Victoria Motta de Lamare França

Mediating Protection?

The UN Community Liaison Assistants and the Politics of Translation

Dissertação de Mestrado

Dissertation presented to the Programa de Pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais of PUC-Rio in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Mestre em Relações Internacionais

Advisor: Prof. Maíra Siman Gomes

Co-advisor: Prof. Roberto Vilchez Yamato

Rio de Janeiro

April 2023

Pontifícia Universidade Católica
do Rio de Janeiro

Victoria Motta de Lamare França

Mediating Protection?

The UN Community Liaison Assistants and the Politics of Translation

Master's Thesis

Dissertation presented to the Programa de Pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais of PUC-Rio in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Mestre em Relações Internacionais
Approved by the Examination Comittee:

Prof. Maíra Siman Gomes Advisor
Instituto de Relações Internacionais/PUC-Rio

Prof. Roberto Vilchez Yamato Co-advisor
Instituto de Relações Internacionais/PUC-Rio

Prof. James Casas Klausen
Instituto de Relações Internacionais/PUC-Rio

Prof. Aureo de Toledo Gomes
UFU

Rio de Janeiro, April 17th, 2023

Victoria Motta de Lamare França

Victoria Motta de Lamare França holds a Bachelor's degree in International Relations from the International Relations Institute at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (IRI/PUC-Rio). Ms. França is currently a research assistant at the Global South Unit for Mediation (GSUM) at PUC-Rio and the Director of Teaching and Research at the *Debates Pós-Coloniais e Decoloniais* Project at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ).

Bibliographic data

França, Victoria Motta de Lamare

Mediating protection? : the UN Community Liaison Assistants and the politics of translation / Victoria Motta de Lamare França ; advisor: Maíra Siman Gomes ; co-advisor: Roberto Vilchez Yamato. – 2023.

193 f. : il. color. ; 30 cm

Dissertação (mestrado)–Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Relações Internacionais, 2023.

Inclui bibliografia

1. Relações Internacionais – Teses. 2. Proteção de civis. 3. Assistentes de Ligação Comunitária. 4. Política da tradução. 5. Nações Unidas. 6. República Democrática do Congo. I. Gomes, Maíra Siman. II. Yamato, Roberto Vilchez. III. Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro. Instituto de Relações Internacionais. IV. Título.

CDD: 327

Acknowledgements

After I was accepted as a MA student, I heard personal stories and received guidance from friends and professors. What struck me the most was the impression that grad school can be lonely: we end up so focused on our research that we feel like there is no one with whom we can talk. To counter this feeling, I was advised to form strong friendship bonds and learn to rely on them to make carrying the load a lighter task. I am immensely grateful for that, and I hope to make the following acknowledgments an expression of my appreciation. That way, I cannot help but stress that this research was not accomplished by myself alone. It should rather be seen as the sum of all the conversations, laughs, and tears (and frankly, litters of soft drinks) I shared with these people, who were there for me, as I hope to be there for them.

First, I wish to thank my mother, my greatest supporter, with whom I shared all the good and ugly parts of this process. You have always been there for me as an inspiring role model, and I want you to know that this encouraged me to face all of these challenges. TAM.

I would also like to thank Maíra, my advisor, who accepted the advising invitation with open arms. Thank you for putting your trust in me and pushing me to take all the steps back and then go forward with this research. I feel like I have re-discovered so much about a research topic I had been working on since the beginning of my academic journey. The same thanks go to Beto, my co-advisor, who arrived later on in my research path. Thank you for always stimulating my interest in Derrida and being a wonderful conversationalist on all the crazy topics I have come up with inside and outside the scope of this thesis.

Super special thanks go to Pablo, who participated in almost all of the said talks, laughs, and tears. I am grateful for all of our hour-long conversations on the phone that made me feel prepared to face the personal and professional tests that this MA presented. Moreover, I want to express my appreciation to Andréa, who, as I worked alongside her as a TA for a year, made time every week to check up on me and stimulate me to write this thesis. Thank you for making me fall in love with the classroom once again. Your personal and professional kindness are *inspiring*. Thank you, Aureo, for the conversations to come.

Surely, I would not have made it this far without the trans-formed friendships I made along the way. Tatiane, Valquíria, Vítor, and Vitória made this MA a funnier experience on a daily basis. Thank you for supporting me by validating my stress, worries, and happiness throughout the emotional roller coaster we have been enduring. My appreciation also goes to Ana Carolina, with whom I shared many discussions on Peace Operations literature and love for Thai food. Likewise, I would like to thank Victória, who showed me genuine kindness in all of our interactions inside and outside GSUM. Dani, Fernanda, Gabriela, Iasmini, Luisa, Andressa, and Lorena also made this process easier, which is much appreciated.

Being part of the *Debates Pós-Coloniais & Decoloniais* project since 2020 has been a crucial part of my academic journey. I am grateful for having such fantastic people in my life as we learn and share more and more about postcolonial and decolonial thought. Exceptionally, Badra, Luisa, and Maísa have been encouraging the postcolonial contribution that this thesis aims to make.

Another crucial group who inspired me during this MA was the professors I met as their student or simply because I have been in IRI since my undergraduate studies. I offer you my many thanks. Thank you, Kai, for *always* trusting my potential and pushing me toward my best. Thank you, Ricardo, for meeting me with a smile and encouraging me to pursue this MA. Thank you, Anna, for inspiring me to broaden my pursuits and helping me see Security Studies differently. Thank you, Fernando, for treating me seriously when the circumstances demanded but also cracking a joke from time to time. Thank you, Jimmy, for showing me incredible authors and theoretical debates that have changed this thesis. Thank you, Paula, for being supportive and honest when offering guidance on my career path. Thank you, Stefano, for your kindness and stimulating discussions. Thank you, Marta, for helping me re-read Bhabha. Thank you, João, for encouraging me to attend the IPS Winter School. Thank you, Luciana, for your support in our weekly unscheduled meetings while running late between classrooms at PUC.

During this MA, I also participated in the IPS Winter School, which allowed me to come into contact with various scholars and ideas. Thank you, Audrey, for stimulating me to turn my reflexivity concerns toward myself. Thank you, Sam, for taking the time to discuss postcolonial translation theories with me. Thank you, Jef, for sharing your interest in methods and methodology.

My gratitude also goes to the IRI's administrative staff members. Thank you, Clara, Claudia, Geísa, Lia, Luana, and Janaína, for helping me make sense of all things PUC.

I would like to express my appreciation to the members of the Brazilian Research Network on Peace Operations (REBRAPAZ) and the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB). Your help and willingness to discuss my interests enabled me to explore such a specific analytic prism on a topic that shaped all our research agendas.

Finally, I am grateful for FAPERJ's financial support in the final months of the MA. This study was financed in part by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - Brasil (CAPES) - Finance Code 001.

Abstract

França, Victoria Motta de Lamare; Siman, Maíra Gomes (Advisor); Yamato, Roberto Vilchez (Co-advisor). **Mediating Protection? The UN Community Liaison Assistants and the Politics of Translation**. Rio de Janeiro, 2023. 193p. Dissertação de Mestrado – Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

This thesis analyzes how the United Nations (UN) attempts to stabilize and justify an ambivalent meaning of protection and its sociopolitical roles in the Protection of Civilians (PoC) agenda. Traversed by different notions of translation, this research takes the Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) as an analytical prism to complexify the efforts to construct representations of protection. The CLAs, created alongside the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), are local staff tasked with improving the mission's engagement with the local population in PoC activities, given their supposed linguistic-cultural skills. Thus, the CLAs are also part of the stabilization missions' movement in UN doctrine. This turn signals the use of counterinsurgency tactics, whose understanding of language and culture as weapons seeks to obtain intelligence and support of the local population. Following a poststructuralist and postcolonial approach inspired mainly by the works of Jacques Derrida and Homi K. Bhabha, this thesis proposes deconstructing the representations applied to the CLAs through the analysis of the discourses presented in the UN reports and doctrinal documents. To this end, it is investigated how the CLAs are expected to translate linguistically and/or culturally the UN vision of protection to the local population. In this sense, this research promotes dialogues with Translation and Interpretation Studies by exploring the political character of translation for International Relations while delving into a generally denied actor in UN doctrine and Peace Operations Studies.

Keywords

Protection of Civilians; Community Liaison Assistants; Politics of Translation; United Nations; Democratic Republic of Congo

Resumo

França, Victoria Motta de Lamare; Siman, Maíra Gomes (Orientadora); Yamato, Roberto Vilchez (Co-Orientador). **Mediando Proteção? Os Assistentes de Ligação Comunitária da ONU e a Política da Tradução**. Rio de Janeiro, 2023. 193p. Dissertação de Mestrado – Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

Esta dissertação analisa como a Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) tenta estabilizar e justificar um significado ambivalente de proteção e seus papéis sociopolíticos na agenda de Proteção de Civis (PoC). Atravessada por diferentes noções de tradução, esta pesquisa toma os Assistentes de Ligação Comunitária (CLAs) como um prisma analítico para complexificar os esforços para construir representações de proteção. Os CLAs, criados juntamente com a Missão das Nações Unidas para a Estabilização da República Democrática do Congo (MONUSCO), são funcionários locais encarregados de melhorar o engajamento da missão com a população local nas atividades de PoC, dadas as suas supostas habilidades linguístico-culturais. Assim, os CLAs também são parte do movimento das missões de estabilização na doutrina da ONU. Essa virada sinaliza a utilização de táticas de contra insurgência, cujo entendimento sobre linguagem e a cultura como armas objetiva obter inteligência e o apoio da população local. Seguindo uma abordagem pós-estruturalista e pós-colonial particularmente inspirada nas obras de Jacques Derrida e Homi K. Bhabha, esta dissertação se propõe a desconstruir as representações aplicadas aos CLAs por meio da análise dos discursos presentes nos relatórios e documentos doutrinários da ONU. Para tal, investiga-se como se espera que os CLAs traduzam linguisticamente e/ou culturalmente a visão de proteção da ONU para a população local. Nesse sentido, esta pesquisa promove diálogos com os Estudos de Tradução e Interpretação ao explorar o caráter político da tradução para as Relações Internacionais ao mesmo tempo que se aprofunda em um ator geralmente negligenciado na doutrina da ONU e nos Estudos de Operações de Paz.

Palavras-chave

Proteção de Civis; Assistentes de Ligação Comunitária; Política da Tradução; Nações Unidas; República Democrática do Congo

Table of Contents

ABREVIATIONS

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AIIC	International Association of Conference Interpreters
APCLS	*Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain*
CA	Civil Affairs
CANs	Community Alert Networks
CCOPAB	Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center
CLAs	Community Liaison Assistants
CLIs	Community Liaison Interpreters
CNDP	*Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple*
COIN	counter-insurgency
CPP	Community Protection Plan
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPO	Department of Peace Operations
DPPA	Department of Peacebuilding and Political Affairs
EWER	Early Warning Early Response
FARDC	*Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo*
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
FM 3-24	U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency
FNL	National Liberation Forces
HIPPO	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HTS	Human Terrain System
HUMINT	Human Inteligence
IR	International Relations
JPTs	Joint Protection Teams
LAs	Language Assistants
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
M23	March 23 Movement

MINUSCA	United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
PCCs	Police Contributing Countries
PoC/POC	Protection of Civilians
TCCs	Troop Contributing Countries
UN	United Nations
UN-CIMIC	UN Civil-Military Coordination
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNJHRO	United Nations Joint Human Rights Office
UNMIN	United Nations Mission in Nepal
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States

FIGURES

In these tasks, the military forces said they are used to protect the population from various threats. They are the friends of civilians against the barbarians who are the armed civilians, that is, religious or ethnic minorities manipulated by violent and fanatical rebels or terrorists. They are part of the civilised part of the world and their uniforms are signs of that. They act 'whitely' and have blue helmets.

Didier Bigo, *Protection*, p, 86.

Stranded between languages and societies, translators were also exiled from both. Neither native nor foreign, they were both at the same time. Their uncanny identity triggered a recurring crisis on all sides. It was as if their capacity for mediation endowed them with a power to disturb and destabilize far out of proportion to their socially ascribed and officially sanctioned positions.

Vicente Rafael, *Motherless Tongues*, p, 117.

1.
INTRODUCTION

During the transition between the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations (UN) created the role of the Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) to aid the mission in following a mandate focused on the Protection of Civilians (PoC) agenda. The CLAs are tasked with establishing and maintaining connections between the UN peacekeepers and the local communities the mission aims to protect. To do that, this UN staff needs to be able to (1) speak and interpret local and international aid languages, especially Swahili, French, and English and (2) have cultural sensibilities to avoid misunderstandings and potential conflicts. Considered a "case of success", the CLAs' role has been expanded to three[1] other UN missions (DPKO/DFS, 2016; MONUSCO CA, 2014).

This thesis takes the CLAs as an analytical prism to debate how the UN aims to construct its protection discourse on the ground. That is done by investigating how the CLAs are expected to translate the UN's notion of protection to the local population either linguistically or as an internalizing move in other PoC-mandate-related activities. Following a poststructuralist and postcolonial approach inspired primarily by (but not limited to) the works of Jacques Derrida and Homi K. Bhabha, this research aims to explore the ambivalent meaning of protection in the PoC agenda and how the UN tries to center specific socio-political roles through translation. These authors see linguistic and cultural interpretation and translation as imperfect mediation efforts, negotiating undefined meanings and hierarchies. The subsequent discussion focuses on how translation is tackled in Derrida's (pseudo-)concept[2] of *différance* as well as in Bhabha's critique on the ambivalence

[1] As of December 2015, there were 308 CLAs distributed around MONUSCO, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) (DPKO/DFS, 2016). In MONUSCO (2022), there are currently 147 CLAs, of which more than 73% are working with MONUSCO Force deployments in 44 "strategic hotspot areas".

[2] Following Arfi (2013), I wish to highlight how authors bring to a text pseudo-concepts, hoping to translate their arguments into an already (con)text-driven audience, in this case, the IR discipline. While trying (and failing) to avoid appropriations and misunderstandings, they simplify and sustain their thoughts by a thread of familiar linguistic beings, that is, concepts. Thus, when I propose working with pseudo-concepts, I am opening my work to the same criticisms and deconstruction I aim to explore. Perhaps, the difference in these two cases is that I never intended to present this

of the (post-)colonial discourse. Furthermore, this research also calls for a broader discussion on the (post-)colonial character of these translation and discourse practices, relating to the colonial mis-encounter embedded in language and culture in international settings such as UN peace operations.

By aiming to explore the politics of translation of UN protection discourses in the Protection of Civilians agenda, this thesis employs different definitions of interpretation and translation. In an attempt to remain in touch with Translation and Interpretation Studies while contributing to the International Relations (IR) discipline, I highlight that, for the former, interpretation relates to the oral transfer between pairs of languages, whereas translation typically deals with its written counterpart (FRANÇA, 2020). Since the UN does not make this distinction nor adopt a critical comprehension of the challenges of interpreting and translating, the thesis also uses interpretation and translation in a broader sense as metaphors of meaning comprehension and changing a message to improve an audience's reception respectively. When relating to how the UN introduces the CLAs' tasks, this thesis adopts the word "interpretation" for the linguistic character of communication and "translation" for its cultural counterpart. While this heuristic division helps the reader separate the CLAs' different expertise, the movement towards "cultural translation" intentionally highlights the UN's simplistic engagement with the debates that stimulate this research. Moreover, a similar issue applies to the idea of mediation, given its overly simplified definition by the UN that relates to the "interface" between local groups and UN peacekeepers. In this thesis, I follow Debrix (2003a) by understanding mediation as a ritual that is perceived by language, whose representations are entangled with multiple and paradoxical connotations.

This thesis also understands that the CLAs, while following the PoC agenda, are also working on a UN stabilization mission which adopts counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics. As a part of the "stabilization turn", MONUSCO is one of the UN peace operations with a multi-level intelligence apparatus to assist in mission planning (KARLSRUD, 2018; KUELE; CEPIK, 2017). That way, I am interested in how the CLAs are expected to contribute to activities typical of people-centered COIN, such as information gathering and maintaining a good relationship with the

work as a full independent and self-sustaining argument, but rather a weaving of different thoughts and ideas inspired by a critical reading of the UN manuals.

local population. That makes COIN-driven experiences outside the UN, in particular the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) missions, a fruitful source for further discussion on the role of interpreters and other locally hired civilians (see DE JONG, 2022a, 2022b, 2022c; RAFAEL, 2016). Concomitantly, this thesis also draws examples of other UN missions outside the scope of stabilization to explore different contrasts under the UN umbrella.

Before addressing this thesis' main argument and analytical strategies, the next section situates the background for the CLAs' creation and their relationship with the Protection of Civilians agenda.

1.1. THE "KILLINGS IN KIWANJA" IN 2008 AND THE TRANSLATION PROBLEM AS A PROTECTION PROBLEM

In December 2008, the New York Times published a news report, written by Lydia Polgreen, entitled "*Massacre Unfurls in Congo, Despite Nearby Support*". By narrating the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo[3], it showed that one of the local armed groups, the *Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple* (CNDP), had killed approximately 150 people in less than 24 hours. The victims had been mostly young men allegedly tied to another regional armed group, the Mayi-Mayi. In a gruesome re-telling, the journalist detailed the violence suffered by the local population, presenting examples of the killing methods and interviews of the ones spared, mostly women, who had given money to the soldiers in exchange for their freedom. "'Pow, pow, pow,' said his widowed mother, Ludia Kavira Nzuva, recounting how the rebels killed her 25-year-old son just outside her front door. As they abandoned his bloodied corpse, she said, one turned to her and declared, 'Voilà, here is your gift'" (POLGREEN, 2008).

The main issue discussed is how close one of the biggest UN military bases was located, that is, less than a mile away. Being so near to Kiwanja, it seemed strange that the about 120 peacekeepers had not heard the attacks nor had been informed of what was happening. The news report also detailed how unprepared,

[3] Following Dunn (2003), this thesis does not refer to the Democratic Republic of Congo as the DRC given how the own naming process comes from foreign intervention. The area has been called different names throughout the years, notably "Kongo" before European colonization, so I opted to adopt the name Congo. Yet, the DRC spelling may appear in citations.

in matters of equipment and personnel, had the troops nearby been. Therefore, the killings were framed as another failed experience in the Congo because the mission could not protect civilians. Not only do UN peace operations have mandates that consider protecting civilians a priority in mission planning but they are also historically known for not being able to fulfil them, given the lack of action in attacks (POLGREEN, 2008).

> Meanwhile, confusion reigned at the nearby peacekeepers' base. The company of soldiers sits in a spot that is decidedly not strategic, nestled in a valley that is highly vulnerable to incoming fire and has a poor vantage point from which to keep tabs on the surrounding area. (…) It was not until the fighting was over that the full horror of the killings was discovered in houses stuffed with dead bodies. "We launched patrols in areas we thought there would be clashes," he [Lt. Col. H. S. Brar] explained. "But we could not be everywhere at once" (POLGREEN, 2008).

Another main source on what happened is a report entitled "*Killings in Kiwanja: the UN's inability to protect civilians*" published by the Human Rights Watch (HRW) in November of the same year. It presented three interrelated problems that had contributed to the UN's failure to avoid and respond to the attacks: (1) competing priorities, (2) the *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo's* (FARDC) hostility towards the mission, and (3) logistical and technical issues. Regarding the first matter, the MONUC had deployed a small number of peacekeepers to a large area, who were also trying to negotiate protection efforts between the local population, humanitarian workers, a foreign journalist, and a group of military observers. The report also stated difficulties working with the host country's Armed Forces, who were not supporting the mission and encouraging the population to attack UN vehicles. Lastly, the attacks had happened during a troop rotation in which Uruguayan troops were preparing to replace Indian peacekeepers. In addition, and the crucial part to be considered in this thesis, the report affirmed that there was no interpreter present who spoke French and Swahili (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2008).

Even if still recognizing the failure to protect civilians and the issues addressed in the HRW report, the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) issued an analysis putting more emphasis on the interpreter's absence, making it the main and triggering cause for the UN inability to perform its mandate.

> Evidence gathered during the UNJHRO investigation suggests that *the military personnel who were present in Kiwanja at the time of the killings were not aware of the nature or magnitude of the situation, due*

> *to language and cultural barriers or lack of effective communication with civil society leaders in Kiwanja*; these factors complicated the information flow between the former and peacekeepers, and contributed to the ensuing knowledge or information deficit. A greater communication-flow between the population and peacekeepers, as well as an enhanced understanding of the patterns of human rights violations, could have resulted in a more vigorous response from the peacekeepers vis-à-vis the protection needs of the civilian population (UNJHRO, 2009, p. 3, emphasis added).

In an inquiry on the PoC mandate in UN missions in the Congo, Murphy (2016, p. 222) re-balances the causes of the attacks in Kiwanja: "[w]hile the response was compounded by a period of handover and deficiencies in translation and intelligence, lack of troops, equipment and reinforcements was the real weakness". Other scholars such as Boutellis (2013, p. 4) and Koddenbrock (2016, p. 77–78) also mention it in their evaluations but do not enter in much detail. In their efforts of assessing MONUC and MONUSCO's mandates, the Effectiveness in Peace Operations Network (NOVOSSELOFF et al., 2019, p. 25) and the International Peace Information Service (REYNAERT, 2011, p. 17–18) also recalled the killings quoting the UNJHRO and HRW reports.

This thesis attributes a special importance to these attacks because they are evoked by the UN as a "kick-off" to create the CLAs (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 10). By not having an interpreter available, this story shows the translation problem in UN peace operations. Either as a matter of communication or understanding the local culture to better construct a relationship with the community around the UN base, the lack of full-time interpreters became an issue to be solved. Therefore, the UN transformed local interpreters into linguistic-cultural mediators, that is, their job surpassed linguistic interpretation and started to also entail mediating cultural issues. Timidly and throughout time, what the UN understands as CLAs began by assisting in small *ad-hoc* missions and later became one of the MONUSCO Civil Affairs (CA) Department's key mediators. Indeed, the problem in Kiwanja is not merely the absence of an interpreter to enable communication and build a relationship with the local population, yet this is how these actors aim to frame a pivotal part of the situation.

Despite its importance, the documents which discuss this type of UN personnel do not explain what happened nor what that means for the UN besides the "Kiwanja is something that cannot be repeated" trope seen throughout the specialized literature in peace operations and UN doctrine (DOUCET, 2018, p. 98;

UNITED NATIONS, 2015, parag. 81). What happened in "Kiwanja" becomes the *representation* of many things, as if the mere name of the place is self-explanatory[4]. This thesis takes up the discomfort generated by the naturalization of events in Kiwanja to explore the political role of the translation of protection discourses in peace operations. Before relating the CLAs to the PoC agenda, it is necessary to point out two issues regarding the representation of Kiwanja in political discourses.

Discussions around Kiwanja seem to signal a consensus between the UN, media, academic, and other humanitarian actors on the mission's failures to protect and build relationships with civilians. That is particularly noteworthy when one considers the division between political actors who participate in an event and those who observe it. For Campbell (1998), this denotes a convergence of micro- and macronarratives[5], which can show various ways of interpreting occurrences in realms of discursive practices and the attempt to validate them.

Furthermore, the attacks in Kiwanja are not an exception in UN peace operations trajectory. The inability to protect civilians in these situations is part of a history whose expression in the international media has become stronger since in the 1990s when conflicts started to be televised in real time (ROBINSON, 1999). For instance, considering the main literature with which this thesis dialogues, Séverine Autesserre (2010, p. 41, 2021, p. 89–90) recalled a personal experience in Bukavu in 2004 whereas a later UN document that discusses CLAs quotes a similar situation in Banamukira in 2010 (DPKO/DFS, 2016, p. 4). Curiously (or perhaps not so much), these examples also took place in the Democratic Republic of Congo, even if the authors were not all circumscribing their texts necessarily to this context.

[4] Derrida's interview in Borradori (2003, p. 85–89) offers a meaningful discussion about the events happening in the United States on the 11h of September, 2001. For him, naming it simply with the date, its particular US spelling "9/11", and other types of shortcut calls for pondering the role of language and how repeating a distinct way of naming can hold power over the event's narrative. Simply quoting Kiwanja in UN documents, therefore, is a way of mentioning *and* not mentioning how this event affected the UN's doctrine and actions. See also Yamato (2020) for a commentary on Derrida's and Borradori's conversation.

[5] When considering the role of narrativity in political discourses aimed at constructing interpretations of Bosnia, David Campbell (1998, p. 40–44) promotes the distinction between participant-interpreters and observers-interpreters. For him, those participating in the conflict, such as the warring parties, usually present more personal interpretations than academics and media actors who report on the events based on their observations. By differentiating these actors, Campbell does not imply that they work separately since academic articles and news reports can use interviews with political actors to corroborate their arguments and/or show nuance. They are distinguished that way to separate the micro- from macronarratives. According to the author, the observers-interprets re-produce macronarratives because they take a "bird's eye" view of a given conflict, while micronarratives show a personal account.

That, in turn, reinforces (the discourses on) Congo's exceptionality (BAAZ; VERWEIJEN, 2018; MUDIMBE, 1988; MUTUA, 2002), strengthening the importance of focusing on these UN missions in this thesis.

1.1.1. THE COMMUNITY LIAISON ASSISTANTS IN THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AGENDA

Since being established in 2010, MONUSCO has had PoC as one of its mandate's priorities. That relates to the repeated failures in MONUC and other UN missions in providing protection to civilians but also the PoC agenda's centrality in UN jargon. After it was used in the 1999 mandate for a UN mission in Sierra Leone, "protection" became a buzzword in United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and on the ground. Protection appeared everywhere and in almost all the missions' activities to the point when arguably anything could be classified as protection. As an all-encompassing concept, it transformed from protecting civilians from threats of physical violence to broader visions of what being secure in a conflict-related environment entail (DAY; HUNT, 2021; DPO, 2020a; FOLEY, 2017; MACEDO; SIMAN; MOTTA, 2022).

Protection is one of the ideals that organize social and political life according to White Western[6] thought. Individuals are imagined in their relationship to the state, to whom they have supposedly delegated the role of protection. In exchange, the state receives the monopoly over the use of force and violence, the notion that only the state apparatus can mobilize force and violence legitimately, disqualifying other groups. In doing so, the state can authorize its many agents to attack its citizens "in the name of protection". Yet, this story encompasses not only the need for the naturalization of a specific interpretation of 'reality' but also the acceptance of one's role in it. That does not happen so smoothly as the dominant

[6] This thesis chooses to use the White West concept instead of terms such as Anglo-Eurocentrism or binaries such as North v. South and First v. Third world to refer to how dominant actors seek to build and naturalize hierarchies that maintain their privileges. Following Meera Sabaratnam (2020), the "West" is a category indexed to "Whiteness" during European colonial expansion. "However, because of the production of 'internally' differentiated others within the racial formation, Whiteness is not just Westernness but a particular structural relationship to that Westernness compared to 'non-Whites'" (SABARATNAM, 2020, p. 8). That surpasses geographical as well as race divides because a racial system is maintained not only "from the West to the Rest" but also *within the West*. At the same time, people who are racialized as inferior, what this thesis calls the Other, can also reiterate Whiteness even if they do not benefit from it.

discourse aims to suggest, which shows how political the claim over protection can be (FERNÁNDEZ, 2019; HUYSMANS, 2006; SABARATNAM, 2020). That way, discussing protection, the discourses and the politics around it, means posing fundamental questions to IR.

This thesis opts to explore the UN's protection discourses in peace operations by focusing on the relation between the CLAs and the Protection of Civilians agenda. As an analytical choice, I understand I could be discussing (the need for translating) the meaning of protection through other case studies and prisms. To discuss protection in the PoC agenda makes sense in this research because protection appears in the missions' mandates, in the UN staff "grammar", and in the "hearts and minds" of the UN values. For instance, scholars have discussed the notion of protection regarding the Responsibility to Protect and derived initiatives, notwithstanding the greater focus on the meaning of "responsibility" (ADLER-NISSEN; POULIOT, 2014; FOLEY, 2017; KENKEL; MARTINS, 2016). I have chosen to not promote a deep engagement with this discourse because it privileges a discussion on the strategic level while this thesis focuses on how the UN attempts to represent protection on the tactical level[7]. In other words, I am more concerned in this research with what is supposed to happen in Congo, not New York.

The CLAs align with MONUSCO's PoC efforts because they are seen as the nodal point in a myriad of peace tools that provide a "PoC toolkit" at the tactical level. "Support to the protection of civilians mandate was the original raison d'être for the creation of CLAs and continues to be at the core of their activities" (DPKO/DFS, 2016, p. 9). For instance, the Community Alert Networks (CANs) are a system of Congolese citizens in conflict zones who receive radios and/or telephones from MONUSCO. They act as information-gathering nodes to notify the CLAs and consequently the mission of impending hazards, such as information on

[7] As part of the UN grammar, peace operations are divided into three levels. First, the strategic level relates to the decisions regarding doctrine and logistics. Through its resolutions in New York, the Security Council determines the deployment of troops, police, and civilians to carry out a series of tasks described in the mandate in various parts of the world. The other two levels in the chain of command are present "on the ground", that is, where each mission takes place. At the operational level, the Head of Mission (generally with the title of Special Representative of the Secretary-General), their team, and representatives of the three components (civilian, police, and military) are present. Finally, the tactical level comprises the deployed troops, police, and civilians who constitute the UN's "front line" on the ground and will have the most contact with the local population (UNITED NATIONS, 2008, p. 66–69).

threats to communities or individuals at risk of violence. As a group, these people are selected to enable the reinforcement of communities' capabilities to protect themselves by enhancing and organizing their means of communication. In addition, the CLAs are expected to help local communities design Community Protection Plans (CPPs). The CPPs offer a high-level picture of the security environment, threats to the civilian population, priority communities at risk of violence, and measures anticipated or necessary to mitigate PoC concerns. Depending on the composition of forces in the temporary operating base or general field presence, the field Commander (as part of the military or the police contingent) and the assigned CLA to that area will create the CPP in collaboration with locals (DPO, 2020a). That way, the CLAs work directly in contact with the local population, expected to mediate the mission's day-to-day activities.

It is also noteworthy to consider in this thesis how protection is re-organized in stabilization mandates, as MONUSCO. Inspired by the NATO's experience, the move towards stabilization missions in the UN is seen ambiguously by the Member-States and the Peace Operations literature, given their revision of the main principles that have guided UN missions: consent of the host state, impartiality, and minimum use of force (BELLAMY; HUNT, 2015; DE CONING; AOI; KARLSRUD, 2017). MONUSCO's stabilization mandate, for instance, has inspired a controversy over the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) created in 2013 to proactively go after local armed groups[8] that hinder protection with extensive use of force in MONUSCO (UNSC, 2013).

In stabilization missions, the meaning of protection and the efforts to translate and stabilize the UN vision on the subject are strongly affected by the incorporation of COIN tactics. With a long trajectory in colonial history, COIN becomes re-branded in the 21st century as a more ethical way of doing war and, consequently, peace operations that employ more force (DOTY, 1996; GUHA, 1999; SEN, 2022; ZEHFUSS, 2018). By being created in MONUSCO, I understand that the CLAs' task cannot be drastically separated from this context. Throughout this thesis, I will argue that they help in COIN inasmuch as (1) the information they

[8] Throughout the years, these are specially the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS), the March 23 Movement (M23), Mayi-Mayi Gedeon, the Mayi-Mayi Kata-katanga, and the National Liberation Forces (FNL).

gather through the network they are supposed to manage and (2) the mediation they establish between the local communities and the peacekeepers can help the UN acquire support from the local population and against the local armed groups perceived as insurgents by the UN.

1.2. MAIN ARGUMENT

This thesis advances the argument that UN PoC discourses re-present an ambivalent notion of protection and three derived socio-political roles of who (1) provides, (2) receives, and (3) hinders protection. Understanding that the definition of protection is never as straightforward as the UN wishes to construct with the PoC agenda, there is the need for stabilizing and holding dominant a specific understanding of the political actions *on* and *for* protection. Furthermore, the UN adopts a broader COIN-inspired tactic that resembles host countries' colonial past, given the instrumentalization of language and culture to place the local population in a subordinate position to foreign interference. These protection discourses are thus subjected to an ambivalent play of absence and presence, which mobilizes traces of (mainly negative) past experiences of UN peace operations and supplements to solve these failures. The ineffectiveness of protecting civilians in the Kiwanja attacks re-haunts the attempt to center the UN's meaning of protection, stimulating the UN to supplement a technical instrument such as the CLAs to solve the problem.

I argue that the CLA's task of mediating the relationship between the UN as the protector and the local population as the protected and/or the enemy can be understood as different translation processes. By playing the game of the mediator's in-visibility in the service of the peacekeepers, I understand that the CLAs are expected to fulfill the role of (1) analyzing the local population to divide into who supports and who rejects the UN and (2) instigating the locals to assimilate an UN expression of protection. However, these objectives find their downfall because the solution to achieve protection and center its meaning also compromises this process.

In creating the CLAs, the UN follows a simplistic understanding of what communication, language, and culture mean, transforming the CLA's mediation

into a technical task that does not consider the impossibility of a perfect translation (Chapter 2). In addition, the protection imaginaries' mediation is never fully transmitted, but constantly negotiated through the CLAs as they are de-centering the roles of protector, protected, and enemy in themselves, showing that these are not supposedly whole groups while failing to belong to either of them (Chapter 3). Thus, the politics of translation in UN protection discourses aims to construct a monolingual understanding of protection in a process that attempts to re-organize the actors' socio-political roles on the ground, relying on the CLAs' supposed linguistic-cultural skills to facilitate the discourse's assimilation (Chapter 4). In doing so, the CLAs are placed in a play of presence and absence similar to the role of language and culture in the UN translation of protection discourses, stimulating them to negotiate their "protector", "protected", and "enemy" representations while carrying the mediation tasks (Chapter 5).

1.3. ANALYTICAL STRATEGIES

> As identity is the interpretation of oneself – by others and by oneself – and of the other – by oneself and by the other –, and how to translate is to interpret – at least this is how we understand it – and how to analyze the discourse of oneself and of the other is also to interpret – that's what the discourse analyst does – this text will necessarily deal with interpretation (CORACINI, 2005, p. 12, my translation)[9].

I have opted to understand my intervention as analytical strategies that guide this thesis, resonating with a skeptic understanding of the role of S(s)cience and knowledge re-production in IR that challenges their authority in establishing universal(ized) 'truths' (ÇALKIVIK, 2017; THAKUR; DAVIS; VALE, 2017), in "the boundary and location of the event of theoretical critique which does not *contain* the truth (…). The 'true' is always marked and informed by the ambivalence of the process of emergence itself" (BHABHA, 2004, p. 22, emphasis in the original). This section draws the treacherous path of presenting how I propose to reflect on the way(s) that the UN attempts to construct and stabilize a certain interpretation *of* and *on* protection via the CLAs. Inspired by poststructuralist and

[9] In the original: "Como a identidade é interpretação de si – pelos outros e por si – e do outro – por si e pelo outro –, e como traduzir é interpretar – ao menos é assim que entendemos – e como analisar o discurso de si e do outro é também interpretar – é o que o analista de discurso faz – este texto tratará necessariamente de interpretação" (CORACINI, 2005, p. 12).

postcolonial authors, I understand that such a move is performed through discourses that mobilize socio-political imaginations around the idea of protection. As seen with the narratives about "Kiwanja", the UN uses past experiences to justify and stimulate their actions, making *discourse analysis* a productive way to explore different manifestations of UN official(ized) discourses.

Such a pluralistic approach has been growing for the last 30 years as an opposition to the 'scientism' of mainstream IR and "its seeming obsession with methodology" (MILLIKEN, 1999, p. 226). Arguably, the idea of carefully interpreting discourses and their relation to different texts has become a well-established analytical procedure in IR despite the different ways to accomplish it (see ANGERMULLER, 2014). This view also aligns with recent discussions about methodology and methods in Critical Security Studies (CSS), in which the literature on UN peace operations takes part. In their work, Aradau et al. (2015) state that CCS understands threats and insecurity are not simply research objects to be studied or problems to be solved but the product of social and political practices. They also consider that productive analytical strategies originate from how key actors perform their tasks, contrary to the hierarchical (and one can add teleological) notion of academic research detached from its objects (i.e. theory X leads to methodology Y which, in turn, drives method Z).

That way, the intervention explored in this thesis follows a deconstructionist proposal when re-reading UN documents on the PoC agenda and the CLAs' role in it. "Deconstruction does not offer a method for establishing a final, authoritative interpretation, but rather practices an ongoing, integrated analysis of texts (in the narrow sense) *and not* our methods for identifying texts" (DAVIS, 2001, p. 25, emphasis in the original). By analyzing the discourse presented in these texts I aim "to show how it undermines the philosophy it asserts, or the hierarchical oppositions on which it relies, by identifying in the text the rhetorical operations that produce the supposed ground of argument, the key concept or premise" (CULLER, 1982, p. 86). Focusing on protection discourses and the re-production of the "protector", "protected" and "enemy" roles entails continuously identifying the hierarchy contained in these imaginations to invert *and* displace them, while trying to avoid neutralizations. This double gesture, reversal and displacement, is a way of making visible the author's premises in a text (BORRADORI, 2003, p. 138–139; DAVIS, 2001; DERRIDA, 1981; HADDOCK-LOBO, 2019; YAMATO, 2020; ZEHFUSS,

2004, p. 203–204). Nonetheless, deconstruction does not propose a destruction of the Western philosophical thought nor a form of critique from the outside, because it works from inside these structures and institutions (ARFI, 2013; DERRIDA, 1997, p. 24; MENESES, 2013).

Furthermore, Borradori (2003, p. 138) underscores how adding a third element to a binary, which in this research will be represented by the CLAs ambiguous positionalities in the different protection pairs, can *de-form*, *re-form*, and *trans-form* the structure around a supposed self-fulfilled discourse. My goal is to explore how the CLAs are re-presented in the UN texts not as protector, protected or enemy; but all *and* neither. They become the personified image that transits between these elements without belonging to any of them, whose role is to negotiate with these discourses applied to themselves and to whom they are supposed to convince and mimic. In this sense, deconstruction cannot be understood as an all-encompassing method to be applied, but rather, as Derrida suggests, as an *intervention* that requires tailoring in different contexts (see DAVIS, 2001; FERREIRA, 2009).

By analyzing UN protection discourses in this thesis, I am specifically interested in how language is supposed to work among different UN texts, either being the written UN documents (which I call manuals, given their normative value) themselves or the discourses performed by different UN staff while participating in PoC activities as stipulated in the manuals. That entails a concern with the *representations* that encompass the UN's protection imagination, which privileges linguistic and narrative elements of a discourse (CAMPBELL, 1998; DOTY, 1996; EDKINS, 1999; RAFAEL, 2016). This issue also permeates the dynamics of translation and interpretation, given how communication ranges through different transformations between speakers, thus consisting of intra and interlinguistic translation processes (this part will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4). Thinkers such as Derrida and Bhabha become helpful in this thesis, given their concern with culture, language, and the politics of representation. They are known inside and outside IR disciplinary borders for following a more "textualist" discussion, whose goal is to target the knowledge re-production systems that put White Western experience in the center while subordinating other cultures (HIDDLESTON, 2009, p. 98).

> Derrida and Bhabha invite their readers to question assumptions of European hegemony, to rethink the relation between self and other and to conceptualize differently the creation of that relation through language. They deconstruct the mastery of the subject and the assimilation or rejection of the other by the dominant discourse, and they insist on an ethical relation of openness to mobile and potentially intractable forms of difference (HIDDLESTON, 2009, p. 98–99).

That means engaging with the dichotomies ingrained in the dominant discourse presented by the UN to denaturalize and displace certain meanings from their privileged position. It implies opposing and dismantling the 'truths' and dogmas persistently upheld in what Derrida (1997) calls the logocentric tradition of Western thought. For him, this system of thought privileges the notion of presence in opposition to absence, signaling a 'reality' in which words carry meaning independently. In a careful reading of Saussure's, Rousseau's, and Husserl's understandings of language and the idea of the sign as composed of the signifier (expression) and signified (content), he problematizes how words acquire meaning given a play between signifiers and not by themselves. In other words, signifiers are always referring to other signs to construct their own meaning, making it impossible to define one sign by itself (ARFI, 2013; CULLER, 1982; DAVIS, 2001; RAFAEL, 2016; ZEHFUSS, 2004, 2009). "Meaning, then, is an *effect* of language, not a prior presence merely expressed in language. It therefore cannot be simply extracted from language and transferred" (DAVIS, 2001, p. 14, emphasis in the original; see also VENUTI, 2008, p. 13).

As a result, the meaning of an individual word appears in the relationship between the presence of this word *and* the absence of all other words through repetition in different contexts[10] and further explanation. That makes absence constitutive of presence inasmuch as what one understands as the "present" constitutes as such only through the idea of a past that once was a present and so on (ARFI, 2013; CAMPBELL, 1998; CULLER, 1982; DAVIS, 2001; DERRIDA, 1988, 2001; RAFAEL, 2016; YAMATO, 2020; ZEHFUSS, 2004). Maja Zehfuss (2004) gives the example of a shooting arrow to demonstrate how its motion cannot be captured as pure presence:

[10] One of Derrida's most infamous quotes states that there is nothing outside the text or there is no outside-text [*il n'y a pas de hors-texte*], which he has latter supplemented with the notion that there is nothing outside context. In doing so, he wishes to underline how meanings should be deeply analyzed under the context in which they are brought. See Davis (2001, p. 9) and Ferreira (2009, p. 233).

> The motion of the arrow becomes conceivable only if we accept that every instant is already marked by its past and future (…). Thus, although our thinking is based on the notion of presence as absolute presence, thinking about an everyday occurrence such as motion is at the same time possible only because we abandon the purity of the notion of presence. The idea of presence is therefore contaminated by its opposite (ZEHFUSS, 2004, p. 198–199).

To deal with the impossibility of presence and absence and the instability in meaning production, Derrida proposes the neographism *différance*, a wordplay between the verbs "differ" and "defer" in French that does not alter its pronunciation and can only be perceived in writing (criticizing Saussure who diminished its value vis-à-vis speech). While "defer" relates to how the meanings are always temporally "delayed" as a single word cannot give an absolute description, "differ" refers to how specific words are used to differentiate distinct ideas spatially. By creating this pun, Derrida calls attention to how a chain of signifiers (texts) never arrive at a pure meaning in themselves but are always deferring and differing, temporally and spatially, themselves with/from other (con-)texts. "But *différance*, Derrida cautions, is not a concept or even a word in the usual sense; we cannot assign it a 'meaning', since it is the condition of possibility for meanings, which are effects of its movement, or 'play'" (DAVIS, 2001, p. 14–15). As Zehfuss (2009, p. 142) states elsewhere, "*différance* illustrates why nothing ever simply 'is'. It is more useful to look at the effects of *différance*", so my proposition is to explore how it operates in the UN's attempts to re-articulate protection discourses. Focusing on the notion of *différance* in this thesis resonates with an interest in translation, as Ferreira (2009, p. 231, emphasis in the original, my translation) eloquently summarizes, because "translation, like deconstruction, is the place *par excellence* for languages and the proliferation of meanings; it is the place of *différance*. In other words, in translation the constitution of meaning is continually found in a differential, different and deferred network"[11].

Particularly, my effort turns to read carefully different UN documents to underscore traces and supplements. For Derrida, a trace is what indicates the absence inside a presence of a sign, that is, with there being no absolutely full and present meaning in itself, words rely on establishing a web of meanings with past

[11] In the original: "diremos que a tradução, assim como a desconstrução, é o lugar por excelência das línguas e da proliferação de sentidos; é o lugar da *différance*. Dito de outra forma, na tradução a constituição da significação encontra-se, continuamente, numa rede diferencial, diferente e diferida" (FERREIRA, 2009, p. 231).

and future words to attempt to center their own definition. As Yamato (2020, p. 9; see also DAVIS, 2001, p. 15) explains while quoting Derrida (1997, p. 62), the trace is responsible for retaining the Other as Other in its relation to the Self to establish meaning, making *différance* "pure trace". Furthermore, Derrida borrows from Rousseau the idea of the supplement to show how no sign carries meaning on its own but rather depends on the further explanation provided by other words. Once it relies on a supplement, a word cannot be complete in itself: "the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace. It intervenes or insinuates itself *in-the-place-of*" (DERRIDA, 1997, p. 144 emphasis in the original). That shows an *original lack* in which meaning cannot be assigned to a sign since it is always dispersed and delayed. As such, a word will always contain traces and supplements of other words in a never-ending chase to construct its meaning.

> No element of language, then, let alone an entire sentence or text, is ever fully 'original'. In order to exist as meaningful events, texts must carry within themselves traces of previous texts, and are, therefore, acts of citation. The source text for a translation is already a site of multiple meanings and intertextual crossings, and is only accessible through an act of reading that is in itself a translation. The division between 'original' and 'translation', then – as important and necessary as it is to translators and scholars today – is not something pre-existing that can be discovered or proven, but must be constructed and institutionalized. It is therefore always subject to revision (DAVIS, 2001, p. 16).

Under Derrida's proposition, I am interested in exploring how the UN through the CLAs tries to center a specific meaning of protection that (1) authorizes UN peace operations to intervene in the Congo under a PoC mandate and (2) re-organizes the relationship between protector, protected, and enemy.

> Every concept, moreover, belongs to a systematic chain and constitutes in itself a system of predicates. There is no concept that is metaphysical in itself. There is a labor – metaphysical or not – performed on conceptual systems. Deconstruction does not consist in moving from one concept to another, but in reversing and displacing a conceptual order as well as the nonconceptual order with which it is articulated (DERRIDA, 1988, p. 21).

Following this quote, I am committed in this thesis to considering that UN peace operations do not operate under a vacuum or are a *tabula rasa* (BHABHA, 2004). I am particularly interested in the different con-textual connections between the protection discourses in UN peace operations and Congo's colonial past. That means, for instance, paying attention to the legal order in the background of these missions that rules over the UN and its (post-)colonial attributes (ANGHIE, 2004;

HIDDLESTON, 2009; OTTO, 1996) and the different manifestations of hierarchies in how the CLAs and other UN staff should carry their PoC-related activities.

In recalling the re-articulations of the colonial enterprise, Bhabha (1990, 2004, 2011) emphasizes the binary implications of the (post-)colonial discourse, which attempts to build its authority by differentiating the (former) "colonizer" and "colonized" into several binaries that are co-dependent but not of equal value and later attributing a comparable superiority to the former (*inter alia* good v. bad, civilized v. savage/barbarian, White v. non-White, cultured v. uncultured). As such, it relies on a "narcissistic demand that [the colonizer] should be addressed directly, that the Other should authorize the self, recognize its priority, fulfil its outlines, replete, indeed, repeat, its references and still its fractured gaze" (BHABHA, 2004, p. 140). Nevertheless, this move vacillates because, to confer such legitimacy, the colonized should be equal to the colonizer's rationality, otherwise, this system's orderliness cannot be established. The imagined differences that separate both groups depend on their inversion, what Bhabha (2004, p. 95; see also COSTA, 2006; HUDDART, 2006; KAPOOR, 2008; MOORE-GILBERT, 2000) denominates ambivalence.

It is noteworthy to highlight that the colonial discourse is not static or universal but rather always being modified; it has a non-objective will of its own. Following particularly these authors as proposed in this thesis means paying attention to postcolonial discourse's abstraction and universalization, on the one hand, and specificities in a case study on the other (HIDDLESTON, 2009, p. 99–100). In consonance with Derrida, Bhabha (2004) underscores how, when articulating an idea, one is always in the process of re-articulating it, what I try to signal by employing the hyphen[12] in many words in this research. Accordingly, I understand that UN peace operations resemble Congo's colonial past, given it places the local population in a subordinate position to foreign interference following a teleological 'peace' discourse. That makes UN protection discourses, I want to suggest, a re-articulation of the colonial discourse that attempts to re-

[12] For instance, Arfi shows the importance of the prefix 're' preferably with a hyphen before certain words, which adopts a double movement of iteration: "There always is a constitutive concatenation of change, invention and repetition in a process of re-thinking/thinking. Repetition takes the form of traces that shape, or haunt through and through, whatever we think in re-thinking" (ARFI, 2013, p. 1).

construct a ‘reality’ based on a specific notion of protection, which re-places the Congolese population in a tutelage relationship.

That way, the images attributed to each sides of a binary should be understood more as stereotypes, a “contradictory mode of representation, as anxious as it is assertive” (BHABHA, 2004, p. 100) that depends on a constant iteration to be assimilated. According to Bhabha (2004, p. 94–95; see also HUDDART, 2006, cap. 3), these exaggerated imaginations, whether regarding the colonizer and/or the colonized, are repeated in the discourse to reiterate the (post-)colonial hierarchy, yet they cannot be proven nor verified logically. The author gives examples to explore the ambivalences inherent to the re-articulation of race and gender in stereotypes to demonstrate how they are not ‘truths’ but rather a discursive strategy to attempt to re-affirm (post-)colonial legitimacy.

> My reading of colonial discourse suggests that the point of intervention should shift from the ready recognition of images as positive or negative, to an understanding of the *processes of subjectification* made possible (and plausible) through stereotypical discourse. To judge the stereotyped image on the basis of a prior political normativity is to dismiss it, not to displace it, which is only possible by engaging with its effectivity; with the repertoire of positions of power and resistance, domination and dependence that constructs colonial identification subject (both colonizer and colonized) (BHABHA, 2004, p. 95, emphasis in the original).

Hence, by proposing a deconstruction, I underscore a dialogue with more authors concerned with the colonial nuance of the established relationships with which I am concerned in this thesis. Deconstruction as an analytical gesture helps me to examine and uncover how the foundations of UN protection discourses do not support themselves. Yet, throughout the research, it feels as if it alone cannot help me observe in detail how colonial dis-order remains operative in the discursive in-visibilities in the attempt to stabilize a meaning. Alongside Kapoor (2008, p. 90; see also COSTA, 2006, p. 123–124), my aim is “bringing attention back to this ambivalence, or rather, deconstructing what is always already unravelling”, precisely in this *in-between* of the so-called poststructuralist and postcolonial approaches in IR. My ongoing conversation with postcolonial thinkers allows me to explore further the stereotypes, disqualifications, dehumanizations, and other elements of colonial discourse as traces in (post-)colonial actions, such as UN peace operations (BHABHA, 2004, p. 247–248). Continuing with Bhabha,

> I do not intend to deconstruct the colonial discourse to reveal its ideological misconceptions or repressions, to exult in its self-

> reflexivity, or to indulge its liberatory 'excess'. In order to understand the productivity of colonial power it is crucial to construct its regime of truth, not to subject its representations to a normalizing judgement. Only then does it become possible to understand the productive ambivalence of the object of colonial discourse – that 'otherness' which is at once an object of desire and derision, an articulation of difference contained within the fantasy of origin and identity. What such a reading reveals are the boundaries of colonial discourse and it enables a transgression of these limits from the space of that otherness (BHABHA, 2004, p. 95–96).

Following this quote, I see this thesis as part of an ongoing process in shaping my coming to understand the political character of translation and its relations to (post-)coloniality in UN peace operations.

Moreover, I do not wish to present a simple and/or romanticized account of the possibility of combining Jacques Derrida's thought with authors, such as Bhabha and Spivak, because they are strongly inspired by him. Neither do I want to suggest any junctions between homogenic representations of poststructuralism and postcolonialism in IR but rather explore possible dialogues. Indeed, this kind of aggravation with the theoretical-methodological borders in IR can also be understood as a problem of translation. Concomitantly, it is not my aim to re-present Derrida as a postcolonial author, given reasons such as his place of birth, social identifications and/or the postcolonial character of his more recent discussions[13], and then simply move on to my subsequent argument. On the one hand, I recognize that these categories can be more problematic than fruitful for they will never perfectly fit anyone's reflections or work. In an attempt to frame any of these authors according to the parameters of a discipline (the reader and I cannot forget that this thesis is in International Relations, requiring me to answer to the discipline's discussions and mostly in its language), I would end up imposing reifications that are distant from the political projects proposed by these thinkers. On the other hand, it is through these categorizations that IR scholars organize (part of) their thought, *re*-forming, *de*-forming, and *trans*-forming the discipline (ÇALKIVIK, 2017; EDKINS, 1999; HANSEN, 2006, p. 3–4).

Bhabha (2004, p. 33–38; 262–263; see also HIDDLESTON, 2009, p. 110–111; HUDDART, 2006, p. 5–6) and Spivak (1988, 1990, 1993, p. 189, 2002, p. 211) draw my attention to the potential difficulties between deconstruction, as

[13] That does not mean, however, that such contributions are crucial in my understanding of Derrida's thought. See Hiddleston (2009), Ahluwalia (2005), Arfi (2013), Davis (2001), and Sajed (2012).

proposed by Derrida, and political projects with more transformative agendas, such as postcolonial and feminist approaches (see also MOORE-GILBERT, 2007). Both authors show, however, that the *discomfort* that emerges from such a positioning should not be paralyzing, but productive. Thus, this thesis proposes to explore the *negotiations* embedded in these approaches and not determine an endpoint to this discussion. "The contribution of negotiation is to display the 'in-between' (…); it is not self-contradictory but significantly performs (…) the problems of judgement and identification that inform the political space of its enunciation" (BHABHA, 2004, p. 43). By negotiating, I reckon that

> The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one always inhabits, and all the more when one does not suspect it. Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old structure, borrowing them structurally, that is to say without being able to isolate their elements and atoms, the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own work (DERRIDA, 1997, p. 24).

Simone Drichel (2013) further calls attention to the anxiety usually presented in postcolonialism toward deconstruction. According to the author, the colonial enterprise can be seen as a traumatic experience that wished to dislocate (post-)colonial people's sense of self in a hierarchical relationship vis-à-vis the colonizer. As a form of inversion and displacement, deconstruction can similarly dis-organize the self, which, in turn, stimulates putting up what she calls a "protective shield" to combat this vulnerability.

> The anxiety around deconstruction, in other words, functions, in this reading, as a belated attempt to immunize against the trauma of colonization—and not without good reason, for if deconstruction amounts to a "radical acceptance of vulnerability," then deconstruction is of course the very thing that most *cannot* be accepted (…). Inasmuch as these walls around a community are built "for the protection against the other," they can be read, I suggest, as an expression of Freudian anxiety in the wake of traumatization: an anxious attempt to re-establish the breached "boundary between inside and outside," the "protective shield," so as to pre-empt—and thus be able to prevent—further traumatization (DRICHEL, 2013, p. 57, emphasis in the original).

As an ambivalent response, this anxiety is read by Drichel (2013, p. 59) as a comprehensible stance in postcolonial approaches. Yet, it also impedes the very defense it aims to enact, prolonging an openness to vulnerability. Inspired by Spivak's (1990, p. 18) understanding of deconstruction as radically accepting

vulnerability, she remarks that it is a crucial move to achieve postcolonial approaches' goals (DRICHEL, 2013, p. 64).

As such, I recognize that this text, like any other, is open to its deconstruction *and* it is already deconstructing itself. Yet, I do not see this as necessarily negative to the point of abandoning my thesis. Similarly, the criticisms against the UN discourse on protection or the specialized literature on peace operations carried out in this thesis should not be interpreted as a rejection of all peace missions conducted by international organizations or of how the academic literature has been analyzing them. On the one hand, the recurring comment, "so you believe the UN should never intervene?" or "you consider that it would be better if the UN did not hire local interpreters?", should be seen as unproductive in the long run because it reiterates a defensive posture, closing itself to the exploration of the inconsistencies of this process. As Arfi (2013, p. 6) re-affirms, closure is the "nemesis" of deconstruction. This kind of posture can be seen in the case of Kiwanja: "Colonel Brar was clearly troubled by what happened here but said he and his troops did their best in an awful situation. 'We did what we could,' he said. 'Imagine if we had not been here. Many more could have died'" (POLGREEN, 2008). On the other hand, these conversations have worked as a specter in the thesis writing process, reminding me that whatever form of critique I wish to make would also require taking these questions seriously and deepening the discussion around the CLAs to address and go beyond them. As Spivak (2002, p. 213) recalls, "[d]econstruction is not an exposure of error, nor a tabulation of error; logocentrism is not a pathology, nor is the metaphysical closure a prison to overthrow by violent means".

In sum, the analytical strategy of using UN documents helps me in this research to show the UN's attempt to construct and stabilize a singular meaning of protection and centralize its interpretations of the categories of protector, protected, and enemy. Even if there is only a timid mention of the CLAs in another UN doctrinal text, this thesis will understand that this is a movement of building a web to connect traces and supplements. It is in these endeavors, I argue, that lies the anxiety of stabilizing/centralizing meanings about, for example, peace operations doctrine, protection, and even the role of CLAs in this process. Nonetheless, it remains crucial to emphasize that this research delves into the representations of the CLAs, not the CLAs themselves as well as most actors on the ground. Their

presence in these manuals, that is, their representations, is a contained presence that allows them to be 'present' and even participate in the peace process, therefore, have 'agency' over what peace is been kept and built. However, the UN is mediating my access to the CLAs through the ones who have written these manuals (HOBSON; SAJED, 2017; SPIVAK, 1988). Even if I recognize there are spaces for resistance and the challenge of the (post-)colonial discourse, and future fieldwork could help shed more attention to that, the manuals with which I work present a very closed-off representation of the CLAs' expected role in UN peace operations. The next section introduces the main texts that guide this thesis careful reading, focusing on this tension.

1.3.1. SOURCES

In "*Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India*"[14], Guha (1999) dealt with a source issue similar[15] as my own in this thesis when also discussing counter-insurgencies: the difficulty to access the key-actors concerning the research problem. Indeed, with the financial and time constraints to do field work and the challenges to interview the CLAs or any uniformed and non-uniformed personnel which works directly with them in MONUSCO and other missions, this thesis transformed itself into a careful reading of UN materials. For Guha, the matter was a bit different though: they were dead and the few governmental and historical accounts on the peasantry in India depicted them using stereotypes typical of the colonial discourse to disqualify their political demands.

[14] What is at stake in Guha's book is a debate about predominant Western historiography, that is, how the White West tries to naturalize its political narrative. According to the dominant historiography, the violence inherent to the colonial process is not widely discussed but justified within a legal-political order that removes the status of a political subject from the peasant population. This movement implies an attempt to disqualify any manifestations contrary to the dominant regime, framing them as illegal and illegitimate (GUHA, 1999, p. 3–4). Concomitantly, Guha (1999, p. 5–10) promotes a discussion *with* and *against* the academic literature on resistance, focusing on the rationality and organizational criteria that qualify an insurgent movement as political.

[15] It should be underlined that the debate proposed in this thesis recognizes the peculiarities of each case, having, for example, different historical times, geographic spaces, and actors. Regardless, I stress my alignment with Said (2000), who demonstrates how theoretical-conceptual approaches travel between these contexts and may have adaptations and new reflections (see also BILGIN, 2021).

Regardless, the author transforms his methodological dilemma in one of the book's backbones by using these colonial discourses *for* and *against* themselves, that is, twisting and untwisting the COIN discourse. It is *not just* a question of using these documents against themselves, as a movement of criticism that identifies the violent nature of the attributions formulated by British colonialism on the peasant population. It is *also* about looking in detail at the rationality that guides them, reading them for what they are and are not. The author accomplishes this methodological maneuver because of the intertangled relationship insurgencies and counterinsurgencies carry (GUHA, 1999, p. 15). His depiction of the "prose of counterinsurgency" shows a complex tangle of ambiguous discourses in the search for credibility and legitimacy, whether for a tactic focused more on fighting the enemy or conquering the population's support (KRISHNA, 2009).

This thesis focuses on documents issued by the UN, especially the Department of Peace Operations (Department of Peacekeeping Operations until 2018, respectively DPO and DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS). By assessing the use of CLAs as an experiment to improve the Protection of Civilians agenda in peace operations, these documents serve as manuals for they provide instructions for UN peacekeepers to use CLAs services to fulfil their mandate using "good practices" and "lessons learned", that is, positive and negative experiences of other missions. As a function newly created by the time the documents were written, CLAs are an experiment within the "laboratory logic"[16] that is usually assigned to UN missions in the Congo, which makes these texts a report of the activities carried out. Following the simplified instructions presented in the manuals, such as "Do's and Don'ts" boxes, the idea is that the UN at the strategic level, mission leaders at the operational level and peacekeepers at the tactical level can learn and instrumentalize the service provided by CLAs to fulfil their tasks and the missions' mandates. Thus, three documents are analyzed in more detail.

[16] Both UN doctrine and the specialized literature on peace operations consider MONUSCO as a "laboratory" mission to create and experiment with new peace tools (KODDENBROCK, 2016, p. 75; MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 8). Within this logic, there is the possibility of testing new approaches. If something unexpected happens, such as civilians being saved or killed (remembering that the objective of the mission, at least in the discourse, is mainly to offer a protection mechanism), good practices and lessons learned are created for the UN to form better experiments in future missions.

Firstly, the "*CLA Best Practice Review*" derives from the efforts of the Civil Affairs Department/Sector of the MONUSCO. At 41 pages, this manual describes the tasks of CLAs on the ground, pointing out issues to be addressed by strategic and operational planning: the gender ratio of CLAs (most are men) and telephone/radio coverage. The text also uses boxes outside the main text to highlight "best practices" made by exemplary professionals. Another noteworthy visual feature is the use of big blue arrows in the end that show a "lessons learned" flux between an activity, its outcome, and assumed impact (MONUSCO CA, 2014).

Secondly, the "*Community Liaison Assistants in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Survey of Practice*" fits into the context of the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (under the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York), showing a more institutionalized discussion. If the first document showed the result of a small experiment, this manual defends its expansion to other missions highlighting the success in MONUSCO. At almost half the size of its predecessor (25 pages), it deals with the deployment of the CLA into four peace operations following a similar structure but balances the examples across missions. One significant feature is that none of the images in the report carry an explanation of what the picture aims to show (DPKO/DFS, 2016). This is curious when one considers that that behavior even fails to single out who the CLA is among the local population, something vital to the UN.

As a brief digression, it is important to point out that these two manuals are not available for public access, that is, even an academic who is researching UN peace operations should not be able to find these documents online. Indeed, these and other UN materials are exclusively for the use of UN staff and Peace Operations Training Centers through the UN library. What allowed me to be introduced to the discussions around CLAs was a course I did on UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC) at the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB), where I later acted as a voluntary researcher because of an agreement between my academic department and the military institution. Putting it simply, I could only have gotten access to other UN documents as someone connected to CCOPAB. As an exception to this institutional practice, however, the MONUSCO CA text can be found under the professional website of the PhD student who interned for the mission for only six months and wrote it (despite the document not having any authorship connecting to them).

Thirdly, the "*Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Handbook*" can be considered the UN's essential effort in systematizing the UN PoC agenda in a unique and didactic document. This manual has 238 pages and describes in detail the different aspects of protection in missions' mandates since the UNSC resolutions to implementing it on the ground. Throughout 15 chapters named after one specific matter regarding protection mandates, it offers advice to different leadership and "boots on the ground" positions in these missions to better understand, coordinate, and carry out PoC activities in peace operations (DPO, 2020a).

This thesis also considers other manuals produced by the UN within peace operations when working on issues adjacent to CLAs within a protection-driven context. Examples are the documents that discuss the UN doctrine for mediation (DPPA, 2012, 2020, 2022), civil-military cooperation (DPO, 2022), the concept of Peacekeeping-Intelligence (DPKO, 2019), and the preparatory material for UN Military Liaison Officers (DPO, 2020b). Lastly, broader peace operations doctrinal materials play an important role in this thesis, such as MONUSCO's UNSC resolutions that determine the mission's mandate as well as the commonly referred to as Capstone Doctrine (UNITED NATIONS, 2008), HIPPO Report (UNITED NATIONS, 2015), and Cruz Report (UNITED NATIONS, 2017).

Thinking *with* and *against* these UN documents means translating them within the COIN logic they subtly present, concerned with the dynamics of hierarchies produced in the relationships between actors represented in the text but going beyond them. Guha's invitation, therefore, is productive as it encourages me to re-read the manuals, dissecting the different layers they present through the PoC agenda. However, the author's analytical strategies do not perfectly apply to the case of the UN manuals. There are no excerpts from testimonies by the CLAs (even though they were supposedly interviewed), the local population or even the peacekeepers themselves (to whom the text is addressed). Thus, I understand that the manuals work with the representations of the CLAs and other actors on the ground, framed to follow the UN interests of counterinsurgency in the name of "protection".

Even so, the manuals would not exist without the CLAs and the local population for whom these peace operations are supposed to happen. CLA activities on the ground are what provided part of the materiality for these UN institutional

documents' existence. In this way, we reach a limit in Guha's (and my own) proposal, that is, there is a limitation of the documents that I analyze that prevents me (or, at least, should prevent me) from "pumping out" data indefinitely. In dealing with these manuals while being sensitive to Guha's effort in not reiterating colonial stereotypes, I am also considering issues related to the CLAs' silence that was part of the UN staff and bureaucracy decisions when writing these documents.

Authors such as Spivak (1988) and Hobson and Sajed (2017) encourage me to go beyond that and think about the role of this silence within my thesis. When I propose to understand CLAs as an analytical prism for debating the translation of protection discourses in a COIN context as MONUSCO, I still risk reiterating the same representational violence I criticize. The path explored in this thesis aims to go beyond a documentary analysis on COIN-driven peace operations, encompassing the questioning of *how* and *if* one should think *with* and *about* the Other. Thus, I understand the source issue in this thesis should not be faced exclusively with anguish in a search for its definitive solution but transformed into a productive effort.

As secondary sources, I am also directly engaging with other five types of literature. Firstly, I highlight the literature on Peace Operations, emphasizing the scholars who work on the local turn and stabilization debates in the most recent UN missions. Secondly, I am in contact with the literature on Translation and Interpretation Studies, particularly discussing the political role of translation and how it does (not) reverberate in IR in different case studies. Third and fourthly, I am inspired deeply by the works of Jacques Derrida and Homi K. Bhabha and indebted to those who engage with them in IR, which I denominate kindly as their translators to the discipline. Finally, while discussing the works of Derrida and Bhabha, I am also debating with poststructuralist and postcolonial authors, surpassing IR's discipline borders.

1.4. CHAPTER DIVISION

This thesis explores the "show, don't tell" movement as a writing strategy. That choice comes from the common resistance in academic writing and reading to approach research objects/subjects similarly as proposed in broad literature

storytelling. Both introduce a different way of writing and reading, so their role is not to have one substitute the other but negotiate them (INAYATULLAH, 2001). Popularly discussed in Literary Studies, this expression relates to a form of writing that immerses the reader in a story, its characters and its plot, transforming (sometimes not so) simple statements into a conversation (GERTH, 2016; HARDY, 2016). The reader, in this case, talks with and back to the text in their hands, is shocked by the plot twists, and laughs when the UN discourse openly mentions the ambivalences I seek to depict. *Telling* can rob the reader's enjoyability of the story, by stating things as they are and hindering imagination. *Showing* in a thesis, therefore, is an invitation to scientific communication, something often neglected in academic works. This thesis dialogues with many writers and aims to start and continue conversations, not (just) become a diploma framed on a wall hidden in plain sight.

Nevertheless, this thesis is not written as a literary story and rather takes inspiration from the famous helpful-unhelpful writing advice. Since the beginning of the research design, I understood that the different types of literature with which I engage here have been debating what I denominate the politics of translation, even if they did not use this expression nor remotely talked about translation. In this sense, one of my efforts in this work is to put this discussion in (greater) evidence. Thus, saying "look here, this is the politics of translation" can miss part of the fun of the writing and reading experiences when I can *show* first. In addition to the introduction (Chapter 1) and conclusion (Chapter 6), this thesis is divided into four development chapters. In Chapters 2-4, the events in Kiwanja haunt the discussions that guide them, while Chapter 5 presents a re-negotiation of the CLAs' representation as a solution to the problems faced in Kiwanja with the introduction of the 2014 attacks in Beni.

In the *second chapter*, Kiwanja represents a problem of communication when I present and locate the CLAs within the UN discourse. That way, the UN sees the CLAs for their linguistic and cultural expertise as a technocratic solution. Furthermore, Kiwanja can also be seen as a problem of cultural in-difference by the local turn in the Peace Operations literature. By presenting a project to include the local population, I show how this body of literature could benefit from the linguistic-cultural mediation service that the UN establishes as the role of CLAs. The chapter argues that, in both cases, there is a simplistic view of concepts such

as communication, translation, interpretation, and mediation that reifies the role of language and culture. The CLAs remain romanticized as bridges *and* barriers between "international" and "local" actors. That way, their non-position among the local population and the peacekeepers contributes to postponing a politics of alterity.

The *third chapter* shows Kiwanja as a problem of protection as the peacekeepers could not protect civilians. It explores how the UN understands the meaning of protection and how it aims to be translatable into the PoC agenda. I argue that protection as a socio-political discourse entails the division between who is protected, who enables protection, and who hinders it. Particularly in people-centered COIN contexts such as MONUSCO, this protection discourse needs to be translated and accepted by the local population, who is supposed to play the role of the protected, to legitimize the UN's protector and the local insurgent's enemy characters. Following this protection discourse, the UN also needs to distinguish who is to be assimilated and who is to be annihilated in the local population. To do so, the UN starts employing intelligence operations that the CLAs aid directly and indirectly. When COIN becomes an effort to win "hearts and minds", experiences similar to the Human Terrain System (HTS) start appearing in UN doctrine, making the CLAs' expertise a valuable asset in information and support gathering.

The *fourth chapter* unravels the representation of the Kiwanja attacks as the politics of translation of protection discourses. Drawing back on the examples presented in the earlier chapters, it displaces the CLAs as linguistic-cultural mediators while attempting to accomplish their tasks. Inspired by the myth of the Tower of Babel, I explore how translations have a political role in their enterprise of creating and diffusing a singular language and, consequently, a unifying understanding of one’s socio-political roles. Moreover, I debate the role of translation in the assimilation efforts of colonial discourses, which aim to stabilize a distinct hierarchy of meanings between the colonizer as a superior entity vis-à-vis the colonized. I further connect this practice with COIN tactics in MONUSCO that propel the weaponization of language and culture to entrench the protection discourses in the local population.

In the *fifth chapter*, the absence of the CLAs during the fights between the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Congolese Armed Forces, and the UN in Beni in 2014 re-presents a different imagination of the translation problem they are

tasked with solving. I explore the consequences of pushing the CLAs to work as linguistic-cultural mediators by focusing on how they are expected to re-present themselves beside and in place of the UN peacekeeper, most notably the uniformed personnel, who holds the protector identity in this representation. That allows this chapter to complexify the imaginations of the presence and absence of the CLAs in Kiwanja and Beni while debating how seeing the UN attempt to disseminate its interpretation of protection as a translation effort can contribute to current debates in Peace Operations literature.

Taken together, these chapters constitute a thesis concerned with the political character of translation and the role of the CLAs in the UN representations of the mis-encounters with the local population. Although this thesis follows a very specific example in a subarea of Critical Security Studies, this discussion stimulates conversations beyond it, therefore, hoping to contribute to the discipline's core debates.

2.
THE UN COMMUNITY LIAISON ASSISTANTS IN THE UNITED NATIONS DISCOURSE AND THE LOCAL TURN LITERATURE: TRANSLATION/INTERPRETATION AS THE PROBLEMS OF COMMUNICATION AND CULTURAL IN-DIFFERENCE

> In this instance, the failure came from a mix of poor communication and staffing, inadequate equipment, intelligence breakdowns and spectacularly bad luck, said Lt. Col. H. S. Brar, the commander of the Indian peacekeepers based in Kiwanja (…). Unable to speak to most of the population and with almost no intelligence capabilities, Colonel Brar groped his way through a fog of rumor, speculation and misinformation. "During this whole time, there was an informational vacuum," Colonel Brar said (POLGREEN, 2008, emphasis added).

As presented in the previous chapter, the United Nations considers the attacks on Kiwanja in 2008, among many similar experiences in the Congo and other missions, as the starting point for the creation of the Community Liaison Assistants. During this event, linguistic and cultural barriers become an obstacle to the protection mandate that the role of an interpreter/translator can overcome. In this chapter, I explore two intertwined movements between the UN discourse on protection and the local turn in the specialized literature on peace operations to understand how CLAs are located within the Protection of Civilians agenda.

Firstly, I discuss how the UN understands the problem of translation as a problem of communication between the peacekeepers and the local population, bringing CLAs as its solution. The UN recognizes the linguistic and cultural challenges to implement Protection of Civilians mandates when it does not construct a comprehensive engagement with the community they are supposed to protect. I also present how these professionals fit into MONUSCO, a multidimensional peace operation that involves different tasks and coordination between the three components. Accordingly, the CLAs are a vital protection tool in peace operations that facilitate connections and fluidity in the mission's everyday activities and work in perfect consonance to the UN's doctrine.

Secondly, I debate how the critical literature on peace operations defends, each author in a particular way, the importance of incorporating the population in the processes of building and maintaining peace as a critique to the Liberal Peace thesis. For them, the 'international' may recognize the need to incorporate 'local' visions in the peace project but fails to do so. In this case, CLAs are not the focus

since this approach concentrates on the local population's ambiguous resistances to the domination imposed by the liberal model of peace operations, yet a linguistic-cultural mediator can be a way of addressing this issue.

This chapter's main argument is that either through the UN discourse or through the local turn literature, there is no deep questioning of the role of translation and interpretation in the relations between actors in peace operations. Translations are seen as neutral and impartial, a simple way of communicating and/or dealing with the Other, and the CLAs remain romanticized as if the linguistic and cultural translation/interpretation could faultlessly fulfill their mediating role in the context of MONUSCO and other missions. Furthermore, the category of 'local', as opposed to the 'international', is part of both discourses as a heuristic device in favor of tolerating cultural difference. The problem of communication, according to the UN, involves a technocracy that places CLAs as a tool to be used by peacekeepers. The problem of cultural in-difference following the local turn constructs a reification of cultures where the relationship with the Other can be mediated and perhaps solved by cultural translation.

Indeed, the argumentation movement used in this chapter re-produces or at least categorizes problems and presents the CLAs as their solution[17]. Seen as this is an effort to translate a complex discussion of UN discourse and scholars focused on peace operations doctrine, it is still open to questioning and problematizing. The way I try to consider the issues with these framings in this thesis is to think about how the problem of translation offers a complexification of the protection discourses inherent to these problems as they are presented by the peace operation's doctrine and academic discussions.

2.1. *BRIDGING* COMMUNICATION WITH THE 'LOCAL COMMUNITY': UN PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE AND THE CREATION OF THE COMMUNITY LIAISON ASSISTANTS IN MONUSCO

[17] The work of Robert Cox has been considered pivotal in IR theory, given his emphasis on how different actors are full of theoretical conceptions located in social and political time and space, which are made by someone and aimed at something/someone (COX, 1986, p. 207). Inspired by the discussions which have followed this kind of problematization, I am concerned with how the UN and the local turn literature in POS create their representations of reality to pinpoint how the CLAs could come to be a solution.

In 2010, the UNSC voted for a resolution to change its mission's status in the Democratic Republic of Congo, transitioning from MONUC to MONUSCO. After 11 years of MONUC and on the country's 50th independence anniversary, this "evolution" is justified by the UN because "the Democratic Republic of the Congo is now entering a new phase of its transition towards peace consolidation" (UNSC, 2010, p. 3). The UNSC Resolution 1925 (2010) constitutes the mission's mandate, following a PoC priority and an "all necessary means" prerogative to use force under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In terms of geographic presence, this means that there is a shift of staff distribution from the West (where the capital is located and the objective was to build a national union during MONUC) to the East of the country, a region where there are still conflicts (DOSS, 2015). As one can see in Figure 01, the Eastern provinces have a concentration of CLAs deployed.



Figure 01: Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo with CLA deployment in 2014.

Source: MONUSCO CA (2014, p. 37).

The literature on peace operations in Congo generally does not theorize this transition, adopting a "MONUC/MONUSCO" graphism when, for example, investigating the "effectiveness" of the UN in bringing peace to the country (BARRERA, 2015; NOVOSSELOFF et al., 2019; REYNAERT, 2011). Some analyses even go directly to 2013 when the Force Intervention Brigade was created to argue for/against the use of force increasement and the deviation from UN peace operations' guiding principles (DEHEZ, 2014; RUSSO, 2021; TULL, 2018). Another trend is to compare these missions to the earlier UN experience in the country in the 1960s, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) (SPIJKERS, 2015). Either way, it seems as if the conditions for change around 2010 are not particularly noteworthy to the UN nor the specialized literature, yet it is in the MONUSCO transition that the CLAs were created. This section explores the context for the invention of this profession, its main tasks, and the communication problem that it is expected to solve according to the UN discourse. For that, I address mainly the UN peace operations doctrine and MONUSCO's mandate.

The UN doctrine at the time had been recently systematized in the "*United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines*" (usually referred as the Capstone Doctrine)[18] in an effort to compile and organize the doctrinal elements of peace operations. It is not the first doctrinal text itself, but its main one since the first mission in the 1940s. Coming from the Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and with the endorsement of the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, it can be understood as an effort from within because it derives from the more direct experiences of peacekeepers.

The document highlights the basis of peace operations following three principles: (1) consent of the host country, (2) impartiality, and (3) non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate (UNITED NATIONS, 2008, p. 21–25). Commonly referred to as the "Holy Trinity", these concepts have been transformed by UN practice throughout missions' deployment. Consent is the

[18] The Capstone Doctrine also states four modalities for its peace and security activities: conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding. Such typology considers aspects such as the consent of the host state, the level of use of force authorized by the Security Council, and the duration of the UN presence on the ground (UNITED NATIONS, 2008, p. 17–20). This thesis understands that this division is not only outdated when considering the most current discussions on stabilization missions but also reiterates imaginaries not so separated on the ground once the missions themselves present confluences between these ideal types. Therefore, the terminology 'peace operations' is adopted.

respect for the host country's sovereignty, which makes most peace operations subordinate to the government's approval for being established (the exception is the peace enforcement missions). Impartially deals with the posture UN peacekeepers adopt on the ground, that is, when conducting the mandate's specified tasks, they should do it regardless of the conflict's dynamics and war-fighting groups. However, that does not mean they are neutral to violence and will respond when attacked and when civilians are put in danger. Lastly, the UN prioritizes the non-use of force, seeing that peace can be achieved differently than in a war-driven scenario where the will of a group is to be brought by subjugating the other. The idea of non-use of force is the part of the peace operation's Holy Trinity that has changed the most throughout the years, given the more proactive mandates written after the Cold War (1945-1989).

Kenkel (2013) further highlights in a generational approach how the UN has changed from a juxtaposing presence to adopting deeper and broader engagements on the ground, making MONUSCO a multidimensional mission. MONUSCO's mandate encompass a complex set of activities around the 'sustainable peace agenda' but also the myriad of PoC tasks as a holistic attempt to keep peace and the contact with the local population becomes even more paramount to attempt achieving such goal (DOSS, 2015). Accordingly, the Capstone Doctrine calls attention to the tailoring of missions' activities to local needs and understandings, and invites local communities to participate in the mandate's efforts (UNITED NATIONS, 2008). The concept of "local ownership" is an expression of this proposal, consisting of asserting agency for the local population, that is, a certain degree of control for domestic actors to exercise over domestic political processes. That notion becomes particularly important in peace operations discourse for the common perception of following a top-down approach, that is, the powerful UN Member-States have a strong influence in defining missions' mandates. Therefore, UN peace operations have been seen as imposing a White Western ideal of peace and the proposition of security, and local ownership wishes to counter that (DONAIS, 2012; EJDUS, 2021). Also allied to the idea of local ownership, the Capstone Doctrine underlines aspects such as legitimacy[19] from the local population and respect for the local culture.

[19] Whalan (2017) discusses the concept of local legitimacy for peace operations doctrine, given the difficulty in obtaining this mark of the mission's 'success'. She points out three challenges to

While accounting for such effort, it is worth stating that MONUSCO, such as other peace operations, is marked by linguistic-cultural barriers (KUNREUTHER, 2020; MORENO-BELLO, 2021; ROSENDO; PERSAUD, 2019; TOMFORDE, 2010; WOODHOUSE, 2010). In the case of the Congo, the country has French as its official language, while Kikongo, Lingala, Swahili, and Tshiluba are recognized as national languages constitutionally, given their cultural status (CONGOLESE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 2005). In addition, linguists identify more than 210 languages spoken in the country but highlight Swahili[20] as predominant in the eastern region of Congo, the most prominent area for employing the CLAs in MONUSCO (MONUSCO CA, 2014; TRANSLATORS WITHOUT BORDERS, 2020). On the other hand, the most used languages by the UN peace operations and other humanitarian agencies are French, English, and Portuguese (TRAN, 2012). Thus, most of the population that receives this assistance is not fluent in these Anglo-Eurocentric languages, so there is a barrier being imposed in this relationship.

Between the many Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), Police Contributing Countries (PCCs), the United Nations Country Team, and the different communities in the host country, the UN has mainly dealt with the encounter of multiple languages and worldviews by hiring national or regional staff to mediate its relations with the host country nationals.

> The complexity of interpreting activity in PKOs lies in the fact that interpreters have to cope with the challenges that come with an operation that combines military and civilian expertise, as well as the enormous challenges that are encountered in a state- or peace-building process, which entails covering a wide range of contexts, from low-level and informal conversations, to mid-level conversations in safe environments and triadic negotiations in tense situations (ROSENDO; PERSAUD, 2019, p. 4).

As a common tactic in war-like environments, interpreters are a central but not discussed piece of the mission's everyday life (FOOTITT; KELLY, 2018; KUNREUTHER, 2020; MORENO-BELLO, 2021; ROSENDO; PERSAUD, 2016; SALAMA-CARR, 2007; TESSEUR, 2019). Their mediating potential is what, in

delimiting local legitimacy: (1) the fragmentation of the local population diminishes the consensus for approval/rejection; (2) the gap between the legitimacy from the locals' point of view and that of the international, which have different (and potentially opposing) interests and (3) the strange/foreign character of peace operations (lack of connection with the local).

[20] It is noteworthy to highlight how Swahili is considered a colonial language to the Congolese (FABIAN, 1986). This will be explored in Chapter 4.

part, enables the communication between the UN peacekeepers and the local population. In this sense, the CLAs are not the first effort in attending to address language and cultural barriers. On the contrary, interpreters and other sorts of cultural mediators have been hired formally and informally by missions and key actors following different nomenclatures.

Predominantly but not limited to journalist practices, fixers are local contacts who assist international reporters by translating interviews, introducing them to people of interest, and navigating foreign environments. Considered 'parachute' journalists, these mostly anglophone reporters are deployed in a context in which they have little knowledge or experience to produce an internationally relevant story. Upon arrival, they hire country residents to assist in the newsgathering process, who are considered the primary contact on the ground. Fixers, as CLAs in peace operations, are a vital part of the main work of journalists, yet they are undervalued and under protected by the industry, exposed to unsafe environments and poor work conditions (KUNREUTHER, 2020; PALMER, 2021, 2018; PALMER; FONTAN, 2007).

> In general, however, CLAs should not be seen as *just* 'fixers' for all mission components at the local level – though facilitating contacts for all mission components is an important part of their role – but as a part of the overall Civil Affairs capacity to provide the mission with effective community engagement support, typically with a protection of civilians focus (DPKO/DFS, 2016, p. 16, emphasis added).

Kelly and Baker (2013) show the experience of military linguists in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) as another option for creating and maintaining contact with the local population. These professionals are military-trained officers who work mainly with translating intra-mission documents (e.g., reports, written orders, and statements) but also locals-peacekeepers interpretation. A common practice for TCCs is to offer courses on key languages, shaping soldiers capable of interacting with the local population while also having the training to work in an unstable environment (FRANÇA, 2020). Following Kelly and Baker (2013; see also RAFAEL, 2016, p. 125–126; ROSENDO; PERSAUD, 2019), the deployment of military linguists is problematic because of time and money constraints. The UN cannot rely on TCCs' language training when there are multiple locations, and even more languages, where a peace operation can be deployed and little time and resources to prepare the military components.

Before 2010, the main course of action was to employ interpreters in the name of Language Assistants (LA) in peace operations. The LAs are local language-based non-professional[21] interpreters whose cultural mediation potential by the UN is recognized but not deeply explored. As the precursor of the CLAs, they work on the ground maintaining the relationships between the UN peacekeepers and the local population, but their role does not encompass the PoC agenda. For example, when assisting the UN Engineering Section in an asphalting operation, the Language Assistants are expected to draw attention to the road obstruction and explain the origin of noise and dirt in the area (FRANÇA, 2020, p. 46) whereas creating a Community Protection Plan, as seen in the previous chapter, would be a PoC-driven CLA activity.

The document written by the DPKO/DFS (2016, p. 17) shows that UN peacekeepers have had difficulty in understanding the distinctions between LAs and CLAs, treating the latter similarly as the former, therefore, undermining the CLAs' potential. Moreover, the MONUSCO Civil Affairs manual reaffirms the difference between them when describing the impact of the CLAs' absence in Beni in 2014 (which will be further explored in Chapter 5):

> Patrols have reportedly not taken place during the CLAs' absence. Language Assistants (who remained in Beni) were not able to interact with local authorities and the communities on the same level as CLAs. *Both the population and the commanders immediately felt the difference, as Language Assistants can translate but are not professionally equipped to conduct analysis and suggest solutions to specific POC issues* (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 31, emphasis added).

Nonetheless, the LAs find themselves in an ambiguous relationship to the peacekeepers and the local population with whom they work. On the one hand, they have a distinct power relationship with the rest of the population given their international staff status, on the other, they fall into similar precarity in work conditions (BAKER, 2010a, 2010b, 2012, 2014, 2019; FRANÇA, 2020; ROSENDO; PERSAUD, 2019).

Thus, fixers, military linguistics, and even LAs have not ceased to exist when the UN formulated the CLAs, but rather this 'new' format of linguistic-cultural mediation is inspired by its predecessors. Yet, it should not be confused

[21] An interpreter is considered non-professional when performing the role without Translation and/or Interpretation Studies training. This type of situation is more common than in the case of LAs and CLAs, with a range of contexts covered by this concept. See Antonini et al. (2017) for a definition and Rosendo and Persaud (2019) for a commentary in UN peace operations.

with them according to the manuals (DPKO/DFS, 2016, p. 8). In *designing* the CLAs' job, the UN attempts to solve what this thesis calls the problem of communication[22], whose expression is the symbolic distance between the main peace operations actors' languages and cultures. Such problematic framing becomes further highlighted when this distance creates security issues such as what happened in Kiwanja in 2008, when the protection mandate could not be fulfilled given an incorrect assessment of the local security situation. Indeed, the attacks on Kiwanja and similar contexts are not solely related to a communication issue, but the UN and other international actors frame it that way (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2008; MONUSCO CA, 2014; POLGREEN, 2008; UNJHRO, 2009).

Communication, in this sense, is downplayed to resemble a simplistic way of transmitting an unambiguous message from a sender to a receiver through the different types of medium, where the identity of a signified object can be separable from the process of passage and form a signifying operation (DERRIDA, 1981, p. 24–25, 1988; see also VENUTI, 2008, p. 17). It follows a unidirectional, top-down, and impartial approach to social relations that has been complexified by traditional Social Communication theories (BEER, 2005; CHANG, 1988; WOLF, 1999). Despite a focus on the medium, Debbie Lisle (2014) shows how problematic this is when one considers the political character of every aspect in social communication i.e. the attempt to establish a centered meaning in communication relates to a specific political view of 'reality'. Hence, this view on communication does not problematize the mediation rituals embedded in social relations whose representations enable the entanglement of multiple and paradoxical connotations in a particular message (DEBRIX, 2003a).

Beer (2005) explores the notion of "frightening communication" to show how, through the idea of *différance*, Derrida argues that communication fails to uphold its ideal, either by shortage or excess in meaning and/or context and regardless of intentionality. As seen in the previous chapter, *différance* relates to the delay *and* difference of meaning re-production that destabilizes its supposedly central definition. It is thus not to argue that communication is impossible but

[22] This thesis has chosen to focus on a specific part of the UN's problem of communication. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the UN has taken substantive action on strategic communications (SHERMAN et al., 2021). It relates primarily to the Public Information Sections, but the DPKO/DFS (2016, p. 2) manual also presents the CLAs as part of the UN communication strategy.

surpass presenting a ‘communication model’ on its im-possibility. Chang goes further by recalling Derrida’s (1997) undecidability of meaning. It is not simply a matter of vagueness or polysemy for it is essentially undeterminable. “If the multiplicity or equivocality of meaning can somehow be reduced if only one can re-contextualise and thereby restore the original meaning of the sign in question, Derrida’s undecidability of meaning would never grant one that possibility of re-contextualisation” (CHANG, 1988, p. 365).

Consequently, the UN's concepts of translation and interpretation do not explore them as complex systems of communication that transform the message between languages but rather fall into what Capan, dos Reis, and Grasten (2021; see also CORACINI, 2005, p. 10–11; VENUTI, 2008, p. 13) call a transfer-centered notion of translation. For these authors, traditional Translation Studies is mainly concerned with meaning transfer from a source to a target language, following the idea of linguistic equivalence, i.e. there is a modicum level of compatibility between languages that enables the translation of any given message. Similar to the communication issue, this conceptualization favors an unbiased view of translation. Thus, it corroborates the attempt to naturalize dominant political discourses such as the PoC agenda (DAVIS, 2001; DERRIDA, 1985). As Derrida recalls:

> In recent times, for scarcely a few centuries, a so-called literal translation that aims to attain the greatest possible relevance hasn't been a translation that renders letters or even only what is placidly termed the sense, but rather a translation that, while rendering the so-called proper meaning of a word, its literal meaning (which is to say a meaning that is determinable and not figural) establishes as the law or ideal-even if it remains inaccessible-a kind of translating that is not *word-to-word*, certainly, or *word-for-word*, but nonetheless stays as close as possible to the equivalence of "one word *by* one word" and thereby respects verbal quantity as a quantity of words, each of which is an irreducible body, the indivisible unity of an acoustic form that incorporates or signifies the indivisible unity of a meaning or concept (DERRIDA, 2001, p. 180-181, emphasis in the original).

Furthermore, the UN makes no distinction between linguistic translation and interpretation as discussed in the previous chapter. The CLA manuals simply repeat the job requires language and cultural knowledge that can be tested in the recruitment process through oral and written language tests (see also ROSENDO; PERSAUD, 2019). When discussing CLAs' interpretation skills, MONUSCO Civil Affairs (2014, p. 21) and DPKO/DFS (2016, p. 16–17) documents’ major concern around this topic is CLAs’ written reporting skills, following a broader

understanding of interpretation. According to the manuals, peacekeepers must correct the use of "emotional language" to improve information flow and operational mission planning:

> Improving reporting skills: Although of high quality and widely appreciated, there remains room to improve CLA reports.
> § Emotional vs. technical wording: CLAs tend to use emotional language that may depict events inaccurately, for example "Three people killed" can become three people 'slaughtered' or even a 'massacre'.
> § Overcoming the language barrier: Some commanders complained that the poor level of English of certain CLAs results in reports requiring significant editing. However, in regions where francophone troops are stationed, reports are drafted and circulated in French.
> § Analysis vs. event reporting: Concerns have been raised about the CLAs' ability to discern between relevant and irrelevant information. Additionally, it has been noted that CLAs tend to focus on stating facts to the detriment of providing a thorough assessment of the implications and consequences of the events they report on. However, some sections (e.g. JMAC) have also expressed their appreciation for the 'rawness' of the data in CLA reports, as it gives the section the opportunity to draw their own conclusions.
>
> To remedy these issues, the following should be considered:
> § Civil Affairs needs to dedicate staff time to reinforce the CLA's reports and analytical capacity through on the job-training. Specific support could be sought and training tools be designed in coordination with the IMTC on basic English reporting skills to align the CLAs' field report with the reporting style used at HQ level.
> § Due to the current CLA-staff ratio, the section does not have the staff available to base capacity-building solely on direct and individualized feedback. Further staffing to manage this ratio imbalance should be explored.
> § The Civil Affairs Officer in the sectors (OIC CA), as well as CLA Focal Points should strive to identify milestones, the way forward and success stories in their daily activities and reporting duties (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 21).

The communication problem in the UN discourse, I suggest, follows a technocratic problem-solving strategy, that is, it focuses on creating and solving an 'issue' by defining it as a matter of technique or expertise. Although presented, but not debated in the detail in the UN manuals about the CLAs, their linguistic and cultural expertise is what justifies creating this kind of position. They repeatedly state the CLAs must be able to speak different languages and have a complex understanding of the conflict and local culture. That is something that even UN peacekeepers lack and, therefore, make the CLAs so important in PoC mandates.

According to Leander and Wæver (2019, p. 1–3), the expert is someone who can create the link, who communicates, represents, and transmits relevant knowledge (that is, produces expertise) to other people who do not have the same

conditions. Thus, there is the judgment involved that this person is trustworthy to make analyses around a given subject. That allows them to judge a complex issue, and this assessment is more qualified than that of a non-expert. "[T]hanks to their cultural and language *skills*, CLAs are also able to improve the interface between communities and missions across mandated tasks" (DPKO/DFS, 2016, p. 2, emphasis added). They are considered as experts in UN peace operations, especially in linguistic-culturally sensitive missions, because

> CLAs are a *unique staff category* with a *rare* combination of *skills*. They were specifically recruited but have also developed their *capacities* over the past 4 years. As Congolese nationals, versatile in communication *techniques* and speaking local languages, they are particularly *apt* to build links with local communities and authorities. They have *field experience* and a *proven record* to work in difficult situations (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 32, emphasis added).

Accordingly, organizing and planning a peace operation with the CLAs' so-called linguistic-cultural skills can help prevent attacks such as the one in Kiwanja. Mac Ginty (2012a; WILLIAMS; MENGISTU, 2015) emphasizes a growing technocracy in peace operations inspired by the ideals of neutrality and efficiency that construct a permanent need in itself. Although not entirely against the technocratic turn, he argues that this approach entails a distinct discourse on 'peace' that impoverishes the discussion on how to achieve it. Hence, the CLAs become a technocratic solution in bureaucracy-driven peace operations as they present linguistic-cultural expertise as the answer to the problem of communication:

> *CLAs' primary strength lies in their ability to establish and develop a direct communication line with local communities, authorities and other relevant actors*. In order to build an effective network with the local population, CLAs invest a great deal of their time in trust and relationship-building activities. Although each CLA is free to develop the approach that they judge most appropriate to their operating context, *Civil Affairs has established a standardized methodology*. (…) In return, the CLAs' close ties to the population enable them to gather information, communicate messages, and implement a variety of MONUSCO activities on the ground (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 20, emphasis added).

That way, the UN assigns a great responsibility to the CLAs in PoC mandates: to mediate relations between the local population and the peacekeepers. I highlight the manuals present this mediating role with metaphors such as "building relationships" and "providing interface" between the local population and the UN peacekeepers (DPKO/DFS, 2016, p. 2; MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 8). However, the UN does not dwell much in these manuals about how this kind of mediation works.

As another part of the Secretariat working alongside the DPO, the Department of Peacebuilding and Political Affairs (DPPA) and its Mediation Support Unit present mediation manuals focused mainly on holistic interstate negotiations (DPPA, 2012). As a more recent effort, they have published two reports entitled "*Support to Local Mediation Challenges and Opportunities*" (DPPA, 2020) and "*Engaging at the Local Level Options for UN Mediators*" (DPPA, 2022). Although the "local mediation" detailed in these documents through different case studies can be considered a more comprehensive approach to what mediation resembles on the ground, it still excludes the everyday mediations performed by UN staff at the tactical level, such as the CLAs.

In addition, the traditional literature on mediation see it as a method of negotiation in which a third party (the mediator) acts as the "channel" that enables communication and, therefore, a negotiation between two parties on a dispute. Its main issues are identifying appropriate mediators, determining "conflict ripeness", and showing impartiality and trustworthiness (HERZ; SIMAN; DRUMOND, 2016). Therefore, only one meaning of mediation and, consequently, one way to perform it are privileged in this dominant interpretation. For instance, the moderator's agency is neither considered nor problematized, while the dis-connection between the two parties remains undiscussed. Thus, this thesis adopts a more critical stance on mediation. It entails how meaning is perceived and transformed in social interactions as mediation rituals. The rituality metaphor focuses on the socio-political aspects of this relationship and what roles different actors play in a given context. It does not impose a fixed imagination on how the mediation process works, for it is open to transformative, plural, and contradictive possibilities (BHABHA, 2011; CORACINI, 2005; DEBRIX, 2003a, 2003b; INGHILLERI, 2018). I am particularly interested in the linguistic and cultural mis-understandings that occur in mediation practices and how it has been traditionally seen as a way of delegating the management of alterity politics to the mediator's role. This third party is supposed to hold the response-abilities to bridge and distance stakeholders while negotiating their interests and beliefs to enable a "good" mediation. For the CLAs, that means paying attention to how the UN expects them to carry out their designated tasks considering impartiality ideals and their linguistic-cultural expertise (see Chapter 5).

Before being properly called CLAs, these professionals went through two brief transformations. Firstly, MONUC created Joint Protection Teams (JPTs), small *ad hoc* missions deployed to remote or high-risk locations to gather information on security-relevant developments. Interpreters worked as part of the team, called JPT Liaison Officers, to improve the mission's understanding of local contexts, creating further recommendations for the employment of such professionals on an everyday basis. Second, the Civil Affairs Section/Department recognizing the JPT case contributed and stimulated the creation of a new staff category under the name of Community Liaison Interpreters (CLIs). In doing so, the hiring process transferred from the military personnel to the Civil Affairs, underlining the position's civilian character. Lastly, in 2011, the name Community Liaison Assistant was introduced after the visit of a Senior Officer to MONUSCO "in view of additional responsibilities assigned to them and to better reflect the complex nature of their multi-dimensional activities" (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 10).

Thus, designing the CLAs is an attempt to experiment with their liaison potential. As such, the CLAs are distinct from other civilian and/or Civil Affairs staff, given their intrinsic relationship with UN uniformed personnel, that is, the military and police components of a UN peace operation. As part of the military "grammar", a liaison officer's job surpasses creating a working relationship between two interested parts, considering its role in monitoring and assessing the relationship dynamics and assisting in the mission planning. They can work at a meso level, bringing together and negotiating between information, discussions, commitments, and caveats on the institutional macro level and grassroots micro level (BIGO, 2000). In UN Civil-Military Coordination doctrine, the liaison between military and civilian components in the mission is stimulated to avoid duplicate work and create cooperation between mission components, but it focuses mainly on the military liaison officer (DPO, 2022). "CLAs are responsible for civil-military coordination and information exchange at the local level. Through their daily interaction with the base commander, CLAs ensure that civilian and the military components of the Mission have a common perspective" (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 24). CLAs are also seen as the "natural counterpart" of military UN-CIMIC Officers' (DPKO/DFS, 2016, p. 8) by "providing the interface" between mostly

military peacekeepers and the local civilian population[23]. That can be seen in the "success story" entitled "*CLAs help to avoid bloodshed in Goma (North Kivu)*":

> In 2011, opposition parties in Goma were preparing demonstrations to contest the Presidential and Parliamentary elections results. CLAs received an alert that armed CNDP militias were printing T-shirts with UDPS (Union des Démocrates pour le Progrès Social) labels and were going to infiltrate the demonstrators. The main concern was the probability of shooting and killings that could later be attributed to the UDPS opposition. *At this point, CLAs in the area assessed the short-term risks for the demonstrators as well as the medium-term threats of a potentially violent political climate in the region. The CLAs shared their concerns with the COB commander and the Civil Affairs section. Detailed information was gathered and passed on to the provincial authorities (Mayor and PNC Officer)*. In response, a search was conducted in some residences and the printed T-shirts were found in the home of a former CNDP officer. *The violence was avoided and the demonstration took place without major disturbances* (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 30, emphasis added).

Nevertheless, I understand that their liaison role addresses a different communication issue than mediating two parts working on the same goal, i.e. managing a hierarchical relationship. Hence, CLAs are tasked with solving the problem of communication insofar as it works in favor of the UN's interests on the ground. While the local ownership discourse facilitates the creation of linguistic-cultural interpreters, I want to suggest throughout this thesis that their role in peace operations resonates more with the management of protection socio-political roles. To accomplish such goal, the MONUSCO Civil Affairs (2014, p. 20–26) divides the main CLAs tasks into six axes: (1) gathering information on security threats and alerting (national and the UN) authorities; (2) creating and managing the Community Alert Networks; (3) increasing community alertness and responsiveness to threats; (4) facilitating missions and activities on the ground; (5) enhancing collaboration and communication between MONUSCO, local communities, and authorities and (6) conducting surveys on the communities perception concerning MONUSCO's PoC mandate.

[23] As stated in full: "Since CLAs frequently live and work in remote areas that are difficult or impossible to reach for other United Nations civilian staff, their work is essential to the implementation of the above-mentioned core Civil Affairs functions. *It is precisely in these settings that CLAs offer the greatest added benefit*, as they provide a civilian capacity to an otherwise strictly military presence. *As field staff have framed it, this gives eyes and ears to the military contingents on the ground*. The fact that CLAs are a long-term presence in the midst of regular military rotations adds further value. On the part of the military, Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) officers make natural counterparts for CLAs" (DPKO/DFS, 2016, p. 8, emphasis added).

As another core doctrinal document that guides CLAs assigned tasks, the final report on the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) emphasizes the central role of political processes in peace operations. The PoC agenda is a decisive component to that idea for the mission planning sees enabling conflict-related politics as a form of protection (UNITED NATIONS, 2015). That favors a "people-centered approach", that is, to plan and organize the peace operation's activities focused on the people in whose interest peace is to be managed. The CLAs' role in people-centered peace operations is signaled in the specialized literature on UN peace operations (DE CONING; KARLSRUD; TROOST, 2015, p. 9), as well as the manuals:

> As recognised by the HIPPO report, protecting civilians is a core obligation of the UN, with a particular emphasis on the importance of unarmed protection and a people-centred approach. CLAs, for reasons outlined in this survey, represent one of the best tools available to missions in this regard (DPKO/DFS, 2016, p. 9).

Given budget and troop constraints to the mission's broad mandate, the CLAs have also contributed to MONUSCO's PoC agenda as a "force-multiplier" (DPKO/DFS, 2016, p. 6). Accordingly, the presence of one or two CLAs generally in a rural UN military base supposedly improves peacekeeper-local relationships and the understanding of the social dynamics and security situation in the area. In this way, the UN understands that hiring fewer than 200 people as CLAs can change the local perception of MONUSCO much more than stimulating donors, TCCs, and PCCs. As part of the "protection as projection" efforts, the CLAs work directly to enable other PoC activities such as Early Warning Early Response (EWER) systems because they create and maintain Community Alert Networks and Community Protection Plans with local authorities and key residents (DUURSMA, 2021; SPINK, 2018).

Since 2019, the mission is preparing to withdraw and UNSC Resolution 2556 (2020) has already planned a gradual exit strategy for the subsequent years. Therefore, the notion of "force-multiplier" amidst financial restrictions can be extracted in UN Secretary-General Reports on MONUSCO that highlight how the CLAs and other adjacent "peace tools" help the UN change the protection strategy from "presence" to "projection". Accordingly, the UN "will need to expand and make full use of these tools to ensure an effective response to protection threats in priority areas of concern" (UNSC, 2017a, p. 12, 2017b). The discourse around the

shift and the CLAs' role in it will be discussed in the next chapter, but here it signals how the use of the CLAs and other experiments have been considered successful in their propositions, allowing the UN to reallocate their efforts. However, it is important to consider that such a change does not mean the CLAs are left in full capabilities to perform their jobs but rather continue to face similar if not the same challenges as before (COLEMAN, 2020).

The policy papers that once regarded the CLAs as an interesting instrument to protect civilians now present them as a key actor in "people-centered" peace operations. For instance, Carver (2022) analyses MONUSCO's experience to argue that community engagement should play a more predominant role in UN peace operations, especially following a PoC mandate, because it consolidates stronger networks with the target of protection and increases the avoidance of atrocity risks:

> CLAs will continue to play an irreplaceable role for as long as the mission retains a presence. They are the bridge between mission and community, they are integral to establishing the other mechanisms which struggle without them, and they are able to build trust where other more embedded elements of the mission can't (CARVER, 2022, p. 24).

Nevertheless, the peacekeepers-local population relationship that CLAs maintain reiterates the binary division between 'local' and 'international' categories in peace operations while presenting a discourse on inclusion. Their mediating role reiterates the division between these two abstract actors, rather than a mixing between them or local ownership of the peace process. Hence, that enables the UN to rely and outsource a third party to provide the means for the conversation (DEBRIX, 2003a; KUNREUTHER, 2020). The manuals on CLAs, therefore, serve the purpose of reporting the successes and challenges that CLAs and the peacekeepers who work with them face while attempting to stabilize a specific role of peace operations actors.

> Such protocols, however, rest on a series of unexamined assumptions about language and translation. They regard language as a mere vehicle for transmitting a speaker's intentions. If handled *properly*, like a car or a tank, it can be relied upon to transport one's ideas to their intended destination. Similarly, such protocols view translation as a pliant process for transferring meaning and faithfully reproducing the original into its copies (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 133, emphasis added).

By providing an analysis of the employment and recommending how peacekeepers should utilize their service, the United Nations follows a technocratic view of the

problem of communication that presents an unproblematized linguistic-cultural mediator as part of its solution.

2.2. *BRINGING* THE COMMUNITY LIAISON ASSISTANTS INTO THE LOCAL TURN: 'TRANSLATING CULTURE' IN PEACE OPERATIONS LITERATURE

The local turn arises in the specialized literature on peace operations as critiques of multidimensional top-down peace operations that presuppose the adequacy of post-conflict states based on liberal values. Typically referred to as the Liberal Peace thesis, the UN endorses this 'new' strategy in the 1990s by establishing a link between achieving peace and the adoption of socio-economic policies (*inter alia* liberal democracy, the rule of law, liberal human rights, the promotion of a market-oriented economy). Common ground between different authors is the inclusion and even the predominance of local perspectives as a core aspect of a peace project, related to broader discussions on donor-driven frameworks and surpassing simple bottom-up replacements in peace and conflict governance. For them, the local agency should not be seen in an essentializing, infantile, or monolithic way, given multiple political subjects' powers and resistances. Agency means a further recognition of the importance attributed to the local population to participate and decide their political future despite the influence of foreign intervention (DONAIS, 2012; KENKEL, 2013; PAFFENHOLZ, 2015; PUGH, 2021).

As critical engagements with the Liberal Peace, Aureo Toledo (2013) lists three groups of authors. First, there are the "reformist critics", who disagree with the implementation of liberal practices in peace operations but not the liberal value behind them. The second group, referred to as "structural critics", debate questions about the functioning of the international capitalist order and understand peace missions as technologies at its service. Finally, the third group is the local turn itself, which proposes a revision of the Liberal Peace and integration with the locals. Nonetheless, when discussing the last group, he chooses to focus on the work of Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond, two pivotal authors who argue for a specific incorporation of the local in peace operations, leaving some other scholars outside the local turn framing.

Paffenholz (2015) offers a deepening in Toledo's view of the local turn by dividing it in two "generations", with only the last one containing these two scholars. For her, a first attempt to include local viewpoint comes from a debate in the mediation and implementation of peace agreements (what the Capstone Doctrine would call peace making) that understands it would only be up to the local population in the context of the conflict to build peace in their respective countries. She indicates John Lederach (1997), a Conflict Transformation[24] scholar, as its exemplary author. He has sought reconciliation between belligerent groups in a long-term logic rather than solving them. Although not opposed to the traditional mechanisms of Conflict Resolution, he defends the expansion of the peace agreements' scope and activities for their consolidation to consider how deeply divided societies can effectively reconcile and not return to direct violence (PAFFENHOLZ, 2014).

Even with these categorizations, it is worth mentioning that Toledo (2013) acknowledges he only considers authors who argue there is a potential for effective relationships with the local population and it is possible to achieve a 'sustainable peace', as proposed in the mandates through the activities that compose this process. Conversely, this thesis adopts a broader understanding of the local turn in the specialized literature on peace operations to encompass a myriad of views that debate the incorporation of the local population in peace operations, attempting to further the discussion brought by these two scholars. That means presenting updated analyses on the critique of the Liberal Peace and the argument of postcolonial authors who are more skeptical of UN's protection discourses.

In doing so, this section explores how the distinct views deliberate on the attempt to negotiate the inclusion of local perspectives in peace operations, as opposed to the 'international'-led Liberal Peace. Despite UN efforts to incorporate local turn's recommendations in peace operation's planning, such as the Capstone Doctrine and more recent guidelines, these authors continue to highlight a troubling understanding of the way UN captures the 'local', which, in turn, relates to the way

[24] The notion of Conflict Transformation, as a critique of Conflict Resolution, argues that people cannot abandon their fundamental needs, even in community and identity conflicts, rejecting a solely political view of the conflict. Furthermore, this approach understands that it is possible to transcend conflicts if the parties can explore, analyze, question, and reformulate their positions and interests. To this end, there is an emphasis on the intervention of qualified third parties, seeking to explore the roots of conflict and identify creative solutions to transform destructive zero-sum conflict patterns into positive-sum constructive results (MIALL, 2004, p. 69–70).

the own literature sees this concept (ALEJANDRO, 2021). Although not discussing the role of the CLAs, they are understood by the UN as a productive part in the solution to bridging different worldviews and cultures, therefore contributing to a more sensitive approach in these missions as favored by the local turn. In this way, presenting the CLAs as an answer to this critique is an argument of my own rather than the discussion of the UN doctrine done in the last section. Nonetheless, the way the authors do not deeply engage with the idea of cultural difference in favor of a romanticized 'local' risks reducing their critiques' potential. Thus, I turn to three contrasting arguments on the local turn debate. Choosing to focus specifically on these scholars relates to their engagement with the im-possibility of resisting the Liberal Peace and bringing a local(ized) way of looking at peace operations. Moreover, these authors implicitly discuss a broader process of translation in this context, which allows me to point out how the CLAs can corroborate their academic and political views.

Firstly, Séverine Autesserre has done extensive fieldwork as a humanitarian worker and scholar in Congo and other locations, making her academic career a mediation between these 'worlds'. Her most recent book even promises to offer an "insider's guide" on how peace operations and other humanitarian and military interventions work and what can be considered successful (AUTESSERRE, 2021). She has systematically argued that humanitarian workers' *habitus*[25] constitute a narrow and closed-off understanding of how to protect civilians and achieve peace that does not correspond to the social dynamics in the countries they are being deployed.

In "*The Trouble with the Congo*", the author offers a complex critique. According to her, MONUC's mandate imposes a top-down logic inasmuch as the UN presents the host-state with a package of interventions that must be enacted to ensure peace. This proposal focuses on several initiatives that aim to strengthen the Congolese state apparatus and re-build it as acceptable in the eyes of the international community (AUTESSERRE, 2010). She also argues that this framework originates from the search for a simplistic discourse about the country,

[25] The author is strongly influenced by Pierre Bourdieu, who developed the concept of *habitus* throughout his academic work. For him, the *habitus* is a system of dispositions, ways of thinking, and doing that leads actors/agents to unconsciously behave in a certain manner and a given circumstance (BOURDIEU, 2013, p. 72).

which persists in being understood as intractable and complex to satisfy the interests of donors and decision-makers (AUTESSERRE, 2012).

Conversely, she identifies that humanitarian culture re-creates perceptions about the 'local' and the 'international' that hinder the UN in carrying out its mandate. In "*Peaceland"*, she tackles the "humanitarian world" to understand how it organizes itself, its social norms and conventions. Peaceland is a way to define the symbolic place where peacekeepers live detached from their environment while working in peace operations or international organizations' headquarters. With their mundane habits and situated knowledge, these inhabitants continuously separate themselves from whom they are trying to protect, creating issues such as the expatriate superiority complex and the disqualification of the general input of local humanitarian workers' and population's general input (AUTESSERRE, 2014; see also JAMES, 2022; SMIRL, 2015).

Her work is full of anecdotes she does not deeply explore, but they serve the purpose of giving the reader an 'insider' gaze on humanitarian politics. A personal experience she commonly refers to is the attacks in Bukavu in May 2004, when an armed group took over the city, engaging in acts of looting, raping, and killing the civilian population. While detained in a UN military compound with diplomats, donors, and other peacekeepers, she narrates that a boy ran for help at the base when the attacks began. In this case, the peacekeepers on duty spoke neither Swahili nor French and there was not an interpreter (probably a LA) available. The soldiers answered failed attempts to explain the acts of violence near the base with "a broad smile" by handing the child a package of cookies (AUTESSERRE, 2010, p. 41, 2021, p. 89–90). When discussing humanitarian workers who have lived for years in Congo and tried to learn local languages, she highlights the potential to increase ethnic tensions in another illustration. She tells the story of an African peacekeeper greeting people in Kinyarwanda, a language they had put in effort to learn to better integrate themselves with the local population, being ill-regarded. That happened because this language conveys a violent past to many Congolese, given the deaths of thousands of people, but it was something they had overlooked (AUTESSERRE, 2014, p. 155, 2021, p. 90–91).

For Autesserre, both examples show that the peace operation's culture and its understanding of the local population are obstacles to the peace project they aim to achieve. Nevertheless, the CLAs work as the translator between the 'worlds' she

sees so distinctly separated. As proposed by the UN, they are designed to permeate the barriers that separate the ‘local’ and the ‘international’ given their linguistic and cultural expertise. In addition, they can connect both groups, enabling peacekeepers to comprehend the local’s grievances and locals to recognize the UN as the protector image that did not materialize in Bukavu (or Kiwanja). Thus, the CLAs contribute to the encounter and the middle ground for the top-down and bottom-up approaches she idealizes.

Furthermore, she argues that outsiders and those who recently enter the Peaceland are better equipped to identify and question its culture and *modus operandi* because they can offer a fresh look at recurrent issues and avoid the accumulation bias (AUTESSERRE, 2014, p. 259). The CLAs are a recent job in the UN, despite the fact that many Congolese professionals are hired in different humanitarian positions (in the United Nations or elsewhere), given the continuous influence foreign interventions have had on Congo’s politics and economy. According to the UN’s understanding of the CLAs, as seen in the last section, their distinct focus on the conflict’s social dynamics challenges an ‘international’ approach to the peace operation, but also defies, at least in part, the culture of Peaceland. That way, the CLAs are very good candidates for handling the division between groups that has been compromising peace operations.

In contrast, Mac Ginty and Richmond argue for a hybridized understanding of peace operations. As a second take on the local turn debate in this thesis, they aim to oppose binarism in the division between the 'local' and the 'international' by understanding these categories are not as separated as imagined in conventional academic research and the UN discourse. Consequently, the ‘local’, as a plural and diverse group, is an ambiguous actor that cooperates *and* resists the influence in the daily acts of negotiation and opposition to liberal peacebuilding in this imagination. The everyday, in this sense, becomes a privileged temporal and spatial dimension of political action. Consolidating local agency and ownership over the UN peace project should be the local turn's goal, even if this implies more radical transformations in the structure of liberal peace operations (MAC GINTY, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2021; MAC GINTY; RICHMOND, 2013, 2016; RICHMOND, 2011, 2012, 2015, 2018).

> We discern from local agency and its relationship with hybrid forms of peace an attempt to redefine what peace and legitimacy mean in different contexts, to maintain everyday life, to gain autonomy,

> aspirations for social forms of justice, to express identity, and to engage with certain aspects of the liberal peace. We also discern a failing or refusal on the part of international actors—in their public transcripts at least—involved in peace building and state building to acknowledge their accountability to local subjects or to refrain from naturalising international and local hierarchies (at the professional as well as political level) (MAC GINTY; RICHMOND, 2013, p. 779).

Inspired by Bhabha[26] (2004) and other poststructuralist and postcolonial authors in IR and Social Sciences[27], the idea of hybridization works not as a simple combination of two or more units, partially reflecting their attributes but a new and unrecognizable cultural form. Hence, the hybridization process in the encounters between cultures, worldviews, and inputs on how to constitute peace permits re-thinking local/international hierarchies in peace operations against a technocratic turn in peace operations. "Fundamentally, the concept of hybridity, if used as a post-colonial, post-territorial and post-biological construct, liberates us from the dominant policy script of goodies and baddies, states and non-states and West and non-West" (MAC GINTY; RICHMOND, 2016, p. 10). Nevertheless, they also present a concerned stance on how hybrid forms of peace can be coopted into the service of existing structures and modes of peace, such as the Liberal Peace thesis.

Accordingly, CLAs perform a strong expression of hybridization. Their ability to mediate the international and the local only happens because they are intrinsically hybrid, as presented in this literature. Not only are they the product of this encounter, but they are also constantly shifting their perspectives to bridge peace operations' actors closer. Then, the CLAs represent how those worlds can come together to achieve a comprehensive peace project that considers the local's perspective while negotiating with donors, TCCs, and PCCs. Following this view,

[26] I highlight the inherent losses and gaps in Bhabha's thought has travelled into the Hybrid Peace thesis. Thus, it does not face some of the main criticisms attributed to Bhabha regarding the capacity of the colonized to resist the colonizer's ambivalent power. Bhabha's critics argue how resistance in his terms only exists after a partial subjugation of colonized peoples. That happens because it is first necessary to accept the meanings of colonial discourse and then create and codify a script that allows resistance. Thus mimicry, although ironic and subversive, still needs to be contained in the structure of meanings that oppresses the 'local' (KAPOOR, 2008).

[27] Some of these inspirations come from the works of Michel Foucault, Néstor García Canclini, and W.B. Yeats. Following Darby and Paolini (1994), I underline how Mac Ginty and Richmond (2016) dedicate their work to providing a dialogue between the Social Sciences and IR by taking postcolonial and poststructuralist as catalyzing approaches.

the CLA position is a productive approach to enabling everyday peace operations that come together as distinctively hybrid[28].

The third view on the local turn in this thesis is Vivienne Jabri's (2013) discussion[29] on colonial versus postcolonial rationalities in peace operations. In a Foucauldian inspired approach, she argues that the 'international' is ambiguously enacted in these contexts, providing the re-production of colonial peacebuilding and post-colonial conflict resolution politics. On one hand, peacebuilding begins to follow a policing rationale, correcting so-called failed states' deviations from the modern state model to establish an administration capable of governing its population and the derived socioeconomic relationships. The concept of peace follows a dimension of 'stable peace', or as it is in the UN discourse 'sustainable peace', and the local population has little to none agency. On the other hand, conflict resolution strategies aim to consider the host country's subjecthood, such as the UN local ownership discourse.

Thus, she rejects the local turn debate 'international' and 'local' categories. Rather, she argues the issue is between practices that see their target as populations to be governed and practices that recognize them and their conflicts as distinctly political. Although the two may be mutually intertwined, such is the case of UN peace operations in this thesis, the attribution of agency to the local population works distinctly (JABRI, 2013). She also has a pessimistic impression on how peace operations locate locally hired staff:

> The 'local' is not the driver behind the practices of peacebuilding I highlight above, *even though the 'local' may, at some point come on board, may be mobilised, as indeed it has to, simply to render operations on the ground workable*. From the use of translators to local professionals like teachers or health workers, the 'local' comes into the frame, and in doing so may influence the tenor of relationships, from accruing legitimacy to incorporating local sensitivities, to enabling negotiation between locals and internationals. What is important to highlight is that, as far as the normative ordering of peacebuilding as a practice goes, it is the international context that matters. The international, its institutions and normative structuration, weighs heavily on the local (JABRI, 2013, p. 9, emphasis added).

[28] A hybrid peace operation, as proposed by Mac Ginty and Richmond, should not be confused with hybrid missions that consider UN cooperation with other regional organizations, see Kenkel (2013) for the latter.

[29] Jabri (2013) adopts the concepts of peacebuilding and conflict resolution with a very specific meaning, which is not the same as the one used in the literature on Security Studies and in policy-making. Peacebuilding will focus on local/tactical level practices in peace operations, while conflict resolution will focus on building how to resolve the post-conflict situation and achieve peace. This distinction is relevant for the author because it will open the space for the discussion of where the post-colonial agency fits, which is the focus of her work.

Following this argument, the CLAs are helping the international via the UN to conquer the local population in a colonial governance. As will be more detailed in the subsequent chapter, CLAs work in a stabilization context that considers COIN tactics in which language and culture play an important role in mission planning (RAFAEL, 2016). However, they are also fundamental to enable local subjectivity in conflict resolution insofar as CLAs are supposedly carrying out their 'voice' throughout *in situ* mediation and reports to mission planning. Thus, the ambiguity in UN peace operation's doctrine also falls into its perceived peace tools.

More skeptical authors point out that the local turn ends up methodologically excluding the local, despite arguing for the integration of local perspectives in peace operations. I underscore the work of Meera Sabaratnam (see also BARGUÉS-PEDRENY; RANDAZZO, 2018; OBAMAMOYE, 2023; PAFFENHOLZ, 2015; RANDAZZO, 2021; RANDAZZO; TORRENT, 2021), given her direct engagement with these approaches, demonstrating how they risk reinforcing the centrality of the international(ized) West. She argues that Autesserre contains and even invalidates local humanitarian workers' manifestations in favor of not discussing nor identifying humanitarians' and peacekeepers' racist and colonial opinions in her anecdotal examples. That reiterates the redemptive character of intervention practices in a Eurocentric discourse[30] (SABARATNAM, 2017, p. 31). By emphasizing the junction between the "more authentic" local logic and its international counterpart, the authors of Hybrid Peace reflect an insurmountable difference as the primary division between these two parts. Thus, ethical problems of peacebuilding practice arise that re-produce the division between the liberal, rational, and modern international and the culturally distinct space of the local (SABARATNAM, 2017, p. 29). Lastly, framing peace operations as governmentality reinforces only the interveners' agency and subjectivity. Consequently, Foucauldian-influenced approaches such as Jabri's obstruct the

[30] The author argues that diverse 'critical' peacebuilding authors follow a Eurocentric discourse. For her, Eurocentrism is the 'sensibility' to the notion that Europe is historically, economically, culturally, and politically unique in ways that profoundly affect how politics is conducted around the world. It works "as a conceptual and philosophical framework that informs the construction of knowledge about the social world – a foundational epistemology of Western distinctiveness" (SABARATNAM, 2017, p. 20). Although expressed differently, she highlights that recent peacebuilding studies have centered themselves around White Western concepts of power, politics, agency, and intervention. That bypasses, ignores, and depoliticizes the local population while maintaining the intervener's privilege, which generates an impasse within the critique.

space for resistance outside its rationale even if the international's power is more diffuse (SABARATNAM, 2017, p. 25–27).

Despite such powerful analysis, it is noteworthy that these three contributions have transformed the Peace Operations literature, providing insightful critiques of the doctrine and practice. The authors' works even surpass the academic field, reaching humanitarian workers and UN peacekeepers. Demonstrating the CLAs as a potential contributor to addressing the issues they present signals not only the importance to the UN, as done in the former section, but also how the idea of a linguistic-cultural mediator can be a step toward achieving more power-balanced peace operations.

Following Sabaratnam (2017) and others, this thesis understands the problematic framing introduced by the local turn as a problem of cultural in-difference. I use the idea of a hyphened indifference to underscore how these discourses attempt to solidify the identities of the "local" and the "international" as pure entities that, in a secondary move, can (and in some cases should) be mixed to generate a 'sustainable peace'. According to this logic, that is possible once these groups' cultures become reified, therefore, translat*able* to one another, allowing some type of comparison and hybridization move. Moreover, in-difference holds a strong association with the Derridean idea of *différance* discussed in the last section because these moves entail a play between differences that also delays any definition except their combination when it supposedly does not make sense to separate them anymore[31]. Inayatullah and Blaney (2004) have extensively debated how IR, as a discipline, defers the issue of tolerating those who are different from the self-referential citizen (defined by power relations embedded in race, gender, and sexuality hierarchies) to the international plane seen as separate from the national. That subscribes to the notion that handling difference has not been solved, simply delayed. For the rest of this section, I explore in more detail the idea of

[31] Although I understand a connection between the notions of différance, as proposed by Derrida, and difference, as used by different postcolonial authors inside and outside IR disciplinary borders, my goal in this thesis is not to determine how similar and different these ideas are/can be, but rather be inspired by them to explore my discussion on the UN's view of protection and how the CLAs are expected to aid its implementation. In doing so, I follow many thinkers, such as Bhabha, Spivak, and Hall, who are deeply inspired by Derrida's works and dedicated to analyzing how colonial rule justified itself and continues to do so even after decolonization struggles, yet draw their critiques privileging the analytical prism of difference and not différance. I understand that I do not provide a finished argument on the possible uses and combinations of these (pseudo-)concepts and how that relates to cultural in-difference. However, I believe that it falls outside the scope of this thesis and hope to explore that more extensively in future works.

cultural in-difference while, in the subsequent chapters, I expand this discussion by focusing on the socio-political identities of the UN protection discourse and the attempts of assimilation through translation.

Difference in the local turn literature relates to a shift in political discourse since the 1990s that attributed a moral framing to non-Western cultures for problems and inequalities previously presented as racialized. The UN "civil society" grammar was re-branded as "local agency" and "local ownership", resonating with the more recent literature on peace operations that acknowledges cultural difference as a deviation from normal(ized) notions of White Western culture. Its consequence is the refusal to recognize the conditions for difference in the first place and how they are translated into peace operations doctrine and practices (BARGUÉS-PEDRENY; MATHIEU, 2018; BEHR, 2018; BRIGG, 2018; CHANDLER, 2010; MATHIEU, 2019). Cultural in-difference becomes an argumentative device to explore binaries such as international v. local, modern v. pre-modern, or protector v. protected. This leaves the CLAs as potential mediators of the relations as if their distinctiveness could be reified and maintained through a third party. Although specifically discussing Hybrid Peace, the following quote identifies the problem of cultural in-difference in the local turn:

> There is a clear emphasis here on the need to engage with the 'indigenous' or 'authentic' traditions of non-Western life, which seems to reflects an underlying assumption of *cultural* difference as the primary division between these two parties. This reproduces the division between the liberal, rational, modern West and a culturally distinct space of the 'local' (SABARATNAM, 2017, p. 29, emphasis in the original).

That reverberates in Birgit Bräuchler's (2018) denunciation of the local turn's hesitancy to engage in in-depth debates on the concept of culture. For her, utilizing categories such as 'local-local', 'everyday', and 'hybrid' masks a problematic association between the local and its culture, something the author believes to be inherent to the local turn. The lack of cultural reflections based on Anthropology, as in the ethnography's instrumentalization as a methodology for research (see also VRASTI, 2008, 2010), is an illusory attempt to coin an authentic 'local'. As a result, it ends up further essentializing the meaning of the 'local population' and reinforcing the boundaries between the local and the international categories.

Bhabha (1990, 2004) shows the importance of working with the concept of "cultural difference" by discerning it from "cultural diversity". According to him, the issue with the liberal discourse of cultural diversity is that it *locates* difference in a romanticized containment, i.e. one's relation with its Otherness consists merely on "collection and appreciation", tolerating (read bearing with the existence of) what is different from the Self. With the idea of an "imaginary museum [*musée imaginare]*", he stresses how the diversity discourse promotes a White Western notion of the "capacity to understand and locate cultures in a universal time-frame that acknowledges their various historical and social contexts only eventually to transcend them and render them transparent" (BHABHA, 1990, p. 208). Culture, then, becomes 'problematic' only when taking seriously the differences in enunciation, the cultural limits in everyday social encounters.

The way in which the local turn reifies culture, I want to suggest, involves an unproblematized view of cultural instrumentalization. When it concerns the discussions on the CLAs, for instance, that relates to a simplistic view of mediation as muffling alterity politics based on the supposed possibility of translating cultures. Indeed, Bhabha highlights the interrelation character of cultures not merely for their content's familiarity, but because they express a signifying and symbolic activity. Yet, to stablish a translat*able* relation, as proposed by the local turn's expression on the problem of in-difference, there is an objectification of culture entailing the process of alienation and *secondariness* in relation to itself (BHABHA, 1990, p. 209–210; CHAKRABARTY, 2000; SPIVAK, 1993; VIVEIROS DE CASTRO, 2004):

> In the restless drive for cultural translation, hybrid sites of meaning open up a cleavage in the language of culture which suggests that the similitude of the symbol as it plays across cultural sites must not obscure the fact that repetition of the *sign* is, in each specific social practice, both different and differential. This disjunctive play of symbol and sign makes interdisciplinarity an instance of the borderline moment of translation that Walter Benjamin describes as the 'foreignness of languages'. The 'foreignness' of language is the nucleus of the untranslatable that goes beyond the transferral of subject matter between cultural texts or practices (…). And it is from this foreign perspective that it becomes possible to inscribe the specific locality of cultural systems – their incommensurable differences – and through that apprehension of difference, to perform the act of cultural translation. In the act of translation the 'given' content becomes alien and estranged; and that, in its turn, leaves the language of translation *Aufgabe*, always confronted by its double, the untranslatable – alien and foreign (BHABHA, 2004, p. 234–235, emphasis in the original).

By creating a problem of cultural in-difference in terms of the 'international' against the 'local', the local turn also risks promoting not only difference but also indifference to both groups by homogenizing them. That way, such approaches have tried to offer contextual and detailed analyses following specific case studies, precisely to counter ideals such as an all-powerful Westernized international and an agency-*less* local (SPIVAK, 1988, 1993). However, they generally stress impractical types of local agency, either the heroic or the victimized local actor. In this marginalization move, even if a certain agency is granted, non-White Western groups are removed from their contextual complexity as part of the argument (HOBSON; SAJED, 2017).

Against this backdrop, recent scholarship has brought interesting contributions. For instance, Myfanwy James (2020, 2021a, 2021b; see also KAPPLER, 2015; LUCHNER, 2020; MARTIN DE ALMAGRO, 2018) takes this kind of critique seriously when analyzing how the 'local' is performed by Congolese workers specialized in access brokering in humanitarian NGOs. This job entails the constant engagement between the NGO and the targets of aid/protection, civilian and/or combatant, to negotiate permission for the former's activities. Her investigation relates to a bigger discussion in Anthropology about linguistic and cultural brokering and broader types of mediation[32], highlighting the importance of the local staff's networking abilities regardless of the safety risks. Through the concept of "shapeshifting", she explores how military-turned-humanitarian workers blur the civilian-combatant distinction, a fundamental image in peace operations doctrine and International Law.

That way, the problems related to the local counterpart in the local turn's political imagination that focuses on the local population's agency can also refer to the CLAs' representation in this discourse. I have presented them as a way of contributing to the solution of the problem of cultural in-difference, given how their expertise is supposed to mediate differences. However, they also highlight the issue of cultural translation as an instrument for domination through assimilation, typical of COIN tactics, an essential aspect of MONUSCO's on the ground activities, which are discussed in more depth in the next chapter.

[32] See specially Peters (2016), but also Crombé and Kuper (2019), Koster and van Leynseele (2018), Vogel and Musamba (2017), James (2011), de Sardan (2005) and Bierschienk, Chaveau, and de Sardan (2002). In IR, for instance, see the works of Sara de Jong (2016, 2018).

Despite the meaningful contributions made by the local turn to invite the problematization of the UN top-down approach to peace operations, there appears to be still a lack of adequate engagement with the performance of local and international identifications that organize its understanding of peace operations' power relations. This is accentuated by the literature's lack of consideration in the literature and the further problematization of culture as translatable. The CLAs, as presented in this chapter, suggest an interesting prism through which one can dive into the issues of translation to discuss the construction and stabilization of protection discourses. The next chapter offers another zoom into the discussion around protection, debating the CLAs' ambivalent position between MONUSCO's COIN and stabilization tactics.

3.
FOUND AND LOST IN TRANSLATION: CENTERING PROTECTION THROUGH INTERPRETATIONS, POSITIONALITIES, AND TACTICS

> *But the killings and the stumbling response to the rebel advance were symptomatic of problems that have plagued the United Nations peacekeeping force in Congo for years*, said Anneke Van Woudenberg, a senior researcher for Human Rights Watch, who investigated the slayings this month. The rebel onslaught was even led by a commander who is wanted on war crimes charges by the International Criminal Court. "Kiwanja was a disaster for everyone," Ms. Van Woudenberg said. "*The people were betrayed not just by rebels* who committed terrible war crimes against them *but by the international community that failed to protect them*" (POLGREEN, 2008, emphasis added).

Interpretations of the attacks in Kiwanja in 2008, either by the UN or academics and the international media, appointed MONUC's inability to protect Congolese civilians as a setback for the mission's mandate. The idea of UN failures related to the mission's ineffectiveness in establishing a safe area and/or shielding the civilian population from the ongoing conflict strongly relates to the 1990s peace operations. Representations around these experiences, in turn, catalyzed several reforms in these operations' doctrine such as the Protection of Civilians agenda from 1999 onwards. They were supposed to re-direct efforts to avoid, for example, what later happened in Kiwanja. When created in MONUSCO, the CLAs came as another adjustment in the "PoC toolkit", aiming to aid peacekeepers in implementing the mandate by mediating the relationship between the UN uniformed personnel and the local population.

This chapter advances the notion of translation as a movement in which the UN gets lost and tries to find itself when it concerns protection discourses and the CLAs' consequential role. To accomplish that, it discusses how the idea of protection in the PoC discourse entails the division of roles between those who protect, those who are protected, and the enemies that need to be annihilated to ensure a protective environment. That way, such roles need to be translated and stabilized to all socio-political actors, putting the UN (while aiding the host state) as the 'protector' whereas the local population falls into the other two groups. In doing so, however, the UN also needs to find a way to distinguish who in the local population is the 'protected' and who is the 'enemy', in which the CLAs are expected to assist. Yet, the UN discourages the peacekeepers from relying too much

upon their CLAs since they cannot be fully trusted, given their possible ties with the 'enemy'. This social imagination, I argue, makes particular sense in COIN tactics that are part of UN stabilization mission doctrines, such as MONUSCO.

To work with COIN under the notion of protection, the UN started dealing more with intelligence operations in terms of the "human terrain", most notably associated with the US COIN experiences in Afghanistan (2001-2021) and Iraq (2003-2021), than the institution reform-based Liberal Peace of the 1990s. It privileges culture and language as ways of better accessing and convincing the local population of the UN's presence on the ground, a task performed by the CLAs when translating protection discourses, gathering information, and maintaining a good relationship with the local population. Nevertheless, the military's understanding of culture and language follows, as seen in the previous chapter, a simplistic notion that complexifies this human terrain approach to UN peace operations.

The rest of this chapter is divided as follows. In the first section, I discuss the PoC agenda in peace operations, diving into the debates around the notion of protection and demonstrating how it needs to be translated on the ground. The second section delves into how protection discourses work in UN peace operations to determine the relationships between those categorized as 'protector', 'protected', and 'enemy' through MONUSCO's stabilization mandate, showing how it has contributed to the emergence of COIN tactics. The third section explores the role of intelligence in peace operations following what the UN understands as human terrain and establishing some parallels with the HTS in Iraq and Afghanistan.

3.1. PROTECTION! WHAT DO YOU MEAN? TRANSLATING THE UN PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AGENDA

The idea of protection has become a central piece of the UN peace operations mandates and doctrine (KENKEL, 2013, p. 129). Nonetheless, one should note the notion of protection is not exclusive to UN peace operations, being part of a broader understanding of politics that relates to the protection of individual and collective rights. As an international organization, the UN establishes itself around protection discourses, following mainly the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in its specialized agencies and the Secretariat

(KÄLIN; KÜNZLI, 2019). This thesis follows Doucet's (2018, p. 99) observation that the impetus of providing international peace and security expressed in the UN Charter has been translated into the "PoC agenda", what the author denominates the convergence of UN protection discourses in contemporary peace operations doctrine.

Thus, civilian protection takes a more direct part in UN peace operations doctrine insofar as the purpose of intervention shifts from what Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin (2010) call a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian logic. Accordingly, the first missions followed a state-centered impetus characterized by creating buffers between (mostly state) fighting groups and monitoring ceasefires and/or peace agreements. On the other hand, the peace operations from 1990 onwards focused on the provision of individual human rights, that is, going over the state's sovereignty and the non-intervention principle. That change not only stimulated the growing number of peace operations but also the complexity of the mandates in multidimensionality (KENKEL, 2013). PoC is then inaugurated in the 1999 mission in Sierra Leone, aiming to protect civilians "under imminent threat"[33]. Ever since, PoC as a normative principle has gained considerable attention not only in peace operations doctrine but in the UN as a whole (DOUCET, 2018; DPO, 2020a, p. 16; FOLEY, 2017; LIDÉN, 2019; STENSLAND; SENDING, 2011).

Doctrinally, the Capstone Doctrine (2008) and the HIPPO Report (2015) contribute to consecrating the protection of civilians in armed conflict as the PoC agenda. The former document adopts a definition of civilian protection closely related to UNSC resolution 1674 (2006), which aims to provide protection "particularly [to] those under imminent threat of physical danger within their zones of operation" (UNITED NATIONS, 2008, p. 41; UNSC, 2017c, p. 3). Seven years later, the HIPPO shows a more balanced proposal to PoC, the people-centered approach introduced in the former Chapter, which adopts a more holistic strategy for how the UN can ensure protection apart from exclusively providing a shield from physical threats, nevertheless centering it around the population (UNITED NATIONS, 2015).

[33] As I will discuss in this section, the notion of "under imminent threat" was the "early mandate language", which was later changed to "under threat of physical violence". The UN PoC manual instructs the reader on how to interpret PoC grammar in the missions' mandates, stating that UN peacekeepers can and should take "proactive and preventive action to protect civilians", including actions that carry an "all necessary means" prerogative (DPO, 2020a, p. 8).

Stensland and Sending (2011) demonstrate a vagueness around the idea of protection even inside the UN System by presenting different UN agencies' interpretations and political interests despite following the PoC umbrella. In doing so, the authors demonstrate the different framings and performances that can be attributed to protection discourses. That kind of effort has been made in the literature and usually focuses on separating a humanitarian/civilian take on protection from a uniformed/military one, for example, in a positive/negative dichotomy of protection (MACEDO; SIMAN; MOTTA, 2022). UN attempts to better determine the operationalization of the PoC agenda on the ground can be seen in the 2014 "Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates in United Nations peacekeeping operations", when the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) declared that:

> Although peacekeeping missions have successfully prevented and mitigated harm to civilians while deployed over huge territories and facing asymmetrical threats with limited resources, *the chain linking the intent of the Security Council to the actions of the Secretariat, troop- and police-contributing countries and peacekeeping missions themselves remains broken in relation to the use of force* (…). Three recommendations were made. They included: enhancing operational control over contingents; *improving clarity of peacekeepers' tasks at the tactical level,* and improving the working-level relationship between peacekeeping operations and humanitarian entities (UN OIOS, 2014, p. 2, emphasis added).

However, the indetermination issue remains and, according to Lidén (2019, p. S219), "[w]hen evaluating the politics of PoC, it is therefore misleading to take the official objective of PoC as a given", which invites this thesis discussion on the very meaning of the UN's protection discourses. For him, the matter lies in how political actors interpret world politics (mostly at the strategical level), yet this thesis aims to discuss how it also encompasses the way which the meaning of protection is translated in PoC's activities on the operational and tactical levels of a mission, focusing on MONUSCO. In a more recent discussion, Day and Hunt (2021) even go as far as suggesting that centering UN peace operations around the notion of protection, as done in the PoC agenda, compromises the missions' efficiency because PoC's gravitational pull distracts, distorts, and create dilemmas for UN activities.

Thus, it is important to delve into how the UN has discussed PoC and the role of the CLAs in protecting civilians. As a recent effort to discuss PoC implementation, the "*Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping*

Handbook", according to the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, "*incorporates and translates into action* the principles set out in the DPO Policy on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping, and brings together the best practices of POC in UN peacekeeping" (DPO, 2020a, p. vii, emphasis added). In his foreword, he further recognizes PoC as a growing characteristic in peace operations mandates and doctrine, working as a standard of a mission's success or failure. As a buzzword, protection defines how the UN may justify its presence on the ground and articulate standards of accountability. Therefore, this kind of manual plays a fundamental *epistemic* role in the efforts to understand what "protection of civilians" means when and how the UN invokes it. The definition of a PoC mandate in peace operations is presented in this document as follows:

> without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the host state, integrated and coordinated activities by all civilian and uniformed mission components to prevent, deter or respond to threats of physical violence against civilians, within the mission's capabilities and areas of deployment, through the use of all necessary means, up to and including deadly force (DPO, 2020a, p. 3).

There are notably three discussions worth emphasizing around this definition. Firstly, it reassures the government's responsibility to protect its population, giving UN missions the task of enabling protection by helping the host state adhere to its obligation. Secondly, this definition centers the scenario for protection efforts when the population is threatened physically and does not mention otherwise. That represents a shift from a more holistic definition of security, such as what the UN adopted in the 1990s and early 2000s as Human Security[34]. Lastly, it positions the UN peacekeeper's capability to protect by using force, even to kill someone considered a threat, siding with more recent UN doctrine, especially in stabilization missions as will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

Furthermore, the PoC mandates have three tiers of action: (1) protection through dialogue and engagement; (2) provision of physical protection; and (3)

[34] Derived from the United Nations Development Program's 1994 Human Development Report, the concept of Human Security is an approach that encompasses food, environmental, community, economic, personal, political, and health aspects as security matters. That highlights the interdependence between development and security issues and proposes a focus on prevention, overcoming the primary objective of survival or shielding from threats of physical violence. Furthermore, the focus shifts to individuals and crosses state borders understood as a common issue for all (MACFARLANE; KHONG, 2006).

establishment of a protective environment. They are mutually enforced in missions' everyday activities and do not follow a specific order or significance (DPO, 2020a, p. 12). Tier I relate to ways of mitigating conflicts and anticipating violence that threatens the civilian population's life and human rights. It stimulates reporting prior violations and promoting interventions in the context of imminent or ongoing threats to civilian lives and safety. The use of force by police and military components for prevention, deterrence, anticipation, and response in situations where the civilian population is at risk of physical violence also serves to advance Tier II. Lastly, programs for "good governance" and the rule of law, Security Sector Reform, promoting and preserving human rights, providing humanitarian access, etc. are all included in Tier III since they work to create a safe environment.

The Handbook further demonstrates that PoC should be a "comprehensive strategy", that is, a stand-alone document of part of the mission concept which proposes the mainstreaming of the PoC agenda in the planning processes, cycles, and strategies (DPO, 2020a, p. 42). It contains methods for assessing the security situation on the ground and creating a mission-specific approach to handling civilian protection. Hence, the agenda has significantly changed over the years and has been implemented differently according to the case-to-case assessments (BELLAMY; HUNT, 2015; FOLEY, 2017).

> Initially faced with limited standardized guidance, specialized staff or dedicated tools for the protection of civilians, UN peacekeeping operations progressively developed their own approaches to POC — strategies, capacities, mechanisms and tools. Much of this has since been captured in policy, guidance and training, and is continuously developed and built upon through ongoing sharing of best practices and lessons learned. A continual learning process that captures mission-specific POC challenges, lessons learned and good practices is required to adapt to changing environments (DPO, 2020a, p. 3).

Doucet (2018, p. 109–111) demonstrates how documents issued by several UN specialized units, such as the DPKO/DPO, DFS, and OIOS, became how the UN firstly tried to organize the PoC agenda on the ground prior to systematizing efforts, such as the recent PoC Handbook. That way, the CLAs are one of those peace tools experimented with in MONUSCO and later diffused to other peace operations. The UN documents on the CLAs explored in this thesis serve as a reporting on this experimentation, assessing the "lessons learned" and "good practices":

> CLAs have been recognized as a major innovation that contributes considerably to the success of the implementation of the Mission's POC mandate. Numerous interviews with the Mission and its interlocutors have confirmed that CLAs are appreciated by the population and seen as indispensable across MONUSCO's civil and military components and hierarchy (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 27).

Regarding the PoC Handbook (DPO, 2020a), this thesis underscores the chapters "Communicating about POC" (chapter 7), "Using Tools for POC" (chapter 9), and "Working with Communities on POC" (chapter 10). They recognize the CLAs as the UN's focal point in communities, responsible for establishing and operating Community Alert Networks, Community Protection Plans, and Early Warning Early Response systems, seen as other key protection tools. In other parts of the document, it insistently points out the use of CLAs to ensure a better understanding of local contexts. Particularly in chapter 9, there is a separate text box that contains the 'testimony' of a CLA working at MINUSCA, Khalil Ngobozoua (Figure 02). It shows his profile picture, probably the one presented in his UN documentation and not one taken throughout an in-person interview, and underlines how he understands the importance of the CLAs' role as a CLA himself:



VOICES FROM THE FIELD

The Role of a CLA

Khalil Ngobozoua, MINUSCA CLA (2015-)

When I was initially recruited to MINUSCA in 2015, I had limited knowledge of the crisis that had spread across my native Central African Republic (CAR). After some months serving as a Community Liaison Assistant (CLA), when I had come to understand the mandate and purpose of MINUSCA, I began to understand how the work of the peacekeeping operation was helping to protect civilians. As a CLA, I initially thought that my work would be limited to organizing and communicating with communities. What I have come to understand, however, is that I have been able to play a key role in the protection of communities as well, mostly by engaging with them, setting up Community Alert Networks (CANs) and by working with the uniformed components of the Mission to ensure we have local level early warning. In my experience, the work of a CLA is important for POC in connecting the local population to the Mission. Several times I have accompanied the Force to translate between them and locals, but also to explain cultural aspects foreign troops might not understand. Being able to increase the levels of

"... I have been able to play a key role in the protection of communities as well, mostly by engaging with them, setting up Community Alert Networks (CANs)..."

communication between the communities and the Force has made a real difference, especially in the perception the population has of the troops. Sometimes I've found the role of a CLA presents risks, because you might need to interact with armed groups as well. These interactions are important, though, as they help us anticipate threats and understand the motivations of armed elements. I find that CLAs are indispensable for the protection of civilians within a peacekeeping operation. Our work helps to reinforce protection initiatives and bridge gaps that might exist between the Mission and the local community.

Figure 02 – Khalil Ngobozoua's CLA profile.

Source: DPO (2020a, p. 96, emphasis added).

In his assessment, Ngobozoua presents how the CLAs can work as a solution to the problems of communication and cultural in-difference discussed in the previous chapter but also how such a position assists the UN in its PoC efforts. Both the simplified ideas of mediation between the UN peacekeepers and the local community and the linguistic interpretation services are highlighted and connected to the other peace tools the CLAs are supposed to manage. When discussing the "risks" associated with the job, he briefly mentions armed groups with whom the CLAs are in contact but does not elaborate on it and other vulnerabilities. In sum, the testimony reinforces the PoC manual's proposal, especially when the Handbook repeats throughout "Do and Don't" boxes that bringing a CLA to a meeting can improve the troop's relationship with the local community and even save peacekeepers' lives.

In comparison to other CLA profiles done by the MONUSCO Civil Affairs (2014) manual and the generalized depiction in the later DPKO/DFS (2016) document, it is noteworthy how the PoC Handbook purposefully presents Ngobozoua's voice under the title "voices from the field". Even if one can argue that several mediations limit and edit their perspectives on the role (SPIVAK, 1988), this 'allowing to speak' *representation* shifts from the other experiences of portraying the CLAs. The first manual also utilizes the CLA profiles as a tool for showcasing exemplary employees, yet their 'voices' are transformed into reports by the manual's author(s). Indeed, the CLAs' 'contained presence' in these documents is located in text boxes that tell a personalized narrative, reporting their trajectory and singling them out for their excellence in the eyes of the UN. Only here do *select* CLAs gain a name, vivacity, and even a smile. In Mamy Aboki's profile[35] (Figure 03), for example, it states the ambivalence of her mediated voice through the author's interpretation, on the one hand, and the "in her own words" testimony without any quotation marks, on the other hand, particularly in the last two sentences:

[35] I wish to highlight that Aboki's profile inspired several conversations on the representations of gender related to the UN discourse. However, I recognize this discussion surpasses this thesis and can be the opportunity to further work.

Text box: CLA profile Mamy Aboki, Photo taken during a patrol in Mogoroko at the border with South Sudan.

Mamy Bahemurwaki Aboki was born in Nyakunda, Ituri district (Orientale) on July 30, 1979. After secondary school she studied health and nursing at the Pan African Institute in Bunia, where she graduated in 2002. Three years later, she finished her post-graduate studies at the National University of Bunia with a Master's in public health. From 2002 to 2012 she worked for a number of international humanitarian organizations in Orientale, including COOPI DRC and Oxfam GB. In 2012, she was recruited by MONUSCO as a CLA. Mamy is one of the few female CLAs deployed in one of MONUSCO's field bases, more precisely in COB Faradje (managed by the Dungu office). In her own words, at first it was very difficult to live as the only woman amongst all male, but she was able to establish herself with the support of her CLA colleagues and the COB commander. She says that when she visits villages in the area, local women are very happy that in the middle of the military escort there is a woman who pays attention to their needs, listens to their concerns and talks with them.

Figure 03: Mamy Aboki's CLA profile.
Source: MONUSCO CA (2014, p. 12).

Concerning the DPKO/DFS manual, the use of pictures lacks any context description, such as who are these people, where, and when the image was captured. Rather, the document seems to carelessly present them throughout the pages because one cannot know how they relate to what is written. Most of them supposedly illustrate who would be a CLA acting seriously and professionally, agreeing with the documents' argument that CLAs are a "good practice" to protect civilians. Nevertheless, this ambiguity of the absence/presence play makes it impossible to identify who the CLAs are in the photos because the images, even with captions, do not have detailed descriptions, especially regarding the DPKO/DFS manual. In Figure 04, the CLA is most likely the man using a blue vest without the helmet, given what is minimally reported about the CLAs. Yet, I can only can deduce but not confirm that people dressed in everyday clothes and wearing UN name tags or a "peace blue" vest (bulletproof or otherwise) potentially play this role.

Figure 04: CLA mediates UN staff and local population, unknown identification, date, UN mission, and location.
Source: DPKO/DFS (2016, p. 19).

Another important feature in the PoC Handbook is the imperative of improving the understanding of PoC through the translation and interpretation metaphors. For example, it provides a section on the correct way of "interpreting mandate's language" to instruct uniformed and civilian staff on implementing PoC-driven missions. To do so, it presents some key-words usually written in UNSC resolutions and other documents that stablish a mission's mandate (strategic level) and a short definition that entails a change of meaning. Hence, the idea of using "all necessary means/actions" in a PoC mandate "is the language used by the Security Council to authorize the full range of measures available to the mission, up to and including the use of deadly force" (DPO, 2020a, p. 8).

So, even if the specific manuals on the CLAs do not adopt an approach concerned with the linguistic and cultural challenges translation and interpretation, as discussed in the former chapter, the need for such efforts in stabilizing a notion of protection as 'reality' is part of the PoC agenda. The politics of 'reality', according to Zehfuss (2004, p. 196–198), work as an attempt to make a representation be recognized and interpreted as truthful and therefore real.

However, what one understands and constructs as 'reality' can only be apprehended through the very different forms of representation re-created by human beings. The issue she highlights is that the 'real' is presented as presence in our political imagination, counterposing the idea of representations. That follows the binary-based logocentrism, in which different conceptual pairs are re-created and then put in a hierarchical order that rejects the inferior(ized) second part. Yet, as Derrida (1997) argues, the first concept, the 'real', cannot be fully understood by itself, always needing its correspondent Other, representation. In other words, presence can only exist because of absence.

Thus, it is impossible to close the meaning around a concept, that is, to center it around something which will sustain it. "By orienting and organizing the coherence of the system, the center of a structure permits the play of its elements inside the total form" (DERRIDA, 2002, p. 352). Yet, the notion of the center in Western thought is paradoxically placed within *and* outside the structure of a concept. For Derrida, the center works as the nucleus of a totality and, to be a center, means it does not belong to the totality itself, therefore, it must be centered elsewhere. That implies a concept's center cannot be *the* center as imagined like the supposed self-maintaining center because it is always a representation of the center. That encourages subsequent substitutions of centers in a search for stabilizing definitions that is doomed to fail because

> the final, ultimate or unique meaning of any concept can never be pinned down (a fact which is widely recognized) despite incessant and tremendous efforts to better conceptualizations and refinements of methodologies. (…) [T]his is so because the condition of possibility of any concept is at the same time the condition of its impossibility, that is, a concept cannot be identical to itself; a concept cannot 'be'; it is never 'is'; its 'is' never is (ARFI, 2013, p. 11).

Defining protection entails attempting to find a center to stabilize its meaning but every center is empty of presence, stimulating a never-ending search of the 'origin' of the 'first' center. As a result, it demolishes the authority of presence, thus making the questioning of the dominant's group authority also possible (DERRIDA, 2002; ZEHFUSS, 2004). The attempts to stabilize or center meanings are what this thesis explores as *translating* protection discourses. It is through the notion of translation that the UN tries to form a center to justify its action. Protection, therefore, not only cannot be centered, yet such movement is constantly being attempted in UN manuals and doctrine and also through the tasks attributed to the CLAs.

Inspired by Huysmans' (1998) discussion on the concept of "security", I propose working with the notion of protection not merely as a concept but what the author calls a "thick signifier" when analyzing how the UN presents protection discourses. For the author, it is not a matter of introducing a statement that defines the key concept or providing a framework around which scholars can determine an area of study. Rather, it is exploring how the *language* around it "implies a specific metaphysics of life (…). [It] brings us to an understanding of how the category 'security' articulates a particular way of organizing forms of life" (HUYSMANS, 1998, p. 231). Nonetheless, it is important to consider that, as Bigo argues (see also HUYSMANS, 2006):

> Protection is different from security, at least from the traditional definition of security as freedom from threat and survival. Protection is about the self and the relation of the self to the others. It has to do with the vulnerability of the body. It is less about life and death than about fear of persecution and torture, about the right to life (BIGO, 2006, p. 93–94).

Following a discussion of protection discourses in terms of what Huysmans and Bigo propose means delving into the social relationships prescribed in how the UN attempts to translate PoC on the ground. In this regard, it is noteworthy to debate the role of protection discourses in COIN tactics, which have gained a considerable place in the case of MONUSCO, and how the CLA's linguistic-cultural mediation is expected to attend to stabilization mandates. The next section deals with how the UN attempts to stabilize its role as the "protector" and how this stabilization implies the possibility to differentiate the "protected" from the "enemy" – a task to be performed with the help of a tool as the CLAs.

3.2. THE 'PROTECTOR', THE 'PROTECTED', AND THE 'ENEMY': STABILIZATION, COUNTERINSURGENCY, AND THE TRANSLATION OF PROTECTION DISCOURSES IN MONUSCO

In a strongly opinionated piece called "*Against Stabilization*", Mac Ginty (2012b) assesses the shift in peace operations doctrine from the Liberal Peace to the "stabilization turn", the movement towards more robust peace operations marked by the addition of the "S" in the missions' acronyms as is the case in MONUSCO. Indeed, both should not be regarded as separate trends in peace operations, given their intertangled relationship in mandates' doctrine and actions on the ground.

However, one should note that they prescribe a different relationship between the UN and the local population. For him, stabilization missions focus on counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism tactics that compromise the local turn project discussed in the former chapter. The author also presents stabilization's first use in the 1990s and later dissemination in the UN by White Western powers' foreign policy, notably the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, three of the Member-States who hold the permanent seat and veto power in the UN Security Council.

This shift catalyzed a new branch of debates in the literature on peace operations. For instance, there was not a clear definition[36] in mandates, therefore no distinct legal guideline, for what changes the stabilization missions meant for peace operations. According to de Coning (2018, p. 88), this is desirable for several diplomatic delegations in the UNSC because it allows for "maximum flexibility" of its interpretation and application. Doctrinally, it relates to the ongoing move away from the UN missions' principles (consent of the host state, impartiality and minimal use of force). On the ground, that means that the military component has more activities besides guaranteeing the security to multidimensional actions (DE CONING, 2018; MUGGAH, 2014). In other words, these missions foresee a greater willingness to employ force by the military and police components, a strong support for host governments, and the use of new weapons and tactical systems, including special forces and intelligence.

Although it appears firstly in the UN mission to Haiti in 2004 (and later in the 2010s mandates in peace operations in Congo, Central African Republic, and Mali), stabilization can be traced to 1995 in the Stabilization Force in Bosnia, followed by NATO deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. NATO's "clear-hold-build" tactics, which signals that once the military has secured control over a region, force must be accompanied by supplementary and helpful measures to establish and sustain peace (NATO, 2011), was the most predominant approach on the ground. For Karlsrud (2018, 2019), UN stabilization missions signal the preeminence of war doctrine at the expense of peacebuilding processes highlighted by Mac Ginty

[36] During the UNSC open meetings between 2000 and 2014, for example, the term "stabilization" was used most of the time to refer to the name of a peace operation, marking the absence of a deep discussion about the concept in the political space of deliberation and formulation of peace operations mandates (CURRAN; HOLTOM, 2015, p. 11).

(2012b), regardless of the dividing and recurrent character of the debate[37] for/against incorporating traditional war tactics in UN peace operations. That also presents unintended consequences to the UN, such as the boost in local civilians' and UN staff's vulnerability, the reduction of the humanitarian space, and the difficulty of mediating political processes (BELLAMY; HUNT, 2015; TULL, 2018).

As this section aims to discuss, the NATO inspiration in the "stabilization turn" does not only mean an increase in the use of force but also the use of COIN tactics. The traditional literature on the subject comprehends insurgencies as complex and varied uprisings and resistances against established authority while such authority's will to impel subjects and/or citizens back into loyalty are counterinsurgencies. This type of definition builds up on an imaginary that counterinsurgency only exists as a response to the aggression of another group. Being weaker, they decide to fight by unconventional and sanctioned means, such as taking advantage of the combatant and non-combatant distinction in International Humanitarian Law as a tactic, making their claim illegitimate and the COIN response appropriate (BLACK, 2016; BROOKS, 2020; MIRON, 2019).

This thesis aligns with postcolonial approaches that denounce how these concepts are deeply embedded in their colonial history, where colonial authorities tried to exercise power over the colonized. Sen (2022), Rafael (2016), and Doty (1996) have demonstrated how more recent uses of the term in White Western interventionalist foreign policies relate to colonial experiences in which the (colonial) authority depends on the socioeconomic and physiological manipulation to acquire local support. In reading COIN texts, such as UN stabilization missions' mandates and recent peace operations doctrine, this thesis traces what Guha (1999; see also KRISHNA, 2009) calls the "counterinsurgency prose", trying to analyze the UN's protection discourse and its relationship with the CLAs' job.

Indeed, COIN terminology remains somewhat taboo in UN doctrine debate. Zaalberg (2012, p. 84), on the one hand, identifies a partly convergence between

[37] Prior to the "stabilization turn", Proença Júnior (2002) has made an adjacent argument by framing peace operations in theories of war. Based on Clausewitz, the author understands these missions as coalition wars. On the other hand, Larsdotter (2019) argues that the Peace Operations doctrine lacks military strategy. She asserts that, by adding a success theory to these missions' planning, the UN can better influence the decision (through compellence and deterrence strategies) and capacity (offensively and defensively) of the conflict parties to reaffirm a peaceful environment. That way, the discussion of peace operations as war-like missions is not a consensus in the literature.

military actions in peace operations and counterinsurgency missions, saying that they are “used in both a narrow and a broad sense” but ends up defending the missions follow different doctrines (see also HOWARD, 2019). Particularly, he shows the role of focusing on winning the “hearts and minds” of the population can be associated with the work of Civil Affairs and the search for local legitimacy in UN peace operations. On the other hand, Friis (FRIIS, 2010) identifies points of contact by analyzing the doctrinal manuals of these two types of mission. For the UN, there is the Capstone Doctrine (2008) and for COIN the author uses the “*U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*” (FM 3-24), a document that interacts with COIN theories based on French and British experiences in Algeria (1954-1962) and Malaya (1948-1960) and the US “lessons learned” in Iraq. He points out that both styles of doctrine advocate political and civil rather than military solutions, emphasize civilian protection and local ownership, and use an integrated civil-military approach. In addition, both documents affirm the need for greater intelligence as support and the restricted use of force for the effectiveness of the mission.

Particularly relevant to this research is the idea of “winning hearts and minds” related to COIN tactics. It is a recurrent expression used in the COIN literature and doctrine, sometimes considered shallow and poorly defined (BELLOU, 2014; BROOKS, 2020; DOTY, 1996; YALÇINKAYA; ÖZER, 2017; ZAALBERG, 2012). Drawing from U.S. experience in Afghanistan and other approaches, Egnell (2010) suggests three main themes: (1) activities in humanitarian and development affairs carried out or funded by the military; (2) a mindset shift in military operations to be less coercive, emphasizing minimal use of force and showing cultural understanding and (3) focus on information and psychological operations. Considering the UN peace operations' connection with people-centered COIN, as explored in this chapter, winning hearts and minds relates to the CLAs' translating role, in which they are to explain the protection mandate to local communities because of their linguistic and cultural expertise.

In the case of MONUSCO, a stabilization mission was created to re-design the UN’s presence in the Congo, considering that MONUC had been operating since 1999 and had been subjected to criticism for not protecting civilians properly. The UNSC Resolution 1925 (2010), responsible for stating MONUSCO’s mandate, divides it in two topics: “protection of civilians” and “stabilization and peace

consolidation" that have been re-produced throughout the years in the mandate's renewal. However, as seen in the former chapter, discussions[38] around the "MONUC/MONUSCO" transition do not usually focus on the institutional change represented by the naming process. Rather, their interests range from the creation of the Force Intervention Brigade in 2013 to more war tactics been used on the ground, leaving part of the "move towards stabilization" unproblematized in UN discourse (BARRERA, 2015; DOSS, 2015; MURPHY, 2016; NOVOSSELOFF et al., 2019; REYNAERT, 2011; RUSSO, 2021; SPIJKERS, 2015).

> [S]tabilization [in MONUSCO] seems to have become a catch-all term used for discursively engaging and winning the support of TCCs (the military understanding of stabilization), the host government (providing buildings, equipment, and training), and donors (following their comprehensive understanding of stabilization) (KARLSRUD, 2018, p. 91).

Consequently, Karlsrud (2018, p. 92) summarizes MONUSCO's stabilization mandate as "military-led state-centric counter-insurgency operations as well as bottom–up peacebuilding – two types of activity almost impossible to combine in doctrine or in practice in UN peace operations".

Thus, this thesis understands that COIN operates closely with the people-centered approach seen in protection discourses in peace operations such as MONUSCO[39]. When the HIPPO Report presented the need to put people in the center of peace operations in face of a move towards the militarization[40] of the missions' doctrine through the stabilization turn (ANDERSEN, 2018; UNITED NATIONS, 2015), an un-intended result is the convergence towards the use of

[38] Baaz and Verweijen's (2018) discussion on the naturalized exceptionalism towards the African continent illustrates why stabilization literature in POS does not problematize the transition in 2010. The authors argue that the ambivalence of the colonial discourse creates a European universalized understanding on how to solve "Africa's issues" while keeping its inferior Otherness. Nonetheless, the re-framing of Africa or the Congo as the problematic Others leaves the discussion of further employing force untouched.

[39] Mockaitis (1999) already suggested that ONUC's mandate already contained COIN tactics by linking UN peace enforcement to war-like missions as "new names for old games". In consonance with Zaalberg (2012), however, this thesis understands that the author does not deepen his analysis in UN peace operations doctrine, mostly concerning the so-called Holy Trinity principles.

[40] Discussions around militarization are part of an interdisciplinary debate promoted extensively by feminist scholarship. I highlight the Enloe's (1983, p. 9–10, 2014) work, when she argues that the concept of militarization follows a material and an ideological dimension. While the former focuses on the takeover of the civilian arena by military institutions, the acceptance of these actions by the civilian population is the latter's concern, as if the "military way" of solving problems had become "common sense". Militarism, therefore, entails situations such as when the army intervenes in everyday civilian issues come to be regarded so positively that the civilians start to be so dependent on it and everyday problems become militarized. For a discussion on the militarization of peace operations, See Vela (2021) and Russo (2021).

people-centered COIN tactics. In traditional discussions of COIN, there is a heuristic division between strategies dedicated to eliminating the insurgents or gaining the population's support, although, in practical terms, it entails a mix of these two goals by employing coercion, control, and incentives. While the use of force prevails in the former, the latter proposes its great restraint to appeal attractive to local civilians (MIRON, 2019, p. 470).

The people-centered approach to COIN can be traced to the 16th century in Spain. It was later reassessed by French theorists in the 19th century because of their experiences in Algeria (1830-1862) and has been since utilized by the United States in their imperialist policies in Latin America and Asia (DOTY, 1996; MIRON, 2019). Miron (2019) explains people-centered COIN has changed over time although retaining its "people-friendly" *mask* in pursuing the population's "hearts and minds". As a broad definition, this strategy aims to deal with local grievances while using minimal violence against them and the insurgent groups. The author also presents NATO's "clear-hold-build" tactics and the FM 3-24 manual as contemporary people-centered doctrine, yet there are parallels with the UN's stabilization missions as well. That happens because COIN also is presented as the humanization of war tactics (RAFAEL, 2016; ZEHFUSS, 2018), creating the conditions for the emergence of COIN in peace operations activities as part of the UN's activities on the ground. In comparison to traditional[41] military scenarios,

> counterinsurgency reformulates the objective of war from defeating of one's enemies to securing a population, strategising power to the level of society and *deepening links between military aims and civilian modes of interventionism*. In doing so, counterinsurgency posits itself as a more inclusive, *culturally sensitive and humane way of war*, while it simultaneously *constitutes the population (in this case the populations of Iraq and Afghanistan) as its battlespace*. In re-orientating warfare around the life of the population, counterinsurgency effectively sanctions and reproduces the relations of force manifested in war (BELL, 2011, p. 318, emphasis added).

Considering recent developments in UN doctrine, the "*Improving security of United Nations: we need to change the way we are doing business*" report presents a positive vision regarding a war-like turn to peace operations doctrine because it can provide protection to UN staff and the local civilians against armed

[41] COIN is strongly associated with irregular warfare, a conflict between state and non-state forces seeking legitimacy and control over a certain population and territory. It is marked by the imbalance between these groups' military strength, stimulating different tactics such as surprise attacks and psychological manipulation. See Miron (2019) and Gray (2007).

groups regarded as hostile towards the mission. As synthesized in the subtitle, it proposes a re-organization of peace operations doctrine and actions to counter the recurrent attacks against peacekeepers following mandates considered unsuitable to the hostile environment. The document is commonly referred to as the "Cruz Report", referencing one of the authors[42], the Brazilian General Santos Cruz. His role as Force Commander in Haiti (2007-2009) and Congo (2013-2016) during the implementation of the FIB inspires the main argument, showing how MONUSCO's stabilization experience works in favor of a new understanding of the relationship with the local population and countering armed groups' attacks. While its approach relates more to enemy-centered COIN, such as the suggestion to increase the use of force to go after armed groups, there are people-centered proposals. As an example, I point out the document's call for a change in the peacekeepers' mindset by suggesting the creation and expansion of informant networks to better assess the local populations' needs and gain support (UNITED NATIONS, 2017).

Thus, I argue that the convergence of COIN and stabilization in peace operations happens through the notion of protection, that is, the discourse the UN presents focuses on the protection and uses COIN tactics to achieve it. Following the path explored in the previous section that instigated an analysis of the social roles performed in peace operations in terms of protection discourses as in the PoC agenda, this section aims to inquire how protection works within a COIN logic. That means asking questions about how protection re-produces a social relations grammar that determines who protects whom from whom, or as the Cruz Report states "[k]nowing who is who, where and when will make it possible to prevent attacks and identify attackers" (UNITED NATIONS, 2017, p. 14). This is vital information for the UN because in Kiwanja, for instance, "[t]he peacekeepers said they could not tell the difference between the different armed groups and were fearful of firing on civilians" (POLGREEN, 2008). In other words, one must ask: who performs as the 'protector', the 'protected' and the 'enemy' in the UN's protection imaginary?

To reflect on that, this thesis is inspired by how Bigo (2006) debates the French military police and the army claiming one's actions as protection. Although it deals with a particular case and time frame, his argument discusses social groups

[42] The Report was written by Cruz and two other UN staff: William R. Phillips and Salvator Cusimano (UNITED NATIONS, 2017, p. 1).

in a protection-driven relationship, showing how such roles are imagined to one another. Inquiring about these positionalities in PoC doctrine is important because it helps discuss how the UN sees its self-appointed task of protecting civilians and the roles designated to the local population (MACEDO; SIMAN; MOTTA, 2022). That way, this hierarchy allows the protector, in this case the UN, supposedly to hold the power to define who can perform the three identities. When the UN presents the PoC agenda as a myriad of efforts to ensure the civilian population is not facing "threats of physical violence" and entrusting the mission with keeping and building peace, I suggest that it attempts to stabilize a representation that places the UN in assistance to the host-state's primarily responsibility in the protector role, as detailed in the "interpreting mandate language" section in the PoC Handbook:

> As the host state always bears the primary responsibility to protect civilians, most country-specific mandates include explicit language that the protection of civilians is without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the host state, so that the mission is not expected to substitute for the role of the host state in protecting the population. There may also be language in the mandate on certain tasks being in support of the host state (see, e.g., MINUSMA mandate language above). *This highlights the importance of supporting the protection efforts and capacity of the host state, though it does not diminish the authorization for the mission to act independently to protect civilians*, in particular, when the host state is unwilling or unable to do so (DPO, 2020a, p. 8, emphasis added).

In addition, I understand that the local population is left to be divided between the protected and the enemy groups, a blurred distinction doctrinally and on the ground[43]. It works around the protected's portrayal in the 'victim of violence' trope while the enemy[44] represents the threat to be eliminated to accomplish the mandate's protection. Hence, how the UN discerns them and later attempts to stabilize such division, that is, put it in practice but also convince the groups of their designation, becomes a fundamental matter in PoC practices. For instance, MONUSCO's mandate throughout the years considers protecting civilians a

[43] Mutua (2002) offers a similar distinction when discussing Human Rights socio-political roles and discourse.

[44] Yamato's works complexify the imagination of the enemy in White Western political thought. Inspired by Derrida, he advances a deconstructivist intervention of Schmitt's understanding of the enemy, discussing ideas such as the role of language in naming and defining the enemy (in opposition to the Self), the foe, the enemy of humanity, and other socio-political performances of identifications. I recognize in this thesis the importance and complexity of each socio-political role that the CLAs are supposed to perform to fulfill their tasks. Yet, my goal is to focus on how the CLAs' representation in this discourse can help me underscore its ambivalence rather than delve deeper into each of them. That way, for a detailed account of the "enemy", see Yamato (2020).

priority, while some local and regional armed groups are nominated explicitly and presented as Human Rights abusers, which stimulates military operations against them (UNSC, 2010).

Yet, according to the Handbook, PoC mandates in UNSC resolutions can be broad and open (DPO, 2020a, p. 7), encouraging such a document to discuss in detail the definition of a civilian that includes, for instance, people who can be the enemy when they are not engaging as perpetrators. To do that, the Handbook establishes a relation to the differentiation between combatants and non-combatants in International Humanitarian Law, a scope of laws and norms that rule over conflict scenarios. However, it distances PoC mandates and peace operations consequently from those cases in the very next sentence. According to International Humanitarian Law principles, states have a generalized negative obligation of not harming civilians and the positive requirement to protect them. Thus, the PoC Handbook states anyone should be regarded as a civilian except in three cases: (1) members of armed forces; (2) members of organized armed groups who have continuous combat functions; and (3) civilians directly participating in hostilities, for such time as they do so (DPO, 2020a, p. 9).

Still concerning International Humanitarian Law, there is an effort to perform this distinction to protect those not fighting and to allow the use of force and killing of an enemy group. That is different to a Human Rights regime that restricts the use of force even when dealing with violent armed groups. Following Foley (2017), peace operations doctrine and particularly stabilization missions such as MONUSCO play around the gray area between these two regimes, which signals the challenge of promoting both, as already recognized in the Handbook, especially in tactical activities. Stabilization missions, in this sense, offer an even more complicated scenario given the lack of clear guidance in UNSC resolutions and peace operations doctrine.

Doucet (2018) analyzes civilian protection by appointing three settings in the PoC agenda: humanitarian, military/police, and governance. Whereas the humanitarian framework relates to providing care[45], particularly to injured civilians, a military/police approach deals mostly to safeguard from physical harm, while

[45] The idea of providing care to injured combatants and civilians who have become (in)direct victims of the conflict is a strong representation in Humanitarianism imaginary (FASSIN, 2012; FASSIN; PANDOLFI, 2010).

governance signals the worry a government takes concerning welfare and health. Regardless, the author claims these protection discourses consider civilian protection merely in biological terms, in other words, saving (strangers') lives and halting death. Even legal efforts to impose protection positively and negatively, such as the International Humanitarian Law's combatant/non-combatant distinction, operate under this simplistic view.

Going further, Zehfuss (2012, 2018) shows how discourses around the idea of protection, as is the case of International Humanitarian Law, introduce a supposed morally concerned rhetoric on war and other conflicts, one that promises an ethical conduit amid their violence and general misery. But instead of limiting wars, it enables them because their aim is to appease Western sensibilities and naturalize brutal conflicts. For her, it is the representation of a defenseless victim being protected that authorizes the use of violence against not only the enemy, imagined as the violent Other, but also the very other civilians who expect protection. That makes war practices more complex than the discourses political actors perform to convince the supposed protected "at home"[46] and on the ground that that kind of violence is justifiable and good.

While the protected/enemy distinction is adopted comprehensively around the mission, an enemy-focused discourse can be specially highlighted by contrasting MONUSCO's PoC more holistic approach with FIB's mandate. The UNSC Resolution 2098 (UNSC, 2013) takes a step further than instigating the Congolese armed forces to combat other armed groups by creating an UN intervention brigade, mandated with the "the responsibility of neutralizing armed groups". With at least three infantry battalions, one artillery, one Special force, and Reconnaissance company under the direct command of the MONUSCO Force Commander, FIB's purpose is "reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities" (UNSC, 2013, parag. 9). In 2014, the UNSC renews MOUSCOs and FIB's mandate, still adopting the latter "on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice" (UNSC, 2014, p. 5). This trend remains in

[46] Zehfuss (2018) demonstrates that the discourse on ethical war also aims to justify the use of violence against civilians for the Western countries' populations. That way, killing a threat in another part of the world is supposed to create a sense of protection for the local people and the foreign interventionist citizens in their own country.

the subsequent MONUSCO resolutions, despite the more recent announcement and re-organization of the mission towards an exit strategy (UNSC, 2019a, 2019b, 2020, 2021). Indeed, the FIB can be considered another effort in building a secure environment, therefore aiding in civilian protection as presented in Tier II of the PoC agenda, but its focus is more on the enemies that hinder the protection to the protected.

One can trace the resemblances of such hierarchical division to the colonial discourse that separates the Other regarding whether they can be brought to the civilizing mission or not. In other words, the UN protection discourses re-present the protector as bringing the civilization to the savages, who should be assimilated, and against the barbarians, whose only option is to be killed. Several authors[47] have discussed the role of the "savage" and/or "barbarian" in the White Western political thought following different theoretical approaches. In this thesis, I follow the work of Michel Foucault for a conceptual distinction. For Foucault (2003, p. 194–196), the savage refers to a representation of leaving their forests to find society. Consequently, there is a voluntary and receptive character of the savage in the face of civilization. It is almost as if they are not to blame when considered inferior because they failed to acknowledge there was a 'better' option. The barbarian, on the other hand, represents a disapproval to an existing civilization, being the starting point for a theory of domination based on the opposition of a group as a discursive resource to reaffirm itself. In this case, the barbarians know that civilization exists and opt to reject it.

Hence, Inayatullah and Blaney (2004, p. 87–92) highlight a double movement of assimilation and/or annihilation that can relate to how protection discourses operate in UN peace operations under the protected/enemy dichotomy

[47] Reinhart Koselleck (2004), for instance, is concerned with asymmetric counter concepts. In discussing the broad notions between civilization v. savage/barbarism, he traces the different words and connotations used for the "savage" and the "barbarian" throughout Social History, showing how it has been associated with nationality, culture, language, and religion. Furthermore, Tzvetan Todorov (2010) depicts how the imagination of the Other is anchored in the barbarian as the "problem" or the "enemy", stimulating a position of fear of those groups framed as the barbarians. Another noteworthy thinker is R. B. J. Walker (2006, p. 70–71), who highlights the role of the "barbarian" as the outsider who defines the inside members of a political system while discussing the principles of Western political thought. The "barbarian", in this sense, is the constitutive Other, who, by remaining outside (absence), defines the presence of a political ordering (YAMATO, 2014, 2019, 2021). I recognize how these authors have shaped my discussions on these socio-political imaginations. Yet, in this thesis, I wish to focus on how the CLAs expected mediation efforts are supposed to solidify these imaginations but displace them.

but also to the broader legal perspectives that ground these missions (see ANGHIE, 2004; LINDQVIST, 1996, 2007; OTTO, 1996; SANTOS FILHO, 2019). The local population is perceived as an 'inferior' entity having two options: it can (attempt to) assimilate the colonizer's (supposedly) superior way of life or be symbolically and physically annihilated[48]. That is translated in protection discourses such as the PoC agenda, I argue, when the UN, performing the protector role, re-claims the power of naming and defining who are the "good", the "bad" and the "ugly" as well as what should be done to ensure the provision of a protective environment. That move entails qualifying and disqualifying other social-political actors' accounts on the matter by presenting the UN's views as the "natural" answer and pressing the Others' responses accordingly. If the Others show acceptance, they can be incorporated into the protector's rule. But if the answer is resistance, "[u]nfortunately, hostile forces do not understand a language other than force" (UNITED NATIONS, 2017, p. v).

Even so, this division is more of a process of classifying the White Western Self versus the dehumanized Other. It is as if this stimulates an analysis in shades of gray, yet the main issue is not what lighter and darker shades of gray symbolize and rather that gray will never become white (this is further explored in Chapter 5). Between the protected and the enemy, the victim and the perpetrator, the savage and the barbarian, there is a colonial discourse that seeks to reaffirm the superiority of the (former) colonizers, mirroring it according to their representations of themselves. It is a type of classification that reflects more on the UN, its staff, and the UNSC than the Congolese population (BHABHA, 2004; CHAKRABARTY, 2000; CHEYFITZ; HARMON, 2018; INAYATULLAH; BLANEY, 2004; SAID, 2003).

In this sense, I understand that the colonial discourse is being re-articulated to show a different version of itself. Bhabha (2004, p. 94; see also HUDDART, 2006, p. 25–26) highlights that "[a]n important feature of colonial discourse is its dependence on the concept of 'fixity' in the ideological construction of otherness". For the author, however, this fixity denotes the paradoxical relationship of the colonial discourse that aims for rigidness but also causes disorder, as seen in Chapter 1.

[48] One should note that, by assimilating, one is killing their own culture, and by annihilating, one is being assimilated into the order. That way, these moves also contaminate one another.

> Thus, racist stereotypes such as 'the lying Indian' or 'the lazy African', which Bhabha sees as part of the cultural armoury of colonial authority, need to appear fixed to be taken as 'true'. Yet, they are often ambivalent (e.g. Indians are also constructed as 'wily', and Africans as hyperactively 'sexual') and have to be constantly repeated and confirmed (to become stereotypical), thus betraying an anxiety that their appeal may unravel at any instant. This repetition and doubling, these psychic fears and insecurities, expose the instability and lack within colonial power (KAPOOR, 2008, p. 118–119).

That opens up the complexity of translating protection discourses, something that is not the focus of the stabilization literature as presented at the beginning of this section, even if it can be traced. To understand and re-produce this kind of distinction, the UN starts working with intelligence and tries to mediate the relationship with the local population in COIN terms. The next section discusses the role of the CLAs in intelligence gathering and the advance of tactics that can resemble the Human Terrain System in UN peace operations.

3.3. PROTECTION IN THE HUMAN TERRAIN: THE COMMUNITY LIAISON ASSISTANTS IN UN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Alongside COIN, planning missions using sensitive information collected through non-disclosed sources has been considered unsuitable for UN peace operations. Indeed, intelligence is historically associated with different state government agents obtaining secret or classified information through dubious methods, strongly contrasting with the UN's accountability and transparency values. Nevertheless, the UN has embarked reluctantly on its version of intelligence operations expanding from Human Intelligence (HUMINT), which focuses on information gathered by general observation skills in patrols, checkpoint posts, and interviews, to the use of images and signals as sources (DORN, 2010).

Concerning UN peace operations in Congo, Dorn and Bell (1995) trace intelligence branches since ONUC in the 1960s, highlighting its importance to the mission's goals. More recently, Kuele and Cepik (2017) offer a detailed analysis over how MONUSCO intelligence apparatus is mobilized, even discussing the Force Intervention Brigade's role: "at the tactical level, MONUSCO can be labeled as an intelligence-led mission, especially regarding offensive actions taken against illegal armed groups (…). To accomplish such tactical goals, and to protect the

force, intelligence was crucial" (KUELE; CEPIK, 2017, p. 61). That relates to COIN inasmuch as intelligence works as a resource to improve "situational awareness", that is, to better understand the political stakes at hand in a given situation and make the best decision against an insurgent group. "This can lead us to conclude that intelligence gathering and distribution might become the key component of successful POC just as it is a key principle of successful counterinsurgency" (BELJAN, 2014).

Doctrinally, the 2019 "*UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy Report*" aims to establish a framework articulating the peacekeeping-intelligence concept to UN peace operations doctrine in general and its practices (DPKO, 2019, parag. 1). Following some of the Cruz Report's recommendations (UNITED NATIONS, 2017), the document affirms that "there is a need for peacekeeping missions to better understand their operating environments and contexts, maintain a strategic overview of developments, and predict specific threats and opportunities to enable peacekeepers to effectively execute their mandates" (DPKO, 2019, parag. 2), particularly those connected to the PoC agenda (DPKO, 2019, parag. 3):

> [T]he fundamental purpose of peacekeeping-intelligence in United Nations peacekeeping operations is to *enable missions to take decisions on appropriate actions to enhance situational awareness* and the safety and security of UN personnel, and *inform activities and operations related to the protection of civilians*. Specifically, peacekeeping-intelligence is intended to:
> § Support a common operational picture: Up-to-date, accurate peacekeeping-intelligence supports the establishment and maintenance of a coherent, real-time, operational understanding of the mission area to support planning and operations.
> § *Provide early warning of imminent threats*: Peacekeeping-intelligence contributes to the early warning of an imminent threat to life, a major destruction of property, significant restrictions of movement, etc., in order to enable the mission to act appropriately in accordance with its mandate.
> § Identify risks and opportunities: Peacekeeping-intelligence can provide mission leadership with an enhanced understanding of shifts in the strategic and operational landscape, and of associated risks and opportunities, with respect to the safety and security of UN and associated personnel, and the protection of civilians (DPKO, 2019, parag. 5, emphasis added).

This thesis draws connections between the use of intelligence in MONUSCO and the peacekeeping-intelligence concept discussed in the Report with the CLAs' job because their tasks directly and indirectly shape the missions' intelligence goals, even if the Report distances itself from "other information and reporting" (DPKO, 2019, parag. 8). For instance, MONUSCO Civil Affairs (2014,

p. 31) points out a "success story" entitled "*CLAs gather real-time intelligence on ADF/NALU attack on Kamango*":

> In the morning of 25 December 2013, ADF/NALU combatants launched an attack on the locality of Kamango (80 km north-east of Beni town*). CLAs from Boikene and Mutwaga alerted the Force and the CA HoO and provided accurate and reliable real-time information on what was happening on the ground. The information included the location, estimated numbers, actions/activities and movements of ADF combatants, FARDC regiments, and the local populations*. Following the alert, the North Kivu Brigade Commander arrived in Beni and immediately set up an emergency management unit. *The information provided by the CLAs formed the most essential inputs in the Commander's briefings, analyses and decisions, because it was more accurate and more relevant than the information received from FARDC sources. The accuracy of the information provided by CLA sources contributed significantly to the success of the following military intervention* (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 31, emphasis added).

This kind of story highlights the complicated positioning the CLAs perform in UN stabilization missions[49], such as MONUSCO, even if the Civil Affairs is not commonly re-presented as an intelligence-gathering Department:

> During their interaction with communities, CLAs strive to obtain information on recent developments and understand the historical, socio-cultural and political dimensions of complex local dynamics. They obtain relevant information about the context and its stakeholders, conduct protection risk and needs assessments, map actors, and identify medium and long-term trends. This information and analysis is then composed in daily, weekly and flash reports, which are consolidated in the regional offices. On the national (OPS East) level, the daily reports from the regional offices are then consolidated into one daily MONUSCO Civil Affairs report. *MONUSCO's substantive sections heavily rely on this information, often basing their own reports on the inputs provided by the CLAs. As a main source of contextual information, the CLA reports feeds into the Mission's decision making processes* (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 20, emphasis added).

I argue that the CLAs can be understood as important assets regarding intelligence operations usually carried out by the specialized military unit because they follow two important points highlighted in the Cruz Report's Intelligence recommendations (UNITED NATIONS, 2017, p. 29). Firstly, they are part of the mission's HUMINT, which connects the military intelligence group/unit to different local UN actors (KUELE; CEPIK, 2017, p. 50). "As field staff have framed it", according to the DPKO/DFS (2016, p. 8, emphasis added) manual, having a CLA "*gives eyes and ears to the military contingents* on the ground. The

[49] It is worth remembering that three out of the four missions the CLAs have been employed as part of the UN PoC mandate are stabilization missions: MONUSCO, MINUSCA, and MINUSMA (DPKO/DFS, 2016).

fact that CLAs are a long-term presence in the midst of regular military rotations adds further value". Secondly, they operate a network of information sharing in Community Alter Networks, Community Protection Plans and other Early Warning Early Response systems[50] by being the focal point or even the only UN civilian staff in some rural areas in the Congo (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 5). In doing so, the CLAs can deal with the considered "misunderstandings" and "rumors" related to "unattainable expectations" or "deliberate manipulation", given the discourse assessment that the Congolese know little about MONUSCO's mandate or the so-called beneficial actions carried out by the mission[51] (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 25).

Thus, their in-between position enables an ambivalent association with the local population that helps in trying to distinguish the protected and the enemies but also "win hearts and minds" of the local population, considering that "[i]nformed communities have shown to be more appreciative of MONUSCO's presence and are less likely to become hostile towards the Mission" (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 25). That was illustrated in the mission's Civil Affairs manual in the "success story" entitled "*CLAs reduce anti-MONUSCO sentiments in Kitchanga (North Kivu)*":

> In September 2013, anti-MONUSCO sentiments were on the rise in the Pinga-Kitchanga axis, when rumors were spread that the Uruguayan battalion is buying minerals from the notorious Mai-Mai warlord Cheka and supporting his armed group with arms and ammunition. *Questioning the neutrality of the UN, local authorities subsequently stopped sharing information with CLAs*. In addition to this, the population started blocking roads and barring the access of MONUSCO vehicles to their villages. *The CLAs immediately developed a series of meetings with the traditional leaders and explained MONUSCO's mandate, activities and principles to village chiefs and influential community members. They stressed the need for MONUSCO personnel to access any location requiring their presence to protect civilians, and their active engagement to counter manipulation and unfounded rumors against MONUSCO*. In a parallel move, FARDC, PNC and ANR officials appealed to the population to refrain from taking action against MONUSCO. *Over the period of two months the CLAs action*

[50] Dorn (2010) shows how Early Warning and Early Response systems are one of the ways the UN has tried to handle the difficulties of using traditional intelligence tactics in peace operations. This further aligns the CLAs work with how the UN uses intelligence in the tactical level.

[51] As stated in full: "Tackling the population's misperceptions and rumors is a big challenge for the Mission and the CLAs. The perception problem appears to be rooted in both the unrealistic expectations of the population and deliberate manipulation. The majority of the population is unaware of MONUSCO's mandate and the Mission's capacities and limitations, which predisposes them to develop unrealistic expectations. At the same time, the Mission's actual accomplishments often remain unknown. These two factors create an easy predisposition for members of national security agencies, local government and civil society organizations as well as community leaders to engage in deliberate manipulation of the population. If, for example, MONUSCO is perceived to support armed groups, the Congolese police and army can hardly be made responsible for their underachievement"(MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 25–26).

> *resulted in a reduction of negative sentiments against MONUSCO, the re-establishment of trust between MONUSCO and improved information sharing* (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 30–31, emphasis added).

However, the manuals categorically defend that the CLAs do not cover intelligence tactics in an attempt to contain "duplicate roles" and even "competition" with the military component branch designated for that (DPKO/DFS, 2016, p. 17). In recognizing a growing power of the CLAs, the UN states that peacekeepers must negotiate CLAs power relations:

> The perceptions and expectations of local populations are shaped by the CLAs' relationship with the Force. On the one hand, this relationship may enhance the CLAs' authority and respect vis-à-vis the population. On the other hand, the CLAs' proximity to the Force can also confine them to an outsider's role. It is imperative that the CLAs avoid unrealistically raising the expectations of the community regarding the CLAs' power and influence, as this might lead to disappointment and frustration (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 17).

Aside from this more powerful position, for the local community, CLAs can be seen as traitors, an accomplice of UN interests in Congo. The association with the UN can put them in a disloyal[52] position for helping the UN to the detriment of their fellow compatriots[53]. In an interview with an CLA carried out by Hoffmann, Vlassenroot, and Büscher (2018, p. 10), the authors quote that "'People are afraid of talking. It is only through telephone. Even the village chiefs are afraid. If you pass by, they are immediately suspected'". That way, either the CLAs and/or the local population that associates with them can be regarded as UN helpers insofar as they are seen as acting against a particular ethnicity/group, being killed or tortured to obtain (counter)intelligence.

> All CLAs are important in gathering information from communities, for instance, *but there is a danger in treating or tasking CLAs as 'spies' or informants in their communities, rather than as mediators and interlocutors* (…). *[T]he value of CLAs* lies in the trust they build with communities, making the integrity of their message and a two-way dialogue with populations of overarching importance (…). Despite the best efforts, however, the performance and reliability of CLAs can be compromised by bias, a lack of rigor or critical judgement, or simply a lack of contextual understanding *on the part of the CLA*. Indeed, in one of the missions interviewed for this survey staff expressed concerns that

[52] De Jong (2022a) traces how interpreters and other locally employed civilians are a constant target of betrayal discourses, not only considering the impossibility of a perfect translation, but the difficulty to mediate their relationships between their own community and the international organization and/or government that hires them.

[53] See Moreno-Bello (2021) on the notion of competing narratives for interpreters working for the UN mission in Lebanon.

> CLAs could be negatively affected by their community ties (DPKO/DFS, 2016, p. 10–11, emphasis added).
>
> CLAs might be considered safe in the area of his or her deployment, but as patrols cross into an area of different ethnic or political affiliations, the CLA may be exposed to increased security risks (…). Certain CLA activities may also create additional security risks if they are undertaken in ways that appear to place the CLA at odds with the community or armed elements in the area. *The security of CLAs risks being compromised, for instance, if they are perceived as collecting intelligence for the mission, the government, or another group*. *Because the actions taken to collect intelligence are often the same as community engagement activities CLAs may be expected to undertake* – such as holding informal discussions with local leaders, keeping abreast of local developments, maintaining an awareness of tensions or the potential for conflict (including the movement of armed groups) – *the CLAs' security will often hinge upon his or her ability to maintain an impartial image amongst all stakeholders and act in a conflict-sensitive manner*. In this context, the close collaboration with military contingents can both be a positive or negative factor (DPKO/DFS, 2016, p. 19, emphasis added).

On the matter of CLAs' safety while performing their tasks, on the one hand, the UN peace operations (and MONUSCO is not an exception) have in their mandates the obligation to protect not only the civilians but also their own staff. On the other hand, the manuals also consider that the UN cannot guarantee their safety, especially those who work in "red zones" considered highly dangerous for the UN presence in general. As Rafael (2016, p. 132) crudely summarizes: "[t]he need to protect interpreters therefore stems from the same imperative to protect complex weapons systems from the risk that they may fall into the wrong hands and be turned against their users". In addition to an ambiguous safety protocol[54], UN peacekeepers must choose what kind of information to share with their CLAs because of security concerns (DPKO/DFS, 2016, p. 19; DPO, 2020b, p. 92; MONUSCO CA, 2014).

Altogether, these details reiterate their non-position between the peacekeepers and the local population while showing that it is not their role to deliberate on the security problems they are specifically tasked to point out. Hence, COIN tactics can be associated with the CLAs' job description because they engage in tasks to gain the local population confidence for two kinds of purpose: (1) obtain intelligence for military purposes and (2) to persuade the local support for the UN mission. However, this also happens when the CLAs are attempting to negotiate

[54] That is also the case of interpreters working for the US in Afghanistan and Iraq, who work without protective vests and hide their identity with Americanized pseudonyms (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 131).

their positionalities with themselves, the UN peacekeepers, and the local population. As mere informal informants, CLAs are ambiguous objectified people in mission planning as they perform the roles of protector, since they work for the UN, protected, because they work with the UN, and enemy, because they cannot be trusted.

Derrida's "*Politics of Friendship*" complexifies this discussion. For him, friendship (like protection) is not a given concept and has become intertangled with philosophical debates that try to separate it from the realm of politics. Yet, politics is imbued in how friendship (and again protection) have been defined historically and socially. One of its marks, according to the author, is its relation with masculinity and, consequently, war. In doing so, he argues that friendships resemble brotherhoods (the gendered naming being intentional as a critique to the exclusion of women in philosophical-political thought), because they create such a strong sense of connection and understanding that forms a natural(ized) bond. Derrida traces this mark in Western thought through Christianity under the idea of fraternity, which still presents the Self/Other inclusion/exclusion motif (DERRIDA, 2005; DEVERE, 2016).

In COIN scenarios, the politics of friendship locates the CLAs in a "segregated brotherhood", a concept created by de Jong (2022b) to discuss the double standard military officers apply to interpreters and other locally employed civilians. Drawing from the experience of Afghan employees and the US Armed Forces, she shows that White Western soldiers are socialized in a "brother in arms" discourse, aiming to create cohesion in their group. Yet, the interprets to whom they also daily rely upon are closed off from this norm because they are framed as the Other, therefore, should be treated under suspicion and constant surveillance. In a similar aporetic regime, this makes the CLAs in MONUSCO perform both the protector and the enemy positionalities under the UN protection discourses. The author furthers this discussion showing the betrayal of these interprets by those they have established interpersonal, institutional, and ideological ties (DE JONG, 2022a; see also INGHILLERI, 2018; RAFAEL, 2016, p. 114–116).

> It is not surprising, then, that U.S. forces [or the UN] should be troubled by the constitutive ambiguity of the interpreter's position. The interpreter's social and ontological instability poses an ongoing problem for counterinsurgency operations that prioritize stability. Weaponized, they can target but also be targeted, fire as well as backfire (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 133).

With intelligence taking a more central position in mission planning tactically and operationally, these mundane and decentralized mediations become the source for cultural translation. As pointed out by Beljan (2014), "[t]o complement intelligence work and to achieve POC as a main effort for MONUSCO, an understanding of the local culture is of paramount importance". To do that, the author highlights engagement strategies, such as the Human Terrain System, as useful for MONUSCO's COIN strategy. Nevertheless, it is notable to consider that the HTS is not the first version of "human terrain" in COIN tactics, despite perhaps being the most well-known after the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States. While this thesis aims to show parallels between the HTS in Iraq and Afghanistan and the use of human terrain in UN peace operations, I stress that the UN doctrine does not employ the term "Human Terrain System" but rather falls into a broader "human terrain" umbrella. Furthermore, most UN documents do not use this expression, following a "people-centered approach" grammar, as I have been showing thus far. That way, before delving into the HTS and its possible dis-connections with MONUSCO and the CLAs, I propose a brief discussion into the uses of "human terrain" in COIN.

This notion of human terrain is associated with the instrumentalization of Anthropology and then Human Geography by its US military gray literature, and takes that kind of naming since the 1960s (MEDINA, 2016; WAINWRIGHT, 2016). Medina (2016, p. 137) differentiates the general use of human terrain as "an outline a concept for sociocultural attributes, activities, connections, and trends" and the HTS as "an application in wartime situations to generate an understanding of regional society and culture and help avoid present and future conflict". Although the US and other NATO Member-States hold prominence in doctrinal contribution to UN peace operations, especially when it concerns stabilization missions (DE CONING; AOI; KARLSRUD, 2017), the dis-connections between the use of HTS and human terrain by the UN are ambiguously framed in the UN manuals. Thus, this thesis aims to present the HTS proposal as an intelligence-gathering tool amid COIN-driven missions while discussing possible parallels to MONUSCO and the CLAs.

The HTS started in the middle of the 2000s as a pilot project employing army officers and Social Sciences academics (particularly anthropologists) and in

2010 it became a driving force in US missions regarding funding and personnel. It emerged from a shift around US understanding on the wars they were fighting, in which the use of force alone was not securing victory: “civilians eventually came to be conceptualized as at the heart of the operation rather than merely as a backdrop to it: people *suddenly* mattered. After all, the population had to be persuaded to agree to the order US forces had come to impose” (ZEHFUSS, 2018, p. 95, emphasis added). That marked the importance of (and perhaps an obsession with) the human (read cultural) aspects of war, entitled "human terrain". In military terms, the human terrain is similar to other terrains (for example, the geographical and the technological) and can be *conquered* using battle strategy. It works as people-centered COIN inasmuch as its focus is on presenting a culturally sensitive approach to war targeted to convince the local population to offer their support. The HTS, therefore, was a way of bringing the cultural knowledge to the US army, something stated in the FM 3-24 but not completely accomplished (GUSTERSON, 2015; ZEHFUSS, 2018).

Yalçinkaya and Özer (2017) discuss the concept of “cultural intelligence”, recognizing how COIN in NATO-led missions in Afghanistan failed to encompass culture in its strategic, operational, and tactic planning. They stress how “cultural awareness” and “cultural intelligence” have become central in achieving military and political goals. Whereas being culturally aware relates to other cultures' recognition and differences to one’s own, cultural intelligence embraces the former’s proposal and transforms it into intelligence material, that is, the product of accumulative data on another entity. For the authors, the UN peace operations can take from the experience in Afghanistan as a “lessons learned”, since not being in tune with local culture can hinder mandate advancement. Although not in those terms, this is something recognized throughout the Capstone Doctrine (UNITED NATIONS, 2008) and underlined as one of the reasons for the 1990s missions’ failure to protect civilians (TOMFORDE, 2010, p. 450–451; WOODHOUSE, 2010).

> An appropriate usage of methods of influence for the success of asymmetric warfare requires cultural sensitivity to improve behaviour patterns. In order to support a political process, troops need to understand the local political effects of the operations. That is, they need to avoid doing harm as a minimum. *It is very difficult to influence politics if you do not understand language, motivations, fears, and desires of opponent. In this context, the military should use cultural intelligence to plan operations in a way that serves the political*

> *objectives of the deployment*. It is possible to state that cultural intelligence allows an understanding of an opponent's behaviour, be aware of grievances driving the local conflict, ethnic, sectarian or tribal maps, and communication with the population and influence the politics (YALÇINKAYA; ÖZER, 2017, p. 9–10, emphasis added).

Thus, the notion of cultural intelligence begins to make sense and become necessary for COIN-driven peace operations because it helps discern the conflict's logic and characteristics, and enables a better understanding of the Other, either as the protected or the enemy.

The human terrain language finds its way into UN doctrine, for example, in the 2020 "*Reinforcement Training Package for Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Officers*"[55], which considers that the "'Human Terrain' is probably the most important factor in the UN operating environment" (DPO, 2020b, p. 436). It separates the mission terrains into three types (human, physical, and information) and stimulates future UN military intelligence officers to understand them as interrelated. Accordingly, a human terrain-inspired analysis will focus on relationships, events, and organizations to enable mapping, liking, and identifying key local actors and assets (DPO, 2020b, p. 446). It also locates the protector's role in comparison to the enemy's as a way of justifying the importance of intelligence tactics in UN peace operations:

> UN personnel are usually already at a *disadvantage* compared to hostile actors when it comes to an understanding of the Human Terrain, as these actors tend to come from and live within the local population. *They may speak the same language or come from the same ethnic background, and therefore may be more effective in understanding local dynamics, communicating a message, and influencing the population* (DPO, 2020b, p. 532, emphasis added).

That way, the human terrain works as a zone of intervention within peace operations in which the UN is concerned to act and show protection to the local population. That happens, I suggest, because the UN seeks legitimacy for its actions through (the translation of) the notion of protection. However, to think of these missions operating in terms of human terrain, the idea of cultural sensitivity presented in the discourse on CLAs and the local turn in the previous chapter needs to be reconsidered.

[55] Reinforcement training package works as further doctrinal training material responding to on the ground missions' needs, produced by the Integrated Training Service of the UN Department of Peace Operations and Department of Operational Support (DPO, 2020b, p. i).

Another topic that is important to debate regarding military intelligence officers is their manual's attempt to discourage the use of CLAs and LAs as intelligence assets:

> Infiltrating a language assistant into an armed group is a clandestine activity not allowed under UN rules. It does not matter that a target is an armed group. The prohibition of clandestine activities also serves to protect us from accusations of "spying" that may undermine the mission's reputation as an impartial risk and place mission personnel at risk. Such infiltration would often also have to involve national staff (like the language assistant in this case) who are particularly vulnerable to reprisals (DPO, 2020b, p. 156).

Given how reluctantly the UN has approached intelligence operations in its mission, as shown at the beginning of the section, the interdiction represented in this citation is not surprising. What drives attention is the second sentence, which reaffirms the prohibition despite whatever tactical advantage putting a LA in a vulnerable position could mean. That way, bringing intelligence tactics to the UN means not only considering the CLAs as part of the HUMINT but also putting them in danger because of it, an exposure perhaps worth going through in a military intelligence officer's calculation despite "UN rules".

The US experience with the HTS has shown the importance of studies made in Anthropology to improve cultural intelligence. Indeed, there is a complicated history between the US intelligence agencies and the American Anthropology Association dating from the 1960s- and 1970s-COIN campaigns (GUSTERSON, 2015). In more recent COIN missions, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the idea of bringing (back) anthropologists to contribute in war efforts had resurged as a more humane way of combat US enemies (ZEHFUSS, 2018), but it was later discarded in 2014, given, for instance, the media attention to these professionals' deaths. That also stimulated an ethical discussion of transforming knowledge *on* the Other and obtained *with* the Other, into another tool for its conquering, notably within the Network of Concerned Anthropologists (2009), considering specially an ethos towards distancing contemporary Anthropology from its colonial origins.

One way to bypass[56] or even solve these 'problems' is to employ local civilians, such as the CLAs, that can provide similar inputs under the cultural sensibility discourse as part of the protection efforts in COIN-driven missions.

[56] I would like to thank Piero Leirner for calling my attention to this connection.

Following a technocratic problem-solving perspective focused on intelligence, the CLAs can better comprehend local dynamics than anthropologists from other countries and perform local identities that can provide inside information. Regarding mission budget issues presented in the last chapter, their employment can also be considered more cost-effective than hiring international staff. Lastly, there does not seem to exist the same problematization around locally hired civilians' ethics as with US anthropologists, and their deaths are less prone to impact international media.

That is the case for Afghan and Iraqi interpreters in NATO-backed COIN operations. As civilians employed locally, they were considered pivotal to "win the hearts and minds" efforts, yet were left behind when the White Western countries decided to end these missions. The International Association of Conference Interpreters (AIIC) has historically fought against leaving interpreters behind when troops withdraw with the "Interpreters in Conflict Zones Project" (FITCHETT, 2018). However, few scholars in IR have discussed the treatment Afghan and Iraqi interpreters have received throughout their service to these missions or their attempt to migrate to flee from being killed and tortured as traitors in their home countries. I point out Sara de Jong's (2022b, 2022a, 2022c) recent works that dealt with how locally hired civilians in COIN operations play an ambiguous role in White Western discourse. In establishing a migration-security nexus, she demonstrates how these countries adopt opportunistic migration policy framings to hinder these people from searching for protection in their former employer's countries following discourses that model them as threats to White Western values and national security (DE JONG, 2022c). Therefore, these interpreters were seen as essential assets in COIN operations. But when there is a target on their backs and they seek protection by the ones they once assisted, that is not retributed (DE JONG, 2022a; see also INGHILLERI, 2018; RAFAEL, 2016). The Afghan and Iraqi interpreters' case can be strongly associated with how the CLAs are treated on the ground and stimulates the discussion around the UN exit strategy for MONUSCO.

By exploring the human terrain as a proposal in broad COIN tactics and the UN, this section provides a strange dissonance in this discourse. On the one hand, the doctrinal material wishes to make war and peace operations strategies more complex by claiming concern over the 'human' as a terrain for combat, regarding complexities of language and culture. On the other hand, close investigation shows

the impetus to make war easier by the simplicity they attribute to the information they get and their sources. Hence, the UN appoints the CLAs (and later the military intelligence and CIMIC officers) to the tasks of gathering/analyzing information and maintaining a good relationship with the local population without detailed guidance. Thus, this system refers much more to those who traditionally operate a doctrine contributing countries than to the Other. In other words, it relates to the White Western Member-States' supposed superiority over the Congolese people targeted in COIN operations such as MONUSCO's stabilization mandate. Debating the meaning of protection, COIN tactics, and the CLAs' translation task – as in this thesis – relates much more to reflecting how the White Western discourse understands its relationship with the Other than the relationship itself. In this case, a simplistic view on language and culture that attempts to weaponize them can never achieve its goals:

> attempts at linguistic and social domination seek to recruit translation as a means for waging war on the complications within, as well as across, languages. But such wars of translation are never unchallenged (…) there is an irreducibly insurgent element in every language that undermines such attempts at mastery. In the wars of, and on, translation, what emerge are multiply mothered and motherless tongues amid shifting zones of untranslatability (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 9).

Inspired by this quote, the next chapter aims to re-visit the discussions posed in the first two chapters by re-introducing them under the politics of translation.

4.
THE COMMUNITY LIAISON ASSISTANTS AND THE POLITICS OF TRANSLATION IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS' PROTECTION DISCOURSES

> Already overwhelmed, [UN] officials said, *they had no intelligence capabilities or even an interpreter who could speak the necessary languages* (…). The company's only translator left the base on Oct. 26 and was not replaced until more than two weeks later. But even in normal times, communications are limited. To make logistical arrangements, *the peacekeepers depend largely on civilian staff members* who work normal business hours and have weekends off (POLGREEN, 2008, emphasis added).

So far, the discourse on the 2008 attacks in Kiwanja have been introduced at the beginning of each chapter to highlight different directions when discussing how the UN understands its protector role in peace operations and its imagined protected and enemy counterparts. The local turn literature, as seen in Chapter 2, claimed how a better engagement with the host country's population and their increased participation in the peace process could have changed the situation prior to the attacks in Kiwanja. In another interpretation, Chapter 3 showed how MONUSCO's stabilization mandate supplements MONUC's by authorizing a more proactive stance on the use of force, which is combined with complex COIN-inspired tactics that propose a different framing for establishing contact with the local population.

While going through these different readings on UN peace operations, the former chapters have discussed the (potential and/or expected) role of the CLAs in these endeavors. Following the UN manuals, I have shown how they are tasked with providing the interface between two supposedly whole groups, the UN peacekeepers and the local population, to aid the mandate implementation by creating and managing PoC activities. Returning to the "Kiwanja" imagination, I have been asking: would the presence of an interpreter have solved the issue(s) presented by the UN-NGOs-academia consensus? What was there to be solved? How are the problem(s) framed in a way that makes the CLAs a plausible solution? These questions have led me to another inquiry I wish to pursue in this chapter: what are the CLAs' translational skills expected to accomplish in and for this socio-political representation?

Here is an invitation to imagine an example other than Kiwanja, the re-occurring representation that haunts this thesis. In a UN mission where there was a generalized local culture and only *one* language was spoken, the same one that all peacekeepers were fluent in or, at least, had an advanced understanding of, would there still be a 'problem' to be solved by the CLAs? In this mythical place untouched by Babel, the CLAs would not be intended primarily to interpret and translate between supposedly whole bodies of language and culture. Would their presence still be required? If so, is the mediation imagined by the UN supposed to be a solution beyond interlinguistic and intercultural exchanges in the way presented in the manuals?

With this provocation, this chapter aims to discuss what I have hinted throughout this thesis as the politics of translation of protection discourses. By re-naming the way in which the UN attempts to center its view on protection as a translation effort, I intend to emphasize the non-existence of any of the categories discussed in the previous chapters *a priori* of their performance. That means that there is no international/local or protector/protected/enemy, civilized/savage/barbarian before the attempt to stabilize these representations through translating these discourses. As I have shown in the Chapter 1, the notion of *différance* inhabits this thesis by calling attention to how the meaning of protection cannot be purely defined, being rather ambivalent when centering its interpretation. In this sense, this thesis aims to offer a small contribution to something that the literature on peace operations already criticizes and signals.

This chapter is divided in two sections. In the first section, I discuss the notion of *politics of translation*, underscoring the monolingual project imbedded in the UN's protection discourses. The second section explores how translation is imagined in (post-)colonial discourse as a means of assimilation and its relation to the use of COIN tactics in Congo. Each section is in direct conversation with the previous chapters and not necessarily presenting something distinct. My intention in this chapter is deepening previous discussions by demonstrating that there is more to the CLAs than what meets the eye when I propose to understand them as an analytical prism to reflect on the UN protection discourses.

4.1.
THE POLITICS OF TRANSLATION IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS: TOWARDS A MONOLINGUAL(IZED) NOTION OF PROTECTION

The discussion on the political character of translation in IR can be considered recent in the discipline, despite translation constituting an ontological premise of social relations in (but not limited to) an international plane (CAPAN; DOS REIS; GRASTEN, 2021, p. 2; EVANS; FERNÁNDEZ, 2018, p. 2; FOOTITT; KELLY, 2018, p. 162). In other words, state representatives and other deeply analyzed actors in IR are constantly mediated by mis-translations while trying to establish social communication (ROLAND, 1999). That way, translation is far from being a marginal aspect of social interactions and political life, being rather a crucial one (BASSNETT; TRIVEDI, 1999, p. 3). Perhaps one of the reasons for the discipline's failure to pay more credit to such an all-encompassing agenda could be what Harmon (2020, p. 22) emphasizes as the confidentiality of empirical materials for researching on economic or conflict negotiations, two cases in which translation and interpretation services are paramount. Nevertheless, translation arguably is not something broadly discussed in IR.

Conversely, Translation Studies have been discussing the power relations in translation for many decades, despite it containing a "secret history" to use Evans and Fernández (2018, p. 4) assessment, that is, being side-tracked in the discipline. In tracing the main debates, Harmon (2020) identifies two research trends: analysis of censorship in totalitarian regimes and postcolonial readings of language encounters. Moreover, she depicts that the discipline sees politics in translations and interpretations on (1) its external factors, (2) the publications of these works, (3) the role of the translator/interpreter, and (4) its importance in social relations. Thus, this thesis takes translation, both its interlinguistic concept and other broader definitions, as means for re-producing power relations. In being interested in debating its political role, I have been following discussions under the 'IR language', yet an implicit dialogue with Translation Studies is also taking place.

That requires embracing a wide-raging sense of the term "translation", emphasizing how ideas and interpretations can *travel* with the message transposition between languages (BILGIN, 2021; SAID, 2000). A common sense understanding of translation and interpretation can close analysis to stereotypical actors (such as academically trained translators and interpreters), scenarios (for

instance, translation of novels or conference interpretation), and definitions. Although a political matter can be found in these examples, they are not exhaustive to the debate on the CLAs' role in the UN PoC agenda. In the introduction to an edited book titled "*The Politics of Translation in International Relations*", Capan, dos Reis, and Grasten (2021) present a typology of understandings for translation, which highlights the potential to (de-)politicize it (see also HERBORTH, 2021; KESSLER, 2021). In a closer standing with Translation Studies, the authors reaffirm they wish to depart from the idea of *translation as transfer*, as seen in Chapter 2 of this thesis, which strives for the perfect symmetry between languages. For them, rather than a search for textual equivalence, the issue is how "translations are viewed as tools that produce cultural representations and images. *These tools may be subject to manipulation by translators to advance specific ideologies or histories through representational distortions and silences*" (CAPAN; DOS REIS; GRASTEN, 2021, p. 4, emphasis added).

Continuing their call for a critical assessment of the political character of translation in IR's research agendas (see also BASSNETT; TRIVEDI, 1999), I follow their comprehension of *translation as transformation*, which emphasizes the potential new meanings created in translation practices because of its performative and productive dimension. In addition, a focus on transformations entails acknowledgement to political processes and how different actors negotiate, mediate, and struggle *in-between* translations:

> *Translation as transformation* recognises struggles and contestation taking place in both context A and context B. Doing so, it adds a focus on the practice of translating—the 'trans' of translation within the 'inter' of international relations—which constitutes the link between A and B. Being multidirectional, *translation as transformation* problematises neither the 'source' or 'origin' nor the 'target' (i.e. context A and/or B), but the 'inter-', the in-between (…). The space *between* A and B—the 'inter'—is a semantic space encompassing signs and practices through which polities, policies and humans interact. The state of being *in translation* not only problematises the fixities that qualify context A and B but also directs our attention towards transformations taking place in and between different contexts (CAPAN; DOS REIS; GRASTEN, 2021, p. 7, emphasis in the original).

Nonetheless, I cannot discard the idea of *translation as transfer* because this understanding rules the CLAs' expected tasks in UN peace operations. In carrying out Community Protection Plans, Community Alert Networks, Early Warning Early Response systems, and other acronym-coded PoC-related activities, the CLAs

are expected to mediate the relationships between the UN peacekeepers and the local population through linguistic and cultural means.

> Community Liaison Assistants, like many national staff, are highly valued for their knowledge of local language, understanding of community dynamics, and ability to engage with the population. While writing, analytical and office skills are important as well, in-depth knowledge of particular communities and strong people skills are the quintessential characteristics of CLAs (DPKO/DFS, 2016, p. 9).

As I have demonstrated by tracing earlier interpreter roles in UN peace operations in Chapter 2 (through fixers, military linguists, and Language Assistants), the CLAs are the UN's newest tool in its protection effort. Yet, their role only makes sense if one takes a step back and understands its translation backbone that related to previous positions. In doing so, however, I have shown how it falls under a simplistic view of communication, which encompasses noncritical definitions of mediation, interpretation, and translation.

Nevertheless, this thesis' reflection of these concepts can go further. It is important to go beyond the Translation Studies focus on the translation between "named historical languages" (SPIVAK, 1993, p. 180) (i.e. interlinguistic translation) because I am also interested in its intralingual complexities (if one wishes to separate them as such[57]). As the notion of *différance* recalls, meanings are never fully stable even in a seemingly structured body of language[58]. Moreover, as Vicente Rafael (2016, p. 118) underlines, the act of translating is highly volatile as it is the proliferation of a constant state of confusion between possible meanings and the impossibility of arriving at any of them: "[a]s the displacement, replacement, transfer, and transformation of the original into another language, translation is incapable of definitively fixing meanings across languages". Therefore, even when speaking only in one 'language', for instance, English (as I am supposedly doing in this thesis), people are in constant translation, offering supplements and finding traces to try improving their understanding of each other's message. In recognizing so, I wish to underscore how the idea of a language encompasses hegemonizing performative acts of translation, aiming to depoliticize and naturalize a fictional discourse over a group, for example, conferring it an

[57] See Derrida (2007, p. 198), Davis (2001), and Rafael (2016) on Jakobson's separation.

[58] Despite having standardized rules of grammar and lexicons working under ingrained codes naturalized by repetition, it is important to underline how languages (of better yet, language systems) cannot be fully contained or made permanent (see DAVIS, 2001, p. 21; DERRIDA, 1985; RAFAEL, 2016).

original myth and authority (CAPAN; DOS REIS; GRASTEN, 2021; DAVIS, 2001; DERRIDA, 1988, 1997, 2001). In this sense, a discussion on translation is intrinsically related to an inquiry of what constitutes a language and who authorizes this delimitation (DERRIDA, 1998, 2007; FERREIRA, 2009; HERBORTH, 2021; KESSLER, 2021).

Thus far, I have been debating on translation and interpretation associated with the idea that CLAs should know "local" and the "international humanitarian aid" languages. In other words, that signals to how the UN imagines the problem of translation as a phenomenon between national languages (such as French, English, and Swahili) and what I have presented as cultural translation. A re-reading of this, however, can strain this interpretation by thinking that the CLAs require fluency over the 'language of UN peace operations'[59] and the so-called 'languages of the local population', as the UN imagines the best way to communicate and enforce its mandate. By the language of the UN, I am referring to the "grammar of peace operations", the terms used by the UN to make sense of its activities and the reality that is trans-formed, re-formed, and de-formed within this conception[60]. Accordingly, the CLAs must be fluent in this language, that is, understand it to the point of being able to inhabit it with ease. At the same time, they must divide themselves between that and their performance as someone compatible with the image that the UN has of the "local", which surpasses linguistic fluency. This dual performance is what I understand that the UN tasks the CLAs when it expects them to mediate relations between the UN and the local population.

As a result, the problem that I have been calling attention to refers to the attempts to stabilize a single meaning about the notion of protection, which relies on the legitimization of hierarchies and the use of physical and symbolic violence. In the case of protection discourses in peace operations, I have shown how protection is imagined as the center of UN representations to authorize their actions in Congo. With its pinnacle in the PoC agenda, the UN protection imaginary determines different roles between who should protect whom and a third group of

[59] One can draw a connection of what I mean by the "language of UN peace operations" and the critique Autesserre (2014) wishes to make with the notion of "Peaceland" as discussed in Chapter 2.

[60] The reader must have noticed how this thesis is also contaminated by this language since, to deconstruct the authority that it seeks to stabilize, it was necessary to understand it within the logic that it proposes, to inhabit it.

actors that hinders this process, which entails the proposal of clearly delimited groups. However, on the ground, the UN identifies problems in filtering its actions: the primary responsibility of the host country to protect its citizens (despite failing) subordinates the UN's protector role, and the enemy is confused with the protected civilian population. Thus, any attempts to centralize this ordering 'in the name of protection' requires going through a process of diffusion and homogenization of protection among the actors. The intended result is to reach a point where the UN protection activities in MONUSCO, ranging from the tasks of Civil Affairs to the Force Intervention Brigade, can be easily included in this umbrella and accepted as legitimate by the protected.

To make sense of these intricacies in analyzing protection discourses, I propose in this thesis a play on the words "translation" and "politics" inspired by Evans and Fernández (2018). In an introduction to an edited book on the relations between "translation" and "politics", the authors follow Jacques Racière's (2007) definition of politics. To do so, they draw from the latter's distinction between "police" and "emancipation"; whereas the first refers to the government of a population concerning hierarchies and power relations, the second relates to practices aimed at equality. Recognizing that even defining what politics means is a political act, therefore not grounded in something prior to disputes over definitions, they are concerned with denaturalizing the role of translations in politics while emphasizing how politics is itself a translational relation. They point out that politics, in this sense, is "a space of oppositions between systems and individuals, hierarchy and equality, police and emancipation, that is always subject to contestation and expansion" (EVANS; FERNÁNDEZ, 2018, p. 2).

Ensuing this debate, I advance the notion of the *politics of translation* as the dispute between actors to stabilize a given interpretation of an event, that is, the place of translation *in* politics. By regarding translation as a political matter, I am concerned with how different representations can become naturalized under translation processes. The movement that I have been underlining in this thesis by placing CLAs as an analytical prism can be understood as such because the CLAs' work encompasses re-presenting the UN's protection discourse to the local population to convince them of one interpretation as the only and/or correct one. That way, I am particularly interested in the different manifestations that *re*-form, *trans*-form, and *de*-form a political discourse for distinct audiences. This definition

goes beyond a commonsensical notion of translation I have been criticizing so far, being concerned with elements and alterations within linguistic systems when changing the presentation of a discourse by considering better ways of communicating with a certain public. The choice of hiring national and/or ethnic mediators to re-present the voice of the UN in the case of the CLAs, for instance, is an example of tailoring the protection discourse to the "local" audience.

Oliver Marchat (2007) complements this discussion by calling attention to "political difference", that is, the distinction between the notion of "politics" and the "political", according to what he denominates as "post-foundationalist" thought. Marchat demonstrates that, for some left-wing scholars who take from Heidegger, there lacks a grounding (a foundation) outside the realm of politics in which human H(h)istory attempts to derive meaning. That does not mean a negation of a foundation (what he sees as anti-foundationalism) but the recognition that establishing one is not a naturalized endeavor but one constructed in socio-political relations. That way, the political refers to the initiating moment in which this non-foundation shows itself, whereas politics is concerned with strategy and the conventions of the dispute for power. Yet, when the struggle pushes forward, its terms and conditions are made evident as being founded on *contingency*.

> As *difference*, this [political] difference presents nothing other than a paradigmatic split in the traditional idea of politics, where a new term (the political) had to be introduced in order to point at society's 'ontological' dimension, the dimension of the institution of society, while politics was kept as the term for the 'ontic' practices of conventional politics (the plural, particular and, eventually, unsuccessful attempts at grounding society) (MARCHAT, 2007, p. 5, emphasis in the original).

Jenny Edkins (1999) pushes forward this discussion in IR by claiming that the commonsensical and the discipline's dominant understanding of "politics" runs the risk of, pun intended, depoliticizing it (and she also calls attention to the potential of technologizing it, given that politics is left to bureaucrats and the so-called experts). She underscores how the "political" can be seen beyond the usual case studies and research interests in the discipline. "In the broader sense, then, 'the political' has to do with the establishment of that very social order which sets out a particular, historically specific account of what counts as politics and defines other areas of social life as not politics" (EDKINS, 1999, p. 2). Contributing to the debate Marchat later promoted (despite any direct quotes), she defends that the "political"

should be interpreted closely related to a matter of *subjectification*, the process in which a group of people and/or an individual is imagined as an actor who can participate in political discussions and claim rights. In doing so, Edkins shows how a controversial act, defining who can be a subject and who is excluded, is detached from the "political" to become "politics" once the foundation in which a socio-political order seemingly legitimizes to stabilize itself attempts to ground itself, that is, to render natural what is contingent.

In analyzing the efforts in the translation of protection discourses, such as the PoC agenda, which attempts to render protection under the UN's gaze a distinct and hegemonic discourse, one must ask what kind of negotiation is happening in the background of the many manuals I have been carefully introducing throughout the thesis. To address this process, I draw on Derrida's discussion in "*Des Tours de Babel*", where he analyses the myth of the Tower of Babel. In following different translations of the Bible, Derrida (2007) re-tells the story of the Semites, who wanted to "make a name" for themselves by building a tower of enormous proportions. By this architectural metaphor, Davis (2001, p. 10; see also DERRIDA, 1985, p. 101) argues that Derrida traces both the Semites' aspirations of claiming power for themselves over the different socio-political groups in the region and creating the unity of a closed system of reference over *one* place, people, and language. Nonetheless, this attempt is rejected by God, who sees this construction as a usurpation of his monopolized power, therefore responding by *naming* it "Babel, Confusion". Going back to Voltaire's reading of the myth, Derrida takes on the discussion of the meaning of Babel as a proper name, which presents a deconstruction of the naming process. He does that because the confusion (as disorientation, misunderstanding) around the capitalized word "Confusion" applies in human languages not only to the noun "confusion" but also to the naming of God. That way, there cannot exist full closure and isolated self-identity (requiring the relations with other signifiers to function) even to the one who, in the myth, holds the authority to give names and determine meaning (DAVIS, 2001, p. 10–12; DERRIDA, 1985, 2007; FERREIRA, 2009; HADDOCK-LOBO, 2019; NASCIMENTO, 2015; RAFAEL, 2016, p. 112–115).

> In seeking "make a name for themselves," to found at the same to time a universal tongue and a unique genealogy, the Semites want to make the world see reason, and this reason can signify simultaneously colonial violence (since they would thus universalize their idiom) *and* peaceful transparency of the human community. Conversely, when God

> imposes and opposes his name, he ruptures the rational transparency but also interrupts the colonial violence or the linguistic imperialism. He destines them to translation, he subjects them the law of a translation both necessary and impossible; with a blow of his translatable-untranslatable name, he delivers a universal reason (it will no longer be subject to the rule of a particular nation), but he simultaneously limits its very universality: forbidden transparency, impossible univocity (DERRIDA, 2007, p. 199, emphasis in the original).

In this work and elsewhere, Derrida presents different multi-layered critiques of the theory and practice of translation. In this thesis, I wish to take on his discussion to highlight how, by building a tower as a define mark of power, the Semites' objective was to take for themselves the authority of *the* name and, consequently, of *the* language. In other words, Derrida's reading compels me to re-read this story as an attempt to define a *monolingual vision* according to the Semites. However, the myth also shows that this vision is subjected to translations and political endeavors to naturalize it, that is, the notion of the politics of translation seen above.

> This "universal language", even if it is that of rationality and world peace, even and even with the best of intentions, it still represents the same desire for domination of the Semites' imperialism: my language, in this case, that of peace, the end of the conflicts, the urgency of what would be called "the West", over all peoples – still a single tower, consequently (HADDOCK-LOBO, 2019, p. 27, my translation)[61].

Derrida (1985, p. 101) continues his problematization over the Semites' aspirations: "[h]ad their enterprise succeeded, the universal tongue would have been a particular language imposed by violence, by force, by violent hegemony over the rest of the world". This quote shows that this groups' only legitimation can be the force used to stablish their rule, but one cannot dismiss other fictional discourses that attempt to build a hegemonic imagination over a legal-political order[62]. Indeed, the UN's monolingual(ized) discourse on protection in its peace operations goes through different contestations about its application in the different levels of the

[61] In the original: "Essa 'língua universal', mesmo que seja ela a da racionalidade e da paz mundial, mesmo e inclusive com as melhores das intenções, ela ainda representa o mesmo desejo de dominação do imperialismo dos Sem: minha língua, no caso a da paz, a do fim dos conflitos, a de uma urgência do que se chamaria 'o ocidente', sobre todos os povos – ainda uma só torre, portanto" (HADDOCK-LOBO, 2019, p. 27).

[62] That is discussed more detailly in another of Derrida's texts entitled "*Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority*'", in which he promotes the discussion (and distinction) between the ideas of law and justice. For him, the authority of law cannot be grounded in anything lawful since its foundation is marked by a *coup de force* (i.e. performative acts of violence used to establish an order that could be considered illegal in it, therefore, unjust). In calling attention to an extralegal act as the basis for what forms the Western justice systems, he wishes to question the (mystical) limits between the definitions of (il)legality and (in)justice. See Derrida (1990) and Otto (1996, p. 341–342).

missions and specialized academic literature as seen in the previous chapters. Nevertheless, I understand that the idea that the UN is responsible for international peace and security and, consequently, should protect civilians even when it repeatedly fails (as in Kiwanja and other events) has been sedimenting since the organization's creation in 1945 and ever more strongly after the Cold War (DOUCET, 2018). Diane Otto (1996, p. 339–341) underlines how post-World War II (1937-1945) politics, of which peace operations are an instrument, seeks to legitimize keeping the White West governments at the center of a political arena primarily understood in terms of the Westphalian statehood model. She demonstrates that this order benefits from a liberal, democratic, and cosmopolitan discourse that attempts to represent universality and equality between Member-States (see also BIELSA, 2020; JAHN, 2013).

In doing so, whatever difference that is recognized cannot be one capable of challenging the established order, but rather should be able to be incorporated and/or dealt with (read assimilated and/or annihilated as seen in Chapter 3). Thus even the UN's so-called efforts to aid decolonization of former European colonies re-affirms White Western superiority, given that it was made in "narrows terms" because independence and entry to this order supposedly entails the subscription to a specific imagination of socio-political relations (OTTO, 1996, p. 343; see also BONACKER, 2021). As a result, "dysfunctional states" are framed as problematic, as is the case of the Congo, becoming targets of international interventions (DUNN, 2003; INAYATULLAH; BLANEY, 2004; JAHN, 2007a, 2007b, 2012; KODDENBROCK, 2012, 2013).

Inspired by Derrida, Rafael (2016; see also MEYLAERTS, 2018) debates the Americanization of the English language as a way for the United States to conquer their own Babel. To achieve univocity, the US has historically incorporated non-Anglophone languages into a linguistic and cultural hierarchy, placing the American(ized) English in the center as a superior language and the ultimate goal, consequently, wishing to end the need *of* and *to* translation. In other words, its objective is to contain polylingualism within the borders of (compulsory) national monolingualism once the American understanding of translation is merely to reduce linguistic and cultural differences.

That entails placing other linguistic expressions in the realm of difference, and latter homogenizing the Other. In reducing their singularities, the Others'

language and culture can become translat*able* and converted to the referent American Self (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 101; see also CHAKRABARTY, 2000). Hence, cultural diversity is tolerated until it becomes an issue for the 'pure' American identity, despite Americanness discourse's basis on a founding myth of migration and cosmopolitanism (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 109–112; see also BHABHA, 1990, 1994; RESENDE, 2015). Although it is important to consider the peculiarities of this case, it is noteworthy to point out some parallels with the UN's monolingual(ized) protection discourses as seen with the notion of cultural in-difference in Chapter 2. In both cases, this logic fails to stand its ground, given the confusion that runs through the attempt to overcome Babel:

> In the American invocations of Babel, its double meaning is usually forgotten (…). As Babel redeemed, the United States is precisely where *unum* comes to rule over *pluribus*. Yet the structural proximity of Babel to America suggests that the latter does not simply negate the former but in fact retraces its fate. Babel is the specter that haunts American English. It informs, in the strong sense of that word, the hierarchy of languages on which monolingual citizenship rests. For as we saw, the hegemony of English is an effect of translation—both intralingual, within English, and interlingual, between English and other languages. In this way national monolingualism is itself divided, requiring even as it disavows the labor of translation (…). We can see, then, how America is less the New World repudiation of Babel than its uncanny double (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 133).

The author also draws attention to US actions after the events of September 11, 2001, highlighting the tactical role of mastery in the Other's language as an instrument of war. Learning the language of the Other, in this logic, is not about better understanding as a form of respect and/or tolerance but ensuring the protection of the American people and control over the Other (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 102). Putting it simply, the American proposal is knowing the Other to better teach "them" to be more like "us", which resembles the colonial enterprise promoted by the European states and missionaries[63]. In UN peace operations, I understand that the incorporation of the 'local' into the UN-led peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes, particularly in stabilization missions such as MONUSCO, seems to follow this containing aspiration in its protection socio-political imagination. As long as translation strives to overcome confusion by imposing only one interpretation, one must remain attentive to excluding processes amid inclusion discourses. In this sense, the subsequent section discusses how translation plays a

[63] Specifically on the role of translation for missionaries, see Liu (2018) and Cheyfitz and Harmon (2018).

role within this logic, based on the case of CLAs in UN missions as translators *of* and *in* this imagination.

4.2. TRANSLATION AS ASSIMILATION IN CONGO: COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY LIAISON ASSISTANTS IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS

The Democratic Republic of Congo's colonial and postcolonial history is marked by different types of foreign intervention to its territory, raging from its private possession by the King Leopold II of Belgium as the "Congo Free State" (1885–1908) and colonization by Belgium government as the "Belgian Congo" (1908–1960) to three UN peace operations (namely ONUC, MONUC, and MONUSCO), additional missions by other international organizations, and unilateral interferences. Following Grovogui (2002), I have opted to place the images of post-independence interventions alongside the Congo's colonial period because it is important to highlight how the understanding of the country's sovereignty is bendable to White Western discourse. However, I do not wish to equalize these experiences but find common points in which the politics of translation of UN protection discourses can be seen as a trace from the colonial discourse. In this sense, understanding how language and culture were part of Belgium's colonization in the region, both by religious entities and Belgic government, and its more contemporary consequences helps relate to COIN tactics in UN missions.

> Both conversion and counterinsurgency seek to rid the world of insurgents, religious as well as political, establishing in their wake a new order of civic life ordered around the broad concerns of the empire. And since both entail the daily colonization of the lifeworld of both occupiers and occupied, they have neither temporal limits nor fixed spatial boundaries. *Like the project of imperial conversion, counterinsurgency is dedicated to "securing all the 'ungoverned (i.e., unconverted) spaces' around the globe* (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 112, emphasis added).

In addition, it is noteworthy how the Congo's colonial setting was also rooted in a "humanitarian" discourse linked to violent and racist practices[64], stating that the

[64] This period is remembered by the common practice of bodily mutilation, rape, torture, and murder of the Congolese enslaved population who failed to uphold the quota of raw material (most notably

European justification was to bring "civilization" in the region (DUNN, 2003; NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, 2007; WESSELING, 1996; YATES, 1980).

> For the colonial ideologues, the Congo was, culturally speaking, a tabula rasa. The absence of writing and a written literature was interpreted to mean the absence of any culture, history and scientific knowledge. Europe's, or the white man's, mission was to introduce these and other aspects of Western civilization in Africa in order to bring it out of darkness and barbarism (NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, 2007, p. 39).

Thus, language and culture have played a pivotal part in imposing one's authority over the colonized people: "the *need* to communicate and the *intent* to control were inseparable motives" (FABIAN, 1986, p. 14, emphasis in the original). To accomplish that, they were framed as part of what marks the White Western civilizations as more 'advanced' than the simplified and derogatory understanding attributed to the Other (BASSNETT; TRIVEDI, 1999; BHABHA, 2004; CHEYFITZ; HARMON, 2018; MIGNOLO, 2012; THIONG'O, 1993, 1994). Samarin, for instance, presents hard-to-believe testimonies of European colonizers in the Congolese region, which claim to master fluency over a handful of regional languages and dialects over a short time. For him, these statements indicate "they had very low opinions of African languages and a limited view of what communication in African languages amounted to" (SAMARIN, 1989, p. 234). That can be exemplified with their dismissal of grammar rules and preference for learning a reduced vocabulary for everyday interactions (with, perhaps, an exception of Kikongo).

Despite internal disputes, Catholic and Protestant missionaries working in Congo differed partly from this approach. For their religious interests, learning the local languages was not a matter of fostering a working knowledge to give orders but establishing communication[65] to become part of the community and enable conversion. On the one hand, the Catholic representatives restricted themselves to becoming fluent in one of the regional languages, such as Kikongo and Lingala, since they believed it was more practical to dialogue with more villages. On the

ivory and rubber). It is estimated that 10 million people died because of the exploitation of resources in the colonial period (NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, 2007, p. 22).

[65] Wolton's (2010) distinction between communication and information helps understanding the different goals of these groups. For her, communication is like a type of "relational information", that is, it gives equal importance to the speaker and the receiver, as well as to the message. On the other hand, informing consists of a single-way flow, reaffirming a hierarchy between them. See also Rafael (2016, p. 129).

other hand, their Protestant counterparts dedicated themselves to staying longer in one location and mastering their unique linguistic expressions (SAMARIN, 1989; YATES, 1980). While carrying their 'mission', there was even a discussion among the Catholic missionaries if the language to be taught the newly converted population should not have been Latin instead of French, with the latter seen as an "unnecessary intermediary" language. For Yates (1980, p. 262–263), that signals a disagreement between Leopold's (and later Belgic) rule and the Church, given that the King's interests in Congo, which were more commercial, were not attending to the Church's commitments (what she contrasts with the ideas of Westernization and Christianization).

Furthermore, official colonial authorities did little to disseminate the use of the French language (or Flemish if one considers Belgium's own political linguistic matters), understanding it as a form of control over who would be allowed to learn it (i.e. the containment of an intellectual elite). The diffusion of the English language was also forbidden in the area in an attempt to "Belginizing" the territory (YATES, 1980). While the French mission in the Congo River (which would later become Congo-Brazzaville) favored teaching a European language as a tool of colonization (see THIONG'O, 1994), Belgic rule instrumentalized local languages in a simplified version to attend to its economic interests (SAMARIN, 1989). Moreover, Fabian (1986; see also CHEYFITZ; HARMON, 2018) underscores how Swahili was encouraged as a *lingua franca* to impose a language barrier between the colonizer and the colonized groups. Yet, it was also rejected as part of the colonial control because of its Arab ties (YATES, 1980, p. 267).

> In sum, Belgian language policy in the Congo comes down to this:
> § first, allow all the vernacular or ethnic languages of the country to develop and use them in the context of evangelization;
> § then, favoring a few with a regional vocation to serve as the language of inter-ethnic contact and as a vehicle for teaching during the first years of schooling;
> § finally, teaching French to a small selected minority called upon to work alongside the Belgian authorities as subordinate auxiliaries (MAKITA, 2013, p. 48, my translation)[66].

[66] In the original: "En résumé, la politique linguistique belge au Congo se réduit à ceci: § d'abord, laisser se développer toutes les langues vernaculaires ou langues ethniques du pays et les utiliser dans le cadre de l'évangélisation; § ensuite, privilégier quelques unes à vocation régionale pour servir de langue de contact inter-ethnique et de véhicule de l'enseignement pendant les premières années de scolarisation; § enfin, enseigner le français à une petite minorité sélectionnée, appelée à travailler aux côtés des Autorités belges comme auxiliaires subalternes" (MAKITA, 2013, p. 48).



Figure 05: The four national languages of Democratic Republic of Congo.
Source: Translators without Borders (2020).

As briefly presented in Chapter 2, there are over 200 languages spoken currently in Congo (Figure 05), yet an exact number cannot be appointed, given the lack of precise statistical data (MAKITA, 2013, p. 46). After World War II, four

distinct linguistic systems were recognized as predominant in the country, Kiswahili, Kikongo, Tshiluba, and Lingala, which later would become the "national languages" in the Congolese Constitution (CONGOLESE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 2005). Concomitantly, the diffusion of French remained restricted, seen as a marker for social status and the "language the of bureaucracy", whereas "the lingua francas [were] the languages of the people" (SAMARIN, 1989, p. 243). According to Yates (1980), this is the result of Belgium's multilingual policy (in opposition to other European colonial policies that imposed their own language) and the failure to connect with the Christian religious entities that were operating in the territory.

Makita (2013) continues his analyses of Congo's language policy after the country's independence by highlighting three different periods: (1) catching up [*rattrapage*] (1960-1965), (2) "revolutionary" change [*changement «révolutionnaire»*] (1965-1976), and (3) "conciliation" [*«conciliation»*] (1976-). In this division, the author shows the lack of coherence in the national language policy, which reasoned with the country's turbulent regime changes and ideological filiations of the ruling government. That way, Congo went from suppressing the instruction of local languages to 'evolve' after political emancipation from Belgium to delaying the introduction of French in the school curricula and romanticizing the country's history before colonization (*Authenticité*[67]*)*. The third movement presents itself as an appeasement between its predecessors, promoting bilingualism between French and the predominant national language in the area. However, the author argues that proper linguistic public policies are still poorly developed, falling merely under political discourse.

Paying attention to a country's language policy is a usually overlooked indicator of the political character of translation. Nevertheless, it is an interesting subject because there is an implicit notion of hierarchy between languages in formulating these policies: "[c]onfronted with multilingual populations, states cannot remain neutral over translation: a translational laissez-faire is no option

[67] *Authenticité* (or Zairianization) was a campaign proposed by Mobutu Sese Seko's dictatorship (1965-1997) in the first years of government. According to Nzongola-Ntalaja (2007, p. 16), it follows a populist ideology to mask his connections to Western powers and win the Congolese population's support as someone "of the people". For instance, Mobutu changed the name of the country and several cities to re-present a "more authentic" Congo, that is, dismissing the traces of colonialism in the country's national identity. It was later abandoned in the fall of the regime in the 1990s.

either" (MEYLAERTS, 2018, p. 222). Meylaerts (2018) offers a typology in which one could place the Congo in the "*monolingualism and occasional translation*" type. In this case, there is one identified official language, French, while other linguistic systems can be recognized constitutionally. That requires state-offered translation in well-defined settings and situations to protect individuals' rights, for instance, in judicial matters, communications with the authorities, and during the provision of public services. However, the author adverts that the translation's occasionality usually means the will to invest in teaching minority populations only the official language in the long term. "In other words, *translation is granted in anticipation of linguistic assimilation* and thus does not endanger the state's monolingualism and the dominant position of the official language" (MEYLAERTS, 2018, p. 224, emphasis added).

This brief digression allows me to point out how colonial rule in Congo makes up for the country's current multilingualism discourse to, then, discuss its role in UN peace operations. Particularly, it is noteworthy to delve into the notion of assimilation in (post-)colonial practices to further this reflection to the linguistic and cultural mediation the CLAs are tasked with providing. Postcolonial scholarship in different disciplines has detailly discussed the processes of translating language and its culture as violent instruments for stabilizing (and resisting) colonial authority. As copies of the original, the colonies were expected to incorporate every linguistic and cultural aspect of the metropolis, seemingly dotted with 'progress' and 'civilization' (BASSNETT; TRIVEDI, 1999; CHEYFITZ; HARMON, 2018; FANON, 1986; MIGNOLO, 2012; THIONG'O, 1993, 1994).

Following Todorov's interpretation of European colonization in America, Inayatullah and Blaney (2004) systematize the colonial discourse's relationship with difference: at first, the dissimilarities between the colonizer and the colonized in their (mis-)encounter place the latter in comparable inferiority. In this logic, language, culture, lifestyle, science, knowledge, politics, gastronomy, etc. are all seen as worse than their European counterparts, if the comparison is not considered impossible given the former's supposed lack thereof. Yet, the colonized groups can overcome their so-called inadequacy by incorporating the former's cultural values, in which "equality comes at the price of assimilation" (INAYATULLAH; BLANEY, 2004, p. 85).

> This suggests that commonality, though claimed as preexisting, must actually be nurtured. Those to whom difference is attributed must be taught, and, if unwilling, they must be forced to recognize that assimilating to the "sameness" of Europeans is good for them. This remains the white man's pedagogical burden— a burden carried by the politics of a particular type of comparison (INAYATULLAH; BLANEY, 2004, p. 92).

One should note, however, that this equalizing move does not fail to promote indifference to the Other's culture because all parallels are drawn with the Self's identity system as reference (as discussed in Chapter 2). As seen in Chapter 3 of this thesis with the metaphor of the shades of gray, this discourse will always privilege the colonizer and place the colonized in the impossible position of aspiring to become who/what they can never be.

To dive deeper into this debate, I highlight how Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o (1993, 1994) accounts autobiographically the use of culture and language in the colonizers' attempt to stimulate the colonized's assimilation. He emphasizes how these two intertangled elements are vital in effecting domination because they enable the control of the "mind", that is, how one perceives themselves and their relationship to the world around them. "In my view language was the most important vehicle through which that power fascinated and held the soul prisoner. The bullet was the means of the physical subjugation. Language was the means of the spiritual subjugation" (THIONG'O, 1994, p. 9). For him, separating culture and language is a heuristic device because they operate together. On the one hand, language acts as a means of communication, whether written and/or oral, allowing interaction between human beings. On the other hand, it is a bearer of culture. Here, language carries the histories, habits, and customs of one or more populations, that is, their identities. Hence, I understand that this tangling relationship lies at the heart of the CLAs' efforts, given how they are expected to navigate in-between the linguistic and cultural borders of the groups they are mediating.

Moreover, Thiong'o (1993, 1994, p. 13–16) demonstrates how linguistic encounters can reiterate positions of power. He compares European and African nationals and the diverse uses of English, a language that he appoints as the globally recognized lingua franca. Firstly, there is the example of England, which sees English as the carrier of their culture but also as a means of communication. This primary case shows the intertangled character of language and culture more significantly. In Scandinavian countries, which have other languages as official,

people use English as an incentive for business and tourism, increasing the wealth of these countries. When two people with different mother tongues relate to each other, as this second example, their linguistic expressions can find themselves on a level of equality and/or independence. As such, the English does not entail the subjugation of Scandinavian countries' cultures and/or the demonization of their national languages.

Nonetheless, another case points to such an oppression in the language encounter, when a language, which may re-present a specific group, a (former) metropolis, dominates another, a (former) colony. In addition, the author also adverts: "[a]n oppressor language inevitably carries racist and negative images of the conquered nation, particularly in its literature[68], and English is no exception" (THIONG'O, 1993, p. 52). Thus, in the context of colonialism and later in postcolonial states such as Congo, the practices of European domination relied on the device of language to "*entrench* themselves in the oppressed nation" (THIONG'O, 1993, p. 49, emphasis added). This entrenching metaphor resonates with images of the defensive tactic strongly associated with World War I (1914-1918). In trench warfare, soldiers dig holes deep enough to create tunnels for easy mobility. With the goal of solidifying their claim over territory, troops would also erect protective measures against enemy fire (BEST et al., 2009; GRAY, 2007). In this imagination, language and culture are tools that can help dig deeper and establish a defensive stance more effectively. They are used alongside colonial violence not as a secondary instrument to create an order based on the colonial discourse but perhaps as the one which will enable it to last longer.

Regardless of the distinctions in war tactics, I wish to emphasize the weaponization of language and culture in both cases. In Chapter 3, I have shown how the UN instrumentalizes language and culture in their COIN-inspired tactics under the protection umbrella. The human terrain, in this sense, is the pivotal *locus* of intervention in which the struggle for the local population's support takes place. As the protected in the PoC socio-political representation, they are the

[68] That ends up allowing the re-affirmation of stereotypes and racist imaginaries about the population of Congo. Books like "The Heart of Darkness" by Joseph Conrad, for instance, still permeate a "dark" imagination about the Congo (BHABHA, 2011; DUNN, 2003; GEHRMANN, 2009; MUDIMBE, 1988; THIONG'O, 1993). However, it is also important to recognize the "Empire Writes Back" movement, which wishes to take literature as a means for counterposing colonial imaginations, see particularly Rajagopalan (2007, 2009) for an overview.

discursive focus of this UN people-centered COIN discourse. When Bigo (2006) inquiries about the politics of protection, he highlights three socio-political practices. Although all can be recognized as part of the UN's protection discourse (MACEDO; SIMAN; MOTTA, 2022), I wish to focus on the notion of *tutore*, given its intrinsic link with the CLAs' position. For the author, *tutore* works through the monitoring and the surveillance of the protected in its own interests: it follows "the sense of to look after", imbedded with "care" and "in the name of love" (BIGO, 2006, p. 92).

> *Tutore* is linked with the obedience resulting from the relation between the protector and the protected. It is linked with the protectorate, with the regulation and the monitoring of the relation. In this third meaning of protection as *tutore*, the enemy disappears. *The protector is so strong that he imposes a protectorate and tutore is related to empire and to colonialism*. The relation is between the protector and the protected after the action of protection, and it enacts the dependence of the protected. *Tutore is the annihilation of the threat by the reframing of protection into strict obedience*. The borders disappear, and the movement is re-installed but channelled. *Tutore is linked with the capacity to impose an order and to monitor the enemy as well as the protected* (…). *Tutore* is also the capacity to anticipate the future, to know better than the protected what he needs, what he wants (BIGO, 2006, p. 92, emphasis added).

Three representations instigated by this quote can be brought up in UN protection discourses following COIN tactics. Firstly, the existence of the enemy character is of less importance in the *tutore* imagination. Even if the author says it disappears, one can still remark on how the enemy is monitored as well. As seen in the former chapter, the UN follows mostly a people-centered COIN discourse, which privileges the relationship between the protector and the protected. That way, the enemy is still there and is recognized as a threat, but ensuring the protected's safety is the mission's priority. Secondly, the protected's role places them in an ambiguous state concerning their agency in UN missions such as MONUSCO. On the one hand, the local turn-inspired discourse seeks to include them in keeping and building peace from which they supposedly benefit directly. On the other hand, this tutoring relationship infantilizes the protected, whose function is to provide information (data and intelligence), while the protector claims responsibility of taking care of possible threats (human or otherwise). Lastly, it is important to emphasize how the CLAs' job entails aiding the monitoring and managing activities promoted *by* the UN *for* the local population, such as the Community Protection Plans, the Community Alert Networks, and the Early Warning Early Response

systems. In all these activities, the CLAs are tasked with creating and sustaining them by, for instance, capacitating local representatives, cross-checking information, or performing constant check-ups to ensure smooth functioning. These three observations can be seen intertangled in a "success story" in the MONUSCO CA manual, intitled "*Minova (South Kivu) CLAs initiated a night patrol to prevent looting by FARDC Special Battalion*":

> On 24 December 2013, CLAs based in the COB Minova received an alert at 01:21 am that the FARDC Special Battalion deployed in the area was planning to loot the shops in the center of Minova. This practice is not unheard of in the event of delayed payment of wages, as in this case, of approximately 4 months. As the locals were still suffering from the lootings by FARDC troops during the clashes with M23 in November 2012, they immediately called the CLAs they had regular contacts with. CLAs conveyed the alert to the COB commander, suggesting a joint patrol to the center towards the market shops and a security meeting with community leaders the next morning to prevent the escalation of the incident. CLAs participated in the night patrol and sensitized the FARDC on the negative impact of looting during the security meeting. Consequently, the looting was prevented and the civilian population felt safer and perceived MONUSCO's action as a relief. CLAs reported that the population feedback to the commander and recommended that patrols should be continued until the New Year celebration. The CLAs convinced the COB commander by demonstrating the great appreciation of the locals, indicating that the population would become more cooperative and provide timely alerts for further protection successes. The commander agreed and night patrols were extended for another week. In addition, the CLAs' and COB commanders' action drew attention to the salary issue and thus accelerated the payment of salaries to the FARDC Special Battalion. As a result, the festive days, which are often the most violent of the year, passed peacefully and without any looting (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 30).

In this *tutore* relationship, I suggest that language and culture are important tools in assimilating the protected, stimulating them to accept an agency-*less* discourse and support the counterinsurgent authority. By presenting oneself to the Other with a mask of cultural sensitivity, that is, the UN using the CLAs to promote their translation of protection, I understand that there is a proposal to disarm suspicions and stimulate cooperation. In other words, it is by having someone to mediate not only between French, Swahili, other regional languages, and English but also the language of the UN and its pro-foreign intervention assumptions that the UN attempts to centralize its monolingual(ized) understanding of protection and justify its actions under the PoC umbrella in MONUSCO.

Following Rafael (2016, p. 15), I argue that the role of mediators in Congo during colonialism is not so different from how general COIN tactics see its own interpreters and, consequently, how the UN designs the CLAs in its missions: all

follow, as Coracini (2005, p. 13 my translation) puts it, the "appeasement function". For instance, Samarin (1989, p. 233) lists the general requirements in the colonial period: "[a]n African intermediary could be anyone, but anyone (1) who shared a language with the white, (2) enjoyed a certain amount of trust, and (3) who could be presented to others as representing the white". So far, my efforts in re-presenting how the UN sees the CLAs in this thesis tend to match these prerequisites: the CLAs are tasked with performing a linguistic-cultural bridge and barrier between the UN peacekeepers and the local population by being able to be recognized by both groups as someone who could represent them concerning their interests but also their identifications. In addition, the author further highlights that while the military experience increased a candidate's qualification for this type of job, it was usually a personal servant who performed the role (SAMARIN, 1989, p. 233). This also resonates with the UN's criteria for selecting CLAs because their trustworthiness triumphs over whatever ability they might have of defending themselves from the usual hazards of the work that, as seen in Chapter 3, the manuals themselves recognize as life-threatening.

However, this mediating position leaves the CLAs lost in-between two groups to which they are supposed to belong but end up rejecting them. Similar to the colonial translator, following Cheyfitz and Harmon (2018, p. 273; see also BASSNETT; TRIVEDI, 1999, p. 12; RAFAEL, 2016), I understand that the CLAs are left in a double bind in this assimilation project: "never will his mastery be considered fluent enough to assume the station of the colonizer, and never will he be at home as a Native speaker once he translates his experience through the master's language". Coracini (2006) complements this idea by bringing Derrida's reflection on Babel, discussed in the former section, and his autobiographical identification dilemma in a book intitled "*Monolingualism of the Other or The Prosthesis of Origin*". For her, both accounts dedicate themselves to debate the fiction of "identity" and one's desire to install an origin myth to make sense of oneself through representations of language and culture. By narrating his thoughts on his (non-)belonging to the French language (and nationality) vis-à-vis a Franco-Maghrebian subjectification, Derrida (1998) explores in this second book a "double interdict" imposed on him through nationality and language policies in Algeria by the French colonizer: he was both isolated from the Berber and Arab cultures in Algeria, where he was born, and the French culture alongside being part of a Jewish

family, in the phantasmagorical “Metropole” (HIDDLESTON, 2009; RODER, 2018).

> What I saying, the one I am speaking about, in a word, a this *I* of whom I speak is someone to whom, as I more or less recall, access to any non-French language of Algeria (literary or dialectal Arabic, Berber, etc.) was *interdicted*. But this same *I* is also someone to whom access to French was *also interdicted*, in a different, apparently roundabout, and perverted manner. In a different manner, surely, but likewise interdicted. By an interdict that, a result, interdicted access to the identifications that enable the pacified autobiography, "memoirs" in the classical sense (DERRIDA, 1998, p. 30–31, emphasis in the original).

What was “left” for him to express and make sense of himself, that is, the language he had at his “disposal”, was French. Nevertheless, he also saw himself taken as its “hostage”, given its colonial trace (DERRIDA, 1998; HADDOCK-LOBO, 2019; OLIVEIRA, 2020, p. 151). As part of a series of seemingly contradicting affirmations, he confesses on the very first page that “I only have one language; it is not mine” (DERRIDA, 1998, p. 1), pondering on his “indisputable” and “unnatural” monolingualism “on the shores of the French language” (DERRIDA, 1998, p. 2; see also HADDOCK-LOBO, 2019; SAJED, 2012). In an anxious desire to claim an identity, he also presents himself as not being French, or Maghrebian, but the *most* and perhaps the *only* Franco-Maghrebian in a conference discussing the issue of Francophonie outside France. Thus, he comes to the realization that, better yet, he is the hyphen[69] in-between Franco-Maghrebian. That representation in drawn as an opposition to his friend Abdelkebir Khatibi, for instance, whose relationship with-in French and Arabic is interpreted by Derrida as more at ease (DERRIDA, 1998, p. 10–15; HADDOCK-LOBO, 2019, p. 30–33; OLIVEIRA, 2020, p. 152–153; RODER, 2018).

Furthermore, Derrida (1998, p. 28; see also CORACINI, 2005, 2006; HADDOCK-LOBO, 2019) calls attention to how that places the discussion in the realm of identifications and not identities for “an identity is never given, received, or attained; only the interminable and indefinitely phantasmatic process of identification endures”. In doing so, Derrida calls attention to the never-ending

[69] For Derrida, “the nature of the hyphen” in Franco-Maghrebian, differently from the one I have discussed on the Introduction, is a non-violent representation of the violent imposition from the French colonial system that in-determines his position in Algeria as a child and in France as an adult. “The silence of that hyphen does not pacify or appease anything, not a single torment, not a single torture. It will never silence their memory. It could even worsen the terror, the lesions, and the wounds. A hyphen is never enough to conceal protests, cries of anger or suffering, the noise of weapons, airplanes, and bombs” (DERRIDA, 1998, p. 11).

effort of identifying oneself and one's relation with/to the Other. The notion of identification as subjectification has also been introduced by thinkers such as Bhabha and Hall, both inspired by Derrida. While Bhabha (2004, p. 70–72, 2016; see also KALUA, 2009) concentrates on the images epitomized in the search for subjecthood in the encounter with alterity (see Chapter 5), Hall (1996) emphasizes how discursive practices (that is, imbedded in language) in relation to subject formation (and I would add the de-formation, re-formation, and trans-formation) play a role in one's claiming in mobilizing and articulating political agendas. In calling attention to the possible gaps between depicted identities and identifications processes, my goal is to highlight how the representations attributed to the CLAs by the UN manuals and their narrators do not exhaust the identification process that these people struggle in a person and a professional level. That way, I understand that how the CLAs are imagined, as mediators working for the UN while performing different identities, falls into another simplification of the UN protection discourse that aims to solidify its monolingual vision of protection.

> The monolingual of whom I speak speaks a language of which he is *deprived*. The French language is not his. Because he is therefore deprived of *all* language, and no longer has any other recourse - neither Arabic, nor Berber, nor Hebrew, nor any languages his ancestors would have spoken - because this monolingual is in a way *aphasic* (perhaps he writes because he is an aphasic), he is thrown into absolute translation, a translation without a pole of reference, without an originary language, and without a source language [*langue de départ*]. For him, there are only target languages [*langues d'arrivée*], if you will, the remarkable experience being, however, that these languages just cannot manage to reach themselves because they no longer know where they are coming from, what they are speaking *from* and what the sense of their journey is. Languages without an itinerary and, above all, without any superhighway of goodness knows what information. As if there were only arrivals [*arrivées*], and therefore only events without arrival. From these sole "arrivals," and from these arrivals alone, desire springs forth; since desire is borne by the arrival itself, it springs forth even before the ipseity of an *I-me* that would bear it in advance; it springs forth, and even sets itself up a desire to reconstruct, to restore, but it is really a desire to invent a *first language* that would be, rather, a *prior-to-the first* language destined to translate that memory. But to translate the memory of what, precisely, did not take place, of what, having been (the) forbidden, ought, nevertheless, to have left a trace, a specter, the phantomatic body, the phantom-member - palpable, painful, but hardly legible - of traces, marks, and scars (DERRIDA, 1998, p. 60–61, emphasis in the original).

By talking about monolingualism and colonization from his point of view, he also aims to discuss the politics of the *monolangue* (and of the identity attributed through language) more broadly. Derrida claims that while someone tends to speak

only one language, even those who understand and/or have fluency several tongues, it is not simply a matter of countable of possessive linguistic systems. That is because this "absolute language" remains unattainable, appearing only as a promise and a desire, given that language does not constitute a natural property so that individuals could take possession of it by themselves, making the colonial project's claim lacking. One cannot consider a "mother tongue" as a natural ownership because it does not belong to anyone to the point of being "at home" [*chez-soi*]. It also does not articulate or claim any cultural or national identity, which could be attributed to a community of speakers and to which one could bond (DERRIDA, 1998; HIDDLESTON, 2009; OLIVEIRA, 2020; SILVA; FERREIRA, 2014). "For contrary to what one is often most tempted to believe, the master is nothing. And he does not have exclusive possession of anything. Because the master does not possess exclusively, and *naturally*, what he calls his language" (DERRIDA, 1998, p. 23, emphasis in the original). According to Derrida (1998, p. 40), language originates from the relationships one stablishes with the Other and, as such, will always return to the Other, preventing its total assimilation. As Roder (2018, p. 15, emphasis in the original, my translation) explains: "[f]ar from being just the particular experience of *a* Franco-Maghrebian, the monolingualism of the other is *the* experience of Language. On language as Law: that is, on language as alterity, coming from beyond, from the other"[70].

> The monolingualism imposed by the other operates by relying upon that foundation, here, through a sovereignty whose essence is always colonial, which tends, repressively and irrepressibly, to reduce language to the One, that is, to the hegemony of the homogeneous. This can be verified everywhere, everywhere this homo-hegemony remains at work in the culture, effacing the folds and flattening the text (…) But for this very reason, the monolingualism of the other means another thing, which will be revealed little by little: that in any case we speak only one language - and that we do not own it. We only ever speak one language - and, since it returns to the other, it exists asymmetrically, always for the other, from the other, kept by the other. Coming from the other, remaining with the other, and returning to the other (DERRIDA, 1998, p. 39–40).

As such, the notion of speaking and translating between "languages" (and, consequently, aiming assimilation through language) fails to acknowledge that there cannot exist *One* language, but many languages in what the common sense

[70] In the original: "Longe de ser apenas a experiência particular de *um* franco-magrebino, o monolinguismo do outro é *a* experiência da Língua. Da língua como Lei: isso é, da língua como alteridade, chegada do além, do outro" (RODER, 2018, p. 15, emphasis in the original).

understanding as a linguistic system (SILVA; FERREIRA, p. 218). That is what Rafael (2016) emphasizes when he recalls all languages have an insurgent component that resists its usage in assimilation projects, such as the use of COIN tactics, as seen in Chapter 3. In the wars *of* and *on* translation, therefore, meanings are never fully carried as expected in the messages mediated by translators. Being part of the political struggle of a conflict, the next chapter debates how the presence of the interpreter, as a "body" and as an "idea", *dis*-orients the understanding of war and translation, returning to the state of confusion represented by Babel.

> Just by being who they were, translators thus found themselves stirring interest and sending out messages beyond what they had originally intended. Without meaning to they generated meanings outside of their control. *In this way they came across as alien presences that seemed to defy assimilation even as they were deemed indispensable to the assimilation of aliens*. They were 'foreign in a domestic sense', as much as they were domestic in a sense that remained enduringly foreign" (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 117, emphasis added).

5.
IN-BETWEEN MAGIC AND MIMICRY: THE POLITICS OF THE COMMUNITY LIAISON ASSISTANTS' IN-VISIBILITY AND THE 'BETRAYLS' OF TRANSLATING THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AGENDA

In the beginning of 2014, the UN evacuated several international and, (only) later, national staff from Beni (North Kivu), given a direct attack after a clash between the FARDC and the ADF. In this second evacuation, 18 CLAs distributed in different military bases were also relocated and asked to refrain from doing even "informal work", changing the dynamics between the mission and the local population. This example is narrated by the MONUSCO Civil Affairs (2014, p. 31) manual to illustrate what the CLAs' absence means institutionally, remarking that patrolling ceased, calls to local Community Alert Networks' Focal Points and Community Protection Plans' weekly meetings diminished, and the sense of insecurity and unreliability towards the UN increased.

> The halt of all CLA activities and the lack of engagement of peacekeepers with the population led to an additional deterioration of security in almost all of the COB/TOBs. *The absence of CLAs was particularly felt because they could have made such an important contribution to the ongoing military operations against ADF/NALU, as well as to the mitigation of the resulting protection risks*. More specifically:
> § In the absence of its civilian 'eyes and ears' the Mission was unable to independently monitor human rights violations against civilian populations, including those committed by FARDC elements. At the same time, the FARDC have hardly shared any information with the Mission.
> § Without the CLAs, MONUSCO was unable to assess the displacement of population as well as the protection threat posed to them.
> § Without CLAs it became very difficult to correctly assess the security threats posed by ADF/NALU elements. Thus, the Mission was forced to rely on the – oftentimes biased – assessments of FARDC/PNC and local authorities (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 32, emphasis added).

After a couple of months, the CLAs and other civilian UN staff came back to the Beni, resuming their Protection of Civilians activities. That was described as an important feature in stablishing a positive re-interpretation on MONUSCO's presence, which was damaged because of the evacuation and the increase in the use of force in the area by the peacekeepers.

> In light of the above, the return of the evacuated MONUSCO staff members to their duty stations in COBs Butembo and Lubero in March 2014 had a very positive impact. *Returning CLAs managed to restore trust and confidence that had been damaged by their departure and the*

> *volatile context of military operations.* Patrols to protect local communities have recommenced and CLAs resumed their usual activities (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 32, emphasis added).

Moreover, the Human Rights Watch (2014) condemned the attacks and criticized the UN's inability to protect civilians, similar to its discourse on the events in Kiwanja in 2008 as seen in Chapter 1. In a news report intitled "*DR Congo: Scores Killed in Rebel Attacks*", the HRW senior Congo researcher stressed the need to "improve ties with local communities" to prevent these attacks. Interestingly, CLAs are also recognized and emphasized as a protection tool worth further exploring by the UN. The HRW re-configures the role of the CLAs by proposing that they work alongside the Force Intervention Brigade in MONUSCO, which follows a more enemy-centered COIN inspiration, while the CLAs could be easily associated with people-centered COIN. As a result, the HRW calls further attention to the CLAs as a multifaceted protection tool:

> MONUSCO should increase patrols to the affected areas, including foot and night patrols, and set up mobile operating bases closer to the remote villages where many of the recent attacks have taken place. *Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs), who speak the local language and have a deep understanding of the local context, should immediately be placed within Intervention Brigade units and peacekeeping contingents based in the Beni area*. A hotline should also be set up so that civilians can directly contact peacekeepers in the area and alert them quickly in case of attack (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2014, emphasis added).

As with the case of Kiwanja, the UN narrates the recognition of a failure to protect civilians in Beni and proposes a linguistic-cultural mediator as a solution to improving the engagement with the local population, given that some of the Language Assistants who remained in their deployment area were seen as insufficiently prepared to aid in PoC activities (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 31). However, the problem of translation I have been proposing to discuss in this thesis goes beyond what is suggested as the absence of an interpreter in the case of Beni or even Kiwanja according to these sources. What I have been demonstrating is that, while working for the UN, that is, in between the translations and interpretations that they perform, the CLAs' are required to make themselves present *and* absent physically and metaphorically. That is the case, for instance, when negotiating their positions as UN staff and locals as well as the tension between original and translated messages to ensure that the audience can better understand and incorporate the UN's monolingual(ized) vision of protection.

In what follows, I propose delving deeper into the debates about the translator's image to complexify the representation of the CLAs' in-visibility in UN discourse. This chapter aims to complement the former's implication of understanding the problem of protection as a translating endeavor. As such, I comprehend that it can be seen as more of a theoretical effort by exploring how the political character of translation impacts the CLA's task of mediating the relationship between the peacekeepers and the local population to improve PoC activities. By emphasizing the 'betrayals' inherent to these processes, which make them a 'problem' to the UN, I argue that their job places them in an ambivalent position. In the first section, I am interested in discussing how the ideals of transparency in translations also place the translators themselves in a desirable in-visible position. In a second movement, I take on Bhabha's discussion on mimicry to explore how the CLAs are supposed to perform the UN's "protector" role.

5.1. MEDIATING *BESIDE* THE UN PEACEKEEPER: THE MAGICAL GIFT AND THE IN-VISIBLE MASK OF TRANSLATION

As a point of departure, which places CLAs more distinctively in the matter, it is worth inquiring who is authorized to perform translations in these war-like contexts. Since the beginning of this thesis, I have been showing how peace operations are marked by multilingual and multicultural contexts, which propelled the UN into seeking to solve problems of communication and connection with the local population in different ways. The CLAs are the most efficient instrument in the eyes of the UN to achieve this goal, given their set of linguistic-cultural and mediational skills. Yet, I have also indicated how they are targets of mistrust between peacekeepers and the local population.

Rafael introduces the notion of the "gift of translation" to explain the relationship between the legitimacy of acting as a translator and the "faculty of translation", what he defines as "an ability to translate repeatedly, to take hold of language in order to talk about language not just here and now, but into a future that eludes final determination" (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 9). The author traces the connections between languages and, consequently, translation as a divine gift according to what he nominates Western Christianity. Arguing it introduces a

notion of Truth as a monopolized interpretation of knowledge, he calls attention to how Apostles and later any Church representative could use the gift of translation to transfer and transport the Word of God to other languages and populations, but only as a return to the One language and same-self Word. Accordingly, language systems are taken as given, depoliticizing the (colonial) mis-encounter between languages and cultures while referencing the supposedly original Word. "As a gift, however, language is neither free nor is its circulation unrestricted. Rather, it is imagined as the coming of a divine fire that is meant to burn and consume all other languages in the process of making them bear the language of God" (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 10).

As seen in Chapter 4, that stimulates a notion of religious conversion, which is intrinsically related to translation and assimilation. In other words, when bestowed to the Congolese people in the colonial mis-encounter, the gift of translation inspires assimilation to the Word of God. Hence, it is by learning the European languages that the colonized people can achieve a closer positioning towards civilization in the colonial discourse[71]. Post-colonial Congo and, more specifically for this thesis, Congo under MONUSCO also reinforces this gift with the CLAs: the UN designs them with the task of *bridging*, as already shown in Chapter 2, which entails not only bringing supposedly separate groups closer but also containing in their differences into a manageable (read translatable) relationship. In this sense, one cannot forget to consider translation's materiality, and how it affects the translator's body. As Ferreira (2009, p. 238) remarks, theorizing about translation is also emphasizing the translators' mis-encounter with language in a corporeal level. Coracini (2005, p. 11, my translation) complements by addressing how the translator constitutes a subject "between-languages-cultures", that is, "a place where one and the other mix and mingle, where one erases or blurs the limits, contours, and dichotomies rooted in the Western culture of which we are all heirs and in which we are prisoners"[72].

[71] Delgado Luchner (2020) has recently drawn attention to how this logic operates in development NGOs in Kenya. See also the works of James quoted in Chapter 2.

[72] In the original, "o tradutor constitui um sujeito entre-línguas-culturas, lugar onde se mesclam e se confundem umas e outras, onde se apagam ou se embaraçam os limites, os contornos e as dicotomias arraigadas na cultura ocidental da qual somos todos herdeiros e na qual somos prisioneiros" (CORACINI, 2005, p. 11).

In addition to the identification challenge, translation itself cannot and should not be regarded as a simple transposition of a singular and/or pure meaning, for which the translator has acquired the skills to move "within, as well as across, languages" because they are performing their role "amid shifting zones of untranslatability" (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 9). By idealizing translation as transfer (CAPAN; DOS REIS; GRASTEN, 2021), the notion of translation as gift excludes the impossibility of achieving a perfect message exchange, simplifying the effort of re-presenting one's thoughts and feelings in a different tongue. "From the moment this economic equivalence – strictly impossible, by the way – is renounced, everything can be translated, but in a loose translation, in the loose sense of the word 'translation'" (DERRIDA, 1998, p. 56). That compels Derrida (1998, p. 56–57, emphasis in the original; see also OTTONI, 2003, p. 165) to locate the complexities of the translating job in-between the possible and the impossible: "[i]n a sense, nothing is untranslatable; but in *another sense*, everything is untranslatable; translation is another name for the impossible". Davis complements:

> If a text were totally translatable, it would simply and purely repeat what already exists: it would have no singularity and thus no identity. (Such a text is an impossibility, of course, since even verbatim repetition must occur within a new context and is therefore different.) Totally untranslatable, a text would bear no relation to any meaningful system: fully self-contained, it dies immediately. (Again, such a text cannot exist, in the sense that it could never be recognized as a text.) The object of translation theory, paradoxically perhaps, is the untranslatable – the singularity of a text – signalled by the elements most inextricable from context, syntax, or lexicon (DAVIS, 2001, p. 22).

Engaging predominantly with the work of Walter Benjamin, "*The Task of the Translator*", Derrida (2007) proposes a reflection about the relationship between original and translated text, taking a step back and inquiring the very possibility of the original. For him, the 'original' message is always re-created by interpretations from those who voice and receive the message at every new context, being subjected to ever transforming circumstances, personalities, and thoughts. Despite translated texts never arriving to the same meaning as the 'original', he recognizes that their meanings are in relation to this 'original' that disappeared with the fall of Babel and/or is imagined as the Word. It is precisely this relationship that is unreliable to construct a stable understanding, escaping and acquiring meanings at every utterance, but creates the illusion of pure meaning in the first place. Whatever

loss or gain in-between translations remains, then, to be managed by the translator through explanatory detours (one of the possible wordplays on the essay's title, *des tours*, not perceivable when spoken), such as translator's notes. That way, translations come short while exceeding the original inasmuch as untranslatability demands even more translation (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 114).

In war-like contexts such as the UN stabilization missions, however, "[j]ust as soldiers are trained to obey orders emanating from the chain of command, so *interpreters are expected to be loyal to the speaker whose original words they must convey into their exact copy* in another language" (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 133, emphasis added). This is similar to the technocratic view of the translator's linguistic and cultural skills as means for providing communication and better engagement with the local population seen in Chapter 2. As such, it compels a representation of translation as "magic" because it conjures equivalents between pairs or languages effortlessly, given the translators' ability for what Rafael (2016, p. 135) denominates "linguistic and ontological transformation" (and I would add *de*-formation and *re*-formation). By that, he means how translators can become someone other than who they are when performing their role, "taking on and taming the language of a foreign presence, reproducing it in one's own native tongue, and thereby converting it into something other than what it is" (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 135–136). One can find this expressed in UN discourse, for instance, when the MONUSCO Civil Affairs manual imagines how and by whom the communication with the local population should be designed:

> In addition to providing MONUSCO with information about the needs of the communities they serve, *CLAs are in the ideal position to sensitize on MONUSCO's mandate and capacities* through outreach activities at the grass-roots level (…). *In order to ensure dissemination and comprehension of relevant information, outreach messages should not only be simple and clear, but developed in participative processes by the CLAs themselves* (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 25, emphasis added).

That way, the CLAs are recognized as having an "uncanny power", the power of translation, and the document emphasizes how it should be harvested by the UN peacekeepers in conducting their PoC-related activities while also paying attention to their broader goals of engaging with the local population (what, as I have been suggesting, is connected to COIN tactics). Or, as Rafael (2016, p. 136, emphasis added) puts it: "[i]t is precisely this power of translation that the soldier must learn

to *appropriate* and *control*". However, even if fidelity is idealized, it can never fully be achieved in translations, something systematically discussed in Translation Studies and the IR literature that engages more directly with it. As a result, the translator's magical abilities, symbolized in their linguistic and cultural skills following UN grammar, cannot fully overcome dwellings in-between the multiplicity of languages and meanings.

In this thesis, I want to suggest that what remains as the translator's task, to keep up with the phrase, in UN stabilization missions is "literally to give face to the speaker while obscuring his or her own" (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 138), aiding in the attempts of assimilating the UN monolingual(ized) view on protection. "From this logocentric perspective the perfect interpreter is a mechanized prosthetic at the command of the speaker's will" (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 137). In Translation Studies, the matter of the interpreter/translator's in-visibility has achieved the category of a myth, whose imagination enables one to make sense of the field while presenting a reduced understanding of it (OZOLINS, 2016). As such, the discipline tends to be more concerned with debating the impacts of the translator's in-visibility, rather than implying it does not exist or remaining attached to simplifying professionalism ideals (MARTÍNEZ-GÓMEZ, 2015).

In a seminal book, Venuti (2008) argues that British and American dominance over translation practice and theory for the last centuries has propelled the value of "fluency", emphasizing translation as a mere enabler of communication and making the translator aspire complete transparency. "Under the regime of fluent translating, the translator works to make his or her work 'invisible,' producing the illusory effect of transparency that simultaneously *masks* its status as an illusion: the translated text seems 'natural,' that is, not translated" (VENUTI, 2008, p. 5, emphasis added). Thus, the translator is reduced to second place in relation to the 'true' author's 'original'. That subordination makes them the target of fidelity assessments, that is, whether they produce a "good (enough)" or a "false" copy. For him, seeing and evaluating translation in these terms stimulates the misleading erasure of the translator's agency, which does not cease to exist despite being seen negatively.

Furthermore, the author sees the translator's in-visibility in this imagination as "a weird self-annihilation, a way of conceiving and practicing translation that undoubtedly reinforces its marginal status" (VENUTI, 2008, p. 7). In this logic, not

only should the translated text be transparent to the reader (what the author explores under the notion of domestication), but that also applies to the translator's relationship with the author. Consequently, the representation of the translator's in-visibility also entails a psychological move distancing oneself while supposedly serving as a channel to the groups they are tasked with mediating. "In doing so, *the translator becomes the translation*, a putatively faithful rendering of unfamiliar elements into familiar terms" (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 135).

Although the UN does not provide in the CLA and PoC manuals how they should act concerning invisibility, the UN relies on the value of impartiality as one of the three guiding principles of all peace operations, as presented in Chapter 1 and detailed in Chapter 2. Job applications for Language Assistants, for example, have consistently asked for "professionalism" as a somewhat equivalent of the impartiality principle (FRANÇA, 2020, p. 40–41). "Furthermore, political, ethnic, linguistic, and security factors also influence hiring decisions, including the need for CLAs to maintain a degree of impartiality that may at times clash with the local hire requirement" (DPKO/DFS, 2016, p. 13). Although impartiality is a standard in UN job vacancies, on-the-ground openings demand the ability to work in a conflict context where the interpreter is already a component, given they are performing the identity of a local to be able to mediate. Thus, the question of impartiality places Language Assistants and CLAs in more nuanced positionalities.

Other recent literature discusses the role of interpreters in-visibility in missions where the CLAs have not been hired, reflecting on positions such as military linguists and LAs. Moreno-Bello (2021) focuses her analysis on locally hired civilians and Spanish military interpreters' agencies while working for the current UN mission in Lebanon, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). For her, their agency comes into place when trying to avoid confusion by further explaining and/or requiring information from the parties relating to matters, such as cultural context, symbolism/ideology, linguistic and military generic protocols, and formality. She argues that there is a duality concerning the interpreter's agency. Even if the interviewed professionals agree on the need for intervention to de-escalate possible conflicts due to language and cultural misunderstandings, there lacks a formal and/or informal consensus on how to do it in terms of the level of interference and approaches. As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, this issue has been extensively documented by Translation and

Interpretation Studies focused on war contexts, showing how it applies similarly to the UN peace operations setting.

Another research was conducted by Kunreuther (2020) concerning the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) activities in the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)[73]. She develops an interesting conceptual debate of the interpreters' positionalities while mediating the relationship between the UN and the Nepali population by exploring the notions of "conduit of voice" and "earwitness". For her, there is a "tension expressed among many interpreters between being a neutral, objective conveyer of information while also being a subjective witness of extremely difficult, sometimes violent, situations" (KUNREUTHER, 2020, p. 298). While the first concept relates to the transparency and impartiality ideals I have been discussing thus far, the second represents how the interpreters are exposed to violent testimonies and are required to balance an ethical and subjective responsibility to deliver the message to the UN OHCHR officers. The latter is a fruitful avenue for complexifying the discussion of the conflict environment in which the CLAs are placed, given the dis-loyalty they seem to be negotiating with both the groups they are tasked with mediating. In the Protection of Civilians Handbook, for example, the UN advances the notion of "do no harm" when engaging with local communities.

> Peacekeeping operations should be particularly aware of the potential risks to civilians caused by their own actions, including from the impact of their military and/or police operations or activities, as a result of mission deployment and placement, or in the form of reprisals against those engaging or cooperating with the mission. Missions must take actions to mitigate these risks. When interacting with civilians, missions should follow a do-no-harm approach, including undertaking a risk assessment of the effects of the mission's actions on the community (DPO, 2020a, p. 111).

Regardless of intentionality, the document encourages all UN staff to become more aware of their potential to replicate physical and emotional harm when conducting their activities. In the case of interpreters working on OHCHR, as discussed by the author, but also considering the CLA's tasks, the "do no harm" principle can be

[73] I understand this mission does not qualify as a peacekeeping mission, according to the UN and POS literature, falling under a "political mission". Nevertheless, as explained in the Introduction, this thesis adopts a broader understanding of UN peace operations. Although there is a focus on peacekeeping missions, given that the CLAs are employed only in four missions following this category (MONUSCO, MINUSMA, MINUSCA, and UNMISS), and I have been particularly interested in the peace operations in Congo, that does not limit the discussion on the politics of translation of UN protection discourses.

tensioned further when one complexifies the UN's understanding of interpreting and translating language and culture, as proposed in this thesis.

Furthermore, Kunreuther (2020, p. 304) calls attention to the desire for the interpreter's invisibility in UN bureaucracy, which also resonates with the CLAs' experience. As she recalls, the information collected by the interpreters to qualify situational reports at the operational and strategical level does not carry the informant's name in the administrative chain. It is crucial to consider that this is not exclusive to the CLAs or MONUSCO but is a common practice in the UN. The technocracy discussed in Chapter 2 stimulates UN reporting practices to focus on the information and not the sources. Indeed, most of the UN reports and even the doctrinal texts do not have a named author, falling under the name of the department in which the document was written. In MONUSCO, for instance, the information flow works as follows:

> During their interaction with communities, CLAs strive to obtain information on recent developments and understand the historical, socio-cultural and political dimensions of complex local dynamics. They obtain relevant information about the context and its stakeholders, conduct protection risk and needs assessments, map actors, and identify medium and long-term trends. This information and analysis is then composed in daily, weekly and flash reports, which are consolidated in the regional offices. On the national (OPS East) level, the daily reports from the regional offices are then consolidated into one daily MONUSCO Civil Affairs report. *MONUSCO's substantive sections heavily rely on this information, often basing their own reports on the inputs provided by the CLAs* (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 20, emphasis added).

That way, MONUSCO and other UN peace operations deeply count on the CLAs and other locally hired staff to collect information to later select and share it across the many phases of mission planning. However, the CLAs do not have access to these reports, or the editions made throughout the chain. In other words, deciding how the gathered material is hierarchized and then transformed into PoC-related actions is not part of their assigned tasks even if it affects them directly. Pushing for their perspective on how the data should be interpreted can also be seen as a transgression of their tasks by some military commanders, "thus forcing CLAs to report critical issues directly to Civil Affairs. In such situations, commanders may feel that the CLA has overstepped, or bypassed the commander's authority, leading to tensions" (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 21). As a "best practice", the manual suggests that Civil Affairs makes sure that the CLAs are not taken for granted when

they present information and recommends further sensibilization of CLAs tasks to the military contingents.

These two case-specific accounts demonstrate the UN interpreters' non-position that I have been discussing in previous Chapters. Conversely, neither of those examples delve into how the interpreters should present and conceal themselves while mediating under COIN-inspired peace operations, such as the UN stabilization missions. With the notion of human terrain, COIN tactics stimulate the weaponization of language and culture in these missions, which, in a simplified comprehension, can become artifices in the peacekeepers' "PoC toolkit": "language works, that is, accomplishes its mission, when its material encumbrances, such as grammar, syntax, spelling, and sounds, can be controlled to the point where they seem to vanish" (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 134), falling under the fluency and transparency ideal. In this sense, what I have been calling cultural sensitivity in UN protection discourse comes to matter to, later, cease to matter. This "dematerialization" of language to be used by the peacekeepers propels the same movement to the medium through which the message 'magically' travels, the interpreter. That is what the author explores under the notion of "tactical deployment of visibility":

> Interpreters can thus connect with their audiences only if they first clearly make visible their social identity. *Becoming visible to their listeners is a tactic for disarming the latter, as it were, of their suspicions and winning their trust.* The effectiveness of native translators begins with their physical bearing, which can be read by others for signs of their social position. Here, the interpreter's appearance matters. *It is crucial to establishing the conditions of connectivity with an audience otherwise resistant to being targeted. Seeing the translator, the listener is reassured and thought to become receptive to what the speaker has to say* (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 133–134, emphasis added).

In recent UN missions which are fighting an "enemy", as recognized in the Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Officers' manual (DPO, 2020b, p. 532) and quoted in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the "hostile actors" commence the conflict in "advantage" simply by being "local". Accordingly, they speak the regional languages and understand the culture, which can facilitate the connection and support gathering in people-centered COIN. However, hiring linguistic-cultural mediators can diminish that tactical drawback, especially if they are easily recognizable as "one of their own" by the local population. Putting it in a different way, to have an interpreter performing such a "local" identity's *mask* aids a foreign intervener in concealing its

"international" image and showing a more sensitive perspective. As the DPKO/DFS (2016, p. 8) manual understands it: "CLAs also have a role to play in public information campaigns. This may include sensitizing the population on peace agreements and educating communities about the mandate and activities of the given peace operation".

Nevertheless, interpreters also need to make themselves invisible to avoid diverting the audience's attention from the message itself: "they must not 'distract' their listeners, for distraction is a kind of noise that draws attention away from the *what* to the *how* of a translated utterance" (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 134, emphasis in the original). Distraction poses a threat to the spokesperson's will when the distance between speaker and translator, or original and copy, enlarges. Hence, when attempting to convince the target population to assimilate an infantilized "protected" position, the CLAs' voice and body should not befuddle them by, for instance, demonstrating an opinion on the matter. Thus, Rafael (2016) concludes that the visibility, through which the interpreter constructs as a disarming tactic, is also meant to produce their invisibility. Interpreters working in COIN settings are playing in-between presence and absence, that is, to be seen to only be subsequently ignored. Inspired by the author, I want to suggest that this constitutes one of the foundations of how the CLAs' task is imagined in this entrenching logic. Using the metaphor of masking underscores how the UN aims to re-present a culturally sensitive approach to its view of protection by employing a linguistic-cultural mediator. That does not necessarily mean, however, that this representation on the CLAs' job is perfectly accomplishable in PoC activities. There are inevitably cracks and misunderstandings in-between translations and re-presentations that no magic trick can solve. As a result, I understand that what they were created to solve, enhancing a positive contact with the local population to gather support for foreign interference, can prove to be lacking in its efforts and generate even more issues.

In the Human Terrain System missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US manuals established a paradox on the use of interpreters, which recognized the impossibility of pure invisibility. Different from the US experience in COIN-driven missions and the respective doctrinal material that evaluates the interpreter's job, the UN manuals do not have address with equal concern the possible betrayals of translation efforts. What allows me to draw from this experience, beside the relationship between UN stabilization peace operations and these missions, is a

similar simplistic approach to language and culture. As Rafael (2016, p. 139–141) shows, there was an attempt to instruct the soldiers in managing their interpreters and themselves to minimize these effects by containing their own language (in this case, American English) into something "translatable", that is, a self-imposing intralingual translation. That happens because one of the challenges to interpretation, seen as the oral transposition of messages, in comparison to written translations (if one wishes to remain in the Translation Studies' heuristic separation), is that the interpretation is supposed to work at the moment, when the 'original' text is provided (FRANÇA, 2020). There is no time to consult a dictionary and, when an interpreter needs to stop the conversational flow to ask what the speaker intended to say, the transparency ideal falls through. Their dis-embodied presence suddenly dis-appears as a "conjuring trick" (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 138) and breaks the speaker-listener's seemingly transparent protocols of address.

Another moment of opacity worth exploring is the physical positionality of the interpreter vis-a-vis the mediated groups in distinct types of interactions[74]. When the exchange seems more one-sided, for instance, when someone delivers a long speech, professional convention places the interpreters behind the speaker. That happens in conferences and courts, where interpreters usually work in isolated "out of sight, out of mind" booths (ROLAND, 1999). Such positioning allows the audience to focus on the speakers' body language and eloquence while hearing the translated message in the background (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 136). That is when the UN peacekeepers' confidence plays a major role in convincing the "protected" of their ability to provide protection. In contrast, interpreters are stationed in the middle in instances when they are mediating everyday conversations between two or more people. In cases such as community patrols and reconnaissance missions, they can even act as interveners in the conversational flows by controlling who can speak at what time, which has been read as a positive and negative type of interpreter's agency in the literature (MORENO-BELLO, 2021). That is an undesirable liaison to peacekeepers who wish to control how the dialogue runs and may seem like another transgression of the CLAs' assigned tasks.

[74] In CCOPAB, where I worked as a voluntary researcher and first came into contact with the Language Assistants' job, the sensitizing classes taught to future deployed UN peacekeepers dealt with this kind of instruction.

While these occurrences help demonstrate the interpretation part of the CLAs' job, it is worth emphasizing that their representation as UN staff does not limit itself to accompanying UN peacekeepers, especially the military contingents, in everyday activities and interpreting whatever message they wish to convey. In tracing the CLAs as the newest "protection tool" for the UN after/while employing appointing fixers, military linguists, and LAs, I have been showing how they incorporate all these occupations' assignments. "Community Liaison Assistants play a key role in extending the mission's presence (…) in ways that are distinct from other national or international Civil Affairs staff, or military/police language assistants" (DPKO/DFS, 2016, p. 6).

As a 'jack of all trades', the magical translation enabled by CLAs does not only become problematic when one focuses on their "LA side", which is more in tune with what Rafael has been criticizing. As seen in Chapter 2, the CLAs differentiate themselves from the LAs precisely because their linguistic-cultural skills are accompanied by the ability to connect with the local population. For instance, in the case of the 2014 attacks in Beni, Language Assistants who remained in the town while the CLAs and other national and international staff were evacuated were not considered "professionally equipped to conduct analysis and suggest solutions to specific POC issues" (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 31).

That way, being a "force multiplier" in MONUSCO's protection strategy also encompasses a proactive stance, for example, in organizing meetings with the local population to install and manage Community Alert Networks and Community Protection Plans. Accordingly, "[o]fficers expressed particular appreciation for the more expansive roles that CLAs have been able to take on" (DPKO/DFS, 2016, p. 6). In these instances, the mediation provided by the CLAs is not *in situ* interpretation but rather the performance in the stance of a UN peacekeeper, that is, of their "protector" identity. In other words, they are mimicking the international UN staff while performing a local, therefore, "protected" identity to facilitate the assimilation of the UN protection discourse. The next section discusses the repercussions of this mimicking performance.

5.2.
MEDIATING *IN PLACE OF* THE UN PEACEKEEPER: THE PRO-ACTIVE MIMIC AND THE PARTIAL PRESENCE OF TRANSLATION

As presented in Chapter 4, the colonial discourse understands that colonies should aspire to become their metropolis culturally and politically. Hence, the colonizer's task is to implement a copy of their home elsewhere, a 'mission' brought up by a feeling of their civilization's superiority to the colonized's savagery/barbarism. In other words, the assimilation project entails a translation effort to teach the colonized how to behave. UN peace operations, especially the ones in the 1990s, have been accused of imposing a similar top-down to what peace entails. The Liberal Peace thesis, which defends the diffusion of liberal values in UN missions to ensure stability, is usually associated with this movement. The local turn, conversely, is interpreted as a response to verticalized forms of creating and managing post-conflict societies' politics by stimulating the incorporation of local perspectives and actors in the peace process. As debated in Chapter 2, the CLAs can be a fundamental actor in bridging this encounter but such incorporation does not happen as smoothly as the UN's and specialized literature's representations may seem to disclose, given the non-problematization of translation and cultural in-difference.

For this to work, the CLAs need to be considered 'loyal' enough to the UN, for instance, having assimilated the UN grammar, to be able to replicate it to the local population. Deemed (trust)worthy, they are put in a position of negotiating their identities between the "local" and "international" parties, performing a sense of belonging to both, while prioritizing the interests of those who employ them, according to the UN imagination. Ideally, in presenting themselves as similar to the local population, the CLAs can aid in disseminating the UN vision on protection as someone from their group while also being a UN staff, someone committed to the PoC mandate of the mission. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the CLAs are a distinct staff in UN peace operations because they are part of the civilian personnel but work more closely to the military and police contingent. However, this representation is placed under mistrust by both groups, who can see these linguistic-cultural mediators acting too much in the interest of the other group and, therefore, betraying them as seen in previous chapters. In doing so, I wish to advance in this section the discussion that the CLAs are considered "almost similar, but not quite" to other UN

staff, whose non-positionality places them in the role of mimicking the foreign intervener, such as in the colonial enterprise, but never achieving a comparable status.

Conceptually, mimicry has been extensively discussed by Bhabha (2004, p. 122, emphasis in the original) for it "emerges as one of the most elusive and effective strategies of colonial power and knowledge" as it is "the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, *as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite*". The author uses this idea to highlight how the colonial discourse imagines that the colonized should be like the colonizer, imitating them. In other words, the *ideal* of mimicry is translation at its finest. In trying to copy the 'original', Bhabha (2004, p. 126–127) argues that it intends to provide the "metonymy of presence", that is, a replacement attempt when the colonized is pretending to be (like) the colonizer.

Following the ideal of mimicry as a translation effort, the CLAs should be able to re-present themselves under the "protector" role of the UN by partially being recognized as any other UN staff. Conversely, the author adverts that in cases such as these the UN "retains its presence, but it is no longer a representation of an essence; it is now a partial presence, a (strategic) device in a specific colonial engagement, an appurtenance of authority" (BHABHA, 2004, p. 163). Accordingly, in re-articulating the protection discourse, the mediator's in-visibility also entails splitting their image between a translator who re-tells the words of another and their own understanding of what protection entails (BHABHA, 2004, p. 53–55). It is crucial to emphasize this split within intention because it enables the displacement[75] of the homogenizing historical narrative of the White West *within* its own discourse for "[t]he act of enunciation, which represents the process and performance of the speaking subject, is the immanent domain of discourse" (BHABHA, 2011, p. 4). As a result, it has implications in efforts of stablishing a monolingual interpretation of a discourses, making the translation of the PoC agenda an ambivalent process.

> What struck me with some force was the emergence of a dialogic sight, a moment of enunciation, identification, negotiation, even a form of

[75] That is more profoundly explored in Bhabha's work under the notion of "third space", the in-between the event and its enunciation. According to the author, there are margins and inconsistencies created by the hybridization process, as mentioned in Chapter 2, which make the third space the *locus* for enunciation, resistance, and subversion of the basic concepts and stereotypes centralized in the dominant discourse. The third space, therefore, operates not only on a spatial level, a common misreading of the author's work (see BATCHELOR, 2008, p. 54) but is also subject to a temporal dimension. See Bhabha (1990, 2004, 2011, 2016), Huddart (2006), and Kapoor (2008).

> recognition, that was suddenly divested of its mastery or sovereignty. In the midst of a markedly asymmetrical and unequal engagement of forces, in an intercultural site of enunciation, at the intersection of different languages jousting for authority, a translational space of negotiation (…) opens up through the process of dissent, dialogue, conversation, strategy and craft (BHABHA, 2016, pt. 15:07-15:48).

Thus, mimicry entails a double articulation, displacing and rejecting the object(ive) it was designed to achieve in the colonial discourse. On the one hand, it is "a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline, which 'appropriates' the Other as it visualizes power", but it has an "inappropriateness" because it also encompasses "a difference or recalcitrance, which coheres the dominant strategic function of colonial power, intensifies surveillance, and poses an immanent threat to both 'normalized' knowledges and disciplinary powers" (BHABHA, 2004, p. 122–123). Discussing Bhabha's work, Moore-Gilbert (2007, p. 459) points out that mimicry as a translation effort in the colonial enterprise does not work because it always requires the subordinate party, the colonized, to remain sufficiently different from the colonizer so that the latter can continue to justify the exertion of control. Furthermore, this element of cultural in-difference on which the colonizer qualifies their authority necessarily challenges the supposedly "universal" values of White Western culture on which colonialism as an assimilative project is based.

In the case of the "success story" called "*CLAs advocate ending harassment of the population in Kiliwa (Province Orientale)*", CLA pro-activity is recognized as positive in a circumstance that helps improve the missions' reputation in the eyes of the local population. In this re-telling, the MONUSCO Civil Affairs' manual narrates how a FARDC platoon started harassing the local population in Kiliwa while deployed to contrapose soldiers from the Lord's Resistance Army. It enumerates the brutal acts committed by the Congolese army while also denouncing that the military officer responsible for this contingent "was accused of supporting soldiers in some of these violations and abuses (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 30)". A group of CLAs come into the story by taking actions and encouraging MONUSCO peacekeepers "to intensify patrols to monitor the situation closely and show UN *presence* as a preventive measure" (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 30, emphasis added). Furthermore, the CLAs participated in such patrols, interacting in an individual level with community leaders and organizing focus groups with the local population to address protection issues. As a result, they made the recommendation to the

mission's operational level officers to push for the arrest of FARDC perpetrators and the replacement of the platoon's commander, which was later accomplished. Thus, the CLAs' intervention contributed to "an effective halt to this trend [and] paved the way for the harmony between the community and the new platoon commander. Community leaders thanked MONUSCO for the support, which *tremendously increased confidence in the mission*" (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 30, emphasis added). However, it is crucial to remind that the CLAs' agency while adopting a UN "protector" stance can also be dismissed as transgressing, as discussed in the former section in the case of reporting information. In mimicking the UN peacekeeper, the CLAs are placed in a tightrope to act like the foreign intervener but not *too much*. Thus, seeming like the colonizer, what is discursively ideal, can even cause anxiety "back home" as this adoption diminishes the differences between them and challenges the superiority premise of colonial hierarchy (see BHABHA, 2004, p. 123).

Trying to be like the colonizer also fails its purpose in the colonial discourse because repetitions and translations are always new forms of re-presentation, which are presented in different contexts and, therefore, cannot carry fully (or purely) the meaning of the 'original'. Either in excess or shortage, the colonized end up performing not exactly the like the colonizer, becoming prey to the supplementary aspect of mimicry as

> any change in the statement's conditions of use and reinvestment, any alteration in its field of experience or verification, or indeed any difference in the problems to be solved, can lead to the emergence of a new statement: the difference of the same" (BHABHA, 2004, p. 33).

In other words, any 'new' utterances of the discourse are subjected to the play of *différance*: "[t]o recognize the *différance* of the colonial presence is to realize that the colonial text occupies that space of double inscription, hallowed – no, hollowed – by Jacques Derrida" (BHABHA, 2004, p. 153–154; see also KAPOOR, 2008, p. 120). That is why Bhabha constantly phrases any imitation attempted by the colonized as "almost the same, but not quite", and later makes a wordplay between "not quite" and "not White". As such, "colonial power is anxious, and never gets what it wants—a stable, final distinction between the colonizers and the colonized. This anxiety opens a gap in colonial discourse" (HUDDART, 2006, p. 4), allowing

mimicry to *ironically*[76] turn the 'original' into mis-translations that discredit the colonizer's legitimacy over the colonized. Perhaps one of the most quoted examples to make sense of this in Bhabha's work is the story of the "Vegetarian Bible". He re-tells an event in Middle India around 1885 in which the religious conversion expected to go smoothly by the missionaries' *trans*-forms, *re*-forms, and *de*-forms into a re-vision of Christianity's sacred text. That happens because this religion's main god could not be as mighty as suggested if he was a meat eater, according to the local population, for most Hindus were vegetarian. Therefore, the author emphasizes losses and gaps in-between languages and cultures in every translation effort, making the colonial encounter an ambivalent re-producer of meaning (BHABHA, 1995, 2004, p. 167–174, 2016; KAPOOR, 2008, p. 118).

The author explores this vacillation of authority through the idea of mockery since the adoption of the colonizer's cultural elements is to be comically done through exaggeration to undermine the ongoing pretensions of colonialism even after political independence (HUDDART, 2006, p. 39). In this sense, they are a stark contrast to the inferred seriousness of the colonial discourse and its pedagogical component seen in Chapter 4. Mocking, according to Bhabha (2004, p. 124, 126), is a "menace" for the colonizer's assertion of control because these imitations are in the realm of repetitions and not re-presentations, or they are *partial* representations. Thus, he credits them as "incomplete" but also "virtual": "despite its reality the subject is not fixed. The play between equivalence and excess makes the colonized both reassuringly similar and also terrifying" (HUDDART, 2006, p. 41). That way, this partial presence mirrors back for the (former) colonizer the absurdities which sustain their supposed superiority and re-organizing the encounter with the Other.

Likewise, putting the CLAs to represent the UN peacekeepers betrays the ordering of their relationship in which the CLAs were supposed to mediate beside the UN uniformed personnel like the Language Assistants. By imitating the role of

[76] The use of the word "irony" in Bhabha's discussion should not be taken without further reflection. Following Said's account on the conflicting economy of the colonial discourse, in which things and ideas are perpetually the same *and* that there are recurrent transformations, Bhabha (2004, p. 122, emphasis in the original) postulates that "mimicry represents an *ironic* compromise". While irony can have many denotations, especially in philosophical discussions, Huddart (2006, p. 40) argues that there is an intention to remain in the humorous lexical, but it is unlikely to be a mere synonym for "comic". Consequently, he shows that Bhabha's use of irony should be understood in a literary sense, as the case of mimicry, and cannot be considered accidental.

the UN as "protector", the CLAs cannot help but deceive the expected representation of identity and meaning. The manuals underscore how the CLAs need to manage the local populations' expectations on their "power and influence, as this might lead to disappointment and frustration" (MONUSCO CA, 2014, p. 17). That happens because they "cross the boundaries of the culture of enunciation through a strategic confusion of the metaphoric and metonymic axes of the cultural production of meaning" (BHABHA, 2004, p. 128). Contrasting these axes, the author borrows literary expressions to show that, for mimicry, "identity is never identical with itself", considering that it operates as a "never-ending substitution that cannot reach any point of full presence" and escapes any attempt of fixity (HUDDART, 2006, p. 44).

As I have been showing throughout this thesis, the UN's representation of the CLAs puts them in a subordinate position, especially when working with UN uniformed personnel. Furthermore, their set of linguistic and cultural skills are seen as appropriable to enhance a seemingly positive relationship with the local population. As more of a "fixer" side of the CLAs, they are re-presenting the UN presence on the ground when they are acting as "guides" to all things "local". Indeed, that is not exclusive of the CLA function but has been informally part of the LAs' job as well. In an interview, a LA who worked in the UN stabilization mission in Haiti explained that their day-to-day task required surpassing the role of an interpreter or even the mediational aspect I have been emphasizing, acting as "a psychologist, a sociologist, a cheerer, and a *teacher*" (FRANÇA, 2020, p. 46, emphasis added, my translation).

Relatedly, Rafael resonates with this mixture when describing how US soldiers interpreted the role of their locally hired interpreters in Afghanistan and Iraq. Not only does he discuss the representation of interpreters as teachers when quoting US military officers, focusing on how they are expected to educate troops about the local culture (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 133), but he also calls attention to how the exposure of "the hazards of war and the exigencies of occupation" brings the soldier and the interpreter together (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 135). In this student-teacher relationship, the subordinate position momentarily inverts the (post-)colonial hierarchy by making the interpreter the knowledgeable one whose opinion should be appreciated by the troops. Otherwise, the dangers associated with everyday activities in COIN contexts can stimulate empathy and admiration for the Other. As

seen with de Jong's (2022b) "segregated brotherhood" conceptual discussion in Chapter 3, however, neither re-organizations of the socio-political roles prevent the foreign intervener from seeing their interpreter as a "tool" designed to aid in intelligence gathering. Consequently, whatever "respect" is earned by the interpreter is seen as a *refinement* of their *conversion* as a COIN weapon: "[i]f native interpreters have value, it is precisely because they never cease to be an asset, which is also a kind of spy, a means or an instrument" for aiding their employers' to achieve their object(ive)s, which in a people-centered COIN environment entails with gathering intelligence and support from the local population (RAFAEL, 2016, p. 132).

That further underscores to the notion of ambivalence, which has been discussed throughout this thesis, given that mimicry functions in the displacement between the intended object(ive) and its meaning. As I have been developing in this section, for Bhabha, the ambivalent character of mimicry is by no means an accidental feature of the colonial discourse, but intrinsic to it because no assertion of meaning can ever be fully accomplished. The (post-)colonial anxiety to define and stabilize a certain understanding of any political subject, what I have introduced under the notion of the politics of translation, has been trying to naturalize the dominant discourse by calling away attention to this struggle. That way, what I have debated as the translation's assimilation project in Chapter 4 cannot be considered a fully successful endeavor. Just as in the case of the vegetarian Bible, Thiong'o's account of the all-encompassing colonial power that perfectly colonizes one's mind fails to acknowledge the colonized people's already cultural values. In other words, the attempt to center a discourse, such as the colonial hierarchy of the UN vision of protection, is subjected to alterations and re-interpretations by those who receive them.

While Bhabha focuses on the local population as a whole, I want to follow Garane's (2015) effort in problematizing in-visibilizing the African interpreter in these instances. With a focus on the French colony in West Africa in the 1890-1900s, she argues that, as mediators, African interpreters were generally seen as neutral conduits of the colonial discourse. Against this naturalizing stance that continues to be partly re-produced in Translation Studies (as seen in the previous section), she traces instances in colonial texts and literature to emphasize the ambivalent character of the interpreter. Despite the absence of an explicit dialogue

with Bhabha, she argues that "the interpreter in these works is often a trickster figure who is never entirely 'faithful' to his 'own' people nor to the colonizer, and that this 'infidelity' is ironically constitutive of agency, whether 'ethical' or not" (GARANE, 2015, p. 2). As a result, her work invites a complexification of the interpreter's agency and the inherent betrayal associated with the translator as a mediator. Since this work relies heavily upon UN documents that do not allow the CLAs to re-present themselves, I have emphasized in Chapter 1 how I am exploring the ambivalence of the UN discourse, aiming to undermine the authority it seeks to assert (CULLER, 1982; ZEHFUSS, 2004). I do not wish to contain the notion of resistance, so crucial to Bhabha's theoretical-political thought, to a "short, but significant footnote" (BATCHELOR, 2008, p. 64). Nevertheless, I understand that the empirical material with which I am working impedes me from exposing in detail how the CLAs are mocking the UN's protector authority besides what the manuals re-present as incongruencies in carrying on the ground activities. That is why I have been exploring the role of language in these texts, inquiring how translation and interpretation are supposed to work in this imagination.

Bhabha's notion of ambivalence also highlights how the categories of colonizer and colonized, civilization and savagery/barbarism do not center themselves, that is, they fail in establishing as pure and therefore separate identities. Distancing himself from the somewhat fixed categories with which Said (2003) works, the author shows that the colonial encounter profoundly transforms the relationship between these groups, while the colonial discourse anxiously tries to separate them discursively (BHABHA, 2004, p. 100–104). That is why I have been suggesting that the CLAs contribute to *de*-forming, *re*-forming, and *trans*-forming the protection socio-political roles, deconstructing the seemingly separated entities created in the UN representation from within. They are positioned in the UN discourse as somewhat a non-determined entity: not merely as the "protector", "protected", or "enemy" but all *and* none of them. Further, it seems as if the CLAs expected to perform these different *masks*. Still, in doing so, they contribute to exposing and, better yet, opening the floodgates to how this discourse does not stand on itself. In creating more complications, the CLAs are unsuccessful in solving the problem I understand that they were expected to address: improving the translation of the UN monolingual(ized) view on protection.

> Each time the encounter with identity occurs at the point at which something exceeds the frame of the image, it eludes the eye, evacuates the self as site of identity and autonomy and – most important – leaves a resistant trace, a stain of the subject, a sign of resistance. We are no longer confronted with an ontological problem of being but with the discursive strategy of the moment of interrogation, a moment in which the demand for identification becomes, primarily, a response to other questions of signification and desire, culture and politics. In place of the symbolic consciousness that gives the sign of identity its integrity and unity, its depth, we are faced with a dimension of doubling; a spatialization of the subject, that is occluded in the illusory perspective of what I have called the 'third dimension' of the mimetic frame or visual image of identity (…).The desire for the Other is doubled by the desire in language, which *splits* the *difference* between Self and Other so that both positions are partial; neither is sufficient unto itself (BHABHA, 2004, p. 71–72, emphasis in the original).

This chapter, therefore, brings forth a displacement of the imaginations of the UN on the presence and absence of CLAs, both in the case of Kiwanja, where their creation is justified, and in Beni, where their existence is ratified. Thinking about protection discourses in the UN PoC agenda through the notion of translation and exploring its political component is a way of deconstructing the socio-political order that the UN envisions in its documents.

6.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

As I mentioned in Chapter 1, I was deeply inspired by the helpful-unhelpful writing strategy of "show, don't tell" in this thesis. On occasion, I even tried to explain my reasoning for this writing strategy by calling my thesis a "murder mystery". Perhaps coming from a personal interest in fictional literature, it has profoundly changed the way I had been planning to portray my arguments. Indeed, no chapter was a 'pure' instance of showing or telling. Yet, in organizing them, I considered that Chapters 2 and 3 required more of the showing component to allow the subsequent chapters to be more telling. Chapter 1 introduced the re-presentations of the attacks in Kiwanja in 2008 as one of the backgrounds of the big puzzle that I wanted to tackle. Questions such as "what happened?" paved the way for reflecting on "how did some of the actors involved in these events understand them?" and "what are the connections between 'Kiwanja' and other occurrences at the time and since?" Likewise, the re-presentations of Kiwanja were a constant trace in this thesis, one to which I would return whenever I started a new part of the discussion. Thus, the *showing* worked not only as a presentation effort for the readers to accompany how the pieces came together but also invited them to be part of the process while the *telling* aimed to point out these connections in a more systematic manner for this concluding scene – a metaphorical meeting in the drawing room to continue the bookish theme – to wrap them all up. Nevertheless, there is no villain to be unmasked or punished, nor do I wish to fall back into the "so you think the UN should not intervene" debate. Still recalling what I discussed in Chapter 1, closure can hinder the efforts of deconstruction. As my final considerations, therefore, I propose tracing the steps taken throughout this thesis and considering its limitations, contributions, and possible ensuing paths.

This thesis focused on protection discourses to discuss how translating them to the local population has been part of the UN's stabilization missions' mandates and one of the CLAs' defining tasks. As a starting point, I identified how protection is part of the UN's re-presentation in international politics and how peace operations are one of the ways it tries to construct this association. Accordingly, the UN PoC agenda is one of its strongest manifestations, aiming to enable the UN's main purpose: promoting peace and security internationally (Chapter 1). Yet, my

main argument was that there lacks a definitive interpretation of what protection is for the UN. Despite the impossibility of arriving at a fixed meaning of protection, I followed Bigo's (2006; MACEDO; SIMAN; MOTTA, 2022) discussion, which argues that protection has been re-presented as encompassing three socio-political roles: there are those who receive protection, those who provide it, and those who hinder this provision. Putting it in another way, protection imagines three types of actors: the protected, the protector, and the enemy respectively. While the enemy is usually seen negatively and the protector positively, the protected has an unclear status. Hence, the protected entity is not entirely positive or negative but can be an undesirable position, as the case of the enemy, because it may be reduced to an infantilized state without much agency vis-à-vis its counterparts (Chapters 3 and 4).

Throughout the PoC agenda, the UN has tried to re-present itself as the protector entity, separating the local population between the protected and the enemy. Nevertheless, as I have demonstrated, this vision does not hold itself in the UN doctrinal documents. For instance, the UN acknowledges that the host State is the institution that holds the primary responsibility to protect its citizens and/but it is also the one that is frequently hindering the provision of protection. That makes the UN's protective role secondary, which can be dismissed if the host state withdraws its consent but also should be enforced when civilians are in danger (Chapter 3). Another case is the proposition to divide the local population between the protected and the enemy (but it can also be the protector, as seen above). Filtering who should be protected and who should be annihilated is an ambiguous endeavor when contemporary conflict tactics aim to disguise themselves among civilians (Chapters 3 and 5). In addition, those of the local population seen as the protected should also participate in the peace process, that is, protecting themselves, yet their participation is conditioned to the UN's dominance over what protection means (Chapters 2 and 4).

By understanding protection as a discourse, this thesis proposed asking how these re-presentations try to be stabilized and naturalized to inspire conformity, most importantly for this imagination, of the protected. With a focus on the PoC agenda in MONUSCO, I argued that this peace operation's mandate, as a stabilization mission, follows people-centered COIN tactics. As such, its crucial goals are to gather support from the protected and intelligence on the enemy to combat the latter in a less publicly violent manner (Chapter 3). To accomplish that

is a difficult task because the UN's view on protection is competing with those of the different enemies, who have more linguistic and cultural ties with their target population. Therefore, triumphing in this type of conflict requires the UN to improve its relationship with the protected group. By cultivating a positive engagement with the protected, in this logic, the UN peacekeepers can harvest information and strengthen relationships that can be fruitful in fulfilling its mandate (Chapters 4 and 5). Following Rafael's (2016) discussion on another case study, I argued that distinguishing the local population between protected and enemy and presenting oneself as the protector to gather support are not tasks that can be done smoothly by the UN peacekeeper, especially the multinational military and police components, because they lack much of the linguistic and cultural knowledge to navigate the human terrain by themselves and generate cultural intelligence. Furthermore, as part of an international organization, the UN representatives can be seen too much as an outsider trying to dictate people's lives, given COIN's colonial roots that are similar to Congo's colonial past. That propels the UN to attempt to re-present a culturally sensitive approach in its peace operations, in other words, alluding to respecting the protected's culture while also trying to understand it to weaponize it (Chapters 4 and 5).

That is the context in which the UN creates the Community Liaison Assistants, nationals of the host state tasked with "providing the interface" between the peacekeepers and the local population in PoC activities (Chapters 1 and 2). Apart from this core assignment, I suggested that the CLA's job description can be described as mediating the relationship between these two groups to inspire the local population's cooperation and collaboration with the mission. What allows the CLAs to be more accomplished in their duties than the ordinary UN peacekeeper and makes them distinguishable from any other UN staff, according to the UN documents, is their linguistic-cultural "skills" (Chapter 2). Namely, the UN understands that they can interpret and translate between the local and the UN language and culture while, as a UN employee, they are advancing the mission's mandate. That requires them to shift in-between being present and absent when performing their PoC assignments alongside the UN peacekeeper and/or in their place (Chapter 5).

Proposing the CLAs as an analytical prism for debating protection discourses inspired me to see the context in which the UN tries to go forward with

its interpretation of protection, the PoC agenda, as a matter of translation *and* politics. I emphasized the many interpretations subjected to competition for centering one understanding. For instance, Chapter 2 debated how the "local" and "international" views of protection have been in dispute in UN missions' history, making the local turn's effort the inclusion of a so-called local perspective in the peace process. Another case is introduced in Chapter 3 when I cited how different departments and agencies inside the UN struggle with identifying a common definition of protection and, consequently, of the Protection of Civilians agenda. While the former example can stimulate the sense of politics of translation in an interlinguistic level, the latter shows an intralinguistic dispute when one considers how the language in/of the dispute is the UN grammar of protection.

As a result, this thesis focused on the Community Liaison Assistants as they are designed to advance the UN view of protection in the politics of translation. By elevating the CLAs, who in Peace Operations literature are not commonly researched actors, as my entry point to debate protection discourses and their socio-political roles, I dedicated myself in this work to analyze how the UN manuals imagine them as a solution to many challenges the UN faces on the ground. Still, in a deeper inquiry into these documents throughout the thesis, I described how a simplistic understanding of linguistic and cultural translation, interpretation, and mediation impedes the CLAs' success in their jobs. As an odd third entity in all pairings of the UN socio-political imagination, I claimed that the CLAs cannot be the protector, the protected, or the enemy but all *and* neither.

Following a poststructuralist and postcolonial approach inspired mainly by Derrida and Bhabha stimulated me to suggest that not only the meaning of protection cannot be centered but it is also ambivalent in its enunciation. In presenting the UN interpretation on the role of the CLAs, I deconstructed the UN protection discourses, aiming to raise "the question of the *authorization* of [post-]colonial representations" (BHABHA, 2004, p. 129, emphasis in the original). As my analytical strategy, it aided me to inquire how the bases of UN protection discourses do not support themselves. Deconstruction, in this sense, enabled me to read these documents inside the logic they represent while also questioning it by displacing the centers that supposedly legitimize it. These thinkers' role in this research, however, also bring into question its limitations and can inspire other approaches in future works.

Negotiating between poststructuralism and postcolonialism did not always lead to clear paths concerning my research. For instance, Chapter 2 promoted the notion of cultural in-difference to discuss how the local turn, while trying to deal with UN peace operations' hierarchical inclusion of the local population in its activities, ended ratifying a simplistic approach to (the local's) culture that aims to render "international" and "local" relationships manageable through translation. The idea of (cultural) difference (and later indifference) in postcolonial scholarship can be echoed in some debates fueled by Derrida's *différance*, given how alterity politics are employed to differentiate and delay the understanding of the Other in the self-referential "We". Nevertheless, there remains a discussion on how these (pseudo-)concepts can(not) be put into conversation, something that was not the primary focus of this thesis. In Chapter 3, this relationship between poststructuralist and postcolonial authors was tensioned when discussing the civilizational character of colonial discourse that divides the Other between the savage and the barbarian imaginations. While this categorization was conceptually instigating to explore, postcolonial literature stimulates taking a step back to emphasize how these re-presentations refer to the (former) colonizer's translation of 'reality'.

Chapters 4 and 5 presented a more converging tone by having already introduced most of the ambivalent examples on which this thesis is based. Still, both Chapters had to deal with the broader discussion signaled in Chapter 1 of the CLAs' representation in these documents and, consequently, how to draw the "counterinsurgency prose" in them. Adopting a more theoretical stance, the final Chapters propelled me to reflect on how I should approach the empirical material *for* and *against* itself, paying attention to how I am portraying the Other without promoting the same violence I am criticizing in the UN's representations. Indeed, violence is inherent to all representations and this thesis is not exempt from this, but delving deeper into the power relations between the UN (as an organization), the UN peacekeepers, the CLAs, and the local population allowed me to refrain from deciding how these actors are performing on the ground and focus more on how the UN wished they were. While this research could benefit from fieldwork observations and interventions, I see this thesis as a step forward into a longer path of discussing how these actors are imagined by the UN.

Thus, I hope this thesis can encourage more reflections on how one comprehends the relationship between translation and politics and, consequently,

the various ways political disputes can occur in terms of translation. By understanding that I seek to discuss something that several authors of the specialized literature on peace operations already identify, either by understanding the role of language and culture in peace operations and/or by defending that the Protection of Civilians agenda does not have a fixed understanding of protection, I emphasize again how this work would not have been possible without this legacy. The literature cited in this thesis was my entry point to bringing out the importance of discussing the politics of translation of UN protection discourses. Likewise, I wish this thesis has opened the readers' eyes to new possibilities for analysis inside and outside the field of Peace Operations.

Future works can benefit from contrasting this thesis with fieldwork in MONUSCO and other UN peace operations should it be already shut down. If the latter is the case, it would be productive to explore how the UN deals with the CLAs' in its exit strategy, given the threats many Iraqi and Afghan interpreters have been facing because of their association with the foreign intervener. Interviewing CLAs and those who interact directly with them, namely the UN staff and the local population, can translate other interpretations of 'reality' on the ground. Moreover, this work does not engage deeply with gender and sexuality topics in the UN re-presentation of the CLAs, yet the absence of female CLAs is stressed in the UN manuals as another "problem" to be solved. Considering that the UN Women, Peace, and Security agenda has more than 20 years, this could be an inconspicuous path to problematize discourses on the engagement with the local female population in COIN-driven stabilization missions.

That way, an interest in the politics of translation goes beyond the selected research object of this thesis and can *travel* to other interests in IR and beyond, as briefly mentioned in Chapter 1. Said (2000, p. 451) states that "the point of theory therefore is to travel, always to move beyond its confinements, to emigrate, to remain in a sense in exile". Bilgin (2021, p. 250) complements this by pointing out that the notion of "traveling theory" is "what makes such an intellectual community possible". In exploring Said's argument, she wants to highlight how theoretical works are *transformed* in their "voyages" between scholars and new contexts. As a result, she shows how *translations* are embedded in the theoretical exchange of ideas. I choose to "end" this thesis with this image to evoke my aspiration of encouraging conversations. Thus, I hope that this thesis, by calling attention to the

politics of translation of UN protection discourses, can stimulate further dialogue in the field of UN peace operations and IR.

7.
REFERENCES

ADLER-NISSEN, R.; POULIOT, V. Power in practice: Negotiating the international intervention in Libya. **European Journal of International Relations**, v. 20, n. 4, p. 889–911, 2014.

AHLUWALIA, P. Out of Africa: post-structuralism's colonial roots. **Postcolonial Studies**, v. 8, n. 2, p. 137–154, 2005.

ALEJANDRO, A. How to Problematise Categories: Building the Methodological Toolbox for Linguistic Reflexivity. **International Journal of Qualitative Methods**, v. 20, p. 1–12, 2021.

ANDERSEN, L. R. The HIPPO in the room: The pragmatic push-back from the UN peace bureaucracy against the militarization of UN peacekeeping. **International Affairs**, v. 94, n. 2, p. 343–361, 2018.

ANGERMULLER, J. **Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis**. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

ANGHIE, A. **Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

ANTONINI, R. et al. Introducing NPIT studies. In: ANTONINI, R. et al. (Eds.). **Non-professional Interpreting and Translation:** State of the art and future of an emerging field of research. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2017. p. 1–27.

ARADAU, C. et al. Introducing critical security methods. In: ARADAU, C. et al. (Eds.). **Critical Security Methods**: New frameworks for analysis. London and New York: Routledge, 2015. p. 1–22.

ARFI, B. **Re-thinking International Relations Theory via Deconstruction**. London and New York: Routledge, 2013.

AUTESSERRE, S. **The Trouble with the Congo.** Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

AUTESSERRE, S. Dangerous tales: Dominant narratives on the Congo and their unintended consequences. **African Affairs**, v. 111, n. 443, p. 202–222, 2012.

AUTESSERRE, S. **Peaceland:** Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

AUTESSERRE, S. **The Frontlines of Peace:** An Insider's Guide to Changing the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.

BAAZ, M.; VERWEIJEN, J. Confronting the colonial: the (re)production of 'African' exceptionalism in critical security and military studies. **Security Dialogue**, v. 49, n. 1–2, p. 57–69, 2018.

BAKER, C. It's not their job to soldier: distinguishing civilian and military in soldiers' and interpreters' accounts of peacekeeping in 1990s Bosnia-Herzegovina. **Journal of War & Culture Studies**, v. 3, n. 1, p. 137–150, 2010a.

BAKER, C. The Care and Feeding of Linguists: the Working Environment of Interpreters, Translators, and Linguists During Peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina. **War and Society**, v. 29, n. 2, p. 154–175, 2010b.

BAKER, C. Prosperity without Security: the Precarity of Interpreters in Postsocialist, Postconflict Bosnia-Herzegovina. **Slavic Review**, v. 71, n. 4, p. 849–872, 2012.

BAKER, C. The Local Workforce of International Intervention in the Yugoslav Successor States: "Precariat" or "Projectariat"? Towards an Agenda for Future Research. **International Peacekeeping**, v. 21, n. 1, p. 91–106, 2014.

BAKER, C. Language Intermediaries and Local Agency: Peacebuilding, Translation/Interpreting and Political Disempowerment in 'Mature' Post-Dayton Bosnia–Herzegovina. **Journal of War and Culture Studies**, v. 12, n. 3, p. 236–250, 2019.

BARGUÉS-PEDRENY, P.; MATHIEU, X. Beyond Silence, Obstacle and Stigma: Revisiting the 'Problem' of Difference in Peacebuilding. **Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding**, v. 12, n. 3, p. 283–299, 2018.

BARGUÉS-PEDRENY, P.; RANDAZZO, E. Hybrid peace revisited: an opportunity for considering self-governance? **Third World Quarterly**, v. 39, n. 8, p. 1543–1560, 2018.

BARRERA, A. The Congo trap: MONUSCO islands of stability in the sea of instability. **Stability**, v. 4, n. 1, p. 1–16, 2015.

BASSNETT, S.; TRIVEDI, H. Introduction: of colonies, cannibals and vernaculars. In: BASSNETT, S.; TRIVEDI, H. (Eds.). **Post-colonial Translation:** Theory and Practice. London and New York: Routledge, 1999. p. 1–18.

BATCHELOR, K. Third spaces, mimicry and attention to ambivalence: applying Bhabhian discourse to translation theory. **Translator**, v. 14, n. 1, p. 51–70, 2008.

BEER, C. S. Communication frightens me: Derrida on communication. **Communicatio**, v. 31, n. 2, p. 155–171, 2005.

BEHR, H. Peace-in-Difference: a Phenomenological Approach to Peace Through Difference. **Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding**, v. 12, n. 3, p. 335–351, 2018.

BELJAN, R. Small Wars Journal: why Counterinsurgency Matters for MONUSCO. **Small Wars Journal**, v. 10, n. 2, p. 38–59, 2014.

BELLAMY, A. J.; HUNT, C. T. Twenty-first century UN peace operations: protection, force and the changing security environment. **International Affairs**, v. 91, n. 6, p. 1277–1298, 2015.

BELLAMY, A.; WILLIAMS, P.; GRIFFIN, S. **Understanding Peacekeeping**. 2. ed. Malden: Polity Press, 2010.

BELL, C. Civilianising warfare: ways of war and peace in modern counterinsurgency. **Journal of International Relations and Development**, v. 14, n. 3, p. 309–332, 2011.

BELLOU, F. Cultural Awareness in Peace Operations: Effective Marketing or Strategic Communications. **Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences**, v. 148, p. 579–587, 2014.

BEST, A. et al. **International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond**. London and New York: Routledge, 2009.

BHABHA, H. Interview with Homi Bhabha The Third Space. In: RUTHERFORD, J. (Ed.). **Identity: Community, Culture, Difference**. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990. p. 207–221.

BHABHA, H. **Translator Translated,** 1995. Available at: <https://www.artforum.com/print/199503/translator-translated-33203>. Accessed: 16 jun. 2022.

BHABHA, H. **The Location of Culture**. 2. ed. London and New York: Routledge, 2004.

BHABHA, H. **Our Neighbours, Ourselves**. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011.

BHABHA, H. **Homi Bhabha: Translation and Displacement**, 2016. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TVQcdbSV6OI>. Accessed: 16 jun. 2022.

BIELSA, E. Cosmopolitanism beyond the Monolingual Vision. **International Political Sociology**, v. 14, n. 4, p. 418–430, 2020.

BIERSCHENK, T.; CHAUVEAU, J.; DE SARDAN, J.-P. O. Local Development Brokers in Africa. The rise of a new social category. **Working Papers. Department of Anthropology and African Studies. Johannes Gutenberg Univ. Mainz. Working Papers**, n. 13, p. 44, 2002.

BIGO, D. Liaison officers in Europe: new officers in the European security field. In: SHEPTYCKI, J. W. E. (Ed.). **Issues in Transnational Policing**. London and New York: Routledge, 2000. p. 67–99.

BIGO, D. Protection: security, territory and population. In: HUYSMANS, J.; DOBSON, A.; PROKHOVNIK, R. (Eds.). **The Politics of Protection Sites of insecurity and political agency**. London and New York: Routledge, 2006. p. 84–100.

BILGIN, P. On the "Does Theory Travel?" Question: Traveling with Edward Said. In: CAPAN, Z. G.; DOS REIS, F.; GRASTEN, M. (Eds.). **The Politics of Translation in International Relations**. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021. p. 245–256.

BLACK, J. **Insurgency and counterinsurgency:** a global history. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.

BONACKER, T. Reporting Security: Postcolonial Governmentality in the United Nations' Trusteeship System. **International Political Sociology**, v. 16, n. 1, olab030, 2021.

BORRADORI, G. **Philosophy in a Time of Terror:** Dialogues with Jügern Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.

BOURDIEU, P. **Outline of a Theory of Practice**. 28. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

BOUTELLIS, J. A. From crisis to reform: Peacekeeping strategies for the protection of civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. **Stability**, v. 2, n. 3, p. 1–11, 2013.

BRÄUCHLER, B. The cultural turn in peace research: Prospects and challenges. **Peacebuilding**, v. 6, n. 1, p. 17–33, 2018.

BRIGG, M. Relational and Essential: Theorizing Difference for Peacebuilding. **Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding**, v. 12, n. 3, p. 352–366, 2018.

BROOKS, B. Winning Hearts and Minds in the Congo: Assessing the Limitations of the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual. **African Security**, v. 13, n. 3, p. 215–234, 2020.

ÇALKIVIK, A. **Poststructuralism and Postmodernism in International Relations**, 2017. Available at: <https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-102.>. Accessed: 27 jan. 2023.

CAMPBELL, D. **National Deconstruction** - Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.

CAPAN, Z. G.; DOS REIS, F.; GRASTEN, M. The Politics of Translation in International Relations. In: CAPAN, Z. G.; DOS REIS, F.; GRASTEN, M. (Eds.). **The Politics of Translation in International Relations**. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021. p. 1–19.

CARVER, F. **Linked Up Peacekeeping Community early warning of atrocity risks as MONUSCO prepares to withdraw**, 2022. Available at: <https://cnxus.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/PA-DRC-Report-Jul2022_EN-Digital_v4.pdf>. Accessed: 16 jul. 2022.

CHAKRABARTY, D. **Provincializing Europe**. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

CHANDLER, D. Race, culture and civil society: Peacebuilding discourse and the understanding of difference. **Security Dialogue**, v. 41, n. 4, p. 369–390, 2010.

CHANG, B. G. Deconstructing communication: Derrida and the (im)possibility of communication. **History of European Ideas**, v. 9, n. 5, p. 553–568, 1988.

CHEYFITZ, E.; HARMON, A. Translation and colonialism. In: EVANS, J.; FERNÁNDEZ, F. (Eds.). **The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Politics**. London and New York: Routledge, 2018. p. 270–286.

COLEMAN, K. P. Downsizing in UN Peacekeeping: The Impact on Civilian Peacekeepers and the Missions Employing Them. **International Peacekeeping**, v. 27, n. 5, p. 703–731, 2020.

CONGOLESE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. **The Constitution of the Democractic Republic of Congo**, 20005. Available at: <https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_2011.pdf?lang=en>. Accessed: 27 jan. 2023.

CORACINI, M. J. O sujeito tradutor entre a "sua" língua e a língua do outro [The translator subject between "their" language and the language of the other]. **Cadernos de Tradução**, v. 2, n. 16, p. 9–24, 2005.

CORACINI, M. J. L'espace hybride de la subjectivité: le (bien)-être entre les langues [The hybrid space of subjectivity: (well)being between languages]. **Langage et Societe**, v. 117, n. 3, p. 41–61, 2006.

COSTA, S. Desprovincializando a sociologia: A contribuição pós-colonial [Deprovincializing Sociology: The Postcolonial Contribution]. **Revista Brasileira de Ciencias Sociais**, v. 21, n. 60, p. 117–134, 2006.

COX, R. W. Social forces, States and World Orders. In: KEOHANE, R. (Ed.). **Neorealism and Its Critics**. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. p. 204–254.

CROMBÉ, X.; KUPER, J. War Breaks Out: Interpreting Violence on Healthcare in the Early Stage of the South Sudanese Civil War. **Journal of Humanitarian Affairs**, v. 1, n. 2, p. 4–12, 2019.

CULLER, J. **On Deconstruction**: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982.

CURRAN, D.; HOLTOM, P. Resonating, rejecting, reinterpreting: Mapping the stabilization discourse in the United Nations Security Council, 2000–14. **Stability**, v. 4, n. 1, p. 1–18, 2015.

DARBY, P.; PAOLINI, A. J. Bridging International Relations and Postcolonialism. **Alternatives: Global, Local, Political**, v. 19, n. 3, p. 371–397, 1994.

DAVIS, K. **Deconstruction and Translation**. Manchester: St. Jerome Publishing, 2001.

DAY, A.; HUNT, C. T. Distractions, Distortions and Dilemmas: The Externalities of Protecting Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping. **Civil Wars**, v. 24, n. 1, p. 97–116, 2021.

DEBRIX, F. Introduction: Rituals of Mediation. In: DEBRIX, F.; WEBER, C. (Eds.). **Rituals of Mediation**: International Politics and Social Meaning. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003a. p. xxi–xlii.

DEBRIX, F. **Language, agency, and politics in a constructed world**. London and New York: Routledge, 2003b.

DE CONING, C. Is stabilization the new normal? Implications of stabilization mandates for the use of force in UN peacekeeping operations. In: NADIN, P. (Ed.). **The use of force in UN peacekeeping**. New York and London: Routledge, 2018. p. 85–99.

DE CONING, C.; AOI, C.; KARLSRUD, J. (EDS.). **UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era**. New York and London: Routledge, 2017.

DE CONING, C.; KARLSRUD, J.; TROOST, P. Towards more people-centric peace operations: From 'extension of state authority' to 'strengthening inclusive state-society relations'. **Stability**, v. 4, n. 1, p. 1–13, 2015.

DEHEZ, D. **Finally Robust? – The United Nations is Showing Teeth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**, 2014. Available at: <https://kipdf.com/finally-robust-the-united-nations-is-showing-teeth-in-the-democratic-republic-of_5ab4de521723dd339c81005a.html>. Accessed: 22 nov. 2022.

DE JONG, S. Cultural Brokers in Post-colonial Migration Regimes. In: DHAWAN, N. et al. (Eds.). **Negotiating Normativity:** Postcolonial Appropriations, Contestations, and Transformations. Cham: Springer, 2016. p. 45–60.

DE JONG, S. Brokerage and transnationalism: present and past intermediaries, social mobility, and mixed loyalties. **Identities**, v. 25, n. 5, p. 610–628, 2018.

DE JONG, S. Brokers betrayed: The afterlife of Afghan interpreters employed by western armies. **Journal of International Development**, n. July, p. 1–14, 2022a.

DE JONG, S. Segregated brotherhood: the military masculinities of Afghan interpreters and other locally employed civilians. **International Feminist Journal of Politics**, v. 24, n. 2, p. 243–263, 2022b.

DE JONG, S. Resettling Afghan and Iraqi interpreters employed by Western armies: The Contradictions of the Migration–Security Nexus. **Security Dialogue**, v. 53, n. 3, p. 220–237, 2022c.

DERRIDA, J. **Positions**. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.

DERRIDA, J. Roundtable on Translation. In: MCDONALD, C. (Ed.). **The Ear of the Other:** Otobiography, Transference, Translation. New York: Schocken Books, 1985. p. 91–162.

DERRIDA, J. **Limited Inc.** Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988.

DERRIDA, J. Force de Loi: le "fondement mystique de l'autorité" [Force of Law: the "mystical foundation of authority"]. **Cardozo Law Review**, v. 11, n. 5–6, p. 919–1046, 1990.

DERRIDA, J. **Of Grammatology**. 3. ed. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997.

DERRIDA, J. **Monolingualism of the Other or The Prosthesis of Origin**. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.

DERRIDA, J. What Is a "Relevant" Translation? **Critical Inquiry**, v. 27, n. 2, p. 174–200, 2001.

DERRIDA, J. **Writing and Difference**. 4. ed. London and New York: Routledge, 2002.

DERRIDA, J. **The Politics of Friendship**. London and New York: Verso, 2005.

DERRIDA, J. **Psyche Intervention of the Other, Volume 1**. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007.

DE SARDAN, J.-P. O. **Anthropology and development:** understanding contemporary social change. London and New York: Zed Books, 2005.

DEVERE, H. The Fraternization of Friendship and Politics: Derrida, Montaigne and Aristotle. **Critical Perspectives on Communication, Cultural & Policy Studies**, v. 24, n. 1 & 2, p. 75–82, 2016.

DONAIS, T. **Peacebuilding and Local Ownership**. New York and London: Routledge, 2012.

DORN, W. United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence. In: **The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. p. 275–295.

DORN, W.; BELL, D. J. H. Intelligence and peacekeeping: The UN Operation in the Congo, 1960–64. **International Peacekeeping**, v. 2, n. 1, p. 11–33, 1995.

DOSS, A. United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). In: KOOPS, J. et al. (Eds.). **The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. p. 803–817.

DOTY, R. **Imperial Encounters.** The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

DOUCET, M. G. **Reforming 21st Century Peacekeeping Operations:** Governmentalities of Security, Protection, and Police. London and New York: Routledge, 2018.

DPKO. **Policy: Peacekeeping-Intelligence**, 2019. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/department-of-peace-operations>. Accessed: 28 fev. 2021.

DPKO/DFS. **Community Liaison Assistants in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Survey of Practice**, 2016. Available at: <http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/400583>. Accessed: 8 jul. 2020.

DPO. **Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Handbook,** 2020a. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/dpo_poc_handbook_final_as_printed.pdf>. Accessed: 3 jan. 2022.

DPO. **Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Officers**, 2020b. Available at: <https://resourcehub01.blob.core.windows.net/training-files/Training Materials/038 RTP-MIO/038-001 UN MPKIO (Intel) Final Version 15 APR 2020.pdf>. Accessed: 10 out. 2022.

DPO. **Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC)**, 2022. Available at: <https://pcrs.un.org/Lists/Resources/07- UN Military Units Manuals/Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC) Policy/2022.01 UN-CIMIC Policy.pdf?Mobile=1&Source=%2F_layouts%2F15%2Fmobile%2Fviewa.aspx%3FList%3D2f346e67-ff8>. Accessed: 28 jul. 2022.

DPPA. **United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation**, 2012. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA2012%28english%29_0.pdf>. Accessed: 13 out. 2022.

DPPA. **UN Support to Local Mediation: Challenges and Opportunities**, 2020. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UN Support to Local Mediation_Challenges and Opportunities_0.pdf>. Accessed: 13 out. 2022.

DPPA. **Engaging at the Local Level: Options for UN Mediators,** 2022. Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/DPPALocalMediationPracticeNote.pdf>. Accessed: 13 out. 2022.

DRICHEL, S. Towards a "radical acceptance of vulnerability": Postcolonialism and deconstruction. **Sub-Stance**, v. 42, n. 3, p. 46–66, 2013.

DUNN, K. **Imagining the Congo.** The International Relations of Identity. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

DUURSMA, A. **Mapping Data-Driven Tools and Systems for Early Warning, Situational Awareness, and Early Action,** 2021. Available at:

<https://protectionofcivilians.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/2104-D4P-report-AD.pdf, accessed 16 April 2021>. Accessed: 22 nov. 2022.

EDKINS, J. **Poststructuralism & International Relations:** Bringing the Political Back In. London: Lyne Rienner, 1999.

EGNELL, R. Winning "hearts and minds"? A critical analysis of counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan. **Civil Wars**, v. 12, n. 3, p. 282–303, 2010.

EJDUS, F. Revisiting the Local Turn in Peacebuilding. In: KUSTERMANS, J.; SAUER, T.; SEGAERT, B. (Eds.). **A Requiem for Peacebuilding?** Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021. p. 41–58.

ENLOE, C. **Does Khaki Become You?** The Militarisation of Women's Lives. Boston: South End Press, 1983.

ENLOE, C. **Bananas, Beaches and Bases:** Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. 2. ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014.

EVANS, J.; FERNÁNDEZ, F. Introduction: Emancipation, secret histories, and the language of hegemony. In: FERNÁNDEZ, F.; EVANS, J. (Eds.). **The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Politics**. London and New York: Routledge, 2018. p. 1–14.

FABIAN, J. **Language and Colonial Power**. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.

FANON, F. **Black Skin, White Masks**. London: Pluto Press, 1986.

FASSIN, D. **Humanitarian Reason**: a Moral History of the Present. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.

FASSIN, D.; PANDOLFI, M. Introduction: Military and Humanitarian Government in the Age of Intervention. In: FASSIN, D.; PANDOLFI, M. (Eds.). **Contemporary States of Emergency**: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions. New York: Zone Books, 2010. p. 5–17.

FERNÁNDEZ, M. As Relações Internacionais e seus epistemicídio [International Relations and its epistemicides]. **Monções: Revista de Relações Internacionais da UFGD**, v. 8, n. 15, p. 458–485, 2019.

FERREIRA, É. Tradução/desconstrução: um legado de Jacques Derrida [Translation/deconstruction: a legacy of Jacques Derrida]. **Revista de Letras**, v. 49, n. 2, p. 229–242, 2009.

FITCHETT, L. **Still fighting for those interpreters left behind.** AIIC, 2018. Available at:

<https://aiic.org/document/1054/AIICWebzine_2018_Issue73_10_FITCHETT_Still_fighting_for_those_interpreters_left_behind_EN.pdf>. Accessed: 11 out. 2022.

FOLEY, C. **UN Peacekeeping Operations and the Protection of Civilians:** Saving Succeeding Generations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

FOOTITT, H.; KELLY, M. Translation and War. In: FERNÁNDEZ, F.; EVANS, J. (Eds.). **The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Politics**. London and New York: Routledge, 2018. p. 162–176.

FOUCAULT, M. **Society must be defended**: Lectures at the College de France 1975-1976. New York: Picador, 2003.

FRANÇA, V. As práticas cotidianas dos assistentes de linguagem na MINUSTAH [The everyday practices of language assistants at MINUSTAH]. **Cadernos de Relações Internacionais**, v. 1, n. 1, p. 31–58, 2020.

FRIIS, K. Peacekeeping and Counter-insurgency – Two of a Kind? **International Peacekeeping**, v. 17, n. 1, p. 49–66, 2010.

GARANE, J. The Invisibility of the African Interpreter. **A Transdisciplinary Journal**, n. Fall, p. 1–33, 2015.

GEHRMANN, S. Remembering colonial violence: Inter/textual strategies of Congolese authors. **Tydskrif vir Letterkunde**, v. 46, n. 1, p. 11–27, 2009.

GERTH, S. **Show, Don't Tell.** How to write vivid descriptions, handle backstory, and describe your characters' emotions. (online): Ylva Publishing, 2016.

GRAY, C. **War, peace and international relations:** an introduction to strategic history. New York and London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.

GROVOGUI, S. Regimes of Sovereignty: International Morality and the African Condition. **European Journal of International Relations**, v. 8, n. 3, p. 315–338, 2002.

GUHA, R. **Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India**. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1999.

GUSTERSON, H. Ethics, expertise and human terrain. In: BERLING, T.; BUEGER, C. (Eds.). **Security Expertise.** Practice, power, responsibility. London and New York: Routledge, 2015. p. 204–227.

HADDOCK-LOBO, R. Derrida e a experiência colonial: Para o outro lado do Mediterrâneo e além... [Derrida and the Colonial Experience: To the Other Side of the Mediterranean and Beyond...] **Ensaios Filosóficos**, v. XIX, n. julho, p. 22–36, 2019.

HALL, S. Who Needs Identity? In: HALL, S.; GAY, P. DU (Eds.). **Questions of Cultural Identity**. London: SAGE Publications, 1996. p. 1–17.

HANSEN, L. **Security as Practice:** Discourse analysis and the Bosnian war. London and New York: Routledge, 2006.

HARDY, J. **Understanding Show, Don't Tell (And Really Getting It)**. (online): Fiction University Press, 2016.

HARMON, L. How Does Translation Relate to Power within Translation Studies? In: HARMON, L.; OSUCHOWSKA, D. (Eds.). **Translation and Power**. Berlin: Peter Lang, 2020. p. 17–25.

HERBORTH, B. Gavagai? The International Politics of Translation. In: CAPAN, Z. G.; DOS REIS, F.; GRASTEN, M. (Eds.). **The Politics of Translation in International Relations**. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021. p. 23–41.

HERZ, M.; SIMAN, M.; DRUMOND, P. O que é a mediação internacional? - Mapeando o debate [What is international mediation? - Mapping the debate]. In: HERZ, M.; SIMAN, M.; DRUMOND, P. (Eds.). **Mediação Internacional**. Petrópolis e Rio de Janeiro: Vozes/Editora PUC-Rio, 2016. p. 19–25.

HIDDLESTON, J. **Understanding Postcolonialism**. Stocksfield: Acumen, 2009.

HOBSON, J. M.; SAJED, A. Navigating beyond the eurofetishist frontier of critical IR theory: exploring the complex landscapes of non-western agency. **International Studies Review**, v. 19, n. 4, p. 547–572, 2017.

HOFFMANN, K.; VLASSENROOT, K.; BÜSCHER, K. Competition, patronage and fragmentation: the limits of bottom-up approaches to security governance in Ituri. **Stability**, v. 7, n. 1, p. 1–17, 2018.

HOWARD, L. Peacekeeping is Not Counterinsurgency. **International Peacekeeping**, v. 26, n. 5, p. 545–548, 2019.

HUDDART, D. **Homi K. Bhabha**. New York and London: Routledge, 2006.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. **Killings in Kiwanja.** The UN's Inability to Protect Civilians. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/9AB26C93A19E67024925751C001EF00D-Full_Report.pdf>. Accessed: 2 set. 2020.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. **DR Congo**: Scores Killed in Rebel Attacks. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/16/dr-congo-scores-killed-rebel-attacks>. Accessed: 13 fev. 2023.

HUYSMANS, J. Security! What do you mean? From concept to thick signifier. **European Journal of International Relations**, v. 4, n. 2, p. 226–255, 1998.

HUYSMANS, J. Agency and the politics of protection: Implications for security studies. in: HUYSMANS, J.; DOBSON, A.; PROKHOVNIK, R. (Eds.). **The Politics of Protection**: Sites of insecurity and political agency. London and New York: Routledge, 2006. p. 1–18.

INAYATULLAH, N. **If Only You Could See What I have Seen with Your Eyes:** Staging an Encounter Between Social Science and Literature. Available at: <http://www.ithaca.edu/naeem/professionalpages/IfOnlyYouCouldSee.pdf>. Accessed: 31 out. 2022.

INAYATULLAH, N.; BLANEY, D. **International Relations and the Problem of Difference**. New York and London: Routledge, 2004.

INGHILLERI, M. Translation and violence. In: FERNÁNDEZ, F.; EVANS, J. (Eds.). **The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Politics**. London and New York: Routledge, 2018. p. 147–161.

JABRI, V. Peacebuilding, the local and the international: a colonial or a postcolonial rationality? **Peacebuilding**, v. 1, n. 1, p. 3–16, 2013.

JAHN, B. The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization, Intervention, Statebuilding (Part I). **Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding**, v. 1, n. 1, p. 87–106, 2007a.

JAHN, B. The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization, Intervention, Statebuilding (Part II). **Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding**, v. 1, n. 2, p. 211–229, 2007b.

JAHN, B. Humanitarian intervention - What's in a name? **International Politics**, v. 49, n. 1, p. 36–58, 2012.

JAHN, B. **Liberal Internationalism Theory, History, Practice**. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

JAMES, D. The return of the broker: Consensus, hierarchy, and choice in South African land reform. **Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute**, v. 17, n. 2, p. 318–338, 2011.

JAMES, M. 'Who Can Sing the Song of MSF?': The Politics of 'Proximity' and Performing Humanitarianism in Eastern DRC. **Journal of Humanitarian Affairs**, v. 2, n. 2, p. 31–39, 2020.

JAMES, M. From Rebel to Humanitarian: Military Savoir Faire and Humanitarian Practice in Eastern DR Congo. **Development and Change**, v. 53, n. 1, p. 166–189, 2021a.

JAMES, M. Humanitarian Shapeshifting: Navigation, Brokerage and Access in Eastern DR Congo. **Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding**, v. 16, n. 3, p. 1–19, 2021b.

JAMES, M. Humanitarian fables: morals, meanings and consequences for humanitarian practice. **Third World Quarterly**, v. 43, n. 2, p. 475–493, 2022.

KÄLIN, W.; KÜNZLI, J. **The Law of International Human Rights Protection**. 2. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

KALUA, F. Homi Bhabha's third space and African identity. **Journal of African Cultural Studies**, v. 21, n. 1, p. 23–32, 2009.

KAPOOR, I. **The Postcolonial Politics of Development**. London and New York: Routledge, 2008.

KAPPLER, S. The dynamic local: delocalisation and (re-)localisation in the search for peacebuilding identity. **Third World Quarterly**, v. 36, n. 5, p. 875–889, 2015.

KARLSRUD, J. **The UN at war**: Peace operations in a new era. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

KARLSRUD, J. From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabilization and Counterterrorism. **International Peacekeeping**, v. 26, n. 1, p. 1–21, 2019.

KELLY, M.; BAKER, C. **Interpreting Peace**: Peace Operations, Conflict and Language in Bosnia-Herzegovina. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

KENKEL, K. M. Five generations of peace operations: from the "thin blue line" to "painting a country blue". **Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional**, v. 56, n. 1, p. 122–143, 2013.

KENKEL, K. M.; MARTINS, M. T. Emerging Powers and the Notion of International Responsibility: moral duty or shifting goalpost? **Brazilian Political Science Review**, v. 10, n. 1, p. 1–27, 2016.

KESSLER, O. The Contingency of Translation. In: CAPAN, Z. G.; DOS REIS, F.; GRASTEN, M. (Eds.). **The Politics of Translation in International Relations**. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021. p. 237–243.

KODDENBROCK, K. Recipes for intervention: Western policy papers imagine the Congo. **International Peacekeeping**, v. 19, n. 5, p. 549–564, 2012.

KODDENBROCK, K. The “failed-state” effect: Statebuilding and state stories from the Congo. **Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding**, p. 118–129, 2013.

KODDENBROCK, K. **The Practice of Humanitarian Intervention**: Aid workers, agencies and institutions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. London and New York: Routledge, 2016.

KOSELLECK, R. **Futures past**: on the semantics of historical time. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

KOSTER, M.; VAN LEYNSEELE, Y. Brokers as Assemblers: Studying Development Through the Lens of Brokerage. **Ethnos**, v. 83, n. 5, p. 803–813, 2018.

KRISHNA, S. **Globalization and postcolonialism**: Hegemony and resistance in the twenty-first century. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009.

KUELE, G.; CEPIK, M. Intelligence Support to MONUSCO: Challenges to Peacekeeping and Security. **International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs**, v. 19, n. 1, p. 44–68, 2017.

KUNREUTHER, L. Earwitnesses and transparent conduits of voice: on the labor of field interpreters for un missions. **Humanity**, v. 11, n. 3, p. 298–316, 2020.

LARSDOTTER, K. Military strategy and peacekeeping: An unholy alliance? **Journal of Strategic Studies**, v. 42, n. 2, p. 191–211, 2019.

LEANDER, A.; WÆVER, O. Introduction - Assembling Exclusive Expertise: Knowledge, Ignorance and Conflict Resolution in the Global South. In: LEANDER, A.; WÆVER, O. (Eds.). **Assembling Exclusive Expertise: Knowledge, Ignorance and Conflict Resolution in the Global South**. London and New York: Routledge, 2019. p. 1–20.

LEDERACH, J. **Building Peace**: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997.

LIDÉN, K. The Protection of Civilians and ethics of humanitarian governance: beyond intervention and resilience. **Disasters**, v. 43, n. S2, p. S210–S229, 2019.

LINDQVIST, S. **“Exterminate All The Brutes”**. New York: The New Press, 1996.

LINDQVIST, S. **Terra Nullius**: A Journey Through No One’s Land. New York: The New Press, 2007.

LISLE, D. How do we find out what's going on in the world? In: EDKINS, J.; ZEHFUSS, M. (Eds.). **Global Politics: A New Introduction**. 2. ed. London and New York: Routledge, 2014. p. 154–175.

LIU, E. R. The role of missionary translation in African colonial politics. In: FERNÁNDEZ, F.; EVANS, J. (Eds.). **The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Politics**. London and New York: Routledge, 2018. p. 494–509.

LUCHNER, C. D. "They are not empowered enough to speak English": Multilingual communication between Kenyan NGOs and local communities. **Journal for Translation Studies in Africa**, v. 2020, n. 1, p. 7–24, 2020.

MACEDO, A.; SIMAN, M.; MOTTA, V. Proteção, Poder, Política: uma leitura foucaultiana do discurso de Proteção de Civis em operações de paz [Protection, Power, Politics: a Foucauldian reading of the Protection of Civilians discourse in peace operations]. In: DUARTE, G.; CARVALHO, L. (Eds.). **Azul da cor da paz**?: perspectivas e debates sobre as operações de paz da ONU. Belo Horizonte: PUC-Minas, 2022. p. 122–130.

MACFARLANE, S.; KHONG, Y. **Human Security and the UN:** a Critical History. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.

MAC GINTY, R. **International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance:** Hybrid Forms of Peace. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

MAC GINTY, R. Routine peace: Technocracy and peacebuilding. **Cooperation and Conflict**, v. 47, n. 3, p. 287 –308, 2012a.

MAC GINTY, R. Against stabilization. **Stability**, v. 1, n. 1, p. 20–30, 2012b.

MAC GINTY, R. Everyday peace: Bottom-up and local agency in conflict-affected societies. **Security Dialogue**, v. 45, n. 6, p. 548–564, 2014.

MAC GINTY, R. Where is the local? Critical localism and peacebuilding. **Third World Quarterly**, v. 36, n. 5, p. 840–856, 2015.

MAC GINTY, R. **Everyday Peace:** How So-called Ordinary People Can Disrupt Violent Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.

MAC GINTY, R.; RICHMOND, O. The local turn in peace building: A critical agenda for peace. **Third World Quarterly**, v. 34, n. 5, p. 763–783, 2013.

MAC GINTY, R.; RICHMOND, O. The fallacy of constructing hybrid political orders: A reappraisal of the hybrid turn in peacebuilding. **International Peacekeeping**, v. 23, n. 2, p. 219–239, 2016.

MAKITA, J.-C. M. La politique linguistique de la R.D Congo à l'épreuve du terrain: de l'effort de promotion des langues nationales au surgissement de l'entrelangue [The language policy of the DR Congo put to the test in the field: from the effort to promote national languages to the emergence of the interlanguage]. **Synergies Afrique des Grands Lacs**, n. 2, p. 45–61, 2013.

MARCHAT, O. **Post-Foundational Political Thought:** Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Baiou and Laclau. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007.

MARTIN DE ALMAGRO, M. Hybrid Clubs: A Feminist Approach to Peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo. **Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding**, v. 12, n. 3, p. 319–334, 2018.

MARTÍNEZ-GÓMEZ, A. Invisible, visible or everywhere in between? Perceptions and actual behaviours of non-professional interpreters and interpreting users. **Interpreters Newsletter**, n. 20, p. 175–194, 2015.

MATHIEU, X. Critical peacebuilding and the dilemma of difference: the stigma of the 'local' and the quest for equality. **Third World Quarterly**, v. 40, n. 1, p. 36–52, 2019.

MEDINA, R. M. From anthropology to human geography: Human terrain and the evolution of operational sociocultural understanding. **Intelligence and National Security**, v. 31, n. 2, p. 137–153, 2016.

MENESES, R. DE. A desconstrução em Jacques Derrida: o que é e o que não é pela estratégia [Deconstruction in Jacques Derrida: what is and what is not for strategy]. **Universitas PhilosoPhica**, v. 60, n. 30, p. 177–204, 2013.

MEYLAERTS, R. The politics of translation in multilingual states. In: EVANS, J.; FERNÁNDEZ, F. (Eds.). **The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Politics**. London and New York: Routledge, 2018. p. 221–237.

MIALL, H. Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task. In: **Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict**. Weisbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2004. p. 67–89.

MIGNOLO, W. D. **Local Histories/Global Designs:** Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.

MILLIKEN, J. The study of discourse in international relations: A critique of research and methods. **European Journal of International Relations**, v. 5, n. 2, p. 225–254, 1999.

MIRON, M. On irregular wars, insurgencies and how to counter them. **Revista Científica General José María Córdova**, v. 17, n. 27, p. 457–480, 2019.

MOCKAITIS, T. R. From counterinsurgency to peace enforcement: New names for old games? **Small Wars and Insurgencies**, v. 10, n. 2, p. 40–57, 1999.

MONUSCO. **Civil Affairs**, 2022. Available at: <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/civil-affairs-0>. Accessed: 15 jun. 2022.

MONUSCO CA. **CLA Best Practice Review**, 2014. Available at: <https://janoschkullenberg.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/cla-review-final_270814.pdf>. Accessed: 8 jun. 2020.

MOORE-GILBERT, B. Spivak and Bhabha. In: SCHWARZ, H.; RAY, S. (Eds.). **A Companion to Postcolonial Studies**. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2000. p. 451–466.

MORENO-BELLO, Y. Narratives in conflict and the limits on the interpreter's agency: A case study from the UN Peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. **Linguistica Antverpiensia, New Series: Themes in Translation Studies**, v. 20, p. 94–114, 2021.

MUDIMBE, V. **The Invention of Africa.** Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988.

MUGGAH, R. Reflections on United Nations-led Stabilization: Late Peacekeeping, Early Peacebuilding or Something Else? In: MUGGAH, R. (Ed.). **Stabilization Operations, Security and Development: States of Fragility**. London and New York: Routledge, 2014. p. 56–70.

MURPHY, R. UN Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Protection of Civilians. **Journal of Conflict & Security Law**, v. 21, n. 2, p. 209–246, 2016.

MUTUA, M. **Human Rights**: A Political and Cultural Critique. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002.

NASCIMENTO, E. Após Derrida: a amizade filosófica [After Derrida: philosophical friendship]. **Alea: estudos neolatinos**, v. 17, n. 1, p. 64–77, 2015.

NATO. **Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) - AJP-3.4.4.,** 2011. Available at: <https://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-Counterinsurgency.pdf>. Accessed: 30 set. 2022.

NETWORK OF CONCERNED ANTHROPOLOGISTS. **The Counter-Counterinsurgency Manual Or, Notes on Demilitarizing American Society**. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2009.

NOVOSSELOFF, A. et al. **Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Missions in the DRC (MONUC-MONUSCO).** Effectiveness in Peace Operations Network, 2019. Available at: <https://effectivepeaceops.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/EPON-MONUSCO-LowRes.pdf>. Accessed: 18 dez. 2021.

NYSTRÖM, D. The UN Mission in Congo and the Basic Principles of Peacekeeping - Revolution or Evolution? p. 1–57, 2015.

NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, G. **The Congo from Leopold to Kabila:** A People's History. London and New York: Zed Books, 2007.

OBAMAMOYE, B. F. Beyond neo-imperialist intentionality: explaining African agency in liberal peace interventions. **Third World Quarterly**, p. 1–18, 2023.

OLIVEIRA, J. **Postcolonial Maghreb and the Limits of IR**. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.

OTTO, D. Subalternity and International Law: the Problems of Global Community and the Uncommensurability of Difference. **Social and Legal Studies**, v. 5, n. 3, p. 337–364, 1996.

OTTONI, P. A responsabilidade de traduzir o in-traduzível: Jacques Derrida e o desejo de [la] tradução [The responsibility of translating the um-translatable: Jacques Derrida and the desire for [the] translation]. **D.E.L.T.A.**, v. 2003, n. Especial, p. 163–174, 2003.

OZOLINS, U. The myth of the myth of invisibility? **Interpreting**, v. 18, n. 2, p. 273–284, 2016.

PAFFENHOLZ, T. International peacebuilding goes local: analysing Lederach's conflict transformation theory and its ambivalent encounter with 20 years of practice. **Peacebuilding**, v. 2, n. 1, p. 11–27, 2014.

PAFFENHOLZ, T. Unpacking the local turn in peacebuilding: a critical assessment towards an agenda for future research. **Third World Quarterly**, v. 36, n. 5, p. 857–874, 2015.

PALMER, J. Fixers, journalists and translation. In: BIELSA, E. (Ed.). **The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Media**. London and New York: Routledge, 2021. p. 217–231.

PALMER, J.; FONTAN, V. “Our ears and our eyes”: Journalists and fixers in Iraq. **Journalism**, v. 8, n. 1, p. 5–24, 2007.

PALMER, L. Lost in Translation: Journalistic discourse on news “fixers”. **Journalism Studies**, v. 19, n. 9, p. 1331–1348, 2018.

PETERS, R. W. Local in Practice: Professional Distinctions in Angolan Development Work. **American Anthropologist**, v. 118, n. 3, p. 495–507, 2016.

POLGREEN, L. **Massacre Unfurls in Congo, Despite Nearby Support.** The New York Times, 2008. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/11/world/africa/11congo.html>. Accessed: 16 abr. 2022.

PROENÇA JÚNIOR, D. O enquadramento das Missões de Paz (PKO) nas teorias da guerra e de polícia [The framing of Peacekeeping Missions (PKO) in theories of war and police]. **Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional**, v. 45, n. 2, p. 147–197, 2002.

PUGH, M. Peacebuilding’s Origins and History. In: KUSTERMANS, J.; SAUER, T.; SEGAERT, B. (Eds.). **A Requiem for Peacebuilding?** Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021. p. 17–40.

RAFAEL, V. L. **Motherless Tongues:** The Insurgency of Language amid Wars of Translation. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2016.

RAJAGOPALAN, K. Postcoloniality as Translation in Action. **Revista do GEL**, v. 1, n. 4, p. 169–186, 2007.

RAJAGOPALAN, K. Arundhati Roy: translation as a way of resistance and self-affirmation in postcolonial writing. **Tradução & Comunicação - Revista Brasileira de Tradutores**, v. 1, n. 19, p. 129–138, 2009.

RANCIÈRE, J. **On the Shores of Politics**. London and New York: Verso, 2007.

RANDAZZO, E. The Local, the ‘Indigenous’ and the Limits of Rethinking Peacebuilding. **Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding**, v. 15, n. 2, p. 141–160, 2021.

RANDAZZO, E.; TORRENT, I. Reframing agency in complexity-sensitive peacebuilding. **Security Dialogue**, v. 52, n. 1, p. 3–20, 2021.

RESENDE, E. **Americanidade, puritanismo e política externa** [Americaness, Puritanism and Foreign Policy]. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Contra Capa and FAPERJ, 2015.

REYNAERT, J. **MONUC/MONUSCO and Civilian Protection in the Kivus.** IPIS, 2011. Available at: <https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1432486/1930_1526374262_monuc-monusco-and-civilian-protection-in-the-kivus.pdf>. Accessed: 26 jul. 2022.

RICHMOND, O. Critical agency, resistance and a post-colonial civil society. **Cooperation and Conflict**, v. 46, n. 4, p. 419–440, 2011.

RICHMOND, O. Beyond Local Ownership in the Architecture of International Peacebuilding. **Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics**, v. 11, n. 4, p. 354–375, 2012.

RICHMOND, O. The dilemmas of a hybrid peace: Negative or positive? **Cooperation and Conflict**, v. 50, n. 1, p. 50–68, 2015.

RICHMOND, O. Rescuing peacebuilding? Anthropology and peace formation. **Global Society**, v. 32, n. 2, p. 221–239, 2018.

ROBINSON, P. The CNN effect: Can the news media drive foreign policy? **Review of International Studies**, v. 25, n. 2, p. 301–309, 1999.

RODER, A. À beira da língua lei: pertencimento, alteridade e identidade em "O monolinguismo do outro" de Jacques Derrida [On the brink of the language of law: belonging, alterity and identity in "The monolingualism of the other" by Jacques Derrida]. **Ítaca**, n. 33, p. 9–20, 2018.

ROLAND, R. A. **Interpreters as Diplomats**: A Diplomatic History of the Role of Interpreters in World Politics. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1999.

ROSENDO, L.; PERSAUD, C. Interpreting in conflict zones throughout history. **Linguistica Antverpiensia, New Series: Themes in Translation Studies**, v. 15, n. 1, p. 1–35, 2016.

ROSENDO, L.; PERSAUD, C. On the Frontline: Mediating Across Languages and Cultures in Peacekeeping Operations. **Armed Forces and Society**, v. 45, n. 3, p. 472–490, 2019.

RUSSO, J. Militarised peacekeeping: lessons from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. **Third World Quarterly**, v. 42, n. 12, p. 3070–3086, 2021.

SABARATNAM, M. **Decolonising Intervention**: International Statebuilding in Mozambique. London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.

SABARATNAM, M. Is IR Theory White? Racialised Subject-Positioning in Three Canonical Texts. **Millennium: Journal of International Studies**, v. 49, n. 1, p. 3–31, 2020.

SAID, E. **Reflections on Exile and Other Essays**. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.

SAID, E. **Orientalism**. 5. ed. London: Penguin Books, 2003.

SAJED, A. The post always rings twice? The Algerian War, poststructuralism and the postcolonial in IR theory. **Review of International Studies**, v. 38, n. 1, p. 141–163, 2012.

SALAMA-CARR, M. Introduction. In: SALAMA-CARR, M. (Ed.). **Translating and Interpreting Conflict**. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007. p. 1–12.

SAMARIN, W. J. Language in the Colonization of Central Africa, 1880-1900. **Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines**, v. 23, n. 2, p. 232, 1989.

SANTOS FILHO, O. Ultra Aequinoxialem Non Peccari: Anarquia, Estado de Natureza e a Construção da Ordem Político-Espacial [Ultra Aequinoxialem Non Peccari: Anarchy, State of Nature and the Construction of the Spatial-Political Order]. **Monções - Revista de Relações Internacionais da UFGD**, v. 8, n. 15, p. 485–520, 2019.

SEN, S. The colonial roots of counter-insurgencies in international politics. **International Affairs**, v. 98, n. 1, p. 209–223, 2022.

SHERMAN, J. et al. **Strategic Communications in UN Peace Operations: From an Afterthought to an Operational Necessity.** IPI, 2021. Available at: <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/IPI-RPT-Strategic-Communications.pdf>. Accessed: 27 jan. 2023.

SILVA, N.; FERREIRA, É. Reflexões sobre língua e identidade: possíveis diálogos entre Jacques Derrida e Stuart Hall [Reflections on language and identity: possible dialogues between Jacques Derrida and Stuart Hall]. **Revista Escrita**, v. 2014, n. 19, p. 213–224, 2014.

SMIRL, L. **Spaces of Aid:** How Cars, Compounds and Hotels Shape Humanitarianism. London: Zed Books, 2015.

SPIJKERS, O. The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo: From ONUC, to MONUC, to MONUSCO and its Force Intervention Brigade. **Journal of International Peacekeeping**, v. 19, n. 1–2, p. 88–117, 2015.

SPINK, L. **Protection with Less Presence**: How the Peacekeeping Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo is Attempting to Deliver Protection with Fewer Resources**.** Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2018. Available at:

<https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/BaseClosurePrint_Web.pdf>. Accessed: 22 nov. 2022.

SPIVAK, G. C. Can subaltern speak? In: NELSON, C.; GROSSBERG, L. (Eds.). **Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture**. Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1988. p. 271–313.

SPIVAK, G. C. The Post-modem Condition: The End of Politics? In: SPIVAK, G. C.; HARASYM, S. (Eds.). **The Post-Colonial Critic:** Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues. New York and London: Routledge, 1990. p. 17–34.

SPIVAK, G. C. **Outside in the Teaching Machine**. New York: Routledge, 1993.

SPIVAK, G. C. Feminism and deconstruction, again: negotiating with unacknowledged masculinism. In: BRENNAN, T. (Ed.). **Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis**. 2. ed. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. p. 189–204.

STENSLAND, A. Ø.; SENDING, O. J. Unpacking the "Culture of Protection": A Political Economy Analysis of UN Protection of Civilians. In: DE CARVALHO, B.; SENDING, O. J. (Eds.). **The Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping:** Concept, Implementation and Practice. Oslo: NUPI, 2011. p. 63–88.

TESSEUR, W. Translating and Interpreting in Danger Zones. **Journal of War and Culture Studies**, v. 12, n. 3, p. 215–219, 2019.

THAKUR, V.; DAVIS, A. E.; VALE, P. Imperial mission, 'scientific' method: an alternative account of the origins of IR. **Millennium: Journal of International Studies**, v. 46, n. 1, p. 3–23, 2017.

THIONG'O, N. **Moving the Centre:** The Struggle for Cultural Freedoms. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1993.

THIONG'O, N. **Decolonising the Mind:** The Politics of Language in African Literature. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1994.

TODOROV, T. **The Fear of Barbarians:** Beyond the Clash of Civilizations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010.

TOLEDO, A. Da Paz Liberal à virada local: avaliando a literatura crítica sobre Peacebuilding [From Liberal Peace to the local turn: evaluating the critical literature on Peacebuilding]. **Monções: Revista de Relações Internacionais da UFGD, Dourados**, v. 2, n. 3, p. 46–76, 2013.

TOMFORDE, M. Introduction: The distinctive role of culture in peacekeeping. **International Peacekeeping**, v. 17, n. 4, p. 450–456, 2010.

TRAN, M. **Translators fight the fatal effects of the language gap**. The Guardian, 2012. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/apr/11/volunteers-translation-language-health-messages>. Accessed: 24 may 2019.

TRANSLATORS WITHOUT BORDERS. **The four national languages of DRC**, 2020. Available at: <https://translatorswithoutborders.org/four-national-languages-DRC>. Accessed: 7 ago. 2020.

TULL, D. M. The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement: The Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo. **International Peacekeeping**, v. 25, n. 2, p. 167–190, 2018.

UNITED NATIONS. **United Nations Peacekeeping Operations**: Principles and Guidelines**,** 2008. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/capstone_eng_0.pdf>. Accessed: 2 abr. 2022.

UNITED NATIONS. **Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO)**, 2015. Available at: <https://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf>. Accessed: 31 jul. 2022.

UNITED NATIONS. **Improving security of united nations: we need to change the way we are doing business**, 2017. Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/improving_security_of_united_nations_peacekeepers_report.pdf>. Accessed: 29 set. 2022.

UNJHRO. **Consolidated Report on investigations conducted by the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) into grave human rights abuses committed in Kiwanja, North Kivu, in November 2008**, 2009. Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4ab38e240.html>. Accessed: 18 out. 2022.

UN OIOS. **Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates in United Nations peacekeeping operations**, 2014. Available at: <https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/787>. Accessed: 15 set. 2022.

UNSC. **Resolution 1925**, 2010. Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1925>. Accessed: 25 mar. 2020.

UNSC. **Resolution 2098**, 2013. Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2098>. Accessed: 25 mar. 2020.

UNSC. **Resolution 2147**, 2014. Available at: <https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1428213.pdf>. Accessed: 1 out. 2022.

UNSC. **Special report of the Secretary** - General on the strategic review of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo S/2017/826, 2017a. Available at: <https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1730125.pdf>. Accessed: 20 ago. 2022.

UNSC. **Special report of the Secretary** - General on the strategic review of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo S/2017/824, 2017b. Available at: <https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1729873.pdf>. Accessed: 20 ago. 2022.

UNSC. **Resolution 2388**, 2017c. Available at: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1322744#record-files-collapse-header>. Accessed: 18 set. 2022.

UNSC. **Resolution 2502**, 2019a. Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2502>. Accessed: 25 jun. 2022a.

UNSC. **Resolution 2463,** 2019b. Available at: <https://undocs.org/fr/S/RES/2463(2019)>. Accessed: 23 jan. 2022.

UNSC. **Resolution 2556**, 2020. Available at: <https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s_res_25562020_e.pdf>. Accessed: 29 jul. 2022.

UNSC. **Resolution 2612,** 2021. Available at: <https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/211220_-_s-res-2612-2021_-_en.pdf>. Accessed: 1 out. 2022.

VELA, V. MINUSMA and the Militarization of UN Peacekeeping. **International Peacekeeping**, v. 28, n. 5, p. 838–863, 2021.

VENUTI, L. **The Translator's Invisibility**: A History of Translation. 2. ed. London and New York: Routledge, 2008.

VIVEIROS DE CASTRO, E. Perspectival anthropology and the method of controlled equivocation. **Tipiti: Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America**, v. 2, n. 1, p. 2–22, 2004.

VOGEL, C.; MUSAMBA, J. Brokers of crisis: The everyday uncertainty of Eastern Congo's mineral négociants. **Journal of Modern African Studies**, v. 55, n. 4, p. 567–592, 2017.

VRASTI, W. The strange case of ethnography and International Relations. **Millennium: Journal of International Studies**, v. 37, n. 2, p. 279–301, 2008.

VRASTI, W. Dr Strangelove, or how I learned to stop worrying about methodology and love writing. **Millennium: Journal of International Studies**, v. 39, n. 1, p. 79–88, 2010.

WAINWRIGHT, J. The U.S. Military and Human Geography: Reflections on Our Conjuncture. **Annals of the American Association of Geographers**, v. 106, n. 3, p. 513–520, 2016.

WALKER, R. B. J. Lines of insecurity: International, imperial, exceptional. **Security Dialogue**, v. 37, n. 1, p. 65–82, 2006.

WESSELING, H. **Divide and Rule**: The Partition of Africa, 1880–1914. Westport: Praege, 1996.

WHALAN, J. The Local Legitimacy of Peacekeepers. **Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding**, v. 11, n. 3, p. 306–320, 2017.

WILLIAMS, A. P.; MENGISTU, B. An exploration of the limitations of bureaucratic organizations in implementing contemporary peacebuilding. **Cooperation and Conflict**, v. 50, n. 1, p. 3–28, 2015.

WOLF, M. **Teorias da Comunicação** [Theories of Communication]. 5. ed. Lisboa: Editorial Presença, 1999.

WOLTON, D. **Informar não é comunicar** [To inform is not to communicate]. Porto Alegre: Sulina, 2010.

WOODHOUSE, T. Peacekeeping, peace culture and conflict resolution. **International Peacekeeping**, v. 17, n. 4, p. 486–498, 2010.

YALÇINKAYA, H.; ÖZER, Y. Another lesson learned in Afghanistan: the concept of cultural intelligence. **International Peacekeeping**, v. 24, n. 3, p. 434–460, 2017.

YAMATO, R. V. Relendo a Construção (Negativa) dos Direitos Humanos Internacionais [Rereading the (Negative) Construction of International Human Rights]. **Carta Internacional**, v. 9, n. 2, p. 3–30, 2014.

YAMATO, R. V. Beyond the line: Carl Schmitt and the constitutive outsider of the international. **Politics**, v. 39, n. 2, p. 218–232, 2019.

YAMATO, R. V. Reading Schmitt from the sea: Tracing constitutive outsiders and displacing the conceptual order (and ordering) of the political. **Dados**, v. 63, n. 4, p. 1–32, 2020.

YAMATO, R. V. Before the and of the World(s): Peter Fitzpatrick and the (Inter)national Supplement. **Law and Critique**, v. 32, n. 3, p. 347–362, 2021.

YATES, B. A. The Origins of Language Policy in Zaïre. **Journal of Modern African Studies**, v. 18, n. 2, p. 257–279, 1980.

ZAALBERG, T. Counterinsurgency and Peace Operations. In: RICH, P. B.; DUYVESTEYN, I. (Eds.). **The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency**. London and New York: Routledge, 2012. p. 80–97.

ZEHFUSS, M. **Constructivism in International Relations**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

ZEHFUSS, M. Jacques Derrida. In: EDKINS, J.; VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS, N. (Eds.). **Critical Theorists and International Relations**. New York and London: Routledge, 2009. p. 137–149.

ZEHFUSS, M. Killing Civilians: Thinking the Practice of War. **British Journal of Politics and International Relations**, v. 14, n. 3, p. 423–440, 2012.

ZEHFUSS, M. **War and the Politics of Ethics**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.