saber, né? O uso- Não pode ter o uso excessivo da força. Porque na Polícia eles ensina a gente – vamos supor, eu tô com mais um... eu com mais um não posso revistar, abordar três, só em último caso. Eu tenho sempre que tá em vantagem. Se eu tô com mais um, só posso abordar um. O outro toma conta, pra ver se vai chegar alguém, se o cara se mexer, pra eu poder revistar ele. Você sempre tem que tá em superioridade. Pra evitar isso, pra não usar o uso excessivo da força. Porque se você tiver- você tem três [suspeitos], vocês são dois, os três se vier pra cima de você, você vai ter que dar um tiro na perna de um. Aí dependendo de como o juiz vai aceitar aquilo, ele pode até te processar. "Ó, usou excessivamente, não era pra ter dado tiro no cara." Mas ali, às vezes, o cara é- os três ia te juntar pra tomar tua arma, né? Então por isso não é aconselhável você com... três, você ser dois,

for you to be two, to approach three. Only as a last resort, if it happens suddenly. [...] Now, when you are on patrol with the patrol, you saw, suspected of three, of four, there's just the two of you there, then you: "hello, help from a car with two more police officers for us to approach, make an approach here and such." Wait for it to arrive for you... understand? The himself himself sees that there are five police for two, then they won't want to do anything with the five, it's enough to immobilize them. Do you understand?

**Silva:** What I wanted was to go out, shoot... run, exchange fire, run after *bandido*... without bulletproof vest, without anything, go up the *morro* at any time... It was pure emotion, you know? Kind of irrational... inconsequential... right? Because we never think we're going to get shot. As I've already seen some colleagues dying beside me, shot hitting... shot passing [vocalized sound of flying bullet]. I never got shot, thank God. \*Thank\* God. I don't think it's an advantage to say that was shot... There are some who say, right? "Oh, I've already been shot ten times! One in the foot, one in the leg...". Thank God I never took it, no. I exchanged shots a thousand times... and never got shot, \*thank\* God. Now, I've always been inconsequential, irresponsible... But, sheer luck. [Laughs] Very lucky!

[Continuation of exchange in section 7.7.]

**Victor:** The *milícia* still has a way of using violence to cause this fear, right?

**Silva:** Only uses violence.

**Victor:** The police doesn't have that anymo-

**Silva:** No, no. It's not "the Police doesn't have anymore". The Police will use \*necessary\* violence. What is the necessary violence? It's going in and shooting someone. Do you understand? Because the guys shot

pra abordar três. Só em último caso, se acontecer de repente. [...] Agora, quando você estiver patrulhando com a patrulha, tu viu, desconfiou de três, de quatro, ali só tem vocês dois aí tu: "alô, auxílio aí de uma viatura aí com mais dois policiais pra gente abordar, fazer uma abordagem aqui e tal." Espera chegar pra tu... entendeu? O próprio camarada mesmo vê que tem cinco polícia pra dois, aí eles não vão querer fazer nada com os cinco, já dá pra imobilizar eles. Entendeu?

**Silva:** Eu queria era sair, dar tiro... correr, trocar tiro, correr atrás de bandido... sem colete à prova de balas, sem nada, subir morro a qualquer hora... Era pura emoção, entendeu? Meio irracional... inconsequente... né? Porque a gente nunca acha que vai tomar o tiro. Como eu já vi alguns colegas morrendo do meu lado, tiro batendo... tiro passando [vocalizou som de bala voando]. Nunca tomei um tiro, graças a Deus. \*Graças\* a Deus. Não acho vantagem dizer que tomou tiro... Tem uns que dizem, né? "Ih, já tomei dez tiros! Um no pé, um na perna...". Graças a Deus nunca tomei, não. Troquei mil vezes tiro... e nunca tomei tiro nenhum, \*graças\* a Deus. Agora, sempre fui inconsequente, irresponsável... Mas, pura sorte. [Risos] Muita sorte!

[Continuação da conversa na seção 7.7.]

**Victor:** A *milícia* ainda tem forma de usar a violência pra causar esse medo, né?

**Silva:** Só usa a violência.

**Victor:** A Polícia não tem mais ess-

**Silva:** Não, não. Não é "a Polícia não tem mais". A Polícia vai usar a violência \*necessária\*. Qual é a violência necessária? É entrar dando tiro em alguém. Entendeu? Porque os cara deram tiro neles. Então tem

them. So you must fight back. Do you understand? Or else gives a beating- [the Police] caught the guy: [harsh voice] “where [is it], my brother?”, [thin voice] “there’s nothing, there’s nothing”, “my brother, I know you’re Victor and that you are responsible for the load” – the drug load. You are the one who distributes the load. 20 *esticas* come, then they come and take it with you: “look, 100 here” – then you will have your notebook, this notebook of yours [referring to the notebook I was using to take notes of the interview] – “look, João took 100 of the white and 100 of the black; José...” – my brother, you who have the notes, you are the one who distribute the drugs. Then the informant came and told the police: “look, yeah- Victor has nothing in his hand, but he distributes it to everyone”. Then the police officer comes to Victor: “Victor, what’s up with you? yadda yadda”, “I’m not Victor...”, “Aren’t you, brother, the one who lives in that place?”, “yeah, yadda yadda yadda”, “where are the drugs?”, “I don’t know anything, no...”. Then “POW” [onomatopoeia of a slap hitting someone], already takes that well-given one in the – which they say is torture... which it is not, it’s just to wake up... [laughing] for life, you know? “Brother, do you want to get hit more?” Then the guy already knows that [in] the “get hit more” a crazy police officer can show up and he ends up dying in the hand of the crazy police officer. And they are weak... As I told you, they are cowards... In the act of committing cowardice and in the act of getting coward. So they already cower there at the time.

**Victor:** And what did you learn, then, in practice, that you didn’t learn in the academy, and things that were important for your career?

**Silva:** Uh... Victor, uh... Everything, right? How to deal with *bandido*. How to deal with

que revidar. Entendeu? Ou então dá uma porrada- pegou o cara: [voz ríspida] “cadê, meu irmão?”, [voz fina] “não tem nada não, não tem nada não”, “meu irmão, tô sabendo que tu é o Victor e que você é que fica responsável pela carga” – a carga de drogas. É você que distribui a carga. Vêm 20 esticas, aí eles vêm e pegam contigo: “ó, 100 aqui” – aí tu vai ter teu caderninho, esse seu caderninho [se referindo ao caderno que eu estava usando para fazer notas da entrevista] – “ó, o João levou 100 de branco e 100 de preto; o José...” – meu irmão, tu que tem as anotações, você que distribui a droga. Aí o informante veio e falou pro polícia: “ó, é- o Victor fica sem nada na mão, mas ele distribui pra todo mundo”. Aí o polícia chega lá no Victor: “Victor, qual é a tua? ba ba”, “não sou o Victor...”, “não é tu, irmão, que mora em tal lugar?”, “é, ba ba ba”, “cadê as drogas?”, “não sei de nada, não...”. Aí “PÁU” [onomatopeia de um tapa atingindo alguém], já toma aquele na orelha bem dado – que dizem que é tortura... que não é, é só pra despertar... [rindo] pra vida, entendeu? “Irmão, tu quer apanhar mais?”. Aí o cara já sabe que o “apanhar mais” pode aparecer um polícia maluco e ele acabar morrendo na mão do polícia maluco. E eles são frouxos... Como eu te disse, eles são covardes... No ato de cometer covardia e no ato de se acovardar. Então eles já se acovardam ali na hora.

**Victor:** E o que você aprendeu, então, na prática, que você não aprendeu na academia, e coisas que foram importantes pra sua carreira?

**Silva:** É... Victor, é... Tudo, né? Como lidar com bandido. Como lidar com cidadão.

citizen. How to handle the gun on the waist. Do you understand? For example, I've been carrying a gun in my belt for thirty something years. Right? Only once did I lose my temper... But I shot the ground. Right? That the guy faced me head on, they were two big black men. They came at me and I said: "brother, don't come because I'm armed". They must have thought it was – a traffic fight – they must have thought it was a toy and such, that I was a \*kid\*... I had a kid face like yours, like that [laughing]. Then I shot the ground, then they: "*pô*" – they came. "Brother, go away and stuff...". This thing they say "[if] you put your hand in, you have to shoot"... nothing like that. Weapon is for your defense. Do you understand? Just mention that you're armed and the smart guy won't come, right? If he sees it, he'll bet on it. And you have self-defense. In your defense [laughing]. So, if he comes, he'll have to take it. Then there's that story of first in the foot, in the leg, right, in the knee, whatever. Right? But whatever. If the guy is too big and comes over you, you already... [laughs].

**Silva:** Then it goes as an investigation. This is an investigation. Now, come to Victor here – a studious, good boy, yadda yadda yadda, who \*knows\* that the phone is of dubious origin – that's why it's worth 5 [thousand], he paid 2. Here comes the police officer: "and that iPhone of yours?", "No, I don't have it, I don't have it...", "How come I don't have it? It's here, boy", "I don't have it", "so let's go see it now". Even without a search warrant. No shit, search warrant! "Let's go there now and see. It's here, look". Flagrant. In this case, it's flagrant. Okay? So you have the right to go, but you're going to ask: "What's the search warrant? Yadda yadda yadda...", "Here, let's go there, look where it is". Then your car is down here, it's already accusing him inside the car. Then it goes: "and this here?", "no, I don't even know what this is".

Como lidar com a arma na cintura. Entendeu? Por exemplo, eu ando com a arma na cintura há trinta e tantos anos. Né? Só uma vez que eu destemperei... Mas dei tiro no chão. Né? Que o cara bateu de frente comigo, eram dois negões. Vieram pra cima de mim e eu falei: "irmão, não vem não que eu tô armado". Eles devem ter pensado que era – briga de trânsito – eles devem ter pensado que era de brinquedo e tal, que eu era \*moleque\*... Eu tinha a tua cara de moleque, assim [rindo]. Aí eu dei tiro no chão, aí eles: "*pô*" – vieram. "Irmão, mete o pé e tal...". Essa coisa que dizem que "meteu a mão, tem que atirar"... nada disso. Arma é pra tua defesa. Entendeu? Basta fazer menção que tá armado que o cara inteligente não vai vir, né? Se vir, ele vai pagar pra ver. E você tem a legítima defesa. Em sua defesa [rindo]. Então, se vier vai ter que tomar. Aí tem aquela história de primeiro no pé, na perna, né, no joelho, o que for. Né? Mas independente. Se o cara tive- for muito grande e vier logo pra cima, tu já... [risos].

**Silva:** Aí isso vai a investigação. Isso é uma investigação. Agora, chega pro Victor aqui – um garoto estudioso, de bem, ba ba ba, que \*sabe\* que o telefone é de procedência duvidosa – por isso que vale 5, ele pagou 2. Aí vem o policial: "e esse teu iPhone?", "Não, não tenho não, tenho não...", "Como não tem? Tá aqui, garoto", "tenho não", "então 'vamo' lá ver agora". Mesmo sem mandado de busca. Mandado de busca é o caralho! "'Vamo' lá agora ver. Tá aqui, ó". Flagrante. Nesse caso é um flagrante. Tá? Então tem o direito de ir, mas tu vai pedir: "qual o mandado de busca? Ba ba ba...", "Aqui ó, 'vamo' lá, olha onde é que tá". Aí teu carro tá aqui embaixo, já tão até acusando ele dentro do carro. Aí vai: "e isso aqui?", "não, nem sei o quê que é isso". Já \*toma\* um no ouvidor. "PÁU". Aí tu já vai ficar



It \*takes\* one in the “listener” [ear]. “POW” onomatopoeia]. Then how are you going to be? “What’s that?”, “You mean you think you’re a *bandido*, you’re tough? You mean you’re really going to clash with the police?” [But] then you’re a good kid... won’t you say everything immediately? Was it torture? Was it not the necessary means? To take it from a \*silly\* kid, a lucky sucker, who thinks he’s smart – that’s what we call it... [Laughing] He is lucky up to there, then he was beaten... [...] So it’s the necessary means that the police has. Now, other fathers, other mothers... will go to the Public Prosecutor’s Office... “He tortured my son...”. Got it? This shit the Police can’t take anymore, damn it. Then [we] can’t do the work \*seriously\*... If suddenly they didn’t \*beat\* it, they wouldn’t get anywhere. Got it ?

**Victor:** You’re saying that violence exists and that police work is violence prevention. What would you call the confrontations, the “slap to make the person wake up”... that kind of thing. Do you give it another name other than “violence”?

**Silva:** Necessary means, *pô*. It’s what I told you from the beginning. They are the necessary means that you have... For example, it’s moderated violence... A slap is not violence, but... it’s called violence. But moderated, for you to reach an objective. If you don’t do it, you won’t reach it. And a simple \*slap\* in the guy’s face, he starts to believe that you’re in charge there, it’s the police officer, and that he has to take another attitude. And what other attitude is it? Collaborate. That from the moment he does not cooperate, he will feel the pressure. Do you understand? And they, as they are weak and cowardly, start collaborating quickly. [...]

**Victor:** In the literature it is said that what defines the state is the monopoly on the

como? “Que é isso?”, “quer dizer que tu é metido a bandido, metido a brabo? Quer dizer que tu vai bater de frente com a Polícia mesmo?”. Aí tu é um garoto de bem... tu não vai falar tudo na hora? Foi tortura? Não ‘foi’ os meios necessários? Pra tirar de um moleque \*bobalhão\*, um otário com sorte, que pensa que é malandro – que é assim que a gente chama... [Rindo] Ele tá dando sorte até ali, aí tomou-lhe a porrada... [...] Então é o meio necessário que o polícia tem. Agora, outros pais, outras mães... vão entrar no Ministério Público... “Ele torturou meu filho...”. Entendeu? Essa porra que a Polícia não ‘guenta’ mais, porra. Aí não pode fazer o trabalho \*sério\*... Se de repente não desse a \*porrada\* não chegava a lugar nenhum. Entendeu?

**Victor:** Você tá falando que existe a violência e que o trabalho policial é a prevenção da violência. Como é que você chamaria os confrontos, o “tapa pra deixar a pessoa esperta”... esse tipo de coisa. Você dá outro nome que não seja “violência”?

**Silva:** Meios necessários, *pô*. É o que eu te falei desde o início. São os meios necessários que você tem... Por exemplo, é violência moderada... Uma tapa não é uma violência, mas... chama-se de violência. Mas moderada, pra você alcançar um objetivo. Se você não fizer isso, não vai alcançar. E um simples \*tapa\* na cara do cara, ele passa a acreditar que quem manda ali é você, é o policial, e que ele tem que tomar outra atitude. E a outra atitude qual é? Colaborar. Que a partir do momento que ele não colaborar, ele vai sentir a pressão. Entendeu? E eles, como são frouxos e covardes, passam a colaborar rápido. [...]

**Victor:** Na literatura se fala que o que define o Estado é o monopólio do uso legítimo da

legitimate use of force. If instead of me talking about “violence”, I talk about “legitimate use of force”, do you think that is appropriate?

**Silva:** No, it is not the legitimate use, no. It’s what I told you. It’s the... How did I tell you? The necessary violence? No. How did I tell you?

**Victor:** Moderate violence.

**Silva:** No. I didn’t say that. [Trying to remember] Oh my god...

**Victor:** The necessary means.

**Silva:** The necessary means. The necessary means may simply be a scolding. It could be a beating. It could be a threat. Do you understand? [Silva tells of an example in which he managed to make an arrest without violence, interrogating three suspects separately and identifying inconsistencies in the accounts]. It was the necessary means that we- And it was in the conversation, no violence. While otherwise, [we] say: “my brother, if you don’t talk I’m going to beat you up” – \*without\*, effectively, using force. Threat, embarrassment is used. Do you understand? For the guy to believe- “no, and such-”. Or... it even comes to blows, understand? Whether it’s a smack [hits the table] on the table... and the guy already fits in, or if you give him a blow, in the ear, then, that makes it sing. Goes “shhhhhh” [making tinnitus sound]. The ear will be- the ear will be singing. Then he: “what is that, and such?”. [He won’t want to take another one of these. Do you understand? There are some who, fuck, don’t care about beatings. \*But\*... you often get the objective. Do you understand? With \*the necessary means\*. Whatever they may be. And you can even put “necessary and moderate means”. Because more than that, beyond that, it would be prison, right? “Oh, you’re not going to talk?

força. Se em vez de eu falar de “violência”, falar em “uso legítimo da força”, você acha que é apropriado?

**Silva:** Não, não é o uso legítimo, não. É o que eu te falei. É o... Como eu te falei? A violência necessária? Não. Como eu te falei?

**Victor:** Violência moderada.

**Silva:** Não. Não falei isso não. [Tentando lembrar] Meu deu- é...

**Victor:** Os meios necessários.

**Silva:** Os meios necessários. Os meios necessários podem ser simplesmente um esporro. Pode ser uma porrada. Pode ser uma ameaça. Entendeu? [Silva conta um exemplo em que conseguiu efetuar uma prisão sem violência, interrogando três suspeitos separadamente e identificando inconsistências nos relatos]. Foi o meio necessário que a gente- E foi na conversa, violência nenhuma. Enquanto de outra forma, fala: “meu irmão, se tu não falar vou te arrebentar” – \*sem\*, efetivamente, usar a força. Se usa a ameaça, o constrangimento. Entendeu? Pro cara acreditar- “não, e tal-”. Ou... ainda chega na porrada, entendeu? Seja uma porrada [bate na mesa] na mesa... que o cara já se enquadra, ou se der uma porrada nele, na orelha, então, que faz cantar. Faz “shhhhhh” [fazendo som de tinido]. A orelha vai fica- o ouvido vai ficar cantando. Aí ele: “que é isso, e tal?”. Não vai querer tomar outra dessa. Entendeu? Tem uns que, porra, não tá nem aí pra porrada. \*Mas\*... muitas vezes você consegue o objetivo. Entendeu? Com \*os meios necessários\*. Sejam quais forem. E pode colocar, inclusive, “meios necessários e moderados”. Porque mais que isso, além disso, seria a prisão, né? “Ah, não vai falar não? Então vai pra cadeia agora”. Aí... enfim. Então “meios necessários” é a forma mais usada... né? Que a gente vai ver a necessidade que a gente vai ter. Se vai ficar

So go to jail now”. Then... anyway. So “necessary means” is the most used form... right? That we will see the need that we will have. If it’s going to be down there in the conversation, if it’s going to be the threat, or if it’s going to be...

## 7.17. War

**Assis:** A difference came to me between the way I was trained in the Parachute Brigade and the access I had to information in the Police, that I found the Police in a phase of transformation. In the Brigade, we are trained by the logic of the enemy. Which... is for... after crossing the territory of the- the border of the *favela*, anyone could be a potential enemy. Is this true? In a way, you have to prepare yourself for the terrain you are entering. But it’s *\*so\** complicated for you to judge that way as... [...] In the same way, you can’t accuse a good citizen, worker, *favela* resident that he has associations with drug trafficking or he would be a drug dealer or a enemy of the state only ‘cause he lives in that territory. Since if you stop to see in the vast majority of these territories the presence of drug trafficking is in the last one or two generations. There are not as many generations as those people are rooted and trapped in that territory and have had the culture of their community for a long time. And community culture is something that is experienced in the culture of Rio de Janeiro. [...] And you- I started to see that not everyone there was a criminal, but that the criminal has a lot of strength, a lot of power within the community. So *\*that’s\** why I decided to be a police officer. I said: “man, I need to do something to change this reality”. And that’s what I came up against... when I came to the Police, with a different mentality in the Police. [...] So I understand that the formation of the Army has to be that way,

ali por baixo na conversa, se vai ser na ameaça, ou se vai ser...

**Assis:** Me veio uma diferença entre a forma como eu fui treinado na Brigada Paraquedista e o acesso que eu tive a informação na Polícia, que eu peguei a Polícia numa fase de transformação. Na Brigada a gente é treinado pela lógica do inimigo. Que... é pra... depois que cruza o território da- a fronteira da favela, qualquer um poderia ser um inimigo potencial. Isso é verdadeiro? De certa forma você tem que se preparar pro terreno que você tá entrando. Mas é *\*tão\** complicado você julgar dessa forma quanto... [...] Da mesma forma você não pode acusar um cidadão de bem, trabalhador, morador de uma favela que ele tem associações com tráfico ou ele seria um traficante ou um inimigo do Estado só que ele mora naquele território. Sendo que se for parar pra ver na grande maioria desses territórios a presença do tráfico tá nas últimas uma ou duas gerações. Não tá tantas gerações quanto aquelas pessoas estão arraigadas e presas naquele território e tem a cultura própria da sua comunidade há muito tempo. E a cultura de comunidade é uma coisa que tá vivenciada na cultura do Rio de Janeiro. [...] E você- Eu comecei a ver que nem todo mundo ali era bandido, mas que o bandido ele tem muita força, muito poder dentro da comunidade. Então *\*por isso\** que eu decidi ser policial. Que eu falei: “cara, eu preciso fazer alguma coisa pra mudar essa realidade”. E nisso eu bati de frente com uma... quando eu vim pra Polícia, com uma outra mentalidade na Polícia. [...] Então eu entendo que a formação do Exército tem que ser dessa

because we have to be prepared for wars outside the country. Right? But not when we are dealing with Brazilian territory.

**Assis:** And I also wanted to understand how were these wars that we were living, especially when I entered- a striking point was when I entered the... it was a takeover of [Morro da] Providência, which we occupied and camped there for a long time, that I began to see how crime weaves a web. So, around criminal activity, you have several other illicit activities that end up... – When I say criminal activity, I mean drug trafficking, right? – other illicit activities that end up happening.

**Assis:** Why doesn't this happen in Rio de Janeiro? Because we have four warring factions here. As long as we have four factions at war, you can't buy the police, you can't buy... the... I'm not saying there's no corruption in the Police, okay? Let's say... We *\*have\** corruption scandals that happen, but... and we see it in the newspapers, we see it... right? Nowadays even a little less because our internal affairs department is very strong. Or is becoming increasingly stronger. But that doesn't happen so strongly because there are four factions that have to worry about their defense, with... and still think about paying the local government. Right? [...] Because the reality of confrontation *\*between them\** is very big. For example, I've already dealt with the faction war of Chapéu Mangueira against Babilônia – Chapéu Mangueira from *TCC* and Babilônia from *Comando Vermelho* – in which they don't care, they threw grenades in the middle... between the houses of the residents, just because one was attacking the other. They left... They went through the woods behind Chapéu Mangueira and Babilônia to

forma, porque nós temos que estar preparados pra guerras fora do país. Né? Mas não quando a gente trata do território brasileiro.

**Assis:** E também queria entender como eram essas guerras que a gente tava vivendo, principalmente quando eu entrei- um ponto marcante foi quando eu entrei no.... foi numa tomada da Providência, que a gente ocupou e ficou lá acampado por muito tempo, que eu comecei a ver como é que o crime ele tece uma teia. Então, em volta do da atividade criminosa, você tem várias outras atividades ilícitas que acabam... – quando eu falo atividade criminosa é o narcotráfico, né? – outras atividades ilícitas que acabam acontecendo.

**Assis:** Por que isso não acontece no Rio de Janeiro? Porque nós temos quatro facções em guerra aqui. Enquanto nós tivermos quatro facções em guerra não dá pra comprar as polícias, não dá pra comprar... o... Eu não tô falando que não tem corrupção na Polícia, tá? Vamos dizer... A gente *\*tem\** escândalos de corrupção que acontecem, mas... e a gente vê isso pelos jornais, a gente vê... né? Hoje em dia cada vez até um pouco menos porque a nossa corregedoria interna é muito forte. Ou está se tornando cada vez mais forte. Mas isso não acontece de forma tão forte porque são quatro facções que tem que se preocupar com a sua defesa, com... e ainda pensar em pagar o poder público local. Né? [...] Porque a realidade de enfrentamento *\*entre eles\** é muito grande. Por exemplo, eu já lidei com a guerra de facção do Chapéu Mangueira contra o Babilônia – Chapéu Mangueira do TCC e o Babilônia do Comando Vermelho – em que eles não se importam, eles tacavam granadas no meio... entre as casas dos moradores, só porque um tava atacando o outro. Eles saíram... Eles passavam pela mata que tem por trás do Chapéu Mangueira e do

attack the other faction. So the *TCC* attacked the Babilônia by exploding grenades on top of the *bandidos*. If this is going to kill a resident they don't care. They don't care.

**Victor:** How was this experience for you?

**Larrey:** From the COE [Special Operations Command]? At first it was very traumatizing because it was a very strong reality shock. [...] This was a shock for me and the shock of being faced with this victimization so close to me, that I didn't experience it [previously]. Because when you experience it, you're usually in an operation, you're... there's a shot very close to you, you're there rescuing a shot police officer... That makes a difference. So it was quite shocking at first, it affected me a lot psychologically speaking. There is a psychologist at the COE and sometimes he assisted me, because I wanted to leave, I didn't want to stay at the COE... That affected me. On my *\*first\** day at the COE, three police officers were shot and that... moved me a lot, like that. But then I went... I kept going, right? This care that I had very closely with a psychologist is not one... everyone should have, right, [but] it is not the reality, unfortunately. Even because there is not have enough staff to deal with all of this. They are a lot- It- The war is very extended to several points and the psychology staff is limited.

**Larrey:** [...] the police officer who is injured goes to a public hospital, because it is the closest, and from this public hospital he needs to go to the Military Police Central Hospital, which is in Estácio. Why does he need to go? Because in the public hospital it is not safe for him to stay. In the same public hospital that he is, in the same bed, beside him, there is a *bandido*, the guy who shot him, or any other

Babilônia pra poder atacar a outra facção. Então o TCC atacou o Babilônia explodindo granadas em cima dos bandidos. Se isso vai matar um morador eles não ligam. Eles não ligam.

**Victor:** Como é que foi essa experiência pra você?

**Larrey:** Do COE [Comando de Operações Especiais]? Em um primeiro momento foi bem traumatizante porque foi um choque de realidade muito forte. [...] Foi um choque isso pra mim e o choque mesmo de tá diante desse- da vitimização tão perto de mim, que eu não vivenciava isso. Porque quando você vivencia você tá normalmente em alguma operação, você tá... tem tiro bem pertinho de você, você tá ali socorrendo policial baleado... Isso faz diferença. Então foi bem chocante no primeiro momento, me afetou bastante psicologicamente falando. No COE tem um psicólogo e aí algumas vezes ele me atendeu, porque, assim, eu queria sair, não queria continuar no COE... Aquilo me afetou. Meu *\*primeiro\** dia do COE três policiais foram baleados e isso me... mexeu bastante comigo, assim. Mas depois fui... fui indo, né? Esse acompanhamento que eu tive muito de pertinho com psicólogo não é um... que todos deveriam ter, né, não é a realidade, infelizmente. Até porque não tem efetivo suficiente pra lidar com tudo isso. São muito- É- A guerra é muito estendida a vários pontos e o quadro de psicologia é limitado.

**Larrey:** [...] o policial que é ferido vai pra um hospital público, porque é o mais perto, e desse hospital público ele precisa ir pro Hospital Central da Polícia Militar, que fica no Estácio. Por que que ele precisa ir? Porque no hospital público não é seguro pra ele ficar. No mesmo hospital público que ele tá, no mesmo leito, ao lado, tem um bandido, o cara que atirou nele, ou outro bandido qualquer

*bandido* who knows he is a police officer, and he is in danger of his life, not because of the shots, not because of his health, but of life because the level of our war he reached this stage.

**Nogueira:** Rio, is the hardest to work in. Compared to other states. Because here we live an urban war. Weapons of war today are found in the parallel state. So we live in a state of conflicts on a daily basis. And we see the difference... we see the difference in a street. Okay? Miguel Salazar: the democratic rule of law, and the parallel state of the right less than a hundred meters away.

**Pereira:** [...] The use of the military in public security has been tried on several occasions. Sometimes, I'll tell you, Victor, it's literally war. They [the military] are prepared for war, right? For the use of rifles, the use in combat. And... Actually today, in the state of Rio, in terms of Brazil, maybe it's the worst. We live in a *\*narco-state\**... Okay? This is important for you to put. We live in a narco-state, similar... similar to Mexico, okay? With extremely strong and powerful factions, right? Both here in Rio and in São Paulo too, but here on- I'll talk about Rio, which I understand more. You have three factions there *\*dominant\**, right? It would be the *Comando Vermelho*, the *Terceiro* – this is important for you to put – the *Comando Vermelho*, the *Terceiro Comando Puro*, uh- the TCP, and the ADA, which is the *Amigos dos Amigos*, right? And today you have a fourth power. Which is the *milícia*. [...] Because we are inside, we know the... right? The obstacles all there. The military itself, when it is placed, right? As it was put, uh... directly in a confrontation – because you have troubled areas in Rio de Janeiro that are like [if] they were war zones, man. War zones.

que sabe que ele é policial, e ele corre risco de vida não pelos disparos, não de saúde, mas de vida porque o nível da nossa guerra ele chegou nesse estágio.

**Nogueira:** Rio, é o mais complicado de se trabalhar. Em relação aos outros estados. Porque aqui a gente vive uma guerra urbana. Armamento de guerra hoje se encontra na- no Estado paralelo. Então a gente vive um- um estado diariamente de conflitos. E a gente vê a diferença... a gente vê a diferença numa rua. Tá? Miguel Salazar: o Estado democrático de direito, e o Estado paralelo de direita a menos de cem metros.

**Pereira:** [...] Foi-se tentado em várias ocasiões o uso dos militares na segurança pública. Em alguns momentos, vou te dizer, ô Victor, é literalmente guerra. Eles [militares] são preparados pra guerra, né? Pra uso do fuzil, o uso no combate. E... Na verdade hoje, no estado do Rio, a nível de Brasil, talvez seja o pior. A gente vive num *\*narco-estado\**... Tá? Isso é importante você colocar. A gente vive num narco-estado, semelhante... semelhantemente com o México, tá? Com facções extremamente fortes e poderosas, né? Tanto aqui no Rio como em São Paulo também, mas aqui no- Vou te falar a nível de Rio, que eu- que eu entendo mais. Você tem três facções aí *\*dominantes\**, né? Seria o Comando Vermelho, o Terceiro – isso é importante você botar – o Comando Vermelho, o Terceiro Comando Puro, é- o TCP, e o ADA, que é o Amigo dos Amigos, né? E hoje você tem um quarto poder. Que é a milícia. [...] Por a gente estar lá dentro, a gente conhece as... né? Os entraves todos lá. O militar em si, quando ele é colocado, né? Como foi colocado, é... diretamente num confronto – porque você tem áreas deflagradas no Rio de

Because if you go to an area- come on, if you go to a Complexo do Alemão and you have a... a drug dealer there – right? Because he works selling drugs – carrying a rifle, a long gun, he is a guerrilla fighter. In \*my\* opinion, he's a guerrilla fighter. He doesn't- What's the difference between a guerrilla fighter like that and a FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]? Which would be at the level of Colombia, right? Here from Latin America. Or a guerrilla like that from Congo or Afghanistan...? There's no difference, man. Perhaps the difference is the rifle he carries. Because there in Afghanistan the guy will carry an AK-47, which is a Russian rifle. Here he will carry an AR-15, a M-4, an AR-Baby... do you understand? Or a FAL...

**Pereira:** So the military themselves... If you, for example, how do I use the military in public security? If you asked me. I'll tell you: "man, they are good for you to put there in direct confrontation in the guerrillas, that he will exchange shots on an equal basis with drug dealers, with the \*narco-guerrilla fighter\* who is there shooting. And we live literally a guerrilla, but with peacetime legislation. Do you understand? We \*live\* an established guerrilla war. But politically... the, let's say, the state spheres, which would be the governor, will never say that, man. Because for him it is a political defeat, right? Imagine getting out there, "pô, the state of Rio de Janeiro is a guerrilla and all..." Nobody will want to come here. So, it's kind of masked, right? We socially have two cities, right? There's a city after the tunnel, right? [Refers to the Zuzu Angel tunnel, between the West and South zones of the city]. And there's a town before the tunnel. There's that too, that this aspect is also [laughs lightly] another interesting aspect. Policing there is

Janeiro que é como [se] fossem zonas de guerra, cara. Zonas de guerra. Porque se você vai pra uma área- vamos lá, se você vai pra um Complexo do Alemão e você tem lá um... um narcotraficante – né? Porque ele trabalha com venda de drogas – portando um fuzil, uma arma longa, ele é um guerrilheiro. Na \*minha\* opinião, ele é um guerrilheiro. Ele não- Qual é a diferença de um guerrilheiro desse pra uma FARC? Que seria a nível da Colômbia, né? Aqui da América Latina. Ou uma guerrilha desse lá do Congo ou do Afeganistão...? Tem diferença nenhuma, cara. Talvez a diferença seja o fuzil que ele porta. Porque lá no Afeganistão o cara vai portar um AK-47, que é um fuzil russo. Aqui ele vai portar um AR-15, um M-4, um AR-Baby... entende? Ou um FAL...

**Pereira:** Então os militares em si... Se você, por exemplo, como é que eu uso os militares na segurança pública? Se você me perguntasse. Eu vou te falar: "cara, eles são bons pra você botar lá em confronto direto na guerrilha, que ele vai trocar tiro de igual pra igual com traficante, com o \*narco-guerrilheiro\* que tá lá atirando. E a gente vive literalmente uma guerrilha, mas com legislação de tempos de paz. Entende? A gente \*vive\* uma guerrilha instaurada. Só que politicamente... as, vamos dizer, as esferas estaduais, que seria o governador, jamais vai dizer isso, cara. Porque pra ele é uma derrota política, né? Imagina chegar lá fora, "pô, o estado do Rio de Janeiro é uma guerrilha e tal..." Ninguém vai querer vir pra cá. Então, meio que é mascarado, né? A gente socialmente tem duas cidades, né? Cê tem uma cidade depois do túnel, né? [Se refere ao túnel Zuzu Angel, entre as zonas Oeste e Sul da cidade]. E tem uma cidade antes do túnel. Tem isso também, que esse aspecto também é [ri levemente] outro aspecto interessante.

more reinforced and such... Do you understand?

**Pereira:** What were special operations? They started to- The military that came, coming from the Armed Forces, already had specific training, special forces and such. They began to bring this knowledge into the corporation. Uh... Training in guerrilla tactics, urban guerrilla warfare... which we call urban guerrilla warfare, right? In the army you have the rural guerrilla and then we adapt to a guerrilla- Because actually that's what I told you: we live in times of war. Rural guerrilla warfare is when it's in a field... more open, right? And the urban guerrilla with... you have a set of *favelas*, of houses. And then we start training our internal public, there are special operations courses and such, and then the police start to have a- let's say, a ready-to-use force for special operations. That would be a unit, a battalion, right?

**Pereira:** From the 1990s onwards, there have been some changes, yes, but they were occasional. But, in general, let's say, armament: has anything new arrived? It always arrives. But the police are also kind of on an equal footing, you know? Those discrepancies from the past are almost non-existent today. But it's still an unfair war. Why? The *bandido*, he shoots at will and I can't shoot at will. I have all- my legality of acting to avoid- precisely, minimizing the risks, right? Because can it happen that I shoot an innocent person? It can, a miscalculation, a... But in general, our responsibility is much greater, you know? To avoid confrontation and such... Confrontation is really only when it's... it's unfeasible.

Policiamento lá é mais reforçado e tal... Entendeu?

**Pereira:** O que que eram operações especiais? Começaram a- Os militares que vinham, oriundos das Forças Armadas, já tinham um treinamento específico, forças especiais e tal. Começaram a trazer esse conhecimento pra dentro da corporação. É... Treinamento de tática de guerrilha, guerrilha urbana... que a gente chama de guerrilha urbana, né? No exército você tem a guerrilha rural e então a gente adapta pra uma guerrilha- Porque na verdade é aquilo que eu te falei: a gente vive em tempos de guerra. Guerrilha rural é quando é num campo... mais aberto, né? E a guerrilha urbana com... você tem um conjunto de favelas, de casas. E aí a gente começa a treinar o nosso público interno, tem os cursos de operações especiais e tal, e aí a polícia começa a ter uma-, vamos dizer assim, uma força de pronto emprego pra operações especiais. Isso seria uma unidade, um batalhão né?

**Pereira:** Da década de noventa pra cá houve algumas alterações, sim, mas foram pontuais. Mas, de uma maneira geral, vamos dizer assim, armamento: chegou coisa nova? Sempre chega. Mas a polícia também tá meio que em pé de igualdade, entende? Essas discrepâncias do passado hoje quase não existem. Só que ainda é uma guerra desleal. Por quê? O bandido, ele atira à vontade e eu não posso atirar à vontade. Eu tenho todo- a minha legalidade de atuação pra evitar- justamente, minimizar os riscos, né? Porque pode acontecer de eu atirar num inocente? Pode, um erro de cálculo, uma... Mas de uma maneira geral a nossa responsabilidade é muito maior, entende? De evitar o confronto e tal... Confronto realmente é só quando é... é inviável.



**Pereira:** Remind me that I'm going to tell you about... war wounds, okay? Remind me of that. I'll tell you about war wounds because the- it's the so-called advent of rifles, right? When rifles start to arrive here in Rio de Janeiro, in the eighties, eighties to nineties, in the second half of the eighties to nineties, that was the part that arrived the most. Ninety it really skyrockets, but... anyway. [...] And at this point we are going to talk a little about generalized violence, because stray bullets are much more common than today, innocent people dead... because, man, it was literally a war... you know? The police had no protection, the *bandido* would also shoot at random... it was a tremendous mess. So they started trying to minimize police casualties.

**Pereira:** Me lembra que eu vou te falar sobre... ferimentos de guerra, tá? Me lembra disso. Vou te falar sobre os ferimentos de guerra porque o- é o chamado advento dos fuzis, né? Quando começa a chegar os fuzis aqui no Rio de Janeiro, na década de oitenta ainda, oitenta pra noventa, na segunda metade da década de oitenta pra noventa que foi a parte que chega mais. Noventa realmente é que que dispara, mas... enfim. [...] E nesse momento a gente vai falar um pouco da violência de generalizada, porque balas perdidas muito mais do que era hoje, inocentes mortos... porque, cara, era uma guerra literalmente... sabe? Polícia não tinha proteção, o bandido atirava também aleatoriamente... era uma confusão tremenda. Então começou-se a tentar minimizar as baixas policiais.

## 7.18. Weapons

**Larrey:** And before we had injuries from a "thirty-eight". Today we have injuries from high velocity weapons, from explosives, from weaponry *\*of war\**. So [injuries from] weaponry *\*of war\** they must be treated with prehospital care equipment that are appropriate for this. Because of this, our entire instruction is based on North American war medicine protocols [TC3/TCCC – Tactical Combat Casualty Care].

**Larrey:** E antes a gente tinha um ferimento de 38. Hoje a gente tem um ferimento por arma de alta velocidade, por explosivos, por armamentos *\*de guerra\**. Então armamentos *\*de guerra\** eles precisam ser tratados com equipamentos de atendimento pré-hospitalar apropriados pra isso. Por conta disso, toda a nossa instrução ela é baseada em protocolos de medicina de guerra norte-americanos [TC3/TCCC – Tactical Combat Casualty Care].

**Larry:** Yes. Wars are great laboratories. For everything, right. And for medicine they were fundamental. [...] So, from very remote times, from Rome, from the medieval wars... since that time, medicine has been evolving and war has done that. So today, what we experience in Rio de Janeiro in terms of war medicine will impact not only Rio de Janeiro and Brazil, but the world. We have our

**Larrey:** Sim. As guerras são grandes laboratórios. Pra tudo né. E pra medicina foram fundamentais. [...] Então desde épocas bem remotas, lá de Roma, das guerras medievais... desde essa época a medicina vem evoluindo e a guerra faz isso. Então hoje o que a gente vive no Rio de Janeiro em termos de medicina de guerra elas vão impactar não só o Rio de Janeiro e o Brasil, mas o mundo.

representatives, right, our doctors, who went to Israel to learn how to deal with injuries from high-velocity weapons, right? As soon as the rifles started to arrive, in the sense of the *bandidos*, right, with the rifles and the police officers being shot with this type of weapon, they went to Israel, because it is supposed that the Gaza Strip... right? They got there, \*ours\* ended up teaching techniques that they did here adapted, surgical techniques that were adapted for those... for that moment, but that didn't have scientific evidence, they went there for scientific evidence. They got there, they were more evolved than Israel. So, from there, countless scientific works and cases were created... experience reports... of today, of surgery, because of firearms, we [Rio de Janeiro Police] are a reference. Not in Brazil. In the world. So, for example, gunshot wound to the skull, right? There is no place in the world that has had more gunshot wounds to the skull than Rio de Janeiro. There isn't. Not even in wars. Because- Especially because in wars they use ballistic helmets. We don't use it. It's heavy, unfeasible... like, only in [inaudible] cases. In some more normal situation, rule, do not use. Doesn't have. Also because it is also impractical to use like this, it is very heavy. It is already a lot of weight, there are more than 20 kilos of equipment that the person carries. So, like, then what? And then... from some time ago we noticed that the injuries to the skull increased. That is, the *bandidos* began to correct the shot. With more powerful weapons, with scope and such, they really \*aimed\* at the head. To try to neutralize the police. And it ends up really neutralizing, you know, a high-speed shot to the head ends up neutralizing. So we had \*many\* people shot in the head, more than anywhere else in the world. [...] They are really very lethal, like that. When you study a little ballistics, you see the damage this type of weapon does to the human body.

A gente tem representantes nossos, né, médicos nossos, que foram pra Israel pra aprender a lidar com ferimentos de armas de alta velocidade, né? Logo que começaram a chegar os fuzis, no sentido de- dos bandidos, né, com os fuzis e os policiais serem alvejados por esse tipo de armamento, foram pra Israel, porque se supõe que Faixa de Gaza... né? Chegaram lá, os \*nossos\* acabaram ensinando técnicas que eles faziam aqui adaptadas, técnicas cirúrgicas que eram adaptadas pra aqueles... pra aquele momento, mas que não tinham evidência científica, foram lá pra evidência científica. Chegaram lá, eles estavam mais evoluídos do que Israel. Então dali se criaram inúmeros trabalhos científicos e *cases*... relatos de experiência... de hoje, de cirurgia, por conta de arma de fogo, a gente [Polícia do Rio de Janeiro] ser referência. Não no Brasil. No mundo. Então, por exemplo, ferimento de arma de fogo no crânio, né? Não existe no mundo lugar que teve mais ferimentos de arma de fogo no crânio do que no Rio de Janeiro. Não tem. Nem nas guerras. Porque- Até porque nas guerras eles usam capacete balístico. A gente não usa. É pesado, inviável... assim, só em casos [inaudível]. Em alguma situação mais normal, regra, não usa. Não tem. Até porque também é inviável usar assim, é muito pesado. Já é muito peso, são mais de 20kg de equipamento que a pessoa carrega. Então, assim, e aí? E aí que... de um tempo pra cá a gente percebeu que aumentaram os ferimentos no crânio. Ou seja, os bandidos começaram a corrigir o tiro. Com armamentos mais poderosos, com luneta e tal, eles \*miravam\* realmente na cabeça. Pra tentar neutralizar o policial. E acaba que neutraliza mesmo, né, um tiro de alta velocidade na cabeça acaba que neutraliza. Então a gente teve \*muitos\* baleados na cabeça, mais que qualquer lugar do mundo. [...] São realmente muito letais, assim. Quando você estuda um pouco de balística

você vê o estrago que faz no corpo humano esse tipo de armamento.

**Pereira:** With the beginning of high-power weapons, which are rifles, right? From the arrival of these rifles here in the 1990s, Rio de Janeiro began to have war medicine. This is important because it also mentions the evolution of crime and its social harm, right? We start to have war medicine and the doctors were not prepared. And doctors from Getúlio Vargas [Hospital], Rocha Faria [Hospital], the big- big emergencies started having to go to conflict regions – Israel, Lebanon, Palestine – to take courses to learn how to deal with rifle wounds. Because the rifle wound is as follows: it has a very high kinetic energy. Ammo is this right here. Imagine that my whole finger is a projectile, right? It's an ammunition, okay? Look. And here- I'll bring you the ammunition later and then you'll understand what I'm telling you. This little dot is just what's going to come out, okay? This whole thing is a- we call it a case, which has a fuse and a powder charge inside. The gun does that. It's a striker, right? It's going to hit the fuse here, it's going to create a small explosion in the fuse, the fuse creates a bigger explosion in the gunpowder, which propels it with the gases, okay? So what comes out is this, it's the projectile, okay? And it goes through the barrel... the barrel of the gun has a twist, ok? Which is what will give it dynamics, you see? It does this, it goes like this. So it comes spinning, okay? With a lot of speed- It's spin is what keeps it in the direction. And [with] a rifle you sometimes reach eight hundred [meters], a kilometer away, right? With accuracy. When this rifle enters the human body, you will see a small hole. For example, if it hits here, it's a small hole here. Now its kinetic energy is so great that behind it makes a hole like this [makes a circle with his hands]. It does that and carries... The vacuum makes it

**Pereira:** Com o início do armamento de alto poder de fogo, que são os fuzis, né? Da vinda desses fuzis pra cá na década de noventa, começou-se a ter no Rio de Janeiro uma medicina de guerra. Isso é importante porque também faz a menção da evolução do crime e os seus danos sociais, né? A gente começa a ter uma medicina de guerra e os médicos não estavam preparados. E os médicos do Getúlio Vargas, Rocha Faria, os grandes- grandes emergências começaram a ter que ir em regiões de conflito – Israel, Líbano, Palestina – fazer cursos pra aprender a lidar com ferimento de fuzil. Porque o ferimento de fuzil é o seguinte: ele tem uma energia cinética muito grande. A munição é isso aqui ó. Imagina que o meu dedo todo é um projétil, né? É uma munição, tá? Olha só. E aqui- Eu depois eu vou trazer a munição pra você e aí você vai entender bem o que eu tô te falando. Essa pontinha só é que vai sair, tá? Isso aqui todo é uma- a gente chama de estojo, que tem uma espoleta e uma carga de pólvora aqui dentro. A arma faz isso. É um percutor né? Ele vai bater aqui na espoleta, vai criar uma pequena explosão na espoleta, a espoleta cria uma explosão maior na pólvora, que impulsiona com os gases, tá? Então o que sai é isso aqui, é o projétil, tá? E ele passa pelo cano... o cano da arma ele tem um giro, tá? Que é o que vai dar dinâmica a ele, tá vendo? Ele faz isso ó, ele vai assim. Então ele vem rodando, tá? Com muita velocidade- O giro dele é que mantém ele na direção. E um fuzil você pega às vezes oitocentos, um quilômetro de distância, né? Com precisão. Quando esse fuzil ele entra no corpo humano, você vai ver um furinho pequeno. Por exemplo, se ele pegar aqui, é um furinho pequeno aqui. Agora a energia cinética dele é tão grande que atrás ele faz um rombo desse. Ele faz isso e leva... O vácuo faz com que seja um rombo desse. E

a hole like that. And sometimes a shot here will damage here [points somewhere else], one here will damage the leg... because the extension- the wave, which we call the impact wave, is very large. Sometimes a shot in the abdomen will burst your spleen, or your liver, or your... And sometimes- Then the guy would arrive- the police officer would sometimes arrive at the hospital – and that the doctors told us over time, all of that was based on what they lived through, in the HPM [Military Police Hospital] and such –, the police officer had a gunshot wound, it [the bullet] left here, here it ripped, but they sewed and such, closed it. Then they sent him home. In three, four days the guy was coming back, dying of infection. But what happened? His liver had burst, his spleen. Then they started to study, gee, the effect of- Which is different from a pistol, from a revolver, you know? The dynamics, the explosion, the speed, is much greater. So its physical strength breaks the organs from the inside a lot. Then the study of war medicine began. Do you understand? Because, actually, that's what I always tell you. It's a guerrilla. It is an urban guerrilla.

**Silva:** Now, the addict finances [drug] trafficking. [He] is our number one enemy. Do you understand? [He] is \*our\* number one enemy. And... from there it generates many other things. The purchase of weapons... this amount of weapons in the hands of the banditos... Them coming to the street to rob a bakery with an assault rifle... Get a [inaudible] with an assault rifle... In one of those it shoots... Kills one, two, three, four, five, because the bullet keeps going. It is a mess... it has become a mess. Nowadays it's calmer. Because there's more police on the street, but it's still a mess. It is a more organized mess, let's put it this way. But it's still a mess. Crime is still rulling. Strongly

às vezes um tiro aqui vai danificar aqui, um aqui danifica aqui a perna... porque a extensão- a onda, que a gente chama de onda de impacto, é muito grande. Às vezes um tiro no abdômen vai arrebentar o teu baço, ou o teu fígado, ou tuas... E às vezes- Aí o cara chegava- o policial chegava às vezes no hospital – e isso as médicas contaram pra gente ao longo do tempo, tudo isso aí foi baseado no que eles viveram, no HPM e tal –, o policial tinha um ferimento de tiro, saía aqui, aqui arrebentava, mas costurava e tal, fechava. Aí mandava pra casa. Daqui a três, quatro dias o cara tava voltando, morrendo de infecção. Mas o que que houve? O fígado dele tinha estourado, o baço. Aí começaram a estudar, caramba, o efeito do- Que é diferente de uma pistola, de um revólver, entende? A dinâmica, a explosão, a velocidade, é muito maior. Então a força física dela arrebenta muito os órgãos por dentro. Então começou-se a estudar a medicina de guerra. Entende? Porque, na verdade, é o que eu sempre falo pra você. É uma guerrilha. É uma guerrilha urbana.

**Silva:** Agora, o viciado financia o tráfico. É o nosso inimigo número 1. Entendeu? É o \*nosso\* inimigo número 1. E... daí geram várias outras coisas. A compra de arma... Essa quantidade de arma na mão dos bandidos... Eles vindo pra rua assaltar uma padaria com fuzil... Pegar um [inaudível] com fuzil... Numa dessa dispara... Mata 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, porque a bala vai embora... É uma bagunça... tá uma bagunça. Hoje em dia tá mais tranquilo. Porque tem mais polícia na rua, mas ainda tá uma bagunça. Tá uma bagunça mais organizada, vamos dizer assim. Mas ainda é uma bagunça. O crime ainda tá imperando. Fortemente.

## 7.19. Euphemisms, Metaphors, Analogies

**Assis:** Because if we took away, if society took away your rights – yours, mine, his – to resolve your individual conflicts, to take justice into your own hands – that at a certain point we lose that nature, the people stop working with the law of talion, you know, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, the right of vendetta for you to take revenge on the one who... or do justice against the one who wronged you –, and you pass that on for the state. The state becomes the only one capable of exerting force. Right? Who can use force to enforce the law, or enforce rights, or resolve conflicts of law, is the state. And if the state is not capable of representing you in this way, the state is failing. Right? So the... If the state sees you as an enemy simply because of where you were born, it's a failure.

**Larrey:** There are other initiatives within the corporation, they existed at the time and continue to exist, which are instructions for concealed carrying, that is, you carry your weapons without the person seeing if you are wearing plain clothes and carry the weapons, quick draw, then that thing from the far west, right, you draw your weapon quickly to fight back, don't take too long... that crisis room for you- where do you shoot... anyway. Other initiatives, from another unit to help reduce victimization.

**Pereira:** But until then you have to negotiate. You really have to arrive – “don't do that, man, the police are already here, you're already surrounded, there's no way you can get out of here...”. Do you understand? In the last case you have to use force. Then you- I don't know if you heard about the sniper, the elite shooter guy. Don't you see that sometimes the guy is there negotiating,

**Assis:** Porque se nós tiramos, se a sociedade tirou os seus direitos – os seus, os meus, o dele – de resolver os seus conflitos individuais, de fazer justiça pelas próprias mãos – que em um certo momento a gente perde essa natureza, a gente deixa de trabalhar com a lei de talião, né, do olho por olho, o dente por dente, o direito de vendeta de você se vingar daquele que... ou fazer justiça contra aquele que te fez mal –, e você passa isso pro Estado. O Estado ele passa a ser o único a ser capaz de exercer força. Né? Quem pode utilizar a força para fazer valer a lei, ou fazer valer os direitos, ou resolver os conflitos do direito, é o Estado. E se o Estado ele não é capaz de te representar dessa forma, o Estado tá falhando. Né? Então o... Se o Estado te vê como um inimigo simplesmente por onde você nasceu, é uma falha.

**Larrey:** Existem outras iniciativas dentro da corporação, existiram à época e continuam existindo, que são instruções de porte velado, ou seja, você portar o armamento sem a pessoa estar vendo se tá de roupa paisana e portar o armamento, saque rápido, então aquela coisa de faroeste, né, você sacar tua arma rápido pra revidar, não demorar... aquela sala de crise pra você- onde que você atira... enfim. Outras iniciativas, de uma outra unidade pra ajudar a diminuir a vitimização.

**Pereira:** Mas até então você tem que negociar. Você tem que chegar mesmo – “não faz isso não, cara, Polícia já tá aqui, tu já tá cercado, não tem como tu sair daqui...”. Entendeu? No último caso tu tem que usar a força. Aí você- não sei se ouviu falar do sniper, o cara atirador de elite. Não vê que às vezes o cara tá lá negociando, negociando... e o cara tá lá com a arma na cabeça da pessoa.

negotiating... and the guy is there with a gun to the person's head. There, the guy over there [sniper], he shoots and he's there stopping him.

Ali, o cara ali, ele atira e ele ali tá ali parando ele.

**Pereira:** I even receive today a reward called “*pecúnia*” which varied from ten, it started in ten percent and went up to a hundred and fifty percent. It was \*vulgarly\* called... “Far West Gratification”. [...] So in this time, what you had, the salaries were too meager, low, and came a General called General Cerqueira. [He] was an Army General and he was security secretary two times in the state of Rio de Janeiro. First was in 82... and then was in 95. So in this time General Cerqueira, he... gave these rewards to us. Today I receive fifteen percent because of that. It should be fifty. It is an increase, uh... today it is around 1.200 *reais* that I receive, I will take it for the rest of my life. Something that makes \*a lot\* of difference. Right? In a time where the salary was \*very\* low, right?

**Pereira:** Inclusive eu recebo até hoje uma premiação chamado pecúnia que variava de dez, iniciava-se com dez por cento e ia até cento e cinquenta por cento. Era \*vulgarmente\* chamado de... gratificação faroeste. [...] Então nessa época, o que se tinha, os salários eram muito poucos, baixos, e entrou um general chamado general Cerqueira. Era um general de Exército e ele foi secretário de segurança duas vezes no estado do Rio de Janeiro. Primeiro foi em oitenta e dois... e depois foi em noventa e cinco. Então nessa época o general Cerqueira ele... dava essas premiações pra gente. Eu recebo até hoje quinze por cento em função disso. Deveria ser cinquenta. É um aumento, é... hoje é em torno de mil e duzentos reais que eu recebo, vou levar pro resto da vida. Algo que faz \*muita\* diferença. Né? Numa época que o salário era \*muito\* baixo, né?

## 7.20. Order x Disorder

**Larrey:** People have no idea what impact police victimization has on society as a whole. Because if the police officer, who is that person who is supposed to be prepared, wearing PPE, is hit, I, who am also a police officer and a citizen, am also being hit. Because my commuting will be hampered, because my property will be devalued, because I won't be able to go to a certain place... Because I no longer have control over that. So it's one last sign, an indicator of loss of social control.

**Larrey:** As pessoas não têm noção do que a vitimização policial gera de impacto em toda a sociedade. Porque se o policial, que é aquela pessoa que é pra estar preparada, portando os EPIs, é atingido, eu, que também sou policial e também sou cidadã, também tô sendo atingida. Porque o meu deslocamento vai ficar prejudicado, porque meu imóvel vai ficar desvalorizado, porque um determinado local eu não vou poder ir... Porque não tem mais controle sobre aquilo. Então é um último sinalizador, indicador de perda do controle social.

**Nogueira:** What is the job of the Police... The job of the Police itself today is- is to maintain order, right? Do the order- keep

**Nogueira:** Quê que é o trabalho da Polícia... O trabalho da Polícia em si hoje é- é manter a ordem, né? Fazer o ordena-

the order, [make] the system work, right? All of it, right? Be it the transport system, be it the subway system, be it- be it the road system... The Police today keeps order, right? We live in a society, right, that has some rules today, some- there are some rules that have to be followed and the police today, the system- the- is to maintain order, right? So that this can go ahead and we have- manage to make everything work, right? Ah... It's very interesting for us to talk about this because the Police... The Police itself... The UPP [Pacifying Police Unit] system, why didn't it work? The UPP system didn't work out because the Police came in, maintained order, did everything they were supposed to do, but the public [trash] collection, sanitation, health, education system... that system didn't come in. The UPP entered. Do you think violence can be solved with violence? It can't be solved, it's already proven that it can't, people. Where do people want to insist? And the UPP... is the face of it. The police comes in, put things in order, does... right? It maintains proximity to the community and such. It keeps that community turning, going... but the other system doesn't enter. And then how does it happen? Over time you lose. Lose strength, lose energy... the flexibility between the community and the police decreases... Because the other system that was supposed to enter, did not enter, and that order that the police maintained, it keeps moving away and causes situations that over time they get worse and worse, and when you see the initial system, it gets diluted over time. It is difficult. It is difficult.

**Pereira:** Ostensive policing tries to maintain public order, you know, in force. Right? And when it gets out of control, he will intervene there to fix, you know, fix the problem, the crime, the social disorder,

o- manter a ordem, o sistema andar, né? Todo ele, né? Seja o sistema de transporte, seja o sistema de metrô, seja- seja o sistema viário... A Polícia hoje ela mantém a ordem, né? A gente vive numa sociedade, né, que tem algumas regras hoje, algumas- tem algumas regras que tem que ser seguidas e a polícia hoje, o siste- a- é manter a ordem, né? Pra que isso consiga andar e a gente tem- consiga fazer tudo funcionar, né? Ah... É muito interessante a gente falar sobre isso porque a Polícia... a Polícia em si... O sistema da UPP [Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora], ela não deu certo por quê? O sistema da UPP não deu certo porque a Polícia entrou, manteu a ordem, fez tudo que deveria fazer, mas o sistema público de coleta, saneamento, saúde, educação... esse sistema não entrou. Entrou a UPP. Tu acha que violência se resolve com violência? Não se resolve, já tá provado que não, gente. Aonde o pessoal quer insistir? E a UPP... é a cara disso. A polícia entra, faz ordenamento, faz... né? Mantém uma proximidade com a comunidade e tal. Mantém aquela comunidade girando, andando... mas os outro sistema não an- -não entra. E aí como que acontece? Ao longo do tempo tu vai perdendo. Vai perdendo força, vai perdendo energia... a flexibilização entre comunidade e policial vai diminuindo... Porque os outros sistema que era pra entrar, não entrou, e aquele ordenamento que a polícia mantinha ele vai se distanciando e vai provocando situações que ao longo do tempo elas vão cada vez piorando mais, e quando tu vê o sistema inicial, ele vai se diluindo ao longo do tempo. É difícil. É difícil.

**Pereira:** O policiamento ostensivo ele tenta manter a ordem pública, né, vigente. Né? E quando sai isso de controle ele vai intervir ali pra sanar, né, sanar o problema, o crime, a desordem social, né? A ideia é

right? That's the idea, we keep it working, right? Keep the social order working.

**Pereira:** I'm going to expand for you a little bit now about- because this is all about maintaining security, isn't that right? Our first theme, right? What is maintenance? It's you trying to keep... give order to chaos, right? 'Cause we literally live in social chaos, so policing is there to try to keep it in balance, right? In some way.

**Pereira:** [...] because all this, Victor, here, which affects society, will fall to the police. It's what I told you. The entire social arrangement, it will fall into the police. Do you understand? One way or another because this is the end, right?

**Victor:** You mentioned, right, that the police is the end.

**Pereira:** Yes, the end, it's the end of everything. Everything will get there. Everything. You understand? So if we have a disorganized social fabric, you know?

**Pereira:** But when you wear down the social fabric, things tend to anarchy, man. And anarchy you have no control and there is no police that can handle, brother. There comes a time when- Especially because the police- this is important, huh? The police are the last barrier between a civilized society and chaos, okay? This is important for you to put, it is the last barrier. If this barrier is broken, society becomes an anarchy, it becomes chaos, ok? Society- The police is the last barrier between a civilized society and chaos. This is very important.

**Rodrigues:** That's what the police is, right, man? It is the only defense the citizen has. Right? Because you, here, in this case, something happened, the guy got in here, you can see the guy over there wanting to

essa, a gente manter isso aí funcionando, né? Manter a ordem social funcionando.

**Pereira:** Eu vou te ampliar um pouquinho agora sobre- porque isso tudo tá nesse tema de manutenção da segurança, não foi isso? Nosso primeiro tema, né? O que que é manutenção? É você tentar manter... dar ordem no caos, né? Que a gente vive literalmente um caos social, então o policiamento ele tá ali pra tentar manter isso aí em equilíbrio, né? De alguma maneira.

**Pereira:** [...] porque isso tudo, ô Victor, aqui, que mexe na sociedade, vai cair na polícia. É o que eu te falei. Todo o arranjo social, ele vai cair na polícia. Entende? De uma maneira ou de outra por que esse é o fim né?

**Victor:** Você mencionou né, que a polícia é o fim.

**Pereira:** Sim, o fim, é o fim de tudo. Tudo vai chegar lá. Tudo. Entende? Então se a gente tem um tecido social desorganizado, entende?

**Pereira:** Mas quando você desgasta o tecido social, a coisa tende anarquia, cara. E anarquia você não tem controle e não há polícia que dê jeito, irmão. Chega uma hora que- Até porque a polícia- isso é importante, hein? A polícia é a última barreira entre uma sociedade civilizada e o caos, tá? Isso é importante você colocar, é a última barreira. Se essa barreira for quebrada, a sociedade ela vira uma anarquia, ela vira um caos, tá? Sociedade- A polícia é a última barreira entre uma sociedade civilizada e o caos. Isso é muito importante.

**Rodrigues:** A Polícia é aquilo, né, cara? É a única defesa que o cidadão tem. Né? Porque você, aqui, no caso aqui, aconteceu alguma coisa, o cara entrou aqui dentro, tu tá vendo o cara ali querendo entrar aqui;



get in here; call the police. Because the police are paid for that, to defend the citizen. Imagine if you don't have the Police, what are you going to do? You will- Or else you will have the right to have a gun inside your house, to have a rifle, for you... to defend yourself [laughing].

**Rodrigues:** Because the only barrier, the only- the only defense that the citizen has between good and evil, to defend you, is the police. You- A guy arrives here, a bandit here, where are you going to call? For the police, right? For her to come to defend you. Do you understand?

liga pra Polícia. Porque a Polícia é paga pra isso, pra defender o cidadão. Imagina se não tiver a Polícia, você vai fazer o quê? Você vai- Ou então você vai ter que ter direito de ter uma arma dentro da tua casa, de ter um fuzil, pra tu... se defender [rindo].

**Rodrigues:** Porque a única barreira, a única- a única defesa que o cidadão tem entre o bem o mal, pra te defender, é a polícia. Você- Chega um cara aqui, um bandido aqui, tu vai ligar pra onde? Pra Polícia, né? Pra ela vir pra te defender. Entendeu?

## 7.21. Police and Society

**Larrey:** There is oppression because there is a sense of police officers \*not\* belonging in this society. It seems to be an exclusion from society in terms of the police officer's belonging \*as\* a citizen. As if the police officer came from Mars, being a police officer- No, the police officer is a reflection of an entire society. Right? So \*today\* we have approximately 50.000 active-duty police. It is an expressive number. From the Military Police. It's an expressive number to-uh... if we consider the population of Rio de Janeiro, it's an expressive number. So, do these 50.000 police officers not represent? That's just active duty, if you consider from the activity more than 110.000 police officers. Do they not represent society? What I see, my impression, is that society does not recognize them as beings of society. So when I say "police victimization" it doesn't seem to reach me.

**Nunes:** People doesn't care- nobody cares about the police. If you send the police today, you'll be inside a *favela* twenty-four hours a

**Larrey:** Existe opressão porque existe uma sensação de \*não\* pertencimento do policial nessa sociedade. Parece que é uma exclusão da sociedade em termos de pertencimento do policial \*como\* cidadão. Como se o policial viesse de Marte, ser policial- Não, o policial ele é reflexo de uma sociedade inteira. Né? Então \*hoje\* a gente tem aproximadamente 50 mil policiais da ativa. É um número expressivo. Da Polícia Militar. É um número expressivo pra- é... se a gente considerar a população fluminense é um número expressivo. Então assim, será que esses 50 mil policiais não representam? Isso só da ativa, se considerar aí da atividade mais de 110 mil policiais. Será que eles não representam a sociedade? O que eu vejo, a minha impressão, é que a sociedade não os reconhece como seres da sociedade. Então quando eu falo "vitimização policial" parece que não me atinge.

**Nunes:** Pessoa não tá nem- ninguém tá nem aí pra Polícia. Se hoje mandar a Polícia, tu vai ficar dentro duma favela vinte e quatro horas

day, it doesn't matter if we're going to be hungry, if we're going to be sleepless, if we're going to be tired, nobody cares. A large part of society will only think of the Police when there is a situation that needs them for help or when the police officer has made a mistake.

**Nunes:** Does society help? Society does not help. And the system favors those with power. [...] So I think the problem is much bigger. It's society. It's not just the institution. The institution is yet another branch of society. That's how I think.

**Pereira:** But then there is also that issue that I told you about, that we later, at another time, we can say that the police officer is a product of the environment... You know? And the social environment at that time was a violent environment. Do you understand? So all this feature. It changed because society also changed, education changed...

**Pereira:** But what does that reflect? The society... Do you understand, Victor? Society has degraded... man, the police officer comes from here. The police officer doesn't come from Mars, he comes from here. If his city is bad, [it'll] put a bad police officer there. Now, if you take the best from society, then... Do you understand? It's linked, education and better social condition.

**Pereira:** [...] but in a way what I- like, from everything I said, we can learn a lesson, man: the evolution of society is the evolution of the Police. Do you understand? The police officer is a product of the social environment. Do you understand? He is the stratum of society, right, man? And then... as you select this group, right? If you select well, you'll have an excellent Police, right, man? If you

por dia, não tá nem aí se a gente vai estar com fome, se a gente vai estar sem dormir, se a gente vai estar cansado, ninguém tá nem aí. Grande parte da sociedade só vai pensar na Polícia quando tem uma situação que precisa dela pra socorrer ou quando o policial fez besteira.

**Nunes:** A sociedade ajuda? A sociedade não ajuda. E o sistema favorece quem tem poder. [...] Então eu acho que o problema é muito maior. É a sociedade. Não é só a instituição. A instituição é mais um ramo da sociedade. Assim que eu penso.

**Pereira:** Mas aí tem aquela questão também que eu te falo, que aí a gente depois, em outro momento, pode falar que o policial é um produto do meio... Sabe? E o meio social naquela época era um meio violento. Entendeu? Então toda essa característica. Se mudou porque a sociedade também mudou, a educação mudou...

**Pereira:** Mas isso reflete o quê? A sociedade... Tá entendendo, Victor? Sociedade degradou... cara, o policial vem daqui. O policial não vem de Marte, ele vem daqui. Se a cidade dele tá ruim, vai botar um policial ruim ali. Agora, se você pega da sociedade os melhores, aí... Tá entendendo? Tá vinculado, educação e condição social melhor.

**Pereira:** [...] mas de certa maneira o que eu- assim, de tudo que eu falei, a gente pode tirar uma lição, cara: a evolução da sociedade é a evolução da Polícia. Entendeu? O policial é produto do meio social. Entende? Ele é o estrato da sociedade, né, cara? E aí... conforme você seleciona esse grupo, né? Se você selecionar bem, você vai ter uma Polícia excelente, né, cara? Se você selecionar mal...

select poorly... Now, how do you select well if you're not paying well, if you don't provide working conditions... do you understand?

Agora, como é que você seleciona bem se você não tá pagando bem, se você não dá condições de trabalho... tá entendendo?

**Pereira:** That's another point I want to get to... for you too, that the police are made... We are not aliens, we came out of the social bosom, man. If the social environment is good, it's strengthened, you'll have a good police force. If it's all deformed, you're going to have a bad police. The police officer is a product of the social \*environment\* in which that society is inserted, you understand? It's what we were talking about. The police officer does not come from Mars. He's a person of the people, man. Are you understanding? Now, through a better selection, a better social level, a social research that is done for him to enter, you qualify the professional. And it goes- And it's even difficult still, you- individuals with misconduct still come in there. It was much worse in my day. Imagine. A time, in 1995, primary education was required, first grade, you had individuals there... even from drug trafficking, man, who entered. You understand? This- For us it was bad, because it was a bad element that entered there, do you understand? So over time, the issue of education level improved, you know, a social level...

**Pereira:** Aí que é um outro ponto que eu quero chegar... pra você também, que a polícia é feita... Nós não somos alienígenas, nós saímos do seio social, cara. Se o seio social tá bom, tá fortalecido, você vai ter uma polícia boa. Se tá todo disforme, você vai ter uma polícia ruim. O policial é produto do \*meio\* social em que é inserida aquela sociedade, tá entendendo? É o que a gente falava. O policial não vem de Marte. Ele é gente da gente, cara. Tá entendendo? Agora, através de uma seleção melhor, de um nível social melhor, de uma pesquisa social que se faz pra ele entrar, você vai qualificando o profissional. E vai- E mesmo assim é difícil, você- ainda entra aí indivíduos com desvio de conduta. Era muito pior na minha época. Imagina. Uma época, em 95, se exigia ensino fundamental, primeiro grau, você tinha indivíduos aí... oriundos até do tráfico de drogas, cara, que entravam. Entende? Isso- Pra gente era ruim, porque era um mau elemento que entrava ali, tá entendendo? Então ao longo do tempo foi melhorando a questão do nível de escolaridade, né, um nível social...

## 7.22. Police as Social Ascension

**Nogueira:** I didn't join by vocation. I joined out of necessity and then I went to see that I had a vocation for the profession. It's very- it's very interesting. Sometimes you- we draw a path and in the middle of the... the path you go to another and you see that you \*have\* a vocation for that, that you discover your vocation, and that you fall in love with what you do. Do you understand? And this is

**Nogueira:** Não entrei por vocação. Eu entrei por necessidade e depois eu fui ver que e- eu tinha a vocação pra profissão. É muito- é muito interessante isso. Às vezes você- a gente traça um caminho e no meio do... do caminho você vai pra outro e você vê que você \*tem\* vocação pra aquilo, que você descobre a sua vocação, e que tu se apaixona por aquilo que tu faz. Entendeu? E é muito

very interesting, because I never imagined that, I imagined being an anesthetist, doing... specializing in this area and it ended up going to another area and today I'm super happy in the area that- that I chose halfway through. It went really well.

**Victor:** And what would you say is the vocation of a police officer?

**Nogueira:** Yeah, there are some, like, there are some police officers who have it in their blood, right? It's already in the blood because it comes from the father, it comes from the grandfather, it comes from the uncle... I don't have a police officer in my family. I was the first to be a police officer in my family. And that, sometimes, you see boys, children, right? Already wanting to wear BOPE clothes, because the father is a police officer, because the uncle is a police officer and you also see boys who have no one in the police family, but he identifies with that profession, he identifies there, in that profession, right, of a police officer and then you see that there was a game a long time ago – police and criminals – then the boy already says “I am a police officer, I am a police officer!” and then he starts identifying himself with the profession. It is very cool. And- and today I see, you know, that there are a lot of people, uh... five hundred times in the profession, just [like] happened to me, and you find out halfway through that... that their vocation is exactly that. Example: uh... there are police officers today who came in due to financial need, because they have to support the family, because they have to support the child, because they have to support the father, mother... and in the middle of the way the guy wouldn't be, but then he discovers that there – “damn it, it's my-” – the guy identifies with the military police service, with the police service, you know? It's very interesting. [...] Yeah. I'm an atypical thing. Yeah... My uncle is a general, the other uncle is a colonel in the

interessante isso, porque eu nunca imaginei isso, eu imaginei ser anestesista, fazer... me especializar nessa área e acabou que foi pra outra área e hoje sou super feliz na área que eu escolhi no meio do caminho. Foi muito bom.

**Victor:** E qual você diria que é a vocação do policial?

**Nogueira:** É, tem alguns, assim, tem alguns policiais que já nasce isso no sangue, né? Já já tem isso no sangue porque vem do pai, vem do avô, vem do tio... Eu não tenho na minha família ninguém policial. Eu fui o primeiro a ser policial na minha família. E isso, às vezes, tu vê meninos, crianças né? Já querendo vestir a roupa do BOPE, porque o pai é policial, porque o tio é policial e você vê também meninos que não têm ninguém na família policial, mas ele se identifica com aquela profissão, ele se identifica ali, naquela profissão, né, de policial e aí você vê que tinha uma brincadeira muito tempo atrás – polícia e bandido – aí o menino já fala “sou policial, sou policial!” e aí ele já vai se identificando com a profissão. É muito legal. E- e hoje eu vejo, né, que tem muita gente, é... quinhentas vezes na profissão, que [nem] aconteceu comigo, e vai descobrindo no meio do caminho que... que a vocação dela é aquilo mesmo. Exemplo: é... tem policiais hoje que entrou por necessidade financeira, porque tem que sustentar a família, porque tem que sustentar filho, porque tem que sustentar pai, mãe... e no meio do caminho o cara não ia ser, mas depois ele descobre que aquilo ali – “caralho, é a minha-” – o cara se identifica com o serviço policial militar, com o serviço de polícia, entendeu? É muito interessante. [...] É. Eu sou uma coisa atípica. É... Meu tio é general, o outro tio é coronel do exército, general... Eu fiz tudo escondido. Eu fiz o- a prova escondido, eu fiz o exame médico escondido, o exame físico escondido... Eu só fui me apresentar- o meu pai, minha família

army, a general... I did everything in secret. I did the- the test hidden, I did the medical exam hidden, the physical exam hidden... I only went to introduce myself- my father, my family only found out one day when I left home at four o'clock in the morning and my father asked me where I was going four o'clock in the morning. I said I was going to report to the police and my father said: "I didn't raise a son to be shot by *bandido*". And today... and today I help my father financially. And if it weren't for the police, I wouldn't have been able to help my father. It's very crazy, right? This... this change.

**Nunes:** It's because the poor need *\*means\** to survive. Now, those who have an improved life situation don't think that way, they just want to enjoy it. There are people here at the Police who only think about buying a cell phone, or a car, or having a house. There are people who already have two, three cars, for him they just want a different cigarette, a different club, to have three women. We have to unbalance this... this balance, right? There are people in my class that they never lived [...] what I lived. There's a colleague of mine, [colleague's nickname], who lives in Lagoa, high class. His Police is totally different. His vision of the Police, his vision of society is totally different, utopian. The guy lived in Europe, man. [Colleague's surname], millionaire, friend of my class, millionaire lawyer, passed because he wanted to be a military police officer. Complains about everything, obviously. But for me this is *\*amazing\**. Man, I'm having an opportunity to earn eight thousand, I'm going to end up earning thirty thousand *reais* in this Police. For them it's normal, for them it's just any job, but not for the poorest people. Is different.

só foi saber num dia que eu saí de casa quatro horas da manhã e meu pai me perguntou aonde eu tava indo quatro horas da manhã. Eu falei que eu estava indo me apresentar na Polícia e meu pai falou assim: "eu não criei filho pra tomar tiro de bandido". E hoje... e hoje eu ajudo o meu pai financeiramente. E se não fosse a Polícia eu não teria como ajudar meu pai. É muito doido, né? Essa... essa mudança.

**Nunes:** É porque o pobre ele precisa de *\*meios\** pra sobreviver. Agora, quem tem uma situação de vida melhorada não pensa dessa forma, ele só quer curtir. Tem pessoas aqui na Polícia que só pensa em comprar um celular, ou um carro, ou ter uma casa. Tem gente que já tem duas, três carros, pra ele só quer um cigarro diferente, uma balada diferente, ter três mulheres. A gente tem que desequilibrar esse... essa balança, né? Tem pessoas da minha turma que elas nunca viveram [...] o que eu vivi. Tem um colega meu, [apelido do colega], que mora na Lagoa, alta classe. A Polícia dele é totalmente diferente. A visão dele de Polícia, a visão dele de sociedade é totalmente diferente, utópica. O cara morava na Europa, pô. O [sobrenome do colega], milionário, amigo da minha turma, advogado milionário, passou porque queria ser policial militar. Reclama de tudo, obviamente. Mas pra mim isso aqui é o *\*máximo\**. Pô, tô tendo uma oportunidade de ganhar oito mil, vou terminar ganhando trinta mil reais nessa Polícia. Pra eles é normal, pra eles é um emprego qualquer, mas pra pessoa mais pobre não. É diferente.

**Pereira:** With what I had intellect-wise, that's what I had at that moment, right? We call it in the barracks the means of fortune, right? Means of fortune I had there at that moment, okay? Of social and professional ascension, right? It was what I had. That moment. So basically that's what made me be [a police officer], you know?

**Pereira:** Com o que eu tinha de intelectualidade, era o que eu tinha à mão naquele momento, né? A gente chama no quartel de meios de fortuna, né? Meios de fortuna que eu tinha ali naquele momento, tá? De ascensão social e profissional, né? Era o que eu tinha. Naquele momento. Então, basicamente é isso que me fez ser [policial], sabe?

## **8. Appendixes**

Note: All the appendixes, except for the interview script, were shared with the respondents for their later referral.

### **8.1. Resumo do Objetivo de Pesquisa**

Você está sendo convidado a participar desta pesquisa, que tem como objetivo estudar as formas pelas quais policiais entendem, explicam, e justificam as violências às quais são sujeitos no exercício da função policial. Essas violências são entendidas aqui como tanto a violência empregada, quanto a violência sofrida no exercício da profissão.

Este estudo será realizado a partir de entrevistas, mantendo-se preservadas a sua confidencialidade, privacidade e o sigilo das informações sob responsabilidade do pesquisador. Todos os materiais coletados durante as entrevistas serão guardados em pastas criptografadas e protegidas com senha e somente serão manuseados em momentos em que a internet estiver desligada, garantindo a integridade e a segurança das informações e dos respondentes. Seu nome e de todos os indivíduos mencionados na entrevista serão substituídos por outros, fictícios, assim como serão substituídas outras informações potencialmente identificadoras, como locais, datas e eventos, conforme estratégias discriminadas em documento anexo compartilhado pelo pesquisador.

As entrevistas poderão ser gravadas em áudio ou anotadas em caderno, sendo a opção de sua escolha. Gravações, quando autorizadas, serão ouvidas e utilizadas única e exclusivamente pelo pesquisador e são feitas principalmente para garantir a integridade das informações e que nada dito durante a entrevista seja negligenciado. As gravações serão feitas em gravadores de áudio não conectados à internet e salvas em cartões de memória em branco. Tão logo a entrevista se encerre e o pesquisador tenha acesso ao computador seguro, as vozes serão digitalmente alteradas para dificultar identificação e quaisquer informações confidenciais ou potencialmente identificadoras serão censuradas. Após a edição preliminar, os áudios das entrevistas serão transcritos e armazenados em local seguro até o fim do período mínimo de preservação dos dados da pesquisa – a saber, 5 anos –, ocasião

na qual todos os dados da pesquisa serão permanentemente excluídos. Caso você prefira que as informações sejam registradas por escrito, as entrevistas serão anotadas em cadernos novos, em branco, e suas informações serão registradas já preliminarmente anonimizadas: nomes e outras informações confidenciais serão substituídos por outros, fictícios, no próprio ato da escrita, tendo sido definidos com antecedência pelo pesquisador para esse caso. Quaisquer materiais físicos serão guardados em local seguro até que sejam digitalizados e protegidos com criptografia e senha, conforme parágrafo acima. Toda e qualquer informação compartilhada com o pesquisador será guardada e protegida, jamais sendo compartilhadas com quaisquer outras pessoas. Após o término desta investigação, em julho de 2022, quaisquer gravações, quando autorizadas, e quaisquer outros materiais não editados serão excluídos ou destruídos.

Sua participação é voluntária, e você está livre para fazer as perguntas que julgar necessárias, interromper a entrevista quando assim desejar, recusar-se a responder qualquer pergunta, e para retirar seu consentimento para participação na pesquisa em qualquer momento e sem qualquer prejuízo para você. No caso de revogação do consentimento, todos os dados coletados e termos relacionados à sua participação serão imediatamente destruídos. Ainda que o risco esperado da pesquisa seja mínimo e que haja precauções estabelecidas pelo pesquisador para que quaisquer riscos restantes sejam minimizados, se você sentir algum incômodo causado pelas perguntas, visto que tratam de experiências pessoais, o incômodo pode ser relatado ao pesquisador e a pergunta pode ser omitida e evitada, caso queira. Se alguma questão ou informação compartilhada gerar alguma forma de sofrimento psíquico, o pesquisador poderá encaminhá-lo a serviços de atendimento psicológico. A princípio você não terá nenhum benefício, assim como não terá nenhum tipo de despesa ou remuneração por participar desta pesquisa, entretanto esperamos converter os resultados dela em ações benéficas para a sociedade e para a classe policial. Além disso, ao participar, você terá a oportunidade de refletir sobre questões pessoais e eventos vividos, potencialmente aproveitando benefícios subjetivos a partir desse exercício.

Ao participar desta investigação, você contribui para um aprofundamento nos estudos sobre violência policial no Brasil. Esta pesquisa possui vínculo com a



Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro – PUC-Rio através do Programa de Pós-Graduação do Instituto de Relações Internacionais, sendo o aluno Victor Damasceno Toscano Costa o pesquisador principal, sob a orientação do Prof. James Casas Klausen. Você terá uma via do Termo de Consentimento Livre e Esclarecido para guardar com você e os resultados da pesquisa, uma vez concluída, estarão à sua disposição caso queira acessá-los. Em caso de dúvidas, você poderá entrar em contato com o pesquisador responsável, com o seu orientador, e com a Câmara de Ética em Pesquisa da Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (CEPq/PUC-Rio), conforme meios de contato incluídos no Termo de Consentimento Livre e Esclarecido. Após estes esclarecimentos, solicitamos o seu consentimento de forma livre para participar desta pesquisa. O Termo de Consentimento é assinado em duas vias, sendo uma entregue ao participante e a outra ao pesquisador. Assinando o seguinte termo, você está autorizando a utilização das informações prestadas em ensino, pesquisa e publicação, sendo preservada a sua identidade e as de quaisquer pessoas citadas ou relacionadas nas entrevistas.

## 8.2. Termo de Consentimento Livre e Esclarecido (TCLE)

Instituto de Relações Internacionais – Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro

**Tema de pesquisa:** Compreensões, explicações e justificativas sobre violência sofrida e utilizada no exercício da função policial

**Pesquisador:** Victor Damasceno Toscano Costa

**E-mail:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Telephone:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Orientador:** James Casas Klausen

**E-mail:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Telephone:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Câmara de Ética em Pesquisa da PUC-Rio:** Rua Marquês de São Vicente, 225 – Edifício Kennedy, 2º andar. Gávea, Rio de Janeiro, RJ. CEP: 22453-900. Fone: (21) 3527-1618.

Estou ciente de que minha privacidade e minha anonimidade serão respeitadas, ou seja, meu nome e quaisquer outros dados, elementos, ou informações que possam, de qualquer forma, me identificar, serão mantidos em sigilo, de acordo com as estratégias de confidencialidade compartilhadas pelo pesquisador, tendo direito a indenização diante de eventuais danos provocados pela participação na pesquisa.

Fui informado de que posso me recusar a participar do estudo, ou retirar meu consentimento a qualquer momento sem precisar justificar minha decisão e de que não sofrerei qualquer prejuízo por escolher sair da pesquisa.

Estou ciente de que me será assegurada assistência durante toda pesquisa, bem como me é garantido o livre acesso a todas as informações e esclarecimentos adicionais sobre o estudo e suas consequências, enfim, tudo o que eu queira saber antes, durante e depois da minha participação. Os meios de contato com o pesquisador me foram adequadamente transmitidos.

Enfim, tendo sido orientado quanto ao teor de tudo aqui mencionado e tendo compreendido a natureza e o objetivo do estudo, manifesto meu livre consentimento em participar, estando totalmente ciente de que não há nenhum valor monetário, a

receber ou a pagar, nem qualquer outra benesse ou contrapartida por minha participação.

*Por favor, rubrique as caixas a seguir, caso concorde com as afirmações*

- |                 |  |                          |
|-----------------|--|--------------------------|
| 1               | Eu confirmo ter lido e entendido a declaração de objetivos e cuidados do estudo. Tive a oportunidade de considerar as informações cuidadosamente e minhas dúvidas foram respondidas satisfatoriamente.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2               | Eu entendo que minha participação é voluntária e que sou livre para remover minha autorização de participação em qualquer momento, não havendo necessidade de explicar a razão para minha desistência.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3               | Eu fui devidamente informado dos riscos potenciais associados à minha participação na pesquisa e as considerei apropriadamente antes de consentir em participar.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4               | Eu entendo quem terá acesso às informações e aos dados provenientes das entrevistas, como serão guardados, e o que acontecerá às informações e dados ao fim do projeto.  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5               | Eu fui informado quanto às vantagens e desvantagens das diferentes formas de registro das entrevistas – isto é, gravações de áudio ou anotações por escrito – e quanto aos cuidados observados pelo pesquisador em cada caso e decidi de maneira livre pela forma que prefiro. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 6               | Eu entendo que <i>não</i> serei identificável em nenhuma publicação ou outras produções acadêmicas baseadas nesse estudo e que a confidencialidade das informações compartilhadas será respeitada.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7               | Eu entendo como a pesquisa será escrita e publicada.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 8               | Eu entendo que esse projeto foi revisado pela Câmara de Ética em Pesquisa da Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) e que foi aprovado, cumprindo todos os requerimentos e cuidados éticos necessários para a execução segura da pesquisa.               | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 9               | Eu recebi os meios de contato com o pesquisador e entendo minha liberdade para expressar preocupações ou fazer reclamações em qualquer momento da pesquisa.  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 10              | Eu concordo em participar do estudo.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <b>Opcional</b> | Eu autorizo a gravação da entrevista.  | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Rio de Janeiro, \_\_\_\_\_ de \_\_\_\_\_ de 2022

### **8.3. Estratégias de Segurança e Confidencialidade**

#### **8.3.1. Cuidados Gerais**

As entrevistas começarão com dados principais dos respondentes já anonimizados/codificados pelo pesquisador;

Entrevistas serão conduzidas em locais escolhidos em colaboração com os respondentes, nos quais a segurança, a privacidade, a anonimidade e o sigilo das entrevistas possam ser preservados;

O entrevistado poderá interromper a entrevista a qualquer momento, caso deseje, não havendo necessidade de explicação ao pesquisador quanto aos seus motivos;

Todas e quaisquer dúvidas que surgirem antes ou depois das entrevistas poderão ser esclarecidas com o pesquisador pelos meios de contato compartilhados;

Quaisquer acomodações e alterações no curso das entrevistas serão feitas em colaboração entre o pesquisador e os entrevistados.

#### **8.3.2. Gravações de áudio**

Gravações serão feitas em aparelhos de gravação de áudio não conectados à internet e em todos os casos serão usados cartões de memória em branco e protegidos por senha;

Cartões de memória usados serão formatados tão logo a transcrição da entrevista esteja completa e outras informações coletadas estejam seguras em pastas criptografadas;

As gravações, quando autorizadas, só serão iniciadas após a exposição completa dos objetivos da pesquisa, das estratégias de segurança e confidencialidade, da obtenção de consentimento livre e esclarecido, e após todas as perguntas dos respondentes serem respondidas e suas dúvidas esclarecidas;

O pesquisador irá anunciar o momento em que as gravações forem iniciadas;

O gravador ficará à vista em todos os momentos, a não ser que os respondentes solicitem que ele seja ocultado;

Em qualquer momento que desejarem, os respondentes podem solicitar a suspensão ou interrupção total das gravações, sem necessidade de informar o motivo da decisão;

Todo e qualquer pedido de exclusão de trechos ou informações compartilhadas será prontamente atendido;

Ao fim da entrevista o pesquisador anunciará o encerramento das gravações e fará o encerramento à vista do entrevistado.

### **8.3.3. Anotações e materiais físicos**

Toda entrevista será feita com um caderno de anotações novo, em branco;

Nenhuma informação reveladora ou incriminadora será registrada por escrito;

Nenhum dado será registrado sem que seja necessário;

Informações potencialmente identificadoras serão anonimizadas no ato da escrita, seja com pseudônimos, seja com códigos;

Todas as anotações e outros materiais físicos coletados nas entrevistas serão guardados em local seguro até que possam ser digitalizados e criptografados, observando-se os cuidados descritos na sessão a seguir.

### **8.3.4. Arquivos digitais**

Todos os arquivos serão preliminarmente editados tão logo possível para tornar quaisquer informações potencialmente identificadoras inacessíveis;

Estratégias de edição incluem: distorção digital de vozes, apagamento ou sobrescrita de informações sensíveis, corte e exclusão de trechos reveladores, entre outros.

Todos os arquivos serão individualmente criptografados e guardados em pastas protegidas por senha;

O manuseio dos materiais será feito com o computador desconectado da internet;

Qualquer informação coletada nas entrevistas só será incluída ao trabalho final depois que as edições preliminares sejam feitas;

Todas as informações incluídas serão revisadas para garantir anonimidade, sigilo, privacidade e segurança.

## 8.4. Roteiro das Entrevistas

### I. Informações básicas da entrevista

- # da entrevista
- Data
- Idade aproximada do entrevistado
- Gênero
- Categoria
  - Policial, policial aposentado, agente de outra instituição de segurança, outro...
- Organizações/Unidade de Polícia
  - Tanto atual, quanto anteriores
- Ranque/patente
- Tempo de serviço
- Pseudônimo

### II. Questionário

- História do entrevistado

Poderia me contar um pouco sobre você?

E sobre como se tornou policial?

Por que decidiu pela carreira na polícia?

Por que decidiu por essa instituição policial (Militar, Civil, outras...)?

Hoje, o que pensa dessas decisões?

- Treinamento

Como foi o treinamento para se tornar policial?

Acredita que o treinamento te preparou de maneira adequada para o serviço nas ruas?

O que gostaria de ter aprendido no início?

O que acredita ter sido conhecimento inútil?

O que aprendeu fazendo o trabalho que a academia não te ensinou?

A instituição te proporciona possibilidades de aperfeiçoamento? (Workshops, cursos, palestras...)

O que acha dessas experiências?

- Sobre o trabalho policial

O que é o trabalho da polícia?

No que consiste o trabalho policial?

Quais habilidades são necessárias?

Que aptidões psicológicas são necessárias?

Quais riscos fazem parte do trabalho?

Por que a polícia e o trabalho policial são necessários?

O que faz um bom policial? O que faz um policial ruim?

Há alguma diferença entre você enquanto policial e você fora do serviço?

Há discordâncias entre o policial que trabalha nas ruas e outros agentes de segurança, policiais ou não, que trabalham fora das ruas?

Há discordância com os oficiais de patentes mais altas/superiores em relação ao que é/deve ser feito nas ruas?

Como a sociedade vê o trabalho policial? E a mídia? E pesquisadores?

O que a sociedade, a mídia, e os pesquisadores não entendem sobre a polícia e o trabalho policial?

Que obstáculos existem para o trabalho policial?

Quais são os maiores obstáculos?



Como contorná-los?

Como você os contorna no dia a dia?

Qual abordagem ou ação foi mais memorável? Por quê?

Que comportamentos são/foram recompensados no trabalho?

Que comportamentos são/foram punidos no trabalho?

Já se arrependeu de algo que fez? E de algo que não fez? Faria diferente?

- Sobre violência

Quando a violência deve ser usada?

Quando a violência é usada?

Existe alguma situação em que a violência não deve ser usada? Se sim, qual(is)?

Em que situações sente que a violência é necessária?

Por que a violência é usada?

A quais situações de violência vocês estão sujeitos?

Alguma vez não se sentiu confortável para fazer o que precisava?

Teme retaliações da sociedade/mídia/pesquisadores?

Teme retaliações da Justiça?

Teme retaliações da Corporação Policial?

Teme que alguns acontecimentos venham a público?

Já sofreu represálias ou punições?

Se se sentir à vontade, poderia contar sobre essas experiências?

### III. Qualidade geral da entrevista (marque todos que se aplicarem)

\_\_\_ 1. Sem maiores problemas, entrevistado cooperativo.

\_\_\_ 2. Entrevistado relutante de início, mas a entrevista foi satisfatória e as respostas foram obtidas.

- \_\_\_ 3. Respostas obtidas, mas entrevistado não pareceu sincero nas respostas.
- \_\_\_ 4. Entrevistado relutante e muitas respostas evitadas.
- \_\_\_ 5. Entrevistado teve dificuldades com as perguntas. Por quê? \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_ 6. Pesquisador não cobriu todos os tópicos.
- \_\_\_ 7. Entrevista interrompida ou havia outras pessoas presentes. Se for o caso, por  
quê/quem? \_\_\_\_\_

8. Houve quaisquer partes da entrevista nas quais o pesquisador duvidou da  
sinceridade do entrevistado? Especifique.

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9. Houve quaisquer partes da entrevista nas quais o pesquisador suspeite ou tenha  
notado grandiloquência e/ou bravata? Especifique.

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10. Anote quaisquer outras impressões da entrevista:

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11. Observações:

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## 9. Questions Asked

### Assis

You mention that you're here temporarily to learn about organized crime, about internal conflicts... What was the most important thing you learned about it?

Você menciona que tá aqui temporariamente pra aprender sobre crime organizado, sobre os conflitos internos... O que que você aprendeu de mais importante sobre isso?

You were saying earlier that it's stupid for traffic to conquer territory. Why do they do it?

Você tava falando mais cedo que é burrice o tráfico conquistar território. Por que que eles conquistam?

So... we've already talked a lot about these things, but... what is your assessment, briefly, about the state of public security in Rio de Janeiro and if you could, had power today, what would you do to change to solve everything?

Então... a gente já falou bastante sobre essas coisas, mas... qual é a sua avaliação, brevemente, sobre o estado de segurança pública do Rio de Janeiro e se você pudesse, tivesse poder hoje, o que você faria pra mudar pra resolver tudo?

### Larrey

How was it when you joined? What was your impression of the Police?

Como foi quando você entrou? Qual foi a sua impressão da Polícia?

And how is the work of the [sector] police officers?

E como é que é o trabalho dos policiais do [setor]?

And you, working here at the front, [...] do you feel that there has been any difference in victims in recent years? If it has increased or decreased?

E você, né, trabalhando aqui na ponta, [...] você sente que tem havido alguma diferença de vítimas nos últimos anos? Se aumentou ou diminuiu?

## Nogueira

Can you name some [police career training courses] that were excellent and some that need improvement?

Você pode citar alguns [cursos da formação à carreira policial] que foram excelentes e alguns que precisam melhorar?

And you also mentioned that you didn't enter the career by vocation, right? And what would you say is the vocation of a police officer?

E você mencionou também que você não entrou na carreira por vocação, né? E qual você diria que é a vocação do policial?

And how did your family react when you decided to join the police force? Because I've heard a lot that sometimes parents don't want their children to participate, they're apprehensive...

E como a sua família reagiu quando você decidiu entrar na Polícia? Porque eu tenho ouvido muito que às vezes os pais não querem que os filhos participem, têm receio...

You were mentioning earlier, right, the militarism that exists in the Military Police. What is this militarism?

Você tava mencionando mais cedo, né, do militarismo que existe na Polícia Militar. O que é esse militarismo?

Yes. For sure. And this has to do with what we talk on the phone too, right? You said that there are some laws, some things that should be made more flexible and others tougher, right? What do you think should be relaxed, and what should be tightened up?

Sim. Com certeza. E isso tem a ver com o que falamos ao telefone também, né? Que você falou que tem algumas leis, algumas coisas que deveriam ser flexibilizadas e outras endurecidas, né? O quê que você acha que deveria ser flexibilizado, e o que tinha que ser endurecido?

So you, as a police officer, in the front, living this every day... What is your assessment of the state of public security in Rio de Janeiro today?

Então você, como policial, na ponta, vivendo todo dia isso... Qual é a sua avaliação do estado da segurança pública no Rio de Janeiro hoje?

You were mentioning just now, right, that our rulers lack making decent public policies. What do you think is missing? Do you think they don't know what to do? Do you think

Você tava mencionando agora, né, que falta os nossos governantes fazerem políticas públicas decentes. O que você acha que falta? Você acha que eles não sabem o que fazer?

they are not interested in doing it? Why don't they do it?

Você acha que eles não têm interesse de fazer? Por que que eles não fazem?

Returning, then, to the actual role of the police, right, what I have also heard a lot is that there is a lack of support for the police officer to do his job. Lack of support, lack... anyway. Many times, the police officer is penalized for the work he does. What do you feel has been missing for you to be able to do the best job you could?

Voltando, então, pra função da polícia de fato, né, o que eu tenho ouvido muito também é que falta suporte pro policial fazer o trabalho dele. Falta apoio, falta... enfim. Muitas vezes o policial é penalizado pelo trabalho que ele faz. O que você sente que tem faltado pra você conseguir fazer o melhor trabalho que você poderia?

I didn't quite understand. You said that he [the police officer] is the driver of the occurrence and ends up getting involved, but what does it mean to be a driver and what does it mean to get involved?

Eu não entendi muito bem. Você falou que ele [policial] é o condutor de ocorrência e acaba se envolvendo, mas o que significa ser condutor e o que significa se envolver?

And the police are seen as the armed wing of the interior of the state, right? You're telling me that your training was deficient both in shooting and in mobilization, which would be the force part, right? Curious. But this is general, it was your specific case... what do you think it is?

E a polícia é vista como o braço armado do interior do Estado, né? Você tá me falando que o seu treinamento foi deficiente tanto em tiro, quanto em mobilização, que seria a parte da força, né? Curioso. Mas isso é geral, foi o seu caso específico... o que você acha que é?

## Nunes

Do you feel this difference [concern with human rights] from the people who work with you?

Você sente essa diferença [preocupação com direitos humanos] das pessoas que trabalham com você?

You mentioned that you had a good profile to be a police officer. What makes a police officer have a good profile?

Você mencionou que você tinha um perfil bom pra ser policial. O que que faz um policial ter um perfil bom?

You mentioned some things that people say are normal, that nothing happens. Can you give me some examples?

Você mencionou aí algumas coisas que o pessoal fala que é normal, que não dá nada. Você pode me dar alguns exemplos?

You were saying, right, that the training was very difficult, that the work is very stressful... Do you believe that your training prepared you in the proper way to exercise the police function?

Você tava falando, né, que o treinamento foi muito difícil, que o trabalho é muito estressante... Você acredita que o seu treinamento te preparou da maneira apropriada pra exercer a função policial?

For sure. So you as a police officer, you working on the street, you know, having this view from the inside, what is your assessment of the state of public security in Rio?

Com certeza. Então você enquanto policial, você trabalhando na rua, né, tendo essa visão de dentro, qual é a sua avaliação do estado de segurança pública no Rio?

Bearing all this, you know, in mind, this panorama of this state of Rio de Janeiro, anyway, corruption and all these illicit agreements, what do you feel is most necessary to be a police officer?

Tendo tudo isso, né, em mente, esse panorama desse estado do Rio de Janeiro, enfim, a corrupção e todos esses acordos ilícitos, o que você sente que é mais necessário para ser policial?

You mentioned that you need a lot of emotional balance. Does the Police or the state give support to the police officer, psychologically or mentally?

Você mencionou que precisa muito equilíbrio emocional. A Polícia ou o Estado dão o suporte, pro policial, psicológico ou mental?

You mentioned who joined the Police to be a hero, to be rich, to be a killer, whatever, [that] this ended... But was there a time that it still existed?

Você mencionou quem entrou na Polícia pra ser herói, pra ser rico, pra ser matador, o que fosse, [que] isso acabou... Mas tinha uma época que ainda tinha?

And what do you feel is different about Rio de Janeiro from the rest of Brazil?

E o que que você sente que é diferente no Rio de Janeiro do resto do Brasil?

## **Pereira**

Can you give some examples of these... suspicious attitudes [which lead to police approaches]?

Você pode dar alguns exemplos dessas... atitudes suspeitas [que levam a abordagens policiais]?

For you, what is the difference between Rio de Janeiro and other states? And of the police officer in Rio de Janeiro too?

Pra você qual é a diferença do Rio de Janeiro pros outros estados? E do policial do Rio de Janeiro também?

And where do these weapons [used by drug trafficking] come from?

E de onde vêm essas armas [usadas pelo tráfico]?

And in what situations does the confrontation have to happen?

E em que situações tem que acontecer o confronto?

Let me just ask you a question. You just mentioned the Massacre of Vigário Geral. Last year happened that one in Jacarezinho, right, the whole media talked about it, there was even Fachin's decision shortly afterwards, if I'm not mistaken... Do you have any comments about that, in relation to that one from the past, anyway, what changed?

Deixa só eu fazer uma pergunta. Você mencionou agora a Chacina de Vigário Geral. Ano passado aconteceu aquela do Jacarezinho, né, a mídia toda falou, teve até a decisão do Fachin logo em seguida, se eu não me engano... Você tem algum comentário sobre isso, em relação a essa do passado, enfim, o que que mudou?

And let me ask you a question that just came to mind. Where is the border, the separation between repressive work and these excesses that these police officers commit?

E deixa eu te fazer uma pergunta que me veio agora. Onde tá a fronteira, a separação entre o trabalho repressivo e esses excessos que esses policiais cometem?

## Rodrigues

Have you noticed any difference between the police officers who entered before you and from your generation? Regarding training and how you deal with people on the street...

Você notou alguma diferença entre os policiais que entraram antes de você e a partir da sua geração? Em relação ao treinamento e como vocês lidam com as pessoas na rua...

Have you had many such situations [where the officer is nervous or agitated]?

Você já teve muitas situações dessas [em que o policial está nervoso ou agitado]?

But were there people [in the *favelas*] who were afraid of the police?

Mas tinha gente [nas favelas] que tinha medo da polícia?

And do you think that the Police had the necessary resources and support for this type of help [to the communities]?

E você acha que a Polícia tinha os recursos e o apoio necessários pra esse tipo de ajuda [às comunidades]?

In these thirty years, how has your work evolved? Can you make a...

Nesses trinta anos como é que foi a evolução do seu trabalho? Você consegue fazer um...

Do you miss the career?

Sente falta da carreira?

And what did you like most in your career, in your work?

E o que você mais gostava na sua carreira, no seu trabalho?

So, talking about the issue of fear, what are the main risks and dangers, anyway, what are the main situations you are exposed to in the Police?

Então, falando sobre a questão do medo, quais são as principais riscos e perigos, enfim, quais são as principais situações que você estão expostos na Polícia?

[In the Police] Were there many lectures of this type [human rights, issues of race, gender, sexuality]? About what subjects? Were these lectures any good? Did you learn a lot from these lectures?

[Na Polícia] Tinham muitas palestras desse tipo [direitos humanos, questões de raça, gênero, sexualidade]? Sobre que assuntos? Essas palestras eram boas? Você aprendia bastante com essas palestras?

Do you think there is some kind of different treatment for them [women police officers] too? Be it for good or for bad. What do you think has changed since then for them to start entering more, to participate more in the police?

Você acha que tem algum tipo de tratamento diferente pra elas [policiais mulheres] também? Seja pra bem ou pra mal. O que você acha que mudou de lá pra cá pra elas começarem a entrar mais, a participar mais da polícia?

## Silva

So, going a little further on this issue of militarism, there are many proposals today

Então, puxando um pouquinho pra essa questão do militarismo, tem muitas propostas



for the demilitarization of the Police, right?  
What do you think about this kind of thing?

hoje em dia de desmilitarização da Polícia,  
né? O que você acha sobre esse tipo de coisa?

Is there anything you would change about  
your police history, or would you do  
differently?

Tem alguma coisa que você mudaria na sua  
história na polícia, ou faria diferente?

You mentioned that you made “excellent  
arrests”. What was an “excellent arrest”?

Você mencionou que você fazia “excelentes  
prisões”. O quê que era uma “excelente  
prisão”?

So, for you, what is the solution for security  
in Rio de Janeiro? What would you do if you  
had the power to do whatever you wanted to  
improve security in Rio de Janeiro?

Então, pra você, qual é a solução pra  
segurança no Rio de Janeiro? O que você  
faria se tivesse esse poder de fazer o que você  
quisesse pra melhorar a segurança do Rio de  
Janeiro?

And were there many of these absurd orders  
[interviewee had commented that “absurd  
orders are not followed”]? In your experience  
at least?

E havia muitas dessas ordens absurdas  
[entrevistado havia comentado que “ordem  
absurda não se cumpre”]? Na sua  
experiência, pelo menos?

So, on that subject, what do you think of these  
proposals to arm the population?

Então, nesse assunto, o que você acha dessas  
propostas de armar a população?

Is there any approach or action that was most  
memorable? Something you remember, like,  
with a certain pride...

Tem alguma abordagem ou ação que tenha  
sido mais memorável? Alguma coisa que  
você se lembra, assim, com certo orgulho...

You talked about the media, about college,  
about young people and everything else...  
How do you understand that society, the  
media, researchers see police work?

Você falou sobre a mídia, sobre faculdade,  
sobre os jovens e tudo mais... Como é que  
você entende que a sociedade, a mídia, os  
pesquisadores veem o trabalho policial?