Pedro Paulo dos Santos da Silva

RACIAL CONTESTATION AS EXTREMISM

the making of black radicals as a threat to the global/local political order

Dissertação de Mestrado

Dissertação apresentada ao programa de Pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais da PUC-Rio como requisito parcial para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Relações Internacionais.

Orientadora: Profa. Paula Orrico Sandrin

Coorientadora: Profa. Manuela Trindade Viana

Rio de Janeiro, 24 de Agosto de 2022

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Graduou-se em Relações Internacionais pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) tendo bolsa integral garantido pelo Programa Universidade para Todos (ProUni). Na graduação foi duas vezes agraciado com bolsa por alto rendimento acadêmico oferecido pela Mitsubishi Motors a estudantes do Instituto de Relações Internacionais da PUC-Rio. Durante o mestrado foi indicado ao prêmio IPS Best Graduate Paper da International Studies Association (ISA) em 2022. Pesquisador do Centro do Estudos de Segurança e Cidadania (CESeC) e Coordenador de Pesquisa do Laboratório de dados e narrativas da favela do Jacarezinho (LabJaca). Tem como temas de interesse as relações entre racismo, raça, e racialização, como temas e categorias analíticas, com os estudos críticos de segurança. Participou de pesquisas sobre produção cidadã de dados, indústria de defesa, segurança pública, e abordagens policiais. Tem artigos publicados na Folha de São Paulo, El País, e na revista Critical Studies on Terrorism.

This dissertation is dedicated to those grappling with white supremacy's roots, those de-legitimized in academia for their activism and in civil society for their "radicalism", those monitored, arrested, tortured, and killed for our collective liberation and abolition. To the radicals, past and present.

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Abstract

This dissertation investigates the making of black radicals as a threat to the global/local political order, focusing on two historical periods in which a discourse on "black extremism" emerged in the United States. The first corresponds to the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the Black Panther Party was constructed as the leading domestic threat to the U.S. security; the second, to the late 2000s and 2010s, when activists and social movements engaged in anti-police brutality re-entered the realm of concrete domestic threats to the U.S. In both historical contexts such threat-making processes were also infused with discourses concerning other racialized global threats to the U.S. The second half of the 20th century was marked by the construction of black radicals as a threat intrinsically connected with anticommunism and invested toward national liberation movements in former colonies. In the 21st century, the threat of black radicals is re-articulated into one intimately linked to "Islamic terrorism". These claims are based on a discursive-genealogical analysis that explores historical records made by policing agencies regarding "black extremism". The dissertation points to the persistence of the framing of black radicals as a "security problem"; within the United States, while the terms for these threat-making processes have been globally re-articulated. Hence, the "black extremism" discourse simultaneously refers to a racialized threat to the global and local political orders in the perception of the United States' policing architecture.

Keywords

Resumo

Esta dissertação investiga a construção de negros radicais como ameaça à ordem política global/local, focando-se em dois períodos históricos em que um discurso sobre "extremismo negro" emergiu nos Estados Unidos. O primeiro corresponde ao final dos anos 1960 e início dos anos 1970, quando o Partido Panteras Negras foi construído como a maior ameaça doméstica à segurança estadunidense; e o segundo, ao final dos anos 2000 e ao decorrer dos anos 2010, quando ativistas e movimentos sociais engajados no combate à violência policial reentraram na lista de ameaças domésticas aos Estados Unidos. Em ambos os contextos históricos, tal processo de construção de ameaça foi, também, informado por discursos sobre outras ameaças racializadas e globais aos Estados Unidos. A segunda metade do século XX foi marcada pela construção do radicalismo negro como ameaça intrinsicamente conectada ao anticomunismo voltado, particularmente, para movimentos de libertação nacional em ex-colônias. No século XXI, a ameaça de radicais negros foi rearticulada de modo a conectá-la com o "Terrorismo islâmico". Tais pontuações baseiam-se em uma análise discursivo-genealógica que explora registros históricos sobre o "extremismo negro" feitos por agências policiai. A dissertação aponta para a persistência do enquadramento do radicalismo negro como "problema de segurança" nos Estados Unidos, ainda que os termos que constroem essa ameaça são transformados globalmente. Assim, o discurso de "extremismo negro" refere-se à uma ameaça racializadas ao ordenamento político global e local na parte da arquitetura de policiamento estadunidense.

Palavras-chave

Racismo; Policiamento; Raça; Estudos Críticos de Segurança; Extremismo; Radicalismo Negro.

Summary

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
BIE	Black Identity Extremism
BL4M	Movement for Black Lives
BLA	Black Liberation Army
BLM	Black Lives Matter
BOI	Bureau of Investigation
BPP	Black Panther Party
BSE	Black Separatist Extremism
CCR	Constitutional Rights
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COC	Color of Change
COINTELPRO	Counterintelligence Program
CP-USA	Communist Party USA
CRM	Civil Rights Movement
CSG	Consolidated Strategy Guide
CTD	Counterterrorism Division
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DMI	Division of Military Information
DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
I&A	Intelligence and Analysis
IC	Intelligence Community
IWW	Industrial Workers of the World
JIB	Joint Intelligence Bulletin

LAPD	Los Angeles Police Department
MID	Military Information Division
MIS	Military Intelligence Section
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NBPP	New Black Panther Party
NSCT	National Strategy for Counterterrorism
NSHS	National Strategy for Homeland Security
NSS	National Security Strategy
NYPD	New York Police Department
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
PC	Philippines Constabulary
RME	Racially-Motivated Extremism
RMVE	Racially-Motivated Violent Extremism
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SitRep	Situational Awareness
SWP	Socialist Workers Party
U.S	United States
URSS	Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics
USA	United States of America
WoT	War on Terror's
WSE	White Supremacist Extremism

Politics is war without bloodshed. War is politics with bloodshed. When the peaceful means of politics are exhausted and the people do not get what they want, politics is continued. Usually this ends up in physical conflict, which is called war and is also political.

Huey P. Newton

When you're in a position of power for a long time you get used to using your yardstick, and you take it for granted that because you've forced your yardstick on others, that everyone is still using the same yardstick. So that your definition of extremism usually applies to everyone, but nowadays times are changing, and the center of power is changing. People in the past who weren't in a position to have a yardstick or use a yardstick of their own are using their own yardstick now. You use one and they use another. In the past when the oppressor had one stick and the oppressed used that same stick, today the oppressed are sort of shaking the shackles and getting yardsticks of their own, so when they say extremism they don't mean what you do, and when you say extremism you don't mean what they do. There are entirely two different meanings. And when this is understood I think you can better understand why those who are using methods of extremism are being driven to them.

Malcolm X

Radical simply means "grasping things at the root."

Angela Davis

1. Introduction

International politics in the second half of the 20th century was overall defined in terms of a bipolar conflict between the United States of America (USA) and the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR), respectively, leaders of the Capitalist/West bloc and Communist/East bloc (Best, 2008).

At the same time, national liberation struggles progressively put an end to de jure colonial empires and aimed at a "radical rupture – one that required a wholesale transformation of the colonized and a reconstitution of the international order" (Getachew, 2019, p.17). According to Adom Getachew (Ibid., p.15), a central tenet of anticolonialism was a critique of the racial hierarchy of the international order that preceded the Cold War conjuncture while also informing it (Barkawi; Laffey, 2006; Seymour, 2015). In this sense, a "radical rupture" meant a profound transformation of racism[1] on a global scale – it also signalized other propositions, which, although not being the center of this dissertation, will be briefly mentioned.

While the processes of decolonization gained traction in the so-called "Third World", the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) in the USA was engaging in a struggle against the Jim Crow laws, which created overt racial segregation in the Southern part of that country (Alexander, 2010, p.35). The CRM also opposed the existence of qualifications for voting, such as poll taxes and literacy tests, which obstructed voting rights for the African American population (Ibid., p.9-30)

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[1] In this dissertation racism is conceptualized as "the belief in, practice, and policy of domination based on the specious concept of race"; in this sense, "it is not simply bigotry or prejudice, but beliefs, practices and policies reflective of and supported by institutional power, primarily state power (Henderson, 2013, p.72). Racism, then, is the systematic utilization of racial differences to orient "discourse and ideologies; choices and interactions; behaviors and outcomes; institutions and institutionalizes orders; and practices and habits" (Vucetic, 2013, 31). Notably, further claims regarding racism, race, and racialization, will be made in the course of this research; hence, this footnote serves just as a primary summary of this concept.

For the United States government, particularly those bureaucracies and professionals engaged in taming dissidences to the order, these were not solely parallel events but could potentially create a security problem for at least three reasons (Borstelmann, 2001; Seymour, 2015). First, the contestation of domestic racism could be instrumentalized by the USSR to expose the U.S.' contradictions, giving breadth to the argument that communism was a superior alternative to capitalism and liberal democracy. Secondly, national liberation struggles could also turn to communism in their quest for transforming the racialized international order and finally, both global and domestic racial dissidences reinforced each other.

This context presented a problem for the U.S. government regarding how to address the "twin efforts" (Borstelmann, 2001, p.2) of anti-colonial and civil rights movements' potential for disordering (i.e., changing the current order), especially considering the aim of limiting communism's expansion at home and abroad. As Michel Foucault (1984a) argued, the terms in which an object is posed as a problem for politics define its "problematization". In other words, underlining that racial contestation was seen as a problem by the United States government since it could potentially push communism forward suggest a "problematization" of antiracist politics – that is, the historical construction of it as a problem for politics.

The contours given to a problem within a "problematization" are crucial for the horizon of available options to solve such an issue (Foucault, 1984a). As Thomas Borstelmann points out in this sense,

> The essential strategy of American Cold Warriors was to try to manage and control the efforts of racial reformers at home and abroad, thereby minimizing provocation to the forces of white supremacy and colonialism while encouraging gradual change. They hoped effectively to contain racial polarization and build the largest possible multiracial, anti-Communist coalition under American leadership. This effort proved generally more successful at home than abroad. The relatively small percentage of nonwhite Americans could be reasonably accommodated within the flexible structure of American democracy. But the more revolutionary situations in much of the Third World proved harder to control, as even deeper racial divisions of wealth and power alienated nonwhite majorities from their colonial and white settler overlords (Borstelmann 2001, p.2-3 – emphasis added).

This excerpt indicates two contours of a problem and as claimed above, a different solution. As aforementioned, a large part of the CRM had integration as its goal; thus, the termination of Jim Crow laws and access to full voting rights were seen as victories for this antiracist strand. Notably, these objectives could be achieved within the existing liberal-democratic institutions; that is to say: the solution to this specific configuration of the problem (Foucault, 1984a) of antiracist politics was "encouraging a gradual change" and "minimizing provocation" to the existing racial order through a 'reasonable accommodation' of African Americas (Borstelmann, 2001, p.2-3). Nevertheless, those that propose a "radical rupture" (Getachew, 2019, p.17) "proved harder to control" (Borstelmann, 2001, p.3), i.e., could have their goals quelled within the current racial order – which indicates a specific solution to this (radical) antiracist politics that will be mentioned below.

Albeit the CRM achieved significant victories during the 1960s, racism remained, as evidenced by successive events of police brutality[2] that targeted especially the African American population (Cleaver, 1968; Newton, 2019). The deaths of prominent antiracist leaders also crystallized the endurance of racism, particularly those of Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X, which prompted two community colleges students (Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale) to create the Black Panther Party (BPP) in the city of Oakland, California (Bloom; Martin, 2016, p.2).

According to Newton (2019), since the Party was triggered by racialized police brutality, its first initiative was to organize patrols to watch the police's actions and provide armed self-defense to the Afro-American community. Further than advocating for armed self-defense, Black Panthers operated a wide range of political interventions, for example, community programs that offered food, political education, and health treatments to the black and poor populations (Bassett, 2006; Bloom; Martin, 2016; Fujino; Harmachis, 2020; Manchanda; Rossdale, 2021).

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2 According to Bonner et al. (2018, p.2), police abuse (or brutality) are practices that include "arbitrary arrest, selective surveillance and crowd control, harassment, sexual assault, torture, killings, or even disappearances". These "may or may not be "illegal" but severely limit selective citizens' rights, receive minimal punishment (limited accountability), and may play a role in maintaining (or promoting) particular political and economic objectives" (Ibid., p.3-4).

The defiance of racial State violence and the initiatives mentioned above made the BPP "the largest Black Power organization of the era, with an estimated two thousand to five thousand members at its peak in forty chapters and branches across sixty-eight cities" (Fujino; Harmachis, 2020, p.2), but also further exposed the limits of the previous 'reasonable accommodation' policies designed to protect USA political interests while maintaining white order, at home and abroad, intact.

The Panthers also argued that racism conditioned "the struggle for liberation in the black community and anti-colonial struggles around the world, not only in Africa but also in Vietnam and elsewhere" (Bloom; Martin, 2016, p.66; See also Cleaver, 1968; Newton, 2019). Hence, as those engaged in national liberation struggles in the (former)colonies (Getachew, 2019) and other civil rights activists such as Malcolm X (Breitman, 1966a, 1966b; See also Kehinde, 2018), Panthers underlined that racism informs foreign and domestic politics. In this vein, antiracist politics should not be limited to transforming the local, but also the global political order since militaristic endeavors by the U.S. in Vietnam and elsewhere mirrored the occupation of internal colonies – the African American communities – in the United States (Cleaver, 1968; Newton, 2019; Manchanda; Rossdale, 2021).

These claims highlight a purpose that surpasses (or counterpoints) that of integrationists because the Black Panthers' aim was decolonization (ending internal/external colonialism), i.e., transforming the current global/local political order, including with recourse to political violence rather than solely through non-violent direct action and litigation. Panthers' breadth and objectives as the "revolutionary situations in much of the Third World" also "proved harder to control" (Borstelmann, 2001, p.2) for, as pointed out above, exposed the limits of the existing order in addressing racism. Such agenda turned global/local politics towards a "radical rupture" (Getachew, 2019, p.17), which posed once again the problem (Foucault, 1984a) of antiracism but in a manner which could not be "reasonably accommodated".

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Black Panther Party emerged as the main domestic threat to the United States in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Annual Reports. These and other documents materialized a (U.S. government) claim that the Black Panthers were the crystallization of a "black

extremism" threat, that is to say: a group that advocated violence against law enforcement agencies while also being influenced by Marxists and other revolutionary philosophies, and concretely tied to communists' states, and national liberation movements that threatened U.S. interests (U.S. Department of Justice, 1969, p.22; 1970, p.24; 1971, p.24-25). This context marks the "emergence" of discourse[3] on "black extremism", i.e., a specific historical moment in which power relations produce and attribute meaning to an object (Foucault, 1984b) – in this case, to a strand of antiracist politics related to the Black Panther Party.

Importantly, the FBI had been targeting "both leftists and black political organizations for investigation and disruption" since its creation in 1908 (Bloom; Martin, 2016, p.200), although the Bureau's inception is connected intrinsically with a bureaucratic reorganization in the U.S. Department of Justice at the turn of the 20th century. Then, the "black extremism" discourse has "lines of descend" (Foucault, 1984b) that precedes the Cold War (Seymour, 2015) scenario. In other words, the erection of this discourse at that particular moment, in these particular terms, and primarily led by that actor – i.e., the Bureau – stems from historical occurrences that were not necessarily aimed at achieving this result (Foucault, 1984b) – e.g., the FBI's inception that results from institutional interests.

Amongst these "lines of descend" (Foucault, 1984b) is the Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) creation. In the course of the first half of the 20th century, the FBI was shaped "into a massive domestic intelligence-gathering operation with files on millions of Americans including politics, political activists, and celebrities", particularly after it began being directed by J. Edgar Hoover in 1924 (Vitale, 2017, p.201). This accumulation culminated in COINTELPRO's creation in the late 1950s at the height of the Cold War's first part (Best, 2008; Seymour, 2015). The Program was an initiative led by Hoover to

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[3] Following Stuart Hall (2017, p.33), discourse is defined here as "that which gives human practice and institutions meaning, that which enables us to make sense of the world, and hence that which makes human practices meaningful practices that belong to history precisely because they signify in the way they mark out human differences. In this sense, there is not a fundamental meaning in the "material world": discourse is that which structures signification and (re)produces "ways of being in, and acting towards, the world" (Milliken, 1999, p.229). Discourse, therefore, is not purely speech or concrete social practices (Ibid., p.330); it underlines "that all human, social, and cultural practices are always both, that is they are always *discursive practices*" (Hall, 2017, 46 – author's emphasis) – that is to say, practices that construct meaning, linguistic and otherwise (Foucault, 2010, p.49).

counter perceived insurgencies to the domestic order through disruptive tactics rather than exclusively intelligence gathering and, initially, had the Communist Party USA (CP-USA) as the primary domestic threat to national security (U.S. Senate, 1976; Seymour, 2015; Bloom; Martin, 2016; Vitale, 2017).

The initial emphasis on the CP-USA gradually changed when, a decade later, the strengthening of CRM pushed COINTELPRO resources to refocus on black political leaders and organizations instead of strictly communist movements. For instance, Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X were investigated and targeted by COINTELPRO: here, a tactic often employed involved associating these leaders with communism (U.S. Senate, 1976; Bloom; Martin, 2016). The assassinations of King and X led to the reformulation of the main targets of COINTELPRO since, according to Director Hoover himself, "militant black nationalism groups" could still be "the first step toward a real 'Mau Mau[4]' in America, the beginning of a true black revolution". Under such terms, there was a need to prevent "the rise of a black messiah" that could articulate distinct strands of dissidence (Hoover, 1968, p.3).

At this moment, the confluence of these historical occurrences – e.g., Black Panthers' breadth, anti-communism, decolonization, particular bureaucratic interests within the Bureau, among others – defined the contours of the "emergence" (Foucault, 1984b) of a discourse on "black extremism". Here, according to FBI Director Hoover stated, Panthers were

> the greatest threat to the internal security of the country. (…) Schooled in the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the teaching of Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung. Its members have perpetrated numerous assaults on police officers and have engaged in violent confrontations with police throughout the country. Leaders and representatives of the Black Panther Party travel extensively all over the United States preaching their gospel of hate and violence not only to ghetto residents, but to students in colleges, universities, and high schools as well (Hoover, 1968 *apud* U.S. Senate, 1976, p.187-188).

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[4] According to Douglas Porch (2013, p.258), "Mau Mau" is "an invented, meaningless term" created by British colonizers to represent a Kenyan traditional named "Oathing", which meant bindind against hardships. Eventually, Mau May came to represent Kenyan anti-colonial dissidence (Porch, 2013), a point that underlines the perception within the Bureah that foreign and domestic antiracist politics were connected, and that the national liberation struggles could influenced the U.S. civil rights movement – particularly, those deemed as "radicals".

Hence, the apparatus erected to manage the security threat of political dissidences in the United States through disruptive tactics aimed at first the social control of labor and leftist organizations such as the CP-USA, which is: had anti-communism as its primary adversary. Anti-communism had racialized contours since its appearance (Seymour, 2015), but, as pointed out above, the center of COINTELPRO's initial goals was not antiracist politics (U.S. Senate, 1976). This (initial focus) did not prevent the later mobilization of such apparatus to tame the critique of racism, which was constituted as a threat to the foreign and domestic order.

The USA security apparatus did not solely make the construction of such a problem regarding the Black Panthers; this issue was posed before the creation of this organization. Nonetheless, this problematization exposed how the previous 'reasonable accommodation' rationality was re-articulated by framing radical alternatives such as self-defense, grassroots programs and a coalition between races and classes as "the beginning of a true black revolution" (Hoover, 1968, p.3). A change that led COINTELPRO's resources to be focused on the BPP: the problematization of antiracism was recycled to also encompass the potential "black revolution" as part of the "problem of national security" in the USA.

As documented in a thousand-page report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the U.S. Senate (1976, See chapter 3), the FBI acted via COINTELPRO to disrupt the BPP by promoting: violence between the Party and other armed organizations; internal dissent between members of the BPP; covert efforts to damage the public image of the organization; and operating with local police departments (P.D.) to collect intelligence and disrupt the Party. Furthermore, within COINTELPRO, the FBI conducted raids, with or without search warrants, in Panther offices[5] (Bloom; Martin, 2016, 233). After "implementing 233 of its 295 official COINTELPRO actions against the BPP" (Fujino; Harmachis, 2020, p.8), the Party increasingly languished until it was destroyed.

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[5] In one of these raids, Fred Hampton, leader of the BPP in Chicago, was assassinated in his home in an alleged firefight after being drugged by an FBI infiltrator (Bloom; Martin, 2016, p.245).

Recently much has been investigated, discussed, and found regarding the COINTELPRO. More specifically, current activists engaged in the same antiracist struggle as the 1960s understand that the Program was served not exclusively to disrupt the Panthers but also to impede the appearance of further "unreasonable" dissidences in the future (Khan-Cullors; Bandele, 2018; Johnson; Lubin, 2017). However, the Program's deactivation during the 1970s (U.S. Senate, 1976) and the defeat of "[t]he militant visions of class, nation, and race which promised utopia and delivered misery" (The White House, 2002a, p.1) – e.g., communism, national liberation movements – brought the general perception of hope for a distinct era.

As an effect of the struggle for civil rights, the United States elected its first African American president (Barack Obama) in the late 2000s. That is to say: an emblematic event that marked the inclusion of black people in society and, in turn, propelled a discourse in which race[6] had been surpassed and the U.S. entered a post-racial era (Alexander, 2010; Krishna, 2019; Bonilla-Silva, 2020). Despite this achievement, the black population continued to be subjected to poverty, precarious housing, differential treatment in private and public spaces, incarceration, and police profiling (Alexander, 2010; Davis, 2017; Bonilla-Silva, 2020), the same issues Black Panthers denounced in the 1960s and 1970s (Fujino; Hamarchis, 2020).

Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2020) claimed that this context expressed "color-blind" racism for systemic discrimination against African Americans remained even during Obama's administration; but, since an African American occupied the highest public officer in the country, this individual achievement came to be the crystallization that race ceased to be significant. Racism endured under a newer guise: operating without necessarily invoking race overtly. Most importantly, for this research, the "color-blind" discourse mirrors a 'reasonable accommodation' given that it does not aim to transform the systemic discriminations based on race

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[6] In this dissertation, race is understood as a set of discursive practices that articulate (linguistically and materially) human variations in order to produce and sustain a hierarchy in humanity, that is: the instrumentalization of physical markers, linguistic and cultural traits, as aspects that fabricate a specific position in a hierarchy of humanity that goes from human (those racialized as white) to inhuman (those racialized as black and indigenous, for example) (Doty, 1996; Shilliam, 2013; Hall 2017). Race has neither a spatial nor a temporal fixed meaning, an immutable essence, but is always a socio-historical articulation dependent on power relations (Doty, 1996; Vucetic, 2013; Hall, 2017; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018).

but solely integrate, gradually and orderly, a few African Americans in positions of power and authority.

Nevertheless, ranging police brutality centered on African Americans (Davis, 2017) gave breadth to another generation of activists to mobilize and organize against racism in the early 2010s, still during Obama's administration (Camp; Heatherton, 2016; Khan-Cullors; Bandele, 2016; Bonner *et al.*, 2018; Krishna, 2019; Bell, 2021). The successive assassination of black males, mostly young and unarmed, led several organizations to form the Black Lives Matter network (BLM) (Khan-Cullors; Bandele, 2016; Bell, 2021) and also to the formation of the Movement for Black Lives (M4BL) (Fujino; Hamarchis, 2020), that ignited demonstrations against racialized police brutality within and without the United States. Regarding police violence, Cullors (a BLM cofounder) argues for the need to construct a discourse that surpasses the idea of reforming the police and underlines the importance of abolishing this institution (Heatherton, 2016, p.35). In this sense, the BLM reaffirms the problem of racism as one that can only be surpassed through a radical transformation of the institutional fabric (Ibid., p.40), a purpose that is currently being pursued by worldwide demonstrations organized by the network (Heatherton, 2016; Khan-Cullors; Bandele, 2018).

With proper consideration, the 2010s context can be compared to the 1960s and 1970s for the substantial proportion of demonstrations domestically and internationally against racism (Johnson; Lubin, 2017; Fujino; Harmachis, 2020). The stitching of racism at home and abroad as intrinsically connected, and the proposition by some antiracist activists and organizations that a profound transformation is necessary to surpass the existing global/local political order, also resonates with Panthers' claims (Johnson; Lubin, 2017; Fujino; Harmachis, 2020). As Malcolm X and Black Panthers disagreed that integration within the existing order was the goal of antiracist politics and proposed a radical alternative in the 20th century, part of the current wave of activism also suggests that individual achievements and institutional reform are insufficient to ending racism.

As occurred in the 1960s, the Bureau read this effervescence in demonstrations against racialized police brutality as threatening (a security problem), culminating in the creation of the Black Identity Extremism (BIE) in

2017. According to the FBI, BIE was an increasing domestic threat to the United States security (U.S. Department of Justice, 2017, 2) and was understood as:

> use force or violence in violation of criminal law in response to a perceived racism and injustice in American society; some do so in furtherance of establishing a separate black homeland or autonomous black social institutions, communities or governing organizations within the U.S. (…) Retaliation and retribution for perceived wrongdoings against African Americans has become an organizing driver for BIEs. Some BIEs desire separation from perceived oppressive forces (law enforcement, USG personnel, and other oppressive forces who are viewed as participants in this perceived unjust institutionalized system). This type of targeting has become a more obtainable goal for BIEs (U.S. Department of Justice, 2018, p.1).

This document marks the emergence (Foucault, 1984b) of a discourse on "black extremism" in the 21st century. As fifty years earlier, radical contestation to racism has been problematized (Foucault, 1984a) as "extremism" – that is, as an unpalatable politics.

In current definitions of "black extremism" (discussed in chapter 3), there is an emphasis on the use of violence against law enforcement officers, usually claimed to be a consequence of Michael Brown[7]'s assassination in 2014 (U.S. Department of Justice, 2017, p.2). According to the FBI, this death and the subsequent acquittal of those involved gave breadth to a "perception" that the American society and institutions are racist against specific individuals and groups (U.S. Department of Justice, 2017, p.2). These "perceptions of police brutality against African Americans" following Brown's death ignited uprisings contesting racialized police brutality at home and abroad (Khan-Cullors; Bandele, 2016; Bonner *et al.*, 2018). For the Bureau, however, it "spurred an increase in premeditated, retaliatory lethal violence against law enforcement and will *very likely* serve as justification for such violence" (U.S. Department of Justice, 2017, p.2 – Emphasis added).

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[7] Michael Brown was an eighteen-year-old African American executed by law enforcement in Ferguson, city of the U.S. state of Missouri. The teenager was unarmed; nevertheless, he was shot six times and the officer involved was not charged. Both the death and the subsequent acquittal, resulted in demonstrations domestically and internationally against racialized police violence (Khan-Cullors; Bandele, 2018; Bell, 2021).

To support these claims, the Bureau referred to six "targeted attacks" on police officers between 2014 and the finalization of this first report on BIE (Ibid., p.4). People had committed these events in distinct places and from different ideologies, then hardly provided the evidence for a cohesive group (Winter; Weinberger, 2017); then, albeit not explicitly mentioning the BLM or the M4BL, this label (BIE) amplitude enabled disruptive actions against members of these and other social movements (Viana; Dos Santos da Silva, 2021). Thus, rather than being a push to reconsider the racist nature of the police, Brown's death was a trigger for framing antiracist protests as "black extremist" violence. Most importantly, "the highly probable" chance of a BIE event (U.S. Department of Justice, 1 and 8) forced the FBI to "*proactively address this priority domestic terrorism target*" (U.S. Department of Justice, 2018, p.1 - author's emphasis).

As aforementioned, it is also important to investigate the "lines of descend" (Foucault, 1984b) that result in this particular articulation of "black extremism". The Panthers and COINTELPRO history came to mind (Davis, 2016; Khan-Cullors; Bandele, 2018), but, as in the 20th century, a current racialized foreign enemy provides a crucial point in the process resulting in the discourse on "black extremism" that emerged in the United States.

As argued by the Bureau, this violent contestation of racism is a possible ground on which "terrorism" might flourish (Viana; Dos Santos Da Silva, 2021), a claim that intrinsically relates to War on Terror's (WoT) emergence in the early 21st century. In this context, 'domestic' antiracist politics is read through similar lenses as those used to deal with 'foreign' threat of "terrorism", particularly the so-called Islamic radicalism, just as the same FBI feared anti-communism spread in the civil rights and Global South's national liberation movements during the Cold War. In a distinct vein from 20th-century anti-colonial movements, groups such as Al-Qaeda are perceived to use political violence in a manner unrelated to racism (Barkwaki; Laffey, 2006; Krishna, 2009; 2019; Abu-Bakare, 2020).

Nevertheless, similar to national liberation movements of the second half of the 20th century, "Islamic radicalism" represents a contestation to colonial/imperial legacies and to a racialized order founded in it, as exemplified in the mentioning of foreign intervention as part of their justification regime (Barkawi; Laffey, 2006;

Krishna, 2009; 2019). The threat of "Islamic radicalism" is also understood as a despise of supposedly Western values such as democracy, liberty, secularism, and equality, since Islamism is essentialized as authoritarian and fanatical (Barkawi; Laffey, 2006; Krishna, 2009; 2019; Barder, 2021). As pointed out in footnote six, rather than exclusively physical attributes, race is also articulated with recourse to cultural traits; in this sense, the dominant reading of Islam and Muslims as "fanatical, obsessed with religion, and prone to violence" and the West as "the embodiment of rationality, secularism and military restraint" (Krishna 2019, p.9) is a racialization[8] process (Barder, 2021).

The claims made above present the mosaic that this dissertation explores. It can be summarized as an investigation of discourse on "black extremism", particularly looking at two global and local historical contexts in which it emerged: first, during the struggle for civil rights and national liberation; and the current moment of renewed protests against racism and the War on Terror. In both these moments, racial contestation was problematized (Foucault, 1984b) as dangerous politics materialized in the "extremism" label; that is, the construction of antiracist dissidence as "black extremism" is a historical continuity. Albeit "black extremism" remains, each of its articulations was infused by global and local politics of the two historical contexts. There were transformations in such discourse from civil rights to "colorblindness" and from anticolonialism to the War on Terror.

Following these suggestions, this dissertation's objective is to investigate what the problematization (Foucault, 1984a) of radical antiracism exposes concerning the broad political and research problem of managing contestations against racism. As Philippe Bonditti (2017, p.57 – author's emphasis) argues, "the history of problematizations consists in showing how a problem – which will be called *specific* here – expresses a particular form of problematization of a *more general* problem". In this sense, investigating the problematization of racial contestation in the United States speaks about a larger political and research problem: racial power and resistance. Such research problem is approached with a particular interest in how this discourse flourishes, particularly considering how

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[8] In this dissertation, racialization is comprehended process in which race is inscribed in a particular spatial and temporal context (Doty, 1998; Vucetic, 2013); it applies to objects and situations, but its focus is on agency, subjects, and identity formation" (Vucetic, 2013, p.34).

both local and global politics are central to understanding the emergence of the "problem of extremism" – that is, a politics understood as incompatible with a "reasonable accommodation" within the existing racialized foreign and domestic order.

To this purpose, this research traces a genealogical-discursive analysis[9] (Foucault, 1984b; Hall, 2017) of "black extremism" as articulated by the United States policing architecture through exploring historical records such as Annual Reports and Annual Strategic Guides, Intelligence and Threat Assessments, Lexicons (a list of threats nomenclatures), National Security Strategies, National Strategies for Counterterrorism, and others[10]. These archives are understood as more than a "register of statements" (Lobo-Guerrero, 2013, 121), but an entry point to thought regarding an object or subject: the emergence of its 'truth', who produces it and, most importantly, the effects of such truth (Bonditti, *et al.*, 2015).

Historical records are then a "materialization of power relations" (Lobo-Guerrero; Groevewout, 2018, p.247) that enable a dive into power struggles resulting in a discourse[11] (Foucault, 1981). Comprehending "black extremism" as

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[9] Such methodology is not "an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities", which reflects an assumption of "the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession" (Foucault, 1984b, 68) – that is, an understanding that a continual meaning to something that is grounded in essence or foundational to reality or a progressive form of history (Milliken, 1999). In a more systematical sense, a discursive-genealogical analysis first traces the lines of descent of an object, which does not mean elucidating an "unbroken continuity" but the scattered occurrences "that gave birth to those things that continue to have value for us" (Foucault, 1984b, p.81). Since the constitution of "things" is not linear, but a spread and complex web of processes, the descent part of the analysis "disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself" (Ibid., p.82). Secondly, there is the analysis of an object's emergence, which should not be confused with a historical culmination, but the "particular stage of forces" that informs "the current episodes in a series of subjugations" (Ibid., p.83), i.e., this part of the analysis grasps a specific "eruption" (Ibid., p.84) of power relations' enmeshing. Notably, there is not a clear separation of this analytical parts (descend and emergence), the distinction made here is mostly concerned with clarifying the methodology to reader.

[10] The nature of policing agencies is operating in secrecy, therefore researchers interested in investigating these institutions usually encountered methodological problems such as finding sources (Bosma; De Goede; Pallister-Wilkins, 2020). In this sense, this research is limited since several important historical records cannot be accessed given their secret character, nonetheless, the so-called leaks – i.e., the publicization of documents without authorization – are a fundamental form in which this issue was mitigated.

[11] It is crucial to mobilize a cluster of sources, not only because a single text cannot grasp a discourse, but also because discourses overlap or collide with one another (Milliken, 1999) – i.e., highlight a struggle. Using multiple sources serve to map broader conjuncture in which a record might be inserted, for example, institutional struggles of power that surround it and which culminate in a particular discursive framing of a threat (Bonditti, 2014) – such as "black extremism".

discourse reflects, first, an understanding of a lack of essential meaning "ways of being in, and acting towards, the world" (Milliken, 1999, p.229) considered as extremists; hence, "extremism" is always a discursive construction. Second, and most importantly, since discourse mirrors and (re)produces power relations, attributing the "extremist" label reveals more about those who articulated it than those constructed as such (Foucault, 1981; Bonditti, 2014). The production of "black extremism" is an endeavor of power; thus, its investigation, albeit speaking of resistance, analyzes power relations that fabricate a meaning regarding antiracist politics as dangerous – to something.

2.   The racial sight of a "giant"

In the final years of the 1960s, the Black Panther Party (BPP) was deemed the primary domestic threat to national security in the United States, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (Bloom & Martin, 2016; Vitale, 2017). At that moment, the Party had a few years of existence, and it was not the only African American social movement; nonetheless, it was assessed as the most dangerous on the FBI threat lists (U.S. Department of Justice, 1967; 1968; 1969; 1970) until it was substituted as this major threat by the Black Liberation Army (BLA) (Meier, 2022). The question guiding this chapter is: how did the "problematization" (Foucault, 1984a) of these African American social movements, particularly the Black Panthers, emerge?

The first section aims at grasping why the FBI was one of the leading agencies in constructing the domestic "extremism" discourse in the United States (U.S. Senate, 1976; Bloom & Martin, 2016; Vitale, 2017). For this purpose, the section begins by tracing the establishment of the domestic intelligence architecture in the United States – that is, the professional and bureaucratic field engaged in such activities in that country. As we will see, although intelligence activities have existed in the US since the eighteenth century, the breadth of such security practices has changed throughout history (Tidd, 2008; Coyne & Hall, 2018).

The formation of the domestic intelligence architecture underwent significant changes in two different moments: the Philippine-American War and World War I. The former provided a "laboratory" in which intelligence practices and institutional blueprints were developed in response to Filipino anticolonial dissidence (McCoy, 2009; 2016; Coyne & Hall, 2018). In this "laboratory", security professionals shaped the racial and social control apparatus by introducing technologies, practices, and racial imaginaries (Kramer, 2006; McCoy, 2009; 2016; Coyne & Hall, 2018).

Suppressing those in disagreement with the Filipino colonization provided these professionals with an expert position when they returned (Coyne & Hall, 2018). The privileged position enjoyed by the professionals returning from the

Philippines was vital in shaping the U.S. domestic intelligence architecture during World War I (Tidd, 2008; McCoy, 2009; 2016; Coyne & Hall, 2018). As will be shown, these professionals also returned with racial imaginaries fed by colonial warfare (McCoy, 2009; 2016).

By post-World War I, the basic contours of this field had been already designed, but the division of labor between agencies within this edifice was the core challenge in subsequent years (Tidd, 2008). In addition to a military intelligence agency undertaking intelligence work during the war, there was also a federal agency with an intelligence capability that expanded and became more professionalized during the war (McCoy, 2009; McCoy, 2016; Vitale, 2017). This multiplicity of specialized personnel and institutions resulted in a bureaucratic dispute from the aftermath of World War I until post-World War II, culminating in a separation of labor within this field according to which one agency was mainly responsible for domestic counterintelligence while the other focused on foreign intelligence-gathering (U.S. Senate, 1975).

In this vein, the second section's main claim is that, on the one hand, the erection of this field during the first half of the twentieth century is permeated by a multilayered institutionalization. On the other hand, despite the line separating foreign and domestic jurisdictions, the discursive construction of threats – i.e., security practices, imaginaries, and narratives regarding dangerousness – transverses this line. Following this argument, the second section also discusses how the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) read the connection between communism and decolonization post-World War II. The Agency, which became in charge of foreign intelligence in this period, argued that decolonization was a strategic problem to the United States' foreign policy, given its potential to undermine allies – that is, colonial empires (Central Intelligence Agency, 1948). In addition, these recently independent states could become a fertile ground for the expansion of communism (Central Intelligence Agency, 1948; Seymour, 2015). Finally, the CIA considered the radical character of African anticolonial movements as threatening to the U.S. and to Western interests worldwide (Central Intelligence Agency, 1961).

Simultaneously, the section points out that the Civil Rights Movement was paced at the center of domestic concerns (Marable, 1984; Alexander, 2010). According to the FBI, there were two sources of threat in this regard, both related to communism: first, the Bureau claimed that members of the Communist Party USA (CP-USA) infiltrated the movement to sow subversion (U.S. Department of Justice, 1964); second, that movements such as the Black Panther Party transpired overtly held communist ideals (U.S. Department of Justice, 1968; 1969; 1970). Thus, in the eyes of the FBI, communism and antiracism potential and actual connections threatened to become a broad insurrection in the United States, thereby justifying the framing of these movements as the main targets of the Bureau from the 1960s onwards (U.S. Senate, 1976). Section 2 presents the development of this dangerous connection between communism and antiracism, particularly to underline that this dual-faced threat resulted in a dual response at home and abroad, respectively, by the CIA and the FBI.

Finally, the third section focuses on how the United States field of intelligence development resulted in the Black Panthers' construction as a domestic threat, specifically by the Bureau. As the previous sections provide discussions regarding the "lines of descend" of the "problematization" analyzed in this dissertation, specifically as it concerns the Panthers, the concluding section explores the "emergence" (Foucault, 1984a; b) of the discourse on "black extremism".

2.1 Serpent's eggs: the racial/colonial/imperial roots of U.S. intelligence

The United States intelligence field is widely associated with professionalism and institutional density in the contemporary period (Tidd, 2008). According to several studies, however, such features only began to take shape in the late nineteenth century (Tidd, 2008; McCoy, 2009; Coyne & Hall, 2018). Although there had been experiences with intelligence-gathering and covert action before this period, they were confined to contexts of war (Tidd, 2008).

It was with the establishment of the Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in 1882 and the Army's Military Information Division (MID) in 1885 that intelligence institutions began to exist in so-called peaceful periods (Ibid.). These agencies focused on "acquiring information about foreign military capabilities, including military technology that U.S. forces lacked" in the post-Franco-Prussian War (1870) and the Chile-Peru naval conflict (1879-84) – armed confrontations that reinforced the importance of " intelligence actions for U.S. policymakers (Ibid., p.9), although the country was not directly involved. Albeit the first institutionalized U.S. domestic intelligence services, both ONI and MID had an "uneven development" between their creation and World War I (Ibid.).

In addition to these intelligence detachments within the U.S. armed forces, the first U.S. non-military agency that specialized in intelligence work was the Bureau of Investigation (BOI) – which turned into the Federal Bureau of Investigation decades later – established in 1908-1909 (Tidd, 2008; McCoy, 2009; Schrader, 2019). The Bureau was initially created to provide the U.S. Justice Department with an investigative capacity, relegated to private investigation companies before that (McCoy, 2009). The push toward federal intelligence gathering was driven by threats from left-wing organizations "implicated" in strikes, bombings, and assassinations in the earlier 1900s (Vitale, 2017, p.201). According to the former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent John M. Tidd (2008, p.9), the fear regarding "foreign subversion" in the earlier 1900s was vital to the expansion of domestic counterintelligence. At that period, however, the BOI did not have expertise in clandestine or covert operations, which would only be gained by the late 1910s (McCoy, 2009, p.26-27). These would only emerge in the context of World War I. Abroad, the main push for the institutional and professional development of the intelligence field was given around that same period, with the Philippine-American War (Kramer, 2006; McCoy, 2009, 2016; Coyne & Hall, 2018; Schrader, 2019).

Following the Spanish-American War (1898), the United States invaded and occupied the Philippines after the Battle of Manila Bay (Kramer, 2006). The Philippines was struggling against Spanish colonialism "for at least two decades" by then (Ibid., p.171), but with the Treaty of Paris signed between Spain and the U.S., the archipelago was formally "annexed" by the latter, triggering another

conflict in such territory (Ibid., p.180-181). As underlined by McCoy (2009, p.28), Filipino "regular" armed forces were defeated by the U.S. Army in the first months of combat, and the United States declared control of the islands in 1902. Nevertheless, an "extraordinary array of insurgents" composed of "national army, urban underground, guerilla resistance, militant unions, messianic peasants, and Muslim separatists" persisted and challenged U.S. colonialism for fifteen years (Ibid., p.22).

For Paul A. Kramer (2006; See also McCoy, 2009), the justification for the war relied on racial arguments. The Philippine-American War, for example, was characterized as a "natural extension of Western conquest" that stemmed from the United States' sharing of Anglo-Saxon superiority; then, its imperial enterprise was "the organic expression of the desires, capacities, and destinies of "Anglo-Saxon" peoples" (Ibid., p.184). The U.S. (white) population had a racial brilliance for empire-building, which served to expand "civilization" given their roots in the Anglo-Saxon race (Ibid.).

The "social Darwinism" that was contemporaneous to the Philippine-American War provided cement for the construction of the Filipino people as "84 tribes" composed of particular languages, religions, and political allegiances (Kramer, 2006, p.185-186; McCoy, 2009, p.39). According to this narrative, at the foundation of these "tribes" were three races: the Negrito, the Indonesian, and the Malayans (Kramer, 2006, p.186). The first was considered inferior to the other two, but this account underlined a "scientific" argument that Filipinos were inferior to the U.S. population (Kramer, 2006, 185-186; McCoy, 2009, 39).

As argued by Kramer (2006, p.189),

> Even as the administration "tribalized" Filipinos in its campaign to rationalize the war at home, U.S. soldiers on the ground racialized their opponents with striking speed and intensity. In the war's early months, what had been diffuse and fragmented prewar animosities quickly congealed into novel racial formations at the very center of U.S. soldiers' popular culture, capable of defining a wartime enemy and organizing and motivating violence against that enemy.

In addition to the racialization of the Filipino people in the US public debate, the U.S. troops used the terms "Indians", "niggers", and "savages" to refer to the local population (Ibid., p.189-190), revealing yet another form of racial imaginary

underpinning this enterprise, one that enabled an intersection of enmity with inhumanity. Although the U.S. Army defeated the "regular" Filipino armed forces, the conflict continued for several years after the U.S. declared control of the archipelago in 1902 (McCoy, 2009, p.22). The Filipino anticolonial dissidence used "guerrilla warfare" to remain in combat. The country was divided into distinct military zones, each under a different command, and combat was waged in a "regionally dispersed set of smaller campaigns through locally raised sandataban [guerrilla] units" (Kramer, 2006, p.194). Such a tactic offered advantages to the Filipinos because the U.S. soldiers were subjected to "unfamiliar conditions" such as "tropical disease" (Ibid., p.195). The guerrilla was familiar with the terrain, such as difficult roads, while counting on village-level support (Ibid.). The so-called insurgents' espionage abilities (e.g. using codes to conceal their identity and the spread of disinformation that implicated adversaries) posed a challenge to the intelligence capacity of U.S. forces, unfolding a complex counterinsurgency terrain for the imperial military forces (McCoy, 2009, p.38).

This complexity pushed the U.S. military leadership to adopt another approach to combat. As underlined by a U.S. Army Colonel,

> The condition of our military forces there might compared with that of a blind giant. The troops were more than able to annihilate, to completely smash anything that could be brought against them in the shape of military force on the part of the insurgents: but it was almost impossible to get any information in regard to those people (apud in U.S. Senate, 1902, p.2850).

This military officer argued that intelligence was essential to achieving the U.S. strategic objectives given the shape of the Philippine-American War had acquired. Since the Filipino anticolonial dissidence was not engaging in broad and overt battles but decentralized confrontations, information was a key weapon to understand the enemies' tactics and strategies, prevent ambushes, predict movements, and design counterinsurgency policies.

According to Kramer (2006, p.195), posing this problem led to the transformation of the U.S. Army's command structure, tactics, and knowledge requirements in the Philippines; its forces were decentralized and re-positioned to occupy cities in more remote areas. In this context, the U.S. colonial administration in the Philippines designed a "three-tiered security structure" (McCoy, 2009, p.60).

The first layer corresponded to the police forces divided into municipal and metropolitan, respectively, a Filipino armed force that operated in the hinterlands and a binational unit to contain dissidences in the capital (McCoy, 2009; Coyne & Hall, 2018). Both executed "standard police patrols" while also conducting surveillance and producing data (photographs and documentation, for instance) of those deemed suspects (Coyne & Hall, 2018). For example, with the ending of the Army's patrols, members of the military's Bureau of Information were incorporated into the Metropolitan police force as its Secret Service and inspected all steamships and pawnshops daily and photographed discharged prisoners (McCoy, 2009).

In the second tier, there was the Philippines Constabulary (PC) (McCoy, 2009; 2016), a paramilitary force that performed patrols nationally to capture dissidents and their weaponry to effectively "disarm the countryside" and used intelligence operatives to monitor so-called subversives and radical nationalists in Manila (McCoy, 2009, p.82). According to McCoy (2016, p.22), "the Constabulary was systematic in its collection of incriminating information and selective in its release" – that is, this police/military unit used intelligence to protect the reputation of allies and to cause damage to the image of the enemies. In addition to pursuing this tactic of (dis)information, the PC also monitored media, developed psychological profiles, and committed assassinations (Ibid., 28). For McCoy (2009, p.17), these practices turned the Philippines Constabulary into the first U.S. federal agency with a "fully developed covert capacity". A point that corroborates the idea that the ONI and the MID gathered intelligence to inform Washington's policymaking regarding other countries but had not institutionalized covert action yet.

The third part of the security field implemented in the Philippines corresponded to the newly established Division of Military Information (DMI), which functioned as the central intelligence unit for the agencies engaged in combating the Filipinos (McCoy, 2009; 2016). At first, the DMI followed the practices used by the MID, such as collecting and cataloging enemies' documents, but the DMI went through a significant restructuration under Ralph Van Deman's command – by then, an Army captain that came from the MID's mapping section in Washington (McCoy, 2009; 2016; Schrader, 2019). As McCoy describes,

> working within a military whose intelligence capacity was at best rudimentary, Van Deman quickly developed innovative doctrines for the DMI by collecting, categorizing, and operationalizing what soon became encyclopedic information on every aspect of the Filipino resistance: active guerrillas, civilian supporters, finances, firearms, ideology, propaganda, communications, movement, and terrain. Instead of passively filing documents and compiling monographs like the Military Information Division in Washington, Van Deman's Manila command combined reports from the Army's 450 post information officers with data from the colony's civil police to produce actionable field intelligence. With telegraph lines knitting nets around guerrilla zones and the captain pressing subordinates for fast, accurate information, DMI's field units proved agile in tracking rebel movements and identifying their locations for timely raids (McCoy, 2009, p.77-78).

Hence, the U.S. Army's strategic perspective that for suppressing anticolonial dissidence, there was a need for more accurate intelligence provided the appetite for expanding and professionalizing such practices. Van Deman's "innovations" fulfilled the giant's hunger for information and gave his DMI particular importance within this triad of bureaucracies (McCoy, 2009; 2016; Coyne & Hall, 2018). The information was gathered from several sources, such as police forces, the PC, and the Army, and stemmed from "captured documents and interrogation reports" (McCoy, 2009, p.80), but also from Filipino spies that infiltrated the guerrillas and from captives, both vital for "operational intelligence" (Ibid., p.79). In addition to this amassing of information, Van Deman also introduced the systematization of information in a list of "cards" that summarized essential subjects in terms of appearance, finances, and political position, among other variables (Ibid., p.78). Most importantly, the Captain's DMI operationalized the intelligence amongst police/military units with products such as daily reports to the Army command and "operational bulletins" for officers in the field (Ibid., p.78).

These security practices are neither neutral nor disconnected from the enemy's construction in racial terms. In a discussion of contemporary "security lists", Marieke de Goede and Gavin Sullivan (2016) argue that listing those deemed threatening is a method through which the enemy is produced. In other words, gathering, compiling, and classifying elements from an entity – e.g. Al-Qaeda – vests such information with coherence, producing the same thing it purports to

comprehend (de Goede & Sullivan, 2016). Along similar lines, the intelligence work undertaken by the colonizer security apparatus in the Philippines was both informed by and contributed to the fabrication of the discursive contours of the enemy as a racially inferior one. Thus, both the racialized imaginaries and narratives concerning Filipino people (Kramer, 2006; McCoy, 2009) and the DMI's and PC's security practices enmesh in the production of the enemy – a point that will be further explored below.

In this sense, although the period stretching from the creation of the ONI and MID to World War I is often disregarded in the history of the U.S. intelligence field (Tidd, 2008), the Philippine-American War had profound importance in the creation of a blueprint involving local police, national police, and a central intelligence agency to counterinsurgency. Besides, as we have seen, the DMI developed procedures for the systematization and dissemination of collected data; articulated different organizations; circulated intelligence amongst this fabric; and, finally, consolidated further a professionalized and institutionalized field of intelligence aimed at achieving the U.S. security goals.

Such institutional fabric speaks to three fundamental points of this first section. First, as modern/colonial enterprises usually occur, the colonization of the Philippines was discursively based on racial difference: indeed, from the domestic public debate and the policymaking circles to the policing practices, the Filipino people was constructed as both inferior and threatening, resulting in a "war of racial exterminism" (Kramer, 2006, p.172). In this sense, "lesser breeds" of Asian, Spanish mestizos, Muslims, and tribal populations were seen as inferior to the colonizer (McCoy, 2009, p.39), which constituted the basis of the regime of justification for their subjection to racial policing – notably, the enmeshing of racism and policing, which will be explored later in this dissertation.

Also, the emergence of this apparatus allows us to understand how intelligence-gathering came to be incorporated as one of the pillars of security practices in the U.S. Combined with the professionalization and institutionalization of racialized social control, these technological and technical transformations gave the U.S. a tactical advantage concerning dissidence, enabling the preservation of white supremacy in the Philippines (McCoy, 2009, p.16; Coyne & Hall, 2018,

p.75). Throughout the years, this process culminated in regular tactics such as "individual surveillance, covert infiltration, political manipulation, psychological profiling, comprehensive data collection, and strategic disinformation" (McCoy, 2009, p.36).

Finally, the Philippines served as a colonial laboratory to create the practices mentioned above, and these developments echoed in the security field erected years later in the U.S. (Ibid., p.37). The professionals that integrated such intelligence apparatus in the Philippines brought these techniques to the U.S. and planted the seeds to expand domestic surveillance (McCoy, 2009; 2016; Coyne & Hall, 2018). These professionals also maintain within the U.S. intelligence field the "imperious dominion over those deemed other, and thus lesser, whether ethnic communities, political dissidents, or ordinary workers" (Ibid., p.39-40). In other words, the racial difference that informed counterinsurgency in the Philippines also figures in the domestic intelligence field (McCoy, 2009; 2016) – as will be discussed below. Colonialism is, in this sense, a process that transforms both the colony and the metropole, rather than being a unilateral event (McCoy, 2009, 20; Hönke & Müller, 2016).

The impact of the experience accumulated in the Philippines on the U.S. domestic intelligence field was not immediate. As Tidd (2008, p.9) underlines, the MID was "essentially abolished" in 1908 and merged with the newly created War College. Other countries also developed counterespionage methods that made the operations carried out by the ONI more complex, while the U.S. Navy started to demand further protection from foreign espionage. In this sense, "[i]n prewar decades, the federal government had limited intelligence, less operational capacity, and no covert capability" (McCoy, 2009, p.296). Here, it is essential to highlight that the Division of Military Intelligence and the Philippine Constabulary were organizations created solely for the administration of the colonial territory. Therefore, although they were part of the US intelligence apparatus, these agencies were not considered "domestic" because their intelligence gathering was not focused on fighting threats inside the United States (Tidd, 2008).

Rather than an immediate result, colonialism directly affected the emergence of the domestic field during World War I. As in past experiences, this

global conflict provided institutional incentives for flourishing intelligence services (Tidd, 2008; McCoy, 2009). McCoy (2009, p.296) argues that the claim of an intelligence threat from other countries during the war pushed the Bureau of Investigation to become a "major investigative agency". Similarly, as Tidd (2008, p.10) pointed out, the Office of Naval Intelligence also gained breadth during this period to increase foreign intelligence gathering and domestic counterintelligence. Most importantly, Ralph Van Deman was vital for the expansion of this intelligence fabric; the military officer built the Army's Military Intelligence Division (MID) – previously named Military Intelligence Section (MIS) –, which, despite the same acronym, is a different organization from the extinct Military Information Division (McCoy, 2009; 2016).

The expertise gained by intelligence professionals in the Philippine-American War, particularly in the case of Van Deman, guaranteed them a position of power within the U.S. intelligence field (Coyne & Hall, 2018, p.79). The acknowledgement of Colonel Van Deman as an expert in the field allowed him to establish a list of those deemed domestic subversives, expand the number of officers engaged in intelligence, employ civilians as operatives that conducted espionage and amass many documents regarding enemies (McCoy, 2009; 2016). Like the DMI in the Philippines, the newly created MID provided assessments to policymakers and introduced electronic espionage with the surveillance and de-cryptographing of messages exchanged among enemies (Tidd, 2008).

As the Bureau (Bloom & Martin, 2016; Vitale, 2017), the MID understood "radical" leftwing politics as threatening since its foundation. For Van Deman, the socialist union International Workers of the World (IWW) opposition to the World War had the potential to damage "strategic copper production from western mines" and "oil fields", resulting in a shortage of resources for the military during the conflict (McCoy, 2009, p.308). Following the Philippine-American War "colonial blueprint", the MID conducted "covert counterintelligence against radical unions and socialist parties", such as the infiltration in those organizations. In this particular endeavor, private security and detective agencies were recruited to conduct these operations in the MID, resulting in the expansion of policing, as will be further discussed in Chapter 4.

Moreover, World War I added tension to the racial segregation in the United States by incorporating African American soldiers into the armed services, which was seen as an advancing black people leading to a backlash by white supremacists and a response by the black population (Ibid.). According to McCoy (2009, p.309), Van Deman concluded without evidence that so-called subversion by "Negro" in connection with German agents was a critical security threat at the time. To prevent this "threat" from growing stronger, the MID commander recruited an African American officer from the Philippine Constabulary to manage potential "Negro subversion". The MID also infiltrated the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) but concluded that "white racism and black resentment were too complex and too deeply rooted in American society for any covert intervention" and recommended reforms both in the Army and in the American society, more broadly – suggestions that had no impact at the time (Ibid.).

During World War, MID acted to quell dissidence by unions or socialists while underlining those racial and ethnic others – such as African Americans – could easily support enemies (McCoy, 2009). This threat perception triggered actions with civilian organizations conducting espionage and contacting local police departments (Ibid.). Although the MID was not the only agency engaged in similar counterinsurgency activities at home[12], it was the most prominent and active institution within the U.S. domestic intelligence field.

Notably, at this moment, the BOI, which previously did not have the covert capacity, managed the recently created network of civilian espionage (McCoy, 2009; 2016). The sharing of knowledge from working with the MID pushed the establishment of this capacity further within the Bureau, culminating in the distillation of practices developed in the Philippines for officers that did not participate in the colonial endeavor.

While the World War itself "left permanence and specialization" (Tidd, 2008, p.10) – e.g. the establishment of organizations and practices that remain after the war – the 1917 Russian Revolution also represented a watershed in the definition of the future contours of the domestic intelligence field. The potential of

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[12] The Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence also worked to quell so-called subversion amongst employees (Ibid.), for instance.

communism to become an alternative to liberal society was considered a threat by then U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and the established intelligence fabric that regularly intervened in the social conflict on the side of capital (McCoy, 2009; Seymour, 2015; Vitale, 2015). Wilson's foreign policy highlighted the importance of the self-determination of nations doctrine and defended the superiority of liberalism vis-à-vis other forms of society (Seymour, 2015).

According to Richard Seymour (2015, p.161), however, the denial of Japan's racial equality clause at the war's end exposed that "Wilson had no intention of permitting "self-determination" to apply to non-white nations". This underlined a contraction between the United States foreign policy narrative and concrete actions that were present in the Bolshevik propositions: the latter favored self-determination of nations broadly, including those racialized as non-White – although as strategic to expand communism, a fear exposed in a U.S. Department of Justice (1952) document. The Bolshevik Revolution's period was thus marked by a moment that came to be known as the "Red Scare", which gave impulse to the fear of an expansion of communism in the world and, more specifically, in the U.S. (Seymour, 2015; Vitale, 2017).

In this context, communism was discursively elevated to the position of the main threat to U.S. security, informing the work of the recently established domestic intelligence field in that country (Vitale, 2017). The "Red Scare" fueled the justification used by the U.S. Attorney General at home, A. Mitchell Palmer, to design policies against specific leftwing organizations. Known as the Palmer Raids, these actions included the deportation of those perceived as subversive (Vitale, 2017; Schrader, 2019). As Vitale (2017) points out, local law enforcement cooperated with the Justice Department during the Palmer Raids to search, deport, arrest, interrogate, and torture activists. Thus,

> While the avowed focus was on preventing armed revolution, the real target was the disruption of the burgeoning labor movement. In addition, Palmer singled out groups that supported equal rights for African Americans for a public attack, such as the Communist Party, which, to his horror told "Negros" that they had the right to strike (Vitale, 2017, p. 203).

In 1919, when J. Edgar Hoover became the BOI's intelligence sector leader, this association between African Americans and communism was crystalized. As

Seymour (2015, p.162) reminds us, Hoover, a central figure in the U.S. domestic intelligence field, considered African Americans "prone" to communism. As head of the Office, Hoover worked to produce thousands of leftwing dissidents' files – targets of investigation and disruption since the beginning of the Bureau (Bloom & Martin, 2016; Vitale, 2017; Schrader, 2019). These files used the technique of "cards" developed by Van Daman's DMI in the Philippines (McCoy, 2009, p.24).

The BOI also cooperated with local police departments' "Red Squads": sections within local law enforcement that focused on anticommunism and gained breadth in the post-World War (Vitale, 2017, p.205; Schrader, 2019, p.65). These detachments were initially formed in the early twentieth century to repress the labor movement, particularly anarchist activists – considered the most dangerous within leftwing politics until the "Red Scare" (Vitale, 2017). Indeed, these teams connected with private business interests and right-wing politics, resulting in interventions to support capital rather than labor (McCoy, 2009; Vitale, 2017). In practice, the "Red Squads" conducted a range of police abuses that went from disaggregating meetings, intimidation, brutalization, and surveillance, such as infiltrating the labor movement by paying informants within the groups (McCoy, 2016, p.24; Vitale, 2017, p.205), a tactic also used in future endeavors.

During World War I, several pieces came together to give contours to the United States domestic intelligence field. First, the Philippine colonization lifted professionals such as Van Deman and acolytes to an expert position allowing for the diffusion of practices and imaginaries in this field. Second, the Bureau of Investigation gained breadth with increased resources and formed an Intelligence Division, which guaranteed the presence of the future Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the pantheon of U.S. intelligence agencies. Finally, the police departments' detachments to prevent dissidence locally developed into "Red Squads" that jointly operated with federal entities.

The United States domestic intelligence field mirrored the one erected in the Philippines. Both aimed at controlling dissidence through mobilizing multiple agencies, such as local police, federal, and armed forces. Indeed, at home and abroad, local law enforcement, federal agencies (Bureau of Investigation and Philippines Constabulary, respectively), and military services (Military Intelligence

Division and Division of Military Information, respectively) operated against dissidents.

Differently from the organization of the jurisdiction of those agencies following a domestic-foreign division of labor, racial and social control discourses were not confined to those boundaries. On the contrary, the discursive construction of "inferior races" and the "danger of communism" as the enemies to be fought often traversed that dividing line since the early moments of that field's formation; renderings of enmity are enmeshed in global and local politics – an argument further developed in the fourth chapter of this dissertation.

However, this field's growth was not without tensions between the professionals struggling to defend or expand each agency's mandate. The existing institutions were expanded during the interwar period, but information or responsibilities were poorly shared, according to Tidd (2008, p.11). Ralph Van Deman importance within the field and proximity with the (at the time) FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover contributed to Van Deman's vital participation in negotiating a delimitation between Military Intelligence and the Bureau (McCoy, 2009; 2016). This accord guaranteed that the Bureau completely controlled domestic counterintelligence while intelligence gathering in other countries would be part of the Army's Military Intelligence mandate (McCoy, 2009; 2016).

The "failure" to prevent the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor resulted in the creation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to produce intelligence for the executive branch rather than for a particular institution (Tidd, 2008; McCoy, 2016). The OSS established a broad "human espionage program" and engaged in a "covert operations program" that included propaganda, sabotage, and guerilla warfare abroad (Tidd, 2008, p.11-12). According to Tidd (2008, p.12), although disbanded at the war's end, the OSS was as vital to the allied forces as introducing new intelligence "collection methods" such as electronic and aerial surveillance.

The war's aftermath brought to the debate an argument that intelligence was essential but that such efforts should be conducted in a "nationally focused and centrally coordinated intelligence", a proposition opposed by existing agencies (Tidd, 2008, p.12). This "intense bureaucratic warfare", in Tidd's terms (2008, p.12), culminated in the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which,

similarly to the OSS, would "produce all-source intelligence for national-level consumers" and also "have access to all intelligence information" (Ibid., p.13). The CIA was authorized to employ clandestine methods, such as espionage, but was limited to foreign intelligence while the FBI continued its mandate to domestic counterintelligence (U.S. Senate, 1975), which includes investigating espionage, sabotage, and "other subversive activities" in the domestic domain (U.S. Department of Justice, 1964, p.21).

As we have seen, this field was marked by a formal boundary dividing domestic and foreign intelligence activities. This formal boundary organizes the discursive fabrication of threats. Nevertheless, conceptually, this boundary meant that the CIA and the FBI emerged as nodal points for producing knowledge regarding foreign and domestic threats, respectively. Here, knowledge is understood as enmeshed in power relations and vice-versa, meaning that what is considered legitimate knowledge gives those who produce it an authorization to speak about a particular topic while marginalizing other possible voices (Foucault, 1980; 1981). Such exclusion occurs because the "speaking subject" (Foucault, 1981, p.62) produces what comes to be considered truth (Ibid., p. 54-56), that which governs the "production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements" (Foucault, 1980, p.133). In other words, truth is the mechanism regulating what can legitimately be said and by whom. Therefore, the division of labor among intelligence agencies following the inside/outside boundary turns the FBI into what Foucault would call a "speaking subject" (Foucault, 1981, p.62) – one of fundamental importance in legitimating the discursive construction of threats to domestic order.

On the one hand, the production of this boundary is constantly contested by discourses such as the enmeshing of antiracism and communism at home and abroad during the Red Scare (Seymour, 2015). This dynamic between formal boundaries and discursive contestation is a focal point in this dissertation that is further discussed in the next section and chapter.

2.2   A hatched egg I: black radicals abroad

The previous section underlined that, during the first half of the twentieth century, the field of institutions and professionals engaged in gathering intelligence and counterintelligence emerged and was expanded. As mentioned above, an essential feature of this Intelligence Community[13] (IC) is the distribution of responsibilities between bureaucracies, resulting in the construction of threats as domestic or international – depending on the "speaking subject" (Foucault, 1980) producing the threat. As in the aftermath of the First World War, the post-second World War was characterized by a renewed breadth of anticommunism, but in different discursive terms (Seymour, 2015). In this particular period, anticommunism coexisted with the growth in the antiracist struggle at home and with the decolonization of European empires abroad: these had profound effects on the terms and practices with which security threats would be conceived and confronted (Marable, 1984; Seymour, 2015; Getachew, 2019).

Indeed, the CIA saw several connections between decolonization struggles, on the one hand, and the threat to U.S. security, on the other: first, because the decrease in European empires would narrow the range of U.S. allies; second, decolonization would allegedly narrow the access to raw materials; and, most importantly, it could stimulate the expansion of the soviet-bloc in case of national liberation movements turned to communism (Central Intelligence Agency, 1948, p.1-2). This last scenario was already articulated in the U.S. in the 1920s, but it was strengthened with the emergence of the USSR as a superpower following World War II and with the revolutionary ethos of decolonial movements (Nkrumah, 1965; Getachew, 2019).

The assessment regarding decolonization as a security problem to the U.S. was vocalized by several prominent actors within the Intelligence Community, including the CIA, branches of the armed forces, and the National Security Council. Although, before the Cold War, decolonization struggles were read as a security

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[13] This nomenclature emerged during the 1950s to express the field of institutions, authorities, and professionals that focus on intelligence and counterintelligence (Tidd, 2008).

problem pertaining to the European empires (Central Intelligence Agency, 1948, p.1-2), the elements mentioned above allowed for the re-signification of those struggles as a matter of "world politics". According to the CIA, this problem should be addressed by

> Far-reaching colonial reforms, designed to foster colonial political, economic, and social development, would do much to neutralize the more violent aspects of native nationalism and to substitute orderly evolution toward the inevitable goal of independence for the violent upheavals characteristic of the present situation (Central Intelligence Agency, 1948, 14).

In this sense, the CIA firmly believed that decolonization was inevitable but sought to develop a foreign policy that enabled the U.S. and other colonial empires to maintain their privileged position after independence (Ibid.). These "colonial reforms" would be the instrument through which change and self-determination would be promoted without decreasing control by the former metropoles – that is, rather than a violent revolutionary ethos, the policy would push for regulated reformulation. This agenda contrasted with many decolonization movements' ambition for a complete transformation of world order, one that would be antiracist, anti-imperial, and anti-capitalist (Nkrumah, 1965; Getachew, 2019), even if by violent means (Fanon, 2004). Deradicalizing liberation struggles were at the core of the CIA's efforts, focusing on reforms to achieve a limited transformation.

Furthermore, intelligence work pointed to USSR support for liberation movements in Asia: according to the CIA, for instance, the Korean War was portrayed by the USSR as "a nationalist struggle against Western colonialism", but for "propaganda" purposes (Central Intelligence Agency, 1953, p.1). Following this narrative, Third World struggles were subsumed into the Cold War conflict rather than previous anticolonial aspirations (Barkway; Laffey, 2006). To Agency's reports, the USSR was at fault for disseminating the idea that the U.S. and European colonial powers were fighting against anticolonial and liberatory movements through aggressive actions (Central Intelligence Agency, 1953). For the CIA, this was a propagandistic narrative aimed at exploring and manipulating these movements and preventing the growth of Western influence in that region (Ibid.). Interestingly, the CIA uses the term colonial in quotation marks, suggesting that European countries were not colonialists.

This articulation of decolonization as a security problem was far from an end in the eyes of the CIA. Another report of the Agency contends that "the USSR is not likely to abandon its policy regarding the 'liberation movements' which has already gained great prestige" (Central Intelligence Agency, 1948, p.4). Years later, this vision would justify the surveillance of the 1955 Bandung Conference by the Agency (Central Intelligence Agency, 1955). The diplomatic event of gathering newly independent countries to discuss the current global order was seen as an organic part of the CIA anticommunism campaign, given the intense participation of leaders aligned to the USSR, as well as the condemnation of imperialism by the participants in that occasion (Ibid.).

Surveillance was also present in the 1957 Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, attended by communists who, according to the CIA, aimed at aligning national liberation movements with the USSR's foreign policy and decreasing the Western influence in Africa and Asia (Central Intelligence Agency, 1957a, p.17). Among the resolutions resulting from such Conference, one highlighted that "the problems of the colonial areas and newly independent countries, as well as the threat to world peace, are due solely to 'imperialist ambitions'" (Central Intelligence Agency, 1958b, p.3). To the CIA (Ibid.), this was part of USSR "propaganda".

Importantly, the Conference's Racial Discrimination Subcommittee attempted to incorporate a formal condemnation of Jim Crow laws into one of its resolutions (Ibid., p.11), a maneuver defeated in a later stage. Despite this decision, the documents and speeches from the Conference elaborated a sound connection between racism in the US and colonial racism, a discursive formulation present in the Civil Rights Movement, as will be explored below.

Similarly, African anticolonial movements deemed "radical" by the United States emerged as another problem linked to decolonization in the early 1960s (Central Intelligence Agency, 1961, p.1). According to the CIA, the claim that the metropoles preserved "spheres of influence" in former colonial areas through the neo-colonial economic dependence of independent countries was a tenet of these so-called radicals (Ibid., p.2). For the Agency, "radicals" advocated for an ending to the colonial economic structure and aspired for the political control of their respective countries and continent's resources while criticizing the reading of

African issues solely in Cold War terms (Ibid., p.2-3). In this assessment, these movements were also characterized as pursuing a unified political action in the African continent, a politics of Pan-Africanism or African nationalism (Ibid., p.3). The CIA also pointed out that the agenda defended by these "radicals" involved the articulation of

> demands for the early withdrawal of Western military assets throughout Africa; (b) further relation against France on Algeria, the Sahara bomb tests, and its policies in West Africa; and (c) frequent support for Soviet Bloc initiatives before the UN and elsewhere which are in harmony with African "aspirations". *The tendency of Africa's militant nationalists to adopt extreme postures on issue areas will pose serious problems of the West, and particularly the US* (Central Intelligence Agency, 1961, p.6 – our emphasis).

This agenda went beyond the reforms previously proposed by the CIA (Borstelmann, 2001, p.2-3): underlining that European colonialism led to an "international racial hierarchy" that could only be overcome through a "radical rupture", meant a reconstitution of the global order rather than limited changes (Getachew, 2019, p.15-17). According to the CIA, grasping the global order in these terms would result in a broad transformation that threatened Western and, particularly, U.S. interests.

In one conceptualization, radicalism was thought of as a political approach that emphasized the depth of specific issues and their respective solutions, while on the other, it was an untamed and dangerous dissidence to particular political interests. In other words, radicalism is a response to a "problematization" (Foucault, 1984a) of politics, which approaches racism and social inequality as a problem deriving from the colonial order. However, radicalism is problematized as threatening the existing order under the perspective of the CIA, which sees this politics as a threat to the United States and the Western countries' interests.

Framing radicalism as a security problem is key to this dissertation, mainly because it constitutes the basis for security practices towards social movements classified as such. For example, in the case of those anticolonial movements deemed radical by the United States, the construction of the problem underlined an untamed, dangerous nature that culminated in overt and indirect military interventions, assassinations, and supporting of so-called counterrevolutionary

groups (Borstelmann, 2001; Seymour, 2015). It is in this sense that Schrader (2019, p.80-81) argues that the United States government promoted, technically and financially, the transnational circulation of policing experts focused on the reform of law enforcement in the Global South since police forces were the "first line of defense" against the expansion of communism and insurgencies abroad.

While communism came to be associated with national liberation struggles throughout the globe by the CIA, a similar pattern emerged at home but in connection with the CRM. The strive for civil rights in the United States relates mainly to the search to end the Jim Crow laws, which aimed at reconstructing racialized social control in the U.S. The structures – racial, economic, social, and political – of the southern part of the United States were heavily dependent on enslaved labor, and with the emancipation and the subsequent advances conquered by African Americans in the Reconstruction Era, these southern structures found in Jim Crow laws another form of maintaining racialized social control (Alexander, 2010, p.30). By the turn of the 20th century, there was a series of legislations "that disenfranchised black and discriminated against them in virtually every sphere of life", that is, overt racial segregation in education, religion, housing, health, and even in the prohibition of interracial chess playing (Ibid., p.35).

In the 1940s, the involvement of the U.S. in the war against Nazi fascism contradicted its domestic politics of racial segregation, especially if we consider that African Americans participated in such conflict (Marable, 1984; Alexander, 2010). Moreover, the strengthening of the self-determination discourse in the aftermath of World War II (Getachew, 2019), the expansion of the USSR, which increased the threat of communism (Borstelmann, 2001), and the growth of African Americans in labor unions during this period (Marable, 1984) also contributed to the questioning of segregationists policies in the United States. This context pushed forward the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People[14] (NAACP) litigation campaign to dismantle parts of the segregation system. The first success harvested by the Association was the ruling, by the U.S. Congress and

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[14] This organization was founded in 1910 by the sociologist and activist W. E. B. Dubois to push forward the rights of African American (Marable, 1984, 14-15). At the moment in discussion in this section, the main method of the NAACP was criticizing racism in its immorality and using litigation that had successful results without changing the broad racial capitalist order (Ibid., p.26 and 41).

the U.S. Supreme Court, in favor of legislation that guaranteed civil rights such as voting while also beginning the desegregation in the education domain (Marable, 1984, p.43-44; Alexander, 2010, p.35-36).

According to Manning Marable (1984, p.17 and 20-21), the NAACP strategy of using moral shaming and litigation to reach integration was informed by ideological and private interests, such as the black middle-class support of capitalism and disaffection with communism, particularly the tendency of communists to prioritize USSR objectives rather than those of African Americans. The Democratic Party's political strategy of supporting racial reforms to gain strength amongst the African American population given elections was also part of this strain of the CRM struggle.

As Marable (Ibid., p.13) argues, "[a]ccommodation, anti-communism, and tacit allegiance to white liberals and labor bureaucrats became the principal tenets of black middle-class politics for the next decade", which also meant the marginalization of antiracist alternatives, as will be discussed below. Parallelly to the NAACP, non-violent direct action gained breadth in the southern U.S. by the final years of the 1950s, such as the boycott of local buses in the city of Montgomery, which saw the emergence of an essential leader in the CRM: Martin Luther King, Jr. (MLK) (Marable, 1984, 44; Alexander, 2010, p.37-38).

In this context, communism was a solid and persistent component in the discourse on the main threats to national security both abroad and at home, concerning national liberation struggles given their potential to expand the soviet-bloc and the actions of foreign agents within the U.S. (U.S. Senate, 1976, p.4). As the latter involved countering foreign intelligence inside the U.S., it fit the jurisdiction of the FBI, which then used this context as justification for creating the Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) in 1956 (Ibid., p.3 and 15).

The FBI had used disruptive techniques against those perceived as dangerous before, such as in the Red Scare in the aftermath of the 1917 Russian Revolution and World War II (U.S. Senate, 1976, p.15; Seymour, 2015; Vitale, 2017). Nevertheless, COINTELPRO was the first program focused on "affirmative action taken to neutralize hostile agents" – which is what characterizes counterintelligence, according to the United States Senate (1976, p.15). Similarly,

the FBI understands counterintelligence as gathering intelligence and developing "preventive measures and countermoves" (U.S. Department of Justice, 1964, p.21). Thus, categorizing a threat under the rubric of counterintelligence enables clandestine and covert tactics that otherwise could be juridically resisted or, in other words, being listed in COINTELPRO broadens the range of disruptive techniques one can be subjected to.

While COINTELPRO was active, there were five separated but interconnected programs or strains of the same program, each focusing on a perceived threat (U.S. Senate, 1976, p.15). The first was articulated to counter the Communist Party USA (CP-USA), which the FBI continued to consider as involved in USSR espionage (U.S. Senate, 1976, p.17; Churchill & Wall, 1990, p.39-41; Bloom & Martin, 2016, p.200). In its Annual Report for the Fiscal Year of 1964, the FBI claimed that the significant counterintelligence threat at that moment was still the CP-USA, particularly because of its active criticism towards the U.S. in the Vietnam War, but also it was working "unremittingly to increase its influence in the racial struggle" (U.S. Department of Justice, 1964, p.21).

By the 1960s, COINTELPRO was expanded to include the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), mass movements such as the NAACP, White Hate–Klan groups, and Black Nationalist–Hate groups (U.S. Senate, 1976, p.17-20). In the same 1964 FBI Report, Hoover argued that communists were exploiting the CRM to create racial tensions and conflicts within the U.S., an argument that sought to increase the range of operations undertaken by the Bureau even further (Hoover apud New York Times, 1964).

As an example of such a connection, the FBI mentioned that the CP-USA and "sympathizers" sought to involve themselves in every aspect of the 1963 March on Washington (U.S. Department of Justice, 1964, p.22), revealing that exposes the Bureau's surveillance of the CRM since at least 1963. Furthermore, the FBI underlined that it "[d]oes not investigate the legitimate activities of civil rights groups, but from an intelligence standpoint it is concerned with determining the extent of possible communist infiltration of these organizations" (Ibid., p.22). Indeed, the U.S. Constitution formally grants the right to protest and freedom of speech, and the FBI itself is responsible for the investigation of federal "crimes"

against civil rights (Ibid., p.9). It is therefore through the vocabulary of "subversion" and the claim that the CP-USA and specific social movements would cause social turmoil and insurgency that the FBI worked the justification for its counterintelligence work. Here the discourse connecting antiracism and communism, which existed since the 1920s, is reinterpreted according to Cold War terms (Seymour, 2015). The CRM achieved its highest victories in this period: the 1964 Civil Rights Act formally ended segregation and the 1965 voting rights, which dismantled barriers that impeded African Americans from voting (Alexander, 2010, p.37-38).

There were alternatives to the view that integration, non-violent direct action, and the State were the means to reconstruct the life of the black population post-emancipation. From the 1850s onwards, Black Nationalism[15] appeared as an alternative and, in certain moments, the main political philosophy informing working-class, rural farmers and black poor in general (Marable, 1984, p.59). Notably, Black Nationalism circumscribes different perspectives (Kehinde, 2018, p.34), but central to this approach was the defense of antiracism, separationism, and all-black institutions – economic, political, and social –, and armed self-defense (Ibid., p.59-60).

During the 1950s, while the NAACP and Martin Luther King, Jr. proposed an integrationist perspective based on litigation and non-violent direct action, the Nation of Islam received growing support from those most marginalized and lower-income within the African American community (Ibid., p.60). This strain of Black Nationalism enmeshed with Islamism that served as a counterpoint to the NAACP and made "white liberals and Negro integrationists alike (…) fearful" (Ibid., p.60-61). Particularly with the entering of Malcolm X into the Nation, Black Nationalism gained breadth, and a part of the black militancy criticized middle-class leadership and the non-violent actions defended by Martin Luther King, Jr. (Ibid., p.61-63).

From a Black Nationalist perspective, the successes harvested by the CRM were a form to keep a profound transformation at bay (X, 1964a, p.33; 1964b, p.50-

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[15] A prime example of this approach was Marcus Garvey and its Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), which propose self-determination to African peoples across the globe; refuse the Western nation-state; and a rejection of the reformist and gradualist perspective to civil rights as claimed by the NAACP (Kehinde, 2018, 39-43).

51). Although critical in some senses, a reform of discriminatory policies in a controlled fashion quelled the rebellion and maintained alternatives such as black ownership of its economic community and political control marginalized. In other words, the integrationist perspective that informed the CRM constituted a strategy that "reasonably accommodated" demands (Borstelmann, 2001, p.2). In this sense, from the intelligence field's point of view, foreign and domestic threats mirrored each other: the NAACP and non-violent action aimed to achieve gradual reforms within the existing racial and social structure, similarly to movements of independence that agreed with reforms; whereas Black Nationalism shared the revolutionary ethos of those African movements deemed "radical" by the Central Intelligence Agency (1961).

As an illustration, in the FBI Annual Report for the Fiscal Year of 1966, the CP-USA continues to be the central counterintelligence issue, and the CRM appears as a security issue insofar as communists might infiltrate such struggle (U.S. Department of Justice, 1966, p.23-24). Nevertheless, this report also highlights that groups which follow Black Nationalism "are antiwhite and promote racial hatred" and that they are also a threat to the internal security of the United States (Ibid., p.28). Here the Nation of Islam and the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) emerge as examples of organizations that, besides "racial hatred", have "a strong potential for violence" (Ibid.). This alleged anti-white hatred came to fuel the support of part of the African American community that diverged from non-violent methods (Ibid.).

Although the Bureau does not use the term "radical" to refer to Black Nationalism as the CIA did regarding African decolonial movements, the problematization of antiracism strains that were committed to revolution rather than reform are similar: both are presented as dangerous at home and abroad, by the FBI and the CIA, respectively. Here, it is possible to return to the argument that, despite the domestic-foreign line organizing jurisdictions within the intelligence field, the discursive entanglement of antiracism and communism transverses global and local security niches. As mentioned earlier, the African decolonial movements considered "radical" by the CIA were violently repressed, given their construction as untamed and threatening (Borstelmann, 2001; Schrader, 2019). This hints at how the response to Black Nationalism occurred – which is addressed in the next section.

2.3   A hatched egg II: black radicals at home

Since 1966, the Black Nationalism push for separationism, black ownership, and armed self-defense was framed as a threat because those positions were understood as "racial hatred" and potentially violent rather than based on profound philosophical, political, social, economic, and historical, discussions of antiblackness. Most importantly, the discourse on "black extremism" started to gain shape here. This section traces how the characterization of this "new threat" transformed through these years to grasp the terms in which the FBI articulated this problem. Rather than arguing that Black Nationalism is better than non-violence, integration, and institutional politics, our purpose is to expose that the intelligence field was perceived as more threatening given its potential for using violence.

In 1967, a classified memorandum from the FBI's Director at that time, J. Edgar Hoover established the COINTELPRO branch focused on "Black Nationalist – Hate Groups" (Hoover, 1967, p.1). The incorporation of this new category of threat as part of the FBI's work was mobilized as justification for increased resources for that particular program. Notwithstanding, the FBI Annual Report for the Fiscal Year of 1967 argued that

> So-called civil rights organizations preaching hatred for the white race, demanding immunity from laws, and advocating violence constitute a serious threat to our country's internal security. These organizations such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Revolutionary Action Movement hope to disrupt the tranquility of our Nation with violence to further the concept of "black power". Leaders of these groups constantly attempt to spread domestic discord among Negroes by making inflammatory speeches and issuing hate-filled literature (U.S. Department of Justice, 1967, p.28).

This argument justified the creation of an enterprise to "expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or neutralize the activities" of Black Nationalist groups and leadership, as designed by Hoover (1967, p.1). Simultaneously to the threat of foreign intelligence services, the "militant activities of domestic hate-type organizations" triggered the need for the Bureau's surveillance to "thwart their

serious threats to the nation's internal security" (U.S. Department of Justice, 1967, p.2). Coupled with Hoover's memorandum to FBI officers initiating the COINTELPRO activities against black social movements deemed problematic, the Annual Report indicates that black organizations that revealed "hatred for the white race" and advocated violence had gained importance in the hall of internal security threats (Ibid., p.28) – even though the connection of CP-USA and the CRM (Ibid., p.23) had its relevance preserved in this regard.

A Hoover memorandum of 3 April 1968 delineates the strategical ("long-range") goals of COINTELPRO that were focused on disrupting Black Nationalism: first, preventing the unification of several groups, a danger that was compared to the formation of "a real 'Mau Mau' in America, the beginning of a true black revolution"[16]; second, preventing "the rise of a 'messiah' who could unify, and electrify, the militant black nationalist movement". According to the FBI, Martin Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X, Stokeley Carmichael, and Elijah Muhammed, leaders of different lineages of the CRM, supposedly aspired to become the articulators of a unified front that, as aforementioned, could result in an insurrection. Third, preventing violence; fourth, discrediting the black leadership to the broader African American community and the white community – "both the responsible community and to 'liberals' that have vestiges of sympathy" for those groups deemed "extremists" and which are, under these terms, irresponsible; and finally, preventing the growth of these ideologies amongst the young people (Hoover, 1968, p.3-4).

The FBI Annual Report for the Fiscal Year of 1968 introduces critical transformations in the list of counterintelligence threats. In this document, the New Left emerged as "a major security problem" for the advocation of "violence as an instrument to destroy the existing social order", as well as Marxist political philosophy (U.S. Department of Justice, 1968, p.21). The organizations previously mentioned as "hate groups" against white people were also framed as "black extremism" – a position seen as incompatible with that of a legitimate civil rights movement (Ibid., p.24).

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The Black Panther Party (BPP) appeared for the first time in this Annual Report and was described as follows:

> The Black Panther Party, which was founded as the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense at Oakland, California, in December, 1966, for the alleged purpose of combating police brutality and uniting militant black youth. The political philosophy of its leaders is based on the writings of Mao-Tse-tung and black revolutionary writers. They advocate the use of guns and guerrilla tactics to end their alleged oppression (U.S. Department of Justice, 1968, p.24).

As the Nation of Islam, the BPP emphasized the critique of police brutality, which received comprehensive support among marginalized African American communities. The core of its agenda called for the transformation of the racial and social structure that also relates to the Marxist and Black Radical philosophies while suggesting armed self-defense and insurrection (Newton, 2019; Bloom & Martin, 2016; Kehinde, 2018). By 1968, J. Edgar Hoover already considered the BPP as "the greatest threat to the internal security of the country", mainly because of its Marxist orientation and because "its members have perpetrated numerous assaults on police officers and have engaged in violent confrontations with police throughout the country" (*apud* U.S. Senate, 1976, p.187-188).

In the Bureau's reading, both the revolutionary ethos and the self-defense doctrine of the Party made it an even more critical threat than the CP-USA and other antiracist and leftist organizations. This view was consolidated in the following FBI Annual Report, which created the "Racial Extremism" section, exclusively devoted to the so-called "black extremism", especially the BPP (U.S. Department of Justice, 1969, p.22). By that moment, the Party had between 500 and 1.200 members, 40 chapters throughout the United States, had already been involved in confrontations with law enforcement agents, and, according to the FBI, their "racial hatred" was being disseminated in educational establishments (Ibid., p.22). Against "black extremism", the FBI invested a series of techniques that were also mobilized in the Philippines and the fight against communism, but this time to dismantle domestic groups (U.S. Senate, 1976; McCoy, 2009; 2016).

The U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities of 1976 revealed that the FBI tried to sow animosities between the Party and other armed organizations with ideological and

pragmatical differences (e.g. United Slaves), aiming at stimulating frictions within the African American community (Ibid., p.189). To achieve this, the FBI used infiltrated agents who gathered intelligence to inform further actions and mailed letters that created rumors, such as the BPP intending to disrupt a rival leadership or organization. These practices led not only to the corrosion of political cohesion inside these movements but also violent reactions between the groups involved in the rumors (Ibid., 189-198). Thus, although the Committee does not categorically argue that violence was motivated by FBI actions, it does underline that violence between antiracist groups was the overt objective of the Bureau (Ibid., 198).

The FBI employed several other tactics to create animosities, rifts, and factionalism within the Party: the conduction of harassing interviews of Party supporters, convincing landlords to prohibit Panthers from living or operating in their facilities, and sending letters and exposing photographs to members espouses, which suggested infidelity in order to create dissension in marriages (Ibid., p.199-200). The FBI tactics also explored emotional and psychic violence such as intimidation and terror of being arrested, forced eviction, and even unbalancing a romantic relationship.

Significantly, the FBI participated in the creation of a dispute between Huey P. Newton (founder and defense ministry of the BBP) and Eldridge Cleaver (leader of the BPP international section) (Ibid., p.200). By the 1970s, these two leaders believed in distinct paths to the Party and its objective, reflected in debates between the Party headquarters and local chapters, the expulsion of members and critiques of Newton and Cleaver (Ibid., p.205). According to the FBI, at the moment which Huey P. Newton's incarceration ended, the BPP founder proposed the "survival pending revolution" (U.S. Department of Justice, 1970, p.25) strategy, which was based on "community services such as free clothing programs, free medical assistance, and testing for sickle cell anemia" (U.S. Department of Justice, 1971, p.25). Newton's program was counterpointed by Cleaver's defense of armed insurrection (U.S. Department of Justice, 1970, p.25; 1971, p.24), consolidating the factionalism pursued by the FBI through anonymous messages, disinformation, and rumors between BPP members (U.S. Senate, 1976, p.205). If, on the one hand, that particular friction derived from organic political dissent within the BPP, on the

other hand, the Bureau pushed the dispute forward, eventually contributing to the Party's ending (U.S. Senate, 1976; Bloom & Martin, 2016).

The FBI also disrupted the Party's survival programs – especially the Breakfast for Children program, understood as a threat for its potential to spread "anti-white propaganda" to children, according to the Bureau (apud U.S. Senate 1976, p.210). To achieve this objective, the FBI sent letters denouncing to bishops that priests were using church facilities for the Breakfast for Children, an initiative of a communist organization, for example (Ibid., p.210-211). The purpose was to prevent the "survival pending revolution" strategy, which did not advocate violence, from attracting the support of a broader population.

The Bureau also used the technique of labelling a person as an informant, the so-called "snitch jacket", against the BPP (U.S. Senate, 1976, p.46). The FBI spread rumors that a Party member arrested by local police was released after other members because he had accepted an agreement to become a Bureau informant (Ibid.). The FBI also employed this tactic by sending anonymous letters accusing a member of being the informant that enabled another member's arrest by weapons possessions unrelated to Bureau infiltration (Ibid., p.47). Moreover, the Bureau used electronic surveillance against the BPP, which led to the discovery of the location of a Black Panther member, and subsequently to the spreading of the "snitch jacket" through an anonymous letter (Ibid.). In this sense, incarceration was a "disruptive" technique in itself but was also explored to create distrust within the Party and potentially lead to the execution of those labelled as informants (Ibid., p.48). Furthermore,

> Red Squads again developed massive systems of files to keep track of the growing movements. While the vast majority of participants in these movements were nonviolent, police used the fact that people were arrested and that violence occurred in connection with subversion; this despite the fact that the arrests and violence were often the result of discriminatory police action, rather than actual criminal wrongdoing (Vitale, 2017, p.206).

As mentioned in this chapter, Red Squads were local law enforcement detachments that engaged in countersubversive actions, such as intelligence-gathering and cooperation with the FBI (Seymour, 2015; Vitale, p.2017). As Vitale (2017, p.205) underlines, during the 1940s and 1950s, local police departments increasingly shared information and provided intelligence to government initiatives

against communism. In 1956, the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit was established to share information regarding "crime" and "political activity" within the local law enforcement bureaucratic field (Ibid.).

As with the Red Squads and anticommunism, the aim to "neutralize" and "disrupt" the Black Panther Party involved local police departments (U.S. Senate, 1976, p.222). The Chicago Police Department, for example, had a "Panther Squad" within its Gang Intelligence Unit (GIU), and this detachment regularly operated with the FBI Racial Matters Squad that was responsible for the monitoring of the BPP in the city of Chicago (Ibid.). This articulation of levels of law enforcement functioned to find motives for arresting Black Panthers and sharing information acquired with their respective informants; however, most importantly, this intelligence served to justify police raids against the BPP, including the raid that resulted in the death of the BPP Chicago Chapter leader, Fred Hampton (Ibid. p.222-223).

In synthesis, as in the Philippines, the monitoring of media, infiltration, the promotion of disinformation, and assassination was used by Bureau against the Black Panther Party (McCoy, 2009; p.28; Coyne & Hall, 2018, p.76). According to McCoy (2009, p.36), "individual surveillance, covert infiltration, political manipulation, psychological profiling, comprehensive data collection, and strategic disinformation" were used in the Philippines. As we have seen, these techniques were all used against "black extremists" movements, most notably the BPP. In other words, the multilayered field invested against the Black Panther Party mirrors the Philippines blueprint analyzed in section 1. As Vitale (2017, p.206) underlines, while COINTELPRO operated to subvert the antiracist movements, local law enforcement agents staged raids on BPP chapters, disrupting demonstrations, imprisoning, and executing, members. Hence, the porosity of professional boundaries present in the Philippines and the early United States domestic intelligence field (McCoy, 2009; 2016) was also present during the repression of the BPP.

More than the use of practices that were regularly employed against "foreign" adversaries acting within the United States, the FBI also used techniques that came from the colonial toolbox of the Philippines – underlining the supposed

foreignness of certain antiracist strains while also providing elements to support the argument that its intelligence practices were aimed at maintaining the global and local racial orders, as the fourth chapter will argue.

2.4   Conclusion

The chapter argued that the Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) is the culmination of processes dating back many decades earlier. First, the erection of the United States domestic intelligence field mirroring discourses that emerged in the colonization of the Philippines. In this sense, the practices developed in that context and the imaginaries regarding a racialized threat informed the field since its origins, not exclusively because of the experience in the Philippines since racism is foundational to the U.S. However, this event pushed this perception forward. Second, the construction of antiracism was connected to communism in terms of threats that, although transforming in time, were present from the field's beginnings until the moment the Black Panther Party was created.

Moreover, COINTELPRO is also related to the boundaries permeating the field, and that separate it into foreign and domestic institutions. As argued during the present chapter, although this boundary does exist formally, the field engaged in intelligence activities is multilayered – indicating a professional porosity that includes local law enforcement and intelligence services at home and abroad. This boundary is vital for us to grasp how the threats of communism and antiracism were designed at home and abroad but are also contested by the transversal character of these discursive constructions – i.e. security practices and narratives regarding threats.

A crucial remark that arises from these claims is that this multilayered nature operates towards a similar objective of producing and sustaining the existing order contours. In other words, institutions, professionals, and expertise, that are formally bounded by juridical and political limits (e.g., law enforcement and intelligence, local and global politics) work to achieve the same goal independently of these boundaries. This point relates to the argument that "police" is closer to a state function than a specific organization (Cleaver, 1968; Newton, 2019; Neocleous,

2000; Foucault, 2007), that is to say: instead of solely about *the* police (as solely an institution) is relevant to make a conceptual shift to policing, which is understood as order-making activities shared by a broad group of apparatuses (Neocleous, 2000; 2010).

In this sense, the intelligence field and local police departments are pieces of a more extensive architecture of policing charged with impending threats to the global and local political order. This argument is further developed in the fourth chapter of this dissertation but is relevant to point out that this expansive conceptualization of policing is already visible in the findings of this chapter and that it also informs the discussions of the following chapters.

Finally, the erection of the COINTELPRO branch against Black Nationalism served as the concrete ground where the "black extremism" discourse could flourish and, eventually, be turned into the Black Panther Party. Our argument is not that this discourse appeared within the United States intelligence field only with COINTELPRO, nor those previous developments were unimportant, but that, with this program, such nomenclature gained the necessary breadth to surpass communism as the most significant domestic threat since it was the "speaking subject" (Foucault, 1980) concerning domestic counterintelligence that pushed this discourse forward.

The discourse of "black extremism" justified that 233 of a total 295 authorized actions under the Black Nationalism COINTELPRO group were against the Black Panther Party, making it the most attacked group from the beginning of this strand of the program in 1966 to its end in 1971 (Ibid., p.4). In this sense, it triggered systematic actions against those deemed "black extremists".

At first, COINTELPRO was a classified program that came to the public eye in 1971, when an FBI building was invaded, and documents containing the word COINTELPRO were gathered (Vitale, 2017). At that moment, documents exposed attempts to push Martin Luther King, Jr. "to commit suicide through sexual extortion" (Ibid., p.206). This led to lawsuits, private investigations, and congressional hearings that revealed the program's depth (U.S. Senate, 1976, p.3; Vitale, 2017).

As Vitale summarizes,

> Through a series of court orders, local laws, and federal
> intervention, many Red Squads were shut down and others were
> given much tighter constraints on their actions. Court settlements
> resulted in restrictions and oversight. Intelligence units were
> required to restrict their activities to cases where there was actual
> evidence of criminal activity being planned or committed, which
> approval require to undertake under work or hire informants
> (Vitale, 2017, p.207 – emphasis added).

Hence, reforms were implemented to prevent future rights violations. As mentioned in this chapter, the other boundary between intelligence and criminal investigations was reinforced since the former enabled aggressive techniques such as clandestine and covert activity. In the next chapter, this point returns to the forefront of the discussions regarding the War on Terrorism.

3. Threats of a future past

In 2021, the United States government's National Security Strategy (NSS) underlined that addressing structural racism through a profound reform of law enforcement and criminal justice is central to achieving national security (The White House, 2021a). The 2021 NSS also highlights that "[a] vibrant democracy rejects politically motivated violence in all of its forms" and "[d]espite significant successes against international terrorism, a diffuse and dispersed threat to Americans remains", that is: "domestic violent extremism" (Ibid., p.19).

In the same year, the US first National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism was published, claiming that both racism and domestic "terrorism"/"violent extremism" were vital security issues, especially what the document articulated as "racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists" (RMVEs) (The White House, 2021b, p.6). Notably, "those who promote the superiority of the white race" (Ibid., p.6) are underlined as prone to committing violence (Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017). The RMVE category includes African Americans with armed self-defense and separatism as part of their political position – "black extremists", according to the policing architecture (US Homeland Security, 2009; 2011; US Department of Justice, 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020).

This chapter aims to trace the processes that resulted in this particular problematization of antiracism as part of RMVE. For this purpose, the first section begins by discussing the responses to September 11, 2011 (henceforth, 9/11). In the same vein as the previous chapter, the articulation of threat pushed the bureaucratic and professional fields engaged in solving it. The appearance of "terrorism" as the primary security issue in 2001 initially emerged as a failure of the policing architecture in preventing it. This triggered the broader reform in such fabric since World War II (Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017).

Such reform had institutional and legislative contours: on the one hand, the existing law enforcement and intelligence agencies expanded in terms of personnel, while new agencies were incorporated into that fabric, such as in the case of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). On the other hand, legislation aimed to prevent rights violations (Vitale, 2017) was often considered a barrier to

investigations that could have impeded 9/11, according to policing professionals and institutions (US Department of Justice, 2004).

The first section argues that this dual reform (both bureaucratic and legislative) resulted in security practices that violated human and constitutional rights, particularly Islamic and Muslim populations at home and abroad (Krishna, 2009; 2019). Part of this expansion aimed at preventing another 9/11; hence, the expansion in personnel meant an increase in the number of Intelligence Assessments, Joint Intelligence Bulletins, and other products that informed security actors of threats.

This process created an endless search for the "next security threat". In other words, the constant push toward prevention is essential to threat-making because the bureaucratic and professional fields are always conceptualizing potential security issues in order to impede them from becoming a concrete problem. In these terms, the fact that "Black Separatism Extremism" (BSE) was already listed as a possible domestic terrorist strain in DHS' Lexicons by the early 2010s (US Department of Homeland Security, 2009; 2011) reflects the bureaucratic-legislative reform in the policing architecture in response to 9/11.

The second section turns to the transition of "black extremism" from a potential threat to a concrete one in the U.S. policing architecture's understanding. Such change was ignited in 2014, when so-called BSEs started to claim that racism permeated the United States government and society, especially law enforcement institutions, to justify the use of political violence (US Department of Justice, 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020). As we will see, this period was marked by successive events of African Americans killed by law enforcement agents, the acquittal of those involved in such killings, and the emergency of the Black Lives Matter network as a response to this context (Bell, 2021). However, for the policing architecture, this scenario stimulated the growth of the BSE category and efforts to repress movements classified as such.

Since 2014, the DHS and the FBI have produced intelligence regarding antiracist demonstrations, activists, and social movements. These records crystallized the gradual making of "black extremism" as a significant domestic threat to the United States national security, which culminated in the emergence of

the Black Identity Extremism (BIE) label in 2017 (US Department of Justice, 2017). According to the policing architecture, BIEs are an evolution of BSEs: individuals and groups deemed BIE advocate separatism and armed self-defense and propose retaliation against law enforcement (US Department of Justice, 2017; 2018).

Section 2 will show that the label was reformulated in subsequent years until it became the current RMVE (US Department of Justice, 2021). In this process, however, "black extremism" remained a threat to be tackled by the policing architecture. Finally, the section explores the practices triggered by this discourse on "racial extremism, " which is the contemporary problematization of black radicalism.

3.1   Echoes of a not-so-distant past

According to the 2002 United States National Security Strategy (NSS), "[t]he militant visions of class, nation, and race which promised utopia and delivered misery have been defeated and discredited" (The White House, 2002a, 1). In this narrative, the United States' victory in the Cold War meant the fulfillment of liberalism promises, such as equality and freedom (Bell, 2014), turning what was earlier called "radicalism" or "extremism" and political violence into anachronic philosophies and practices.

Although "terrorism" has been figuring as a threat in the United States' policing fabric since at least the 1960s (Donohue, 2001), including with racial contours (Meier, 2022), it was after 9/11 that it was elevated to a priority in terms of national security concerns. The profusion of policy documents concerning "terrorism" from 2001 onwards provides evidence of such a claim. Also, although counterintelligence was initially defined in 1947 and was one of the main pillars of security policies in the Cold War, the first national strategy regarding this topic was developed more than fifty years later, after the 9/11 attacks (Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 2005, I). Similarly, the first National Strategy for Counterterrorism (NSCT) was only articulated in February 2003 (The White House, 2003), even if "terrorism" was already one of the main categories with which security agencies worked in the 1960s and 1970s (Donohue, 2001; Meier, 2022).

As these records also reveal, differently from communism, "terrorism" emerged from a policing architecture already consolidated.

Since the early 2000s, "*international* terrorism" has become the primary threat to US national security (The White House, 2002a, 6 – our emphasis). This threat is defined in the 2003 NSCT "as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents" (The White House, 2003, p.1; See Also the White House, 2002a, p.5). According to this document, "terrorism" is a tactic described as the use of violence that culminates in terror, ignited by political motives, and which targets noncombatants (Gray, 2007).

In another policy document, "terrorists" are characterized as "opponents of peace and freedom" (Office of the National Counterintelligence, 2005, p.1; See also, White House, 2006a, p.11). Notably, the 2003 NSCT underlines that contemporary "terrorism" has the political aim of destroying not only the United States but the "very idea of civilized society" since "this evil is intent on threatening and destroying our basic freedoms and our way of life" (The White House, 2003, p.1). The 2006 version of such a policy document summarizes the threat as a "radical ideology of hatred, oppression, and murder" (The White House, 2006b, p.1), which continues to reproduce a narrative of inappropriate use of violence to achieve specific political goals.

Interestingly, this narrative of hatred-inspired violence is also present in the 1960s and 1970s Federal Bureau of Investigation construction of Black Nationalism, as discussed in the previous chapter. Reading dissidences' motivations for violent direct-action as simply hatred towards the United States, its values, and the population is a narrative that dates back to much earlier than the War on Terror. As for the description of Al-Qaeda's tactics as uncivilized, we have seen similar contours given to the Filipino anticolonial dissidence a hundred years earlier (Kramer, 2006; McCoy, 2009) – that is, the reading of Filipino tactics as culturally and politically inferior to those of the US armed forces.

It is indisputable that Al-Qaeda's violent direct actions aim at civilians (Patel, 2017). Nevertheless, there is an essential point often overlooked in the portrayal made by the U.S. security agencies of these groups, Al-Qaeda's and other

organizations' resistance to the United States and the West also stems from a history of colonial, imperial, and racial, violent direct-actions perpetrated by those same countries which consider themselves civilized (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006; Krishna, 2009). In other words, this discourse whitewashes previous acts of violence perpetrated by the US and other Western countries in the Middle East while producing the first as civilized.

In this sense, Orientalism is a central pillar of the particular reading the Occident has on so-called Islamic terrorism (Said, 2003; Krishna, 2009). As Edward Said (2003) elucidates in his dissection of Western discourses on the East (Orientalism), hierarchical binarism historically permeates the first's reading regarding the latter. This divide is organized along the lines of irrational versus rational; theocratic versus secular; Islamic versus Christian; violent versus peaceful; authoritarian versus democratic; fundamentalism versus freedom – where the West is associated with superior characteristics while the East with inferior ones (Said, 2003; Krishna, 2009)

Therefore, the Occident narrative regarding Al-Qaeda follows Orientalist discourses that construct the latter as an expression of a broader Middle Eastern/Islamic culture instead of a particular group's view, according to Sankaran Krishna (2009, p.132-133). Indeed, a central tenet of this association is considering "radicalism" and "extremism", which are tactical and political positions considered uncivilized as aforementioned, as part of Muslim and Islamic culture (Krishna, 2009; Patel, 2017).

According to Alexander Barder (2021), subsuming the multiple existences of Muslims and Islamism as essentialized, ahistorical, and unalterable features are the tenets of racialization. In other words, articulating Islamic and Muslim cultural traits as unmodern and uncivilized, despite the differences within these communities, constitutes a process of racialization (Patel, 2017; Barder, 2021). Barder (2021, p.190-191) argues that this racialization mainly relies on cultural and religious traits rather than exclusively phenotypes such as antiblackness (Mbembe, 2017). Nonetheless, physical markers such as (brown) skin color are also crucial in this racialization of Muslim Middle Easterners and Islamism (Patel, 2017; Krishna, 2019).

This process ensures the maintenance of the Western-dominated global racial hierarchy since "the West" continues to be understood as "possessing unique civilizational attributes that set it apart from other civilizations", similarly to the "biological or natural materiality" of older racialization processes (Barder, 2021, p.190-191). Most importantly, this racialization defines Muslims and Islamism as a whole as the quintessential threat to Western civilization (Krishna, 2009; 2019; Patel, 2017; Barder, 2021); thus, "contemporary forms of Islamophobia have turned toward devising the Islamic as the next paradigm of global enmity" (Barder, 2021, p.191), substituting communism.

There are several consequences of this process, but it is crucial to underline two of them in the context of this dissertation. First, the constitution of Islamism, Muslims, and the Western are intrinsically connected or, in other words, by producing the other as inferior, the United States fabricates itself as superior (Richter-Montpetit, 2007; Krishna, 2009; Barder, 2021). Several studies underline that these contours are notably forgetful of colonialism's decades of dispossession, exploration, and violence in these areas by Western empires (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006; Richter-Montpetit, 2007; Krishna, 2009; 2019; Barder, 2021).

Secondly, given this fundamental racial distinction, those deemed as conducting "terrorism" cannot be integrated into Western society. Philippe Bonditti (2015) argues that the so-called terrorist is the expression of a "radical otherness": those simultaneously that threaten and are unable to enter the political community, authorizing discourses on the need to eliminate them. As the racial definitions of the Filipino population at the beginning of the twentieth century, "racial exterminism" (Kramer, 2006) is also a feature of Islamophobia (Richter-Montpetit, 2006; Krishna, 2009; 2019; Barder, 2021) or Anti-muslim racism (Patel, 2017). On these grounds, that police/military actions such as territorial occupation, torture, imprisonment, and assassination are part of the War on Terror.

However, unlike the nationalist or communist "terrorist groups" of the 20th century, the current threat is characterized by the 2003 NSCT as transnational organizations operating in small and loosely connected cells (The White House, 2003, p.7-9). In order to cope with such a threat, the policy document outlines a strategy aimed at hindering the flourishing of "conditions and ideologies" from

which terrorism allegedly stems, which included the support of the United States government to "moderate" regimes, especially in the "Muslim World" (The White House, 2002a, p. 6).

The War on Terror is underpinned by the racialization of enmity, similar to what happened with the strand of anticommunism focused on national liberation movements during the Cold War: Al-Qaeda's philosophy is thereby conflated to Islamism and Muslim Middle Eastern people in general. Consequently, the reading of Al-Qaeda as an expression of hatred, barbarism, and uncivilization is associated with whole populations instead of with a particular group. Since racism is based on the dehumanization of those produced as outside the boundaries of whiteness, "racial exterminism" (Kramer, 2006) is enabled in the War on Terror as it did in the Philippine-American War.

Abroad, these imaginaries operated with several practices that continuously (re)produced this racial enemy. The United States government employed these practices against those deemed as engaging with "terrorism", such as extraordinary rendition, described as capturing an individual in unlawful conditions and incarceration him/her in secret detention centers ("black sites") or prisons such as Abu-Ghraib or Guantanamo; torture ("enhanced interrogation" in the aseptic vocabulary of security professionals); invasion and occupation countries as Afghanistan and Iraq; and, currently, the use of drones for extrajudicial assassination that often result in the death of noncombatants (Crenshaw; Lafree, 2017; Krishna, 2019; Barder, 2021).

At home, this context meant a profound reform in the policing architecture. As mentioned, 9/11 triggered a profusion of policy documents, speeches, intelligence assessments, legislation, and academic articles that exposed several supposed flaws (Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017). According to Martha Crenshaw and Gary Lafree (2017, p.1 and 63), the problem of how "to formulate effective counterterrorism policies" gained breadth, igniting debates in multiple policymaking circles.

One of the most prominent drives in this movement was the perception that the Intelligence Community (IC) and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA), particularly the CIA and the FBI, could have prevented 9/11 if certain measures had

been adopted. Indeed, for the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (2005, p.9), a relevant action that could have impeded 9/11 was sharing information amongst agencies – a practice almost inexistent given the poor integration within the policing architecture until that moment. According to the FBI, the absence of an efficient system for sharing intelligence within the IC (US Department of Justice, 2004, p.16) and a "centralized structure for the national management" of the US Counterterrorism Program was a failure of the policing fabric (Ibid., p.20).

In other words, a pillar in this discussion regarding the reformulation of the US CT policy (Crenshaw; Lafree, 2017) was that 9/11 exposed a structural flaw in the architecture: the issue of interagency cooperation. This question pushed forward the perception within the US government that 9/11 was a "major intelligence failure" (Bjelopera, 2011, p.14), culminating in a subsequent need for improvement in this field once CT began the "overriding priority" for the FBI (US Department of Justice, 2014, p.20), and other agencies, in response to 9/11.

The agencies that figure as central within this architecture were particularly under scrutiny. On the one hand, the FBI[17] is an institution that has counterintelligence and criminal investigations in its mandate but was supposedly emphasizing "crime-fighting" (US Department of Justice, 2004, p.23; Bjelopera, 2011, p.1-2). According to Jerome Bjelopera (2013, p.1), the Bureau was mostly a reactive LEA rather than engaging in a proactive "dual mission", that is to say: reacting to "crime" *and* preventing it – notably, this point retrieves a discussion regarding the boundaries of criminal investigation and intelligence that were also a reason for debate during the Cold War, which will be discussed below.

On the other hand, the CIA[18] was criticized for focusing on the development of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) rather than Human Intelligence (HUMINT) – information that comes from electronic devices and information collected from human sources, respectively – against a threat were having HUMINT is essential, according to X Lewis (2004, p.180). HUMINT can be achieved, for example,

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[17] As previously discussed, the Bureau is the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for investigating the "federal crime of terrorism" at home and abroad (Bjelopera, 2011, 1) and for conducting foreign counterintelligence within the United States (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004, p.7).

[18] The CIA, as aforementioned, focus is on gathering intelligence concerning national security. Importantly, for a strand of specialists this means foreign intelligence, while for others also includes foreign influences on domestic groups or social movements (Lewis, 2004, p. 176).

through "enhanced interrogation" – i.e., torture – thereby is relevant to grasp the contours of the "intelligence failure" problem to understand its solutions.

Moreover, inquiries uncovered that the George W. Bush administration de-emphasized CT when the FBI requested more resources for this area, particularly in light of bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998) and the US Navy destroyer USS Cole in Yemen (2000) (Perrow, 2006, p.2-3; Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017, p. 8-9). The administration also decreased funding for Al-Qaeda surveillance and ignored warnings regarding information-sharing issues within the IC (Perrow, 2006, p. 3-4).

In summary,

> The idea of reorganizing domestic counterterrorism agencies was not new in 2001, because lack of coordination within the federal government and across federal, state, and local government, and the resulting lack of accountability had long been recognized as problems. The 9/11 attacks provided a window of opportunity for significant change. As the investigations into what went wrong concluded, sweeping revisions to government's bureaucratic apparatus followed, with some recommendations following logically from the diagnosis, some not, and many going well beyond counterterrorism (Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017, p.60-61).

The institutional reorganization aiming to expand the CT fabric is not an exclusive feature of post-2001: it dates back at least to the late 1960s (Donohue, 2001). Nonetheless, the 9/11 context gave breath to the most profound institutional transformation since post-World War II (Crenshaw; Lafree, 2017, p.61). As will be discussed next, resources poured into the CT architecture at that moment, fast-tracked regulations introduced fresh techniques, and, most importantly, institutions such as the FBI had their functions expanded, and new institutions were added to this policing architecture.

A fundamental point of this institutional reorganization was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to coordinate and integrate "numerous diverse agencies that provided aspects of 'homeland security', such as immigration, border controls, disaster management, Coast Guard, and intelligence" (Mabee, 2007, p.391-392). The DHS congregated 22 agencies[19] and 180.000

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[19] More precisely, "the departments and agencies folded into the DHS were: U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Protective Service, the Transportation

employees into a single institution primarily focused on countering terrorism at home (Goss, 2006, p. 3; Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017, p.61), effectively placing areas such as disaster management under the umbrella of counterterrorism (Mabee, 2007, p.391).

Following the creation of the DHS, the US government published its first National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), which emphasizes the domestic dimension of counterterrorism (The White House, 2003, p.2). The 2002 NSHS defines "homeland security" as "a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks *within* the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur" (The White House, 2002b, p. 2 – emphasis added). On this front, the Department of Defense (DOD) contributes to CT by coordinating military operations abroad and at home in cases of social turmoil; the CIA focuses on gathering and analyzing intelligence about terrorism abroad; and the DHS and the FBI jointly develop threat analyses, with the former leading the assessment of vulnerabilities and the warning capacities (Ibid., p.13 and 16).

According to this governmental narrative, the previously fragmented intelligence was expanded and unified by creating the Director of National Intelligence Position (Crenshaw; Lafree, 2017, p.61; See also Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 2005). Indeed, it appeared that the United States government had finally addressed the long-existing issue of interagency coordination. However, not only does it continue to exist as a broad problem within the IC, but the practice of producing threats without resorting to intelligence from other agencies (interagency coordination and information sharing) remains an integral part of winning professional struggles. In other words, the fabrication of threats with intelligence produced solely by one individual institution – for

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Security Administration, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Office for Domestic Preparedness, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Strategic National Stockpile and National Disaster Medical System, the Nuclear Incident Response Team, the Domestic Emergency Support Team, the National Domestic Preparedness Office, the CBRN Countermeasures Programs, the Environmental Measurements Laboratory, the National BW Defense Analysis Center, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, the Federal Computer Incident Response Center, the National Communications System, the National Infrastructure Protection Center, the Energy Security and Assurance Program, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Secret Service" (Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017, p.62).

example, the case of the FBI's Black Identity Extremism, which will be discussed in the next section (Trindade Viana & Da Silva, 2021) – underlines the importance of an agency's work and the resources invested in it.

The proliferation of such policy documents – as national strategies of counterintelligence and counterterrorism – crystallizes the depth of the restructuring ignited by 9/11, the dimension of the CT architecture and the investment by the actors to demonstrate their relevance within that structure, but also the breadth of the discourse on terrorism at the turn of the 21st century in the US.

According to the 2002 NSHS, the FBI's "top priority" became "preventing terrorist attacks" (The White House, 2002b, p.17) from 9/11 onwards. For this purpose, the FBI was pushed to expand the number of intelligence analysts "fourfold compared to pre-September 11 figures" (Ibid., p.18). In this context, the Bureau published its Report to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States regarding its Counterterrorism Program after September 2001 in April 2004 (US Department of Justice, 2004). In this document, the push to turn "the prevention of further terrorism" into the FBI's "dominant priority" is reflected in the Bureau's budget (Ibid., p.7): in 2001, 32% of its resources were invested in counterterrorism and counterintelligence while criminal investigations consumed 49% of the budget, while by 2004 the former corresponded to 40% and the latter, to 34% (Ibid., p.10) – inverting priorities.

The FBI's investment in "national security" was partly due to expanding the number of personnel specialized in those issues – e.g. Special Agents, intelligence analysis, and translators. Following this growth, from 2001 to 2011, the number of intelligence analysts went from 1,100 to 3,000, which coexisted with increased production of Intelligence Bulletins and Assessments to inform other LEA and the IC concerning current threats (US Department of Justice, 2004, 12-15 and 22; BJELOPERA, 2011, p.2). In addition, the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), created in the 1980s, were expanded further to improve the sharing of information within federal, state, and municipal levels, LEA and IC (Vitale, 2017, p.208-210).

The FBI also contended that the failure in preventing 9/11 could be understood in part by the constraints facing the Department of Justice (DOJ) in investigations on "terrorism", specifically the barrier that averted the coordination

and sharing of information between intelligence and criminal agents investigating a suspect within the same agency (US Department of Justice, 2004).

This occurred because rules approved after the publicization of COINTELPRO (Vitale, 2017) turned legal permission for using techniques considered as closer to counterintelligence – e.g. surveillance – more complicated to obtain than juridical consent for employing practices viewed as closer to criminal investigative – e.g., interrogating a suspect –, according to the Bureau (US Department of Justice, 2004; See also US Senate, 1976, p.10-11). In the FBI's view, "international terrorism" combines both intelligence and criminal aspects: the relevance of collecting and processing information to prevent further threats and the need to effectively arrest the suspects (US Department of Justice, 2004, p.23). Hence, according to the Bureau, the legal boundary between intelligence and criminal investigation limits its counterterrorism activities since "international terrorism" has to be engaged by both sides.

As the previous chapter exposed, intelligence techniques – such as the "snitch jacket" – domesticate dissent while engendering physically and mentally those deemed suspects (US Senate, 1976). This debate regarding the divide between intelligence and a criminal investigation is not solely an issue present in the War on Terror but was also a nodal point in the 1976 US Senate inquiries into COINTELPRO, since

> The word "counterintelligence" had no fixed meaning even before the programs were terminated. The Bureau witnesses agreed that there is a large grey area between "counterintelligence" and "aggressive investigation" and that headquarters supervisors sometimes had difficulty in deciding which caption should be on certain proposals. (…) The line between information collection and harassment can be extremely thin" (US Senate, 1976, p.12-13).

In other words, there is a precedent in the technical-juridical divide of intelligence and criminal investigation, in which the porosity of such a boundary enabled the repression of dissent through COINTELPRO. As a response, constraints were created to impede further direct or indirect appropriations of the "grey line" to use techniques (US Senate, 1976).

Despite this previous experience[20], the Bush administration pushed a legislative reform in the "War on Terror" context to address these alleged shortcomings and limitations to investigation and bureaucratic reorganization[21]. Among several other legislations adopted at this moment to strengthen counterterrorism capacities, the US Congress approved the USA Patriot Act in 2001[22]. For the Bureau, this legislation proved to be fundamental to the "War on Terror" since it stimulated the integration between "criminal and intelligence personnel and operations", which in turn allowed for the "use [of] the full range investigative tools against a suspected terrorist" (US Department of Justice, 2014, p.24).

Previously to the USA Patriot Act, approving the surveillance of a suspect in a criminal investigation was more complicated than the same action in an intelligence case (Bjelopera, 2011, p.4), as underlined above. However, this legislation turned the technical-judicial wall between these two areas as practically non-existent as it had been in COINTELPRO. The distinction is that, between the 1950s and 1970s, FBI actions were unknown to the public debate, while in the WoT context, the blurring of this barrier was enshrined in the legislation. According to the Bureau, the USA Patriot Act provides that

> On the intelligence side, we can conduct surveillance on the suspected terrorist to learn about his movements and identify possible confederates; we can obtain FISA authority to monitor his conversations; and/or we can approach and attempt to cultivate him as a source or an operational asset. On the criminal side, we have the option of incapacitating him through arrest, detention, and prosecution. We decide among these options by continuously balancing the opportunity to develop intelligence against the need to apprehend the suspect and prevent him from carrying out his terrorist plans (US Department of Justice, 2014, p.24).

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[20] Interestingly, the FBI underlined in post-9/11 report that COINTELPRO was the only example of program where there was an overlapping of intelligence and other branches of the institution (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004, 28). Although the Bureau's reading of this blurring of lines is distinct from the one adopted in this research – here, this distinction is viewed as furthering rights' violations –, this mentioning of the COINTELPRO by the FBI highlights the connections between the two eras investigated in this dissertation concerning the divide of intelligence and criminal investigation.

[21] For example, the U.S. National Counterintelligence Strategy stems from the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 2005, i).

[22] While this and other legislations deserve a profound debate, this would surpass the scope and purpose of this chapter.

More techniques and technologies were available to an agent since there is an enmeshing of criminal and intelligence investigation while also creating juridical permission for entering a suspect's house without previous notification (Bjelopera, 2011, 4-6). In summary, the combination of the institutional and legislative reforms ignited by the threat of "terrorism" expanded FBI functions from "traditional crimes" to counterterrorism while integrated "its criminal investigation with foreign and domestic intelligence operations" (Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017, p.59), which enlarged the potential for surveillance, both in terms of techniques and resources.

The purpose of raising this discussion is not to reinforce the institutional narrative fabricated by the FBI after 9/11, which underlines its proactive and productive measures such as the introduction of practices and increase in investment in counterterrorism resources – human and material (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004). The aim is to highlight the breadth gained by "international terrorism" from 2001 onwards, particularly as it pushes the expansion of policing.

More than the easiness of using specific techniques – e.g. electronic surveillance – and the establishment of the DHS, the result of said enlargement was that: 'security measures in airports culminated in "passenger profiling"; the USA Patriot Act enabled the collection of metadata from US citizens; and federal agents could invade private property without notice (Donohue, 2001; Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017, p.59 and 61; Coyne & Hall, 2018, p.71). Moreover, these 'preventive actions' led to the detention of racialized populations (Patel, 2017) for "non-terrorism related offences such as immigration violations" (Bjelopera, 2011, p.19), for example.

As the 1960s and 1970s showed, imprisonment also developed so-called sources. In the WoT, undercover agents provoke "suspects" to commit a "crime" in order to force people into operating as infiltrators through entrapment (Ibid.). Laura Donohue (2001, p.48) argues that this context was also marked by introducing special and military courts, secret evidence, classified deportation procedures, indefinite detentions, and special rules of evidence.

Also, according to FBI "standard operating procedures," there is an authorization for the surveillance and intelligence gathering of public meetings – connected or not with "criminal behavior" – and social media posts that advocate

for "illegal activity" (Vitale, 2017, p.210). Nevertheless, although critiques suggest that this expansion in its capabilities could endanger civil liberties, the Federal Bureau of Investigation points out several mechanisms that limit surveillance (US Department of Justice, 2014, p.71-73).

As Vitale (2017, p.208-209) underlines, the combination of an expanded counterterrorism architecture, the weakening of the exact mechanisms the Bureau understands as constraining, and the unending professional necessity of reinforcing its importance culminated in the incorporation of "political extremists" to the Bureau's database on violent gangs and terrorist organizations. Thus, the judicial and institutional reform led to an expansion of the CT architecture, but also in the realm of possible threats: the broadening in resources in conjunction with pressure to prevent another 9/11 pushes professionals and institutions to assess possible threats, which, in turns, furthers a cycle of threat-making that justifies more expansion (Donohue, 2001; Viana & Da Silva, 2021).

A tenet of the WoT is antimuslim racism and Islamophobia based on Orientalism (Said, 2003; Krishna, 2009; 2019; Patel, 2017). Abroad, combating this racialized enemy meant invasion and occupation of territories, extraordinary rendition, and torture. At home, it triggered a judicial and institutional reform that resulted in the violations of Arab and Muslim populations within the United States (Donohue, 2001, p.49; Vitale, 2017, p.211-213): these populations were perceived as racialized threats that were subjected to the full potentials of the possibilities created by the reform[23].

These practices were not solely applied to 'foreigners' – that is, people born or 'radicalized' into "terrorism" outside Western countries. Both the 2006 US National Security Strategy (The White House, 2006a, p.11) and the 2006 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (The White House, 2006b, p.10) mentioned the breadth gained by the so-called "Homegrown terrorists":

> Democracies are not immune to terrorism. In some democracies, some ethnic or religious groups are unable or unwilling to grasp the benefits of freedom otherwise available in the society. Such

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[23] It would be very important to dissect the racial security practices in which Arab, Muslim, and Islamic peoples, are subjected to. But this would surpass the aim of this dissertation: arguing that independently of the global/local racial threat, antiblackness continues to be a pillar of the United States policing architecture.

> groups can evidence the same alienation and despair that the transnational terrorists exploit in undemocratic states. This accounts for the emergence in democratic societies of homegrown terrorists – even among second- and third-generation citizens. (…) We will continue to guard against the emergence of homegrown terrorists within our own Homeland as well (The White House, 2006b, 10 –emphasis added).

This concern regarding "homegrown terrorists" was ignited by the 2004 and 2005 "bombings of mass transit infrastructure" in the European cities of Madrid and London, respectively (Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017, p.10). Since the agents of these events did not come and were not trained in other countries but were 'homegrown' and 'self-radicalized', these acts triggered a sense of threat from within that initiated another phase in the WoT (Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017). Notably, the quote above gives contours to this newer problem: for the Bush administration, even amongst those born in Western countries, there is an inability or unwillingness to enjoy Western values – a vital tenet in the racialization of Islamism that informs the WoT.

At this moment, the 'international' strain of "terrorism" that initially figured as the main threat was gradually replaced by its 'homegrown' and 'domestic' versions (Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017) – as will be further explored in this chapter. Moreover, "homegrown terrorists" are equated to "transnational terrorists"; in this sense, although being 'citizens,' the first are also considered threats to the United States and the West in general, therefore subjected to potential rights violations as their 'foreign' counterparts.

Importantly, highlighting this change in the contours of "terrorism" is vital to this dissertation because it simultaneously refocused counterterrorist practices and added another layer to the problem. It expanded the list of threats with the inclusion of 'homegrown terrorism', which reinforces the professional narrative regarding the relevance of pouring resources into the policing architecture – that, in turn, pushes for more threat assessments and more expansion of the architecture.

As an alternative to this scenario, the election of Barack Hussein Obama to the Presidency of the United States in 2008 was marked by hopes for a post-racial era (Alexander, 2010; Krishna, 2019). As Michelle Alexander (2020, p.2-3) pointed out, since Obama was the first African American elected to the Presidency, it could be argued that the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) promises had been fulfilled.

Regarding the WoT, the Obama administration was expected to discontinue racialized security practices instigated by the previous administration – e.g., torture, extraordinary rendition, and extrajudicial executions (Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017, p.63). Part of this move would involve the withdrawal of the territorial occupation from Iraq and Afghanistan, as stated by the 2010 US National Security Strategy (The White House, 2010, p.4 and 21).

In line with this policy, at that moment, "[a]merican air power, both drones and bombers, became critical to counterterrorism worldwide", which were used to execute "key leaders of terrorist networks", according to Crenshaw & Lafree (2017, p.64-65). This strategy was made possible with the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs, characterized by technological advances that enabled decreased troops operating in occupied countries (Krishna, 2019).

The drone is critical in this 'revolution' since it permitted the United States to execute its enemies without 'endangering' its troops. In this context, Obama was "personally in charge of the kill list, ie decisions on which individuals to target for elimination in faraway lands" (Krishna 2019, p.7). Yet, the expansion in drones' utilization increased the so-called noncombatants' deaths in areas where there was no active conflict, such as Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia, while also resulting in the execution of an American citizen (Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017; Krishna, 2019). Thus, the Obama administration pushed forward a policy of demilitarization of the WoT since it decreased the number of ground troops in Middle Eastern countries. Nevertheless, the enmeshing of racism and militarism – which might be termed racial militarism – was reformulated and maintained with recourse to drones and other aerial vectors.

At home, echoing the 2006 US NSS (The White House, 2006a) and the 2006 NSCT (The White House, 2006b) published by the previous administration, the gradual emphasis on domestic versions of "terrorism" appeared in a 2009 Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) document named Domestic Extremism Lexicon (US Department of Homeland Security, 2009) – just two months after the beginning of the Obama administration. According to the DHS,

> This product [the lexicon] is one in a series of reference aids designed to provide operational and intelligence advice and assistance to other elements of DHS as well as state, local, and regional fusions centers. (…) This product provides definitions for key terms and phrases that often appear in DHS analysis that addresses the nature and scope of the threat that domestic, non-Islamic extremism poses to the United States. Definitions were derived from a variety of open source materials and unclassified information (…). (US Department of Homeland Security, 2009, p.1)

In other words, the document is part of a set that aims at providing the multiple levels of government operational and intelligence assessments, which means that the document is not limited to the DHS – which already encompasses more than 20 agencies and departments. Given that the DHS was primarily created for counterterrorism purposes and currently occupies an essential position within such architecture, this circulation amongst several levels of government indicates that the DHS' listing of threats – which characterizes a lexicon – informs from law enforcement agencies to intelligence ones. In this sense, being listed in such a document is not unimportant since it is a nodal point of knowledge regarding security issues within the policing architecture.

This lexicon is also a crystallization of the significant investment made in counterterrorism after 9/11 that, as discussed, pushed the expansion of the intelligence in Law Enforcement Agencies. Resulting in the growth of bulletins and assessments (policy documents) to inform the architecture of current threats, i.e., threat-making. Notably, the information was gathered from open sources such as social media and newspapers, indicating the breadth of increased material and human resources in the intelligence field. Therefore, this lexicon is a material expression of the fruition of the institutional and legislative reform pursued after 9/11.

Finally, this document further reinforces the gradual refocusing from "international" to "domestic" security threats, particularly non-Islamic ones, which stems from the breadth gained by "homegrown terrorism" by occurrences in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). The emphasis on "extremism" instead of "terrorism" is another essential feature of such a document. These points suggest the continuous expansion of the categories of threats produced by the U.S. security agencies after 9/11: encompassing 'international' and Islamic, but also 'homegrown' and non-

Islamic. As previously pointed out, this cycle begins with pouring resources to expand intelligence capabilities, culminating in constant threat-making. This threat-making justifies the professional narrative concerning the importance of continued investments in architecture, which maintains the cycle of threat-making.

This description is also valid for other products of this type. However, this lexicon is particularly interesting because it mentions that "Black Separatist Extremists" (BSE) were already considered a domestic threat to the US by the end of the 2000s (Ibid., p.4) – and during Obama's administration. Notably, this was an incipient echo of the "black extremism" discourse that appeared in earlier decades – as the 1960s and 1970s – in the current century. According to the DHS, "black nationalism" is a term used by BSEs rather than a political theory in black thought (Kehinde, 2018), while "black power" is described as an expression of BSEs' "pride in and the perceived *superiority* of the black race" (US Department of Homeland Security, 2009, p.3 – emphasis added). In this lexicon, the Department defined BSEs as

> A movement of groups or individuals of black or African American descent who advocate the separation of the rest of the United States; some advocate forming their own political system within a separate nation. Such groups or individuals also may embrace radical religious beliefs. Members have been known to advocate or engage in criminal activity and plot acts of violence directed toward local law enforcement in an attempt to advance their extremist goals (US Department of Homeland Security, 2009, p.4).

In other words, this "extremist" threat involves several groups or individuals that combine to form a movement that aims to separate races or parts of the United States or even construct another political system. The intersection between these groups or individuals is their descent – e.g. black or African American –, and members of this "movement" are related to "criminal activity", religious radicalism, and "acts of violence" against law enforcement officers – an element that remains in other discourses of "black extremism" in the US, as will be mentioned next. The contours given to this "black extremism" threat in the late 2000s are similar to those associated with the Black Panther Party, the Black Liberation Army, and other Black Nationalist organizations in previous decades. Hence, it seems genuinely an echo from previous repressive experiences such as the one discussed in the previous

chapter – although, in this specific lexicon, the DHS is the "speaking subject" (Foucaul, 1980) rather than the FBI.

Following the demilitarization of counterterrorism policies and the expansion of potential 'extremists' threats, Obama's administration also introduced a new nomenclature that informs CT discourses until the present moment. At the beginning of the 2010s, the vocabulary of "Countering Violent Extremism" (CVE) gained breadth and substituted the previous narrative of "War on Terrorism", a transformation that followed the narrative of decreasing militarization (Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017, p.16), while opening an avenue that justifies the incorporation of other threats (Viana & da Silva, 2021).

As conceptualized in the 2011 NSCT, "violent extremists" are those "individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals" (The White House, 2011a, p.1). Additionally, to the similarity with the definition of "terrorism" exposed in the 2002 NSCT, "violent extremism" is conceived as a response to "longstanding grievances" that would be ideally addressed by nonviolent (liberal-democratic) methods (Ibid., p. 1). In this perspective, violence rather than ideology is centered in the discourse claiming the threatening character of those threats.

Importantly, as Viana and Da Silva (2021) argue, this nomenclature transformation changed the tactics mobilized to confront the threat. According to a policy document underpinning this innovative approach is the understanding that "violent extremism" begins with a process through which an individual or a group starts supporting or committing violence, i.e., radicalization (The White House, 2011b, p.11). The assumption underlying the discourse on "violent extremism" is that non-violence is the usual form of politics, but "longstanding grievances" can result in violence; therefore, black radicalism is an unpalatable form of political action – a "radical otherness" in Bonditti's (2015) terms. As in the previous chapter, black radicalism is considered non-legitimate and deemed dangerous – that is to say, subject to policing.

Radicalization is an initial step in becoming a 'terrorist' (Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017). The rationality behind this perspective is that rather than exclusively using law enforcement and military resources for counterterrorism (reaction) is

essential to impede radicalization (prevention). In other words, instead of employing solely militarized methods, the CVE encompasses tactics that involve a range of sectors, from the IC and LEA to development actors and the population itself (The White House, 2010, 14-16; 2011, p.7). These include empowering communities by informing families, local communities and institutions of radicalization signs to prevent the movement from nonviolent dissent to "violent extremism" – i.e., counter-radicalization (The White, 2010, 10; Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017, p.67).

The emergence of this CVE approach in 2010 is the tone for the policing architecture grasping political dissent in the subsequent years, particularly the one exposed by antiracist social movements – the main interest in this dissertation. As discussed in this section, "terrorism" has been constructed as a threat, at least since the 1960s (Donuhue, 2001), including "terrorism" with racial contours (Meier, 2022). Nevertheless, the events of 9/11 gave breadth to this threat that is understood as particular to the current century: the perception of dangerousness gained a magnitude unwitnessed before, which set in motion a profound institutional and legislative reform based on the understanding that "terrorism" was a continuous threat – that is, not an exclusive feature of 9/11 (Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017).

Central to this reform was the further blurring of judicial-technical barriers between criminal investigation and intelligence activities, facilitating the use of practices such as electronic surveillance. Moreover, the growth in resources for intelligence agencies and branches within existing law enforcement agencies and the Department of Homeland Security's creation pushes the number of personnel involved in producing intelligence assessments. These assessments constantly maintain the fabrication of threats that reinforce a narrative perspective that the resources invested were necessary for continuing to finance counterterrorism efforts.

The reform also expanded rights violations, particularly to racialized populations. To those that opposed the violence triggered by the WoT, the election of Barack Obama in 2008 gave a fresh perspective that militarized violent CT policies would be terminated. On the one hand, the Obama administration decreased ground troops in occupied countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. On the other

hand, it also employed airstrikes to eliminate enemies at a distance and without the political cost of sustaining ground occupation, resulting in civilians' deaths while performing extrajudicial executions (Krishna, 2019).

Following this narrative of demilitarizing CT, the Obama administration also introduced the vocabulary of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), which became a more diffuse and supposedly softer form of CT that required engagements from actors outside LEA, the IC, and the military. In addition to this change in nomenclature and the tactics it triggered, there was also the transformation in emphasis from "international" to "domestic" and "homegrown" versions of terrorism. As we have seen before, this particular move stems from bombings in European capitals such as London and Madrid in the mid-2000s, leading to fear that "terrorism" could also emerge within Western societies.

The constant expansion of CT architecture, the focus on 'homegrown' and 'domestic' threats, and the emergence of CVE intersect in a 2011 lexicon. This policy document was produced by the DHS' I&A, the Homeland Counterterrorism Division, and the Homegrown Violent Extremism Branch, entitled "Domestic Terrorism and Homegrown Violent Extremism Lexicon" (US Department of Homeland Security, 2011).

The title, actors involved in constructing the document, and listed threats suggest that these processes connect in this lexicon: first, the DHS and the regular production of assessments regarding "terrorism" and "extremism" are directly tied to the constant expansion of the CT architecture and threats; second, the fabrication of a document focused on discussing and listing homegrown and domestic security issues exposes that foreign threats were not the only nodal point of dangerousness; and finally, the category of "violent extremism" is wholly integrated into the everyday vocabulary of the CT fabric, as the title itself points out. Hence, the three points outlined above cross each other, a crossing materialized in such a lexicon.

Most importantly, as in the 2009 Lexicon discussed earlier in this section, BSEs are again mentioned as a threat and are similarly defined as "[g]roups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence as a means to oppose racial integration and/or to eliminate non-black people and Jewish people" (Ibid., p. 1). The culmination of the processes discussed in this section is the return to the

old/new threat of "black extremism", but with contemporary contours: a context of "terrorism" as the leading local/global threat. As discussed in the next section, the echoes of a "black extremism" threat are eventually soundly heard as they did in the 1960s and 1970s – that is, the possible threat of "black extremists" becomes concrete to the policing architecture.

3.2   Policing, investigation and racial "violent extremism"

Although DHS' Lexicons listed BSE as a potential threat related to "terrorism/violent extremism" in 2009 and 2011, it was in 2014 that BSE turned into a concrete security issue, according to the FBI (US Department of Justice, 2017). That year, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) produced intelligence regarding demonstrations against racialized police violence, such as monitoring social media and mapping protests (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2014a).

Hence, an agency that integrates a department established as a response to 9/11 (the DHS) engaged in surveillance of demonstrations in response to the acquittal of law enforcement officers involved in the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. In the report, FEMA argues that "civil unrest" turned into rioting, looting, and vandalism and eventually became "unruly" (US Department of Homeland Security, 2014b, p.1-2); that is, it turned into violence – a political practice considered symbolical of "radical otherness" (Bonditti, 2015).

A national vigil organized in the same year to "memorialize several recent incidents of *alleged* police brutality" was also monitored by the counterterrorism detachment of the New York Police Department (NYPD), according to a DHS Situational Awareness (SitRep) that mapped the cities where the vigil was going to happen (US Department of Homeland Security, 2014c – emphasis added). Importantly, at that moment, NYPD officers were also under critique for the death of Eric Garner[24].

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[24] Eric Garner was an African American man suffocated by NYPD officers until his death in 2014. This event was filmed and published, showing that Garner claiming for his breath to law

A DHS and FBI Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) exposes that a protest in response to the killing of Freddy Gray[25] by Baltimore police officers in 2015 was also surveilled. According to the document, although "information suggesting violent behavior" was unavailable, "planned demonstrations may be exploited by individuals seeking to justify criminal or terrorist activity" (US Department of Homeland Security; US Department of Justice, 2015, p.1). The JIB also underlines that there was no information regarding a formal connection between the demonstration planned to occur in Washington, DC, and "riots in Baltimore", but that a concern "that unaffiliated individuals could potentially use this event to commit acts of violence" (Ibid.) remained.

The narrative pushed forward in such JIB curiously mirrors that of FBI Annual Reports published fifty years earlier: as discussed in the previous chapter, the Civil Rights Movement did not appear in security documents as a problem in itself since the First Amendment to the US Constitution protected dissidence; nevertheless, the potential exploitation by communist elements was articulated as justification for surveilling the CRM (US Senate, 1976). Given the current contours, instead of communism, the justification used to surveil antiracist dissidences is "terrorism/violent extremism". Indeed, the JIB underlines that

> This information is not intended to associate otherwise protected First Amendment activity with criminality or a threat to national security, but instead is included only for the purpose of providing situational awareness of activities that may lead to violent action, such as use of force, destruction of property, or expression of true threats, as has occurred recently within the region (US Department of Homeland Security; US Department of Justice, 2015 – emphasis added).

Then, these records are not evidence that disruptive tactics were used against individuals or groups participating in such demonstrations, but they highlight that the resources employed against "terrorism/violent extremism" were employed to monitor protests against racialized police violence since 2014. For example, although FEMA existed before 9/11, the reform in the policing architecture pushed

enforcement agents; however, the officers involved were acquitted. Both Eric Garner's death and the acquittal of the NYPD officers gave breadth to domestic and foreign demonstrations against police brutality (Camp; Heatherton, 2016).

[25] Freddy Gray was an African American man that died from "severe injuries to his spine during ride" to a police station after being arrested by Baltimore police officers in 2015 (Bell, 2021, p.35).

it to become part of the DHS – that is, to deepen its participation in counterterrorism. In this sense, in addition to the narrative associating violent direct-action with "terrorism", which is older than the WoT (Viana & Da Silva, 2021; Meier, 2022), the bureaucratic expansion in the policing architecture triggered by 9/11 spilled-over current antiracist dissidences.

Furthermore, practices such as an "assessment" by a "speaking subject" (Foucault, 1980) – e.g. the FBI or the DHS – are also vital to the threat-making of "terrorism/violent extremism"; thus, the records discussed above are a material crystallization of the process that produced certain strains of antiracist dissidences as an expression of "radical otherness" (Bonditti, 2015) – which, in turns, enable practices to solved this "problem" (Foucault, 1984a).

These initial indications of surveillance triggered a FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) lawsuit led by organizations engaged in protecting civil and human rights – namely, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), Color of Change (COC) and the Milton A. Kramer Law Clinic Center – against the FBI and the DHS. The request emphasized racism, police violence and criminal justice; it gathered e-mail exchanges, reports, and policy documents as evidence of continuous surveillance of protesters – which can be revealed even though the bits and pieces of information in these records are fully or partially redacted.

In these registers, it was discovered that in 2015 the FBI with the Creve Couer Police Department was monitoring the travel of an activist who would participate in a protest in the city of Ferguson and surveilling the resources gathered for a demonstration of the Stand Up for Ferguson Organization (US Department of Justice, 2015a, p.1). There was not much more unredacted information, but it was already sufficient to grasp that individual and financial surveillance were practices used against those deemed potentially dangerous. As in the twentieth century, federal agencies operated with local law enforcement to monitor antiracist dissidences – i.e., the multilayered character of architecture continues to be present.

The Bureau was also surveilling social media during the "Baltimore unrest" (US Department of Justice, 2015b, p.1) and, in this context, employed a surveillance plane that followed the protests in the city (US Department of Justice, 2015c). This last information was brought about in a FOIA lawsuit by the American Civil

Liberties Union (ACLU), particularly regarding using the Bureau's aviation program during protests. Importantly, considering the necessity of responding to requests under the FOIA, the FBI discussed in e-mail exchanges the use of technical language to justify surveillance of protests (US Department of Justice, 2016a; 2016b):

> Individuals or groups named in this [Alert/EC/Briefing book] have been identified as participating in the activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the US Constitution. (…) However, based on known intelligence and/or specific historical observations, it is possible the protected activity could invite a violent reaction towards the subject individuals or groups, or the activity could be used as a means to target law enforcement (US Department of Justice, 2016a, p.3 – emphasis added).

This excerpt adds essential information regarding the justification regime for surveilling antiracist demonstrations: the potential targeting of law enforcement personnel. According to the Bureau, a 2016 shooting between an African American man named Micah Johnson and law enforcement officers in Dallas, Texas, crystallized this threat to police officers (US Department of Justice, 2017, p.4) – even though this was a unique event. According to a DHS and FBI JIB published after Johnson's shooting with officers, BSEs "will likely continued" to use "perceived police brutality targeting African Americans" as a "catalyst for retaliatory violence" (US Department of Homeland Security & US Department of Justice, 2016, p.2, emphasis added). Importantly, this JIB primarily aims to produce a SitRep regarding the "domestic extremist threat" in political events (Ibid, p.1), such as antiracist demonstrations.

In this same context (of Micah Johnson's shooting), a DHS e-mail exchange mentions a "threat of black supremacist extremisms attempting" to use violence in the Democratic and Republican national conventions – which predate the choosing of each party candidate for the presidency (US Department of Homeland Security, 2016, p.2). According to the same e-mail, more than a single "black supremacist extremist movement" exists in the area of Dallas city, the most dangerous being the New Black Panther Party (NBPP), which already had altercations with law enforcement. Hence, the DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) contacted the FBI's Domestic Terrorism Analysis Unit to share information regarding the threat (United States Department of Homeland Security., p.3).

Another of these e-mail communications mentions a paper titled "Race Paper", which discusses "drivers" – a pillar of the CVE strategy – informing "black extremist" actions and the "alternative readings" of the issue that was being addressed in the paper (US Department of Homeland Security, 2017, p.1). While the "Race Paper" was obtained in a FOIA lawsuit, the document was redacted, preventing even the full title from being disclosed.

Notably, from 2012 onwards, successive deaths of African Americans – particularly, but not exclusively, by law enforcement officers – gained notoriety and pushed an antiracist and anti-police violence agenda forward with demonstrations under the banner of Black Lives Matter (Camp & Heatherton, 2016; Khan-Cullors & Bandele, 2017; Krishna, 2019; Bonner *et al.*, 2018). Despite the non-violent direct action of those protests (Bell, 2021), the policing architecture claim that potential dangerousness existed in protests against "alleged" events of police violence: as in earlier periods such as the 1920s Red Scare and 1950/60s Civil Rights Movement, antiracism could be coopted by violent elements that did not participate in protests – then, communist and, currently, terrorists.

Further than the violence from outsiders to 'legitimate' demonstrations, there were also the strains of dissidence within antiracism that could resort to violence, a threat articulated as "black extremism". Therefore, antiracist protests could provide an opportunity for violence by individuals or groups that did not integrate those engaging in demonstrations, while there was also a form of antiracism that was dangerous itself. This narrative creates a division between palatable and unpalatable forms of dissidence, respectively, the non-violent but exploitable and the violent – in this sense, repeating the 1960s narrative that problematized the Black Panther Party and others.

As argued in the previous section, following the institutional-judicial responses to 9/11 and "terrorism" discursive reformulations, "black extremism" re-emerged as a potential threat in the late 2000s and early 2010s. According to the policy documents, intelligence assessments, and e-mails mentioned above, with the protests against racialized police violence, "black extremism" returned to the list of relevant threats in the United States – similarly to the 1960s and 1970s.

The culmination of these processes, particularly the architecture's perception that "black extremism" was no longer a potential threat but an existing one, was establishing the Black Identity Extremism (BIE) label in an intelligence assessment dated 3 August 2017, elaborated by the Counterterrorism Division (CTD) of the FBI. This document consolidates these previous understandings by warning that BIE was a rising domestic threat to US national security[26] (US Department of Justice, 2017).

According to the Bureau, the "perception that police brutality is concentrated in African-Americans", especially after Michael Brown's death in 2014 and the subsequent decision of the Justice System not to convict the police officers involved, would give new impetus to BIE attacks against law enforcement (Ibid., p.2). For the Bureau, BIE corresponded to individuals that illegally employed force or violence "in response to perceived racism and injustice in American society"; additionally, some BIE use force or violence to achieve a separated or autonomous black political community "which is sometimes formed around or includes a belief in racial superiority or supremacy" (Ibid., p.2).

Notably, this problematization of "black extremism" follows the CVE approach articulated in the early 2010s – and discussed in the previous section. A tenet of the framework is addressing the radicalization process to prevent "terrorism"/"violent extremism" from emerging (The White House, 2010; 2011b; Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017). For the CVE strategy, understanding and dealing with radicalization "drivers" –motives for an individual or group to become radicalized – is essential. In this sense, the FBI's argument is that the reason for BIE is the "perception that police brutality is concentrated in African-Americans" (US Department of Justice, 2017, p.1), works as an instrument to enmesh antiracism with "terrorism"/"violent extremism".

In other words, the construction of the BIE threat mirrors the CVE vocabulary, which suggests a "perception" of racism as a driver for radicalization understood as an illegitimate form of politics instead of a legitimate proposition

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[26] Interesting, when this report was first publicized by Foreign Policy, there were solely five mentions to BIE on the internet, indicating that this vocabulary was recent and that the report informed subsequent debates (Winter & Weinberger 2017).

(Viana & Da Silva, 2021). This move concretely pushes those deemed BIE to the realm of "radical otherness" (Bonditti, 2015) – i.e. a non-legitimate and dangerous dissidence that cannot be dealt with by means other than policing.

As highlighted above, this was not the first document that mentioned such a threat. In the BIE Intelligence Assessment, the Bureau mentions that it

> has previously reported on BIE retaliatory violence against law enforcement in two products, both of which had findings consistent with this assessment. The 23 March 2016 FBI intelligence bulletin, titled "(U//FOUO) Black Separatist Extremists' Call for Retaliation in Response to Police-Involved Incidents Could Incite Acts of Violence against Law Enforcement," assessed incidents involving allegations of law enforcement abuse and related legal proceedings would likely lead to BSE calls for violent retaliation and incite these domestic extremists to commit violent acts against law enforcement. The 14 November 2014 FBI intelligence bulletin, titled "(U//FOUO) Potential Criminal Reactions to Missouri Grand Jury Announcement," assessed the announcement of the grand jury's decision in the shooting death of Michael Brown in Ferguson would likely be exploited by some individuals to justify threats and attacks against law enforcement and critical infrastructure (US Department of Justice, 2017, p.3 – emphasis added).

Thus, according to the FBI, the current "black extremism" threat is intrinsically connected with a threat to law enforcement officers, given the context of constant "allegations of law enforcement abuse" (US Department of Justice, 2017, p.3). This conceptualization is slightly different from the previous DHS definitions where acts against police officers were possible but not necessarily vital to such "black extremism". Moreover, although the BIE label emerged during Donald Trump's administration, the excerpt above underlines that the FBI has been monitoring "black extremism" since 2014 – i.e. during Obama's administration.

Following the seeds of these previous reports and to justify the emergence of the BIE label, the FBI mentioned "six targeted attacks" committed by supposed BIE since 2014 while also underlining that the people who participated in these events were influenced by distinct ideologies (US Department of Justice, 2017, 4). The only connection between these isolated incidents was the use of force or violence by black people against police officers, given that the drive of each one was distinct – e.g. grievances against law enforcement or the influence of sovereign citizen's ideology (Ibid., p.4-5). In this sense, the BIE label could encapsulate a

broad range of antiracist social movements, potentially creating a justification for repression, particularly against those individuals or groups that protest racialized police brutality.

In response to this threat to antiracist movements, as earlier as the FBI's report's first publicization, practitioners, scholars, and black-led organizations deeply criticized the label (Winter & Weinberger, 2017). The Center for Media Justice[27] and Color of Change[28] requested information about black dissidents' surveillance through the FOIA. Additionally, the US Congressional Black Caucus members officially critiqued the label in a letter to the then-FBI Director[29], further pressing the Bureau.

In an e-mail exchange, members of the FBI's CTD point out that "Black Identity Extremism" is a historical redefinition of the BSE to expand the formulation further than "separatism, since "[t]he threats or movement has simply evolved, and many are seeking more than/other than separation"[30]. As argued, "terrorism" is subjected to historical transformations such as its formulation as "violent extremism" (Bonditti, 2015; 2017; Viana & Da Silva, 2021). In this case, the narrative that "black extremism" encompasses more than black separatism raised within the policing architecture, serves as a catalyst for bureaucratic power at the expense of antiracist dissidents, that is: broadening the contours of such discourse on "black extremism" results in a claim for enlarging bureaucratic resources.

Further than a specific Intelligence Assessment, the BIE nomenclature appeared also in the 2018 FBI' Consolidated Strategy Guide (CSG) produced by the Counterterrorism Division. This register underlines that BIE is the

> use force or violence in violation of criminal law in response to perceived racism and injustice in American society, some do so in furtherance of establishing a separated black homeland or

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[27] For more information, see: https://mediajustice.org/news/fbi-misled-congress-black-activists-still-under-investigation-by-new-and-old-extremist-designations/. Last accessed at: 03/02/2021.

[28] For more information, see: https://act.colorofchange.org/sign/FBI_whitesupremacy/. Last accessed at: 03/02/2021.

[29] For more information, see: https://cbc.house.gov/uploadedfiles/cbc_rm_thompson_cummings_conyers_letter_to_fbi_re_intel_assessment.pdf. Last accessed: 15/10/2021.

[30] For more information, see: https://www.aclu.org/foia-document/october-7-2017-email-michael-paul-fbi-counterterrorism-division-bie. Last accessed: 15/102021.

> autonomous black social institutions, communities, or governing organizations within the US. A desire for physical separation is typically based on a religious or political belief system, which is sometimes formed around or includes a belief in racial superiority or supremacy. Retaliation and retribution for perceived wrongdoings against African Americans has become an organizing driver for BIEs. Some BIEs desire separations from perceived oppressive forces (law enforcement, USG personnel, and other oppressive forces who are viewed as participants in this perceived unjust institutionalized system). This type of targeting has become a more obtainable goal for BIEs. Some still advocate for a separate homeland, while some advocate for starting a race-war (US Department of Justice, 2018a, 1 – emphasis added).

Regardless of the public backlash against it, the BIE label evolved from appearing in an Intelligence Assessment to entering the realm of a strategic security problem. Nevertheless, the conceptualization remains similar to that of the first BIE report: the tactic (force or violence) and "drivers" (a perception of institutionalized racism), which, according to the FBI, characterized "black extremism", continue as primary tenets of such category.

Furthermore, the 2018 FBI CSG points out that within the realm of racial extremisms, BIE was a "priority domestic terrorism" threat (US Department of Justice, 2018a, p.1) that was "likely to remain elevated" and "may continue to expand" (Ibid., p.3). This perspective is contrary to the reading of White Supremacist Extremism (WSE) that would "likely present a medium threat in 2018" (Idem., 2018b, p.3), although a year early (May 2017), a DHS and FBI JIB highlight "white extremism" as the primary source of lethal violence in 2018 – and, historically, more common (Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017).

In 2018 the Trump administration published its National Strategy for Counterterrorism (NSCT), which underlines that Islamic radicalism continues as the main "terrorist" threat abroad. But this is the first policy document that mentions "racially motivated extremism" as a primary domestic terrorist problem (The White House, 2018, p.10). Further than crystallizing that race fully entered the policing architecture list of issues, it (the 2018 NSCT) provided the first re-articulation of what was called BIE a year earlier.

The public and political pressure exerted on the Federal Bureau of Investigation, particularly considering the potential of the BIE label to criminalize

antiracist dissidents and the fact that WSE is historically more common than "black extremism" (Crenshaw & Lafree, 2017; US Department of Homeland Security & US Department of Justice, 2017), pushed the Bureau to reformulate the label. From being termed Black Separatist Extremism (BSE), it became Black Identity Extremism (BIE), then Racially-Motivated Extremism (RME) in 2019 – which was divided into Black-RME and White-RME (US Department of Justice, 2019a).

According to the FBI, RME

> encompasses threats involving the use or threat of force or violence, in violation of federal law, in furtherance of political or social agendas which are deemed to device from race-related bias held by the actor against others, including a given population group (US Department of Justice, 2019a, p.1).

In this conceptualization, the essential pillars of BSE and BIE have been maintained: the use of force or violence triggered by a perception of racism within American society and government, especially after Michael Brown's death (Ibid., 1-2). The potential of each "extremism" also perdures (in the FBI's view) since Black-RME represents a threat that will probably "remain elevated" (Ibid., 2) while White-RME "will likely present a medium threat" (Ibid., p.1).

However, this label completes a process of equalizing Black Nationalism with White Supremacy into a "racial extremism" category: Black Separatist Extremism has racial superiority and supremacy as a tenet, according to DHS Lexicons (US Department of Homeland Security, 2009; 2011) and the FBI BIE Intelligence Assessment (US Department of Justice, 2017), similarly to White Supremacy Extremism. Hence, "black extremism" and "white extremism" have been since the late 2000s considered as part of the same issue – that is, "racial extremism". A rationale that comes full circle in 2019 with the RME label.

Furthermore, the description of BSE, BIE, and Black-RME include "separatism" and armed self-defense ("force or violence"), which are part of the Black Nationalist philosophy discussed in the previous chapter. In this sense, the pressure culminated in a refinement of the "black extremism" discourse since it provided a push for the FBI to construct a category of "racial extremism" that in being all-encompassing – independently of the objectives of each "extremist", such as White Supremacy and Black Nationalism –, can be said not to discriminate at

least conceptually. Therefore, the RME vocabulary creation did not decrease the contemporary black extremism discourse's repressive potential in the United States but provided further protection to the FBI in its use of the label.

In this vein, the DHS Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence (US Department of Homeland Security, 2019), published in late 2019, mentions the label of "racially- and ethnically-motivated violent extremism, including white supremacist violent extremism" as an essential threat of extremism in the United States (Ibid., p.4). Although underlining WSE as more threatening, this DHS policy document maintains the pattern of equalizing antiracism with white supremacy in a single label – in other words, the suggestion that both are strains of "racial extremism".

Similarly, the FBI published "A Study of Lone Offender Terrorism in the United States (1972-2015)": an analysis of individuals that committed "terrorism" independently – that is, without direction from a group or organization – (lone offender), which were mainly "radicalized" in the US, and also that carried acts within the said country (US Department of Justice, 2019b, p.8-9). In this November 2019 study, the Bureau uses the term "racially-motivated violent extremism" (RMVE) and, again, divides it into black and white strains (Ibid., 29). This label (RMVE) also appears in the 2020 FBI Consolidated Strategy Guide (US Department of Justice, 2020), furthering such reformulation.

In the late 2000s, the election of Barack Obama provided hope for transforming the United States' security policies, particularly those concerning counterterrorism. In 2021, the beginning of Joe Biden's administration held a similar sense since, in its 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, the former Obama vice-president underlines that ending racism is a priority (The White House, 2021a). Indeed, "black extremism" gained the most breadth as a current problem in Donald Trump's period as US president – although, as argued, the strength this discourse received in 2017 reflects previous administrations' policies, including those defended by Obama –, in this sense the election of a president (Joe Biden) that has antiracism as a pillar of his administration gives a renewed breath to such struggle.

In a JIB published seven days before Biden assumed the office of US president, the label of "racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism" is defined encompassing "potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence in furtherance of political and/or social agendas, which are deemed to derive from bias often related to race or ethnicity, held by the actor against others, including a given population group" (US Department of Homeland Security, US Department of Justice, US National Counterintelligence Center, 2021, p.1). Importantly, bias (the "driver" in CVE language) is not defined, potentially enabling those forms of antiracism be categorized as bias against the white race – as the FBI considered the BPP extremist for having hatred against the white race during the 1960s and 1970s, as discussed in the previous chapter.

Such a label also appears in the 2021 National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, which underlines RMVE as the leading security issue in the United States, even though other strains of "domestic terrorism" are also thought to be threatening (The White House 2021b; See also Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021). Within the RMVEs, white supremacists are considered the "most lethal" (Ibid., p.11), but a label that encompasses the possibility of framing antiracist politics as "black extremism" continues.

Indeed, an FBI and DHS research named "Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism", published in May 2021, follows the understanding that white supremacists are most lethal while continuing to argue that there are RMVEs that use "racism or injustice in American society to justify their of violence" (US Department of Justice; US Department of Homeland Security, 2021, p.7).

In this same vein, the current NSCT underlines that

> It is critical that we condemn and confront domestic terrorism regardless of the particular ideology that motivates individuals to violence. The definition of "domestic terrorism" in our law makes no distinction based on political views – left, right, or center – and neither should we. We must disrupt and deter those who use violence to intimidate racial or religious minorities, who have so often been the victims of hateful extremists. So too must we disrupt and deter those who launch violent attacks in a misguided effort to force change in government policies that they view as unjust. In a democracy, there is no justification for

resorting to violence to resolve political differences (The White House, 2021b, p.13).

Hence, independently of motives ("left, right, or center), using violence for political reasons – e.g., self-defense – is considered "terrorism". It is, of course, impossible to argue that this necessarily will result in further criminalization of black radicalism as "terrorism/violent extremism". Nevertheless, the potential for such an understanding to unfold is already present in these current policy documents.

3.3   Conclusion

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's efforts to disrupt black nationalist organizations under Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) prerogatives came to public scrutiny during the 1970s – although it had been running since the 1950s, as discussed in the previous chapter. Until the United States Senate dissected COINTELPRO in 1976, most actions continued to be involved in a veil of secrecy common to the United States policing architecture – and of modern states generally (Bosma, de Goede, Pallister-Wilkins, 2020). Hence, given that RMVE is a contemporary discussion, there are probably several essential pieces of information to this dissertation that could not be accessed given the fabric's secrecy, particularly those concerning the methods employed in investigations of those deemed "black extremists" – which, as in the COINTELPRO case, might come to public scrutiny in the future.

However, the arguments made in this chapter aimed at underlining that, although we do not have the information to equalize the policing of black radical dissidents in both eras, the potential of the first is similar to the latter: justifying criminalizing and repressing antiracist dissent deemed as too radical. In addition, seeing that rather than "black extremism" and "white extremism", the current nomenclature emphasizes strains of "racial extremism", such discourse might provide an argument that the policing architecture does not discriminate between what it criminalizes. This last point needs to be grasped considering that, even if policing architecture operated in a non-biased fashion in its use of the label, the

criminal justice system historically incarcerates more African Americans than white people (Alexander, 2010; Davis, 2017). Moreover, enmeshing both highlights the policing architecture sees racism and antiracism as equal.

As pointed out above: the seeds for a politics of controlling antiracist dissent have again been planted.

4. Racism and policing: the making of global/local political order

The theme of police brutality appeared in the previous chapters as a thread connecting the two historical contexts investigated and the re-articulations of the discourse on black extremism. In both the 1960s and the 2010s, the contestation of police brutality and its concentration on African Americans has been a pillar for mobilizing those framed as "black extremists". In this vein, those deemed as extremists target police forces for perceiving them as a materialization of a racist structure. Further than a nodal point for activists' critique or a "driver" for extremism – as constructed by State's narrative – "police" is a crucial concept for this dissertation. This chapter explores this conceptual importance.

For such purpose, the first section briefly addresses the main discourses on "police" that regard it as an institution characterized by uniformed police officers combating crime (Bayley, 1996). This approach enmeshes with the primary discourse on international politics (i.e., interstate relations) and excludes the police as an eligible topic for International Relations since such an institution operates within State boundaries (Neocleous, 2000; Holmqvist; Bachmann; Bell, 2015). In this discourse, the police might be researched by the field of International Relations exclusively when it enters the international for crimefighting reasons – that is, when the internationalization of crime gains breadth (Andreas; Price, 2001).

In the second part of this initial section, the perspective mentioned above is counterpointed with recourse to the critical literature on police and policing in International Relations. This literature mainly argues that "police" concerns more than law enforcement institutions and crimefighting. As will be argued, "police" is a concept that grasps various bureaucracies and professionals engaged in making and maintaining the current political order (Cleaver, 1968; Neocleous, 2000; 2010).

Following such conceptualization, this chapter's second section argues that the problematization of black radicalism as a dangerous form of extremism constitutes a historical continuity that operates to sustain a particular global/local political order. As discussed in previous chapters, the articulation of such

problematization (that of black radicalism) is intrinsically related to the US making of other racialized threats such as anticolonial movements in the Philippines or the

African and Asian continents during the twentieth century and the so-called Islamic radicalism during the current century. Hence, this problematization as articulated by the policing architecture is threatening for it aims to transform the current order at home and abroad since it ("black extremism") is constructed as always intrinsically connected with other racialized threats – i.e., the policing entities simultaneously repress and produce the threat to achieve their goal of making and protecting the order.

Finally, the conclusion returns to such claims to underline that regardless of the era, race remains informing policing – and, in this vein, the global/local political order – albeit with changes.

4.1   A Panther view on policing

Usually, when "police" enters a debate or discussion, the meaning associated with it is that of an institution (*the* police) charged with crimefighting and composed of uniformed officers that mostly conduct patrolling (Bayley, 1996). The bureaucracies, professionals, media and entertainment industry cooperate, although not always formally, to push this understanding to the broad public (Brodeur, 2010; Vitale, 2017). Concrete practices also are crucial for such framing:

> As we have seen, the new police from 1829 onwards was indeed charged with the task of preventing crime. The formal bureaucratic organization of the police reinforces the view that the police are primarily dedicated to criminal law enforcement. Police training emphasizes things criminal – criminal law, criminal statistics, crime prevention – and the internal administration of police authority tends to reflect formal criminal enforcement specializations, for example in the way that key units are named after specific offences, or the way record keeping is of crimes. The criminal process is almost always set in motion by the police and the work of a certain number of police activities is determined by the provisions of the penal code. Moreover, the image of the police as the vanguard fighter in a protracted war on crime is propagated by the police, politicians and the media (Neocleous, 2000, p.92).

Indeed, the usual understanding of "police" as a bureaucracy erected for law enforcement purposes has gained breadth since it began emphasizing crime as its principal object, criminology as its field of study, and organizing the internal

boundaries around specialties (e.g. drug trafficking). Defenders of *the* (i.e., the institution) police argue that crimefighting is not the primary activity of law enforcement, regardless of common thought concerning it (Bayley, 1996). Critical stances on "police" argue that "police" originally had another meaning attached to it (Neocleous, 2000; 2010) – which is vital for this dissertation and will be addressed next.

Although subject to such critics, the hegemonic discourse on police informs most of the public and policymakers' imaginaries. Notably, this discourse concerning police has historically been enmeshed with other discourses such as the separation of crime and warfare, law enforcement and armed forces, peace and war, respectively, based on the inside and outside boundaries of modern politics (Walker, 1993; Bigo; Walker, 2007; Neocleous, 2014; Holmqvist; Bachmann; Bell, 2015). In other words, the construction of "police" as concentrated on crimefighting correlates with the distinction of crime from warfare since the first occurs within the State and the latter outside of it. This division relates to the distinction between "police" and military in terms of where each operates, respectively, domestically and internationally.

The crossing of such discourses reinforces an associative boundary between police/crime/domestic politics/peace and military/warfare/international politics/anarchy (Walker, 1993; Bigo; Walker, 2007; Neocleous, 2014; Holmqvist; Bachmann; Bell, 2015). Developing this argument would not only extrapolate the scope of this dissertation: it has already been the central task of authors such as Neocleous (2010), Holmqvist, Bachmann and Bell (2015). For our purposes here, it is enough to underline those police have been circumscribed to police studies, public policy, and criminology and overall excluded from discussions within International Relations (Neocleous, 2000; Hönke; Müller, 2016). That is: since IR focuses on international politics framed as interstate relations, particularly conflict (Walt, 1991; Walker, 1993), "police" is a non-eligible topic for this academic field.

However, researchers have argued that the perception of policymakers, professionals, and other scholars, that the internationalization of crime is constantly gaining breadth pushes the "police" into international politics (Andreas; Price, 2001; Andreas; Nadelmann, 2006). In addition, other studies argued that policing

is global since "police powers" surpass national boundaries. That is to say: they have a global capacity (Shepticky; Bowling, 2012). These contributions enlarge the field of IR in their investigation of the police while continuing to be informed by the foundational boundaries of police/crime/domestic politics/peace and military/warfare/international/anarchy (Hönke; Müller, 2016), even though criticizing such divisions (Andreas; Price, 2001).

To address the issues above, this dissertation advances another conceptualization of "police". As both Michel Foucault (2007) and Mark Neocleous (2000) remark, the sense with which the word "police" is mobilized has changed throughout the years: during the 18th and 19th centuries, the term referred to interventions aiming at potentializing the forces of a state while maintaining an ideal order (Foucault, 2007; Neocleous, 2000). Indeed, this conceptualization does not exclude law enforcement but pushes the contours of the police's mandate by emphasizing an object broader than so-called crime.

Neocleous (2000, p.1-2) argues that two historical and interlinked events were crucial for the emergence of "police": first, feudalism's corrosion gradually led to the advent of free individuals who sold their labor in exchange for a wage in the nascent industry; second, industrial capitalism gave breadth to urbanization. For reasons that fall outside the scope of this dissertation, the combination of both (free wage labor and urbanization) culminated in impoverishment and habits that became associated with it, such as gambling, drinking, adultery, blasphemy, but also begging and vagrancy – these latter associated with the figure of wandering, the epitome of social disorder (Ibid., p.2).

For several motives (see, for example, Foucault, 2007, p.322-325), these behaviors were constructed as negatively impacting the development of the State's forces since they did not contribute to the fertile and ordered environment thought to be crucial for achieving such purpose. In this sense, these conducts were posed as "problems" at that time (Foucault, 1984a) on the grounds of their disorderly nature (Foucault, 2007; Neocleous, 2000). The idea of "police" emerges as a response to these issues, thus:

> It can be seen that from the outset police was for the most part concerned not with criminal activity but with activities potentially damaging to communal good order. In other words,

preventing crime was not integral to the definition of police; crime prevention has never been the *raison d'être* of police (Neocleous, 2000, 4 – authors emphasis).

Law enforcement is neither exclusively nor primarily the focus of "police", but as "crime" is perceived as threatening to that which is idealized as order, it enters the police's mandate (Neocleous, 2000; Foucault, 2007). In other words, "police" conducts crimefighting as it came to be seen as part of the broader purpose of maintaining social order. This point suggests that "the best way to understand police is as an *activity* rather than an institution, a *function* rather than an entity" (Ibid., p.5).

Prior to developing this argument is important to underline that such *activity* or *function* is a pillar of the State's power since, as it became seen as the sovereign, social order "was discursively structured around the concept of sovereign power" (Ibid., p.7). Social disorders eventually came to orbit the State's mandate, and policing (i.e. the practice of "police") became the primary instrument to achieve this objective. Hence, the activity named "police" became a crucial mechanism for the State's taming of what was perceived as disorderly behavior and, therefore, it has been a pillar of the State's power (Neocleous, 2000).

Notably, the meaning of social order is discursively produced, given that, as outlined above, the particular understanding of order in this discussion emerged historically to address capitalism and the modern state needs. In this sense, the conduct viewed as disorderly was also constructed discursively, mainly through the State's central instrument to produce and maintain social order: policing. The perception that behavior was disorderly, thus subjected to policing, produced such conduct and subjects as threatening and dangerous to social order. In these terms, policing holds a productive character instead of exclusively a repressive one; it produces that which is deemed disorderly, a point that will be returned below.

Intrinsically connected to the historical process that forwarded the emergence of capitalism and the modern State are colonialism and imperialism (Robinson, 2020; Neocleous, 2014); both hold this vital importance for leading to the dispossession and exploration of colonized labor, land, and material resources, which were essential to capitalism's development and the strengthening of European states' forces. Indeed, colonialism and imperialism are more relevant to

politics than they appear in the above description (Robinson, 2020; Fanon, 2004). For the argument in construction here, it is crucial to underline those colonial/imperial enterprises that appear fundamental to capital accumulation while also being a pillar for the modern State for granting material resources relevant to its power (Neocleous, 2014).

Importantly, the *modus operandi* of modern colonial/imperial enterprises is indiscriminate and visceral violence informed by a racialization of indigenous populations, as Kramer (2006) and McCoy (2009; 2016) argued in the Philippines example discussed in chapter 2. According to several authors (Césaire, 2020; Fanon, 2004; Krishna, 2001; Kramer, 2006; McCoy, 2009; 2016; Barder, 2021), this pattern of racialized violence in colonialism/imperialism operates as warfare for conquest, land dispossession, labor exploration, capital accumulation, and settler colonialism.

Differently from the hegemonic perspective, which constructs war as an armed conflict between states, exceptional, and waged by military forces (Walt, 1991), or from the approach that classifies colonial/imperial violence as "small wars" (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006), examples from countries as distinct as Brazil, Canada, the Philippines, the United States, Algeria (Gonzalez & Hasenbalg, 1982; Fanon, 2004; McCoy, 2009; Vitale, 2017; Bell; Schreiner, 2018), and others (Barder, 2015; Danewid, 2019), underline a pattern of taming colonized unruliness (i.e., policing) through military, paramilitary, and law enforcement organizations. Groups such as slave patrols in Brazil and the United States (Wilson, 2022) and Canadian Mounties (Bell; Schreiner, 2018) conducted a broad range of activities ranging from waging war through invasion and occupation of territories and extermination of indigenous populations to patrolling colonized urban spaces and pursuing enslaved people (Gonzalez & Hasenbalg, 1982; Fanon, 2004; Kramer, 2006; McCoy, 2009; Vitale, 2017; Bell; Schreiner, 2018; Danewid, 2019).

Colonial/imperial warfare essentially enabled the subjugation and exploration of the colonized land and labor, a crucial endeavor for developing the contours of the liberal socio-racial order at home and abroad (Neocleous, 2014; Fanon, 2004). As underlined above, this goal was achieved with recourse to bureaucracies and practices that addressed unruliness/disorder – that is, policing –

of the colonized/racialized. Hence, the boundary of war/crime that permeates the primary understanding of "police" is blurred because socio-racial ordering transverses law enforcement and war.

In this sense, regardless of the 'force' yielding violence (e.g. armed forces, law enforcement, paramilitaries), the space it is used (e.g. metropoles or colonies, cities or hinterlands), or its practices (e.g. patrolling or raiding), policing "is very much about the shaping of the behavior of individuals, groups and classes, and thereby ordering the social relations of power around a particular regime of accumulation" (Neocleous, 2014, p.32-33) – that is, produce social order. Agreeing with the claim that warfare is crucial for policing but further underlining the importance of colonialism and imperialism, the Black Panthers argued that the "regime of accumulation" (Neocleous, 2014, p.33) also feeds and is fed by race (Manchanda; Rossdale, 2021). Hence, the order produced and protected by policing – e.g., military, paramilitaries, or law enforcement – is social, racial, colonial and imperial.

According to Eldridge Cleaver (1968), this means that

> The police on the domestic level does what the armed forces do on the international: protect the way of life for those in power. The police patrol the city, cordon off communities, blockade neighborhoods, invade homes, search for that which is hidden. The armed forces patrol the world, invade countries and continents, cordon off nations, blockade islands and whole peoples; they will also overrun villages, neighborhoods, enter homes, huts, caves, searching for that which is hidden. The policeman and the soldier will violate your person, smoke you out with various gases. Each will shoot you, beat your head and body with sticks and clubs, with rifle butts, run you through with bayonets, shoot holes in your flesh, kill you. They each have unlimited firepower. They will use all that is necessary to bring you to your knees. They won't take no for an answer. If you resist their sticks, they draw their guns. If you resist their guns, they call for reinforcements with bigger guns. Eventually, they will come in tanks, in jets, in ships. They will not rest until you surrender or are killed. The policeman and the soldier will have the last word (Cleaver, 1968, p.156-157).

Albeit distinct bureaucracies which operate at different levels and through different practices, law enforcement agencies and the armed forces share the same goal: sustaining "the implementation of the policies of those who make the decisions" (Ibid., p.160). In this vein, Cleaver (Ibid., p.148) argues in another

passage that their (police/military) purpose is protecting "white supremacy", which characterizes "part of the ideology of the world of power".

Huey P. Newton similarly points out that:

> Black people desire to determine their own destiny. As a result, they are constantly inflicted with brutality from the occupying army, embodied by the police department. There is a great similarity between the occupying army in Southeast Asia and the occupation of our communities by the racist police. The armies were sent not to protect the people of South Vietnam but to brutalize and oppress them in the self-interests of imperial powers (Newton, 2019, p.161).

These claims are in line with the argument that policing corresponds to "a set of apparatuses and technologies constituting political order in general and the law of labour in particular" (Neocleous, 2014, p.11) – which was made previously – for they claim that independently of the nature (law enforcement/armed forces) of policing institutions or their practices, their aim is the same. The Black Panthers, nevertheless, deepen this point by drawing out the racial contours of this order. That is: Panthers underline the white supremacist's character of policing[31] by arguing that these apparatuses are employed against primarily "all people of color throughout the world" to protect racial capitalism and those that benefit from it (Newton, 2019, p.160).

In summary, policing is fundamentally "transversal" (Bigo; Walker, 2007), i.e., a thread that cuts across global and local politics. First, because discourses, practices, and professionals, circulate independently of traditional political boundaries (Hönke; Müller, 2016), as exemplified in the Philippine-United States circuit case explored in chapter 2 and the War on Terror example discussed in chapter 3. These, of course, are not isolated cases (Barder, 2015; Danewid, 2019). Secondly, policing, understood as order-making, encompasses multiple bureaucracies not bounded by divisions, such as law enforcement and armed forces, crime and war, or domestic and international (Neocleous, 2000). Finally, the

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[31] Importantly, although anticipating Foucault's (2007) and Neocleous' (2000; 2010) main argument concerning policing as order-making mechanisms, and adding racism to the debate, Black Panthers have not been mentioned by these authors or had their arguments given importance in critical security studies until recently (Manchanda; Rossdale, 2021).

discursive practices that create the subject of policing are not confined in local and global political boundaries.

4.2   Policing and world politics

Having conceptualized policing as a set of practices, bureaucracies, and professionals that constantly (re)constitute the order, it is crucial to return to arguments outlined in previous chapters to underline the importance of such theoretical movement to the analysis of the black extremism discourse.

At first, the dissertation addressed the foundations of the United States intelligence field in the Philippines since, albeit policing is grasped here in an expanded sense, it is the agencies concerned with producing intelligence and engaging in counterintelligence (e.g., FBI, DHS) that mostly hold the authority to determined the contours of the black extremism threat, as previously argued. This part of the investigation has led us to US intelligence's racial/colonial/imperial roots.

Such debate provided evidence of policing as a central mechanism for producing and maintaining white supremacy, given that the erection of a policing architecture – that had race as a nodal point for determining disorder – was essential to the US imperial enterprise in the Philippines (Kramer, 2006; McCoy, 2009; 2015). The knowledge acquired and developed in the Philippines was central for participants of the Philippine-American War, which returned stateside with the status of experts (McCoy, 2009; 2015). These policing professionals and their knowledge were vital to shaping the United States domestic intelligence field, including the racialized perception of threats that prevail in it (McCoy 2009; 2015; Coyne; Hall, 2018).

The discursive practices that constitute this racialized threat-making are global and local, as seen in an excerpt mentioned in chapter 2 and extracted from a 1961 Central Intelligence Agency report on African anticolonial dissidents. According to the CIA, African "radicals" (in a negative connotation):

> demands for the early withdrawal of Western military assets throughout Africa; (b) further relation against France on Algeria, the Sahara bomb tests, and its policies in West Africa; and (c) frequent support for Soviet Bloc initiatives before the UN and elsewhere which are in harmony with African "aspirations". The tendency of Africa's militant nationalists to adopt extreme postures on area issues will pose serious problems for the West, and particularly the US (Central Intelligence Agency, 1961, p.6).

In other words, African activists' propositions were constructed as threatening to the United States and Western interests given their "extreme" contours, for example, the quest for ending military occupation by former colonial empires in the region – that is to say, political autonomy. Indeed, these movements contested the global and local political orders made in and through colonialism/imperialism and proposed a radical (in a positive sense) change in this white supremacist structure (Getachew, 2019). However, rather than arguing that these movements and activists were truthfully dangerous, the point is that the perception of threat stems from the policing aim of protecting white supremacy at home and abroad (Cleaver, 1968; Newton, 2019).

It is in this sense that we re-read a Federal Bureau of Investigation excerpt mentioned in chapter 2, which suggests that

> So-called civil rights organizations preaching hatred for the white race, demanding immunity from laws, and advocating violence constitute a serious threat to our country's internal security. These organizations such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Revolutionary Action Movement hope to disrupt the tranquility of our Nation with violence to further the concept of "black power." Leaders of these groups constantly attempt to spread domestic discord among Negroes by making inflammatory speeches and issuing hate-filled literature (US Department of Justice, 1967, p.28).

In this document, groups that purpose a profound transformation were framed as particularly dangerous (hence, eligible for policing) for having rhetoric perceived as "preaching hatred for the white race," aiming at political autonomy constructed as "demanding immunity from laws," and advocating for self-defense, that is, violence – understood as a non-legitimate political method by policing architecture, even though it is also crucial for ordering practices that keep racialized peoples tamed. According to the Bureau, such groups tried to sow dissension amongst the African American population, furthering disorderly behavior to

achieve a profound transformation of the existing order – i.e., a threat to white supremacy.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the epitome of such a threat was the Black Panther Party, as highlighted in chapter 2. As suggested by the FBI,

> The Black Panther Party, which was founded as the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense at Oakland, California, in December, 1966, for the alleged purpose of combating police brutality and uniting militant black youth. The political philosophy of its leaders is based on the writings of Mao-Tse-tung and black revolutionary writers. They advocate the use of guns and guerrilla tactics to end their alleged oppression (US Department of Justice, 1968, p.24).

Although this excerpt mentions the Panthers' objectives as "combating police brutality and uniting militant black youth," this has been done with the inclusion of "alleged purpose," that is to say: a wording that delegitimizes such purposes. Moreover, their theoretical references (Marxism-Maoism and "black revolutionary writers") are underlined as points of dangerousness as they advocate for violence as a means to put an end to "their alleged oppression" (suggesting that those claims were questionable). Notably, the FBI's construction of Black Panthers as "black extremists" is similar to the CIA's making of African activists as "radicals": both are made as threats for materializing dangerousness to the existing racial order at home and abroad, which provided the basis for making subjected to policing.

Before addressing the meaning of these claims to this dissertation's main argument, it is fundamental to return to points made out in chapter 3, which underlined that the global/local making of black radicalism as threatening is not exclusively of the 1960s and 1970s. As the context of anticommunism and decolonization informed the construction of Black Panthers as threatening, the contemporary expression of the black extremism discourse also feds of another so-called security threat: Islamic radicalism.

From the turn of the twentieth to the twenty-first century, "Islamic terrorism" came to the forefront of threats to the United States, previously occupied by communism (Seymour, 2015). Indeed, as the twenty century's anticommunism discourse is connected to race and vice-versa – i.e., the issue of decolonial movements pending towards communism (Central Intelligence Agency, 1948;

1961) – the counterterrorism discourse is also embedded in race (Krishna, 2009; 2019). As the 2006 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the threat of Islamic radicalism "is fueled by a radical ideology of hatred, oppression, and murder" (The White House, 2006b, p.1); in this sense, these actors' method (political violence) is non-legitimate as their goals – supposedly, "hatred, oppression, and murder".

Nevertheless, according to Tarak Barkway and Mark Laffey (2006, p.347-348), the emergence of so-called Islamic radicalism "is a reaction against Western modernity and an attempt to outline a new, Islamic modernity". "Islamic radicalism" can also be framed as a contestation of the global and local political order produced by and through colonialism/imperialism (Krishna, 2009; 2019), even if not overtly articulated in these terms. This counterargument to the view that produces "Islamic radicalism" as a quintessentially anti-Western perspective points out that

> Amalgamating a complex set of political dynamics and treating it as a whole by combining a representation of culturally retrograde religion with fanciful notions of transitional threats embodied an active racialization of Muslims and Islam (Barder, 2021, p.205).

Hence, the point here is not legitimizing or delegitimizing political violence but, first, underlining that the War on Terror discourse is embedded in a racialized threat-making process, which justifies policing so-called Islamic radicals and the Muslim population generally at home and abroad (Krishna, 2009; 2019) for this it is a threat to the existing political order. Secondly, this racialized security threat materialized by "Islamic terrorism" is crucial for the contemporary articulation of the "black extremism" discourse. That is: as the racialization of anticommunism was mobilized in the twenty centuries against the Black Panther Party, the racialization of "terrorism" is currently being used to justify policing black radicals.

This claim is crystallized, for example, in an excerpt extracted from a Department of Homeland Security Lexicon (2009) mentioned in chapter 3, which points out that the existence of dangerousness named Black Separatist Extremism conceptualized as

> A movement of groups or individuals of black or African American descent who advocate the separation of the rest of the

United States; some advocate forming their own political system within a separate nation. Such groups or individuals also may embrace radical religious beliefs. Members have been known to advocate or engage in criminal activity and plot acts of violence directed toward local law enforcement in an attempt to advance their extremist goals (US Department of Homeland Security, 2009, p.4).

As highlighted earlier in this dissertation, the DHS is an organization created primarily as a response to the supposed failure of the United States intelligence to prevent the 9/11 events (Crenshaw; Laffrey, 2017); therefore, it is an agency mostly focused on counterterrorism efforts. In itself, the mentioning of a "black extremism" potential threat by the DHS indicates the War on Terror discourse reflection on the contemporary articulation of the "black extremism" discourse. Furthermore, this Lexicon is an intelligence product that discusses domestic terrorism, i.e. the BSE is listed as a possible expression of current terrorism enterprises.

As has been with the Panthers and other twentieth-century groups, the BSE threat relates to African American groups or individuals that have political autonomy, separationism, and the advocation for violence, as part of their ideological framework. Most importantly, this same perspective returns during the 2010s with the introduction of BIE, RME and, finally, RMVE, which labels racism as a vector for radicalization. Hence, according to the policing apparatus, these tenets materialize a threat that existed for at least the 1950s: black extremism. A politics that supposedly or actually aims at surpassing racism with recourse to political violence and political philosophies deemed dangerous, such as Marxism and currently abolitionism.

Nevertheless, political-economic autonomy and self-defense, to name two aspects considered threatening by the policing architecture, are also two primary suggestions of the black radical tradition (Robison, 2020). As Andrew Kehinde (2018) summarizes, such tradition argues that the main issue is the system or power structure to which African and Afro-diasporic people are subjected: white supremacy. It suggests that "[t]here can be no reform, no adjustments" but "an overturning of the system that oppresses Black people, and for nothing short of a revolution" (Ibid., xvii). Notably, the meaning of radicalism gains positive contours since it points out that the basis of the current modern/colonial society is *the*

problem; therefore, radical means transforming the roots of the society through "rejecting the fundamental principles that govern society and creating a new paradigm" (Ibid., p.18).

Black radicalism proposes dis-order, i.e. dislocating the current order deemed as unsavable, since it is built upon "racial exterminism" (Kramer, 2006), dispossession, enslavement, capital accumulation, and labor expropriation (Fanon, 2004; Danewid, 2019), for the benefit of white supremacy (Cleaver, 1968). In this sense, black radicals' propositions cannot be tamed within the current system because their main proposition is ending such a power structure, which poses a problem to politics (Foucault, 1984a): how to digest such dissent? The black extremism discourse emerges as a response to this problem because it constructs black radicalism as a "radical otherness" (Bonditti, 2015), i.e. an entity that cannot and should be integrated but eliminated.

As outlined in the previous section, rather than a law enforcement institution, policing is better conceptualized "set of apparatuses and technologies constituting political order in general and the law of labor in particular" (Neocleous, 2014, p.11). Following this argument, black radicalism is policed not because of the particular bureaucracies operating to "disrupt" it (e.g., FBI, DHS, or local police departments) but because it is a threat to the global/local political order. In other words, the discursive construction of black radicalism as black extremism further advances the argument that policing is a function that operates to produce and maintain the socio-racial order at home and abroad.

Furthermore, as racialized people, black radicals are also produced as inhuman, resulting in 'heavier' policing than those destined for those non-racialized – or racialized as white (Fanon, 2004; Vitale, 2017; Howell, 2018; Danewid, 2019). This argument is exemplified by the law enforcement's use of weaponry such as assault rifles and armored personnel carriers to suppress demonstrations or overt armed conflict, such as the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) raid of a BPP headquarters in 1969 (Vitale, 2017; Howell, 2018). Special operations tactics such as raiding, infiltration, smear campaigns, and assassination have been employed against black radicals (US Senate, 1976; Vitale, 2017; Howell, 2018).

These tactics and weaponry are usually regarded as part of the warfare repertoire: both are practices for conducting war exclusively used by the military against an enemy, following the liberal discourse in which war/military are separated from policing. However, as the Black Panthers argued, the police and the military, and their tactics and weaponry, are always entangled to protect the order (Cleaver, 1968; Manchanda; Rossdale, 2021) – that is, policing. Then, as pointed out in the previous section, policing surpasses the boundaries of inside/outside and crime/war because it aims to protect the global/local order and since their discursive practices, both productive (i.e. constructing the threat) and repressive (i.e. disrupting the threat), is transversal.

4.3   Conclusion

From the 1960s context of anticommunism enmeshing with decolonization struggles to the 2000s "War on Terrorism" and anti-police brutality demonstrations across the globe, black radicalism has been constructed as a threat by the policing architecture. As argued in the previous chapters, this threat-making historically appeared as a discourse on "black extremism", which is articulated in connection with discourses on racial enmity that transverse global and local political boundaries. Although briefly, it was crucial to reflect on what such problematization (i.e., black radicalism as extremism) meant for a broader discussion of global and local politics, particularly its production and protection.

To such endeavor, this dissertation employed the concept of policing in a sense that differs from the regular comprehension of "police" as a law enforcement institution. This common-sense approach diverts from its original definition and, most importantly, erases the importance of such a concept for investigating the making of order at home and abroad (Neocleous, 2000; 2010). The historical-empirical findings of this research connected with the critical literature on policing and International Relations contribute to the argument that an expansive concept of "police" helps to grasp the contours of the global/local political order. Mainly, it pointed out that policing is an essential mechanism for taming those that contest and radically dissent from the current white supremacist order rather than

exclusively law enforcement. As argued, this socio-racial control is pursued transversally: the threat-making processes at home and abroad are intrinsically connected, as are the bureaucracies, professionals, and techniques to tame dangerousness.

In summary, the analysis of the discursive practices that construct black radicalism exposes that they have been articulated by institutions created in and through colonialism/imperialism and that such threat-making processes are intrinsically linked with other racializations of enmity. Hence, it underlines that despite the conjuncture, the Black Panthers' claim remains true: policing serves white supremacy.

5.   Conclusion

This dissertation sought to investigate what the framing of radical antiracist politics as a domestic threat to the United States meant regarding the broad political and research problem of managing radical dissents to racism. For this purpose, it traced a genealogy of the discourse on "black extremism" as it emerged during the 1960s and the 2010s, particularly looking at the intersections of domestic and global politics in defining the contours of such discourse. This genealogical-discursive analysis was based on the U.S. policing architecture's historical records concerning "black extremism", but it did not manage to read every document of interest.

In pursuing the objective outlined above, the second chapter looked into the professionalization of the U.S. field of intelligence in its first section to grasp the foundations of the crucial voices in the construction of radical antiracist politics as a threat, which is: agencies charged with intelligence-collection and counterintelligence, i.e., our "speaking subjects" (Foucault, 1981). Further than finding that such a field has colonial/imperial roots, the chapter underlined a fundamental yet blurred bureaucratic boundary between those agencies charged with foreign and domestic (McCoy, 2009; 2015; Coyne & Hall, 2018).

Such division is significant for our discussion since it produces distinct but interconnected threats; particularly in that chapter is the making of antiracism as a threat for potentially being linked to communism. At home, this threat-making process emphasized the foreign influence on the struggle for civil rights and the communist impact on national liberation movements in former colonies abroad (Seymour, 2015). The breadth gained by the Black Panthers in the late 1960s, their claim that racism is a thread that traverses the inside/outside political boundary (e.g., civil rights and decolonization), their revolutionary ethos of radically transforming society at home and abroad, and their advocacy for self-defense (Cleaver, 1968; Newton, 2019; Manchanda; Rossdale, 2021), brought them to the forefront of FBI's list of dangerousness effectively framing Panthers as "black extremists".

The third chapter turned to the twenty-first century when communism ceased to be the leading foreign threat to the United States and "terrorism" of the

so-called Islamic radicalism strand gained such position. As struggles for national liberation of the twentieth century, those deemed Islamic radicals expressed an armed contestation against racial, colonial, and imperial legacies in the Global South (Barkawi; Laffey, 2006; Krishna, 2009; 2019). Albeit agreeing with the Black Panthers' argument for the legitimacy of armed self-defense (Newton, 2019), this dissertation's interest is not in justifying political violence but in analyzing its perception by those charged with defending the existing order and underlining that the struggle against coloniality and racism appears in distinct forms – including "Islamic radicalism".

Following the focus on the policing architecture, the investigation argued that 9/11 pushed forward a narrative of failure within the intelligence and counterintelligence field (Crenshaw; Laffrey, 2017), which served to maintain a process of bureaucratic reformulation and expansion that precedes and follows such an event (Donohue, 2001; Viana; Dos Santos da Silva, 2021). This growth in the policing architecture led to constant searching for dangerousness that eventually led to "black extremism" returning to the list of potential domestic threats. With the breadth gained during the 2010s to demonstrations against racialized police brutality, the Bureau produced the "Black Identity Extremism" (BIE) label to conjure a concrete domestic terrorism problem. As it did during the 1960s, certain antiracist radical politics again have been posed and, most importantly, remain a domestic threat to the United States.

Notably, as Angela Y. Davis (2016) argues, although the War on Terror was proclaimed in 2001, the U.S. government had framed both national liberation movements and domestic black social movements as threats in the past. In this vein, Anna Meier (2022) remarks that the Black Panthers' gradual demise also meant an increased focus on the Black Liberation Army (BLA). This organization disagreed with Huey P. Newton's politics of "survival pending revolution" – i.e., emphasizing survival through community programs to achieve a future revolution – and sought to engage in armed struggle against the U.S. government (Umoja, 1999). The FBI framed the BLA as domestic terrorism from the mid-1970s until its termination (Umoja, 1999; Davis, 2016; Meier, 1999).

The BLA is then also a vital thread connection between past and present. Nevertheless, this dissertation did not discuss this organization as did the Panthers, for its aim was not to explore each instance of the discourse on "black extremism" since, as Michel Foucault (1984b) remembers, genealogy is not concerned with finding origins or an immutable essence to an object – e.g., "black extremism" – for it would prove an impossible and problematic quest. In this vein, the research also did not dive into a discussion of domestic islamophobia; given its focus on the "black extremism" discourse, the investigation mainly addressed the racialization of Islam and Muslims as a foreign threat, but it is important to underline that such racialized violence also occurs domestically (Krishna, 2009; Barder, 2021).

The third and concluding chapter engaged directly with the issue of policing. Seeing that the discourse on "black extremism" has been erected against an antiracist politics deemed too radical and incompatible with usual political means – that is, an "extremism" – the U.S. government mobilizes the policing architecture to disrupt such racial contestation. In light of Foucault's (1981, 52-53) claim that "discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is a struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized", this dissertation understanding is: first, the articulation of discourse on "black extremism" is a result of power struggles between maintaining order and contestations to it; secondly, and most importantly, that the mobilization of such discourse speaks more about those that yield it than those deemed as such by the policing architecture (Bonditti, 2015).

Indeed, finding that the policing architecture is the primary "speaking subject" (Foucault, 1981) in such a threat-making process – i.e., the discursive articulation of "black extremism" – exposes that black radicalism is seen as dangerous to local and global political order, because as Angela Y. Davis argues,

> Assimilationist strategies that leave intact circumstances and structures that perpetuate exclusion and marginalization have always been offered as the more reasonable alternative to abolition, which, of course, not only requires resistance and dismantling, but also radical reimaginings and radical reconstruction (Davis *apud* Johnson; Lubin, p.246-247).

In other words, radicalism is threatening by suggesting reimagination and reconstruction of political order at home and abroad. "Abolition", an aim sought by

black radicals from the Black Panthers (Newton, 2019) to the Black Lives Matter network (Heatherton, 2017), but also before and beyond these eras in the United States (Robinson, 2020; Johnson; Lubin, 2017), is a threat for it addresses the vitality of transforming the racial global/local political order. The third chapter grasped policing as order-making practices those transverse bureaucracies, professionals, topics (e.g., counterintelligence, law enforcement), and boundaries such as crime/war, law enforcement/military, and inside/outside (Cleaver, 1968; Newton, 2019; Neocleous, 2000; 2010; Foucault, 2007; Manchanda; Rossdale, 2021). In this sense, racial contestations cuts-across domestic and foreign lines, for racism is not a structure bounded by these contours. However, this claim also meant that the protection of this power also transverses these boundaries: understood in the broad sense mentioned above, policing is a central mechanism for producing and sustaining the global/local racial order.

This argument tries to push forward the importance of such concept (policing) to the studies of the racial order in the academic field of International Relations, contributing, as pointed out in this dissertation's introduction, to the investigation of the broader political and research question (Shilliam, 2013; Hall, 2017): how, despite having been scientifically disproved, race and racism remain until nowadays? Part of this answer is that radical alternatives are quickly constructed as threats and subjected to violence. Policing, then, is vital to the continuation of the racial order locally and globally.

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