



Camila Amorim Jardim

**Putting Brazil in front of the mirror: Lula's
Foreign Policy and Brazil's biographical narratives**

Tese de Doutorado

Thesis presented to the Programa de
Pós-Graduação em Relações
Internacionais of PUC-Rio in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor in International
Relations.

Advisor: Prof. Stefano Guzzini

Co-Advisor: Marta Regina Fernandez Y Garcia

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Abstract

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Lula da Silva's government (2003-2010) has been approached in Brazilian Foreign Policy Analysis (BFPA) mainly under a framework of change versus continuity. Nonetheless, the way the area assesses change and continuity might need to be framed differently and, if either change or continuity are found, it might be of a different kind than the literature has established so far. An illustrative result of this is a reduced capacity of the field to understand the recent turn towards the far-right in Brazil and how the strong polarization and memory disputes over the Lula and Dilma governments could relate to foreign policy, for example. Those recent movements seem to defy the regular cost-benefit calculus, as well as to consider the deep influence between 'domestic' discourses of identity and official Foreign Policy. Therefore, I propose to look at post-structuralist and constructivist approaches to foreign policy and identity and national biographies that analyze foreign policy discourses in the context of a Lacanian ontology of lack and anxiety, which leads to the country's continuous search for (impossible) stability and ontological (in)security. Understanding foreign policy as discursive practices drawing frontiers between the 'domestic' and the 'international' and the biographical narratives of past, present, and desired future, the literature suggests a central role to master signifiers and the libidinal investments over them. Henceforth, the main contribution of this thesis is presenting the (re)construction of Brazilian biographical narratives under the lenses of the analysts of BFPA, which includes both politicians and academicians, aiming to map the master signifiers around which their hegemonic narratives circulate. According to the field, the master signifiers found guiding Brazil's hegemonic biographical narratives were *miscegenation/racial democracy, legalism/pacifism, development, and autonomy*. Around those, many other relevant ones circulate. Later on, those master signifiers and their chains of significance

were contrasted to the official BFP discourses during Lula, trying to understand if and to what extent Lula's Foreign Policy discourses could have dislocated meaning over Brazilian identity narratives. This thesis pays special attention to racial discourses and their relation to a sense of ontological insecurity of the Brazilian self. Not aiming to present definitive answers to the matter and finding many elements of complexity and discursive ambiguity during Lula, also taking into consideration the sliding/shifting nature of signifiers, one of the main objectives of this work is to show the constructive role of the BFPA academia in Brazil's understandings of its biographical narratives. Another central goal is to explore how the realm of 'domestic' identity discourses, part of foreign policy, actively inform and/or limit official Foreign Policy and how this one influences back Brazil's domestic understandings of 'self' and 'other' (foreign policy). Such an approach disrupts the traditional idea of Foreign Policy as a bridge between the 'domestic' and the 'international'. Differently, takes it as a discursive construction entrenched to libidinal and imaginary narratives, anchored by master (and sliding) signifiers, of its 'self' or 'ego,' as well as the 'ideal of the ego' and the 'others'.

Keywords

Brazilian Foreign Policy; Lula da Silva's Foreign Policy; Foreign Policy Analysis; Discourse Analysis; Psychoanalysis; Post-colonialism; Race and Racism; Ontological Insecurity; Populism.

Resumo

JARDIM, Camila Amorim; GUZZINI, Stefano (Advisor); GARCIA, Marta Regina Fernandez Y (Co-Advisor). **Colocando o Brasil em frente ao espelho: A Política Externa de Lula e as narrativas biográficas do Brasil.** Rio de Janeiro, 2019, 343p. Tese de Doutorado – Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

O governo Lula da Silva (2003-2010) tem sido tratado na Análise da Política Externa Brasileira (APEB) principalmente sob uma abordagem de mudança versus continuidade. Contudo, a forma como a área avalia mudança e continuidade pode precisar ser reestruturada e, se mudança ou continuidade forem encontradas, podem ser de um tipo diferente do que a literatura estabeleceu até agora. Resultado ilustrativo disso é a redução da capacidade do campo de entender a recente guinada à extrema direita no Brasil e como a forte polarização e as disputas de memória sobre os governos Lula e Dilma poderiam se relacionar com a política externa, por exemplo. Esses movimentos recentes parecem desafiar as análises tradicionais de custo-benefício, bem como considerar a profunda influência entre os discursos "domésticos" de identidade e a Política Externa oficial. Portanto, proponho olhar para abordagens pós-estruturalistas e construtivistas de política externa, identidade e biografias nacionais, os quais analisam os discursos da política externa no contexto de uma ontologia lacaniana de falta e ansiedade, levando à busca contínua por uma (impossível) estabilidade e segurança ontológica. Compreendendo a política externa como práticas discursivas que traçam fronteiras entre o "doméstico" e o "internacional" e as narrativas biográficas do passado, do presente e do futuro desejado, a literatura sugere um papel central para os significantes mestres e os investimentos libidinais sobre eles. A partir daí, a principal contribuição desta tese é apresentar a (re)construção das narrativas biográficas brasileiras sob a ótica dos analistas da APEB, que inclui políticos e acadêmicos, com o objetivo de mapear os significantes mestres em torno dos quais circulam suas narrativas hegemônicas. De acordo com o campo, os significantes mestres encontrados como norteadores das narrativas biográficas hegemônicas do Brasil foram *miscigenação/democracia racial, legalismo/pacifismo, desenvolvimento e autonomia*.

Em torno deles, muitos outros relevantes circulam. Posteriormente, esses significantes mestres e suas cadeias de significação foram contrastados com os discursos oficiais do PEB durante o período Lula, tentando entender se e em que medida os discursos da Política Externa de Lula poderiam ter deslocado significados sobre as narrativas da identidade brasileira. Esta tese dá atenção especial aos discursos raciais e sua relação com um sentimento de insegurança ontológica do *self* brasileiro. Não objetivando apresentar respostas definitivas ao assunto e encontrando muitos elementos de complexidade e ambiguidade discursiva durante o período Lula, levando também em consideração a natureza deslizante/cambiante dos significantes, um dos principais objetivos deste trabalho é mostrar o papel construtivo da academia da APEB na compreensão brasileira de suas narrativas biográficas. Outro objetivo é explorar como os discursos “domésticos” de identidade, parte da política externa, ativamente informam e/ou limitam a Política Externa oficial e como esta influencia as compreensões internas de “eu” e “outro” (política externa) no Brasil. Tal abordagem rompe com a ideia tradicional de Política Externa como uma ponte entre o “doméstico” e o “internacional”. Diferentemente, entende-a como uma construção discursiva enraizada em narrativas libidinais e imaginárias, ancorada por significantes mestres (e deslizantes), de seu “eu” ou “ego”, bem como do “ideal do ego” e dos “outros”.

Palavras-chave

Política Externa Brasileira; Política Externa do Governo Lula; Análise de Discurso; Psicanálise; Pós-colonialismo; Raça e Racismo; Insegurança Ontológica; Populismo.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABC - Brazilian Cooperation Agency

BFP - Brazilian Foreign Policy

BFPA - Brazilian Foreign Policy Analysis

BRICS - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

CNPIR - Brazilian National Council for Racial Equality Promotion

Commercial G20 - (group led by Brazil and India to push for an end to subsidization and protectionist policies in agriculture by developed countries)

CONAPIR - National Conference for the Promotion of Racial Equality

CPLP - Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries

ECLA - United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. After 1984 it becomes ECLAC by including the Caribbean

FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization

FHC – Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazil's former president from (1995-2002).

FPA - Foreign Policy Analysis

G20 - Group of Twenty (intergovernmental forum comprising 19 countries and the European Union considered the world's largest economies)

G4 - Group of Four (comprised of Brazil, India, Germany and Japan – group pursuing permanent seats at the UNSC)

G77 – Group of Seventy-Seven (coalition of 134 developing countries, designed to promote its members' collective economic interests and create an enhanced joint negotiating capacity in the United Nations)

G8 – Group of Eight (inter-governmental political forum from 1997 until 2014. It had formed from incorporating the country of Russia into the Group of Seven, or G7, and returned to its previous name after Russia was removed in 2014)

IBSA – India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum

IMF - International Monetary Fund

MINUSTAH - United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

PDT - Brazilian Worker's Democratic Party

PSDB – Party of Brazilian Social Democracy

PT - Brazilian Workers' Party

SEPPIR - Brazilian Secretariat of Racial Equality Politics Promotion

UBM – Unified Black Movement

UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDP - United Nations Development Program

UNGA - United Nations General Assembly

UNOSSC - United Nations Office of South-South Cooperation

UNSC - United Nations Security Council

WTO - World Trade Organization

“Até cortar os defeitos pode ser perigoso – nunca se sabe qual o defeito que sustenta nosso edifício inteiro...”¹

- Clarice Lispector

¹ In a free translation: “Even cutting your own defects can be dangerous - you never know what defect sustains our entire building.”

INTRODUCTION: Brazilian Foreign Policy and mirror images

The political persecution established against the Workers' Party (PT) in Brazil, which culminated in Dilma Rousseff's impeachment in 2016 and the election of a far-right president, Jair Bolsonaro, in 2018, could, to some extent, be seen as a disciplining of something traumatic (EDKINS, 2003). Social symptoms as strong polarization have been pointed as indicators of processes of identity crisis (GUZZINI, 2012) or ontological insecurity (SUBOTIC, 2016; KINNVALL, 2017; VIEIRA, 2018) that the PT years (2003-2016) could have unveiled².

However, it seems yet unclear what role Brazilian Foreign Policy Analysis (BFPA) as a field plays in the process of interpreting what Lula's foreign policy meant to Brazilian identity narratives and what (if any) could be the relation between foreign policy, national identities and political 'stability'.

Domestic audiences, mainly political opponents, strongly criticized Lula da Silva's foreign policy (2003-2010) as partisan, a projection of PT's ideology to appease the most radical sectors of the party. On the other hand, BFPA sees Lula's foreign policy mostly as an expansion of Southern and non-traditional partners relations and has been trying to understand the reasons for it, considering both domestic and systemic elements. Related to that, another central topic considered by the field is what this expansion *represents*, and whether it can be interpreted under a framework of *change* or *continuity*, given Brazilian mainstream guidelines of foreign policy. (SARAIVA, 2007; VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007; BURGESS, 2008; CASON; POWER, 2009; LESSA; COUTO; FARIAS, 2010; LEITE, 2011; DE FARIA; LOPES; CASARÕES,

² Though I do not develop this to a satisfactory level in the thesis, I consider the possibility that an ontologically insecure 'self' does not necessarily mean a 'self' under identity crisis (experiencing symptoms of crisis, such as polarization and securitization). This happens because, ultimately, in a Lacanian ontology, all identities are empty and, then, all subjects are ontologically insecure. In the frame proposed here, an identity crisis would happen only when the disciplinarian mechanisms (here identified as the identity discourses, or identifications and Foreign Policy in itself, built and referred to through biographical narratives) are somehow unable to manage or reconcile an (imaginary) ontological security.

2013; HURRELL, 2013; RAMANZINI JÚNIOR; MARIANO; ALMEIDA, 2015; LIMA, 2018)

In either case, arguing for *change* or *continuity*, mild or great, the main element that has to be justified, analyzed or understood is the greater relevance given to Southern (or developing) countries, mainly South America and Africa, under the Lula-Celso Amorim administration. Nonetheless, while looking towards South America had become increasingly significant since the late 1980s (SARAIVA; 2010; MALAMUD, 2011; VIGEVANI; RAMANZINI JUNIOR, 2014) the emphasis in relations with African countries under Lula was greater than ever (AMORIM, 2010; CICALO, 2013; MESQUITA, 2021).

Could the memory disputes, polarization, and political persecution against the PT and Lula himself be related to a discomfort, ontological insecurity, or even identity crisis, mobilized by closer relations to black Africa? Though for answering this question it would require a greater empirical analysis, I take seriously the idea that Brazil's closer look to Southern countries – and mostly black African countries – could have meant much more to Brazilian society than only an increase in its commercial relations.

Foreign policy discourses under Lula, it has been argued, are disruptive and reflect an inherent ontological insecurity of Brazilian society. Under Lula, it has been argued, Brazil presented itself as a black country, the second-largest black population after Nigeria in the world (VIEIRA, 2018). Lula has even cited Fanon and seems to have – at least to some extent – changed Brazil's mirror image (it's narrative of the

self, the ego³) or even moved the ideal of the ego⁴ from the US and European countries to Southern referential.

Analyzing these closer ties with African countries and even the domestic changes over racial issues and how they have influenced (or been influenced by) the formulation of BFP under Lula (CICALO, 2013; AMORIM; SILVA, 2021) requires that BFPA considers the complexity of the racial foundations of the Brazilian state and the construction of its identity narratives. For this, the field might need a closer dialogue with Brazilian Social Thought literature (SCHWARCZ, 2013; LAGE, 2016; MUNANGA, 2019).

As I understand it, it is impossible to talk about Brazilian identity discourses during the Lula government and the possible discomforts caused by those without addressing race and racism (VIEIRA, 2018). The racial democracy narrative is not only a myth that has provided unity and self-esteem to Brazilian people. It lays at the foundations of Brazilian foreign policy narratives and institutions (SANTOS, 2010), both as a field and as praxis, as well as the very foundation of the Brazilian state, concealing the embedded racism and continuous violence against black populations in Brazil (GONZALEZ, 1989; SCHWARCZ, 2013; SOUZA, 2017; MUNANGA, 2019).

In this task, also regarding their relevance to recent IR debates, I seek to establish also a closer dialogue with Postcolonial and Decolonial Studies, approaches that have been attentive to the social and psychic impacts of racism - seen as a condition of

³ According to Bruce Fink: “[...] the ego, according to Lacan, arises as a crystallization or sedimentation of ideal images, tantamount to a fixed, reified object with which a child learns to identify, which a child learns to identify with him or herself. [...] This self or ego is thus, as Eastern philosophy has been telling us for millennia, a construct, a mental object, and though Freud grants it the status of an agency (*Instanz*), in Lacan’s version of psychoanalysis the ego is clearly not an active agent, the agent of interest being the unconscious. Rather than qualifying as a seat of agency or activity, the ego is, in Lacan’s view, the seat of fixation and narcissistic attachment. Moreover, it inevitably contains “false images”, in that mirror images are always inverted images (involving a right-left reversal), and in that the “communication” which leads to the internalization of linguistically structured ideal “images” [...] is, like all communication, prone to miscommunication [...]” (FINK, 1997, p.36-37)

⁴ While the ego-ideal is a narcissistic formation linked to the mirror stage in the child’s early childhood, which is linked to the desire to please the Other’s desire, the ideal of the ego, by its turn, is a dynamic notion that sustains ambitions to the subjects progress after its childhood, though it can be seen as a nostalgic survival of its lost narcissism.

possibility for modern colonialism (QUIJANO, 2007) - in post-colonial countries (FANON, 1961; 2008; NANDY, 1989; BHABHA, 1990; SPIVAK, 2003; FERNÁNDEZ, 2021).

The roots of IR studies in Brazil have assumedly deep connections with historical studies and diplomatic practice (PINHEIRO; VEDOVÉLI, 2012; CERVO, 2003, CERVO; BUENO, 2011; SARAIVA, 2009). These connections resulted in the reproduction of the tacit assumptions of mainstream theoretical approaches in IR studies, mostly highly influenced by Realist approaches (PINHEIRO, 2000). Moreover, the strong focus on policy orientation, historical approaches, and diplomatic practices in BFPA show a low engagement with FPA as a greater field, which has become quite theory-oriented (GUZZINI, 2013).

In this context, the analysis of change and continuity in BFPA seem to be still highly influenced by diplomatic narratives or by the finding of specific ‘thermometers’ of what has been considered the enduring principles, ideas, identities, or characteristics of Brazilian Foreign Policy (BFP). Among those (frequently unquestioned) terms, there is, for example, the enduring quest for national ‘autonomy’ and ‘development’; the always ‘pragmatic’ foreign policy action; the greater preference to ‘multilateralism’; the character of ‘peace’ respect towards ‘international law’; the continuous role of ‘bridge country’ between the North and the South’. Those are among the core elements presented by the mainstream literature when presenting analysis over change and continuity in BFP and the Lula government.

Taking all of this into consideration, I argue that the way the field has been approaching change or continuity might need to be restructured. By following a poststructuralist perspective on Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) encouraged by Campbell’s (1992) work, this doctoral thesis intends to follow a methodology of discourse analysis, inspired by works such as Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Stavrakakis (1999; 2007), Epstein (2010), Solomon (2015), Vieira (2018), Kinnvall (2017), among others.

Campbell (1992) presents a very insightful distinction between ‘foreign policy’ and ‘Foreign Policy’ that will be central throughout this thesis. While ‘Foreign Policy’ in his terms are the official and bureaucratic activities that our common sense understands as foreign policy (treaties, official discourses, meetings, etc.), ‘foreign policy’ refers to “all practices of differentiation or modes of exclusion (possibly figured as relationships of otherness) which constitute their objects as ‘foreign’ in the process of dealing with them.” (CAMPBELL, 1992, p.76)

According to him, ‘foreign policy’ operates at all social levels, since the personal relationships to the global orders, as it establishes the collective understandings of what is ‘domestic’ and what is ‘international’, or who is to be protected as ‘citizen’ and who or what threatens her and, therefore, should be treated as ‘foreign’. Therefore, those “representational practices serve as the resources from which are drawn the modes of interpretation employed to handle new instances of ambiguity and contingency.” (CAMPBELL, 1992, p.76).

Thusly, Foreign Policy is not seen as a mere ‘projection’ of a state’s interests or bureaucratic/domestic disputes to the ‘international’. Foreign Policy in these terms guarantees the very existence and justification of the state as such:

“Foreign Policy is concerned with the reproduction of an unstable identity at the level of the state, and the containment of challenges to that identity. In other words, Foreign Policy does not operate in a domain free of entrenched contingencies or resistances. Whichever Foreign Policy practices are implemented, they always have to overcome or neutralize other practices which might instantiate alternative possibilities for identity; and the intensive and extensive nature of the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ political contestation that this presupposes means the efficacy of one particular practice will more often than not be sharpened by the representation of danger” (CAMPBELL, 1992, p.78).

Henceforth, while ‘Foreign Policy’ can be interpreted as the field of diplomatic and political practice, which “is concerned with the reproduction of an unstable identity at the level of the state, and the containment of challenges of that identity”, ‘foreign policy’ is the realm of discourses circulating in historical narratives, national heroes,

social media, etc. Most importantly to the work proposed here, is that the field of BFPA in itself can also be understood as ‘foreign policy’ and, thus, actively informing and being informed by official ‘Foreign Policy’.

As from Campbell’s definition, also considering Hansen’s (2006) approach of foreign policy as a discursive practice, I propose carrying out a discourse analysis as a FPA method. Though not assuming that the Brazilian state has a ‘self’, I assume that the state has interlocutors and spokespersons, so it speaks. In this task, Epstein is an inspiration:

“The question raised by the discourse approach is quite simply, *who speaks?* [...] This talking is central both to what they [states] do and who they are – to the dynamics of identity. States, like individuals, position themselves in relation to other states by adopting certain discourses and not others. Moreover, these discourses function as important principles of coherence for statehood.” (EPSTEIN, 2010, p. 341).

According to Epstein (2010, p. 343) to speak is to act, thus, the speech gives agency and promote agents’ positioning in the world, and the actor’s behavior “is regulated by existing discourses that structure the field of possible actions” (EPSTEIN, 2010, p. 343). Thus, she calls attention to the difference between ‘subjectivity’ (or a complex ‘self’, which cannot be reduced to being discursive phenomena) and ‘subject positions’ (which refer to positions within discourses). Thus, “[...] discourse approach analyses [...] the ways in which actors – crucially whether individuals or states – define themselves by stepping into a particular subject-position carved out by a discourse” (EPSTEIN, 2010, p. 344).

Inspired by Laclau and Mouffe (2001) as well as by Stavrakakis (1999; 2007) and other FPA analysts working with a Lacanian ontology (SOLOMON, 2015; KINNVALL, 2017; VIEIRA, 2018; SANDRIN, 2020), I understand that the libidinal and affective dimension of politics and its identity discourses cannot be left outside BFPA. It is time for us to drop the expectation of rational-choice agents - either states, institutions, or individuals - and take the affective attachments and the discursive nature of reality seriously. Politics is made with passions (MOUFFE, 2015) and BFPA studies

will remain incapable of understanding ‘irrational’ actions or developments if they do not consider them.

Such an approach inspired by psychoanalysis considers identities as fluid and discursively enacted while being also capable to understand the deeper mechanisms through which they endure (SOLOMON, 2015; SANDRIN, 2019), not only assuming that subjects change from one stable identity to the other. (ZEHFUSS, 2001, EPSTEIN, 2010)

Therefore, effective (and affective) political discourses rely on the use of master signifiers because those are the terms with the biggest appeal of security, certainty, and stability, strongly resonating in the audiences. Master signifiers are terms such as *father, mother, justice, state, nation, God, freedom, democracy, sovereignty, etc.* (STAVRAKAKIS, 2007) According to Solomon (2015), they:

“[...] act as temporary anchors of both meaning and affective investment because of their central role in structuring subjectivity. [...] These are words that we accept as our own, as defining ourselves and others, and are those around which our identities and our understandings of others’ identities cohere” (SOLOMON, 2015, p. 27-28).

In agreement with Edkins and Pin-Fat (2006, p. 8), without master signifiers, we can have no language, no symbolic order, as they are the anchor of chains of signifiers (that is what there is discourse). Yet, even though chains of signifiers work as anchors in a given period of time, they also are ultimately sliding signifiers, not having a fixed ultimate meaning, what is the very condition of possibility that allows the subject to identify with it by the use of their imaginary (EDKINS; PIN-FAT, 2006; STAVRAKAKIS, 2007; SOLOMON, 2015).

In a discursive approach to foreign policy analysis, according to Vieira (2018, p. 4), a possible focus can be the search of identity constructions in the elite’s narratives. In Brazil, the narratives over BFP are still dominated by discursive constructions of Itamaraty:

“The analytical focus is on the historically situated affective sources and discursive processes of identity construction among elites who claim to speak on behalf of the Brazilian state and who are placed in dominant ‘subject positions’ within its institutional foreign policy apparatus. Following a process of bureaucratic consolidation initiated in the 1930s, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (commonly known as Itamaraty) gradually became, and still currently is, the dominant institutional framework for the production and socialization of Brazil’s international autobiographical narratives. According to Janice Bially Mattern, political actors’ attempts to rhetorically lock-in and perpetuate existing identities are a form of ‘power enacted through the narrative gun’. The case of Brazil is noteworthy because diplomatic elites’ autonomy to construct and enact the ‘narrative guns’ of foreign policy making. These have creatively articulated a hybrid postcolonial self-understanding merging Western and non-Western identity makers, yet favoring the former, as the significant desired other” (VIEIRA, 2018, p.4).

As ‘foreign policy’ narratives, in close relation to ‘Foreign Policy’ ones, construct the ‘self’ (in psychoanalysis the ‘ego’, its mirror-image), its ‘significant others’, the ones that inspire the ‘self’, representing an ideal of the ego and ‘hated or undesired others’, they also place those narratives in time, creating narratives of past, present, and desired future. They do so by the choice and construction of specific historical moments and its heroes, very often projecting a messianic future. For the greater amount of those narrative constructions, I took inspiration from Berenskoetter’s (2014) concept of ‘national biographies’, but which I had slightly adapted, calling it ‘biographical narratives’.

In this perspective, the role of ‘hated others’ should not be underrated in the construction of Brazilian biographical narratives. As it has been discussed, usually, the construction of a collective identity happens through the exclusion of others. The portray of an imaginary ideal future depends on it as well. Very frequently, a scapegoat (the immigrants, the Jews, the blacks, the communists, or whoever will be constructed as the enemy) is needed to be blamed for the peoples’ dissatisfactions and, then, the imaginary of a brilliant future in which the reason of all suffering has been exterminated will be possible. (SOLOMON, 2015; KINNVALL, 2017) Scapegoats, ultimately, also, conceal the emptiness or absence of the Symbolic order and of the master signifiers to

which we are attached to, covering as well the very impossibility of our society. This will be further discussed in chapter two.

As linguistics and Lacanian psychoanalysis have concluded, signifiers have no fixed meaning. Their meaning is given always in relation to other signifiers, through their relative position in a chain of signifiers, which is anchored by one or more master signifiers. (FINK, 1997; LACLAU; MOUFFE, 2001; STAVRAKAKIS, 2007; MOUFFE, 2015) As already mentioned, master signifiers are those terms we assume as fixed or given – even though they are not – because they behave as a common ground for communication, as the interlocutor is expected to have a similar idea of what they mean. Nevertheless, critical theory has taught us to be suspicious of what we assume as given and look for what this movement conceals (COX, 1981).

All of this, a poststructural FPA, a psychoanalytical (discursive and libidinal) ontology, and a postcolonial critical reading of the international and of the Brazilian state, made me question some of the mainstream understandings in BFPA. My inquiring is directed mainly to the narratives over the Brazilian enduring principles, guidelines, or elements of identity, such as *autonomy*, *development*, *multilateralism*, *pacifism/legalism*, *pragmatism*, etc.

By reviewing all this literature, already applied in the field of constructivist/critical/poststructuralist FPA, I started to question if/to what extent/how those widely accepted terms of BFPA behave as master signifiers securing Brazilian identities. How/which violences and exclusions are hidden by the narrative that Brazil is a *pacific* country? How *autonomy* and *development* have been articulated to be interpreted as the same guidelines, thus, indicating continuity in BFP if in each historical moment they meant completely different policies (and results)⁵? In the 1960s,

⁵ In the 1960s, *development* and *autonomy* are said to be sought through industrialization by imports substitution and rejection of hierarchical institutions (such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT). In the 1990s, the same ‘principles’ were interpreted as to be achieved through liberalization and adhesion to international regimes. (PINHEIRO, 2000; VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007; LEITE, 2011; LIMA, 2018;

development, and *autonomy* are said to be sought through industrialization by imports substitution and rejection of hierarchical institutions (such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT). In the 1990s, the same ‘principles’ were interpreted as to be achieved through liberalization and adhesion to international regimes?

Henceforth, I consider that the way BFPA has been analyzing change and continuity needs to be restructured, taking into consideration the affective (or libidinal), colonial (racist, patriarchal, violent), and the discursive dimensions of foreign policy and its identity narratives.

Considering those approaches will also allow for a more comprehensive assessment of BFP under Lula da Silva (2003-2010). By taking new approaches into consideration, it is possible that we find similar results regarding continuity or change in the period, or, it could be that we also find different answers or valuable insights that have been yet overseen. Yet, given the growing relevance of these methodologies in the field of FPA, a new assessment of the Lula period with those would be relevant.

Thus, having Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) conception of the field of discursivity and hegemonic narratives, I propose a (re)construction of Brazilian hegemonic biographical narratives through the lenses of the field of BFPA. For that, I also propose the inclusion of a new category between the ‘field of discursivity’ and the ‘hegemonic narrative’, which is the ‘field of contextual possibilities’, this later includes all the disputing narratives that are taken seriously in a given period of time.

The master signifiers around which BFP biographical narratives circulate, according to my (re)construction, are *pacifism/legalism*, *racial democracy/miscegenation*, *autonomy*, and *development*. Around those, many other relevant circulate, such as *multilateralism*, *pragmatism*, *territorial greatness*, *search for international greatness*, *North-South mediator/bridge country*, *other West*, among others. As I see it, the mapping of Brazilian biographical narratives from the lenses of BFP analysts has been the main contribution of this thesis. The foreign policy

discourses (here represented by the field of BFPA), in Campbell's terms, their master signifiers, and the chains of significance anchor Brazilian identity imaginaries and discipline its ontological insecurities.

Therefore, this (re)construction of Brazilian hegemonic biographical narratives was done from an extensive mapping of the BFPA literature. I gave a special focus to approaches on the formation of the Brazilian state and its identity towards 'the international', as well as its guiding 'principles' of foreign policy, also in close dialogue with Brazilian Social Thought literatures. To better approach the 'field of discursivity' and 'hegemonic narratives' of BFPA, I conducted an online survey, in Portuguese, with 24 researchers of the field, asking them, among other questions, what they considered to be the main authors, references and debates that constitute the area. Allied with this, I also gathered, through a manual search, Google Scholar's most cited BFPA papers. The results of both surveys were not surprising, but, at the same time, they were very insightful for the construction of the narrative I propose.

The surveys were conducted not because I aim to cover the *real* Brazilian biography according to BFPA or even to map the *entire* field of discursivity of BFPA – which is, by definition, impossible. Those surveys were important because I am aware of the high level of subjectivity of this research and, in this regard, I take inspiration from Subotic (2016):

“I have to accept that there will always be disputes about the truthfulness of a particular interpretation, especially since I carry out the interpretation of the interpretation. I am careful to use strategies to minimize selection bias (mostly by expanding the pool of data and texts to analyze), and to be upfront about potential inconsistencies and biases in the interpretation” (SUBOTIC, 2016, p. 616).

Beyond that, while talking about hegemonic narratives, it is important to observe what are the discourses circulating the field, how they emerge, what are the master signifiers and chains of significance supporting them. Hence, to analyze change and continuity in Lula da Silva's foreign policy, I had to, first, (re)construct Brazilian biographical narratives through BFP analysts' lenses. Later on, those narrative

constructions could be contrasted to specific government narratives (chains of significance) of identity and Foreign Policy during Lula's government.

Though the analysis of the Lula government has not been extensive and might require further deepening, this first validation was relevant to observe that the master signifiers, their chains of significance, and the overall imaginary over Brazilian biographical narratives under the lenses of BFP analysts have encountered many similarities, parallels or even clear reproductions during Lula da Silva's Foreign Policy. It was relevant as well to see how foreign policy discourses (BFPA), as well as the existing hegemonic biographical narratives, (re)produce, inform, or constrain the contextual possibilities of new identity discourses and possible dislocation of those narratives of Foreign Policy. Therefore, change and continuity in BFP during Lula da Silva was, then, reframed in relation to the master signifiers and their positions in chains of significance presented in the hegemonic biographical narratives of BFPA.

Though it seems to me an innovative attempt in the field of BFPA, among the attempts I have been able to acknowledge, the study has some relevant weaknesses or silences. The first is that, while considering the practitioners' narratives in Foreign Policy, I had almost excluded relevant actors other than the Presidency and Itamaraty (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). This means, of course, that there is (one more) clear bias in my work. However there is, indeed, a dominance of Itamaraty and the Presidency over the narratives of Foreign Policy in Brazil – and this is also clearly observed in BFPA mainstream narratives-, if one is willing to understand Jair Bolsonaro's field of discursivity and hegemonic narratives (for example) the researcher should take into consideration other sources, other actors, and other chains of significance. An analysis of Bolsonaro should consider – among many others - the narratives circulating in the military sectors⁶ and the role of this group in Brazilian identity narratives, for example. Interestingly enough, Lula da Silva's chancellor, Celso Amorim, was Dilma Rousseff's Defense Minister.

⁶ For a study of the military in BFP under a poststructural/discursive approach, see Gomes (2014).

Another relevant silence of my work is the patriarchal/masculinist dimension of Foreign Policy (KINNVALL, 2017). Though I am a woman and write the thesis in the feminine, this is yet not enough. Such as it is impossible to talk about foreign policy and identity without considering race and racism, as I argued in the beginning of this thesis, it is also essential to keep in mind how identity discourses of gender and masculinity (WEBER, 2016) have been acting as phantasies (EBERLE, 2017; KAPOOR, 2020) of ontological security in Brazilian society. For instance, an analysis focused in Dilma Rousseff's impeachment and its relation to BFP would have to engage more deeply with such discussions.

Finally, yet no less importantly, my work is almost completely silent about the climate crisis (BURNHAM; KINGSBURY, 2021) – a great example of the Lacanian Real in our contemporary world – and how its traumas, anxieties, and discomforts have been mediated, concealed, and disciplined by identity narratives and foreign policy discourses. Furthermore, this work is silent over the COVID-19 pandemic, a central element of foreign policy inflection under Bolsonaro (GUIMARÃES; FARIAS, 2021).

Beyond its limits, I also want to make clear the division of chapters of this thesis. After this introduction, the first chapter makes a bibliographical review of the main approaches on continuity and change in Lula da Silva's (2003-2010) BFPA. The second chapter introduces some relevant concepts of psychoanalysis, poststructural FPA, discourse analysis, and Postcolonialism, showing how they contribute insightfully in a dialogue to BFPA. The third chapter deepens the discussion presented in the previous chapter, presenting a methodology of discourse analysis inspired by a dialogue of Laclau and Mouffe with Lacanian psychoanalysis and postcolonialism. Chapter four is, then, the first empirical chapter, presenting the results of the surveys aimed at mapping the field of discursivity of BFPA. From this first empirical survey, chapter five presents the (re)construction of Brazil's biographical narratives according to the field of BFPA, presenting its master signifiers and chains of significance. Chapter six compares the chains of significance found in the previous chapter with the Foreign Policy discourses under Lula da Silva. Chapter seven presents an initial analysis of the contemporary period, mostly regarding the backlash after Lula and what could be some

possible interpretations over it if the methodology and findings of the thesis are taken into consideration. Finally, the conclusion reinforces the relevance of restructuring the way the field has been approaching change and continuity, mainly by taking seriously the inherently discursive, colonial, and libidinal dimensions of Foreign Policy, as well as the relevance BFPA has in (re)producing identities, violences, knowledge, and truth.

1. Brazilian foreign policy under Lula: framing change and continuity

1.0. Introduction

The mainstream analysis of Brazilian Foreign Policy (BFP) during Lula da Silva (2003-2010) argue that, if compared to previous governments, there was greater emphasis in relations with developing countries, mainly in South America and Africa, but also other non-traditional partners from Asia and Middle East. However, considering Brazilian Foreign Policy Analysis (BFPA) main analytical traditions, there is no consensus on whether this moment could be interpreted under a frame of change or continuity.

Given this context, this chapter aims to go through these multiple interpretations over the Lula period and what the closer relations with the South have meant. Therefore, in the first section, the chapter will briefly discuss a historical background of the field of BFPA and its intimate relation to the diplomatic arena. Then, taking two main approaches on BFP, the systemic and the domestic, the second section will pay a closer attention to systemic approaches on the Lula government and its closer ties to Southern countries. In the third topic, the approaches giving larger relevance to domestic elements to analyze change or continuity under Lula will be considered, finding that change has been mainly found by those approaches focusing on domestic determinants. The fourth section presents some authors' approaches I found relevant to reflecting over continuity and change in BFPA, though I do not share many ontological or epistemological similarities to them.

Overall, though showing differing interpretations on whether Lula's foreign policy approach towards the South represents change or continuity, I argue that the mainstream BFPA approaches over the Lula period have much in common in terms of how these interpretations understand foreign policy. The mainstream analysis approach

foreign policy as the external enactment of instrumental reason, and as bridge between a well-defined inside, with pre-existing identity and interests, which will be ‘projected’, to an outside in which the frontiers are clear and not being actively constructed. Even though often importing Realism’s presuppositions, those texts hardly ever debate theories or critically reflect on the theoretical presuppositions at the foundation of their work, as well as often underestimating the impact their own work has in (re)producing knowledge, truth or even colonial, violent and/or racist orders.

Furthermore, the analysis of change and continuity in BFPA seem to be still highly influenced by diplomatic narratives or by the finding of specific ‘thermometers’ of what has been considered the enduring ‘principles’, ideas, identities or ‘characteristics’ of BFP. Among those (frequently unquestioned) terms, there are, for example, the narratives of the continuous quest for national ‘autonomy’ and ‘development’ in an always ‘pragmatic’ foreign policy action, the multilateral character of Brazilian diplomacy, its ‘pacifism’, respect towards ‘international law’, and a ‘mediator between the North and the South’. BFP is frequently described as politics of state, not of government (with some very interesting exceptions of approaches focusing on domestic politics), which gives it a higher status and a continuity component. Those concepts are central to a great amount of the most accepted literature in BFP studies and around those circulate the major national narratives of foreign policy analysis.

Therefore, as it will be discussed, the way BFPA assess change or continuity might need to be reframed, and, whether one or the other is found, it might be of a different character of what the mainstream BFPA has argued so far, with different implications for understanding the field and the nature of BFP itself.

1.1. The Field of Brazilian Foreign Policy and International Relations in Brazil

The Brazilian tradition of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) has a low engagement with theoretical debates, which seems to be compatible with the idea that the

peripheries are left with the production of empirical knowledge and case studies which should be used by the centers, the ones put in charge to develop theories with higher abstraction (CHAKRABARTY, 2000; GUZZINI, 2001, INAYATULLAH; BLANEY, 2004, HOBSON, 2007, WAEVER, 1998, HOFFMANN, 1977)

Furthermore, the roots of IR studies in Brazil have assumedly deep connections with historical studies and diplomatic practice on the one hand (PINHEIRO; VEDOVÉLI, 2012; CERVO, 2003, CERVO; BUENO, 2011; SARAIVA, 2009), or with the Political Sciences inspired by positivist methodologies on the other (e.g.: LIMA, 2005; OLIVEIRA; ONUKI; OLIVEIRA, 2015). Those historical roots in Brazilian studies of its own foreign policy resulted in the reproduction of the tacit assumptions of mainstream theoretical approaches in IR studies, mostly highly influenced by Realist approaches (PINHEIRO, 2000). Moreover, the strong focus on policy orientation, historical approaches, and diplomatic practices in BFPA shows a low engagement with FPA as a greater field, which has become quite theory oriented (GUZZINI, 2013).

The reflection on International Relations in Brazil was also deeply influenced by International Political Economy studies, mainly the thoughts of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)⁷. ECLA, as well as Dependency Theory, calls into attention the binary relationship between the center and the periphery in the international political economy system, in which the Latin American (and other peripheral) economies are inserted into an international division of labor as providers of primary goods. In this context, the deteriorating terms of trade in that scenario is the main reason for their underdevelopment. Considering that diagnosis, ECLAC proposes an inward looking development strategy, seeking national industrialization and autonomy, as well as regional integration – as a country cannot develop independently of its region. The understanding of a possibility of a different insertion in the

⁷ After 1984, the commission integrates also the Caribe, becoming the Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribe (ECLAC).

international economy ECLAC's main difference to Dependency Theory: though both have the same diagnosis, Dependency Theory sees no other solution than facing up and breaking with the capitalist system (BERNAL-MEZA, 2005; CERVO, 2008; NERY, 2014; ECLAC, 2016).

Beyond that, diplomatic thought is central to understanding the conception of International Relations as a field of study in Brazil. The Brazilian intelligentsia, broadly understood, had an intimate association with the State's formation from the empire on, since the public and the intellectual activities were closely linked. To the nascent political class, Pinheiro and Vedoveli (2012) attribute the term 'intellectuals as diplomats' since, according to the authors, for these individuals "[...] intellectual activity was the constituent practice of their political action (and diplomacy only a minor possibility)" (PINHEIRO; VEDOVELI, 2012, p. 219, my translation). The beginning of the study of international relations in the country was characterized, therefore, by the absence of autonomy of the intellectual field from state bureaucracies, and vice versa, since political and intellectual elites were not differentiated.

The constitution of international relations as an autonomous academic discipline in the UK since the 1920s (and broadly in Europe and United States after the Second World War) did not impact Brazilian thinking, at least not at that time (SALOMÓN; PINHEIRO, 2013). The beginning of the study of IR in Brazil is closely linked to the formulation of foreign policy and the thought of the Brazilian international insertion by the diplomatic service. Even though the area of Political Science scholarship was formerly constituted, it did not create a specific line for international relations. In addition, the discipline was seen as a field linked to the hegemony of the United States, which caused some resistance by Brazilian intellectuals. Until the 1960s, the scholarly production in the area was restricted to the scopes of diplomats and intellectuals of history and law (MYAMOTO, 1999; PINHEIRO; VEDOVELI, 2012; LESSA, 2005; CERVO, 2014).

Public servants continued being very active as intellectuals, even with the processes of bureaucratization and institutionalization, which started in the 1930s and among the diplomats only in the 1940s. According to Pinheiro and Vedoveli:

“As members of two camps, diplomats, as officials, could speak and produce on behalf of the state and its "national interests," and, as intellectuals, often elaborated analysis with the aim of contributing to the process modernization of society” (PINHEIRO; VEDOVELI, 2012, p. 222, my translation).

Therefore, in the onset of the area in Brazil, diplomats did not abandon the function of intellectuals to work as bureaucrats, but maintained both activities simultaneously. If they were formerly known as ‘intellectuals as diplomats’ the progressive bureaucratization of the profession increases their sense of belonging to the state in order to become ‘diplomats as intellectuals’. In addition, the Rio Branco Institute is one of the motivators of the interrelationship between the fields for the motivation of the academic insertion of their views⁸.

Although they do not question the excellence of diplomatic productions, the authors point out that the academic community has not been cautious enough to critically incorporate the academic productions of diplomats, considering the social place they occupy. This social place, as representatives of the State, implies, for example, in the interpretation of Brazilian foreign policy by its own formulators, being a factor that can add ambiguities to the academic production in international relations in Brazil. (PINHEIRO; VEDOVELI, 2012).

A more autonomous academic environment started to be built from the establishment of undergraduate and postgraduate programs at university level from the

⁸ It is worth mentioning that, in 1975, the Ministry of Education recognized the Diplomatic Career Preparation Course (CPCD) as a higher education course, including a teacher exchange partnership with the University of Brasília. Consequently, in 2002, it was also recognized as a Professional Master's Degree in Brazil (Pinheiro and Vedoveli, 2012). More recently it lost such a status and started being exclusively regarded as a bureaucracy training.

1970s. In this sense, academics began to defend their legitimacy and space so that, alongside contributions from policymakers, they could reflect on Brazilian foreign policy critically. One could argue that this movement can be also related to the increase of the “third world” identity narrative, which reinforced autonomy and development concepts in that period. Hence, there is an indication of the emergence of a new international agenda in Brazil, which also motivates the rise of studies in the area of Brazilian foreign policy (LIMA; MOURA, 1982; MYAMOTO, 1999; LESSA, 2005).

Thus, in 1974 the first undergraduate course in International Relations of Brazil was created at the University of Brasilia (UnB), and at the end of the same decade was also created the International Politics area of the postgraduate program at Iuperj (Rio de Janeiro). In 1983, the first Master's program was created and, at the postgraduate level, the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) was founded, focusing on issues in the region of Prata. At the same time, this initiative was followed by the creation of the UnB International Politics Program and the International Politics Program at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), both in 1984 (HERZ, 2002; LESSA, 2005; PINHEIRO; VEDOVÉLI, 2012).

The institutionalization of IR as a field of study is considered late if compared with fields such as Political Science. However, the interest in IR has in History Studies a strong basis for its development in the country. History has been a consolidated disciplinary area since the 1950s and the Postgraduate Program in UnB's history department had a specific area in History of International Relations already in 1976. In 1994, the Ph.D. program was created in the same area of the mentioned department. Only in 2002 the Department History of International Relations became part of the Institute of International Relations (Irel-UnB), together with the International and Comparative Politics area, thus modifying the former Post-Graduation in International Relations, created in 1984, within the scope of the Department of Political Science and International Relations (PINHEIRO; VEDOVÉLI, 2012; LESSA, 2005; SARAIVA, 2009).

The process of consolidating the area as an autonomous field in Brazil did not, however, diminish the influence of diplomats in the intellectual environment, of which they actively participated as teachers in the training of international relations analysts, in addition to contributing with publications to the main Brazilian journals (see for example Amorim's [2010] text for *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*). The dialogue established between diplomats and academics and their positive impacts for the consolidation of the area are undeniable and extremely relevant to the understanding of this process. However, criticism of the strong presence of diplomats and the adoption of their positions without consideration of the social place they occupy consists in "[...] a strong prescriptive sense in the production of academics held until the end of the 1980s and the excessive thematic convergence between academic analyzes and the government agenda." (PINHEIRO; VEDOVÉLI, 2012, p. 236, my translation)

Hence, there is no denying of the relevance of this dialogue to understand the current state of art of Brazilian foreign policy, considering the assimilation of diplomatic categories and interpretations by the academy, mainly the identification of a pattern of continuity in Brazilian foreign policy. On the other hand, we can observe the opposite movement as well, in which scholars have their contribution in the diplomatic discourse, especially in the idea of the search for autonomy as guiding principle in the process of foreign policy formulation (PINHEIRO; VEDOVÉLI, 2012).

Beyond that, according to Farias and Ramanzini Júnior (2015, p.11), diplomats' influence is relevant outside Itamaraty in many fields, not only in the academic, but also at private organizations (after their retirement) and actively participating in other government agencies. According to the authors, at that time:

"Ambassador Rubens Barbosa is currently the president of the High Council on Foreign Trade of the influential Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo. Likewise, the Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, the 35th best think-tank outside the United States in 2014, according to Go To Think Tank, is currently presided by

ambassador Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves. In the government, fifty four diplomats advise the most important sectors of the bureaucracy. Forty-six Itamaraty employees work directly or indirectly in the Presidency (MRE 2015, 66-72). Excluding the case of those retired, when it comes to inter-bureaucratic conflicts, it is reasonable to assume that they will hardly oppose a higher rank colleague. The reason is the hierarchical nature of the diplomatic corps [...]” (FARIAS; RAMANZINI JÚNIOR, 2015, p.11).

Given the focus of this study to the academic field, one of the first specific and systematic academic studies on Brazilian international relations conducted by a Brazilian was Gerson Moura's (1982) doctoral thesis on relations with the United States during World War II and in the immediate postwar period, between 1939 and 1950. The scarcity of secondary sources meant that the research was based almost exclusively on primary sources (BETHELL, 2012). Moura was responsible for one of the first historical concepts of Brazilian foreign policy, the so-called "autonomy in dependence", which consisted of the political game adopted by Brazil in order to negotiate its support for the United States in World War II in exchange for support for the development of its industry, in a dubious game involving Germany as well (MOURA, 1982; LIMA; MOURA, 1982).

It is also worth mentioning the work of Hélió Jaguaribe, who in the 1980s coined the term ‘autonomy’ in BFP, largely inspired by ECLAC’s search for autonomy and self-sufficiency in industrial production, which should also impact its political bargaining possibilities with the United States. The idea of the continuous seek for ‘autonomy’ and ‘development’ was, thus, coined in the context of the Cold War, and Brazilian foreign policy and Third World movements, currently widely consolidated as one of the defining parameters of Brazil's external performance (ALTEMANI 2005; LIMA, 2005; SARAIVA, 2007; VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007; LEITE, 2011).

Thus, between the mainstream – and frequently unquestioned – assumptions about BFP are, for example, the narratives of the quest for national autonomy, the continuous sought for development, the national interest as the main guideline for foreign action, and the idea of pragmatism in Brazilian Foreign Policy (BFP). BFP is

frequently described as politics of state, not of government, which gives it a higher status and a continuity component. Brazil is portrayed as a pacific nation, a bridge between the North and the South, a defender of multilateralism and development. All those concepts are central to the most accepted literature in BFP studies and around those circulate the major national narratives (e.g.: MOURA, 1982; BREDASANTOS, 2002; CERVO; BUENO, 2011; CERVO, 2003; PINHEIRO, 2004, LIMA; 2005, ALTEMANI; 2005, VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007, SARAIVA; 2007, CERVO; 2008, AMORIM, 2010; LEITE, 2011; VIZENTINI, 2013; RICUPERO, 2017).

Beyond the apparent line of continuity established by the narratives of the field, they usually contain unspoken Realist assumptions entrenched in their analysis. In this context, Pinheiro, one of the main references in BFP, describes that there is “a hegemony of a realist perception in IR in Brazil” (2000, p. 6) when talking about the role that the country should play in the system, both in diplomacy and in and in academia. This vision perceives an anarchical international system, in which the State is the major (though not the only) actor seeking both absolute and relative gains (PINHEIRO, 2000).

Such approaches also carry specific understandings of what foreign policy is. Considering this, Pinheiro defines foreign policy as:

“Foreign policy can be defined as the set of actions and decisions of a particular actor, usually but not necessarily the State, in relation to other states or external actors - such as international organizations, multinational corporations or transnational actors - formulated from opportunities and demands of domestic and/or international nature. In this sense, it is a question of the conjugation of the interests and ideas of the representatives of a State regarding its insertion in the international system as it presents itself or towards its restructuring, guided by its resources of power” (PINHEIRO, 2000, p. 5, my translation).

Brazil indeed has the particularity of Itamaraty – the main State interlocutor of Brazil’s foreign policy - being considered a very solid institution in developing and implementing BFP (CASARÕES, 2012), with relatively little interference from the

Executive and even smaller from the Legislative (as, for example, the treaties have ex-post approval and the ministers and diplomats are entitled with autonomy directly negotiate and sign them). (LIMA, 2000; MILANI; PINHEIRO, 2013; RAMANZINI JUNIOR; FARIAS, 2016). This opens the possibility for a more Realist analysis in the sense of a rational and, to some level, ‘unitary’ actor.

Itamaraty (Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs) is still to this day, considered very insulated (with little influence or dialogues with civil society) (MILANI; PINHEIRO, 2013; RAMANZINI JUNIOR; FARIAS, 2016), hierarchical and non-representative of the diversity of the Brazilian society, as the more common diplomatic profile is the upper-middle class white man (CARMO; FARIAS, 2018). Regarding this context, the institution is introducing and stimulating more black people and women to enter the diplomatic career, but changes might be seen only in the long term. Furthermore, it has been involved in many polemics⁹ in its selection process, mainly considering racial quotas, as in Brazil racial consciousness is a very delicate topic (FERREIRA, 2002; CICALO, 2013; PINTO; FERREIRA, 2014) and many self-declared black candidates have been excluded and threatened of sue for attempting fraud as they were not black enough to declare themselves as such¹⁰.

1.2. Reading the context: Brazil’s ambiguous positioning as both emerging country and representative of the Global South under Lula

⁹ Also contentions of moral and sexual harassment against women and racism, happening surprisingly often with colleagues in lower hierarchical positions. Some references in Brazilian newspapers: <<https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/diplomatas-relatam-casos-de-assedio-dentro-do-itamaraty-18186656>>; <<https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,denuncias-de-assedio-rondam-itamaraty,1031082>> , <<https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/itamaraty-criara-comissoes-para-casos-de-assedio-diz-jornal/>>,<<https://oglobo.globo.com/sociedade/itamaraty-cria-norma-para-prevenir-assedio-22077781>> All accessed in June 29th 2018.

¹⁰ See: <<https://www.cartacapital.com.br/politica/polemica-racial-e-reelitizacao-no-itamaraty>> and <<https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2017/12/1944852-aprovados-no-rio-branco-sao-barrados-por-suspeita-de-uso-indevido-de-cotas.shtml>> Accessed in June 29th 2018.

A great amount of BFP works focus on the systemic elements and discussions regarding Brazil's 'insertion' in the international arena, giving little or smaller attention to the domestic determinants and the bureaucratic dynamics of foreign policy seen under lenses of public policy in Brazil (FARIAS; RAMANZINI JÚNIOR, 2015). Taking this great field of BFPA into consideration, this section aims to make a literature review of the main contributions to Brazilian foreign policy literature and its international 'insertion', considering its positioning, alignments or roles in the international realm over the Lula government (2003-2010).

The mainstream BFPA has approached Lula's foreign policy mostly under a framework of change versus continuity. While there seems to be a majority of analysts considering that there was no structural change in BFP during Lula (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007; LEITE, 2011; SARAIVA, 2007), there is also the contradictory understanding that it was a peculiar moment in BFP history, a change that could only be compared to what was seen in during the 'Independent Foreign Policy' (PEI) (1961-1964) of Janio Quadros and João Goulart governments. This was a period characterized by a lot of political instabilities and that was interrupted by a military coup, with some possible parallels to what has happened to Dilma Rousseff's impeachment (Lula's successor, also from PT) in 2016 (LIMA, 2018) followed by Bolsonaro's (a far-right candidate) election in 2018.

A somewhat deviant approach, which has inspired this work, is Vieira's (2018), who considers that the period exposes a latent ambiguous, insecure and fractured Brazilian identity, built upon colonial and racist foundations. Lula's government foreign policy discourses would have broken with the myth of racial democracy in Brazil, by openly affirming the country's blackness and its enduring racist structure. Given its relevance to this thesis and the fact that it dialogues with other literatures than BFPA (eg.: postcolonialism, ontological security studies and Lacanian psychoanalysis), Vieira's (2018) argument will be better debated in the following chapters.

Analyzing Brazilian Foreign Policy (BFP) patterns and strategies from Rio Branco (considered the founding father of Brazilian diplomatic tradition during 1900's) to the end of the twentieth century, Pinheiro (2000) remarks that BFP strategy has been oscillating between Americanism (alignment towards the US) and Globalism¹¹ (or, Universalism, diversification of partnerships and reaching for the South). Then, even though South-South relations cannot replace Americanism (and relations with developed countries in general), Globalist initiatives became increasingly important mainly in the second half of the century.

According to Vizentini (2004), the end of the Second World War highlights the end of a large period in which BFP was developed under a specific realm of hemispheric alignment, noteworthy towards the United States. From this moment, it is possible to identify an increasing tendency of a more multilateral and universal discursive approach (mostly regarding an approximation towards non-traditional partners in the Third World) attached with the argument of intimate relationship between the foreign policy strategy and the objectives of national development (relationship that has been enforced since the 1930's with Getúlio Vargas administration).

Then, even though a historical analysis can identify that cooperation with other developing countries has always been important in Brazilian international strategy during the second half of the twentieth century, there is a common perception between Brazilian Foreign Policy analysts that there were three specific moments in which South-South relations have been a priority: 1) from 1961 to 1964, during Jânio Quadros and João Goulart administration, in which the foreign policy strategy was known as "Independent Foreign Policy"; 2) during Geisel's "Responsible and Ecumenical

¹¹ The term 'Globalism' in BFPA tradition and mainly in Pinheiro (2000) should not be confounded with the Globalist approaches of IR in the 1970's. Even if some relation could be drawn, the term, the term is used by the author only as synonym of diversification of partnerships and approximation to non-traditional partners (e.g.: standing for 'Global' instead of 'Hemispheric'), mainly to enhance the bargaining power towards the US. The same idea is also used in different authors as Universalism. Both Globalism and Universalism in BFPA can be used interchangeably.

Pragmatism”, from 1974-1978; 3) and during Lula’s (2003-2010) “Active and Haughty foreign policy” (LEITE, 2011; AMORIM, 2015).

Considering those three moments, this work aims to drive attentions to the most recent one and highlights that an attentive analysis towards Brazilian Globalist initiatives might identify some important peculiarities during Lula’s (2003-2010) administration - also to be later contrasted to Rousseff’s (2011-2014), which will not be the focus of this thesis.

Lula da Silva’s government since 2003 highlights a change in BFP strategy to most of analysts towards a resumption of placing cooperation with developing countries (or South-South cooperation) as a priority agenda¹². According to Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007), ‘autonomy’ has kept being a central objective of the BFP strategy, only differing the *means* to achieve it. Thus, assuming continued traditional objectives of economic development and autonomy that characterize Brazil’s external action throughout history, the means adopted during the previous administration (president Cardoso, from 1995-2002) were characterized as “autonomy through participation”, defined by the authors as the accession to international regimes with neoliberal agenda through a convergent position to the interest of great powers.

On the other hand, Lula da Silva’s foreign policy strategy is characterized by Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007, p. 283), as “autonomy through diversification”, defined as the accession to international norms and principles through South-South alliances, either regional or with non-traditional partners, motivated by the belief that South-South partnerships reduce asymmetries in the relations with powerful states and increase Brazil’s bargaining power.

¹² Nevertheless, South-South relations do not replace North-South relations, as developing countries are still very dependent on great powers. (Lima, 2005; Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007).

This particular period is seen as peculiar in relation to previous Globalist periods (as in the 1960's and 1970's) mainly because of external variables¹³: the end of the Cold War presented to the world the expectation of consolidation of a liberal and democratic order, which would have the United States as hegemon. This expectation was not fulfilled and, according to Lima and Castelan, "the emergence of great peripheral states introduces complicating elements to the scenarios constructed in the 1990s, since it places the hegemony of an ultraliberal order in a court of justice [...]" (LIMA; CASTELAN, 2012, p. 176, my translation). Thus, the rapid rise of China and later of other countries, such as Brazil and India, reinforces a relative decline of the United States as hegemon.

Fonseca Jr. identifies that after the end of the Cold War, more specifically in the early 2000s, there is demand for international order "and it is not clear who will supply it" (FONSECA JÚNIOR, 2012, p. 15). As he describes, this demand corresponds to the inability of traditional powers to generate new paradigms of order, which almost automatically opens up space for countries (and groups) emerging at that moment to seek their own space and contribute considering their own interests and ideas in relation to international order (FONSECA JÚNIOR, 2012, p. 16).

In this sense, BFP engagement with the South during Lula's administration can be differentiated from its engagement with 1960's and 1970's third world movements, considering its relation to occidental economic and political institutions. According to Lima and Hirst (2009, p. 11-12) traditional third world grouping such as G-77 and Non-Aligned Movement had a strong idealist component, sustaining discourses and demands of profound change in favor of more equitable international regimes, willing

¹³ However, it also has some internal relevant components, noteworthy: Brazilian economic growth (in some points also positively influenced by China's growth) and implementation of some public policies that became references between developing countries regarding food and water security, health and combat against poverty; and, last but not least, the pair Lula da Silva (president) and Celso Amorim (chancellor) was central to the constitution of a foreign policy focused in South- South relations, presenting a great activism in foreign policy initiatives towards the South and sustaining demanding positions willing to promote reforms in international institutions.

to achieve a New International Economic Order. Nonetheless, the centrality of East-West and security agendas left little room for development issues. Then, those spaces of dialogue and coordination between developing countries presented a massive heterogeneity of realities and interests while retaining small power capabilities. Those elements made it difficult to deepen cooperation and made those agendas restricted to vague issues regarding development and international trade regimes. Thus, a central element of those groups was its critical position towards liberal international order, with rather lack of a propositional behavior (LIMA; HIRST, 2009).

Differently from post-Second World War international order, in which the multilateral system was instituted by the great powers, post-Cold War order seems to present more space for developing countries to offer international public goods. That happens, according to Lima and Hirst (2009, p. 15), because, presently, developed countries do not profit the most from multilateral negotiations and, thus, prefer bilateral negotiations. Alternatively, Brazil and other 'intermediate states' seek the strengthening of multilateral organisms and developing countries coordination because they are great beneficiaries of an order based on multilateral rules as multilateral arenas work as constraints to great power's unilateral impulses (LIMA, 2005).

Further, Brazil (and other emerging countries) has passed through a relevant economic growth in the 2000's and progressively acquired more political influence. For the first time, Brazil can actually present itself as a possible contributor to international institutional order and international public goods. The country has been pointed out as an emerging donor in development cooperation arena (BESHARATI; ESTEVES, 2015; VAZ; INOUE, 2012; MAWDSLEY, 2012); has contributed to the creation of new international institutions (such as the New Development Bank in the BRICS, in which Brazil was the major responsible of the institutional idealization of the project) (COZENDEY, 2015); and participated as an important leadership demanding reforms in international institutions and regimes such as the IMF, the Security Council and even WTO (considering the international trade regime) and FAO.

In this sense, Brazilian Globalist initiatives in the 2000's can be understood, on the one hand, as more reformist and less revolutionary (since they do not seek a disruption to the contemporary order), while having a more specific agenda and a greater capacity of real contribution to the international institutional order, regarding both the vacuum left by the Great Powers as higher sponsors of international order and its recent acquirement of higher political and economic status.

Despite its new power status in the 2000's Brazil still carries internal issues that prevent it to be considered a developed country. Thus, Lima and Hirst (2009, p. 12) call Brazil, and other countries with similar proportions, such as India, as 'intermediate states'. The category can be described as countries that have a complex industrial foundation, with relative development in some technological sectors, but still presenting typical Third World vulnerabilities in relation to poverty, inequality, and limitations in offering infrastructure and national public goods such as health and education. In relation to the same need for classifying Brazil and other bigger states in the developing world, Alden, Morphet and Vieira (2010) apply the term 'middle powers', which can be described as countries that are committed to multilateralism as means to overcome their material and structural power deficiencies.

Brazil has, also, frequently been included by international analysts in the so called group of 'emerging powers': countries that passed through vertiginous economic growth (in particular in the 2000's), who present demanding positions in international multilateral arena, offering to share some costs of international institutional order, with increased possibility of a systemic political impact (NARLIKAR, 2010). Besides, emerging powers are frequently analyzed as regional powers and holders of power resources that are much superior in relation to other developing countries. (ARMIJO, 2007; HURRELL, 2013)

However, Brazilian academy and government representatives present a reticent position, as they tend to resist denominating Brazil as an emerging or a regional power. Even if recently this position is considered less adequate to Brazil's political, economic (and even International Relations engagement) reality, international media and analysts

in the recent past did not mind calling Brazil as an emerging power (HURRELL, 2013; NARLIKAR, 2010; ARMIJO, 2007).

Nonetheless, it can be noticed that Brazilian academia and, mainly, Brazilian diplomatic representatives have been resistant to openly take on the ‘emerging power’. One of the main reasons could be that the consolidation of such an image could jeopardize Brazil’s position as a legitimate representative of the developing world. Instead, diplomats and local analysts defend Brazil’s position as a developing country, part of the so-called Global South, that still faces development issues, thus, trying to present a more horizontal discourse to other developing countries in opposition to a vertical one (JARDIM, 2016).

As previously mentioned, if there was some room for consensus around general demands over a New Economic World Order in the 1960’s and the 1970’s, contemporary intermediate states might not be supported by the ‘weak coalition’ anymore. As some scholars identify, least developed countries present a growing alignment towards developed countries (LIMA; HIRST, 2009, p.12). Then again, states such as India, Brazil and South Africa (in the IBSA forum, for example) present an explicit compromise with the defense of international institutions, international liberal order and democratic values, what might not be compatible to other developing and least developed countries interests and certainly guards some difference from the agenda presented by traditional third world movements. Moreover, groupings such as IBSA and BRICS have developed and deepened a wide cooperation agenda between high status developing (or emerging) countries, both intra and extra group, which could not be seen in traditional third world movements (JARDIM, 2016).

Besides the fact that emerging countries share a vertiginous economic growth in the 2000’s and an increasing involvement in international institutions and seeking to strengthen multilateralism, there are some central issues in which they present a rather divergent position from least developed countries interests, such as the proposal of reforming the Security Council (UNSC). The inclusion of emerging countries (such as IBSA) as permanent members of the UNSC would not represent a democratization of

the system but, instead, an institutionalization of heterogeneities and hierarchies between the so called Southern countries (LIMA; HIRST, 2009, p.15).

Therefore, there are incongruences and limits to Brazilian leadership position and bargaining power towards developing and developed countries. In this context, establishing itself as a representative of the ‘South’ or of the ‘developing world’ seems to be a central aspect of BFP strategy under Lula as it guarantees its participation as a legitimate representative of the Global South in high policy international arena with the lower possible costs, which could not be assured otherwise (STUENKEL, 2013; MILANI, PINHEIRO, LIMA, 2017; MALAMUD, 2011; SPEKTOR, 2011; SARAIVA, 2010).

Even though further empirical studies are needed, there are some examples of Brazilian Foreign Policy accomplishments that were dependent, at least to some extent, on the power of discourse and the construction legitimacy to represent developing countries. The country has been able to be a central actor in multilateral institutions, electing Brazilian representatives in the Board Directors chair in WTO (since 2013) and FAO (2011 and 2015). Both elections were extremely dependent on least developed countries support, noteworthy African ones (RAMANZINI JUNIOR; MARIANO; ALMEIDA, 2015), and represent important symbolic achievements in agendas that are central to least developed countries and in which Brazilians and ‘the coalition of the weak’ can have different interests, such as agriculture and food security (considering that Brazil is a major agriculture producer and usually not a supporter of familiar and small scale production in other countries).

José Graziano da Silva’s discourse right before his first election as Director-General at FAO in 2011 – besides not being a diplomatic one – serves as an example of how Brazil mobilizes the concept of Global South as means to legitimate itself as a representative of the category and, more than that, how this narrative is able to reconcile elements in Brazil’s identity of both developing and emerging country.

Graziano's speech highlights the importance of construction of consensus at FAO – an affirmation compatible with Brazil's image as *bridge builder between the North and the South* – while stresses the importance of implementing reforms and increasing FAO's representativeness by the inclusion of more staff from developing countries. (FAO, 2011) This position shows willingness to strengthen the institutional arrangement, only reforming it as means to better reflect contemporary politics, a position that is fully compatible to Global South term as an ambiguous one, both empowering and lightly reformist, as it supports the major foundations of the current international institutional order.

The candidate describes his personal involvement in the design and implementation of Brazil's famous program Zero Hunger, stressing, also, his personal relationship with the former president Lula and the Worker's Party (what could imply a connection to Brazilian government interests and hardly an impartial position). Those statements reinforce the image of Brazil as a country that faces major food security issues and has been able to develop highly successful practices that could – and were – applied in other developing countries around the globe. Seeking and sharing solutions *horizontally* to common issues is a central aspect of South-South cooperation and creates or reinforces the discourse over common identities between Brazil and other least developed countries (FAO, 2011).

The discourse also presents South-South and triangular cooperation as the main proposal for facing financial issues regarding the implementation of cooperation projects by FAO, considering the crisis faced by developed economies during that period, a proposal that reinforces the South as a constructive and propositional contributor to the provision of international public goods. Combined with the idea that those countries face similar problems that only they can fully understand, the discourse successfully combines identities of both an emerging and developing country in the construct of the Global South (FAO, 2011).

Furthermore, it could be mentioned that, granting an interview to me¹⁰, the former Minister of Foreign Relations, Celso Amorim, presented some other examples

of Brazil's legitimacy as a representative of the Global South. Amorim described that, while negotiating the TRIPS health agreement in Doha, as the negotiation process went by, he was called to share the bargaining table alone with the United States representative. In a defensive position, Amorim requested that he would only enter the dialogue if some African representative could be at the negotiation table as well. Nevertheless, African representatives supported Amorim and affirmed that they felt represented by Brazil in the negotiation, abdicating to participate during that important part of the bargaining process.

Amorim mentioned a negotiation in Seattle regarding Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as another example in which his presence – even though not central to the topic – was informally requested by LDCs representatives, as they felt supported by Brazilian positions in the arena. In addition, he also mentions the rather trivial role Brazil played alongside IBSA in the international negotiations of the Arab-Israeli conflict, being the only non-Arab developing countries invited to participate in the Annapolis Conference. In 2010, during the crisis in the occupied Palestinian territories, the Palestinian minister appeals political support to IBSA for the task of sensitizing international public opinion by coming to Brazil to attend a breakfast with the leaders of the Forum.

With those examples in mind, let us reflect critically over the ambiguities of Brazilian identity while analyzing its South-South cooperation initiatives. While analyzing Brazil's engagement in Angola, the authors Santos, Gomes and Fernández (2019) argue that there are two Brazils, one facing the (colonial and African) past and the other facing the (developed and European/North-American) future:

“Brazil's SSC discourse exposes the ambiguities and tensions that permeate its development efforts. Brazil's situated post-colonialism allowed for the constitution of a development model based on the state's alliance with elite private interests, marked by attempts to reconcile its slaveholding heritage with Western liberal ideology. Thus, the desire to promote technical cooperation that allows more inclusive development for African countries coexists with the diverse political and economic interests of business elites that see

internationalization as allowing them to pursue the project of constructing the ‘Brazil of the future’. [...] Moreover, the success of the Brazilian narrative is not only the result of Brazil supposedly offering a model with fewer conditionalities and, consequently, greater material gains, but also because the reaffirmation of a cultural and ideological proximity between the two countries allows for Angolan decision-makers to feel recognized and represented in Brazil’s cooperation discourse – even if the latter projects the desires and aspirations of certain business elites at the same time” (SANTOS; GOMES; FERNÁNDEZ, 2019, p. 25).

Seeking to “resituate its place in the developmentalist continuum” Brazil articulates a temporal trope that discursively constructs it as a ‘teenage’ country, temporally close to an immature Africa, but also not so distant from an adult and rational United States or Europe’. (SANTOS; GOMES; FERNÁNDEZ, 2019, p. 27)

Not aiming to find out whether the discursive articulations that have recently placed Brazil as closer to the African continent than before are true or only utilitarian rational lies, Santos, Gomes and Fernández understand it as the expression of “the very ambivalence of the Brazilian self and its situated post-colonialism”. According to them, it is impossible to choose between the ‘lusotropical fantasy’ or the ‘historical debt to Africa’, so they go for the acceptance of “the very undecidability of the identity of Brazil and its ‘Others’” (SANTOS; GOMES; FERNÁNDEZ, 2019, p.18).

1.3. Change and continuity of Foreign Policy under Lula

“The way Brazil is seen – both abroad and within her borders – has dramatically changed in the last few years. The return to democracy, monetary stability, economic growth, poverty reduction, improvement in social indicators, internationalisation of Brazilian companies, the change of status from debtor to creditor, all add up to redefine Brazil’s image in the world. In this process, President Lula’s magnetic personality, his large experience as a trade union leader, the charisma resulting from an extraordinary life, played a central role. But it is not unreasonable to claim that an audacious and, sometimes, irreverent, foreign policy has contributed to this ‘leap forward’” (AMORIM, 2010, p.216).

Usually, approaches that reflect over change and continuity in BFP under Lula take into consideration as the main factor the changing process in domestic dynamics of foreign policy formulation and implementation¹⁴. They also present a comparative focus with Lula's antecessor, president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), who also ruled for 8 years; gave great importance to foreign policy, having previously been chancellor; came from a different political party (PSDB); and was Brazil's executive leader in similar international (globalization) and domestic (democracy and financial stability) contexts.

Cason and Power (2009, p. 119), for example, argue that foreign policy under both Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) and Lula is marked by two main trends: 1) the pluralization of domestic actors and 2) the advent of presidentially led diplomacy. According to them, those elements constitute a disruption of historical patterns of foreign policy making and have been accelerating in the post-1995. The presidential diplomacy is very notorious in both governments. Nevertheless, while "Cardoso gave more attention to developed countries, especially the United States and Europe" (CASON; POWER, 2009, p.122) seeking to move away from third worldism, Lula "has emphasized South-South relations, and used the tool of presidential diplomacy to reach out to previously underemphasized regions such as Asia, Africa and the Middle East." (CASON; POWER, 2009, p. 122)

Both Lula and Cardoso were amongst the main leaders of their respective parties and used the external political support they had acquired during their political career. Therefore, "the presidentialization of foreign policy was *externally legitimated* during their years in office", while the "pluralization of actors in foreign policy was facilitated by the [domestic] social bases of the PSDB and PT, respectively." (CASON; POWER, 2009, p. 127) While Cardoso's diplomatic activism was already considered intense, being called 'his own chancellor', Lula da Silva more than doubled the number of

¹⁴ For a purely systemic approach on Lula's foreign policy, see Fletes (2009).

FHC's international travels, with his famous *AeroLula* airplane, as his airplane was nicknamed by the press (CASON; POWER, 2009, p.122; SILVA, 2015).

Concerning the domestic and bureaucratic dimensions, Brazil under Lula has sought a multidimensional cooperation, what I have called elsewhere a 'cooperation in multiple fronts' (Jardim, 2016), with cooperation both on the domestic (through development cooperation) and the international levels (through coalitions or blocs), which usually did not involve high levels of institutionalization, encompassing various ministries, international organizations, societal actors, and even the creation of new cooperation mechanisms. This involvement of multiple actors had some relevant impacts over BFP:

“on the one hand, it increased the degree of credibility of international commitments; the possibility of horizontal and diagonal articulations between State and Brazilian society actors and their foreign counterparts was expanded; and the construction of consensus in the construction and implementation of external projects became more complex. On the other hand, when it comes to setting up a foreign policy agenda in domestic ministries and state-owned companies, we must pay attention to the risk of triggering inter-bureaucratic disputes; while the growing pluralization of divisions within the diplomatic bureaucracy, in an attempt to respond to the diversity of the agenda and the pluralization of actors with coordination objectives, can equally trigger intra-bureaucratic disputes and a swelling of the bureaucracy without necessarily having a counterpart in effectiveness” (HIRST; LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010, p. 38, my translation).

Thus, it seems the number of social and political actors involved in foreign policy formulation and implementation generated a new configuration has increased, though it is yet unclear on whether or to what extent it reflects horizontalization of BFP (FARIAS; RAMANZINI JÚNIOR, 2015).

Some analysts agree that there was greater transparency and increased public debate of the choices over the country's international insertion project, with positive impacts for the democratization of the process. On the downsides, there was lack of coordination among Brazil's greater strategy and the context of its involvement in local

cooperation initiatives. Beyond that, the demand for participation of many government levels (federal, state and municipal) increased the difficulty of coordination and implementation of those various initiatives. (HIRST; LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010) Furthermore, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency remained with no institutional autonomy and did not acquire the needed institutional mechanisms to better coordinate and implement Brazilian development cooperation initiatives, which left it more susceptible to government changes and budgetary constraints (UNDP, 2021).

As it will be further discussed in the following subsections, the approaches over change and continuity under Lula usually discuss domestic and systemic elements, but the main topic which usually has to be analyzed, explained or justified are the closer ties with Southern countries. This will be more closely discussed in the following subsections.

1.3.1 'Autonomy through diversification' and the limits of rationalist and state-centric constructivist FPA

The most cited BFPA paper, according to Google Scholar, is Vigevani and Cepaluni's (2007)¹⁵ '*A política externa de Lula da Silva: a estratégia da autonomia pela diversificação*'. The paper became relevant in the field by trying to answer the question of whether (and to what extent) Lula's government represented a change of direction in BFP.

To analyze change in BFP, the authors apply Hermann's (1990) model combined with the Wendtian constructivist hypothesis that countries' political strategies are socially constructed by ideas regarding the social world. They understand that many of

¹⁵ In September 20th, 2020, the two versions of the article were published in 200, one in English published by Third World Quarterly and one in Portuguese published by Contexto Internacional, accounted for a total of 847 citations. The second most cited was Lima and Hirst's (2006) "Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities", published at International Affairs, with had 647 citations.

the changes observed during Lula da Silva's government foreign policy have to do with the president's different ideas and diverse reading of the international if compared with previous leader FHC (considering also the staff accompanying both).

Important enough is to reinforce Hermann's definition of foreign policy, which is also implied in Vigevani and Cepaluni's work:

“Beginning with the concept of foreign policy, let us stipulate that it is a goal-oriented or problem-oriented program by authoritative policymakers (or their representatives) directed toward entities outside the policymakers' political jurisdiction. In other words, it is a program (plan) designed to address some problem or pursue some goal that entails action toward foreign entities. The program presumably specifies the conditions and instruments of statecraft” (HERMANN, 1990, p. 5).

Bearing in mind this foreign policy definition, Hermann's (1990, p. 3) approach is famous for establishing a methodology to analyze change in foreign policy, which can be of minor adjustment changes (either through program and goal changes), and of major extent, or fundamental changes. The author examines change regarding four main agents 1) the leader driven; 2) the bureaucratic advocacy; 3) the domestic restructuring; and 4) the external shock.

Hermann (1990, p.5-6) presents four levels of change. The first are Adjustment Changes, which occur only in the level of effort, representing only quantitative changes; in this scenario, what, how, and the purpose of what is done in foreign policy remain unchanged. The second are Program Changes, which are modifications in the methods or means, keeping the same goals; in this regard, these changes are qualitative and involve new ways or instruments to pursue the same goals. The third level of change are Problem or Goal Changes, in which the initial goals are abandoned or changed. Finally, the fourth level is Changes of International Orientation, it is considered the most extreme one as it involves the redirection of the actor's entire international orientation, change the actor's role, activities and many simultaneous policies.

From this point of view, Vigevani and Cepaluni argue that Lula da Silva's foreign policy represented only a program change in relation to FHC's, as his main BFP goal was still to seek 'autonomy' and 'development', even through different means. They consider as the main variables causing those changes: the change in leadership from president FHC to president Lula; the change of the main practitioners of BFP from Luiz Felipe Lampreia and Celso Lafer during FHC, to Celso Amorim, Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães and Marco Aurélio Garcia during Lula; and the external shocks of September 11th 2001 and the difficult negotiations at the Doha round.

The authors only explain what they mean by 'autonomy' in a book published some years later, in which they describe it as "a notion that refers to a foreign policy free from constraints imposed by powerful countries". They also consider Latin American approaches of 'autonomy' to be different from mainstream in IR "[...] which defines it as the legal recognition of sovereign States considered 'equal units' in an anarchic international order" (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2011, p. 27-28, my translation). Later on, they define that 'inside' of the State, autonomy consists of a way to secure autochthonous/non-dependent development; while 'outside' it consists of the foreign practice of the Third World, as the 1950's non-alignment.

As shall be discussed in the following chapters, 'autonomy' and 'development' will be approached in this work not as words to be defined, with definitions one can stick with and apply to different scenarios. Those terms, or, as I will call them here, those 'signifiers', can have different meanings depending on the period of time, the location they are used, or the power struggles they are inserted. This will be further developed in chapter two. For now, the reader needs to keep in mind that I understand that there is a close connection between the need for linear narratives in BFP found in academia and in Itamaraty itself, guided, between others, by a belief in a supposed rational orientation of State's political action, and the repetition of terms such as 'autonomy' and 'development', which imply such linearity.

After considering this critical approach over signifiers, let us have a look at the definitions over 'autonomy' presented by Vigevani and Cepaluni:

“We define synthetically: (1st) “autonomy through distance” as a policy non-automatic acceptance of prevailing international regimes and, above all, the belief in partially autarchic development, focused on the emphasis on the internal market; consequently, a diplomacy that opposes certain aspects of the agenda of the great powers in order to preserve the sovereignty of the National State; (2nd) “autonomy through participation” as adherence to international regimes, including those of a liberal nature, without losing the capacity to manage foreign policy; in this case, the objective would be to influence the very formulation of the principles and rules that govern the international system; (3rd) “autonomy through diversification” as the country's adherence to international principles and norms through South-South alliances, including regional alliances, and agreements with non-traditional partners (China, Asia-Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, etc.), as it is believed that they reduce asymmetries in external relations with more powerful countries and increase national negotiating capacity” (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007:283, my translation).

If *autonomy* in one occasion is understood as something that can be achieved through the adhesion to international liberal regimes; and in the other is seen as something that can be achieved through diversification of partnerships, mainly through South-South cooperation, did not the very understanding of *autonomy* change and, thus, also the goal pursued from one case to the other? Does the role the country is playing internationally not change dramatically? Did the relations with others, such as the desired other (countries that inspire the self, as projections of a desired future) not change as well from the United States to other emerging economies? I am not assuming the answer for those questions is yes, but I consider it problematic that they have not been pondered in the analysis.

Beyond that, according to Vigevani and Cepaluni, the guidelines of Lula's foreign policy can be directly obtained from observation of “concrete events of foreign policy” (2007, p. 283). In this perspective, the guidelines under Lula da Silva and actions from which they were observed, according to them were:

“(1) contribute to a greater international equilibrium, seeking to attenuate unilateralism; (2) fortify bilateral and multilateral relations as means to increase the country's weight in political and economic international negotiations; (3) to deepen diplomatic relations aiming

to enjoy the possibilities of greater economic, financial, technological and cultural exchange, etc; (4) avoid agreements that could compromise development in the long term. These guidelines, throughout the first period of government, from 2003 to 2006, probably unfolding in the second period, implied precise emphases: (1) deepening of the South American Community of Nations (Casa); (2) intensification of relations between emerging countries such as India, China, Russia and South Africa; (3rd) prominent action in the Doha Round and the World Trade Organization, as well as in some other economic negotiations; (4) maintenance of friendly relations and development of economic relations with rich countries, including the United States; (5) resumption and strengthening of relations with African countries; (6) campaign for the reform of the United Nations Security Council, aiming at a permanent membership for Brazil; and (7) defense of social objectives that would allow for greater balance between States and populations” (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007, p. 292).

It can be potentially problematic that they consider that intentionality can be directly inferred from observation of ‘concrete events of foreign policy’ (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007, p. 283) as not necessarily a foreign policy action or result is directly caused by a clear/objective intention. Furthermore, it is not clear in the analysis how the authors understand the empirical work should be done to check if the goals were kept the same: had the ‘concrete events’ of Lula and FHC foreign policies been similar or not, they cannot be considered to represent a direct link to what the goals were when the activities were idealized or implemented. On the other hand, if the intentionality should be grasped from discourse, then, neither Hermann or Vigevani and Cepaluni present an analysis that takes the discursive dimension seriously.

Vigevani and Cepaluni affirm to be working in a combined approach with constructivism, citing Wendt, Adler among other constructivists, following the “presupposition that countries’ political strategies are socially constructed by ideas over the social reality and the external world” (2007, p. 276, my translation). Nonetheless, their use of Wendt’s work seems to be out of context. Arguing that ideas are taken into consideration does not mean they are actually dialoging with Wendt or constructivism. (GOLDSTEIN; KEOHANE, 1993) Max Weber, for example, explains the rise of capitalism through the ethics of Protestantism, thus using a value-rational

framework in which ideas matter to understand why individuals behave in a certain way. This does not mean that the approach considered takes the social world as constantly under construction and informed by inherently relational identities. (GUZZINI, 2000) That consideration is relevant not only to Vigevani and Cepaluni's piece, but also to other BFPA that imply identities in a loose way¹⁶, or as a synonym for ideas, while presenting a rationalist analysis.

An interesting example of this is Spektor's (2011) article on ideas and regional activism in BFP. In the introduction, the author argues that "[w]ithout ignoring the causal factors [...] [structural and institutional causes], this paper analyzes the role of ideas in the conformation of a renewed Brazilian regional activism, mostly in the last decade." (SPEKTOR, 2011, p.25, my translation) The author refers as his intellectual sources for the concept of ideas authors such as Acharya (2004) and Finnemore (2003), among others. However, later, when assessing what are the main reasons for this greater engagement in the region, the author argues in favor of power and autonomy, and not ideas:

"What deserves special attention in this case is the fact that the logic behind the Brazilian choices was not one according to which a South American entity was useful and necessary to solve collective action problems, promote regional coordination or manage common problems typical of complex interdependence between porous borders in the region. On the contrary, the logic that animated Brasília was that of using a new regional arrangement as a tool to rescue space for maneuver in the face of the financial crisis and a dying and decaying Mercosur. Thus, the origin of the idea of "South America" *had less to do with new ideas about collective governance or about a supposedly common regional identity rather than an instrumental calculation based on considerations of power and autonomy.*" (SPEKTOR, 2011, p.34, my translation, emphasis added.)

¹⁶ Stuenkel (2011), for example, in '*Identity and the concept of the West: the case of Brazil and India*', published at *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, though having 'identity' as a major element of his analysis, the term is not defined anywhere in the text and only used in a common sense approach.

In a broader way, the mobilization of constructivist or supposedly intersubjective elements, common in BFPA approaches, usually aims to include the concept of identity, ideas, or principles. A central example of this is Celso Lafer's (2000) (FHC's former Chancellor) publication on identity. Lafer (2000) argues that the national identity is intermediated by the representation institutions, having an *internal* instance of intermediation with a population in a given territory, shared economic goods, with technical and scientific knowledge, information and culture; while having also an *external* intermediation with the world, which departs from vision of a collective identity, of specificities regarding history, language, geographic localization, developmental level e societal data (LAFER, 2000, p. 18-19). Lafer's approach on identity in BFP is interesting and widely applied in the field of BFPA, as it might be one of the only systematic works on the topic in BFPA. However, as we will discuss in later chapters, his work does not present a greater theoretical engagement beyond his conceptualization and historical conceptualization of what identity means.

Taken the relevance of elements such as ideas and identities, it will be relevant to resume Zehfuss's (2001) critique towards Wendtian constructivism. According to her, in Wendt, identities and interests change and are sustained through interaction. Nonetheless, for Wendt's systemic approach to work, the author needs to assume the existence of a corporate identity, which are intrinsic qualities that constitute the actor individually. Corporate identity is based on domestic politics, which Wendt considers to be ontologically anterior to States' system, exogenous to international politics. Hence, it is the platform to other identities, as it is pre-given, and the other social identities, such as role identities and collective identities, are built through relations with other actors and, then, can assume multiple forms in the same actor. In this regard, to Wendt, actors have many collective identities and only one corporate identity. (ZEHFUSS, 2001) Social identities can be relatively stable, but they also can be transformed through learning processes during the interaction between ego and alter described by Wendt, usually through conscious efforts to identity change, which leads to change in actions. Nonetheless, one of the central elements of Zehfuss's (2001) critique is the impossibility to differentiate between what is an actual change in identity

and what is only a mere change in state action and, if an identity matters only when it results in certain types of action, then why not keep the analysis at the level of action instead of identity? Furthermore, to detect changes in identity it should be possible to identify which identity an actor has in a specific point of time, which is also complex, to say the least.

Furthermore, excluding the process of construction of the State and taking it as given as Wendt does, other BFP authors, while dealing with identity, analyze change in FPA to be only informed by the idea that change in foreign policy will be change from one stable identity to another - which should be only informed by change in actions. Thus, these approaches consider identities not as fluid as in poststructural approaches, which understand them as inherently unstable discursive constructs. In Wendt, identity becomes only something that is negotiated between States and their bureaucrats and a matter of pushing the frontiers of who is considered part of the self (the State) and who is not (CAMPBELL, 1992; ZEHFUSS, 2001). In this context, Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007), for example, consider the change in the State role, which is part of the international identity of the nation. In this model, a change in action should directly point to a change in role, which can be a problematic line of causality.

The mainstream approaches over BFP and the Lula period have much in common in terms of understanding foreign policy as a bridge between a well-defined inside (and its pre-existing identity and interests) to an outside, to which the frontiers are clear (and not being actively created and re-enacted). Beyond that, foreign policy is seen as the enactment of instrumental reason, the result of simple rational cost-benefit calculations, an almost obvious definition of priorities and interests, which supposedly represents the best Brazilian population's interests. The variables are given by Brazil's material and societal capabilities and its positioning in the international system, which reflects a strongly realist perception of the international and the State's role in it. Even though importing the realist ontology, those texts hardly ever debate theories and critically reflect on the theoretical presuppositions at the foundation of their work and the impact it has on the possible actors, methodologies and variables considered (GOMES, 2014).

While analyzing Lula's foreign policy, those approaches have focused mostly in identifying whether it has represented change or continuity given the greater BFP framework. Though the interpretations vary, the central element to be explained under change or continuity has indeed been the closer relations to Southern countries under Lula. Nevertheless, the way those approaches assess change or continuity might need to be reframed and whether one or the other is found to be the prevailing interpretation, the prevailing significant-master. These significant masters might change from time to time, and have different implications. These considerations will be further discussed throughout my thesis.

1.3.2 Domestic determinants and change in foreign policy

Hirst, Lima and Pinheiro (2010) present an approach to change and continuity under Lula by mobilizing both domestic and systemic elements, with relevant focus in the first. They argue that Lula's foreign policy was not an accessory to macroeconomic stability and international credibility, as the recent previous one (making a reference to FHC's foreign policy). In a different take, the foreign policy in that period is said to have been 'proactive' and 'pragmatic' (here relying upon the imaginary of a foreign policy guided by national interest), and foreign policy was one of the pillars of the government's strategy. According to Hirst, Lima and Pinheiro, Lula's government strategy represented a) the maintenance of the macroeconomic stability; b) the resumption of the role of the State in the coordination of the neo-developmental agenda; and, c) social inclusion and the formation of an expansive market of masses. According to the authors, there was an expansion of agendas and actors involved in foreign policy (bureaucratic and societal), so the foreign policy acquired a larger societal basis than it had before. (HIRST; LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010, p. 23)

Concerning domestic disputes, Hirst, Lima and Pinheiro (2010, p. 23) emphasize that the government's opposition denounces the partisanship of Lula's foreign policy with "counterproductive priorities and excessive generosity". In this context, to some

domestic analysts, Brazil's greater engagement with the South is interpreted as a foreign policy that is 'partisan' in the sense that it is guided less by state interest and more by party ideology. The government, in its turn, defended its strategy as a way to project Brazil regionally and globally with an objective to amplify its power resources, its entrepreneurial opportunities, seeking prestige and a greater voice to the country.

Nonetheless, the authors' opinion is that Brazil's international policy amplified its institutional grounding "through the mobilization of multiple external state agencies with their own external agendas or agendas that are complementary to Itamaraty's guidelines" (HIRST; LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010, p. 23), which resulted in changes in BFP under Lula if compared to previous periods. In this context, some ministries have presented a protagonist role, namely the Agriculture Ministry through Embrapa (its research enterprise), having an active role in African and South-American Countries, as well as the Ministry of Health and its Fiocruz research foundation, which developed numerous projects of technical cooperation in health (HIRST, LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010, p. 25).

Hirst, Lima and Pinheiro identify that, when compared to previous governments, a greater emphasis was given to global governance fora, as Brazil started to present more demanding positions, abandoning the defensive positions that characterized Third-Worldism after the Second World War. Beyond that, the Lula government has given greater priority to South-South relations, with special regard to South-America. (HIRST; LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010, p. 29) This more demanding positioning would be both a result of the new government guidelines under Lula and Amorim, as well as a result of the greater power status that Brazil had acquired in that period.

On the other hand, for Hirst, Lima and Pinheiro, the defense of 'universal multilateralism' is one the most enduring characteristics of BFP "reflecting the classical *Brazilian international identity of mediator between the North and the South*" (HIRST, LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010, p. 29, emphasis added). Here, I would like the reader to pay attention to the jargons attributed to Brazilian identity and how they are recurrent throughout the literature, the elements of Brazilian identity that guarantee the

narratives of continuity, such as ‘multilateralism’ and ‘mediator between the North and the South’.

The analysis of BFP under Lula argues it presents a ‘soft revisionism’ in various topics and international fora, differently from the past, when the country had only defensive interests. During Lula da Silva, Brazil also presented offensive interests regarding agricultural liberalization at the WTO and took to the creation of the G20 in close coordination with India and South Africa, among others. Beyond that, a significant change occurred in 2009 regarding the climate crisis agenda. In the Copenhagen meeting, Brazil also abandoned the defensive posture in the climate agenda by announcing voluntary reductions in its carbon emissions, building a negotiation coalition with India, China and South Africa (BASIC). In both WTO and Copenhagen, the change in Brazil’s positioning has also reflected domestic rearrangements (HIRST; LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010, p. 29).

Another relevant change was the abandoning the sovereigntist behavior was on the topic of Peace enforcement Operations based in chapter VII of the UN Charter. An example of Brazil’s change of positioning was its acceptance of the command for the UN Mission for the stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004. The authors argue that this new disposition in participating in peacekeeping operations is related to Brazil’s aspiration for a permanent seat in a reformed UNSC. (HIRST, LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010, p.30) While this aspiration is said to have been part of BFP for long, since the creation of the UN, the activism for it increased dramatically under Lula-Celso Amorim, what can be analyzed also as a change resulted by the new government guidelines in a changing world order.

Therefore, overall, Hirst, Lima and Pinheiro argue that Lula’s foreign policy had both change and continuities. The changes were understood mostly in terms of domestic politics dynamics with and the continuities in terms of the enduring characteristics of BFP.

Let us move now to another of the most cited papers of BFPA, from the former chancellor Celso Amorim (2010)¹⁷. It is interesting to observe the similarities and disparities of the diplomatic and academic discourses concerning research topics, the main arguments, and interpretations over Lula's foreign policy and how it represent change or continuity. Though there are some relevant divergences, academic and diplomatic approaches are still considerably similar, mainly regarding what are considered the central guidelines of BFP (e.g.: autonomy, development, multilateralism, pacifism) as well as the topics addressed by the Minister versus what is the research agenda of the field.

One example of divergence in the justification of change under Lula by Amorim and the academic field, for example, was Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH. According to Amorim (2010, p.222), the engagement was based on 'solidarity' and 'non-indifference', and not on a self-interested pursuit of a permanent seat at the 'Security Council':

“The exercise of solidarity with those who are more in need has been one of the tenets of President Lula's foreign policy. The Brazilian Government has not been indifferent to the necessities of countries stricken by poverty, armed conflict and natural disasters. Such attitude of *non-indifference* is not contradictory with the defense of our own interests. We are convinced that in the long run an attitude based on a sense of humanity that favours the promotion of development of the poorest and most vulnerable will not only be good to peace and prosperity around the world. It will bring benefits to Brazil herself, in political as well as economic terms. This dialectic relation between national interest and the exercise of solidarity has been a fundamental aspect of President Lula's foreign policy” (AMORIM, 2010, p. 225).

There is some consensus among analysts and diplomats that Brazil has presented a proactive international engagement through coalition and cooperation blocs. Those articulations with other countries, developing and developed, such as through the

¹⁷ According to Google Scholar data, the text published at Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, had 292 citations in September 20th, 2020, ranked in 6th in my data collection.

constitution of ‘coalitions of variable geometry’ (e.g. IBSA, BRICS, and BASIC), as well as through a new kind of *ad hoc* multilateralism, as the informal coordination under the financial G-20. Those somewhat new initiatives have been favored both by a government vision (domestic determinants) as well as by the international context possibilities (systemic determinants) (OLIVEIRA, 2005; HIRST; LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010; AMORIM, 2010; SILVA, 2015).

There is a common perception, among both analysts and diplomats, that Brazilian bilateral relations have expanded considerably. (HIRST; LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010; LESSA, 2010; AMORIM, 2010) Brazil’s posts increased from 150 in 2002 to 230 in 2010, with 52 new embassies, 6 new missions to International Organizations, 22 consulates, and one diplomatic office in Palestine. Among those, 23 were in Africa, 15 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 13 in Asia and 6 in the Middle East. To follow the institutional growth, the diplomatic corps increased from 1,000 in 2005 to 1,400 in 2010 (AMORIM, 2010, p. 226; HIRST; LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010).

Contrasting academic and diplomatic narratives will remain a relevant task throughout my thesis. Both narratives inform each other and actively make up the existing interpretations over what the look towards the South has meant during Lula da Silva’s foreign policy.

1.3.3 The centrality of the South: closer relations with South America and Africa

As already discussed, a central parameter used by BFPA literatures to assess change and continuity under Lula’s foreign policy is its greater focus in South-South relations. The centrality given to South America and Africa, also including other non-traditional partners in Asia and Middle East, is considered the central element to be justified, either in terms of finding common elements with previous periods that corroborate its understanding as ‘continuity’; or listing domestic elements or

‘pragmatic’ reasons why ‘changing’ BFP could be plausibly understood. Taking this element into consideration, this section will go through some of the literature focused in analyzing Brazil’s greater proximity with Southern countries and what kind of analysis are mobilized in their interpretation to position it in the overall BFPA narrative.

Concerning the so-called greater emphasis in South America under Lula, Malamud (2011) argues that this does not present a change in BFP. The author describes that ‘Brazil’s major foreign policy aspiration has long been to achieve international recognition in accordance with its self-perception as a “great country”’ (MALAMUD, 2011, p.3) and that leadership in South America has been regarded as a “springboard to global recognition” (2011, p.1). According to him, this sought for leadership has been mainly through ideational means, given its absence of hard power instruments. Citing Sean Burges (2008), he argues that ““without sticks or carrots’ [...] Brazil has no choice but to resort to instrumental (or ideational) ones - hence the characterization of the country as a ‘soft power’ promoting ‘consensual hegemony”’ (MALAMUD, 2011, p.6).

Given this context, the author argues that MERCOSUR has been one of the major elements of BFP since its creation in early 1990s. Under the regional framework, Brazil has sought to include other South American countries, seeing the region as “an autonomous political-economic area” (MALAMUD, 2011, p. 6). The political moment was marked by a change in the bilateral relation between Brazil and the United States, also accompanied by a crisis in Washington’s projection of leadership in South America and Brazil’s mobilization in fulfilling this leadership vacuum. According to the author, under Lula (and other left contemporaneous leaderships in South American partners), MERCOSUR character has also changed:

“MERCOSUR was initially a pragmatic integration project that dealt with trade, customs, and market access, but increasingly it has become a symbol for progressive political activism and leftist ideologies. In Brazil, it has turned into the flagship of those who stand for developmental, anti-imperialist, or nationalist ideas. To the

most vocal of its supporters, MERCOSUR is not simply an economic association or a strategic instrument but a supranational identity that provides its member countries with the only way to survive in a globalizing world” (MALAMUD, 2011, p. 7, references omitted).

Hence, for Malamud (2011), BFP under Lula and its greater focus to the region did not represent a major change, as it has been a tendency throughout the 1990s. Nonetheless, he argues that Mercosur under Lula (and other leftist leaderships) had a different character, and has been more vocal in topics such as development and anti-imperialism in the region, moving away from a mainly economic-commercial articulation.

Hirst, Lima, and Pinheiro (2010) argue in favor of the idea that Lula da Silva’s government represented a change in terms of a greater focus in South America. They corroborate the idea by demonstrating that Brazil behaved in the region also as a democratic stability factor. According to them, the role of regional power, nonetheless, involved new political and economic expectations of its neighbors, not always compatible with its own interests of projecting itself as a global actor in global negotiations. Argentina and Colombia did not support Brazil’s candidacy for a permanent seat in the UNSC, for example (HIRST; LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010).

In this context, Brazil’s presence in Latin America has been associated with a “local mediator role in contexts of local crisis, [...] as the cases of Venezuela (2003), Bolivia (2003 and 2006), Ecuador (2004), Honduras (2009) e Haiti (2003)” (HIRST; LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010, p.31, my translation). More intense political connections with South American governments, such as of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina, of Tabaré Vázquez and José Mujica in Uruguay, of Michelle Bachelet in Chile, and of Fernando Lugo in Paraguay, received negative reactions from some segments of the Brazilian elites (HIRST; LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010).

Regarding its role in the region, Brazil sometimes assumed greater costs when involved in disputes in the region, mostly when dealing with countries with smaller relative power. Among those, there were problems in Ecuador related to the operations

of the Brazilian company Odebrecht; Morales' government in Bolivia decided to nationalize Petrobras facilities; and Lugo in Paraguay demanded the renegotiation of the Treaty of Itaipu, concerning the production of hydroelectric energy. (HIRST; LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010, p. 32)

Concerning the divisions of the domestic opinion regarding relations with Latin America, more broadly, the authors describe:

“on the one hand, there is a conservative opinion that opposes abandoning the tradition of non-intervention and calls for the maximum defense of national interests; on the other, progressive intellectual and political circles have supported a bolder and more committed engagement in Latin America with a view to building a regional-global strategy” (HIRST; LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010, p. 31, my translation).

Beyond the relations with South America, the pluralization of partnerships under Lula also encompassed the ‘rediscovery of Africa’, also seen as a considerable difference of his government, though previous experiences in Brazilian history make the Africa part of BFP’s framework possibilities. For Hirst, Lima and Pinheiro (2010), the Lula government represents a third wave of Brazilian interest towards Africa, but now differently, as a “symbolic referent of the South-South strategy, reinforced by the discourse of identity convergence that involves historical, ethnic and socio-cultural aspects [...] as a developing country.” (HIRST; LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010, p. 32, my translation). Nonetheless, they also reinforce that, beyond the economic and commercial agenda, there were also political interests, namely the aspiration for a permanent seat at the UNSC, to which Brazil openly sought support when dialoguing with African countries. In this context, Africa became the main destination of technical cooperation offered by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency, always in a demand-driven way. (HIRST; LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010)

Concerning the relevant contrasting of academic and diplomatic narratives, on the same topic of a closer relation to African countries, Celso Amorim argues:

“Beyond incidental political and economic gains, the search for closer relations with Africa is guided by historic, demographic and cultural bonds. African Portuguese-speaking countries are, quite understandably, the ones with whom Brazil has the most enduring, solid and diversified relationships. [...] The Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (or CPLP) – originally idealized by Ambassador José Aparecido de Oliveira following a Summit held in São Luís do Maranhão, Brazil, in 1989, and formally established in 1996 – brought us even closer to those African nations. Brazil’s movement toward the African continent was not limited to the Portuguese-speaking nations. By the end of his second term in office, President Lula will have visited Africa 12 times, including as many as 23 countries. Few, if any, non-African (or even African) leaders can claim such a record. The fact that President Lula was a guest of honour at the 13th African Union Summit held in Sirte, Libya, in July 2009 – upon invitation by the President of the Commission of the African Union – is a testimony to the fact that his commitment to Africa is recognized. [...] As result of the political priority attributed to the African continent in Brazilian foreign policy, the number of Brazilian resident embassies in Africa has more than doubled, now covering 39 out of the 53 countries. In spite of the well known financial difficulties of most African nations, thirteen countries of that continent decided to open permanent representation in Brasília since 2003, putting Brasília among the top capitals in the world in number of African embassies (29)” (AMORIM, 2010, p. 233-234).

The numbers are also mobilized by Amorim (2010) in favor of an interpretation of greater change under Lula. He argues that development cooperation with African countries has been significantly expanded and consisted of 60% of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency Budget (ABC) by 2010 (Amorim, 2010). Embrapa (Brazilian State-Institution for agricultural research) opened an office in Accra, Ghana, aiming to share the technology that increased the productivity of the Brazilian *cerrado* to the African savannahs. In the health sector, Brazil financed the construction of a factory of anti-HIV/AIDS medicaments in Mozambique. Concerning industrial training, units of Senai (Brazilian national industrial training service) were opened in Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé e Príncipe. (AMORIM, 2010, p. 233) One of the consequences of the expanded dialogue with Africa were the expansion of trade, jumping from US\$ 5 billion in 2002 to US\$ 26 billion in 2008 “Taken as a single country, Africa would be Brazil’s fourth commercial partner, only behind China,

the United States and Argentina, ahead of traditional partners such as Germany and Japan” (AMORIM, 2010, p. 234).

Overall, it seems that Brazil sought the recognition as a significant other to Africa, as a friend or an older brother, concepts that will be further discussed in chapter two. For now, it is important to keep in mind Santos, Siman and Fernández (2019) approach on ‘two Brazils’. According to them, “by accepting this projection as a ‘teenage country’, Brazil ends up reproducing the European narratives and highlighting a supposed immaturity of African societies.” (2019, p.11) In this context, the notion of European modernity is not seen “as ‘the prototype’ for development” but neither can it be denied (SANTOS; SIMÁN; FERNÁNDEZ, 2019, p. 4) So, taking into consideration that Lula’s foreign policy sought recognition from African societies as a significant other, does Brazil under Lula also recognize African countries as such? This will be one of the inquiries present in the following chapters.

In summary, the links and close cooperation both with South American and African countries were the main pillars sustaining the argument of change or continuity in BFP under Lula. In this context, some argue for a similar logic in the approximation towards both regions. Authors argue Brazil has a common history, culture or geopolitical aspects, either with the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP, the acronym in Portuguese) group or in co-habiting the South American region, for example, which would lead the country to seek to strengthen the bilateral relations and institutional arrangements (as Mercosur) in both regions (HIRST; LIMA; PINHEIRO, 2010; AMORIM, 2010).

1.4. Dissonant approaches over the Lula period

Now I will be moving to approaches that have, to some extent, inspired my own. Not necessarily following the same epistemological, methodological or even ontological takes of those authors, as some parts of their work cause me some

discomfort (if my theoretical biases should be taken into consideration), but all of them, in one way or another, have instigated me and made me willing to make a contribution to the field of BFPA.

A relevant contemporary constructivist approach on Brazilian identity, this time inspired by role theory, is Guimarães's (2020). To explain Brazil's so-called 'ambivalent sense of well-placement and uneasiness within Latin America and the West' the author created a model for Brazil's identity-set. It is composed by three overlapping layers: the first one comprised of historical national identity (such as the Portuguese-Brazilian and Americanism); the second are institutional identities of foreign policy concepts built in the 1950s and 1960s, such as 'autonomy', Third World country and connection to African countries; the third and least institutionalized one is comprised by the use of various contemporary roles built upon the previous levels, such as non-Western power, regional leader, middle power, and emerging power. According to the author, Itamaraty "[...] [has] managed to create a complex identity repertoire in which multiple contradicting identities coexist, especially about Brazil's role in Latin America and the West" (GUIMARÃES, 2020, p. 4).

Though presenting a very insightful approach, Guimarães (2020) to some extent seems to reinforce the idea of levels of analysis. By corresponding the construction of its identity layers to Brazil's mainstream historical narratives, the author appears to reproduce Wendt's idea that a state corporate identity is ontologically anterior and separated from the international identity and roles the country can play. This interpretation might be possible when considering that the roles that are above, or more recent, are portrayed as more fluid, open to negotiation and interaction in the 'international'; while the older ones (more related to domestic issues) seem to be more solid and less open to social construction and change through interaction.

Moreover, the presupposition in Wendt (ZESHFUSS, 2001) and reproduced by many BFPA analysts that all States (in this case the Brazilian state) seek 'autonomy' comes usually from two possibilities. The first is an ontological reading of the international system as anarchic based on the potential war against all. The second is

the perspective of International Political Economy approaches, either Dependency Theory or ECLAC's developmentalism of the 1960s and 1970s. The use of the term 'autonomy' until the end of the 1970s has been somewhat a combination of both perceptions – the geopolitical and political economic ones -, but reflecting specific elite interests (LIMA, 2018). It has worked in favor of defending Itamaraty's bureaucratic independence, the supposed special status of Foreign Policy as state politics (PINHEIRO, 2000), and the direct connection of the term, or signifier, 'autonomy' to the signifier 'development' has played a central role in this discursive construction.

The relevance of the signifier 'autonomy' has also fueled the emergence of the idea of analyzing Brazil as a 'middle power' or an 'intermediate state'. As mentioned before, those concepts have also played a major role in analysts' narratives on Brazil in the 2000's (HIRST; LIMA, 2006; ALDEN; MORPHET; VIEIRA, 2010).

Nonetheless, as I will argue, terms such as 'autonomy' lack a critical approach that understands them not as theoretical concepts, but as sliding/shifting signifiers (Stavrakakis, 2007) that have their meaning constructed through discourse, including BFPA. Differently from what I propose here, most analysts have been trying to define and fix their meaning according to Brazil's history and socioeconomic experiences.

Also presenting an intriguing approach, and probably moved by a similar discomfort as mine, Lima (2018) tries to define 'autonomy', one of those important terms for BFPA. Lima describes that, differently from the dominant interpretation between BFP analysts, the moments in which there was a prevalence of an autonomist orientation in BFPA were exceptional. For her, in the post-Second World War, the autonomist movements were actually the *points of rupture, not of continuity*, such as Jânio Quadros-João Goulart 'independent foreign policy'; Ernesto Geisel's and the foreign minister Azeredo da Silveira's 'responsible pragmatism'; and Lula da Silva's and the foreign minister Celso Amorim's 'active and proud foreign policy'.

Lima (2018) describes that this perception of continuity happens due to the maintenance of the same model of international economic insertion for approximately

40 years and the prevalence of a *foreign policy of prestige* responding to Brazil's diplomacy ambition of acquiring protagonism in the multilateral realm. Nonetheless, according to Lima's categorizing, the *foreign policy of prestige* was restricted to matters of trade and development and presented varying levels of adhesion towards the international status quo, not presenting a strong contestation towards that order. Citing Morgenthau (1971, p. 67-82) for the concept of *foreign policy of prestige*, Lima (2018, p. 41) mentions that it consists of demonstrating or building a reputation of power and performance to impress other nations, and one of its means is through diplomatic ceremonials.

In the current days, the *foreign policy of prestige* could be interpreted as the search for a strong multilateral presence as means for acquiring soft power, substituting its lack of hard power. Thus, for her, what has been interpreted as a search for 'autonomy' is actually a typical (realist) sought for prestige of a country located in the world's periphery and desiring to acquire recognition from great powers and special places which would distinguish it from similar and neighboring countries. For Lima (2018, p. 41-42), such ambition has also guided the empire's foreign policy, as well as Rio Branco's administration during the 'old Republic'. Under her perspective, this sought for recognition from the great powers was, for the political elites during the empire and the first republic, a quest for prestige that would, following their desire, result in a permanent position at the League of Nations or, later, at the United Nations Security Council.

Defining what an actual autonomist foreign policy requires, Lima (2018, p. 42) points out the requisites according to her own parameters: first, ambition of international protagonism allied with some degree of contestation of global rules; second, a long-term geopolitical view regarding international relations and the North-South divide; third, a perspective of active solidarity with its southern peers and of integration with the neighbors of the region. Following her proposed criteria, neither Getúlio Vargas' dual foreign policy, nor Geisel's responsible pragmatism would qualify for an autonomist classification, as in the last one the solidarity with Southern

partners had an instrumental bias, mainly restricted to multilateral arenas on matters of trade and development, while no real relevance was given to the region.

Hence, for her, what has endured, since the 1950s and 1960s has been the active presence of Brazil in multilateral fora of trade and development, with some specific moments of leadership in G-77, presenting a *mediator role between North and South* interests. The ‘role of mediator’ encompasses not only promoting leadership of Southern countries in negotiation processes, but also to be willing to make concessions and play a balancing role between the North and the South, exercising what she calls ‘pragmatic realism’, allowing for concessions to guarantee its influence. This would characterize Brazil as a *bridge-builder*, a mediator, allowing for both the adhesion of international regimes as well as a claim for reforms. (LIMA, 2018, p. 42)

Even though we have different perceptions regarding autonomy either as a concept, which can be defined, or a sliding signifier - which cannot - there is an important conclusion of her work that will be insightful to the analysis proposed in this thesis. According to her, the endurance of a *foreign policy of prestige* happened due to the support of the ruling elites, the same which have positioned themselves against autonomist foreign policy projects, which have been faced with conservative turns: both Jânio Quadros-João Goulart (1961-1964) and Lula da Silva-Dilma Rousseff (2003-2016) have been interrupted by conservative forces, in 1964 with the civilian-military coup and in 2016 with the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff and later the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018. For Lima, PT’s ‘autonomous’ foreign policy could be considered an “[...] external projection of its policies of social inclusion in the domestic realm. Its domestic politicization was a consequence of this linking.” (LIMA, 2018, p. 49, my translation) Presenting more solidarity towards its Southern peers and Latin American neighbors, Brazil would have gone beyond its traditional acting only in multilateral realms and provoked an elite reaction against its move. (LIMA, 2018)

On the limits of Lima’s work, which resonates also with Vigevani and Cepaluni, Jaguaribe, Gelson Fonseca, Celso Lafer and other canons of BFP, I highlight the understanding of foreign policy and the approach towards the studies on FPA:

“Therefore, a reformulation of neoclassical realism is proposed, which in this approach is most relevant, namely the combination of systemic and domestic factors - in particular the idea that foreign policy is at the intersection of domestic and international politics. This double face of foreign policy - not only public policy generated within the State and later input of international politics, but also conditioned by the asymmetric order in which it is inserted, combining the functioning of the system of States and global capitalism - gives agency to the foreign policy, even in the context of relative subordination to those systemic injunctions” (LIMA, 2018, p. 45, my translation).

Further on, Lima continues:

“After all, foreign policy consists of the *external projection of the concept of country elaborated at the internal level*. The policy of autonomous bias of the governments led by PT can thus be considered the external projection of its policy of social inclusion at the domestic level. Its domestic politicization was a consequence of this link” (LIMA, 2018, p. 48, my translation, emphasis added).

Lima (2018) reinforces the idea of foreign policy as an *external projection* of a concept of country elaborated at the *internal level*, as if those realms are separated (and exist without each other). She also speaks as if the internal came first, and then there was a moment in which the States encountered each other and rationally projected their ‘concept of country’ (or the corporate identity, in Wendtian terms). This so-called ‘concept of country’ contains, between other things, the country’s interests, which are always pragmatically obtained, established through a cost-benefit/*homo economicus calculus*, speaking for the best interest of the survival and ‘autonomy’ of the country and its elites, probably very close to a Peripheral Realism reading (Escudé, 2020). Their foreign policy choices seek to maximize their objectives given the intersection of these two realms, the domestic and the international, departing from the Realist perception that autonomy is a central sought of foreign policy action given the anarchic character of the international.

1.5. Conclusion

There is a dominant perception over analysts that the BFP under Lula has presented a greater focus in dialogues and cooperation with Southern partners, to some extent reviving the developmentalist narratives of the 1960s and 1970s. Whether it is interpreted as structural change, mild change or continuity is more disputable.

The approaches analyzing change and continuity of BFP under Lula usually have two main parameters or lines of explanations mostly based on the levels of analysis: the systemic analysis and the domestic ones. Though most analysts present a mixture of those approaches, the ones that give a higher relevance to the domestic determinants have found change more often, or in a greater level, than the ones that approached Lula in the systemic level.

Nevertheless, usually, approaches on change and continuity, including the ones considering the domestic elements of BFPA, very often relies on the narratives of the so-called ‘principles’ or elements of ‘identity’ of Brazilian foreign policy – which are deeply related to diplomatic narratives. Among those well-known principles that usually appear as thermometers to identify change or continuity in the literature, are the continuous search for ‘autonomy’ and ‘development’, the role of ‘mediator between the North and the South’, the ‘multilateral’ character of Brazil, the respect of international law, ‘pacifism’, ‘South-Americanism’, ‘pragmatism’, etc.

Trying to move to a critical analysis towards the BFPA cannon and taking the relevance of the diplomatic narratives and their influence in the academic field, I propose that we take an initial look at this excerpt from Celso Amorim’s text:

“Brazil’s international credibility stems, to a large extent, from the *principles* that guide its foreign policy. We are a *peaceful* country, one that abides by *international law* and respects other countries’ *sovereign rights*. We choose to settle our disputes diplomatically – and we encourage others to act in the same way. We see *multilateralism* as the primary means of solving conflicts and making decisions internationally. We uphold Brazilian interests with *pragmatism*, without renouncing our principles and values. *These foreign policy characteristics of ours have been more or less constant over time*. Departures have been rare and short-lived” (AMORIM, 2010, p. 214, emphasis added).

Therefore, as I see it, the argument that the ‘characteristics’ or ‘principles’ that guide Brazil’s foreign policy have been constant over time was a narrative borrowed from the diplomatic service that has also found room in some of the mainstream approaches of BFPA. Nevertheless, how this discursive production is done, how the discourses of the diplomatic and the academic practices relate and inform each other is still a topic little explored by the literature, as well as the knowledge or regimes of truth (in Foucauldian terms) they create.

The analysis or justifications of continuity or change seem to be strongly embedded in these regimes of truth, these ‘principles’ and linear narratives that supposedly constitute BFP throughout its institutional history. Beyond that, those mainstream narratives of BFPA always keep in mind the pragmatism and rationality of the rational choice actors, in a foreign policy that is mainly directed to the ‘international’, or to ‘projecting’ or ‘inserting’ Brazil in this international. To contrast with the mainstream approaches on BFP and Lula’s foreign policy, I would like to highlight in Campbell’s questioning: “how was it that we [...] came to understand foreign policy as the external deployment of instrumental reason on behalf of an unproblematic internal identity situated in an anarchic realm of necessity?” (CAMPBELL, 1992, p. 43).

Therefore, I argue that the way the field analyzes change or continuity might need to be reframed and this might have some implications. Beyond the implications towards the field of FPA and how foreign policy itself is understood, there is also another important element that should be taken into consideration: the authors need to take more seriously how their own work impacts Brazilian identity and historical narratives, having the power to reinforce/reproduce or to put into question Brazilian (possibly colonial and racist) narratives of self and other, of its own ideal of the ego, of its past, present and desired future (and the hierarchies and violence made possible by them). Those elements will be further discussed in the following chapters.

2. Doubting the Brazilian stable self through poststructural FPA: ontological (in)security, affective discourses, and postcolonialism.

2.0. Introduction

As described in the previous chapter, mainstream BFPA as been mainly based on continuity and linear narratives, orbiting terms that can often be taken for granted, like: ‘*pragmatism*’ (LIMA; MOURA, 1982, AYLLÓN, 2006, AMORIM, 2010, RICUPERO, 2017; LIMA, 2005), ‘*autonomy*’ (ALTEMANI, 2005; VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007; AMORIM, 2010; SPEKTOR, 2014), ‘*multilateralism*’ (ALTEMANI, 2005; LIMA, 2005; BREDASANTOS, 2002, AMORIM, 2010, RICUPERO, 2017), ‘*development*’ (ALTEMANI, 2005; VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007; CERVO, 2008; AMORIM, 2010; JAGUARIBE, 2008, RICUPERO, 2017).

Furthermore, a rather insulated, largely unrepresentative, and highly institutionalized Ministry of External Affairs would predispose for a relatively unequivocal analysis centralized in the institution. This perception is also reinforced considering that international agreements are autonomously negotiated and signed by the minister or diplomat in charge and have an ex-post approval in Brazil, a procedure that increases the political costs of non-ratification. (PINHEIRO 2005; FARIAS; RAMANZINI JÚNIOR, 2014; CARMO; FARIAS, 2018)

The BFPA field, by its turn, has its logic and even its terminology still highly compatible to what is being observed at the diplomatic level. Beyond that, a policy-oriented line in BFPA reflects a low engagement with FPA as a field, which, as it has been mentioned, has been focused also in presenting larger dialogues with theory. This character of BFPA can be understood by the close links between academics and diplomats in IR, dating back to the very initial structuring of the field in Brazil (CHEIBUB, 1985; PINHEIRO; VEDOVÉLI, 2012, CERVO, 2014).

Considering the presuppositions that lie at the foundations of narratives of linearity and stability, it can be noticed that BFPA have unspoken theoretical assumptions (SMITH, 2011) mainly dominated by a Realist ontology (LIMA, 1994; SARAIVA, 2000), such as the belief that Brazilian external actions are somewhat intentional, rational, manifesting a rather cohesive and pragmatic ‘individual’, and reflecting well defined national interests (of development and autonomy, mainly sought through multilateralism or industrialization) and, to some extent, if even mentioned, a consistent national identity.

As Smith (2011) describes, one of the major weaknesses observed in foreign policy studies is the ‘myth of the national interest’, which, according to the author is very imprecise and, thus, can be framed to mean whatever the user wants. (See also WELDS, 1996 and WENDT, 1999). Such a belief in the ‘myth of national interest’ can be highly observed in BFP tradition. The myth of national interest in Brazilian foreign policy tradition can be described, as previously discussed, by an always-pragmatic pursuit of autonomy and development in Brazilian foreign policy actions and, even though the context or the means to achieve such objectives could change, those principles would remain fairly unchanged (e.g. VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007).

It is possible to notice that, under such a narrative, almost any foreign policy action could be framed or narrated under a ‘pragmatic’, ‘rational’ or ‘national interest’ perspective. Hence, to be able to actually understand reasons for action, the observer (or the researcher) might need to go deeper and understand the underlying perceptions that would explain why a specific policy is understood as pragmatic and seeking development or autonomy in a determined period of time. In that regard, the constructive turn describes the importance of the study of identities to understand behavior, as they would be the very determinant of State’s interests (WENDT, 1992).

Identities seem to be one of the great concepts, if not the great concept, that has marked IR theorizing in the last decades. (SOLOMON, 2015). In this context, FPA approaches, following the constructivist turn, point to very different possibilities to what has been mostly described and reinforced by BFP tradition so far, as it puts into

question and creates doubt over the stability of identities, and those big narratives of continuity and linearity. According to Goff and Dunn (2004, p. 4), identities need alterity to be built (or difference, the relationship with the ‘other’); they are inherently fluid and dynamic (always in the making); identities are multiple (refer to different possible subject positions for the same ‘self’); and they are socially constructed (or intersubjective).

One of the greater divergences among analysts has been the role of language in the formation of identities and if they have a more stable or unstable character once they are constituted (SOLOMON, 2015). The central role of language and the mainly unstable nature of identities has been emphasized by post-structuralists, whose approach is followed here. Nevertheless, the employment of a Lacanian theory of the subject allows for understanding why some identities and some discursive constructions are more stable than others, not abandoning a discursive construction of reality. The reason is the affective investments or libidinal attachments over identity and their anchor terms (master signifiers), that provides the individual with a (partial/incomplete) sense of wholeness and stability to individuals and masses that are ontologically insecure.

Those elements will be further discussed in this chapter in an introductory take (to be further developed in the following chapters), 1) through an initial dialogue to the post-structuralist FPA through Campbell’s (1992) ideas; 2) by an introduction of the affective dimension of the signifiers and identities; leading to 3) an introduction to concepts of ontological insecurity and postcolonialism, regarding their compatibility and possible close relations with each other, which will be among the central elements guiding the approach followed here.

2.1. Postructuralism in foreign policy analysis

The mainstream approaches in IR present a conventional understanding of foreign policy as being the “external orientation of pre-established states with fixed identities” (CAMPBELL, 1992, p. 18). In that regard, those approaches analyze the ‘foreign’ as something that is ‘external’ to the state, to which we distinguish the ‘inside’ and to which the foreign policy acts as a bridge between the inside and the outside. (ROSENAU, 1987 apud CAMPBELL, 1992).

Presenting a critical perspective on Foreign Policy, Campbell (1992) describes that the majority of the conventional approaches on nation and state considers the identity of a ‘people’ as the legitimacy basis of the State. However, what the studies on historical sociology tell us is that the State usually precedes the nation. In this context, for Campbell “nationalism is a construct of the state in pursuit of its legitimacy” (1992, p. 11). Therefore, a critical approach on foreign policy understands that the discourses of differentiation and exclusion (or foreign policy discourses) that establish what is ‘us’ and what is the ‘other’ actually constitute and legitimize the very being of the state. In that regard, according to Campbell:

“[...] meaning and identity are, therefore, always the consequence of a relationship between the self and the other which emerges through the imposition of an interpretation, rather than being the product of uncovering an exclusive domain with its own pre-established identity” (CAMPBELL, 1992, p. 24).

In that regard, “[t]he construction of the ‘foreign’ is made possible by practices that also constitute the ‘domestic’” (CAMPBELL, 1992, p. 69) thus, foreign policy is a political narrative which produces and reinforces boundaries. In contrast, mainstream approaches, that rely either on the arguments that the domestic determines the international action or that international constraints can explain external behavior, understand that “[...] the domestic and the international realms exist prior to history and politics” (CAMPBELL, 1992, p. 69), existing independently from each other.

Thus, IR as discipline has mainly understood foreign policy as the external enactment of instrumental reason “[...] on behalf of an unproblematic internal identity situated in an anarchic realm of necessity [...]” (CAMPBELL, 1992, p. 43)

Nonetheless, for Campbell, there is no such thing as stable national identities and that, *Foreign Policy* should be understood as “[...] the reproduction of an unstable identity at the level of the state, and the containment of challenges to that identity.” (CAMPBELL, 1992, p. 78) He understands that there are no securely grounded national identities prior to foreign relations, which promotes a radical shift in the understanding of foreign policy:

“Foreign policy shifts *from* a concern of relations *between* states which takes place *across* ahistorical, frozen and pre-given boundaries, *to* a concern with *the establishment of the boundaries* that constitute, at one and the same time, the 'state' and 'the international system’” (CAMPBELL, 1992, p. 69).

Campbell (1992), therefore, introduces an important differentiation between Foreign Policy, or what we understand as the official Foreign Policy, of the official political discourses, treaties, meetings, etc; and the foreign policy as every practice of frontier construction of who/what is domestic and who/what is international. Those elements play a central role in my thesis and will be further developed in the following chapter.

Concerning the Lula period, the mainstream in BFP approaches analyze it in a framework of continuity or change and, while finding that there was greater focus on South-South relations and rhetoric, there is no consensus on whether it constituted a structural change or not. However, the discussions of change and continuity are based on those narratives of the main principles of BFP, idealized by Itamaraty, with foreign policy seen through a lens of politics of State (not of government) and, thus, reflects Brazil's *national interests*. Under that perception, BFP should be mainly marked by continuity, and the adjustments would only refer to contextual and international changes.

Authors arguing for change and non-linearity usually take into consideration foreign policy analysis approaches, such as Allison's (1969), Putnam's (2010), and Carlsnaes' (2008), considering that there is a tendency for inclusion of new actors in the foreign policy making in Brazil - due to democratization and globalization

processes. This is argued to have impacted the narratives of continuity and change, introducing new complexification factors in the foreign policy making, making it more susceptible to domestic and governmental oscillations. (CASON; POWER, 2009; PINHEIRO; MILANI, 2013; RAMANZINI JÚNIOR; FARIAS, 2016)

Though I consider this move necessary and I try to bring it into my analysis, the present thesis will not be following this (already critical) approach over the bureaucratic disputes of BFP. Instead, I propose we look at the move of critical and poststructural foreign policy analysis in Campbell (1992) and Hansen (2006) as a starting point for my theoretical framework. Those authors allow me to consider, in the process of FPA, the possibilities of multiple and fractured identities, always in the making, and how they could give different answers about State behavior, also giving special attention to the other way around: how state foreign policy narratives influences in the building of collective identities and imaginaries?

Thus, the kind of analysis proposed here might offer different ways to assess change or continuity in foreign policy, ways that have been overlooked so far in BFPA and that could offer different answers, as well. This position can also be explained by the use of narratives of behavior to understand change can be questioned and needs further assessment, as behavior can be re-written and narrated as being continuous, according to the interests and preferences that motivate the narrative.

Consequently, what this thesis does is exactly put into question the naturalized Brazilian foreign policy discourses based on its 'principles' or its 'identity', terms and biographical narratives which have been analyzed by the mainstream literature as somewhat coherent and stable, with little questioned elements and terminologies. This work aims to go the other way around, to desecuritize and politicize BFP widely accepted discourses and expose the underlying and unquestioned assumptions behind them.

2.2. The affective dimension of discourse and identity

Investigating why some discourses and social constructs are more compelling than others, Ty Solomon (2015) integrates a group of IR theorists that understands the relevance of a look towards psychoanalysis. Though many IR theorists consider that identities are socially constructed, or even discursive, they usually stop there and do not explore the mechanisms through which some discourses or identities are more politically enduring or resonate more than others. Furthermore, arguing that people seek security through collective identities, for example, does not explain why it happens that way. Taking those questions seriously, the theory of the subject of Jacques Lacan and its political implications can offer an insightful ontology without just falling into a simplistic Realist ontology of the subject in which all seek security just because it is how the world works (without showing the mechanisms behind it). Beyond that, a conventional psychological approach, due to its focus on the individual level, might not be able to analyze mass-based effects of a discourse and explain how/why a political discourse resonates more than others (SOLOMON, 2015, p. 20). According to him:

“how exactly is the discourse’s contingency rendered invisible? And how is this invisibility of contingency politically maintained? In this sense, most IR constructivist and discourse analyses tend to skip over this crucial move, first emphasizing a context of struggle between different discourses vying for dominance and then analyzing the particular discourse which has already “won”—yet without offering a satisfactory analytical accounting of this accomplishment. This study spotlights and unpacks this key move. Lacanian theory suggests that it is possible to take further steps here regarding the power of language, both theoretically and empirically. Although these existing IR theories rightly expose the taken-for-grantedness of powerful discourses, there must also be a focus on how a discourse appeals to or resonates with audiences. Put differently, can a theory of discourse and identity offer an account of how a discourse “grips its subjects, of how ideology exerts its hold over us,” given its historical contingency?” (SOLOMON, 2015, p. 18, reference omitted).

A psychoanalytic approach, thus, allows for a poststructuralist position in which every identity is contingent, but also understanding the mechanisms why they do not

change all the time. Therefore, “Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory is far from simply a theory of the individual and is much more about how people relate to broader collective-level symbolic processes. In this sense, it is a social-psychoanalytical model of the subject” (SOLOMON, 2015, p. 25). Psychoanalysis, therefore, reinforces the affective dimension, or the libidinal investment, of and over identities (SANDRIN, 2020).

To reflect over it, let us first analyze Freud’s concept of libido:

“Libido' is an expression derived from the theory of affectivity. We call it the energy considered as a quantitative quantity - even if for the moment it is not measurable - of those impulses that have to do with everything that we can gather under the category of 'love'. The nucleus of what we call love naturally consists of what is habitually called love and what the poets sing about, sexual love with the goal of sexual union. But we do not separate from this other things that also take part in the term 'love'; on the one hand, self-love, and on the other, parental love and filial love, friendship and universal love of neighbor, nor dedication to concrete objects and abstract ideas” (FREUD, 2013, my translation, p.74).

According to Freud (2013), the amplified conception of love in psychoanalysis is not original and was there already in Plato’s eros. Freud argues that the love relationships and the emotional connections are the essence of the psyche of the masses. For him, what keeps the masses cohesive is eros, libido, love. Through it, the individual in a mass of people renounces her singularities and lets others suggest her. What exists in this subject is a need to be in harmony with the mass and to be equally loved, to the same amount as everyone else in the mass, by their leader. (FREUD, 2013)

This need, in Freud, comes from libido and from the horde instinct of the human being: “[a]ll the individuals must be equals amongst each other [except the leader], but all want to be governed by only one. Many equals that can identify with each other, and only one superior to all, this is the situation found in the mass that is capable of surviving” (FREUD, 2013, p. 128, my translation).

Nonetheless, Mouffe (2015) and Sandrin (2020) remind us of a complementary definition of libido presented by Freud: “It is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestation of their aggressiveness” (FREUD 1962, p. 61 apud SANDRIN 2020, p. 3)

If humans are beings permeated by libido, by (not only, but also) a need to be led, loved and to belong to groups (united against external others), the mainstream approaches towards individuals as mainly rational beings, moved by the maximization of their own interests, acting in the world in a basically operational way are considerably limited. Another contradicting approach, related to the first one, is the idea that the political debate is a field where we can apply morality and reach a moral consensus through free discussion (MOUFFE, 2015, p. 12-13). Differently, in political life, there is no totally inclusive rational consensus as interests are distributive.

Citing Elias Canetti, Mouffe (2015) describes that there is both an impulse to individuality/singularity and the impulse of losing oneself in fusion with the masses. According to her:

“[t]he refusal to accept this [later] tendency is at the origin of the incapacity of the rationalist approach to deal with mass movements of political nature, which it tends to consider as an expression of irrational forces or a “return towards the archaic”. On the contraire, if we accept, alongside Canetti, that the attraction towards the masses will always be with us, we have to approach democratic politics in a different way, dealing with the problem of how to mobilize it without threatening the democratic institutions” (MOUFFE, 2015, p.22-23, my translation).

In this context, Mouffe argues that the dimension at stake is what she calls ‘passions’, which is ‘the various emotional impulses that find their origin in forms of collective identification.’(MOUFFE, 2015, p.23, my translation) As it is observable, what Mouffe calls ‘passions’ is very close to what Freud understands as libido, and what other authors call ‘libidinal investments’ and ‘affective investments/attachments’ (SANDRIN, 2020; SOLOMON 2015).

While recognizing that ‘the political’ is permeated by conflict and disputes, instead of antagonism (in which each side aims to destroy the other, as in Carl Schmitt’s approach), Chantal Mouffe (2015, p. 19) proposes the idea of agonism. Agonism is a relationship of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ in which both parts, though knowing that there might not be rational or consensual solutions for their disputes, recognize the legitimacy of their opponents, this time as adversaries, not as enemies. Therefore, radicalizing democracy also encompasses transforming antagonism in agonism (MOUFFE, 2015).

In Lacan, the Freudian libido is reframed as *jouissance*, or enjoyment, which can be defined as ‘a satisfaction so excessive and charged that it becomes painful’ (STAVRAKAKIS 2007, p. 195, apud SANDRIN, 2020, p. 3). It is closely related to desire¹⁸ and anxiety. According to Kinnvall and Mitzen:

“this is the anxiety associated with primary differentiation, as the infant discovers it is separate from the caregiver. Awareness of separateness means the infant can no longer be certain its needs will be met, or that it will not be harmed, and so on. In Lacanian terms, ontological anxiety results from the split between the inner world of the infant and the symbolic order that pre-exists it” (KINNVALL; MITZEN, 2020, p. 245).

Considering a discursive ontology, Lacanian psychoanalysis understands that we all become subjects when we enter the symbolic order - the realm of words and speech. Psychoanalysis understands that it happens in the same phase that the child starts recognizing itself as an individual, separated from the mother or the other main figure taking care of her. However, entering the symbolic order is also losing touch with the real - a realm that is not intermediated by language - as well as understanding itself as a lacking subject. The subject in Lacan is a subject of lack. This lack generates an

¹⁸ According to Bruce Fink, in Lacan: “*Desire, strictly speaking, has no object*. In its essence, desire is a constant search for something else, and there is no specifiable object that is capable of satisfying it, in other words, extinguishing it. Desire is fundamentally caught up in the dialectical *movement* of one signifier to the next, and is diametrically opposed to fixation. It does not seek satisfaction, but rather its own continuation and furtherance: more desire, greater desire! It wishes merely to go on desiring.” (FINK, 1997, p.90-91)

anxiety and a desire of the subject to feel whole again (STAVRAKAKIS, 2007; FINK, 1997).

The subject seeks representation and a sense of wholeness in the symbolic order, seeking signifiers - words, terms - to which she can identify with. Nonetheless, the words, or signifiers, as the identities, cannot fill the task, as they do not have an essential and truthful meaning. As Sandrin (2020) argues, the signifiers are also lacking. In the chain in which the signifiers are inserted, there will always be missing a signifier to complete it. Then, the subject will endlessly engage in identification processes, aiming to fill the lack and finally feel complete, finding its enjoyment (SOLOMON, 2015; SANDRIN, 2020).

2.3. Ontological (in)security

Ontological security studies in IR draw upon contributions from psychoanalysis by RD Laing (1990) and sociology by Anthony Giddens (1991) (KINNVALL; MITZEN, 2017, p. 4). Differently from mainstream approaches in IR, it includes as a main concern of the State the ‘security as being’, which means the concern with subjectivity, not just the familiar concern of physical safety of ‘security as survival’ (GIDDENS, 1991 apud KINNVALL; MITZEN, 2017, p. 3). Ontological security studies assume that “[...] all social actors need a stable sense of self in order to realize a sense of agency” (KINNVALL; MITZEN, 2017, p. 3), both through biographical continuity and through recognition from their relations with others.

According to Croft and Vaughan-Williams (2017, p. 15), an individual will only be ontologically secure if certain elements are taken for granted, described as ‘the natural attitude’ by Giddens (1991). The natural attitude ‘brackets out questions about ourselves, others and the object-world which have to be taken for granted in order to keep on with everyday activity’ (GIDDENS, 1991, p. 37 apud CROFT; VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS, 2017, p. 15). Further, Ontological Security Theories talk about

individuals who are inserted in a world with previous social understandings established intersubjectively.

Croft and Vaughan-Williams (2017) describe four intersubjective elements, which are essential to understand ontological security: a biographical continuity, a cocoon of trust relations, self-integrity and dread. Thus, “when the relationships and understandings that actors rely on become destabilized, on the other hand, ontological security is threatened, and the result may be anxiety, paralysis or violence” (KINNVALL; MITZEN, 2017, p. 3).

In this thesis, I assume that foreign policy narratives seeking ontological security through identity discourses can be also directed to the ‘inside’, to nationals, as well as “externally directed, seeking recognition from perceived salient peers, though their relative importance may vary depending on context” (BROWNING, 2015, p. 199).

Ontological security theories assume that a state of disruption on the ground bases of ontological security can jeopardize an individual’s self-identity, or its “ability to sustain a linear narrative and answer questions about doing, acting and being” (KINNVALL; MITZEN, 2017, p. 7). Regarding states – not individuals – one needs to be cautious to apply such a framework, as it assumes a capacity of self-reflexivity. As I do not follow a perspective that deals with the state as a rational unitary actor, some elements need to be taken into consideration to make this movement of applying ontological security discussions to Brazilian foreign policy studies.

First, the expectation of a cohesive self can be unrealistic even if applied to individuals. In modern times, the state can be seen as one of the main ontological security providers for individuals (KINNVALL; MITZEN, 2017, p. 8). It is important to keep in mind what Ashley (1988) calls the ‘heroic practice’ of the state, made through the threat of anarchy, part of the realist imaginary of International Relations. By leaving anarchy at the ‘outside’ the state is seen as a hero, and nationalism can be reinterpreted as one of the main tools to promote individuals’ sense of ontological

security. However, under a critical postmodern perspective, ontological insecurity is inherent to any individual or actor. According to Browning:

“[...] nationalism, like religion, appeals to the desire that our identity be historically anchored. Nationalism can provide people with a sense of continuity, stability, and safety even when other aspects of their personal life may be fragmenting (Kinnvall 2004:742–4). Indeed, citizens frequently expect their political leaders to provide reassurance with respect to the unfolding of their everyday lives. Beyond demands for welfare and physical safety, political leaders are expected to provide a coherent narrative of society, its nature and place in the world, through the outlining of a sense of national mission and purpose” (BROWNING, 2015, p. 198, reference omitted).

In a rather different take from Giddens’ sociology, it is important to consider Ontological security literatures which are based in Lacanian psychology applied to social sciences. Such a take would allow the differentiation between ‘identity’ and ‘self’, which is not possible under Giddens. Thus, considering a Lacanian perspective, Epstein (2010) describes that, in individuals:

“[...] that unified self is, in a Lacanian perspective, nothing more than an imaginary construct that the individual needs to believe in to compensate for a constitutive lack that lies at the core of her (or his) identity. That underlies the concept of identity is in fact a dynamic process of *identification* by which the individual makes up for this lack and in so doing, makes herself” (EPSTEIN, 2011, p. 334).

Seen from this perspective, there is no cohesive self. The subject is fundamentally split and there will always be a fundamental lack, as the process of identity construction is mediated by language. The pre-social is speechless and words are social facts, hence, there are no identities prior to the process of social interaction, as Wendt’s constructivism would like us to believe (ZEHFUSS, 2001). In that regard, Epstein describes that: “In Lacan’s analysis, the social work or symbolic order, is centrally constitutive of identity. What makes identity possible in the first place is the individual’s inscription into the symbolic order, the process by which she becomes a

discursive subject [...]” (EPSTEIN, 2011, p. 336). Therefore, this could also apply to a collective subject, such as “Brazil”. By applying the Lacanian point in IR, she writes:

“[...] the making of the self is a narrative act [...] [and] it is premised on a fundamental loss. Alienation within the symbolic order is a basic condition of the formation of the subjectivity and agency. For that order is initially alien to the individual, to the subject of desire: the symbolic order is the order of the Other” (EPSTEIN, 2011, p. 336).

Epstein (2011, p. 336) summarizes that this loss, or fundamental alienation through the language of the Other: “[...] is precisely the lack that lies at the heart of identity. It is also what defeats the possibility of a closed, cohesive self” (EPSTEIN, 2011, p. 336). Thus, “[...] the ‘self-other’ relationship is constitutive of identity [...]”. Rather, the relationship with the other is the very site where its original identity takes shape.” (EPSTEIN, 2011, p. 337). The author then suggests that dealing with states it would be more appropriate to use the term *identifications* rather than identities, which serves not only to demonstrate its dynamic nature, but also to highlight that it will be a perpetual and impossible search for compensation for an inherent lack.

Nevertheless, the kind of approach I am proposing here, though flirting with postmodern approaches, I will not assume from the start that identity and ontological security discourses only happen through the management of difference and fear. The construction of ‘the Other’ is still central to the analysis and the building of ‘the Self’, but I understand a need to look with more attention to the construction ‘friendships’, ‘groups’ or ‘significant others’ and why some differences or otherness between allies or friends can be ‘respected’ instead interpreted as a source of fear. According to Browning and Joenniemi:

“[...] Explicitly linking friendship to ontological security Berenskoetter (2010) therefore views ‘friendship as a particular and morally significant relationship ... [that] ... strengthens moral certainty and the sense of what is “the right thing to do”... friendship matters because it molds and reinforces “identity”, or the sense of Self” (BROWNING; JOENNIEMI, 2017, p. 42).

Hence, the ontological security framework has also an intimate link with recognition dynamics, as “selves are not simply ascribed with subjectivity, it [subjectivity] rather needs to be continually claimed, fought for, performed and articulated.” (BROWNING; JOENNIEMI, 2017, p. 42) According to that and considering states also pursue social security, or a security as members of the international society, Subotic affirms:

“It is not enough for states to feel secure in their view of self; they also need to feel secure in the company of other states (for example, by being considered “European,” “modern,” or “democratic”). Narratives help provide these securities during challenging times” (SUBOTIC, 2016, p. 616).

The second movement that must be kept in mind is that the state does not have a self, but it speaks, it has spokespersons and interlocutors. If we consider the making of the self as a narrative act, it might be possible to grasp what kind of identity – or identification discourses (EPSTEIN, 2011), – State representatives have been using to manage the state’s ontological (in)security. Taking the argument further, it is possible to say that ‘the state’ does not only *use* biographical narratives to pursue certain policies, but to consider that states *are* biographical narratives themselves. (BERENSKOETTER, 2014 apud SUBOTIC 2016, p. 614)

Third, even if identities – and state identity discourses - are always in the making, it does not mean that there cannot be some stability or some recurrent identity discourses. This happens because “a coherent narrative can include all sorts of change as long as a sensible link from ‘before’ to ‘after’ is maintained” (BERENSKOETTER 2014, p. 279 apud SUBOTIC 2016, p. 614). Another consequence of this perspective that needs to be taken into consideration is that narratives are fundamentally normative:

“They carry a desire for a particular social order and a particular set of social practices and policies. This is why we cannot understand state behavior if we do not understand what is the normative narrative underpinning of the policy choices actors make” (SUBOTIC, 216, p. 613).

Hence, according to Subotic (2016, p. 615), the state narrative is complex and multidimensional and, due to its character, states can selectively activate or deactivate determined narratives in times of great ontological stress. Citing Wertsch (2008) idea of ‘schematic narrative templates’, Subotic describes:

“I want to show how multiple individual historical narratives can merge into one, larger, narrative, which then becomes a frame for understanding both the past and the present in a simplified, schematic, and linear fashion. These larger narratives are used in “unreflective, unanalytical, and unwitting manner” (Bartlett 1995:45 in Wertsch 2008:124) and are particularly prone to state control, production, and consumption. They represent basic plotlines for the most significant events of a state’s history [...]” (SUBOTIC, 216, p. 615)

The fourth and last movement proposed here is that the ‘self’ needs to be apart – and, thus, considered different – from identity discourses, which is different from Giddens (1991) approach. As Browning and Joenniemi (2017, p. 38) highlight, the importance in dissociating ontological security from identity and to retain an emphasis on the reflexive self lies in avoiding a focus in an agenda of identity-stability, which could promote a naturalization of the “state’s need to seek and sustain the intactness and consistency of its identity [which] could dangerously depoliticize the act of protecting a biographical narrative of the state [...]” (Browning and Joenniemi, 2017, p. 38).

Hence, regarding identity “as a constantly dynamic and performative practice that connects an individual to a continuously changing social setting” (KRISHNA, 2002), this work also considers the relevance of keeping identity and ontological security as two different ideas. According to Browning and Joenniemi, identities can be understood “as crucial elements in the self’s attempts at achieving it [ontological security],” (2017, p. 32) and, instead of dealing with ‘self’ and ‘identity’ as synonyms, they suggest that “ontological security analysis would [...] benefit from analyzing how subjects become connected to particular identities and why they articulate identity claims in the way they do” (BROWNING; JOENNIEMI, 2017, p. 32).

In a similar fashion, Kinnvall (2017, p. 97) describes that “the search for unitary, consistent and singular identities continues to play a crucial part in the linear narratives that people and groups construct in order to make sense of their selves” (KINNVALL, 2017, p. 97). Those statements make me wonder: could these linear narratives in Brazilian foreign policy have been a way to discipline Brazilian latent ontological insecurity?

Thus, this thesis aims to destabilize and denaturalize Brazilian foreign policy discourses, which have been analyzed by the mainstream literature as a somewhat coherent and stable narrative, with unquestioned elements and terminologies. This work aims to go the other way around: to desecuritize and politicize BFP identity discourses and expose the ontological (in)securities that could lie in its foundations. As Croft and Vaughan-Williams (2017, p. 20) describe, ontological secure positions are precarious and highly political, being able to cause securitization of others, being an inherently sacrificial logic. Without such analysis, it is not possible to affirm whether BFP has been marked by continuity or not.

To understand how ontological security structures in Brazil have been causing ontological (in)securities to most Brazilians, Vieira (2018) proposes a very significant move – which inspires many parts of this thesis. The author dialogues Brazilian social thought (mainly through discussions about racism in Brazil); ontological security theorizing under a Lacanian perspective; and post-colonial authors, to state that Brazil has an inherent ontological insecure, or ambiguous, self. This is a very important statement which is also part of the empirical study proposed here.

Considering works such as Vieira’s (2018) and Sandrin’s (2020), It is important to highlight that ontological security studies and Lacanian approaches in IR can profit a lot from dialogues with post-colonialism and, still, such interactions are still very little explored by the literature. While the literature on the Lacanian Subject and Ontological Security are very insightful, they can also be color-blind/colonial-blind or tend to a-historicity if one considers that they are a general ontology that can be applied to every subject or society indistinctly. Hence, as this section presented a literature

review of ontological security theory, the next will be debating post-colonialism and why it could make sense to analyze Brazil as an ambiguous ‘self’ in those grounds.

2.4. Introducing postcolonial discussions through a critical dialogue

Postcolonial thought originated from the study of artistic and fictional works in ex- colonies, with the aim of identifying similarities from a predominantly comparative study methodology (DARBY; PAOLINI, 1994). Postcolonial lines of thought, however, have expanded into various areas of social thought, and, currently, have as one of their main points of concern the relations of domination and resistance in postcolonial peoples, seeking the deconstruction of dominant narratives, and then unmasking political interests in colonial narratives, hidden by labels of credibility such as positivism, the state, development theories, teleological and modernizing narratives, and the realistic theory of international relations.

Thus, post-colonialism is a political project in itself. Yet, It can be identified some differences in post-colonial approaches, which will be briefly mapped in this section. The first movement is the more essentialist and has as its starting point the identification of an antagonistic relation between colonizer and colonized, having as exponents, among others, the works of Fanon and Césaire (FERNÁNDEZ, 2021). These works were produced under a context of political struggle and articulation in favor of the independence of colonial nations and have as their main political project the objective to restore autochthone knowledge, cultures and societies the way they were before colonial domination. (KRISHNA, 2008, DARBY; PAOLINI, 1994)

Postcolonialism, as Poststructuralism and Psychoanalysis, also understands the centrality of the self vs. other relationship to analyze political dynamics, but goes even further on its critical take. According to Césaire “Europe is indefensible [...] morally and spiritually indefensible.” (CÉSAIRE, 2000, p. 15-16, apud FERNÁNDEZ, 2021, p. 35) According to Césaire, Western ‘civilization’ and ‘rationality’ depend on the

invention of a barbarous other against whom they can affirm themselves as such. (FERNÁNDEZ, 2021, p. 38)

Such approaches, however, are sometimes criticized for representing the interests of local political elites, romanticizing the colonized and/or silencing the problem of difference in national territory through a seemingly conciliatory response but representing in itself a colonial and violent movement: The Westphalian national state (BEIER, 2002, INAYATULLAH; BLANEY, 2004).

In this regard, postcolonial approaches located in this first movement are criticized as works that reinforce identity instead of difference, cease to transgress limits and to promote a really international and polyphonic discipline. They are said to be reinforcing an arbitrary division that gives an oversimplified answer to complex problems, limits thought and knowledge over the subject and reproduces poor stereotypes. (ASHLEY; WALKER, 1990) Hence, the very quest against dichotomic thought is taken up by post-structuralism, and some authors are on the borderline between post-structural and post-colonial thinking.

One of the most resonant critics of essentialisms and dichotomist thought in IR is Robert Walker and, willing to historicize this dialogue in question – as it is an attempt of critical reflection –, I will be dealing here with the text “World politics and western reason: universalism, pluralism and hegemony” that, according to him¹⁹, was written in 1980, in response to Said’s *Orientalism* and its repercussions in the debate of IR. Walker (2016) criticizes postcolonialism mainly for its reactionary essentialism relying on nationalism as means to redeem its original cultural traditions (as if colonial subjects lived in a static universe) as means to overcome colonial subjugation. He describes, as well, that western parochialism creates intrinsic limitations to any emancipatory project:

¹⁹ Lecture given at International Political Sociology (IPS) winter school in June 2017, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

“[...] not only will the search for universals in an emerging world order be predicated on the reified universals of a dominant tendency in a dominant but parochial culture, but also that the critique of that process as cultural imperialism will be co-opted into the linguistic categories of that imperialist culture” (WALKER, 2016, p. 50).

Nevertheless, the work of Sayed (2012) describes that post-structuralism origins are also deeply embedded with the colonial movement, which makes her wonder and criticize why current deconstructionist exercises in IR are usually divorced from post-colonial perspectives. Even though exercises trying to trace back the origins of an intellectual movement that disrupts the ideas of origin, originality or essence might be considered contradictory, not historicizing post-structuralism could mean that this kind of intellectual initiative incurs on the same a-historicity and some kind unquestionable questioning, what could make it very detached from some of the main basis of critical theory. Those criticisms are going to be better developed in the next sections.

2.4.1 The hybridist and ‘presentist’ movement in post-colonialism

There is no coming back in time, the colonial encounter cannot be undone and each side in the encounter has already been transformed by it. With that in mind, there is a second movement in post-colonial thought, one that seeks hybridism. This movement is composed of a line of authors that dialogue more intimately with post-structuralism, considering movements in the social sciences and in international relations inspired by Foucault, Derrida, and even Lacan’s works, with exponents in international relations like Richard Ashley, Rob Walker and Der Derian. In IR, this movement is accompanied by a critique of the realist tradition and positivism, stating that it limits ontologically and epistemologically the study of IR with limiting abstractions such as the State and Anarchy and with colonial discourses transposed into scientific truths. The idea, for example, that the Indigenous peoples would be living proof of the existence of the Hobbesian state of nature is, then, criticized not only as a fallacious narrative, but also that it places the Indigenous in a position of temporal

backwardness and material and cultural inferiority (JAHN, 1999; BEIER, 2002; ROJAS, 2016).

In postcolonialism, authors such as Bhabha, Chakrabarty and Spivak can be cited as some of the main exponents of this second movement. Those authors seek to transpose binary and essentialist identities, question teleological/modernizing narratives and linear conceptions of time - approaches that are very common in the discourses of the so-called "Third World" and that were deeply related to whether developmental (as in ECLA's works in the 1960's) or revolutionary (as in dependency theorists in the 1970's) rhetoric and are still an important part of the narrative of the Global South (ALDEN; VIEIRA; MORPHET, 2010; GROVOGUI, 2011; STUENKEL, 2014)

These authors deal with rather complex, hybrid, and presentist (willing to be in the present, not either trying to redeem a frozen – non-existing – past or not trying to achieve some other point of social emancipation in the future) approaches, which consider that there is no prior 'self' essential to the 'colonial' self to be redeemed, but the formation of a third space (BHABHA, 1990). In this sense, Bhabha (1990), while recognizing that there is no resistance outside the colonizer's framework, presents a great contribution by conceiving agency to the subaltern individual and surpassing the essentialization of cultures. The colonized, or the subaltern, has power of agency over the colonizer's discourse, as it has an important role in translating and subverting it to its own culture. In this sense, while the mimicry of discourse reveals a colonial subjection, it also might be a way of resistance, resulting in hybridism or the Third Space (BHABHA, 1990, p. 211).

Then, the result of this hybridist position is not a dialectical synthesis, but a qualitatively different one. Conversely, there is not also a path to be followed and a reality of exploitation that can be overcome, but a constant spectrum of relationship between individuals directly influenced and subjectivated by colonialism. For such authors, modernity is not made in Europe and then expanded to the colonies, but rather it is built through colonialism. In this context, the creation of a culture of imperialism

(SPIVAK, 1999) creates asymmetries of power in the former colony, constituting, on the one hand, a class that has affinity with the culture, ideology and institutions of the colonizer and, on the other, the subaltern, who is excluded from this culture of imperialism and which political elites cannot hear (KRISHNA, 2008, p. 99).

By seeking to privilege the reverse IR's traditional object of study, postcolonialism brings to the center of its agenda the problem of difference (to the detriment of highlighting identities) to which the Westphalian peace myth seeks to silence. Thusly, Inayatullah and Blaney (2004) recall the double movement presented by Todorov in relation to difference, which is realized mainly by the modern state: either difference will be exterminated, since it is inferior to the 'self', or assimilated (converted) Since it is also human, as the 'self'. To change this picture, the authors suggest the recognition of ambiguities internal to the State and that efforts can be made to learn from difference by seeking to look at each other from the learning with the other.

Hybridist postcolonial thought, besides pointing out contradictions, relations of power and difference between the colonized, confers agency to these individuals through mimic, subversion and even mockery in relation to the discourse of the colonizer, since the colonized consists of pre-colonial territory - occupied, and not a shallow slate that will assimilate and reproduce the colonizer's culture. In this sense it is possible to also think how this third space of hybridity also influences the construction of subjectivity of the individual colonizer, previously portrayed as an antagonist one, and that from then on can be thought of in a more complex form.

Those hybridist approaches disrupt traditional imagined geographies, blurring the frontiers between oppressor and oppressed. In that sense, the colonizer also needs the recognition and admiration of the colonized, since he recognizes him as human, as himself, and, kept in due proportion, may also suffer from colonization, since this individual must be the personification of a state strong and masculine (NANDY, 1989), devoid of weaknesses or doubts. The oppressed are no longer geographically limited to the colonial space, but they are also oppressed groups in the colonizing space and

oppressive groups (especially elites that are part of the colonial culture) within the colonial space itself.

There is also some criticism towards poststructuralist critical theory coming from postcolonial theorists. The first is that, despite the fact that deconstruction and poststructuralism have its historical origins directly related with the colonial experience (Sajed, 2012), acknowledging that every theory is made by someone and for some propose (Cox, 1981), poststructuralists currently present de-historicized works regarding their own knowledge historicity. Furthermore, critical theory continues failing to decenter the discipline, and the “native” is still the limit of Western knowledge, as Sajed (2012) describes:

“[...] one of the most significant consequences of conducting poststructuralist research without attention to postcolonial horizons lies in the idealisation of the marginalised, the oppressed or the *native* without attention to the complexity of her position, voice and agency. Within critical attempts in IR at retrieving the *native's* voice this idealization of the *native* as the *other*, the oppressed, and wronged/marginalized subject speaks ironically to the notion that ‘defilement and sanctification belong to the same symbolic order’, which is that of colonial/imperialistic discourse” (SAJED, 2012, p. 143).

Deriving from Sajed’s (2012) critique, an important perception is that even when they are critical or post-positivist, most approaches talking about Eastern or Southern societies usually implicitly assume that the West has an endogenous self-generating immanence able to remake the world as its own image (HOBSON, 2007), thus hiding an Eurocentric view of the world (QUIJANO, 2005) and of roots of modernity (BHAMBRA, 2011; ROJAS, 2016). Despite of not buying the myth of modernity as something that the periphery wants to achieve as it supposedly represents the possibility of emancipation (DUSSEL, 1993) and understanding modernity represents a violent movement, post-structural Eurocentric approaches are not able to conceive the realistic possibilities of scape or of either pluriversal politics (ROJAS, 2016) or an ecology of knowledges (SANTOS, 2007), limiting thoughts of emancipation and the possibilities to think about the future.

In this regard, Sajed (2012) points out and criticizes post-structuralist self-referential projects (inspired mainly by Derrida's deconstruction) as the only possible critical production in IR. Considering the ambiguous place of individuals such as Derrida's, that didn't properly identify himself as Algerian or French, Derrida saw his own act of resistance and excavation of the self in the attempt of subverting the only language he used to speak but that did not belong to his own and did not either carry his people's histories and cosmologies (the monolingualism of the other).

Hence, in open dialogue with poststructuralism, the only possibility of knowledge or belonging happens through language. Thus, the fragmented self that does not identify itself either with the colonizer or with the colonized can finally find its reason of being through the subversion of the monolingualism of the other. Then, as important and as necessary as these initiatives might be, these kinds of self-referential projects limit the possibilities for imagining and understanding postcolonialities and moving beyond a critique of the discipline from within the western modern project. Thus:

“Deconstruction informed by (post)colonial perspectives opens the door to a much needed balance between too narrowly defined oppositional politics – a common criticism advanced by postmodernist approaches against postcolonial endeavors, and analyses that lack groundedness and the deeply politicized positions (stemming from historical contexts) which deconstruction often lacks. [...] a critical project that aims to subvert the discipline of IR by exposing the historicity of its most cherished categories and thus refuting their alleged universality, operates within a dehistoricised framework, unaware of its own colonial legacy. How shall we make sense of this contradiction?” (SAJED, 2012, p. 152).

Therefore, in this work I seek to keep poststructuralism and postcolonialism in close articulation to allow for a critical approach on BFP and BFPA that both takes into account the vulnerability of identities while not being blind to subalternity and how the existing narratives - that we as academics of the field (re)produce - can be embedded in coloniality, racism, patriarchalism, and other diverse forms of subjugation.

2.4.2 Brazil and its hybrid or ambiguous ‘self’

Following a hybridist perspective to understand the constitution of the Brazilian ‘self’, as well as introducing postcolonialism to ontological security studies, Vieira (2018) investigates how Brazilian discourses of racial hybridity in Brazil are “[...] ontological security-seeking moves to accommodate elites’ anxieties over Brazil’s self-inflicted status as an ‘inferior other’” (VIEIRA, 2018, p. 13).

As widely supported by post-colonial literatures (FANON, 1952; SANTOS, 2002; VIEIRA, 2018), racism is an arbitrary and hierarchical categorization of human individuals created with political intentions to legitimize colonial domain (mainly European but not only) over other peoples in the world. Racism was, during a long period in the XIX and early XX centuries, an alleged ‘scientific’ approach, which was claimed to explain underdevelopment and a supposed intellectual superiority of European peoples. Narratives of racial superiority had deep implications in the constitution of post-colonial selves and, alongside with the entire colonial framework, established a colonial self through humiliation and low self-esteem, seeking to be a mirror image of the European colonizer. Still, this mirror image would always be incomplete and distorted (BHABHA, 1990).

Quoting Franz Fanon and Bhaba, Vieira (2018, p. 11) describes that the politics of white assimilation led to the fragmentation of the colonial subject, what “have creatively articulated a hybrid postcolonial self-understanding, merging Western and non-Western identity markers, yet favouring the former, as the significant desired other” (VIEIRA, 2018, p. 4). Vieira concludes that: “[...] the empirical substantiation of postcolonial states’ ontological security derives from the multiple narrative self-articulations representing and demarcating this ambivalent, lacking subjectivity” (VIEIRA, 2018, p. 10).

Even if formal colonialism is long over in countries such as Brazil, its impacts are still present in the national imaginary and in the structure of Brazilian society. Brazilian whitening policies through the stimulation of European migration to the

country (FERREIRA, 2002), represented a first movement in Brazil's racial story in which elites tried to erase, or, at least, hide African heritages in the Brazilian phenotype and cultural manifestations (VIEIRA, 2018; SOUZA, 2017).

At the beginning of the XX century, the key designers of Brazil's diplomacy Barão do Rio Branco and later Joaquim Nabuco, were deeply influenced by such ideas. According to Vieira (2018, p. 14), "Nabuco envisaged a foreign policy centered on close cooperation with the perceived main beneficiary of European modernity, the United States, which he described as an 'immense moral influence in the march of civilization'." (VIEIRA, 2018, p. 14) Hence, ideas of 'Americanism' in Brazilian foreign policy had its roots in racism and colonialism, as the United States started to embody Brazil's very *significant other*, which – albeit similarly passing through colonization – overcame it and achieved a modern industrialized development.

A second moment in Brazil's racial history is *lusotropicalismo*, a moment that draws upon contributions of Gilberto Freyre (2019) and Sergio Buarque de Holanda (1936). (SANTOS, 2002, VIEIRA, 2018; SOUZA, 2017) According to Souza's opinion, there was no 'Brazilian identity' before Freyre's work, and his contributions are still very relevant to contemporary national imaginary. In a move of self-esteem, Freyre's *lusotropicalismo* (followed by Holanda's idea of the Brazilian cordial man) claims that Brazil has a unique contribution to the world as its unique cultural integration and racial miscegenation promoted by the mix between Portuguese, African, Indigenous and other European and Eastern cultures gave birth to a racial democracy, tolerant, 'another West', not only different, but better than Europe and US (VIEIRA, 2018, p. 15).

A different narrative was, then, built, based on the idea of Brazil's post-colonial exceptionalism and, even when engaging in Third World relations from the 1960's, this was the mindset when dealing with African and Asian former colonies (Vieira, 2018, p. 16). The Third World was still the *inferior other*; the one Brazil does not want to look alike. According to Vieira (2018):

“Brazil’s ‘fantasized’ self-narrative of a mixed race and tolerant nation swayed its foreign policy to a different role, as a ‘bridge’ between, what former Brazilian foreign minister Afonso Arinos described in 1965, as a ‘racial curtain’ separating the West and the Third World” (VIEIRA, 2018, p. 16).

Again, it is possible to take from Brazilian social thought about its racial history the foundation of one other well-known concepts of Brazilian foreign policy: Brazil’s role as a bridge between the North and the South (ALTEMANI, 2005; LIMA, 2005) and, further, its great manifest destiny (the country of the future) as a big country, rich in natural resources and a well succeeded experience of Portuguese colonialism. (PAULA, 2016)

According to Vieira (2018), a third significant moment in our racial history is when Brazil, under the Lula government, breaks the myth of racial democracy and introduces in the political discourses some elements that have always been denied, like Brazil’s involvement with slave trafficking, Brazil’s conformity with Portuguese colonialism and Brazil’s structure social racism, which can be seen reflected in the relation between racial groups and illiteracy and poverty in the country (CICALO, 2013; VIERA, 2018; SOUZA, 2017).

Lula’s government reinforces and amplifies policies of racial quotas in Brazil, and, more important than that: supposedly supports a different nation narrative. Brazil stops narrating itself as a country of *pardos*, a category created in the 1970’s to describe the *mestiços* with brown skin (the in-between black and white), and of racial democracy, to be narrated as a *black* country, the second largest in the world after Nigeria. (CICALO, 2013; VIERA, 2018, P. 18; SOUZA, 2017) According to Vieira:

“[considering] Brazil’s mirror-image representations of Western/white superiority. At the symbolic level, Da Silva’s reconfigured desire for non- Western/African signifiers converged with and was reinforced by the re- emergence of the Third World symbolic order (now rebranded as the Global South) that followed the breakdown of the Western liberal consensus of the 1990s” (VIEIRA, 2018:19).

Disrupting a narrative that had been so carefully constructed, strongly reinforced and praised for so long can have caused a stronger sense of ontological insecurity of the Brazilian self. It is important to highlight that, though I consider an ontology where every identity is fractured, I am following Vieira's (2018) assumption of Brazil being highly ontologically insecure especially due to its postcolonial nature.

Thus, a possible disruption in the Foreign Policy discourse could have represented not the end but an intensification of ambiguity. At the same time as Brazil performed as a voice of the developing world, a black nation advocating as never before in favor of the fight against hunger and poverty, it also forgave African debts (using a rhetoric of a historical debt with Africa) while promoting its economic ties with the continent, in a politics known as the politics of the "national champions" in which the state would finance, subsidize and stimulate big Brazilian infrastructure companies to invest billions in construction in African and Latin American countries. Many of those projects and enterprises were recently involved in corruption scandals and some of them have had deep social problems and civil society resistance, such as ProSavana in Mozambique. (GARCIA; KATO, 2016) Brazil was also included as a member of the BRICS, of the financial G20 and strongly advocated its case to be a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, starting to participate more actively in many UN peacekeeping missions.

Affirming that neocolonialism is one of the biggest silences of post-colonial analyst, Santos (2002, p. 34) describes: "Actually, Brazil played the role of 'colonizing colony', in Marc Ferro's words, when it sent to Angola the largest contingent of white immigrants. Angola, in fact, had long been economically dependent on Brazil." (SANTOS, 2002, p. 34). According to Cicalo (2013):

"On the international level, the recent emergence of Brazil as a world economic power has turned Africa into a strategic ally for the consolidation of its international leadership. In the context of economic expansion, Africa represents, more than ever, an appealing market for Brazilian products and a crucial reservoir of raw materials and fuel. For this reason, trade between Brazil and African countries tripled in size between 2002 and 2006 alone (Schläger, 2007: 8;

Captain, 2010), and Petrobras, the largest energy company in Brazil, is making massive investments in the African fuel sector, extending its tentacles from Angola to Nigeria, Tanzania, Mozambique and Benin to extract oil and produce bio-fuel' (CICALO, 2013, p. 21-22).

This ambivalent discursive position of Brazil as an in-between, a teenager temporally in front of 'childish Africa' (SANTOS; GOMES; FERNÁNDEZ, 2019), more rational and experienced in terms of the development and modernization telos and still behind the adult Europe and United States, actually does not go unnoticed by the other countries and the somewhat arrogant phrase proffered by Amorim that "there is a Brazilian solution for every African problem" did not remain uncriticized (ESTEVEZ; FONSECA; GOMES, 2016).

Still, most analysts do not work with the idea of Brazil's inherently ontological insecure 'self' due to its post-colonial nature, a perspective I have only found in Viera (2018). Yet, taking the role of identity seriously in the explanations of foreign policy, as proposed by the poststructuralist, psychoanalytic and post-colonial scholarship in this chapter, sheds a new light on the question whether or not Brazil's foreign policy under Lula represent change or continuity. In other words, until this research avenue has been checked out, the call is still open and not yet settled, contrary to the claims made by the great majority of BFP analysis, as we have seen in the previous chapter. It still remains to be seen, whether Lula's foreign policy is merely more of the same, even if pursued with renewed strength or activism, still a 'nation' following the same master signifiers of development, autonomy, multilateralism, pragmatism, and its great manifest destiny, or whether we can identify some structural change in Brazil's 'self' narrative that would challenge that continuity.

2.5. Conclusion

Though mainstream approaches on BFPA have been strongly based on narratives of stability and linearity, and on the so-called 'principles' of BFP or the elements of

Brazilian identity, such as *pragmatism*, a supposed constant sought for *autonomy*, *development*, etc., it is possible to argue that those terms, narrative anchors, or master signifiers (as it will be debated in the next chapters) are not stable and do not carry an inherent meaning. Despite appearing to carry an analytical transparency, free from biases, BFPA has unspoken assumptions mainly dominated by a realist ontology and lacks a larger engagement with theoretical and critical debates.

Considering a constructivist and post-structuralist approach on FPA, which takes language as central to the construction of reality and identities as inherently unstable, it is possible to understand foreign policy as a narrative of production of boundaries, necessary for the very (re)production of the State. (CAMPBELL, 1992; HANSEN, 2006) From this perspective, there are no prediscursive identities.

Allied with a Lacanian ontology of the subject, this understanding allows for a more complex understanding of reality, as subjects are lacking, therefore, desiring, and permeated by libido. This allows for the understanding of social phenomena as inherently permeated by libido, and identity politics embedded in affective attachments that give the subject a partial and illusory sense of wholeness and stability, which some analysts have called ontological security.

Furthermore, the combination of psychoanalysis and postcolonialism allows for a more complex understanding of racism as an enduring and traumatic process that affects the psyche of the postcolonial peoples (FANON, 2008; CÉSAIRE, 2000; GONZALEZ, 1989), de-humanizing its victims but also its perpetrators (NANDY, 1989). This provides the backdrop for an analysis that moves beyond the individual actions or choice, since foreign policy behaviour may have reasons which have become naturalized, hence invisible, through the postcolonial and modern era. and are so intricate in the postcolonial and modern era that it sometimes becomes invisible or naturalized. They are there even when we do not talk about it - and probably mainly in those situations.

Therefore, one of the core objectives of my thesis is to put into question the naturalized Brazilian foreign policy discourses based on its ‘principles’ or its ‘identity’, terms and biographical narratives which have been analyzed by the mainstream literature as somewhat coherent and stable, with little questioned elements and terminologies. I aim to go the other way around, to desecuritize and politicize BFP widely accepted discourses and expose the underlying and unquestioned assumptions behind them. By this move, I hope also to contribute in the way to put into question a naturalized ideal of this entity called “Brazil”, with identities, interests, and desires.

The following chapters are hence informed by the need to check out the hypothesis derived from the present theoretical discussion, namely that there could have been something traumatic about the Lula government. Probably not the Lula government in itself, but its closer look towards the traumatic wound (EDKINS, 2004) of racism that lies at the foundation of the Brazilian nation, but has been compulsively disavowed throughout its history (GONZALEZ, 1988; SOUZA, 2017). Building up on Viera (2018), such a hypothesis assumes that this ontological insecurity has been disciplined through very specific foreign policy identity discourses (in Campbell’s sense of foreign policy as a narrative of inclusions and exclusions).

When Lula-Celso Amorim foreign policy (supposedly) radically changes the identification discourses by identifying the Brazilian self with the previous *inferior other*, which has been repeatedly and progressively erased from national biographical narratives through categories such as *pardo*, this possible latent ontological insecurity of the Brazilian self could have erupted, for example, as an identity crisis (in Guzzini, 2012 terms), as the main national elites, owners of the communication medias, of big companies, occupying most relevant political and economic posts not just do not identify with, but *reject*. Though these are not my study objects, the extreme polarization, Dilma’s impeachment and the turn towards a far-right populism could be an indicator of it. I hope that maybe by introducing a new way of understanding identity and foreign policy in BFP as well as applying it to the Lula period, there would have been an initial foundation for us to analyze what comes after.

3. The chain of signifiers: A psychoanalytical approach to discourse analysis

3.0. Introduction

[...] when a discourse analyst interprets a written text using Lacan's work they are, in effect, more like an analysand than an analyst, but an analysand faced with chains of signifiers in a text that are not their own. (PARKER, 2005, p.178)

The present thesis seeks to analyze Brazilian Foreign Policy Analysis (BFPA) through poststructuralist discourse analysis methodologies aiming, to a small extent, to contribute to the development (and awareness of) post-positivist methodologies in the field of BFPA. The work developed here is an attempt to combine perspectives regarding both coloniality and an ontology of constitutive lack (STAVRAKAKIS, 1999), inspired by Lacanian approaches, central to this analysis. In a context in which everything acquires meaning through discourse and politics are permeated by emotions and affections, discourse analysis emerges as a valuable approach to foreign policy studies. Some of my founding references in this task are Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Campbell (1992), Hansen (2006), Stavrakakis (1999; 2007) Solomon (2015), Parker (1997; 2005) Dunker et al. (2016), among others.

In the present chapter, I seek to clarify the specific ontology pursued throughout this thesis as a poststructuralist approach dialoguing directly to psychoanalysis. The following sections will recall elements discussed in the previous chapter that are central to the methodological design. The first section will discuss (1) the discursive construction of identities and their inherently positional and changing character, (2) the disruption of the dichotomy ideas/materiality, as everything acquires meaning through language and, thus, is discursively constructed; and (3) the nature of the symbolic order as both alienating and productive. Section 2 will discuss psychoanalysis as a method of discourse analysis, and section 3 will discuss the method applied to the Brazilian case.

3.1. The nature of identity and its discursive construction in foreign policy

Inspired by Campbell and others, Hansen (2006, p. 1) explains that the relationship between identity and foreign policy is at the heart of poststructuralism's research agenda, as foreign policy depends on representations of identity and, at the same time, foreign policy produces and reproduces identities. Along these lines, identities do not exist as variables independent of discursive practices belonging to some extra-discursive realm. On the contrary, identities only exist through their continuous re-articulation.

In this context, Laclau and Mouffe (2001, p. xvii) describe: "[...] political identities are not pre-given but constituted and reconstituted through debate in the public sphere. Politics, we argue, does not consist in simply registering already existing interests, but plays a crucial role in shaping political subjects." Therefore, as Hansen (2006, p. 21) argues, this discursive epistemology makes a corporate or pre-social identity, as found in Wendt's work (and most BFPA studies mentioning identity), impossible. (ZEHFUSS, 2001)

Influenced by an Althusserian formulation, Laclau and Mouffe (2001:104) criticize "every type of fixity, through an affirmation of the incomplete, open and politically negotiable character of every identity." They reinforce that identities are essentially relational. Hence, identities are constructed through articulations, which they call discourses: "any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice we call discourse." (LACLAU; MOUFFE, 2001, p. 105). The authors further reinforce that their understanding of discourse is the juxtaposition of elements in a differential and structured system of positions and those differential positions they call 'moments.'

In this respect, the incomplete nature of every ‘totality’ (as to how they are portrayed in discourse) allows for the abandonment of the premise of the existence of ‘society’ as a structured and self-defined totality. “‘Society’ is not a valid object of discourse.” (LACLAU; MOUFFE, 2001, p. 111). This happens because a discourse constructing a determined totality “only exists as a partial limitation of a ‘surplus of meaning’ which subverts it” (idem). Such a ‘surplus’ is inherent in every discursive construction and is necessary to every social practice. This is what they define as the *field of discursivity* (idem), having that much different meanings, or ‘elements,’ as Laclau and Mouffe call it, which will always be left outside of this discursive ‘totality.’

Under this perspective, the category of ‘subject’ will constantly be referring to a discursive position which cannot be totally fixed: “Subjects cannot, therefore, be the origin of social relations – not even in the limited sense of being endowed with powers that render an experience possible – as all ‘experience’ depends on precise discursive conditions of possibility.” (LACLAU; MOUFFE, 2001, p. 115) Hence, the analysis should not consider a particular subjectivity (such as the proletariat) as its foundational reference of analysis. Subject positions are constantly changing depending on the hegemonic discourse, but this does not mean that there are no enduring subject positions. This shall be discussed further on.

Thus, to Laclau and Mouffe (2001, p. 114), and the approach followed in this work, the incomplete character of social identities allows for their articulation in different historic-discursive formations (or the Gramscian ‘historical blocs’²⁰). At the same time, the articulatory force also has its identity constituted by the general field of

²⁰ According to Laclau and Mouffe: ‘A social and political space relatively unified through the instituting of nodal points and the constitution of tendentially relational identities, is what Gramsci called a historical bloc. The type of link joining the different elements of the historical bloc - not unity in any form of historical a priori, but regularity in dispersion - coincides with our concept of discursive formation. Insofar as we consider the historical bloc from the point of view of the antagonistic terrain in which it is constituted, we will call it hegemonic formation.’ (LACLAU AND MOUFFE, 2001, p. 136)

discursivity, which makes it impossible for the existence of any transcendental or originative subject.

A Lacanian approach to discourse analysis understands that discourses are the social bond, they are symbolic structures that circumvent the Real, the very apparatus of enjoyment. The Real, in the Lacanian psychoanalytic vocabulary, is the impossible to be inscribed in a discourse (or represented by the symbolic order, as the Real always escapes representation), and such impossibility causes uneasiness, discomfort.

Narratives, built through discourses, are ways of constructing knowledge and truth. They are based on meanings that become somewhat universalized, shared. Those narratives, or discursive complexes, position the subject they address; they prescribe forms of subjectivity, limit what can or cannot be said²¹. In this sense, discourses are ways of structuring social relations, through signifier chains that operate and anchor meaning. This means that a term, or a signifier, will have its meaning defined in a specific discourse given its relation to other terms.

For example, the signifier *development*, which is very important to BFP narratives, in some discursive articulations works in chains with terms such as “imports substitution” and “industrialization”, creating the chain: imports substitution - industrialization - development. In other discursive articulations, the same signifier *development* can work in chains with “economic liberalization” and “comparative advantages”, creating the chain: economic liberalization - comparative advantages - development. Therefore, signifiers have no standalone meaning, the meaning of a signifier can be established only in relation to others.

In this regard, [t]he relation between *space*, *place*, and *position* is essential to observe discursive changes that show changes in relation to knowledge and truth.

²¹ Not only said, but also done, and felt. However, there will be always a surplus and possibilities of resistance, because the Symbolic order itself is lacking.

(DUNKER et. al., 2016, p. 149) It is worth bearing in mind that these positional relations between signifiers that Dunker et. al. (2016) call the Lacanian discourse analysis a topological one, in the sense that the place where they appear matters. In this regard, the dislocation of signifiers produces the subject. Beyond that, signifiers overdetermine the subject, in the sense that they represent (and bias) desire, demand, fantasy, and identification.

Considering Zizek (1991, p. 40 apud DUNKER et.al, 2016, p. 151-152), narratives are based on imaginary conceptions. Through linear narratives, essential contingencies can be well dissimulated, ordinating situations as if they had a necessary causality between one another, which is not always true. In this sense, history and social memories are built through discourse.

In a Lacanian ontology, the imaginary is sedimented in the ‘mirror stage’, as well as the ego, when the child builds a mental image of what would be their own self. There is a big gap between the baby’s own perceptions of herself and what she sees in the mirror. The specular image needs, then, to be confirmed by the *symbolic* other “in order to start functioning as the basis of the infant’s imaginary identification: every imaginary position is conceivable only on the condition that one finds a guide beyond this imaginary order, a symbolic guide.” (STAVRAKAKIS, 1990, p. 19). According to Stavrakakis:

“If the imaginary, the field of specular images, of spatial units and totalised representations, is always built on an illusion which is ultimately alienating for the child, his or her only recourse is to turn to the symbolic level, seeking in language a means to acquire a stable identity’ (STAVRAKAKIS, 1990, p. 20).

In this sense, all identity has both an image, or imaginary component, and a symbolic one, which articulates it through language and the significant and signifier dynamics. Meaning, image, and words are deeply intricated in identification dynamics.

Another important ontological elucidation under a psychoanalytical approach is that the duality - and any possible causal hierarchy - between ideas and materiality

is not only counterproductive but does not exist. Even though reality and material objects exist on their own, everything acquires meaning through language, and, in that sense, objects matter only because of the ideas we have about them. Under this perspective, anything in the social world could be analyzed through discursive analytical strategies as, for Laclau and Mouffe, ‘discourse’ is not only language but all social phenomena (JØRGENSEN; PHILIPS, 2002).

Laclau and Mouffe might have a helpful example in this regard:

“The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of “natural phenomena” or “expressions of the wrath of God”, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field” (LACLAU; MOUFFE, 2001, p. 108).

In this regard, the approach presented by Laclau and Mouffe, which largely inspires this research, allows for a rupture with dichotomies such as discursive/extra-discursive or thought/reality, as they do not make sense under a discursive understanding of reality.

Finally, the nature of language is also an important element in the approach pursued here. Relying on the understanding of the symbolic order, inspired by readings of Lacan, language is not only seen as a tool but as both an alienating and productive structure. The symbolic order categorizes everything we know, (temporarily) imprisoning things into terms, always losing something untranslatable and inapprehensible to language (the Lacanian Real), which escapes signs, nomenclatures, or categories (ŽIŽEK, 2010; SAFATLE, 2018; STAVRAKAKIS, 2007).

On the other hand, for the same signifier, there can be different meaning articulations. In this context, the perspective on discourse analysis followed here relies on the ‘[...] ambiguous nature of language as both structured and unstable [what]

implies that discourses will try to construct themselves as stable, but that there will always be slips and instabilities [...]’ (HANSEN, 2006, p. 18).

According to Parker (2005, p. 174), ‘there is no external point from which it is possible to speak that is not also necessarily implicated in a certain kind of position.’ Hence, nothing lies outside chains of signification and meanings are articulated through chains of equivalence and differentiation.

3.2. Psychoanalysis as a method of discourse analysis

One of the main tasks of a psychoanalytical discourse analysis is to examine the linguistic-discursive mechanisms of transformative practices²². Freud defined psychoanalysis not only as a clinical treatment, but also as an investigative method. The psychoanalytic method can be committed to transformative ethics, so it should not be seen as a neutral or ‘unengaged’ discourse analysis approach, being a discourse in and of itself. It further disrupts positivist approaches as one of its essential focuses of analysis – the unconscious – is defined by parameters that make it impossible to build an impersonal universalization or controlled repetition.

In this context, Lacan’s contribution to understanding psychoanalysis along with Saussurean linguistics is central to the possibility of using it as a discourse analysis method. As he defines it, ‘psychoanalysis should be the science of language inhabited by the subject’ (LACAN, 1988, p. 276 apud DUNKER et al, 2016, p. 89). As Dunker

²² Though Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis has, to some extent, been an inspiration to the development of this methodological chapter, the core interlocutors for the development of my methodology were authors dialoguing with Laclau and Mouffe’s work, as well as Lacanian Psychoanalysis. Nonetheless, the critical analytical position of Fairclough seems to have been an inspiration not only to myself, but also to authors researching about psychoanalysis as a method of discourse analysis as well.

at. al. describe, this linguistic turn radicalized the use of language as an object of investigation:

“Before being a way of meaning production, made to communicate and fix norms, language contains specific ways of meaning denial (non-sense). Those are points that resist signification ([...] by which the desire is not entirely articulated through language) of denotative instability (metaphoric or metonymic); of impossibility of enjoyment (organized by discourse), of disparity of enunciation [...]. This general Lacanian approach in discourse analysis can be called disavowal criteria [*Verneinung*] of the meaning of transparency [...]. To study the structure of meaning from the negative production of language implicates a method based on localizing the manifestations of not knowing; furthermore, the supposition that, in this point of not knowing, lies a truth. Similar to Foucault, it explores the contrasts, the articulation of differences – not the positives – as a method of discourse investigation” (DUNKER et. al., p.88- 89, my translation).

A psychoanalytical approach in discourse analysis is rooted in a radical hearing of their object, recognizing their paths or roots of truth, subordinating their analysis to the narratives of the object. In this context, it is important to highlight that, for Lacan, metalanguage does not exist, so, every ‘truth’ is a discursive articulation that produces some knowledge and hides/escapes/excludes some other truth.

The turn towards language in psychology and social sciences in the 1960s and 1970s was a response towards the exhaustion of the debate of interiority (mentalism, nature, self-determination) versus exteriority (nurture, social determinism) understanding human behavior. (DUNKER et.al, 2016, PARKER, 1997; 2005) Far from being resolved, this debate evolved, in the 1990s, to a tension between constructivists and realists and somewhat endures to the date.

Nonetheless, as it will be further discussed in this chapter, I believe Lacanian psychoanalysis provides a very insightful ontology. It creates a hybrid that includes both language and speech (something excluded by Saussure from its structural method) and, the consideration of subjectivity by the very inclusion of the ‘individual’ use of the language, considering the language constraints, mistakes, jokes. The subject and its

unique use of the language is the shift that inscribes the enunciation in the enunciated, exposing its own division. (DUNKER et.al., 2016, p.135)

The Freudian idea of the unconscious disrupts the individual versus social dichotomy. As the unconscious is not only inhabited by language, but stands as the place of the truth in the subject (where she hides her repressed and true desires), but it is also, and ultimately, a space of a social process. It is always built in a relationship, inherently transindividual, relational (DUNKER et.al. 2016, p.140). In Lacan, the concept of the unconscious is radicalized and becomes the place inhabited by the symbolic order - language - in which lies the desire of the Other, the desire of the symbolic order in itself. Ultimately, subjects are inhabited by desires which are not their own, but belong to this big Other which is the symbolic.

Thus, the analytical/critical focus in psychoanalytical discourse analysis has many different aspects: it can be committed to a critique of the idea of the subject as an autonomous issuer, considering ideology, the existence of the unconscious, or structural constraints in the political and discursive processes of subjectivity and individuation. It can also be a critique of transparency of messages, as what is being affirmed can be interpreted as just the contrary. Lelia Gonzalez (1988) gives us such an example in Brazil's disavowal of racism. In Gozalez (1988) terms, racism is repetitively denied by Brazilian identity discourses and is, thusly, denounced by this very denial.

Therefore, a psychoanalytical approach sees discourses always in interpretation, divided between their expressed and latent content, as well liable to class and other sectoral interests. Such an approach can be, as well, a critique of the accessibility of the code (message), considering that the symbolic is not a complete and easily translatable code, but a productive principle of differentiation in itself. Furthermore, it can critically analyze the relationship between issuer and recipient as not being equal and reflexive, as discourse always involves power, domination, and authority exercises.

Ultimately, in my understanding, psychoanalysis's main contribution to the field of discourse and foreign policy analysis is to disrupt the expectation of a rational choice actor (either the state or the individual), including the dimension of attachments, emotions, and affections. Through this perspective, discourses cannot be analyzed as an intentional message clearly captured by the interlocutor. As a method, a psychoanalytical approach can be helpful both in close readings of specific texts or through more structural and historic approach.

Considering all this information, Parker (2005) proposed seven criteria for Lacanian discourse analysis, which are the guidelines for piecing together my own methodology. The following paragraphs are a brief summary of this approach, to the best of my interpretation.

The first criterion would be the *formal qualities of the text*. Some of the main questions asked are: What are the differences, dualities, and oppositions constituted by the particular piece of discourse? What are the master signifiers that organize it? Where is this subject positioned? What is the absolute difference?

This first movement is important because a Lacanian discourse analysis does not aim at understanding the actual (or unconscious) meaning of the text lying beneath the surface or either to extract an abstract of it: it aims to identify the signifiers used and the differences mobilized to anchor their meanings (what is the absolute difference?). Beyond that, it searches for the non-meanings, what does not make sense in the narrative, as well as the irreducible to what the narrative is subjected to.

Citing Lacan, Parker (2005) describes that the subject is represented by signifiers, but its meanings do not lie 'inside the head of the author or speaker nor is it something that can be discovered and taken up by another subject as an addressee. It happens because when a signifier represents a subject it is "not for another subject, but for another signifier"' (LACAN, 1979, p. 198 apud PARKER, 2005, p. 168) Therefore, the meaning is given by the analysis concerning the terms in a sequence, a chain of signifiers.

The second criterion suggested by Parker is the *anchoring of representation*. As I understand it, the main questions to be asked would be: what are the representative modes of the discourse? What elements are repetitive or reinforced? What are the metaphors and metonymies used? What anchors their convergences and its divergences? How is the temporal logic of the text constructed?

The process of anchoring happens retroactively, it is a retroactive constitution of the traumatic, nonsensical, and the creation of those anchoring points which makes the narrative appear to have a natural occurrence. It is a temporal logic of apparent cause and effect. In this regard, this criterion of analysis aims at identifying what are the repetitive elements of the text around which it revolves, how it is temporally structured, what conclusions it justifies, and on which master signifiers it relies on. As Parker affirms,

“[...] trauma is something that is constituted after the event as an attempt to give sense to an event that could not be comprehended by the subject, as a “retroversion effect” (Lacan, 1977, p. 306). Lacan argues that the punctuation of a sentence retroactively determines what that sentence will be understood to have meant, and so the temporal logic of apparent cause and effect is, in a Lacanian reading, reversed. An analysis of discourse, then, will search out anchoring points that serve as the ‘conclusion’ of sentences or other stretches of text, anchoring points that only then, at that concluding moment, posit their own original starting point” (PARKER, 2005, p. 170).

Here, a note is worth making: the idea of trauma could be useful in analyzing the Lula period. The memory over that period has been strongly disputed, as well as its narratives have been actively deconstructed during the posterior decade. From Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment to Lula da Silva imprisonment, and the election of Jair Bolsonaro with lines such as “Let’s shoot [with a rifle] the *petralhada* [pejorative name for followers of PT]” there is a symptomatic and fast turn towards a far-right. Something embedded with affections, noteworthy hatred, that could be a reaction to trauma. Throughout this thesis, I will not be able to offer definitive answers to that hatred and trauma, and I am not even sure such answers would be possible. But, through discourse analysis, I hope I can explore some of the affective ruptures and disjunctions,

and the discursive elements that could have been traumatic for being a confrontation with the real, the impossible; a confrontation with the inherently insecure nature of all identity and (maybe) the centrality of racism and coloniality for anchoring the very possibility of identity in the Brazilian case. (VIEIRA, 2018)

Accordingly, a Lacanian approach to discourse analysis should also look at the traumatic or anchoring points starting from the end of the discourse analyzed, and how they were constructed to justify determining conclusions that would seem otherwise natural, but can also, through such methodology, be seen as contingent.

The third element is *agency and determination*. The main questions asked in this topic would be: what appears to be the ‘cause’ discourse encircles? What is established as interiority and exteriority by the textual topology? How does it approach the emissary and the recipient? Regarding this topic, as I have also previously mentioned, Parker portrays that in Lacan the duality ‘agency and determination’ (or individual versus collective, nature versus nurture, etc.), is somewhat disrupted in Lacan’s work:

“[...] the overdetermination of meaning is at the same time an overdetermination of the subject, and what is most ‘intimate’ to the subject is what is outside it. Lacan’s neologism for this intimate exteriority of the subject in discourse is ‘extimacy’, and the symbolic, unconscious and *objet petit a* do not lie outside discourse and inside the subject (Miller, 1986). They are extimate to the subject, not reducible to it, and this is one reason why they are relevant theoretical concepts for discourse analysis” (PARKER, 2005, p. 172).

In this sense, as it has already been discussed, psychoanalysis allows for a break if the dichotomy inside vs. outside the individual, as everything is constructed and permeated by discourse. The unconscious and discourse itself are inherently social, transindividual, ‘extimate’ to the subject. This is why I allow myself to speak of collective imaginaries, of national identities and biographical narratives, the images that produce an entity called ‘Brazil’. This idea of a ‘mirror’ is, of course, a metaphor for shared understandings that assume an image concerning our discursive, symbolic, constructions.

In this context, the signifier *development*, for example, which has its own chains of signifiers and imaginaries, seems to assume the position of ‘*objet petit a*’ in BFP discourses: an object around which BFP discourses circulate as being the fantasy of a place Brazil will supposedly arrive and then finally have achieved the completeness, the solution for all its anxieties and issues. Nonetheless, the partial enjoyment constitutes a constant search for development without ever achieving it, either because it is unachievable or because once it is achieved, then this place can be inhabited by another desired (and unachievable) object, such as peace.

Being a discursive instance and articulation, this does not mean I am anthropomorphizing Brazil. I refuse to do so exactly because all subjects, as I understand here, are subjects of discourse. What has been analyzed are the discursive positions, the subject positions of discourse, and their narratives (EPSTEIN, 2011).

The fourth element highlighted by Parker (2005) is *the role of knowledge*. Implying a Foucauldian approach on the power-knowledge dynamics, some of the main possible questions would be: what is the economy of knowledge the discourse builds? What kind of game, play, or contract it establishes with the recipient? What are the points of the text where knowledge is presumed? What does it indicate of what kind of authority and power are being presumed?

The fifth point is *positions in language*: What is its style, what is its interdiscursivity (to what discourses it refers to or speak with)? What are the content being affirmed? What are the content being denied?

According to Parker (2005, p. 175), a Lacanian discourse analysis follows an ethical position in which there is no meta-language, or, there is no such thing as a discourse about discourse or outside it. Every speaker is ‘always reflexively positioned in relation to the text’, always rebuilding the discourse. Furthermore, ‘every communication is viewed as directed to an audience, as an appeal for recognition’ (LACAN, 1992 apud PARKER, 2005, p. 175) Hence, such a discourse analysis would

be concerned with who is the audience of the text and how it is approached and subjected in the narrative constructed.

The sixth point is *deadlocks of perspective*. The main questions highlighted would be: how does the analyzed discourse deal with its own structural impossibility? How does it educate, ordinate, objectify or construct desire? How does it deal with interruptions, cuts, suspensions of the signifiers/arguments chain? Does the discourse try to hide any *failure* of agreement?

According to Parker, points where deadlocks can be identified are the closest one can get to Lacanian Real in the text, points where there is a failure of agreement that somehow the discourse aims to hide:

“[...] the Real is not a realm “outside” discourse that can be identified and described, but it is something that operates at a point of breakdown of representation, at a point of trauma or shock that is then rapidly covered over in order that it can be spoken of. Those points in a text that indicate something unspeakable, something “unrepresentable”, can be interpreted as points of encounter with the Real, and this is the closest we can speak of something “outside discourse”” (FROSH, 2002, p. 133 apud PARKER, 2005, p. 176).

Thus, in a Lacanian approach to discourse analysis, aiming to obtain the absolute difference in the discourse, the analyst finds points of disagreement and exposes them. The idea is that the ‘analyst’ and the ‘analysand’ will not find an agreement on the ‘meaning’ of the text and this competition over the possible meanings should be exposed instead of concealed.

Finally, the seventh point in the analysis is the *interpretation of textual material*. The possible questions would be: how does the text articulate the imaginary? What are the examples, illustrations, symbolic artifices? How does it portray the desired future? According to Parker:

“The reflexive position of the discourse analyst is an issue here, for when one approaches a text in hermeneutic mode as something we can ‘understand’ because it is like our own framework (or even

because we recognize it as being the mirror opposite of what is familiar to us), this, for Lacanians, would betray the stance we are taking as lying on ‘the line of the Imaginary’ (imagining that we interpret from outside the text). The task of an analyst is to work on ‘the line of the Symbolic’ (working within the domain of the text), and to open up the text by disrupting and disorganizing it so that its functions become clearer, including its functions for us” (PARKER, 2005, p. 177).

Hence, a Lacanian approach to discourse analysis goes far beyond hermeneutics: it is a tactic of reading that aims to incorporate memory and history as textuality. The researcher exercises its transference to the text, which functions as the other. The text is both something with which we participate and that we see as other, raising our defenses and symptoms.

In a general approach of the methodology proposed by Parker (2005), Dunker et.al. (2016, p. 134), point out, in a first moment, the following key questions: *what does the discourse repudiate? What commitments does it make? What does it appropriate and what does it make us forget? What does it deliberately omit?*

Such analysis should be done ‘one by one’, and there would be no role models of ‘cases’ to be followed when analyzing specific narratives in discourse analysis. In this sense, he highlights, to what I fully agree, that: ‘[...] every good description of a ‘case’ is also an elaboration of theory. [...] Each reading of Lacan and of Lacanian writing about discourse will need to be a rewriting of their reading when it encounters each new text.’ (PARKER, 2005, p. 179). The author also highlights:

“Even Lacan’s own readings of literary texts are not really ‘Lacanian psychoanalysis’ as such, and insofar as they open up a path to what we might term ‘Lacanian discourse analysis’ they pose new research questions as to how we should conceptualize the relationship between analyst, analysand and language (Rabate, 2001)” (PARKER, 2005, p. 166).

Pursuing a discourse analysis that takes into account Lacanian Psychoanalysis and Postcolonialism to analyze Brazilian foreign policy discourses (as in Campbell, 1992), I aim to create space in my research methodology to consider Brazilian

narratives of self, identity and other. This will be the aim of the following section, and will be further structured in chapter 4.

3.3. Building biographical narratives: master signifiers, the field of contextual possibilities, and field of discursivity

According to Berenskoetter (2020, p. 280), modern societies have created mechanisms to deal with the anxiety generated by the ontological insecurity rooted in the impossibility of experiencing oneself as a whole. The author describes that chronologic measures of time (and other scientific measures that follow the logic and mathematical symbols), routine practices, and narratives are some of the main anxiety-controlling mechanisms in our society that provide some certainty and epistemological peace to deal with the contingency of politics. Beyond those practices, I try to concern myself here with the narratives and discourses.

For Berenskoetter (2020, p. 281) to function effectively, people need to forget or hide those anxiety-controlling mechanisms that have an invented and contingent nature, as mere human constructs cannot be seen as anxiety-relief mechanisms. In this sense, they have to become independent and unquestioned phenomena to be accepted.

Following Laclau and Mouffe's discourse analysis, Jørgensen and Philips (2002) describe that discourses can be understood as a partial fixation of meaning, a temporary closure to create a unified system of meaning, attempting to stabilize sliding signifiers and their fluctuations of meaning. As Laclau and Mouffe (2001) argue, discourses are the totality resulting from articulatory practices, that act modifying or establishing identities among elements through their articulation with one another. In this regard, a discourse is constituted also through its relation to what it excludes in the *field of discursivity* (which is all the universe of possibilities of discourse articulations outside the presented discourse).

Hence, discourses are formed by articulations of partial fixations of meaning around *nodal points* or *master signifiers*, signs (or terms) that act as anchors around which other signs are ordered. Those special signs in a discourse allow other signs to acquire their meaning considering their relationship to the nodal point in a signifying chain (SOLOMON, 2015, JØRGENSEN; PHILIPS, 2002). Therefore, in this approach, *identities* also exist as they are articulated discursively, through chains of equivalence and, very importantly, differentiation. According to Laclau and Mouffe:

“Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre. We will call the privileged discursive points of this partial fixation, *nodal points*. (Lacan has insisted on these partial fixations through his concept of *points de capiton*, that is, of privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of a signifying chain)” (LACLAU; MOUFFE, 2001, p. 112).


Those fixations are always partial and incomplete and are themselves also floating signifiers ‘incapable of being wholly articulated to a discursive chain. And this floating character finally penetrates every discursive (i.e. social) identity’ (LACLAU; MOUFFE, 2001, p. 112). As the same signifier can have multiple signifieds (or meanings), given the relational character of every identity and the incomplete fixation of meaning around nodal points, a discursive structure can always be disarticulated by competing signifieds, ‘as every nodal point is constituted within an intertextuality that overflows it’(idem).

If the field of discursivity is everything the discourse excludes, discourses are always constituted in relation to an outside and, then, are always in danger of being undermined or disrupted by competing discourses. Even though discourses’ dispute for fixing meaning plays a central role in the approach presented here, it does not mean that everything is fluid and changes easily all the time. Thus, nodal points play a key role, as they represent the crystallization of meaning in time. Those nodal points can be analyzed also as sliding signifiers, in the sense that they can be filled with different meanings by different competing discourses.

Nonetheless, as I see it, there is a field of possible meanings in a given period of time. And, most of the time, one can find the winning narrative or the crystalized meaning for that sign in a given point of time and the specific realm of the society. That would be what we call the hegemonic discourse. Mapping the other competing discourses that compose the field of discursivity could be another important task.

Therefore, I propose a differentiation between the concept of the *field of discursivity* (building up on Laclau and Mouffe) and what I call the *field of contextual possibilities*. The *field of contextual possibilities* should be narrower than the field of discursivity, which encompasses the entire possibility of meanings. While the *field of contextual possibilities* would be the narratives, discourses, chains of equivalence, and signifiers which are possible (i.e.: are taken seriously as possibilities) in a determined period of time. Identifying how the *field of contextual possibilities* varies across time and how the disputing narratives influence or push the barriers of what is acceptable in a political/identitarian discourse would be central to my analysis in this thesis, seeking to identify and analyze the changing character of competing discourses over the Brazilian identity during Lula da Silva (2003-2010). In this sense, Figure 1 summarizes the elements of discourse as used in this analysis:

Figure 1: The elements in the field of discursivity:



Source: my own elaboration

By including this differentiation through an extra category, I believe the methodology designed by Laclau and Mouffe can be improved regarding one of its weakest spots, which is the ability for understanding continuities and stability (JØRGENSEN; PHILIPS, 2002). Even though everything is contingent, it does not mean that all elements and identities change all the time. I am sure Laclau and Mouffe were aware of that by the time they wrote their book '*Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*', and one could just assume what appears in the field of discursivity in a determined period of time is what matters for the analysis. However, I believe the inclusion of an extra category could make it easier and clearer for my personal empirical analysis comparing different periods of time. It also allows for the consideration that certain identity discourses, while contingent, could also have an enduring nature throughout time.

The often changes from one period to another in the field of contextual possibilities in identity narratives have happened quite clearly in the case of Brazil. Brazilian hegemonic and competing identity narratives - which compose what I conceptualize as the field of contextual possibilities - seem to have changed from Fernando Henrique Cardoso's (1995-2002) government to Bolsonaro's (2019-current). Consider, for example, the narratives regarding the civilian-military dictatorship and the perception that the democratic institutions should always be defended. That perception has somewhat changed in the present times and now it seems socially acceptable by a considerable part of the population to claim that the dictatorship was beneficial to the country and that it could be a better regime than some other democratic arrangements. Even though the defense of a dictatorial regime is still not a hegemonic narrative in Brazil now, it was not accepted as a disputing discourse in the 1990s or the beginning of the 2000s (taken seriously as a possible hegemonic narrative in the foreseeable future) as it has been in current times.

In this sense, for the purposes of this thesis, *biographical narratives* are a set of inter-articulated identity discourses that produce a given entity that gives it a sense of continuity in time, whether in multiple or diverse identity scripts, or as a differentiation

from others, constructing narratives of a past, a present, and the desired future. Biographical narratives can be constructed through a historical mapping of identity discourses and are important because they give a sense of continuity, purpose, and stability. In this sense, according to Berenskoetter (2014), they contain discourses about friends (support nets, resembling entities, competitors, non-radical alterities), enemies (hated others, radical alterities, against which most of their identity stability relies on), and role models (desired others, ideas of future and telos).

Following Berenskoetter (2014, p. 271), ‘a community’s historical sense of Self is given meaning through collective memory’, specific traumas and glories will be chosen by the official narratives, while others might be deliberately forgotten or left unarticulated, still left present as silences. Furthermore, the author describes that biographical narratives are not only looking at the past but are also to the future selves. Furthermore, ‘[t]he formulation and maintenance of the narrative is a political process’ (BERENSKOETTER, 2014, p. 278). To be successful, a narrative needs to cement a stable whole, binding together past, present, and future selves, generating a sense of biographical continuity.

Biographical narratives are a ‘form of governance’ (BERENSKOETTER, 2014, p. 279). They will always contain tensions and contradictions, and can include changes if a coherent bridge between past and present is built. They require agency, legitimacy, and sometimes institutions. While agents, on the one hand, are themselves constituted and subjected through identification process in the realm of the symbolic:

“(i) agents who can claim expertise and legitimacy in carving out authentic memories and visions and possess the creative skill to fuse them and (ii) agents who adopt and carry the narrative along, and who possess the resources to affirm it with tangible practices. The ability to successfully participate in the formulation and dissemination of a national narrative depends in part on the position in the structural-institutional configuration of the state. Institutions not only render some voices and their representations to be dominant, silencing others; they also lend the narrative a material infrastructure that can sustain it across generations” (BERENSKOETTER, 2014, p. 279, references omitted).

This is why the role of Itamaraty (Brazilian Ministry of External Affairs) is so central in the construction of the Brazilian biographical narratives. The institution dates back to the beginning of the XX century and has a strong institutional memory, selecting and forming diplomats that can, ideally, perfectly reproduce its institutional directions through one of the most competitive public tenders in Brazil as well as the two years long career training at Instituto Rio Branco inside Itamaraty. The narratives of foreign policy built-in Itamaraty are also deeply related to the birth of the field of FPA in Brazil, and still today, the field agendas are not entirely detached from what is being discussed by the Ministry.

Henceforth, biographical narratives are important for any entity's existence as a subject, as they construct those entities, through discourse, in the symbolic and imaginary realms. Very little State's foreign policy action is non-verbal, which makes discourse analysis feasible in terms of methodology and epistemology. Foreign Policy solutions and strategies are 'written into a discursive terrain, already partially structured by previous institutionalized identities' (HANSEN, 2006, p. 23).

In terms of State politics and Foreign Policy, discourses construct problems and articulate policies to address them. In this regard, foreign policy and identity are interlinked in the sense that identity legitimates (or justifies) determined policy actions and (re)create by them. Linking certain foreign policy actions to relevant national identity discourses makes it legitimate to the relevant audience, presenting consistency and guaranteeing support to the responsible policymakers (HANSEN, 2006).

Different from traditional poststructuralist references such as David Campbell, the methodological focus here will be not only on the analysis of the discursive construction of threat and radical others. Even though those are still considered very central to this thesis, I would like to pay attention also to the construction of possible friendships (BERENSKOETTER, 2007) and desired others to identity discourses and to analyze how those are articulated to hated or radical others. It is important to approach identity in a more complex and fluid way, to show inconsistencies in the discourse, and to demonstrate how contextual national identity discourses can be. In

addition, because official discourses can be very subtle and not state openly who or what the radical other is and, even further, international foreign policy discourses can contradict national policies.

This is a very important methodological point considering that Brazil, our case study, has most of its biographical narratives based on the myth of racial democracy while black and indigenous peoples seem to still occupy the place of undesired – or hated – other. Daily executions in the peripheries, tribal exterminations, massive incarceration, and necropolitics (MBEMBE, 2019) seem to be the treatment destined to those populations and it is especially disquieting when, during the Lula period, Brazil approaches African countries presenting Brazil as a black country (making new friends and resembling others that internally do not possess such a status) when convenient in political and economic terms.

While some rational choice theory, such as neo-realism, would probably perceive it as an obvious strategy, I would like to examine this issue in a more complex way. Ontological (in)security studies under a psychoanalytical ontology allow for an understanding of identity as a core element in foreign policy and discourse analysis, as it provides a sense of fulfillment and stability for the individual, which would be its ultimate (and impossible) ideal goal. When identity discourses resonate in audiences, it provides government legitimacy while reinforcing the illusion of the nation as an ontological security provider for individuals.

As Laclau and Mouffe describe, no hegemonic logic can be considered to be the totality of the social, as their concept of hegemony encompasses the existence of disputing narratives and the open character of the social is the precondition for the existence of a hegemonic order as they conceive it. In this sense: ‘The important point is that every form of power is constructed in a pragmatic way and internally to the social, through the opposed logics of equivalence and difference; power is never foundational’ (LACLAU; MOUFFE, 2001, p. 142). This means that a hegemonic formation ‘manages to signify itself (that is, to constitute itself as such) only by transforming the limits into frontiers, by constructing a chain of equivalences which

constructs what is beyond the limits as that which it's not. It is only through negativity, division, and antagonism that a formation can constitute itself as a totalizing horizon' (LACLAU; MOUFFE, 2001, p. 143-144).

According to Laclau and Mouffe (2001) a context in which there is a major weakening of the relational system (the hegemonic discourse and the chains of signifiers that structure it) in a given political space that, as a result, presents a proliferation of floating elements, will see arise a 'conjuncture of organic crisis'. The authors describe that '[...] it reveals itself not only in a proliferation of antagonisms but also in a generalized crisis of social identities.' (LACLAU; MOUFFE, 2001, p. 136) This context defined by Laclau and Mouffe will be henceforth labeled as *identity crisis*, inspired by Guzzini (2012).

Having followed the readings mentioned above (mainly Laclau and Mouffe) and the recent debates on ontological security, I believe it is important to differentiate *identity crisis* from *ontological insecurity*. As I understand it and for my use in this thesis, ontological insecurity is an existential condition of every subjectivity under a Lacanian ontology, and the existence of disputing narratives does not necessarily mean that a specific hegemonic order loses its status as such, as no subject can be whole and this will always be a process of continuous search (unless the subject is faced with therapy, or the narrative of the nation faces critical academic reflection! And, even so, Fantasies can withstand contestations.). An identity crisis, on the other hand, is when crystallized identities and biographical narratives are disrupted and a sense of major loss and insecurity is installed - as no hegemonic narrative can be identified - while there is an enduring and unreal expectation of stability, causing many other social symptoms to appear, such as deep political crisis, political violence, ultra-nationalism, etc.

3.4 Bringing passion back in

As Stavrakakis (2007, p. 191) discusses, approaches that describe identities as essentially fluid are challenged by the endurance of certain configurations of identification: how can one explain the sustained reproduction and almost impossibility of changing certain identities, such as national and religious ones? The author describes that the answer could be the psychic (and emotional) investment people have on their bond to national identifications, for example. In this context, the nation plays almost a unique role as a desirable and irresistible object of identification. Citing Freud's *Group Psychology*, Stavrakakis (2007, p. 193) reinforces that what is at stake in collective identifications, beyond the chains of signifiers and the symbolic meanings, is the power of libidinal investments, passionate affective investments:

“it is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love [to create, in other words, a libidinally invested shared ‘identification’], so long as there are other people left over to receive manifestations of their aggressiveness” (FREUD 1982, p. 51 apud STAVRAKAKIS, 2007, p. 193).

According to Stavrakakis (2007, p. 195), identification operates in different but interconnected aspects: discursive structuration/representation and *jouissance*²³ (or enjoyment). As national (and all) identities are discursively built, when there is either a crisis or some dislocation event, even stable identity formations lose their appearance of stability and wholeness. In such critical moments, the only way to guarantee their hegemony is to blame an out-group, create a scapegoat, and blame this group for the lack of fullness/stability. That is why identity claims can be considered dangerous because scapegoating (a radical exclusionary practice, based on demonizing and relying on manicheisms) is always a real possibility.

²³ According to Stavrakakis (2007: 195) “In Lacan’s work, *jouissance* – a satisfaction so excessive and charged that it becomes painful – seems to occupy a place partly overlapping with what is associated with the libido in Freud. In that sense, it could be argued that Lacan prefers to ‘reconceptualise sexual energy [Freud’s libido] in terms of *jouissance*’ (Evans 1996: 101). As a result, identification has to be understood as operating in both these distinct but interpenetrating fields: discursive structuration/representation and *jouissance*.”

This is also the reason why incorporating the passionate (or affective) dimension to the understanding of identity discourses is so relevant: the libidinal investment and affective attachment to identity can easily mobilize or justify hatred and violence, and often escape mere rational choice politics analysis. In this regard, it is necessary to bring passion back into political theory, which has been frequently denied since the Enlightenment and mostly since modernity, as it is, considered limited, primitive or even pathological:

“Enlightenment philosophy and political theory – as well as politics itself – have largely seen their role as drawing a sharp distinction between the symbolic dimension of identification and its affective/obscene support. In the age of reason and rational administration there was no room for ‘irrational’ forces and libidinal bonds. The aim was either to control or, even better, to eliminate passion, affect and enthusiasm, to drain out the *jouissance* of the body from political practice and political theory” (STAVRAKAKIS, 2007, p. 205).

Identity politics are deeply rooted in dynamics of enjoyment, or *jouissance*. It is deeply connected to affective attachments, and this is why there is a libidinal pleasure when a political opponent suffers political persecution/or violence (for example in a war victory). Enjoyment-thieves will necessarily be blamed for the impossible realization of a universalized identity. This phantasmatic *jouissance*, based in fantasy, is supposed to, for a little moment, re-capture the lost and (imaginary) sense of wholeness. However, this feeling will always be partial and incomplete. Therefore, beyond symbolic coherence and discursive closure, politics are also animated by desire and limit-experiences of (partial) *jouissance*, that promise to fulfill the human desire of wholeness, stability, and enjoyment but never actually do (STAVRAKAKIS, 2007).

This is why Lacan’s broadening of the Freudian idea of identification and its relation to dynamics of *jouissance* allows for a very enriching approach to identity and nationalism. The intricate link between love and hate, libido and death drive, as not antagonistic forces, but essential to each other’s existence, allows for an understanding that ‘no identity with the durability characteristic of nationalism can be constructed without effectively manipulating libidinal investment and *jouissance*.’

(STAVRAKAKIS, 2007, p. 207) In this regard, collective identities necessarily need passion that are impossible to rise only from a purely civic, constitutional or democratic non-affective order to be built.

Even when considering a world of multiple identities and equally valid subject-positions, those are not considered optional or voluntary, and some between them have a larger amount of influence, usually, it is nationalism. In multi-identitarian contexts, there will be a fantasy that ordines and binds together different identities and their particular modes of enjoyment and libidinal investments. In this case, some are more structural, or transmit more steadiness, than others. If the nodal points that structure determined subject positions collapse, a psychotic state can start to settle in. While, when loyalty conflicts arise, usually the national identifications will have a larger priority. (STAVRAKAKIS, 2007, p. 219-220)

Hence, dynamics of identification are partially linked to phantasmatic *jouissance* alongside the *jouissance* of the body. All desire, including the desire of identification, emerges through symbolic castration, ending a pre-symbolic *jouissance*, or perception of fullness, which is the imaginary promise of recapturing this lost and impossible enjoyment that, in fantasy, would support the being in its choices. Hence, beyond imaginary *jouissance*, desire is also sustained through limit-experiences of a partial *jouissance* of the body, such as a national war victory and the success of the national soccer team. They are considered partial because they cannot still provide a feeling of wholeness to the subject. Those experiences re-inscribe the subject in lack dynamics, reproducing the attachment to the phantasmatic promise of recapturing fullness and *jouissance*. (STAVRAKAKIS, 2007, p. 197)

Socially speaking, fantasy provides the promise of a solution of social antagonism, concealing lack and constituting itself as a needed object of identification. Beyond that, there is another dimension of fantasy that justifies why this lack was not fulfilled, which is the mechanism of scapegoating, which blames others for stealing our *jouissance*, excludes and demonizes this specific social group. Fantasy also reflects the centrality of identification and projects full realization of *jouissance* in the future,

keeping it at a moderate distance from the individual, trapping her in a never-ending dynamics of desire and blame of the outer group for the incomplete realization of her identity, reinforcing the thought that:

“what is limiting my identity, is not the inherent ambiguity and contingency of all identity, its reliance on processes of identification, its social and political conditioning, but the existence or the activity of a localisable group: the Jews, the immigrants, the neighbouring nation, and so on. If my identifications prove incapable of recapturing my lost/impossible enjoyment, the only way these can be sustained is by attributing this lack to the ‘theft of my enjoyment’ by an external actor. If, the ideological argument goes, this group, this ‘anomalous’ particularity, is silenced or even eliminated, then full identity could be enjoyed. This is when difference as antagonism reaches its most disturbing and unsettling political form” (STAVRAKAKIS, 2007, p. 198).

This intimate relation between love and hate accounts for the complexity of the dynamics of identification in a unique way, which is considered an important contribution to Lacanian theory to identity politics and nationalism. (STAVRAKAKIS, 2007, p. 198) Thus, discourses that mobilize love and the utopic realization of a great future quite often are also mobilizing hate, exclusion, or extermination. Nonetheless, this mobilization does not need to be explicit and it can happen through the combination of different discourses of otherness, considering friendship and role models, for example. Whether those relationships of friendship can, at their ultimate analysis, be reduced to a fundamental difference discourse (e.g.: discourses regarding ‘friend’ nations or social groups ultimately reinforce the scapegoating politics if analyzed at their core, as they would be ‘friends’ in relation to some other external enemy) is something that I am not sure about and I hope this study can shed some light over.

Brazil, differently from the case of the United States described by Campbell (1992), has no formal international enemies. Brazilian identity politics, then, could be slightly different, based in other identification discourses that not rely on fundamental difference, but on anthropophagy, for example, as it will be discussed in the following chapter. (ANDRADE, 1976; GARCIA, 2018) On the other hand, it is possible to identify the others in the realm of foreign policy, in the ‘domestic’ realm, when talking

about black and indigenous populations and then, Brazilian narratives of identity would still be centered by radical difference and otherness. On the other hand, if we consider psychoanalytical contributions, such as Gonzalez (1988), this difference is disavowed, so it might not be perceived or narrated as radical by Brazilian biographical narratives. I will not be able to provide an answer to this question, but those are some of the intriguing points that made me look at the Brazilian case.

3.4.1. The affective appeal of populist discourses

Following a dissociative conception of politics - different from perspectives in which politics are about acting together and trying to establish consensus - the literature I engage with here understands politics is about agonistic conflict and the construction of political frontiers. Mouffe (2018) describes populist discourses as very appealing because they construct a conflict between the real people, the people from below, and the people from above. Those identity essences are discursively constructed, and many countries in the world have been facing a rise of far-right and populist discourses, amidst a specific conjuncture of crisis of neoliberal hegemony.

Mouffe (2018) argues that while there was no alternative to the neoliberal globalization and the centrist politics of the 1990s and 2000s, - when the macroeconomic consensus led to an undifferentiation between left and right - it left 'the people' with a perception that there was no political option for change, something like 'technocrats are always the same, no matter who is in power'. According to her, this scenario led to disinterest and disaffection into politics, de-democratization and oligarchization (through financial capitalism) of many societies, the impoverishment of middle classes, and the exponential increase of inequality. When populist discourse arises, mobilizing all kinds of affects, many people identify with the people uttering such discourses and find hope again in politics through the dynamics of desire described earlier. This can be utmostly dangerous but also a powerful weapon of political mobilization and change. (MOUFFE, 2018)

Even though some discursive constructions can actively and rationally try to use this ability to play with the audience's emotions and affections, one can never foresee with certainty how a determined discourse will resonate. Besides, discourses transmit much more than one you believe at first, or rational intentions would allow. As mentioned before, discourses are inscribed in a field of discursivity, structured by previous identities and discourses. If the system and the symbolic order have racist and patriarchal fantasies, they will somehow appear in the structure of the discourse, its audience, the terms used, the mechanisms chosen, etc. Parapraxes, or Freudian slips, and jokes or spontaneous answers can also tell a lot about the structure of biographical narratives or perspectives of the enunciator, which, again, are inscribed in a much wider field of discursivity and should not be analyzed only as personal or individual views, even more when talking about a State spokesperson.

3.5. The Brazilian case

To argue whether certain policies break, disrupt or change previous constructions in the Brazilian context requires a mapping of what are the country's autobiographical narratives, through the understanding of the main identity discourses. Those discourses are sedimented in the most influential literature about Brazilian Foreign Policy, with a special look towards the Brazilian identity, considering both the diplomatic and academic fields (as, in this specific case, they are deeply intertwined). I am aware that this is a very narrow understanding of foreign policy (in terms of actors considered for the analysis) and that not only government representatives should be considered in the debate of IR narratives, as there are multiple disputes over Brazilian identities and biographical narratives. Nevertheless, the possibilities and scope of this work require some limitations in the empirical material and analytical focus due to the enormous possible amount of material.

Another very relevant point for this specific focus is that I do not intend to map *the real* Brazilian identities, to understand their most relevant implications and all the

main actors involved in it. I do not aim to do a comprehensive mapping for the main reason that, considering my epistemological point of view, I do not believe in the existence of a core central (or a *real*) Brazilian identity.

In addition, I want to contribute more directly to the literature of Brazilian Foreign Policy analysis (BFPA). For that, I consider most relevant, first, to reflect over the hegemonic discourses over the Brazilian autobiographies in the realm of analysts, which are the ones actively interpreting BFPA discourses and systematizing them into history. BFPA analysts are telling, writing, and (re)producing specific imaginaries about the Brazilian identity.

Hence, through the mapping of master signifiers and their positioning in a chain of signifiers, there will be a first moment in the analysis in which I will be mapping what are the main identity discourses that compose the hegemonic biographical narrative among BFPA analysts. This will be helpful in understanding the imaginary of Brazilian biographical narratives and the signifiers around which they circulate, taking into account the narratives of self and other, as well as its sense of past, present, and future.

I understand that biographical narratives are in constant movement and reconstruction not only in the field of analysts and specialists – the part of foreign policy in Campbell (1992) terms which I intend to look at - but also in close interaction with the field of political praxis itself – the formal Foreign Policy discourses, as in Campbell (1992).

Hence, I chose to focus on mapping the hegemonic narratives over the Brazilian identity in both political and intellectual elites and how they interact. This is why, in a second moment of the analysis, I will look at the identity discourses and the national biography(ies) articulated under official discourses during the Lula da Silva administration (2003-2010) looking at if or how they rely upon the existing identity discourses and the hegemonic narrative over the Brazilian biography observed in the field of analysts. Therefore, in this work, I am interested in how the Brazilian Foreign

Policy (in Campbell terms) discourses relate to national identity constructions (in the realm of foreign policy, in Campbell terms), which will be derived from specialized analysts.

The interest specifically over the Lula period arises due to something apparently traumatic in that period - of the realm of the Real. That something traumatic seems to escape and appear here and there, in the memory disputes over the period; in the disputes over the hegemonic narratives of national identities and national biographical narratives; in the continuous polarization of the political debate, based in antagonism (exterminate the opponent) and not in agonism (compete for political space and recognize the other to do so) (MOUFFE, 2001); the weakening of democratic institutions; and the rise of a far-right populist government. I wonder if some of this trauma could have originated (or exposed?) in a possible disruption of the BFP narratives of self and other during Lula.

Under this interest, I seek to understand some of the mechanisms of discursive articulation of ontological (in)security through the construction of national biographical narratives and their relation to legitimizing specific Foreign Policy choices during the Lula period, and if and how it diverges from previous narratives. From the insights and results of that analysis, the final sections of this work will be dedicated to launching some possible understandings of what could be the relation (if any) between identity discourses' change (or adaptation) and ontological insecurity or signs of identity crisis (GUZZINI, 2012) - or psychotic states (STAVRAKAKIS, 2007). Some of the possible clues for an identity crisis pointed out by Guzzini would be strong polarization and political instability, and the recent turn towards far-right in Brazil experienced in the post-Lula period could be an indicator of an attempt to stabilize an identity discourse possibly destabilized during Lula da Silva.

I hope my position over the concept of ontological security is clear. I understand that ontological security is impossible and discourses trying to stabilize national identities are dangerous (EBERLE, 2017). In this context, I believe subjects, either states or individuals, live in constant ontological insecurity. Nonetheless, such a state

of being does not implicate an identity crisis (or a psychotic state), which I consider being two different moments, as discussed in previous chapters. The very confrontation with ontological insecurity and the instability of all identity could be something traumatic; or even, the confrontation with a reality that has been strongly denied - disavowed - and how this disavowal constitutes a central anchor of the narratives of the self (as Brazil's disavowal racism described by Gozalez, 1988), could also be something traumatic.

In order to analyze how Brazilian identity discourses and biographical narratives are structured during Lula da Silva and whether they could have been traumatic, in the sense of exposing inherent ontological insecurities that (could have) led to an identity crisis, this work has two main objectives. First, explore the main Brazilian identity discourses among BFP analysts and; second, contrast them with the Lula da Silva foreign policy discourses trying to understand whether there was a disruption of the main biographical narratives, identities and the chains of signifiers anchoring the Brazilian 'self', its 'others' and their positioning in time.

I understand the *mainstream* BFPA is still dominated by studies that privilege history and description over theory and abstraction, or yet, almost fully aligned to rational-actor theories. Thus, in a broader way, I expect to provide a small contribution to the literature of Brazilian Foreign Policy analysis by presenting a theory-oriented case study, exploring new methodological, ontological, and epistemological openings to the field by dialoguing with poststructuralists (mainly Lacanian) and postcolonial literature.

Considering the focus on Foreign Policy analysis and the limits of the scope of this research, the first part, of mapping the identity discourses, will be carried out by a comprehensive literature review, with a selection of key textbooks considered canonical in BFPA, as well as the most cited articles and books in the field, with special regard towards the narratives over Brazilian identity. The BFP texts and authors to be analyzed were selected not only based on my own expertise, but also on a survey

directed to researchers of the field, which will be described in the following section, as well as a review of the most cited articles of BFPA according to Google Scholar.

As previously mentioned in this methodological chapter, I will be looking for what are the master signifiers around which the narrative circulates, what are the events that are considered relevant, what has been silenced, how the chronology is constructed, and which conclusions it aims to corroborate. Some of the main questions to be asked will be: What are the elements in the field of discursivity? Does the field of contextual possibilities change throughout history? What is the hegemonic narrative? What are the privileged groups in its construction? How the past, present, and future are portrayed? Who is Brazil and who are the Brazilian people? Who is the other? What are the mechanisms of scapegoating used? What types of relations are articulated between the self and others?

This reading will be supported by similar works in the field of Brazilian Social thought, a field in which there are many similar works which I can rely on and be inspired by, such as Lage (2016), Vargas (2007), Vieira (2018), Souza (2017), Schwarcz (2019), among others. Those studies will support me in the analysis of some of the considered main references to talk about Brazilian identity in the field of International Relations, helping me to find intertextualities and what are the master signifiers around which BFP and its identities discourses circulate.

Under the methodological and theoretical perspective I follow, the identity discourses and the field of possibilities orbit certain aspects that would not vary much if many more other pieces were included, because of the collective imaginary constituency of the field of discursivity, the intertextuality in the area of International Relations in Brazil and its studies and narratives of Brazilian identity. Hence, following the most cited texts and the considered most influential authors in the field should be enough to identify the hegemonic narratives and their master signifiers.

3.6. Conclusion

This chapter presented the methodological framework through which I will conduct the discourse analysis in the following empirical chapters. This methodology is inspired by Lacanian psychoanalysis, as well as by Laclau and Mouffe's discourse analysis, which allow for a disruption with dichotomies such as ideas vs. materiality and emotion vs. reason. In both, language plays a constitutive role of reality. The relation among signifiers and meaning in chains of significance is anchored by master signifiers, which give a sense of closure and stability. But the meaning of these anchors are also not definitive, but constructed and positional as well. People are affectively attached to certain discourses, as they give them a sense of stability and ontological security; and those frequently need also the mobilization of otherness, through emotions of fear and hatred, towards which their *jouissance*, or enjoyment, depend upon.

The realm of narratives is also a realm of disputes. In a field of discursivity - concept proposed by Laclau and Mouffe - every narrative construction is possible, but there are always hegemonic narratives, as well as disputing ones taking part in these dynamics. Regarding these dynamics of what can be relatively stable in a given period and what cannot, I propose the introduction of the concept of the field of contextual possibilities, which delimits narratives that are considered possible in a given period and can be contrasted to the entire field of discursivity.

To analyze hegemonic narratives over the Brazilian identity and its biographical narratives, I propose to look at the master signifiers around which its narratives circulate and the chains of significance in which they are inserted. For that, I suggest looking at the field of BFPA specialists, considering their role in knowledge production and the (re)creation of narratives and regimes of truth. This realm of specialized narratives over Brazilian identity, the discourses over itself and its others, I consider to be part of what Campbell (1992) calls foreign policy.

I understand that there might be something traumatic about the Lula Government, which is not entirely clear (and probably will still not be by the end of this analysis). This trauma could have generated an identity crisis period, and the recent turn towards far-right populism could be a symptom. So, later on in the analysis, I propose looking at Foreign Policy (Campbell, 1992), by analyzing official discourses during Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and taking a close look to what are the master signifiers and the chains of significance that are inserted in and how they relate to Brazilian hegemonic biographical narratives found at the level of foreign policy.

Through this work, I aim to contrast identity and biographical narratives. Identity and biographical narratives BFP specialists have built libidinal investments, and over which many ontological security fantasies rely on. Still, I aim to contrast the identity narratives presented during Lula da Silva and see what possible reflections and insights this contrast offers. Those attempts will be presented in the following chapters.

4. Mapping the field of discursivity: a survey about Brazilian identity and canonical texts

4.0. Introduction

Aiming to explore the mainstream understandings over Brazilian foreign policy, Brazilian identity, its hegemonic biographical narrative, and the master signifiers around which these circulate in the field of BFP analysts, I conducted a survey with 24 BFP researchers, mostly Ph.D.s. Later, the results were also complemented with the most cited articles in Google Scholar and with an overview of Brazilian academia and how the authors mentioned and their research agendas could be related to the sociological constitution of the field.

The literature and authors found in the survey will inform a critical literature review of Brazil's identity narratives in the following chapter, also considering the elements that have been absorbed by the international relations literature, deriving mainly from specific readings of Brazilian social thought, historical and diplomatic thought.

The survey²⁴ was conducted through Google Forms, and destined to researchers in the field of BFPA, including graduate researchers and Ph.D.s. The results were useful to guide the selection of relevant literature and relevant debates according to the audience, adding to other efforts and also my personal experience as a graduate researcher of the field for the past 7 years.

The survey was broadly announced from the period of September 29th 2020 to November 5th 2020, through email and social media, and was entirely conducted in Portuguese, with the main target being Brazilians or Portuguese speaking researchers that publish in Brazil or are able to read the material published in Portuguese. Researchers were individually approached and the survey has also


²⁴ For the survey I had the insightful support and contributions from the professors of IRI PUC-Rio Dr. Maíra Siman Gomes and Dr. Paula Sandrin.

circulated in mailing lists of the main postgraduate programs in IR in Brazil. Individuals and/or groups from 20 Brazilian institutions were contacted: UFU, UERJ, UFRJ, UFRRJ, PUC-Rio, PUC-SP, PUC-Minas, UnB, UniCeub, USP, Unesp (San Tiago Dantas program), UFMG, USFC, UFSM, UFRGS, UFGD, UFG, UEPB, UFPB, UFBA. In total, I have obtained 24 answers, 20 (83.3%) coming from Ph.Ds. and 4 (16.7%) from non-PhDs (postgraduate students), all considering BFPA one of their main fields of research and interest.

4.1. The survey results

When asked if they lecture or have already lectured BFPA for undergraduates or postgrads, 67% (16 people) have taught the subject, while 33% (8 individuals) did not. The majority only taught the subject at the undergrad level (33%, 8 participants), a great amount has taught for both undergraduate and postgraduate students (29%, seven individuals), and a smaller amount has taught only at the postgraduate level (4%, only one participant). The results can be observed in chart 1, below:

Chart 1: Do you teach or have ever taught the subject of BFPA?



Source: my own elaboration

When inquired, in an open question format, about what are the debates in BFPA that the participants consider the most relevant, the most mentioned were, tied in the first place, development/developmentalism and foreign policy as public policy, with 7 (29%) mentions each; in second place, debates regarding multilateralism, regimes, and international organizations were mentioned by 6 people (25%); concepts/paradigms/theories, history of Brazilian foreign policy, identity and regional integration all come in third, with 5 (20,8%) mentions each; in fourth are: autonomy and international cooperation for development/south-south cooperation, with 4 mentions each (16.6%). The following table summarizes the main results:

Table 1: Topics or debates mentioned by two or more participants

Topic/ Debate	How many people mention
Development / Developmentalism	7 (29%)
Foreign Policy as Public Policy/ Decision making process/ Social participation	7 (29%)
Multilateralism / Regimes / International Organizations	6 (25%)
Concepts, paradigms or theories	5 (20.8%)
History of BFP	5 (20.8%)
Identity	5 (20.8%)
Regional Integration	5 (20.8%)
Autonomy	4 (16.6%)
International Cooperation for Development/South-South cooperation	4 (16.6%)
Diversification of actors and agendas	3 (12.5%)
United States	3 (12.5%)
International insertion/ International projection	3 (12.5%)
Americanism vs. Globalism	2 (8%)
Foreign Policy Analysis	2 (8%)

China	2 (8%)
Continuity and Ruptures	2 (8%)

Source: my own elaboration

When asked whether the participants consider any specific approach(s) or theoretical line(s) in their BFPA studies, the most cited were: constructivism (7 mentions); realism/ neo-neo synthesis (5 mentions); international political economy/ dependency theory/ world-systems theory (4 mentions); liberalism/ intergovernmentalism/ historical Institutionalism (3 mentions). Table 2 systematizes the answers, keeping in mind that one participant could mention more than one theoretical approach and that the systematization took into account only the ones mentioned more than once:

Table 2: Theoretical approaches mentioned more than one time

Approach	Number of mentions
Constructivism	7
Realism/neo-neo synthesis	5
International Political Economy/ Dependency Theory/ World systems theory	4
Liberalism/ Intergovernmentalism/ Historical Institutionalism	3
Brazilia school/ Amado Cervo's Paradigms/ Historiography	2
Role theory	2
Critical theories	2
Poststructuralism	2

None	2
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Source: my own elaboration

When questioned what were the primary texts (articles, books, thesis, dissertations) that the participant considers foundational to the subject of BFP, the authors cited more than one were the following at table 3:

Table 3: Authors mentioned more than once as foundational to BFP studies

Author	Number os mentions
Amado Cervo	18
Maria Regina Soares de Lima	14
Letícia Pinheiro	13
Tullo Vigevani	11
Gabriel Cepaluni	6
Gerson Moura	6
Mônica Hirst	6
Celso Lafer	5
Mathias Spektor	5
Eugênio Vargas Garcia	3
Gelson Fonseca Jr	3
Henrique Altemani de Oliveira	3
Paulo Visentini	3
Antônio Carlos Lessa	2
Ariane Figueira	2
Celso Amorim	2
Haroldo Ramanzini Jr	2
José Flávio Sombra Saraiva	2
Miriam Saraiva	2
Moniz Bandeira	2
Norma Breda Santos	2

Rodrigo Cintra	2
Sean Burges	2

Source: my own elaboration

Considering the same question, the references mentioned more than once were the ones in the table below. Symptomatic of what is found in the field, the most cited reference is a textbook of the history of BFP and has mainly a historical/descriptive content:

Table 4: Most cited references on BFP by the interviewees


Reference	Number of citations
CERVO, Amado; BUENO, Clodoaldo. História da Política Exterior do Brasil.	11
PINHEIRO, Letícia. Traídos pelo desejo	5
HIRST, Mônica; PINHEIRO, Letícia. A política externa do Brasil em dois tempos. Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 38 (1): 5-23 [1995].	4
VIGEVANI, Tullo; CEPALUNI. A política externa de Lula da Silva: a estratégia da autonomia pela diversificação. Contexto Internacional, Rio de Janeiro, vol. 29, no 2, julho/dezembro 2007, p. 273-335.	4
CERVO, Amado. Inserção Internacional do Brasil.	3

LAFER, Celso. A identidade internacional do Brasil e a política externa brasileira: passado, presente e futuro	3
LIMA, Maria Regina de Soares. Ejes analíticos y conflicto de paradigmas em la política exterior brasileña. America Latina/Internacional, vol. 1, nº 2 otoño-invierno, 1994.	2
LIMA, Maria Regina Soares de. Aspiração internacional e política externa. Revista Brasileira de Comércio Exterior, no. 82, ano XIX, Janeiro/Março de 2005, pp. 4-19.	2
MOURA. Relações Exteriores do Brasil, 1939-1950.	2
VIGEVANI, Tullo; CEPALUNI. A política externa brasileira: a busca de autonomia de Sarney a Lula. São Paulo, UNESP, 2 ed.2011.	2

Source: my own elaboration

When asked if they work with the idea of identity or national identity in their research and/or with their students 75% (18 people) of the respondents said yes, while 25% (6 people) said no, as it can be observed in chart 2:

Chart 2: How many participants consider identity or national identity in their work or classes



Source: my own elaboration

When approached on whether they use any specific theoretical approaches to the concept of identity in their research or studies, the respondents answered as follows in table 5.

Table 5: Most mentioned theoretical approaches to the concept of identity by the interviewees


Responses/ Theoretical approaches	Number os mentions
None	7
Poststructuralism/ Postmodernism	4
Constructivism	4
Role theory	4
History of Brazilian Foreign Policy/ Brazilian Concepts/ Brazilian paradigms/ French sociology of IR (Brasilia School)	3
Postcolonialism/ PanAfricanism/ Latinoamerican Perspectives	2
Critical Theory	1

Imagined Communities (based on Benedict Anderson and Rubens Ricupero)	1
Status Theories	1

Source: my own elaboration

When asked in a multiple-choice answer about their understanding of the concept of identity (with more than one possible alternative) and open to other contributions, considering the following: 1) identity as a set of historical and socially constructed values that define the Brazilian nation; 2) Identity as principles that guide external action; 3) Identity as an unstable category, which cannot be predetermined or fixed, the responses were as follows in chart 3:

Chart 3: Preferred approaches of identity by the interviewees



Source: my own elaboration

When asked what the main elements or principles that compose Brazil's identity for the interviewees were, the most cited in order of relevance were systematized in table 6:

Table 6: Main elements or principles that compose Brazil's identity for the interviewees:

Order of relevance	Element/principle	Number of mentions
1º	Legalism/ Primacy of law/ Negotiation/ Universalism / Pacifism, peaceful settlement of conflicts	9
2º	Development	6
	Autonomy	6
3º	Historical traditions/ diplomatic history	5
	Cooperation	5
	Pretense racial democracy/ cultural mixture/ racial mixture/ Afrolatinoamericanism	5
4º	North-South Mediator/ Bridge country	4
	Government ideology/ domestic, internal determinants	4
	Patriarchalism/ Oligarchies/ Elites's values/ Corruption	4
	Latinoamerican cooperation/ South-american cooperation/ South-american identity/ Cordiality with neighbors/ Geographic positioning.	4
5º	Territory (greatness)	3

	Hybrid/ ambiguous/ antropophagic/ the other West.	3
	Multilateralism/ Reform of the international liberal order	3
6º	Global South/ Developing World	2
	Solidarity	2
	Greatness dream/ greater role in the international arena	2
	State bureaucracy	2

Source: my own elaboration

When inquired about what were the main texts or materials considered central to approach the topic of Brazilian identity to the interviewees, the most cited references were the following:

Table 7: most cited references to Brazilian identity according to the interviewees

Reference	Number of mentions
Celso Lafer: a identidade internacional do Brasil	12
Amado Luiz Cervo: Inserção Internacional: formação dos conceitos brasileiros	4
Luis Claudio Villafañe G. Santos: O dia que adiaram Carnaval	2
Luis Claudio Villafañe G. Santos O Brasil entre a Europa e a América: o Império e o Interamericanismo.	2

Source: my own elaboration

In the same question, the most cited authors were, as follows in table 7:

Table 8: most cited authors to Brazilian identity by the interviewees

Autores	Número de menções
Celso Lafer	12
Luis Claudio Villafañe G. Santos	4
Amado Cervo	4
Gelson Fonseca	3
Maria Regina Soares de Lima	2
Letícia Pinheiro	2
Darcy Ribeiro	2
Sérgio Buarque de Holanda	2
Rubens Ricupero	2

Source: my own elaboration

The authors mentioned, as well as some others, their main research traditions and some initial reflections over their influence over the BFPA studies, the production and reproduction of Brazilian identities will be discussed in the following topic.

Beyond the survey, a search on google scholar on September 20th 2020, pointed out the following papers as the most cited in the field of Brazilian Foreign Policy, which shall also be taken into consideration:

Table 9: Most cited Brazilian Foreign Policy papers according to Google Scholar

Author	Title	Year	Journal	Number of citations
Vigevani, T. Cepaluni, G	A Política Externa de Lula da Silva: a estratégia da autonomia pela diversificação/ Lula's foreign policy and the quest for autonomy through diversification	2007	Contexto Internacional/ Third World Quarterly	847
Lima, MRS., Hirst, M.	Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities	2006	International Affairs	647
Malamud, A.	A leader without followers? The growing divergence between the regional and global performance of Brazilian foreign policy	2011	Latin American Politics and Society	450
Cason, JW; Power, T.J.	Presidentialization, pluralization and the rollback of Itamaraty: explaining change in Brazilian Foreign Policy making in the Cardoso-Lula Era	2009	International Political Science Review	327
Burges, S.W.	Consensual hegemony: theorizing Brazilian foreign policy after the Cold War	2008	International Relations	326

			(SAGE publications)	
Amorim, C.	Brazilian foreign policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview.	2010	Revista brasileira de política internacional	292
Saraiva, M.G	As estratégias de cooperação Sul-Sul nos marcos da política externa brasileira de 1993 a 2007	2007	Revista brasileira de política internacional	237
Pinheiro, L.	Traídos pelo desejo: um ensaio sobre a teoria e a prática da política externa brasileira contemporânea	2000	Contexto Internacional	235
Cervo, A.L.	Brazil's rise on the international scene: Brazil and the World	2010	Revista brasileira de política internacional	214
Lima, MRS.	Instituições democráticas e política exterior	2000	Contexto Internacional	198
Dauvergne, P., Farias, DBL.	The rise of Brazil as a global development power	2012	Third World Quarterly	176

Milani, C.R.S., Pinheiro, L.	Política externa brasileira: os desafios de sua caracterização como política pública.	2013	Contexto Internacional	145
Burges, S.W.	Brazil as a bridge between old and new powers?	2013	International Affairs	129
Faria, CAP	Opinião pública e política externa: insulamento, politização e reforma na produção da política exterior do Brasil	2008	Revista brasileira de política internacional	120
Salomón, M., Pinheiro, L.	Análise de Política Externa e Política Externa Brasileira: trajetória, desafios e possibilidades de um campo de estudos	2013	Revista brasileira de política internacional	113

Source: My own elaboration.

4.2. Analyzing some of the main authors' contributions to BFA and their larger relation towards thought traditions

Maria Regina Soares de Lima is a pioneer in the field of FPA, inspired by neorealist perspectives and IR in Brazil more broadly. She headed the area (of FPA), paved the way to many other referential authors, and is probably the primary reference in Brazil working with FPA neo-neo synthesis, combining both domestic and systemic elements, particularly the idea that foreign policy is in the intersection between domestic and international politics. Citing her: 'Foreign policy's double facet, not only as a public policy generated inside the State and later inputted into international politics, it is also conditioned by the asymmetric order in which it is inserted, combined to the functioning of the States system and global capitalism.' (LIMA, 2018, p. 45, my translation)

Lima (1994) systematizes the analytical axis of BFP. which will later be developed by Saraiva (2000) and others. Lima (1994, p. 27) describes the idea of continuity in Brazil's foreign policy action and the belief that there has been a consensus between the relevant political and economic forces regarding foreign policy as a fiction. Nonetheless, she argues that Brazil has presented through the history of the XXth century, from Rio Branco to the end of the 1980s, two main foreign policy paradigms, one of a special alliance with the United States and the globalist one. The first is inspired by Rio Branco's legacy and the notion that the US is a global power and hegemon in the West and, therefore, an alliance with the US would represent a tactical alliance for Brazil. That notion lasted until the beginning of the 1960s (LIMA, 1994, p. 34) and was later named as *Americanism* by Saraiva (2000).

On the other hand, the *globalist* paradigm, originated at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, is based on the necessity of globalizing Brazil's foreign policy. It was idealized by political figures such as the diplomat Araújo Castro, inspired by intellectuals such as 1) the nationalist critique against the *Americanist* paradigm posed by ISEB (High Institute of Brazilian Studies), mainly Helio Jaguaribe's; 2) ECLAC's approach on the center-periphery relations, namely Raul Prebisch's; and 3)

the realist thought in International Relations, mostly the idea of the anarchical system and the self-help principle. Hence, different from the previous paradigm that supposed a mutual relevance between Brazil and the United States, in *globalism* Brazil needs to pursue that relevance by increasing its negotiation power, with mechanisms such as development through industrialization and the sought of greater autonomy (Lima, 1994, p. 35-36) The author understands that both paradigms find a dead end in the 1990s and that the context of the end of the cold war, Brazil's re-democratization and the multilateral environment imposed the creation of new approaches.

Some of the most referential authors Lima seems to have inspired are: Letícia Pinheiro, Mônica Herz, Mônica Hirst, Carlos Milani, Miriam Saraiva, Mônica Salomon, very influential authors researching most aligned with the Rio de Janeiro axis. Some of them have been also pushing for a debate of foreign policy as public policy (e.g.: MILANI; PINHERO, 2013), disrupting the realist ontology as the main lenses of foreign policy analysis, unsettling the common (realist and influenced by Instituto Rio Branco's strong tradition in Brazil's FPA thought) perception that foreign policy has a special status, dealing with the survival of the State, and should not be exposed to domestic political disputes and scrutiny.

In this regard, consider the "foreign policy as a public policy" to be the main debate in BFPA in current times; it has impacted/interacted, and learned from other academic spaces in Brazil. The researchers more aligned with the São Paulo axis, which has also a focus on *multilateralism* and international negotiations, are Tullo Vigevani, Gabriel Cepaluni, Janina Onuki, and Amâncio Jorge de Oliveira, Rogério de Souza Farias, Mathias Spektor, Oliver Stuenkel, Haroldo Ramanzini Júnior, Feliciano de Sá Guimarães, Dawidsson Belem Lopes, between many others²⁵.

²⁵ Another relevant dialogue in this area are the strategic and geopolitical studies, which have one of its most influential research programs at UFRGS and important dialoguing authors throughout Brazil, either at the Rio-São Paulo axis or outside of it, also with a considerate participation of researches that are also part of the armed forces and the Escola Superior de Guerra, linked to the Ministry of Defense.

Another head of research in Brazilian Foreign Policy in Brazil would be the so-called 'Brasilia school', strongly influenced by the historical/historiographic studies, and to some extent, by the English School, International Law, and the French sociological school, represented by works such as Renovin and Duroselle. These authors inspired the works mainly of Amado Cervo, Jose Flavio Sombra Saraiva, Henrique Altemani and Antonio Carlos Lessa, as well as the diplomats Rubens Ricupero, Celso Lafer, Gelson Fonseca and Celso Amorim. The IR institute at the Brasília University is still the highest-ranked in Brazil and very referential, it is also responsible for the highest-ranked IR journal in Brazil, the *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* (RBPI). The institute also has deep connections to the Rio Branco Institute (IRBr) and its publications. The IRBr trains diplomats at the beginning of the career and, as mentioned before, both institutions have deep influence on each other and interchange of specialists and professors. When the institute was created, the diplomats taught there and since then, the researchers at the University also teach and advise the institute and have great influence at their publications committee, FUNAG, IPRI, etc.

In the 'Brasilia school', professor Amado Cervo is famous for advocating against the importing and employment of theories that were designed for different contexts (and usually for different political or economic interests) and reinforces the importance of banishing epistemological imperialism. He argues, instead, for the use of theories and concepts based on our nation's own experience and history. According to him, Brazilian concepts were created by the thinkers of the nation regarding the nations' destiny and place in the world; the political and diplomatic thinkers; and the academics and scientific analysts that systematically analyze the connections between the inside and the outside. According to Cervo, while the traditional method for elaborating theories is a deductive one – and that gives it intrinsic fragility – the most

adequate method would be the historical one, which, through induction, goes from concrete to abstract. (CERVO, 2008, p. 14-21)

Hence, rejecting the use of theories such as realism or liberalism in international relations, Cervo (2008, p. 22) proposes understanding Brazilian foreign policy through concepts or paradigms. Concepts have, he argues, four main characteristics: i) are socially constructed; ii) express historicity; iii) include a positive (or propositional) image; iv) and reflect truth and methodological rigor. Cervo (2008, p. 23, my translation) describes that, as concepts express historicity, they are able to “penetrate the deep structure of concrete stuff [...] exhibiting an autonomous ontological entity”, intermediating the analyzing subject and the objects analyzed. “Once constructed, concepts have their own existence and aggregate to the *corpus* of knowledge facing international relations. They are born and die as historical phenomena.” Even though admitting that a concept does not comprehend the entire complexity of the phenomena and that they are constantly changing, Cervo considers that they are consistent when they exhibit continuity and order over volatility and complexity. He argues that concepts are ultimately fed by the cultural basis of the nation and the country’s national interest rulers’ readings and by the critical influence of researchers. (CERVO, 2008, p. 23)

Cervo describes that the first paradigm of Brazilian foreign policy is the liberal-conservative one that starts at our Independence and continues until 1930. This framework is based on the appropriation of classical European Liberalism and is responsible for keeping Brazil’s historical backwardness, considering ECLAC’s structural reading of the international. From his perspective, the liberal-conservative paradigm’s founding fathers have dominated Brazilian power circles for over a century and have created inerasable marks in national formation.

The second paradigm, the developmentalist, is based on ECLAC’s diagnostics and modernization/development theories. According to Cervo, this paradigm lasted 60 years, when it was interrupted by the neoliberal wave in the 1990s. The third paradigm, that represents, in his words “a coming back to the past through subservience but, at

the same time, a leap towards the future, opening up the economy and the society to the fluxes of globalization”. (CERVO, 2008, p. 16, my translation) The final paradigm he proposes is the logistical, a mark of the XXI Century, in which the State behaves as an inductor and a supporter of development. The main actors in this process are society and its agents, which would not choose the market at the expense of the wellbeing of the nation.

Very important for consolidating influences of theoretical approaches and advancing refined methodologies in FPA to BFPA, those approaches are, nonetheless, still much guided by the idea of foreign policy as a link between the domestic and the international realms. The conceptions of identity have a Wendtian profile, and the actors seem to still be reflecting the *homo economicus*, making decisions guided by objective cost-benefit calculus. Hence, identity discourses have mostly an instrumental character. Elements such as emotion and affects, the discursive construction of reality, and colonial – mainly racist – foundations of Brazilian imaginary are still widely overlooked, as well as the contributions of critical Brazilian social thought are still considered not to be FPA.

A central example of this is Celso Lafer’s approach to the Brazilian identity. According to him, a collective identity is constructed through the “[...] idea of a collective good or interest that takes people to affirm an identity through similarity, based in a shared vision of this common good or interest.” (LAFER, 2000, p. 15) In this context, for Lafer, it is also possible to talk about national identities, which are created through international interaction with the external Other. Hence, the author reinforces how foreign policy and diplomatic activity are entitled to defend the country’s interests in the international realm, and the very identification of those interests and their specificities is a task and a daily exercise of representation of the collective identity of a country. (LAFER, 2000, p. 16)

Darcy Ribeiro and Sérgio Buarque de Hollanda are thinkers of Brazilian social thought that have been introduced to Brazilian studies, and more recently, BFPA, mostly in critical approaches. Contributions from authors such as Luis Claudio

Villafañe G. Santos, Marco Antônio Vieira, Victor Coutinho Lage, Maíra Siman Gomes, among many others, are writing considering the intimate relation between Brazil social thought and the constant production and reproduction of Brazilian identity through foreign policy discourses. (HANSEN, 2006) Concerned with the so-called corporate identity of the state, those authors, like myself, understand that there is no such thing as an ‘internal’ identity (or corporate identity) separated from an external identity, which for Wendtians is only ‘formed’ through interaction in the international system. (ZEHFUSS, 2001)

Instead of well-separated internal and external realms, I understand foreign policy as an active (and discursive) creation of the boundary between the inside and outside. (CAMPBELL, 1992; HANSEN, 2006) This boundary needs to be constantly articulated because it, ultimately, makes the very existence of the State possible. It does so by articulating identity and difference, constructing the state through the idea of anarchy and the self through the hate or the fear of the other. (ASHLEY, 1988)

In this context, I am concerned not only with the official narratives of BFPA but also with the role of knowledge production and regimes of truth and. In this regard, the very scholarship of BFPA holds a vital role in the production and (re)production of Brazilian biographical narratives, identity discourses, and the master signifiers around which they revolve. Those elements will be further discussed in the following chapter.

4.3. Conclusion

This chapter presented a survey with 24 researchers of the field of BFPA, with the primary objective of having a more significant ground for, given the most cited texts, authors, theories, and debates, then mapping the field of discursivity and the hegemonic discourses over Brazilian biographical narratives in the next chapter. This survey was also complemented with a Google Scholar search of the most cited texts of BFP.

Considering the results, I also presented a small section debating the sociology of knowledge of the BFPA field in Brazil. Through this, I hope to give a sense of the dynamics of the production of knowledge of the area in the country, as well as to facilitate the understanding of the next chapter, which will focus on the mainstream narratives building the country's biographical imaginary of BFP analysts. Therefore, the following chapter will be based on both a critical literature review of the area, as well as on the (re)construction of Brazilian biographical narratives under these specific lenses.

5. The master signifiers of Brazilian Foreign Policy

5.0. Introduction

Bearing in mind the results of the survey and the review of BFP and Brazilian social thought literature, this chapter aims to build its discussion about some of the main master signifiers around which BFP narratives of identity circulate. Constructing a meta-narrative²⁶ over Brazilian identity, it seeks to understand which signifier chains those anchors are attached to, how they emerged as great narratives of the Brazilian self and how they build and reinforce discourses about the Brazilian self, its past, present and desired future. In chapter six, these narratives and chains of signifiers will be compared to Lula da Silva's foreign policy discourses, seeking to understand whether or to what extent it dislocates BFP's identity anchors, regarded as its master signifiers, autobiographical narratives, as well as how it relates to its others.

For this, the master signifiers selected for the discussion were *miscegenation/racial democracy*, *pacifism/legalism*, *development*, and *autonomy*. Other relevant master signifiers also appear related to the previously mentioned ones, such as *multilateralism*, *pragmatism*, *territorial greatness*, *search for international greatness*, *North-South mediator/bridge country*, *other West*, among others.

Before starting the discussion, it is important to mention that though the analysis of the four master signifiers selected will be separated into different sections, most of the terms have their critical discussion intertwined and appear

²⁶ I understand that what I am doing, beyond being a scientific exercise, is also a creative one in itself. The attempt to (re)construct the hegemonic narratives over Brazilian identity can be interpreted as a construction in itself, a narrative, and not the only possible truth. Regarding the same bibliographical material I went through and the same methodology I propose, other analysts could frame the Brazilian biographical narratives differently. I do think such a comparison would enrich the approach over the master signifiers of BFP, regarding and what the similarities and differences could say both about the hegemonic and disputing narratives in the field as well as about the creative role of the analysts.

throughout the text. There is also a temporal line of construction of those narratives, not only because this was the way the bibliography is structured but maybe also because biographies are built in an imaginary linear time. While “reconstructing” the BFP biography, I could find some narratives analogous to an imaginary birth, childhood, and youth, walking towards a desired (and unattainable?) mature adulthood of the Brazilian nation.

Finally, in Laclau and Mouffe terms, considering that every hegemonic narrative has also disputing ones, I always try to put the hegemonic narratives in debate with some other disputing narratives, with special regard to the racial debates, as Vieira (2018) presents it to be the core discursive disruption during Lula. Through this strategy, I seek to contrast how the master signifiers are being differently articulated in each narratives’ respective chains of signifiers. I am also aware that I am not able to cover the entire field of discursivity and try to make clear that this is far from my goal.

By exploring some of the disputing narratives I have two main objectives. First, to expose the heterogeneity of the field of discursivity. Second, to explore the vulnerabilities, inconsistencies and internal tensions in the master signifiers and the hegemonic narratives in which they are articulated.

5.1. Bridging the old and the new, avoiding ruptures: the Republic as a foundational myth of Brazil and its imaginary of miscegenation

The Brazilian nation is constantly being built, produced, enacted, and performed through literature, historiography, social sciences, and the multidisciplinary explanations of ‘Interpreters of Brazil’. Original myths and national heroes also play a central role, as well as national symbols, hymns, and festivities. Even though from a formal Foreign Policy perspective, Brazil started to exist in 1822 in the proclamation of independence, there was no national feeling to ballast the country or a common identity between the diverse provinces in the territory, and probably it did not exist until the period of Proclamation of the Republic (1889) (SANTOS, 2010).

Regarding the construction a national identity and of national myths of territorial greatness, its intimate relations to the Portuguese heritage, Cervo and Bueno (2011, p. 97) describe that:

“The idea of nationality was an original fact, which triumphed over regional revolts and separatist attempts to consolidate since the beginning of the Second Reign. [...] [The characteristics of Brazilian nationality were constructed] based on the Portuguese heritage, a historical legacy, and it was supported by the monarchic state. It created its myth: that of national greatness. Brazilian nationality was introverted, of congenital sufficiency, turned inward, supported by the vastness of space and the abundance of resources. The policy of limits, according to the logic of the elements, would have to be one of preservation, the uncompromising defense of the legacy, of the *uti possidetis*. The myth of the frontier was replaced by that of national greatness, and in this way the problem of the frontier was reduced to the political-legal problem of limits, as occurred in the rest of Latin America” (CERVO; BUENO, 2011, p. 97, my translation).

The Brazilian doctrine of the *uti possidetis* had by its definition, that the demarcation of the Brazilian territory would always follow *conciliatory*, *pacific* and *friendly* means, seeking for a common agreement and allowing for the exchange of territory or indemnities, to fix the frontiers in the most natural and exact away, following the interests of both peoples involved. (Cervo and Bueno, 2011, p. 100) In the doctrine of *uti possidetis* lies some of the central myths of Brazil: the *pacific* resolution of conflicts, the *rule of law* and the *territorial greatness*. Those elements will be recalled and reinforced by the founding father of Brazilian diplomacy, Barão do Rio Branco, in the beginning of the XX century, as the core elements of Brazil’s diplomatic identity. (CERVO; BUENO, 2011)

Still in 1838, the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute (IHGB)²⁷ was created aiming to construct an official narrative over Brazilian history, seeking to define the Brazilian nation and provide it with a unique identity. It was largely supported by the Portuguese crown, which was the sponsor of around 75% of IHGB’s budget, and mainly inspired by Illuminist academy, being a central tool in the centralization of the Brazilian state under the emperor, Dom Pedro II.

²⁷ In Portuguese: *Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro*.

To define Brazil, IHGB had also to construct narratives of the “other” in relation to which its identity is built and, somewhat differently from other postcolonial countries, Brazilian identity was not constructed in opposition to the Portuguese metropole, as mentioned by Cervo and Bueno (2011) in the citation above. On the contrary, the idea of the Brazilian nation was consolidated as a continuation of the civilizational mission initiated by Portugal and the other of this narrative – hindering the nation’s development - were the indigenous and, mostly, the black populations. (GUIMARÃES, 1988)

Hence, the idea of a Brazilian nation was inspired and created by a white monarchist elite oriented under scientific racism paradigms. In 1847, IHGB awarded the German Carl Von Martius essay in a contest aiming to discuss how to portray Brazil’s official history. Published in 1844, the winning essay following a naturalistic approach, described Brazilian society through the image of the junction of three rivers. The main one, with the major water flux, was the contribution from white (European) populations; a second, and smaller one, joining the first, represented the indigenous peoples influences; and the third one, the smallest, also joining the first, represented the black populations’ contributions. The idea was that the main river got bolder and ‘clearer’ throughout time, representing the consolidation of a white and civilized society in the tropics. (SCHWARCZ, 2013, p. 23-24) This could be considered the first version of Brazilian imaginary of its founding myth of racial democracy, which would be consolidated in the first half of the XX Century. (GUIMARÃES, 1988)

In this regard, approximately 73% of IHGB’s publications were regarding the indigenous *problematique*. Most of it looked at the possibilities for indigenous colonization and their employment as a labor force in the context of the imminent end of slave trafficking. Others, concerned the exploratory trips of mapping Brazil’s frontiers, where also is born the narrative of Brazil’s greatness in terms of territoriality and natural sources; as well as regarded local historiographies from other regions far from the capital, to make sure the monarchy was informed of what happened in other parts of Brazil. Thus, knowledge production was a central mechanism for the consolidation of a narrative over the Brazilian nation in its

colonial (hence, racist, in Quijano's [2007] terms) emergence and IHGB represents the institutionalization of the quest for a Brazilian nationality genesis in this context.

Beyond the role of IHGB, the Catholic Church was another central institution in the construction and reinforcement of the hegemonic narratives over the Brazilian state the legitimization of slavery. Abdias Nascimento (2016, p. 62), quoting lines of the famous Jesuit priest, Father Antônio Vieira, shows that the main discourse of the Catholic Church was that the black peoples in Brazil should be grateful to God for having been taken out of their land and given the opportunity to become Christians and serve as slaves as means to achieve salvation.

The State institutions also represent a curious and enduring attempt throughout Brazil's history, which is the attempt to integrate the "old" and the "new", *avoiding ruptures*. (GUIMARÃES, 1988, p. 7) This seems to be a very important element when analyzing Brazil's historical construction from a psychoanalytical perspective: it seems that Brazil has been sweeping the dirt under the rug for a very long time, not dealing with its ruptures and its wounds properly. The transition from colonialism to the imperial monarchy without a rupture with Portugal and the colonial political arrangements is an example, as well as the formal end of slavery in 1888 without any social policies of inclusion of recently free black populations.

Schwarcz (2013, p. 19) reminds us that the Republic's Anthem, created in 1890 (only one year and a half after slavery abolition) would proudly proclaim "*we cannot even believe that slaves existed in such a noble country!*"²⁸, as if Brazilians could already forget slavery or pretend it never existed. In this regard, psychoanalysis teaches us to be suspicious of what is actively denied – or disavowed - and to believe that there could be something else telling the analyst just the contrary.

According to Lafer (2000, p. 37), the monarchy was the basis for a *sui generis* Brazilian identity in the 1800s, an empire amidst republics, a great Portuguese

²⁸ In Portuguese: "*Nós nem cremos que escravos outrora/ Tenha havido em tão nobre país!*" (SCHWARCZ, 2012, 19)

speaking territorial mass with fragmented Hispanic neighbors, having as the reference of North America the United States in full territorial expansion. Hence, in the XIX century, being Brazilian meant to be non-Hispanic, due to its linguistic and sociological singularity.

In this context, the proclamation of the Republic represented the insertion of Brazil in the Americas, as the Republican Manifest affirmed “We are from America and we want to be American.” This ‘Americanization’ sought to undue the perception that Brazil was different from its neighbors, due to its monarchic institutions, and reduce its connection with Europe.

Therefore, the Brazilian state identity official narratives during the empire were also consolidated against the ‘external other’ represented by the ‘chaos’ and ‘barbarism’ of the neighboring Republics in South America, a view that also reflected an isolationist foreign policy in the region during the period. Brazil did not only have a different regime, it also was the last country in the American continent to officially abolish slavery, which happened only in 1888, representing a more conservative position if compared with the neighbor countries. (GUIMARÃES, 1988)

In this context, the war against Paraguay (1864-1870) was an important moment of stimulus for nationalism in Brazil. The victories moved the population, the national flag started to be continuously apparent in newspapers and magazines, as well as scenes of the battlefield, the national anthem publicly executed. Furthermore, the emperor D. Pedro II was presented as leader of the nation and the first military national heroes were created. (SANTOS, 2010, p.182)

Military forces were also applied to the management of regional resistances against the consolidation of the Brazilian state, while the formal Portuguese diplomats and elites were gathered on the project of unification of the country. The main element unifying those elites was their fear of the end of slaves trafficking and slavery itself, measurers that were already demanded by England. Using the already traditional and trained remaining Portuguese diplomats in the country was, then, key to D. Pedro II’s independence project. (SANTOS, 2010)

Considering Brazil's particular situation, according to Santos (2002), the post-colonial literature needs to overcome its silence when referring to hierarchies in the colonial world. The author describes that an important differentiation between Portuguese and British colonialisms must be made, as the former represents the old-fashioned mercantilist world, also not adjusted to the modern industrialized Era in which the British represented the real and main significant other. To Santos (2002), this hybrid position of the colonizer also influenced the constitution of a hybrid Brazilian self, which was subject of a double colonization as Portugal was strongly dependent on Great Britain and, hence explored Brazil. Regarding that, Santos (2002, 19) highlights an important question, difficult to answer: "[h]as colonization by an incompetent, reluctant, originally hybrid Prospero resulted in undercolonization or overcolonization? A colonization that was particularly empowering or disempowering for the colonized?" (SANTOS, 2002, p. 19)

According to Santos (2002), Portugal's 'weak' colonialism was particularly relevant in Brazil's case because it made a conservative independence and a movement of internal colonialism possible: "[...] oligarchic elites were allowed to cash in on the structures of colonial domination while singing the praise of the inaugural act of the construction of the national state. Internal colonialism is the great continuity in this space." (SANTOS, 2002, p. 36) Thus, the conditions created by external colonialism allowed internal colonialism to follow. (SANTOS, 2002, p. 19)

In this context, there is a common idea that slavery was somewhat lighter in Brazil, due to its Portuguese heritage of supposed racial tolerance (SCHWARCZ, 2013, p. 39). Indeed, the seminal book *Big House and the Slave Quarters*, by Gilberto Freyre, reinforces that logic that the relationship between the slaves and the landowners was supposedly more intimate than in other slave countries.

In this biographical narrative reconstruction, the Republic, proclaimed through a military coup in 1890, ended Brazil's imaginary 'childhood'. Childhood here in the sense of a period in which the country could not be responsible for its acts, needing tutelage from the grown-ups, Portugal and, ideally, Great Britain. Now, after the Republic, it seeks to merge and be similar to its equals, the other

Republican Latin American countries, and finally starts the search for its national identity, which, in a biographical narrative imaginary is very similar to the country's adolescence.

The proclamation of the Republic was an important mechanism of the elites in trying to erase the slavery past, which would now belong only to the monarchist period of Brazil. It was a way of starting a new history and erasing the previous one²⁹. Shortly after the promulgation of the Republic, Rui Barbosa, the minister of finance, ordered that all slavery records in the national archives should be burned. (NASCIMENTO, 2016; SCHWARCZ, 2013) Guided by a very restrictive, modern and colonial idea of *progress*, the Republic institutionalized the persecution and destruction of Afro-Brazilian spaces such as *cortiços* (tenements) and *capoeiras*, the main example being the Pereira Passos urban reform in Rio de Janeiro, the city with the biggest black population in the Americas:

“By pursuing *capoeiras*, demolishing tenements, modifying urban designs - in short, by seeking to change the direction of the city's development - the Republicans were actually attacking the historical memory of the search for freedom. They did not simply demolish houses and remove debris, but also sought to dismantle scenarios, to empty out meanings painfully constructed in the black city's long struggle against slavery” (CHALHOUB, 2011, p. 325-326, my translation).

In that same context, the immigration laws after the abolishment of slavery were created under the strategy of abolishing the ‘black stain’ in Brazilian population. According to Nascimento (2016, p. 86) the decree of June 28th, 1890 allows for free entrance of individuals apt for work, except indigenous *from Asia or Africa*, who could enter only with the authorization of the National Congress. Nascimento highlights how the argument that Brazil was lacking workforce was a fallacy supported by whitening ideologists, as the recently free afro-Brazilians would be left to die with no real possibility of inclusion in the labor market and increasingly substituted by Europeans with the hope to gradually whiten Brazilian population.

²⁹ I own this comment to my colleague Gustavo Alvim de Góes Bezerra, also Ph.D. candidate at PUC-Rio and researcher of this period of Brazilian history.

This thesis reinforces the whitening ideologies as embedded in racism, which is a core element of coloniality. In accordance with Quijano's (2007, p. 171) approach, the coloniality of power is marked by process that have race as the key element of hierarchization between colonized and colonizers, in which the white Western European is considered biologically and structurally superior and, hence, entitled of the quest of civilization.

Under this perspective, the proclamation of the Republic, a foundational myth for the other that comes right after, the myth of racial democracy, works as a way of erasing and disempowering the black memory and legacy in Brazil, in a similar way that the Republican urban reforms did. The myth ends the possibility of discussion about the neurosis left by the racial trauma and creates a fantasy that, taken to the limit, does not believe that slavery happened in Brazil (as it is found in the republican anthem), which opens for the possibility to affirm that there is no racism in Brazil. However, this only propagates the neurosis, as the desired future is still white and the whitening policies in the end of the XIX century and beginning of the XX are in full swing and become the very founding basis of the Brazilian collective imaginary.

Therefore, regarding the biographical narrative explored in this section, the signifier chain of the master signifiers discussed would look close to this: *Republic (Latin American) - miscegenation - pacifism*.

5.1.1. Disputing narratives: The racist foundations of the Brazilian State

[...] a white or whitish society, generated in the womb of racism and its culture, in which it was immersed for more than four hundred years. Thus, racism constitutes the psycho-socio-cultural backbone that makes conventional Brazilian society an intrinsically prejudiced and discriminatory entity of Afro-black descendants. (NASCIMENTO, 2020, p. 188-189, my translation)

The end of the XIX century was a period in which scientific racism was central to knowledge production and the whitening policies were idealized, as equality was seen as a fallacy. Black peoples were frequently portrayed as

degenerated, beholders of psychiatric diseases and criminality, which would condemn Brazil to underdevelopment and degeneration. (SCHWARCZ, 2012, p. 19-20) Brazilian whitening policies through the stimulation for European migration to the country (FERREIRA, 2002), represented a first movement in Brazil's racial story in which elites tried to erase, or, at least, hide African heritages in the Brazilian phenotype and cultural manifestations (VIEIRA, 2018; SOUZA, 2017).

In this context, the following topic will debate the imaginary foundation of the Brazilian state - the Republic - and its built narrative of *miscegenation* as inherently linked to racism.

5.1.2 Debating the signifier *miscegenation*

According to Lélia Gonzalez, Brazilian cultural neurosis has racism as its symptom par excellence (GONZALEZ, 1988, p. 69, my translation). She calls Brazilian racism 'disavowal racism', using Freud's concept of disavowal (*Verneinung*). She describes disavowal as "a process by which the individual, even though formulating his own desires, thoughts and feelings, until then repressed, keeps defending himself from it, denying that it belongs to him", such as the narrative of racial democracy does.

Munanga (2019, p. 18-19) reinforces that the eugenic thought that is on the roots of Brazil's identity formation left on the country's collective unconscious an ideal of whiteness that jeopardizes any construction of an identity based on the black populations or *mestiços* (which comes latter in Brazil's history), because the collective ideal (or fantasy, in psychoanalytic terms) is a desire of whiteness. In this context, the *mestiços* become an epistemological problem, as Darcy Ribeiro would say, an in-between of two worlds: the black, that they abominate; and the white, that rejects them. (MUNANGA, 2019, p. 97)

Souza (2017, p. 54-55, 64) describes that Brazilian families in the XIX century, were patriarchal, and polygamist, as the big land owners usually had many 'non-legitimate' children, with mainly black but also indigenous servants. Those

descendants were, many times, given the same education as the ‘legitimate’ ones and represented some possibility of social mobility. Those *mestiços* would many times work in trust functions, such as labor control and hunting escaped slaves, as well as military services in squabbles and land borders. These ‘extended patriarchal families’, as the author calls, would open for the first version of the ambiguous structuring of Brazilian society.

In the USA, for example, only whites practiced these kind of functions, but in Brazil there was a predominance of *mestiços*: “[...] since then, the possibility of social ascension to *mestiços* in patriarchal familyism happened in exchange with the values and interests of the oppressor.” (SOUZA, 2017, p. 55, my translation) The process of miscegenation was boosted with the ‘import’ of millions of Europeans to Brazil. Souza (2017, p. 70) describes that the proportion of *mulatos* grew from 10% to 41% in the end of the XIX century, due to strong miscegenation and interracial marriages.

From these efforts, the category of *mestiço*, *criolo*, *mulato* or (the later ones, even more usual, *moreno* and *pardo*) were created, which are categories inherently hybrid, to progressively erase the African heritage. *Mestiços* started to have some kind of social mobility, especially if they had lighter skin, were Christians and had academic training (GUIMARÃES, 1999, p. 47 apud SOUZA, 2017, p. 71). Being white, or, to use Fanon’s terms, to wear a white mask, would signify, at that time, to be favoring Brazil’s modernization.

According to Souza (2017, p. 70-71), being white meant at that time (and still does) to possess specific moral and cultural attributes, against something other from African origin that was considered ‘primitive’, ‘uncivilized’ and incompatible with the European modern standards of society that Brazilians wanted for the future. The author even describes that Brazilian miscegenation was a national way of ‘dividing to conquest’: “[...] separating the mulattoes from the blacks and making them servile to the whites makes it possible to stigmatize and over-explore black people in every conceivable way.” (SOUZA, 2017, p. 68, my translation)

The idea that, in Brazil, slavery was lighter due to close relations between slaves and its owners, as portrayed in Gilberto Freyre’s book *Casa Grande e*

Senzala (Big House & the Slave Quarters) is also a central narrative enabling the racial democracy myth. As Nascimento (2020, p. 36-37) argues, this false image of a humanized slavery with certain freedom has been attributed not only to Brazil, but also more broadly to Latin America. Instead of being benevolent, such a perception of Brazilian racism has worked in favor of the maintenance of the white's racial supremacy in the country:

“A very special type of racism, an exclusive joint creation between Brazil and Portugal: diffuse, evasive, camouflaged, asymmetric, masked, but as relentless and persistent that it is liquidating the men and women of African descent who managed to survive the massacre in Brazil. In effect, this collective destruction has managed to hide itself from world observation by disguising an ideology of racial utopia called ‘racial democracy’, whose technique and strategy has succeeded, in part, to confuse the Afro-Brazilian people, doping them, numbing them inwardly; such an ideology results for black people in frustration, since it prevents any possibility of self-affirmation with integrity, identity and pride” (NASCIMENTO, 2020, p. 34-35, my translation).

As Gonzalez (1988, p. 72-73) discusses, racism played a fundamental role in the internalization of the ‘superiority’ of the colonizer by the colonized. Considering the same topic, Fanon (2008, p. 125, my translation) affirms: “A feeling of inferiority? No, a feeling of inexistence. Sin is black just as virtue is white. All these whites united, guns on their hands, they could not be wrong. I am guilty. I do not know of what, but I feel that I am miserable.”

Considering the case of Latin American racism, that Gonzalez calls *disavowal racism*, as mentioned before, it is sufficiently sophisticated to keep blacks and indigenous peoples in conditions of subordination in exploited classes, thanks to its most efficient ideological form: the whitening ideology. Once established, the white superiority myth demonstrates its efficiency by the fragmentation of the racial identity that it produces: *the desire to whiten* (or to clean the Brazilian blood), which is internalized with simultaneous denial of its own race, its own culture. (GONZALEZ, 1988, p. 73)

Regarding that it is impossible for an individual to whiten and that this is the foundational desire of Brazil as a society in its consolidation as a nation and its

shared imaginary for a future of progress and development, I consider Gonzalez's perception that this is the Brazilian neurosis (in Freudian terms) very accurate. Nonetheless, while she talks about the Brazilian society neurosis of disavowal racism (denying both the existence of blackness or even the violence of racism in itself), Frantz Fanon goes the other way around and explores how the racist order also creates a neurotic state in black peoples, creating in them a neurotic (impossible) desire to whiten. In this regard, Fanon describes this neurosis as follows:

"If he [the individual] finds himself so submerged by the desire to be white, it is that he lives in a society that makes his inferiority complex possible, in a society whose consistency depends on the maintenance of that complex, in a society that affirms the superiority of a race, it is to the exact extent that this society causes him difficulties he is placed in a neurotic situation" (FANON, 2008, p. 95, my translation).

To Fanon (2008, p. 96), the black individual should not face this dilemma to whiten or disappear any longer. Instead, she should acquire consciousness of a new possibility of existence or, if we can find on her desire to change her skin color, she should get to know the foundational origin of her neurotic conflict, which is not the Oedipus complex, but the racist social structures, and she should get to choose (action of passivity) towards this knowledge.

5.2. The *Rio Branco* era (1902-1912): the great pacific country of South America and the United States as the ideal of the ego

"[As de Gaulle conceived a certain idea of France] For Brazil, thanks, in the first place, to Barão do Rio Branco, with the help of other diplomats, statesmen, thinkers, an idea of a country satisfied with its territorial status, at peace with its neighbors, was gradually built, confident in Law, in negotiated solutions, committed to seeing itself recognized as a constructive force of moderation and balance in the service of creating a more democratic and egalitarian, more balanced and peaceful international system" (RICUPERO, 2017, p. 31, my translation)

Considering the path for constructing the nation, the first great national hero was Juca Paranhos, or Barão do Rio Branco (Rio Branco Baron). Rio Branco is

considered the founding father of Brazilian diplomacy and was responsible for negotiating Brazilian frontiers with its neighbors in many ‘heroic’ diplomatic – and pacific – victories in the continent from 1895 to 1909. He was the minister of foreign affairs between 1902 and 1912, consolidating Brazilian frontiers and the very founding myth of Brazil’s territorial unity and greatness. (SANTOS, 2010)

Though Juca Paranhos personally believed in Europe’s greatness as the cradle of civilization, one of the main changes he implemented in Brazilian Foreign Policy was an unwritten alliance with the United States. Brazilian authors interpreted such an alliance as a *pragmatic* move that provided the country some maneuver space in relation to the British Empire and the other European imperial powers. (SANTOS, 2010)

Cervo and Bueno (2011, p. 191, my translation) describe that: “the great lines of foreign policy of the Brazilian diplomacy patron were the quest for a shared supremacy in the South-America area, restoring of the country’s international prestige, the intangibility of its sovereignty, defense of agro-export, and the solution of frontier issues.” The authors argue that one of its main components was the proximity with the United States, which, nonetheless, did not represent an automatic alignment. Institutionally, they understand that the Foreign Affairs Ministry gained autonomy of action due to the prestige of Rio Branco and the conduct of BFP during the period can be attributed almost uniquely to him as, since he assumed the leadership of the Ministry, he had a unique and special status in the Executive power. (CERVO; BUENO, 2011, p. 192)

Regarding the friendship with the United States and Brazil’s positioning as *pragmatic* or *realist* during the Rio Branco Era, Cervo and Bueno affirm:

“Rio Branco's realistic vision allowed him to perceive, like others of his time, the weight of the United States in the new distribution of world power and the fact that Latin America was in his area of influence. It could be said that Brazil had no alternative to closer relations with the United States, discarding the possibility of a rapprochement with some European power. For Brazil, the American friendship not only assumed a defensive-preventive character, but also allowed it to play with more ease with its neighbors. Furthermore, Rio Branco did not see the possibility of forming on the continent any power bloc capable of opposing the

United States, due to the weakness and lack of cohesion of the Hispanic countries” (CERVO; BUENO, 2011, p. 200, my translation).

The authors reinforce how the close relationship with the US and the tacit acceptance of the Monroe doctrine, the Roosevelt corollary, was strategic to guarantee that the Americas hegemon would support Brazil in his frontier disputes and that it was essential for a pacific resolution of those negotiations. (CERVO; BUENO, 2011)

According to Muñoz (2019), Rio Branco made it to coincide the beginning of modern Brazilian diplomacy and the definitive delimitation of geographic frontiers, what created a great link between issues related to national space and the main foreign policy agendas of the beginning of the XX century, legitimating the narrative of foreign policy as State politics (different from domestic policies). It reinforced, between Brazilian elites, the idea that Itamaraty was supposed to occupy a special place in Brazilian State politics, not only to be in a space free of political disputes, but also to pursue the idea that Brazil was destined to international greatness. The Foreign Policy was, then, constructed to be one of the main instruments in the sought of national development and greatness. (LIMA, 2005; MUÑOZ, 2019)

Rio Branco’s popular notoriety led to the creation of an imaginary white book of Brazilian diplomacy, which was, in fact, the product of a wide debate with many other important figures, such as Joaquim Nabuco and Rui Barbosa, among many others. Therefore, the figures that came after Rio Branco would always claim to be following his steps to be validated or obtain credibility over their diplomatic moves. This was how, for example, Oswaldo Aranha justified Brazil’s entrance on the Second World War on the side of the United States or Celso Lafer justified the creation of Mercosur in the 1990s (SANTOS, 2010).

The main elements of the Brazilian identity according to this unwritten white paper of Brazilian diplomacy embodied by the figure of Barão do Rio Branco are: i) Brazil as a *pacific* country, adept to *non-intervention*, with well-defined frontiers and with *territorial greatness*; ii) an unwritten *alliance with the United States* and an intermediary between the giant of the North and other Latin American Countries;

iii) a country with *a multilateral vocation* and respectful of *international law*, not only for Pan-American initiatives, but also for global ones (being part of the Second Peace Conference in Hague, for example, as well as having sought for a special seat in the League of Nations); iv) and the *quest of international prestige*. Those elements were kept with all due ambiguity needed for guaranteeing their longevity as the sacred foundations of the Brazilian identity in the international realm (SANTOS, 2010).

It is important to mention that those identity elements also appeared in the survey mentioned earlier in the previous chapter (see table 6). In the survey, the term *pacifism* was among the most mentioned ones, categorized in first place with 9 mentions, category that includes analogous terms such as: *legalism*, *primacy of law*, *universalism*, *peaceful settlement of conflicts*, *constructive moderation*, *diplomacy of the law*, *a Grotian reading of the international*. Those elements can also relate to the terms *non-intervention* and the *self-determination of the peoples*, which did not appear in the survey, but are part of this discursive set, as I will argue later. *Territorial greatness* also appears, in fifth place, tied with *multilateralism*, with 3 mentions. The *search of international prestige* appears in sixth, with two mentions. While the specific relation with the US did not appear as a main element of the Brazilian identity, the answers of the survey mentioned Brazil as a *North-South mediator/bridge country*.

Considering the relevance of Rio Branco to Brazilian diplomatic identity, Lafer (2000) describes:

“[...] Rio Branco, in my opinion, is the *inspiration of the style of diplomatic behavior* that characterizes Brazil, in the light of its circumstances and its history [...] a *constructive moderation*, which, according to Gelson Fonseca Jr., is expressed in capacity “to *de-dramatize* the foreign policy agenda, that is, to reduce conflicts, crises and difficulties to the diplomatic bed.” This constructive moderation is permeated by a *Grotian* reading of the international reality, in which it is possible to identify a positive ingredient of sociability that allows dealing, through *Diplomacy and Law*, with conflict and cooperation and, in this way, reduce the impetus for “power politics”. Common sense is guided by “*realism*” in evaluating the conditions of power in international life. In addition, based on *information gathered from the facts of power*, but without paralyzing immobility or

Machiavellian/Hobbesian impulses, it seeks to build new diplomatic and/or legal solutions in addressing issues related to Brazil's international insertion" (LAFER, 2000, p. 47, my translation, emphasis added).

Through this excerpt, it is possible to observe some relevant master signifiers of BFP: foreign policy guided by a *realist* reading of the international, which is also seen as a synonym for *pragmatic*, “*de-dramatized*”; the *Grotian* reading of the international, through *Diplomacy and Law*. The *realist* signifier, more specifically, is usually articulated meaning a reading of the international ‘based on information gathered from facts of power’ (LAFER, 2020, p. 47), in a very similar approach to what is seen at Periphereal Realism of Carlos Escudé (2020). According to Escudé (2020, p. 39) even though the great powers might be acting in anarchic conditions, the international order is hierarchic if the other States in the periphery (as the Latin American countries) are considered. Nonetheless, the international order is not to be considered crystalized: States should ponder what their room for maneuver is and seek to increase their autonomy (meaning greater freedom of international action). In this regard, Lafer (2000) describes that the sought for an autonomous space was a central element of Rio Branco’s and Joaquim Nabuco’s construction of the Brazilian vision of pan-Americanism as well as Brazil’s identity in the field of *multilateralism* as a great *consensus builder*.

A *realist* reading of the international in BFP implies a perception and strategic articulation of Brazil’s interests, which according to Lafer’s perception lies in the diplomatic competence and the Grotian style:

“The assertion that Brazil has ‘general interests’, that is, a vision of the world and its functioning, and that this vision is important to safeguard and forward the country's specific interests, explained in the post-First World War period, will be a constant in the Brazilian international identity throughout the 20th century. The *locus standi* for this statement resides in the diplomatic competence with which Brazil, with a Grotian vision and style, has continuously operated its presence in international life as a *middle power* of continental scale and regional relevance” (LAFER, 2000, p. 74, my translation).

Therefore, adding to this *realist* or *pragmatic* reading of the international as a *middle power*, there is an understanding of the Brazilian diplomatic identity as having a Grotian style, which manifests as the respect for *international law* and

seeking a *constructive moderation*, in Lafer's words. This is a reference to the English School of International Relations, which relies on Hugo Grotius' thought and, more specifically, in Hedley Bull's perception of International Society as an offer for an in-between position between Hobbesian state of nature and Kantian Cosmopolitanism. (FONSECA JÚNIOR, 1999; LINKLATER; SUGANAMI, 2006).

Those principles, according to Lafer (2000, p. 48), are a normative framework of Brazilian diplomatic action, which he presents the following examples: a) the constitutions of 1891, 1934 and 1967 which limit Brazil's engagement in wars of conquest; b) the delimitation of nuclear activities in Brazilian territory only for pacific ends in 1988 constitution; c) the recognition to international arbitration as a pacific way of solution of international disputes in the constitutions of 1891, 1934 and 1946 (which mentions the UN). Furthermore, Brazil's first participation in International Fora (represented by Ruy Barbosa at the II Hague Peace Conference in 1907), it presented a claim based on the legal equality of the States, supported by Rio Branco, for Brazil to be enrolled in the elaboration and application of the norms that should govern the great international problems of the time, thus questioning the great powers' logic. (LAFER, 2000, p. 68)

Those elements are still strongly enforced in BFP, being part also of the 1988 constitution, which lists the principles that govern Brazil's International Relations: national independence; equality between States; defense of peace; peaceful resolution of conflicts; repudiation of terrorism and racism; cooperation among peoples for the progress of humanity; and granting political asylum (BRASIL, 1988). As a programmatic norm, the Constitution affirms that Brazil seeks to stimulate economic, political, social and cultural integration of Latin American peoples, which according to Lafer (2000) is as aspect of a "*republicanizing*" of Brazilian international relations, showing the country's link to the continent, but also reflecting the famous "gospel" of Rio Branco. (SANTOS, 2010)

Henceforth, considering the discussion followed here, the chain of master signifiers will derive mostly from: *pragmatism - unwritten alliance with the United States legalism/Grotianism - territorial greatness*.

5.2.1. Disputing narratives: Questioning the national hero and the supposed independence of Foreign Policy agendas

Considering that all hegemonic narratives have disputing ones (LACLAU; MOUFFE, 2001), this chapter will also explore some of those, always placed in parallel with the narratives they dispute. Through this, I try to show the potential insecurity, tensions and contradictions lying in the hegemonic biographical narratives. This can also provide a richer exploring of the field of discursivity of Brazilian narratives of identity and show the dynamic nature of signifiers and their chains of significance (as they enter or exit what I have called the *field of contextual possibilities*, for example) that would otherwise be hidden if one takes into consideration only the hegemonic narratives. Beyond that, as ontological insecurity is inherent to every identity discourse (EBERLE, 2017), looking at those can also give some initial tools for analyzing the deeper mechanisms involved in understanding how they can turn into an *identity crisis* (GUZZINI, 2012) dynamics, for example.

National biographical narratives and nationalism in itself have between its anchors the image of national heroes. The idealized descriptions of those figures are often questioned by critical approaches, taking into account such images are carefully built through discursive mechanisms. In this regard, according to Farias (2019):

“Praised in life, Rio Branco was civically canonized after death – encomiums, street name, coin stamp, etc. Few figures in Brazilian history have deserved equal attention. Brazil, since 1912, has changed incessantly. Even so, the admiration for Rio Branco remained, always finding in his life the reflection of our institutional and personal ideals, insecurities and beliefs. Due to its relevance in the field of Brazilian foreign policy, its diplomatic action has always been a target of interest to scholars” (FARIAS, 2019, p. 2).

Rio Branco is not only considered a national hero, it is also seen as a sphinx in Brazilian history. Though the Baron, and some of the official narratives, would repeatedly argue that Rio Branco had no interest in domestic politics during his time as Chancellor, historical evidence shows that Rio Branco acted actively through the

media, publishing articles signed under pseudonyms or with a vast network with Brazilian correspondents. He was also close to the republican politicians and “those who had power”, such as Floriano Peixoto and Rodrigues Alves, actively mobilizing his net to keep his high posts. (SANTOS, 2018; FARIAS, 2019)

The idealized image present in the national imaginary might be also far from historiographical studies portrait, as Farias describe:

“his indiscipline was inadequate for the exercise of various professional pretensions; his dissatisfaction with superiors and colleagues was often misplaced and unfounded; he was critical of several of his predecessors, such as Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro, called “bumbling”; he was ungenerous in acknowledging the support of collaborators in his victories; like his predecessors and successors in the post of foreign minister, he used public resources extensively to buy the press” (FARIAS, 2019, p. 3).

It is also of particular interest the Baron’s strong enforcement of the barriers of the domestic and international frontiers. This narrative became structural to BFPA’s understanding of the international as a clearly separated realm of the domestic. Different from the inside, the outside should be marked by a realist or pragmatic behavior and it should not be affected by the political oscillations of the domestic. Different from what is there in the imaginary, the Baron was constantly worried with domestic politics and with how the Foreign Policy actions would be interpreted domestically:

“The examination of daily life by newspapers of the time demonstrates how Rio Branco was bound by the dictates of domestic politics and far from being reclusive in his office. A week after arriving in Rio de Janeiro, he was already having lunch at the Hotel Globo with senators Rui Barbosa and Antonio Azeredo. The next day, it was time to confer with owners of press vehicles. He then visited the Federal Senate and the entire Chamber of Deputies building. *Gazeta de Notícias* reported: “It would not be surprising that this visit would hasten the discussion of the extradition treaty with the United States, a treaty that has long been dormant in the Chamber.” (FARIAS, 2019, p. 6).

Far from the legend found in many history books and diplomatic discourses, Rio Branco was never in an ivory tower and hardly ever had full autonomy over Foreign Policy, but instead, was dependent upon the patrimonialist character and oscillations of the Brazilian Republic. (Santos, 2018; Farias, 2019)

5.2.2 Disputing narratives: racism behind the founding father and its institution

[The newspapers] were filled with articles praising the hero who had made Bruzundanga known in Europe, [...]

When, however, it is said abroad that, in its population, there are millions of Javanese and their mestizos (which is true), immediately everyone gets annoyed, angry, sadly casting the lip of shame on their compatriots of such extraction. [...]

His will [of the Pancôme Viscount] was done; and the curious nation in Paris was often touted on the boulevards as the ultimate drugstore specific or as a brand of automobiles. [...] In the luminous advertisements, then, his imagination was fertile. There was one who became famous and prayed: “Bruzundanga, Rich country — Coffee, cocoa and rubber. There are no blacks.”

[...] in order to hold tenders, there were always scathing candidates of the javanese race, with whom he solemnly resented. Even last time, almost a bold pure javanese takes first place, such was the brilliance of his tests; Pancôme, however, arranged matters so loyally diplomatic that the boy lost the last test. (BARRETO, 1922, my translation)

Lima Barreto was a journalist and novelist, active during the first couple of decades of the XX century in Brazil. Barreto authored the book “The *Bruzundangas*”, a satirical description of the ailments of Brazilian politics and society during the first republic. *Bruzundanga* is, then, a fictitious/satirical name for Brazil; as well as the Pancôme Viscount, is a satirical representation of Barão do Rio Branco.

The excerpts of the book above describe how Brazilian diplomacy in the beginning of the century was not only concerned in portraying Brazil to Europe – the ideal of the ego³⁰ – as a rich country, where there were no blacks (also named as *javanese* in the book), as Lima Barreto himself. The literary work also describes how the diplomacy tenders conducted by Rio Branco were very concerned with the appearance of the participants and would not select black or mestizo candidates.

Regarding the diplomats and Lima Barreto's perceptions, Rogério Farias describes:

“From the point of view of the identity of these representatives, there was no doubt: the Brazilian diplomatic service should be composed of the “citizens most respectable for their lights” – the elite white man. Lima Barreto, upon entering the Itamaraty premises, understands that this “civilized” image remained, constituting a system of beliefs that reproduced “the European domination over the world” – and, naturally, a racial segregation in diplomacy itself. The black was an uncomfortable presence and, as the writer pointed out, “their disappearance [was] a necessity”” (FARIAS, 2021, p. 8-9, my translation).

At the beginning of the XX century, the key designers of Brazil's diplomacy Barão do Rio Branco and later Joaquim Nabuco, a very influential name concerning abolitionism in Brazil, were deeply influenced by the ideas of scientific racism. According to Vieira (2018, p. 14), “Nabuco envisaged a foreign policy centered on close cooperation with the perceived main beneficiary of European modernity, the United States, which he described as an ‘immense moral influence in the march of civilization’.” Hence, Americanism ideas in Brazilian foreign policy had some of its roots in racism and colonialism, as the United States started to embody Brazil's very *significant other*, or *ideal of the ego* to which Brazil look up to, which – resembling colonization – overcame it and achieved modern industrialized development.

Therefore, during the first half of the 20th century, Itamaraty selected young people who could represent Brazil in the way they considered appropriated, with the aim of changing the country's external image. Some of the prerequisites were to be from a family of European origin, hence, white. When working abroad, they should attract white immigrants to whiten the population, while preventing “certain” migrants from going to the country. (KOIFMAN, 2021, p. 16) This was a policy, if not instituted by Rio Branco, strongly reinforced and amplified during his era and structures the core of Brazilian diplomacy in the first couple of decades of the XXth Century.

5.3. The Modern Brazil starting from the 1930s: Development as a master signifier

From the end of the 1920's onwards, there was an important intellectual debate about what it meant to "be Brazilian" and what were the supposed characteristics and singularities of the "Brazilian national character". (SANTOS, 2010) To some extent, in the biographical analogy proposed here, the discursive construction of Brazil was somewhat facing its youth.

It marks also a second moment in Brazil's racial history, *lusotropicalismo*, a moment that draws upon contributions of Gilberto Freyre and Sergio Buarque de Holanda. (SANTOS, 2002, VIEIRA, 2018; SOUZA, 2017) According to Souza's opinion, there was no 'Brazilian identity' before Freyre's work, and his contributions are still very relevant to contemporary national imaginary. In a move of self-esteem, Freyre's *lusotropicalismo* (followed by Holanda's idea of the Brazilian cordial man) builds the idea that Brazil has a unique contribution to the world. This perception comes from Brazil's distinctive cultural integration and racial miscegenation promoted by the mix between Portuguese, African, Indigenous and other European and Eastern cultures. Such a unique mixture would have given birth to a racial democracy, to 'another West', a tolerant one, not only different, but also better than Europe and the US. (VIEIRA, 2018, p. 15)

In this new perspective, strongly supported by Vargas nationalism and the promotion of Brazilian culture, through Samba and national stereotypical characters such as Carmen Miranda and Zé Carioca, being a country of *mestiços* was, at least at the discourse level, inherently good. In this regard, according to Santos (2002), the *mulato* man and woman represented:

"The in-between space, the intellectual zone that the postcolonial critics claim for themselves, incarnates in the mulatto man or woman as a body and corporeal zone. The desire of the other, upon which Bhabha grounds the ambivalence of the representation of the colonizer, is not in this case a psychoanalytic phenomenon, nor is it doubled in language (1994, p. 50). It is physical, creative, and engenders creatures. Far from being a failed mimetic gesture, the mulatto man and woman are the negation of mimicry. They affirm a limit *a posteriori*, that is

to say, they are the affirmation of a limit that only affirms itself after having been overcome. They are the affirmation of the white and black man and woman at the very point of reciprocal elision. Miscegenation is not the consequence of the absence of racism, as argued by Luso-colonialist or Luso-tropicalist reasoning, but it certainly is the cause of a different kind of racism” (SANTOS, 2002, p. 17).

Considered a successful and peaceful case of miscegenation, different from places like the US and South Africa, Brazil was the object of study of the UNESCO project in 1950. The self-representation of Brazil as a harmonious racial society established the country as a civilizational model to the world. In this regard, the UNESCO project of racial relations was designed believing that Brazil was a civilizational laboratory that would allow for the study and replication of its experience in other contexts. The country was seen as an alternative to the social imaginary that segregation was the only viable solution to countries inhabited by two or more races. (OLIVEIRA, 2020, p. 32-33)

The research was based on ethnography and surveys taken in some of the largest cities of Brazil: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Recife and Bahia. The research team, nonetheless, was composed only by white researchers, and this could have influenced their results. Even though recognizing that there was racism in Brazil, the reports indicated a noticeable harmony in Brazilian racial relations if compared to other experiences outside the country, reinforcing the pretense racial harmony. (OLIVEIRA, 2020, p. 35-42) The racial democracy myth, from the realm of foreign policy, was then actively internationalized through Foreign Policy. (CAMPBELL, 1992)

What is possible to take from Brazilian social thought about its racial history is the foundation of another well-known concept of Brazilian Foreign Policy: Brazil's role as a *bridge between the North and the South* (ALTEMANI, 2005; LIMA, 2005). An idea that can also be found is its great manifest destiny (the country of the future) as a big country, rich in natural resources and a successful experience of Portuguese colonialism. (DE PAULA, 2018)

The narratives and master signifiers of the discourse of the Brazilian racial democracy (having the colonizer as its ideal of the ego) are strongly absorbed by

BFP identity discourses, even in contemporary days, through expressions such as *another West*. Another piece of evidence is that this perception can be observed by Celso Lafer's - former chancellor and intellectual - work on Brazilian identity. His work on Brazilian identity (LAFER, 2000) was the most cited reference by the interviewees, mentioned by 50% of them when asked about references on the topic of identity and BFP. Citing Lafer's words:

“[...] Brazil, as pointed out by Darcy Ribeiro, is a confluence of varied racial matrices and distinct cultural traditions that, in South America, under the rule of the Portuguese, gave way to a new people. This is not exactly a transplanted people, trying to rebuild Europe in new places. [...] *It is a new mutant, with its own characteristics, but unequivocally tied to the Portuguese matrix*, due to the unity of the language in the vast national space. This new people expresses itself through *Brazilian culture, which became Europeanized at the decisive moments in the formation of literature* in the 18th and 19th centuries. [...] The Lusitanian western heritage had its repertoire enriched and modulated by the historical non-European components of Brazil – the Indians and the Africans. To this cultural and demographic matrix were added, due to the fluidity of immigration currents in the 19th and 20th centuries, other European components (for example: Italians, Spaniards, Germans, Slavs) and non-European (for example: Arabs and Japanese). Hence, despite the persistent dilemma of social exclusion, Brazil remains a country in the *pluralism of its continental scale and its multi-ethnic, linguistically homogeneous composition, prone to cultural integration and reasonably open to the syncretism of diversity*. That is why it is, to use a formulation by José Guilherme Merquior, *another West*, poorer, more enigmatic, more problematic, but no less West” (LAFER, 2000, p. 38-40, my translation, emphasis added).

In this regard, following racial democracy thought, Brazilian cultural identity would be the expression of diversity and mixture that, even though structured by Europe and the Portuguese heritage, would still be a unique contribution by the combination of multicultural elements. Under this perspective, Brazilian literature and social thought has a central role in capturing understandings of Brazil's identity.

As I already mentioned, one of the core references in the imaginary of racial democracy in Brazil is *Casa Grande & Senzala* (Big House & the Slave Quarters), by Gilberto Freyre, which describes the formation of the Brazilian patriarchal family. The text describes that relations in Brazil between white and ‘colored races’

were conditioned by plantations of monoculture in big land properties, on the one hand, and the shortage of white women among conquerors on the other, which functioned as a decisive factor in the reduction of the social distance between white and indigenous or black populations. (FREYRE, 1933, p. 32 apud LAGE 2016, p. 104) Nonetheless, this process was marked by violence and rape and, in that regard, Lage describes that ‘[t]he family is, indeed, the colonizing unit in Brazil, since the Portuguese colonization was initially basically conducted by the private initiative, and not by the state [...]’. (LAGE, 2016, p. 104)

In this context, Freyre also portrays that Portuguese colonialism was somewhat different from other colonial experiences, as Portugal was an in-between country, one that better fraternized with other races. Therefore, in this moment, Freyre also contributes to the consolidation of the narrative that enslavement in Brazil was less violent and the country was, in America, the one that constituted its racial relations in the most harmonious way. (LAGE, 2016)

According to Schwarcz (2012, p. 46), even though creating a positive component in the idea of racial mixture (which was considered inherently degenerating by scientific racism theories), Freyre has kept untouched the perspective of superiority and inferiority of races. He, as well, romanticized the violence and sadism of slavery, as Slave masters were seen as paternal and slaves as faithful, creating a ‘good slavery’.

Departing from this narrative, it is common in Brazil, until current times, to see affirmations that the country had (or has) a mild experience of racism and that the main discrimination in the country is of social inequality and not concerning race, as Brazil did not go through something such as the Apartheid in South Africa. Then, Brazilian racism would be weaker than in other countries, as it actually allows for social ascension (mainly for the whiter *mestiços*, which socially become considerate white). (MUNANGA, 2019)

Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, in “*Raízes do Brasil*” (Roots of Brazil), is also another important interpreter of Brazilian identity. The author debated how the attempt of transplantation of a European civilization to a tropical zone created incompatibilities with the ideal of a modern and civilized society. In this context,

the national characteristics derived mostly from Brazil's Portuguese heritage, noteworthy: cult of personality, lack of organization, and absence of work ethics. Beyond that, Brazil also had the "cordiality" as a peculiar trace of its identity. Brazilians' cordiality was, according to Holanda, understood as a society dominated by emotions, in opposition to a rational ideal (with also impersonality and efficiency) modern and civilized North American man. (SANTOS, 2010)

Caio Prado Júnior, then, argues that since the arrival of the Portuguese court in Brazil in 1808 the country was in transition from colony to become a nation, a process that, according to the author's perception, was still ongoing and would require a process of industrialization conducted by the State. (SANTOS, 2010) Caio Prado also reinforces the narrative that there was a lack of labor force in Brazil in the second half of the XIX century, not explaining where the liberated black populations had gone after the abolition of slavery. The author affirms that the immigration of white workers had the objective of stimulating certain cultural patterns in the Brazilian population and points out as evidence the differentiation of the Southern part of the country from the Northern, which, according to him, is given to the sensible superiority of white European immigrants. (NASCIMENTO, 2020: 220-222)

In the imaginary telos of the incomplete Brazilian nation, the narrative of overcoming Brazil's backwardness was consolidated as a key instrument to arriving at modernity during the Vargas Era (1930-1945). While the previous period of the 'Old Republic' had a liberal ideological profile, the period from the 1930s highlighted the role of the State was seen as the central actor to promote the country's *development* and consolidate the nation. In this context, the government actively promoted propagandas, patriotic popular festivities and civic manifestations. (SANTOS, 2010) The signifier *development* appeared as an important element to define Brazilian identity for six of our interviewees, ranked in second between the main elements or principles of Brazilian identity in the survey previously mentioned (table 6).

The Vargas rule was a period of intense nationalism and its narrative was deeply linked to the idea of economic development. The ideal of industrialization as means for modernization and development substituted Brazil's agricultural

vocation as the mainstream narrative. In 1941 Stefan Zweig, an Australian Jewish writer and novelist who fled from Nazism in Europe, spending his last years in Petrópolis³¹, published the famous book “Brazil, the country of the future”, that described the country as a model to be followed in terms of *pacifism, societal and racial conciliation through miscegenation, liberalism and democracy* (even having written his book during Vargas dictatorship). Brazil’s destination to have a bright future became, then, another founding myth of the nation. (SANTOS, 2010) Though *liberalism* and *democracy* do not appear directly as terms mentioned in the survey, other elements of Sweig’s book are there: the idea of *racial miscegenation* (mentioned in third, reminded by five interviewees), *pacifism*, as already mentioned; and a *dream of greatness* or a *destination for great future* was cited by two interviewees.

The inclusion of *Latin America* as an important factor in Brazilian identity (the fourth in order of relevance in the survey presented in table 6, mentioned by four interviewees) for Santos, only happened in parallel with the consolidation of the concept of Latin America in itself, after the Second World War, mainly after the creation of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLA) in 1948. The idea of Latin America was consolidated in opposition to Anglo-Saxon America, considering a peculiar region, society and race in opposition to the North-American one, nonetheless, Brazil only assumed a Latin American identity in opposition to a North American one by ending decades of the XX century. (SANTOS, 2010, p. 212-225)

On the other hand, Lafer (2000, p. 84) considers that the idea of Latin America’s development was present in BFP discourses since Rio Branco, seen as a way to reduce the region’s vulnerabilities and balance other great powers. A famous quote by Rio Branco was that Brazil “wants to be strong among large and strong neighbors”. In this context, Lafer recalls Helio Jaguaribe’s advocacy for nationalism in Brazil as means for one only goal: national *development*.

³¹ A city placed 65 km North of Rio de Janeiro.

Nonetheless, Lafer (2000, p. 88) agrees that from 1930's onwards Brazilian Foreign Policy has two main lines: *autonomy* and *development*. Cultivating space for *autonomy* preserves the country's freedom to interpret its reality and seek for national solutions. Foreign action also contributes in the search for *development* as it can mobilize external resources in different international contexts. In this perspective, he affirms: "Indeed, development continues to be, in light of Brazil's identity as the *other West*, the objective par excellence of our foreign policy, as a public policy aimed at translating internal needs into external possibilities." (LAFER, 2000, p. 109, my translation)

Hence, the discourse over Brazilian identity has gone through different moments but it has had a nationalist tone since the Republic, while the State action for the propagation of this sentiment increased dramatically in the 1930's, during Vargas rule, with a major contribution of the mass media, mainly the radio and, later, television. At that time the State was also consolidated as the development vector (SANTOS, 2010, p. 231).

The *mestiço* culture in the 1930s emerged as the official representation of the Nation. The nationalist movement observed in Brazil in this period created national symbols and the constitution of the idea of the Brazilian 'people', which is built by the suppression of pluralities, seeking for 'an authentic Brazilian identity'. The practice of *capoeira*, repressed by the police and perceived as criminal by the 1890 law, officially became a national sportive modality only in 1937. The *samba* also stopped to be perceived as 'black dance' to 'Brazilian exportation music'. In this moment is also born the Brazilian *malandro* (trickster), an inherently *mestiço* stereotype represented by the refusal to regular work and the valorization of intimacy in social relations, represented by the Walt Disney character Zé Carioca. (SCHWARCZ, 2012, p. 56-59)

In songs, the term race appears constantly associated with the means of republican construction of national representation and Brazilian racial mixture is portrayed as the very positive and unique trace of the nation, as well as the solution for the dilemmas for constructing a civilization in the tropics. The *mulato*, being the very representation of the Brazilian identity, is also, at the same time, expressing the concealed racism, hidden behind the idea of equality before the civil law, as the

racial conflicts are supposedly transferred to the private realm, marked by quotidian embattles. (SCHWARCZ, 2012, p. 59-63)

Therefore, the idea of being Brazilian has varied deeply throughout the XIX and XX centuries, departing from being vassal of the crown, being Christian and non-Hispanic. Later on, the idea of the Brazilian was a *mestiço*, and our *mestiçagem* was our original contribution to the world, a unique experience of a civilization in the tropics - even though it was deemed to be whitewashed in the desired future. Then, culture becomes an important identity marker, almost confused with the idea of race. (SANTOS, 2010, p. 231-232) All those ideas have been embodied and flowed into the idea of *development*, which becomes a central master signifier around which Brazilian narratives of the future start to circulate from the 1930s onwards, as mentioned in the previous section. Development is in the future, and it is white, and, then, the Brazilian neurosis continues even though the signifiers have somehow changed.

An important change in Brazil's Foreign Policy orientation was observed during the so-called Independent Foreign Policy (*Política Externa Independente* – PEI) of the years 1961 to 1964, governments of Jânio Quadros and João Goulart which, interesting and unfortunately enough, was interrupted by a military coup that promoted a yaw towards a much more conservative Foreign Policy. PEI was marked by an abandonment of the unwritten alliance with the United States and an approximation with other developing countries, incorporating to the Brazilian identity discourse an identification not only with Latin America, but also with Asia and Africa, while an attempt of distancing from the Salazarist and colonial Portugal. In this period, the Foreign Minister Araújo Castro gave the famous three Ds speech in the opening of the UN General Assembly meeting in 1963: Disarmament, Decolonization and Development, pointed by him to be the central pillars of Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Brazilian contribution to the international realm. (CERVO; BUENO, 2011)

Still, this movement was closely articulated with the narrative of racial democracy:

“Jânio Quadros [...] and others used the idea of Brazilian racial democracy and appropriated an alleged African cultural heritage to help Brazilian diplomacy with the new nations in Africa. Jânio saw business opportunities in the establishment of commercial relations with any other nation, despite the political-ideological position dictated by the Cold War. Elevating Brazilian representations in Africa to the category of embassy as an approach strategy was added to another concern of an internal nature: signaling that in Brazil, in fact, there was a racial democracy, a differential that the rulers thought could open doors” (KOIFMAN, 2021, p. 20-21).

According to Lafer (2000, p. 41), the economic dimension of anticolonialism of Araujo Castro’s speech was aligned with the Third World concept, in a context in which the North-South divide was seeking space in the East-West bipolarity. Nonetheless, Brazil positioned itself as the *Other West*, as western in values (as a result of its historic formation), but also aligned with other Third World countries seeking development - here seen performing a double insertion as the *Other West*.

In this context, Brazil consolidated its narrative as a *developing* country, and this identity narrative has embraced all the previous ones. Being a developing country meant advocating for the relevance of the North-South divide instead of the East-West, so disarmament and decolonization appear as narratives that are entrenched to development. At the same time, the country reinforces the image of being a connection between Eastern powers and the other developing countries. (MAWDSLEY, 2012)

According to Cervo and Bueno (2011):

“[...] at the XV UN General Assembly, opened on September 20, 1960, in the context of the admission of 15 new African States, in addition to Cyprus, Brazil defended and supported the principle of *self-determination of peoples*. A principle, moreover, that became the dominant theme during the Assembly. Brazil, by tradition, supported it. Later, [during] the Independent Foreign Policy [...] this principle became one of the leitmotifs of Itamaraty's rhetoric. Likewise, the relationship between foreign policy and national development. Horácio Lafer, in the introductory part of the [...] 1960 Ministerial Report, highlighted *economic development* as one of the greatest national problems. The same chancellor, when opening the debates of the aforementioned XV UN General Assembly, linked *economic development with the consolidation of peace* and defended the application of resources in development projects, instead of

spending them on armaments. Such saved resources should be collected into an international development fund of the United Nations” (CERVO; BUENO, 2011, p. 329, my translation, emphasis added).

Cervo and Bueno (2011, p. 342-343), reinforce that, though Brazil aimed to become a *bridge between Africa and the West*, it was faltering and did not achieve concrete results in this new political direction, especially regarding its positioning in the UN concerning the Portuguese colonies, which did not go beyond abstentions.

This reality somewhat reflected Brazilian diplomatic whiteness. According to Rosenbaum (1968, p. 379), in the 1960s, “[a]t least 10% of the diplomats [had] fathers, sons, or brothers who are also diplomats” which, according to him, has produced a family oligarchy in Itamaraty. He describes that there were no black diplomats at that moment, even though the writer Raymundo Souza Dantas, not a career diplomat, was sent to Ghana in 1961 as ambassador by the Ministry Afonso Arinos. According to Rosenbaum, the nomination of Dantas was:

“An attitude which annoys many foreign diplomats, particularly those from Africa, is the continuous flaunting by Brazilian diplomats of Brazil’s racial record of nondiscrimination. When a Negro was sent as Brazilian ambassador to Ghana, he was not particularly well received because it was thought that a Negro was purposely sent there in order to stress Brazilian racial harmony.” (ROSENBAUM, 1968, p. 389)

Presenting a different view over the nomination of Raimundo de Souza Dantas to the Ghana Embassy, Koifman (2021, p. 21) describes that the critics had as its background the discomfort of a black and modest man having a prestigious post in the Executive. He shows historiographic evidence that the diplomat was well received in Ghana but that the mission was dissolved some months later due to the political crisis that led to Jânio Quadros renunciation. (KOIFMAN, 2021, p. 23)

Not only diplomacy, but also the study of IR in Brazil has its markers of race and social class as well. The field was almost non-existent and as well restricted to elites in the 1960s, with scarce literature in Portuguese, and literature mostly relying on English and French books. Rosenbaum (1968, p. 385) describes three types of specialists in the subject in Brazil at the time: “the diplomats who prefer to speak twenty years later, the journalists who are only interested in the highly dramatic

aspects of the field, and the professors of international law.” It could be said, though, that this reality still endures, most of Brazilian academia in IR is white³² and still to some extent elitist (OLIVEIRA, 2020).

Thereafter, as debated in this section, the chain of significance of *development* can be similar to: *European workforce* - *miscegenation* - *racial democracy* - *development* - *other West* - *great country*.

5.3.1 Disputing narratives: racist foundations of the signifier development and the white academia

The myth of racial democracy in Brazil has already been put into question in a study on racial relations in Brazil financed by UNESCO between 1950 and 1953. The research was supposed to provide subsidies on the diffusion of the Brazilian racial experience as a successful one to showcase and provide inspiration for more equal racial relations over the world. Instead of showing Brazil to be a successful case, it showed that poverty and low access to social ascension was actually deeply related to race in the country. (Santos, 2010, p. 227-228)

Nevertheless, this relevant moment in Brazil’s international identity construction is scarcely mentioned among Brazilian IR academicians. This historic moment is neither studied nor theorized about. Mentioning Cida Bento’s concept of the narcissistic pact of whiteness³³, Ananda Oliveira calls our attention:

“[...] the UNESCO Project contributes to the understanding of the conceptions behind the internationalization of the myth of racial democracy. The inattention of historiographies in this field of studies in Brazil distorts the domestic reality starting from a supposed national homogeneity, leaving aside the violence promoted by the State itself and by the legacy of colonization” (OLIVEIRA, 2020, p. 46, my translation).

Later on, she continues:

³² Including myself.

³³ In their narcissistic pact, whites tend to protect themselves socially, politically, economically and academically at the expense of black people (BENTO, 2002 apud OLIVEIRA, 2020, p. 52).

“The UNESCO Project, which placed Brazil at the center of the functions on race and the internationalization of the myth of racial democracy, even though it made Brazil’s conflicts and dissidences explicit, did not occupy a place in the theorizations of the discipline [in Brazil]. Afro-Diasporic perspectives that place black subjects as agents of the construction of their own knowledge and present other interpretations of Brazil and its place in the international system are not incorporated into the field of studies that responds to the normatization of whiteness” (OLIVEIRA, 2020, p. 46-56, my translation).

Then, through the myth of racial democracy, a different narrative from the whitening one was built. It is based on the idea of Brazil’s post-colonial exceptionalism and, even when engaging in Third World relations from the 1960’s, this was the mindset when dealing with African and Asian former colonies. (VIEIRA, 2018, p. 16) The Third World was still the *inferior other*; the one Brazil does not want to look alike. According to Vieira (2018):

“Brazil’s ‘fantasized’ self-narrative of a mixed race and tolerant nation swayed its foreign policy to a different role, as a ‘bridge’ between, what former Brazilian foreign minister Afonso Arinos described in 1965, as a ‘racial curtain’ separating the West and the Third World” (VIEIRA, 2018, p. 16).

Having this understanding in mind, Lage (2016, p. 21) describes that Brazil’s interpretations usually mobilize the following expressions: ‘the owners of the power’, ‘racial democracy’, ‘cordial man’, ‘big house’ [*casa grande*], and ‘patrimonialism’. Taking into analysis some of the foundational texts of Brazilian social thought, Lage has found that the concept of ‘formation’ of the Brazilian state is demarcated by five traces:

“(1) the centrality of the *nation*; (2) the *incompleteness* of the transition from the colonial to the modern condition, marking a coexistence of the old and the new; (3) the *internal inequality* within the country; (4) the mobilization of *external parameters* in the definition of Brazil; and (5) the focus on the *specificities* of Brazilian formative process.” (LAGE, 2016, p. 22).

In this sense, the author describes that these traces of ‘formation’ are tied to discussions of past, present and future, as well as of inside and outside. Therefore, those five elements can be interpreted through the discursive play of identifications and differentiations in the ‘formation’ of Brazil. (LAGE, 2016, p. 85)

As it has been discussed, the endurance of racism will not be fought through the achievement of civil rights, only, as it concerns a dehumanization of the racialized other, depriving the individual of her human status (QUIJANO, 2007). Racism does not lie only in law, but in our psyche as postcolonial subjects (FANON, 2008; VIEIRA, 2018; KAPOOR, 2020). In this regard, it makes no sense to celebrate a lighter racism, following Fanon's argument:

“for a Jew, the differences between the anti-Semitism of Maurras or of Goebbels are unperceptive [...] [so, it makes no sense to say] that the black in French country is happier than his equal in the United States. Is there any difference between one racism and another? Couldn't the same fall, the same failure of men be found in both? [...] All forms of exploitation look alike [...]. When considering abstractedly the structure of one and other exploitation, one is masking the main problem, the fundament, which is to replace men in its rightful place” (FANON, 2008, p. 86-87, my translation).

As discussed in the previous section, Gonzalez (1988) argues that Brazil actually lives a disavowal racism: a denial of the racist component of the society but which, still, determines our social relations. The whitening ideology as a social neurosis in Brazil seems to be a foundation for the miscegenation imaginary. Again, we see an attempt of a conciliatory narrative, that aims to erase the past without threatening its wounds (actually forcing our black populations to whiten or disappear), as well as to keep the status quo and not allow for structural social change. For me, it seems that Brazil's supposed 'pacifism', that ended colonialism, the monarchy and established its frontiers with no major social violence, appears to be quite violent as well, as it allows for the enduring of violent orders of racial, patriarchal and social subjugation.

Many times, from 1921 to 1923, Brazilian legislators discussed laws to prohibit black individuals entry in the country. Almost at the end of Getúlio Vargas dictatorship, on September 18th of 1945, the president signed the decree regulating the entrance of immigrants in Brazil according to 'the necessity to preserve and develop its ethnic component, with the characteristics that were more convenient to the European ascendancy.' (NASCIMENTO, 2016, p. 86, my translation)

In this context, Munanga (2019, p. 101-102) reinforces that though there was an assimilationist idea over the black populations in Brazil through racial mixture, *mestiços* are in contemporary days the major social sector suffering social exclusion and discrimination: they are the majority of carceral and peripheral populations, as well as the population that grows the most in Brazil. If, in the past, *mestiços* had some possibility of social mobility when they were the sons of the lords of the plantations, now, this population increasingly occupies the subaltern position of the black subject in Brazil, a condition that is also aligned with their economic subalternity.

Indeed, as already mentioned, the *mestiço* is an epistemological problem when thinking about race in Brazil. Munanga (2019) describes that professor Darcy Ribeiro, a prominent Brazilian intellectual, not only reinforced this assimilationist idea of the black population, but also described *mestiços* in the zone of non-being [*'ninguendade'*], as they were not Europeans, nor indigenous and nor Africans, they were *nobody*. They had to leave this zone of non-being to search, or invent, their own identity, that would become the 'Brazilian identity', that would present itself as something better, something that the world had not yet seen, with an 'incorporated humanity'. In a similar fashion, Schwarcz describes that the *mestiço* is the very representation of ambiguity, representing both the concealed racism of both social exclusion and cultural assimilation. (SCHWARCZ, 2012, p. 63)

Another central author of Brazilian identity, as mentioned, is Sergio Buarque de Holanda and his description of the Brazilian as the cordial man. Interestingly enough, one of the core attempts of this work is to overcome the dichotomy between rationality and emotions/affections that have been central to the discourses of politics and colonial modernity; and to reinforce how all realms of existence are embedded with emotions and affections. Hence, those should not be considered unrational and neglected to a private space of existence: as I understand it, there is no rationality detached from emotions and affections. In this regard, Holanda's work, even though it seems to highlight a unique feature of Brazilian identity in a possible effort to redeem the country's self-esteem, reinforces a hierarchical and colonial dichotomy in which being emotional is equated with being naïve, prone to corruption, underdeveloped, in need for tutelage, and not adapted to modernity.

Furthermore, a vital ambiguity in the Brazilian identity narrative has been kept. Although discursively supporting decolonization, positioning itself against the apartheid in South Africa, for example, and promoting itself as a country free of racial discrimination, as Nascimento (2020) argues, the Brazilian government has kept its support for the Portuguese colonialism until the colonial rule became unsustainable. Brazilian government has repeatedly voted against (or abstained its vote) when the resolutions at the UN condemned Portuguese colonialism, or urged for its end and the respect of human rights treaties in the colonies. The president Juscelino Kubitschek (1955-1961) even affirmed that Brazil's foreign policy would be the same as Portugal's, declaring that Brazil's independence was a gift from Portugal. One of the only two votes in favor of the independence of those colonies happened in 1974, on the eve of decolonization of those countries. (NASCIMENTO, 2020, p. 208-209)

Analyzing the speeches and the practices towards Portugal, it seems to be in the imaginary of the political elites that Brazil owes its amount of civilization to the Portuguese and is grateful for that. In that regard, Brazilian loyalty towards Portugal dates back to the empire: when Angola and Brazil were still both fighting for their independence, there was a cooperation between the independence movements from both countries. Nevertheless, when Brazil acquired its independence, the country signed a treaty with Portugal committing itself to renounce all alliance policies with 'separatist forces' in Angola. (NASCIMENTO, 2020, p. 227)

In this sense, supporting Portuguese colonialism and stating that there was no racism in Brazil were two sides of the same coin. Still in 1966, a volume published by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs destined to promote Brazil internationally affirmed that the majority of Brazil's population is composed by whites and only a small part composed by people of mixed blood. Even though there is no accurate data on the topic and the demographic census of that epoch would point out a larger number of whites, around 60%, another 40% was composed by non-whites, in majority *pardos* (or mestizos). As Nascimento (2020, p. 190-191) describes, not only the methods were inaccurate, but also the desire of whiteness would lead the majority of *mulatos* to be willing to declare themselves white, so the numbers cannot be taken as a fixed data but only as an estimation.

Still, even if those numbers reflected the ‘reality’, 40% of the population could never be portrayed as a small proportion.

Hence, it is possible to consider that, in a very similar way to what has been portrayed by Fanon regarding the feeling in the Antilles, Brazil, albeit being a postcolonial nation, would identify itself with the colonizer, their ideal of the ego, and not with other postcolonial peoples. As Fanon describes, it is common that racialized peoples, including mostly black populations, to have racist imaginaries:

“In the Antilles, the young black man who, at school, keeps repeating ‘our parents, the Gauls’ identifies with the explorer, with the civilizer, with the white man who wants to bring the truth to the savages, an all-white truth. There is identification, that is, the young black person subjectively adopts an attitude of white. He recharges the hero, who is white, with all his aggressiveness laden with sadism” (FANON, 2008, p. 132, my translation).

Dialoguing with Jung’s concept of collective unconscious, Fanon latter reinforces how racism, or blackphobia, as he names it, is deeply entrenched in colonial (and, as I see it, also postcolonial) unconscious, which leads them to a neurotic state in which being black is a synonym for being immoral, abject:

“[...] it is normal for the Antillean to be a blackophobic. By the collective unconscious, the Antillean adopted all European archetypes as their own. The *anima* of the black Antillean is almost always a white one. [...] Returning to psychopathology, let us say that black people live an extraordinarily neurotic ambiguity. [...] Just because, and this is very important, the Antillean recognized himself as black, but, due to an ethnic slippage, he realized (collective unconscious) that he was black only insofar as he was bad, indolent, mean, instinctive. Everything that opposed this way of being black, was white. It must be seen as the origin of the Antillean black-phobia. In the collective unconscious, black = ugly, sin, darkness, immoral. In other words: black is one that is immoral. If, in my life, I behave like a moral man, I am not black. (...) But the real white man is waiting for me. On the first occasion he will tell me that it is not enough that the intention is white, that it is necessary to build a white totality. It is only at that moment that I become aware of the betrayal’ (FANON, 2008, p. 162-163, my translation).

Thus, this racist collective unconscious, or, in Lacanian terms, as I understand, the collective imaginary, creates a neurotic ambiguity in which the postcolonial peoples aspire to be white and imagine that they could achieve

whiteness by reproducing white civilization standards, considered to be sacred, better, moral (against an impure, sinner, terrifying blackness). Nonetheless, when the racialized people are confronted with the ‘real white’, they are confronted with the Real (in Lacanian terms), the unsymbolizable darkness of their skin and the bad affections it mobilizes in others and in themselves. This is when they are confronted with the colonial betrayal and with the neurotic, hence impossible, (and externally imposed) desire to undress their own skin.

This context falls into the fallacy of *development*, which, under the perspective followed here, is a colonial narrative that creates an imposed imaginary as well as an imposed and impossible drive³⁴. Narratives of *development* are portrayed as close enough to keep us seeking it, but just like the horizon line, it is impossible to be achieved, not only but also because *development* cannot be reduced to economic indicators, as it has to do with achieving modernity, which is ultimately eastern, *white*. For that matter, I endorse Ilan Kapoor’s perspective:

“But I want to suggest that racism is an abiding supplement to development discourse because the latter is accompanied by broader racialized power dynamics. That is, development discourse is armed with an (unconscious) ideological apparatus premised on white supremacy and fantasies of Third World subordination, which predispose it toward racist domination of the Other” (KAPOOR, 2020, p. 241).

In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that *development*, a master signifier of Brazilian identity and its Foreign Policy discourses, is not a neutral, rational, natural objective for the greater good of all Brazilians. Against this widely accepted perspective, I suggest that the idea of *development* emerges from colonial, and hence, racist (QUIJANO, 2007) foundations and propagates its neurosis, suffering and danger, as it is inherently entrenched with the belief for the need to whiten and/or eradicate black and indigenous populations, where the reasons for underdevelopment lie.

³⁴ In Freud, drive is the continuous effort to find the lost object of the subject’s desires satisfaction model. It is a limit concept between the somatic and the psychic.

5.3.2 Disputing narratives: Anthropophagy as an alternative to development

“Only ANTHROPOPHAGY unites us. Socially. Economically. Philosophically.

Only law in the world. Masked expression of all individualisms, all collectivisms. Of all religions. Of all peace treaties.

Tupi, or not Tupi that is the question.

[...]

I am only interested in what is not mine. Man's law. Law of the cannibal.

[...]

We want the Carafba Revolution. Bigger than the French Revolution. The unification of all effective revolts in the direction of man. Without us, Europe would not even have its poor declaration of human rights.

[...]

The struggle between what would be called the Uncreated and the Creature-illustrated by the permanent contradiction of man and his Taboo. Everyday love and the capitalist *modus vivendi*. Anthropophagy. Absorption of the sacred enemy. To turn it into a totem. The human adventure. The earthly purpose. However, only the pure elites managed to carry out carnal anthropophagy, which brings in itself the highest meaning of life and avoids all the evils identified by Freud, evils of catechism. What happens is not a sublimation of the sexual instinct. It is the thermometric scale of the anthropophagic instinct. From carnal, he becomes elective and creates friendship. Affectionate, love. Speculative, science. It deviates and transfers. We arrived at the debasement. Low cannibalism clustered in the sins of catechism - envy, usury, slander, murder. Plague from the so-called cultured and Christianized peoples, it is against it that we are acting. Anthropophagous.” (ANDRADE, 1976, my translation).

The “absorption of the sacred enemy” through Anthropophagy, as described in the citation above, seems to be a different concept of self and other, if considered the one portrayed by Campbell (1992). Considering the central component of miscegenation and racial democracy, Brazilian identity narratives could not necessarily be based only in a radical difference of the “domestic” good self and the “international” violent other, as portrayed by Campbell (1992). The national imaginary includes an Anthropophagic movement, which could imply a different

understanding of the construction of identity, which seems to not (or not only) be based on radical difference.

The *Manifesto Antropófago* (Anthropofagist Manifesto), cited above, was authored by Oswald de Andrade and first published in 1928 around the famous painting *Abaporu*³⁵. According to Garcia (2018), the Manifest presents a Decolonial thought *avant la lettre*. For that, the author understands Anthropophagy as:

“the ingestion of human flesh within ritual practices, typical of some Brazilian native tribes such as the Tupinambás, for the sake of incorporating the vision of the world of the enemy being ingested; within those rituals, the eater undergoes a process of transformation into the devoured other, so that we could say that what is ingested is actually the point of view of the other (Viveiros de Castro 2002). Andrade sees the concept expressing those practices not only as a (i) metaphor for a procedure of critical assimilation of European culture, but also, as we will see, as (ii) a tool to diagnose the socio-economical structure of colonialism and as (iii) a therapeutic operator to deal with it” (GARCIA, 2018, p. 3).

Though I am not able to answer whether Anthropophagy represents a different understanding or possibility of identity, it is, undoubtedly, part of the country’s narratives and imaginaries about the self. It is considered by some the only original philosophy made in Brazil, as well as the core influence of many Brazilian artistic and sociocultural movements in the second half of the XXth Century, such as *Tropicalismo* and *Cinema Novo*. (GARCIA, 2018, p. 3)

The Anthropophagy ideas are close to postcolonial hybridist approaches that inspire this doctoral thesis as well, such as Bhabha’s (1984), Spivak’s (2003) or Nandy’s (1989), which tend to look at the presence of the other in the self, disrupting the idea of separation between them. In this approach, it is not against the other that I construct my identity, but with her. It is also close to a psychoanalytical approach, not only because of its dialogue with Freud, but also

³⁵ *Abaporu* is an oil on canvas painting by Tarsila do Amaral (1886-1973). It was a birthday gift to Oswald de Andrade, her husband at the time, in January 1928. The name of the work was chosen by Andrade and by the poet Raul Bopp. The name comes from the indigenous language Tupi: *aba* (man), *pora* (people) and *ú* (to eat), meaning “man who eats people”. The painting became a reference for the creation of the Brazilian modernist Anthropophagic Movement, which proposed to swallow foreign culture and adapt it to Brazil.

because of the dynamics of desire, which is the desire of the other, as in the citation: “I’m only interested in what is not mine”.

Nonetheless, it is hardly possible to say that Anthropophagy would be part of hegemonic narratives about the Brazilian nation, including because the indigenous peoples that practice cannibalism have been portrayed as barbaric and, indeed, as a radical other. There are exceptional critical works reacting to this barbaric view, such as Viveiros de Castro (2018) exploring how it represents a different ontology or metaphysics altogether and to which modern subjects have a hard time to understand. Beyond the barbaric stigma, indigenous peoples have as well indistinctly been widely exterminated in favor of Brazilian development and civilizing, so the indigenous subject or the philosophy inspired by it are not in a position of an ideal of the ego or a significant other.

Furthermore, regarding diplomacy, the poet Raul Bopp, one of the editors of the journal *Anthropophagy* in which Oswald’s piece was published, was a diplomat. Many other diplomats also published in the same journal, which became the material expression of the Brazilian Modernist Anthropophagic movement. (UNESP, 2020)³⁶

However, it is hard to say that the movement has broken the barriers of the artistic elite of the time to integrate formal Foreign Policy discourses, though a categorical affirmation would need further empirical studies. Henceforth, though Anthropophagy ideas seem not to have directly influenced formal Foreign Policy, it is part of the Brazilian imaginary of itself, which here I understand to be part of foreign policy narratives, in Campbell (1992) terms.

5.4. From World War II and beyond: Autonomy, a master signifier in chains with Realism and the Center-Periphery divide

³⁶ Available at: <https://www.cedem.unesp.br/#!/noticia/454/revista-de-antropofagia-em-defesa-da-semana-de-1922>. Access in 12 nov. 2021.

For many interpreters of Brazilian Foreign Policy (BFP), *development* is not only an end in itself, but is also a means for achieving *autonomy* (and vice-versa), supposedly ultimate goals for states in an ‘anarchic international system’ which are deeply related to each other, a realist perspective over international relations (ASHLEY, 1988) that influences directly the discourses and interpretations of BFP. The concept of *autonomy* is understood to be an ultimate goal in BFP, even though the perceptions of how it can be achieved differ through time. (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007)

Building upon Lima’s analytical axis of BFP (1994), Saraiva (2000, p. 310) describes that Brazilian history in the XX century can be divided into moments of *americanism* and *globalism*. While the first seeks autonomy through a closer relation with the United States, the second has a foreign policy paradigm originated from a combination of a nationalist critic from ISEB, with ECLAC’s reading of international economy, and as well with a realist perspective of IR (mainly considering the anarchic international system and the consequent self-help principle). The author argues that BFP has a combination of both *Grotian* and *hobbesian* views into its political action and readings of the international, taking Hedley Bull’s affirmation that those different realities coexist in the international realm.

In this regard, Miriam Saraiva (2000, p. 311-312) affirms that *autonomy* is the main trace of continuity of BFP and, under this objective, many others, “including the traditional respect to International Law, have been reinterpreted in the light of the current [autonomist] interests. Another main trace for her is *development*, for which the understanding varies depending on the “design of autonomy” of a determined moment. Therefore, the changes in BFP in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War and the neoliberal context can, as well, be interpreted under *autonomist* lenses.

By a combination of *Grotian* and *hobbesian* readings, it would, then, be possible to understand that Brazil’s *autonomist* strategy takes into account the great relevance of international institutions and the political possibilities they offer, not only under a purely cooperative gaze, but mainly in a rational-choice one. In this context, she proposes a new paradigm, as in the 1990s globalist and Americanist

paradigms seemed to have found a dead end (Lima, 1994), a paradigm that she proposes to call *pragmatic institutionalism*. (SARAIVA, 2000)

Beyond the combination of realism plus Grotianism, a great number of BFP analysts are working with systemic constructivism inspired by Wendt, to which *autonomy* is also considered a central concern of the state and, as Zehfuss (2001) describes, is not that far from Waltz neorealism. Saraiva (2000) also mentions the constructivist principle that anarchy is what states make of it and how the realist reading of the international has influenced BFP. Hence, it is important to remember: for Wendt's constructivism, independent from social context, States have four national interests: preserve and increase their physical security, autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem. (ZEHFUSS, 2001).

Autonomy will be analyzed further on both as a master and a floating or sliding signifier. On the one hand, seeking autonomy during the Rio Branco Era represented an unwritten alliance with the United States to balance the European (and mostly the British rule). On the other hand, during Vargas it meant balancing and bargaining with WWII enemies, both the United States and Germany. Later on, during Jânio Quadros and João Goulart (1960-1964), in the Independent Foreign Policy period, this independence was supposedly sought through an alignment towards the South to call attention to development issues instead of the East-West development sought during the Cold War. The shifting and re-articulation of autonomy in different chains of signifiers as well as its mobilization as an anchor for BFP discourses goes on until our current date.

According to Muñoz (2016), BFP historiography has obsessively searched for lines of continuity in the concept of *autonomy* throughout time, what promoted its proliferation, or, in the perspective followed here, reification as a master signifier. The author describes that studies over the topic usually privilege two tendencies: on the one hand, an emphasis on the State and its quest for *autonomy*; on the other hand, a reduced interest over the domestic determinants, as Foreign Policy supposedly has a special status and, then, should be analyzed separately.

As claimed by Spektor (2014, p. 17), the autonomist project has guided BFP for fifty years, and has as its distinguishing mark “the definition of the national

interest in terms of industrial modernization with a view to building a national capitalism shielded against political and economic pressures of an international system on which Brazil is dependent.” The author further describes that, though the industrialist goal and the dependent aspect of the national economy, the project has been articulated in many different ways:

“The autonomist project was never articulated in a precise set of propositions, nor does it have a single paternity. Thinkers as varied as Hélio Jaguaribe, Celso Furtado, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso contributed to it. Its trajectory was shaped by the choices of such disparate politicians as Juscelino Kubitschek, San Tiago Dantas, Ernesto Geisel and Lula, and professional diplomats such as João Augusto de Araújo Castro, Miguel Álvaro Osório de Almeida, Antônio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira, Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães and Celso Amorim. Importantly, the consensus around the notion of autonomy only existed at an abstract level – the commitment to a policy of adherence to capitalism that ensured some national leeway. In practice, foreign policy choices were intensely disputed among the exponents of autonomism themselves” (SPEKTOR, 2014, p. 21, my translation).

Under this point of view, Helio Jaguaribe is seen as one of the predecessors of the consolidation of the concept of *autonomy*. Jaguaribe’s description of the Brazilian quest for *autonomy* is applied to the Cold War context and Brazil’s necessity to recognize its peripheral position under the United States’ imperial system, world’s major one, portraying it as a framework of levels of State self-determination. (MUÑOZ, 2019, p. 76)

Helio Jaguaribe’s idea of *autonomy* has two main structural elements: material resources (human and natural resources, including territorial ones); and what he calls the level of ‘international permissiveness’, defined as means to neutralize risks offered by other states, what is mainly a geopolitical idea and has much to do with coercion (and military) capacity. The author also considers dynamic elements that influence *autonomy*, especially regarding economic matters, such as keeping favorable exchange rates in relation to the major powers. (MUÑOZ, 2019, p. 77)

Gerson Moura is another important analyst of the idea of *autonomy*, and created the concept of *autonomy in dependency* to refer to BPF from 1935 to 1942,

in which Vargas implemented the so-called ‘pragmatic equidistance’ between the two major powers, the United States and Germany. Given Brazil’s structural dependency towards the United States and considering that the North Americans were a central axis of BFP since the Republic, Moura argues that negotiating with Germany and establishing economic and military bonds with the Germans increased Brazil’s bargaining power (MOURA, 2012).

The Brazilian strategy of international insertion that placed the USA as a “special ally” achieved little of the desired results, being especially frustrating during the Dutra government and the first JK government (1954 to 1958). Therefore, the idea of autonomy in relation to the US becomes a central element of BFP and national-developmentalism starts to gain greater space in the nation’s political imagination. A peak of this thought can be seen during the Jânio Quadros and João Goulart administrations, in the period 1961-1964, which resulted in the formulation of the Independent Foreign Policy (PEI) (LEITE, 2011).

In this context, Vigevani and Ramanzini Júnior (2010) describe *autonomy* in BFP as the following:

“From a historical perspective, autonomy is a primary objective of any nation-state, even having characteristics that adapt to over time. According to Fonseca Jr., “the expressions of what autonomy is vary historically and spatially, vary according to interests and positions of power” (1998:361). The concept admits different approaches depending on the configuration of the international system in a given historical period, as well as the worldviews of the population and of the elites. Historically, for the Brazilian State, the idea of autonomy meant, in the face of the outside world, the ability to decide in relation the centers of international power, enabling the possibility for the country to make real choices. This was true at different times with greater or lesser intensity, but it is a constant conducting wire, valid until today, in the second decade of the 21st century” (VIGEVANI; RAMANZINI JÚNIOR, 2010, p. 517-518).

Considering its use in BFP, the dominant discourses on *autonomy* do not take this signifier as an opposite to Latin American Dependency Theories. It rather seems to be positioned in chains of signifiers relating it more deeply to realist and state-centric approaches - including because Brazil macroeconomic guidelines on the 1970s, that were much more influenced by Keynesians and ECLAC’s analysis,

instead of Dependency Theorist, as the country was under a far-right nationalist dictatorship that persecuted any ideas that could be directly linked to Marxism. (JARDIM, 2014)

International Relations Theory in Latin America - including in Brazil - in the second half of the XXth century was strongly marked by the contributions of the thinkers of ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America), which is consolidated between the 1940s and 1950s and has as some of its exponents Felipe Herrera, José Carlos Mariatégui, Aníbal Pinto, Raúl Prebisch, and Celso Furtado. ECLAC draws attention to the center-periphery binomial, in the role played by Latin American economies, regarding the deterioration of means of exchange in the international division of labor as producers of primary goods, causing the peripheral countries underdevelopment. It proposes, in general terms, an inward-oriented development, necessarily aimed at industrialization, as well as strengthening regional integration (TICKNER, 2009; BERNAL-MEZA, 2005; CERVO, 2008; NERY, 2014)

Another line of thought that influenced the thinking of international and economic relations in Latin America was the Dependency Theory. It is not the focus in this work due to the fact that – based on the revised literature – this line of thought does not seem to have had a clear observable influence on the performance of Itamaraty and the executive in the direction of foreign policy (although one of its greatest exponents was the minister of foreign affairs and President). This line of thought was consolidated between the 1960s and 1970s, and has as references authors like Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, Rui Mauro Marini and Theotônio dos Santos. *Dependentistas* identify the capitalist order as the main cause of Latin American underdevelopment, in order to reinforce the manifestations of dependency and underdevelopment, including in its analysis on the class conflict and class alliances between elites, on inequality and exclusion, and its analysis on deformation of the national state (TICKNER, 2009; BERNAL-MEZA, 2005). In a simplistic way, its main difference in relation to the thought of ECLAC is that dependency theory considers that the peripheral insertion in the international system could only be overcome by a radical rupture with the capitalist system. In

this sense, no reforms would be sufficient to break with the imperial and exploitative order of the international. (NEGRI; HARDT, 2000)

In this regard, it is once more clear that the idea of *autonomy* - such as *development* -, acts not only as a master signifier, but also as a sliding signifier, as its meanings are variable and discursively constructed through time in relation to many different opposites, such as Dependency Theory, economic dependence in Keynesian terms (which justifies policies of industrialization through imports substitution), liberalization and adhesion to international norms and regimes (during the 1990s), or geopolitical vulnerability (that could provide justification for armaments policies, for example).

Taking into account, for example, the very influential approach of Lima (1990, p. 10-11), she describes how BFP has not been compatible with the findings and theoretical propositions of Dependency Theory, which presents the idea that dependency and autonomy are excluding phenomena in a country's foreign policy. Lima argues that both autonomy and dependency coexist in semiperipheral country's foreign policy. Considering that, the author proposes a theoretical framework based on Olson's theory of collective action to allow for a power analysis concerning the different fields of International Politics, instead of other approaches that limit the understanding in terms of center and periphery. In this sense, she argues:

"Imbalances between existing capacities explain the fact that peripheral countries pursue, at the same time, expansive and distributive negotiation strategies. Consequently, in opposition to perspectives that exclude the variability of behavior patterns and those that considered inconsistent conduct of a transitory nature, the focus developed here is based on the premise of the multiplicity of international strategies inherent to the international relations of the semiperiphery due to the cross-pressures arising from the diversity of objectives and interests at stake in the international system and the imbalance of its power resources" (LIMA, 1990, p. 11).

With that in mind, it is important to highlight Gerson Moura's approach on *autonomy*. It has offered an important inspiration to BFP analysts, and the signifier is later adapted to other periods of Brazil's diplomacy by other relevant BFP experts. In the periods of Independent Foreign Policy (1961-1964), president

Geisel's Responsible Pragmatism (1974-1979) until the government Sarney, the transition towards democracy, one of the main interpretations is that BFP strategy has been characterized as *autonomy through distance*, defined as politics of non-automatic acceptance of international regimes, reinforced by an idea of autarchic development, focused on the domestic market. Later, on the 1990s, Fernando Henrique Cardoso's presidency (1995-2002) is known as a period of *autonomy through participation*, as it is marked by the adhesion to international regimes seeking to restore Brazil's image as a reliable market and investment destination, as well as a stable democracy; while Lula da Silva's has been characterized as *autonomy through diversification* due to its close approach towards the South. (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007)

Moura's approach of FPA dialogues with Realist perspectives: questioning Graham Allison's bureaucratic decision-making process, the author opposes the idea presented by Allison that foreign policy would be highly undetermined, being the result of bureaucratic disputes between multiple government institutions. Therefore, Moura doubts the idea that there would be no clear national interest in foreign policy decision making. According to him, looking beyond the day-to-day decisions and taking a broad and structural analysis, one would be able to identify well-defined objectives regarding US foreign policy actions towards Latin America and, more specifically, Brazil. (MOURA, 2012, p. 249)

As previously mentioned, the author has deeply influenced the debates on *autonomy* in BFPA literature, which became a master signifier around which its narratives of linearity circulate. For that matter, Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007) are also mainstream references when talking about *autonomy*. According to them, the quest for *autonomy* has been, since Brazil's independence and during the Republic, a central axis of the foreign policy debate. The sought of a friendship relation with the US during the Rio Branco Era (1902-1912) and Osvaldo Aranha period (1938-1943) to maintain some room for maneuver by the increase of economic interdependence, has been called *autonomy through participation*. (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007, p. 276)

The same concept of *autonomy through participation* was also applied by the authors to Fernando Henrique Cardoso's (FHC) foreign policy, as Brazil was

adhering to liberal regimes and institutions during that period (1995-2002) in the context of the Washington Consensus and the sought for economic stability and for consolidating Brazil as a solid market after the long periods of crisis and indebtedness of the 1980's and the first half of 1990's (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007).

The relevance of the signifier *autonomy* has also fueled the emergence of the idea of analyzing Brazil as a *middle power* or an *intermediate state*, which are states, such as Brazil, that have some international prominence due to its territorial greatness and abundance in natural resources, but seek an international insertion through *multilateralism* as means to increase its bargaining power and overcome its hard power deficiencies. Those concepts have also played a major role in analysts' narratives of Brazil in the 2000's. (LIMA, 1990; HIRST AND LIMA, 2006; ALDEN; VIEIRA, 2010)

Nonetheless, *autonomy* is not observed as a sliding (or empty signifier) by the main BFPA analysts. Actually, most have been trying to define and fix its meaning according to Brazil's history and socioeconomic experiences. In this direction, as mentioned in chapter 1, Lima (2018) describes that the moments in which there was a prevalence of an *autonomist* orientation in BFPA were exceptional. For her, in the post-Second World War, the *autonomist* moments were actually the points of rupture, not of continuity.

The maintenance of the same model of international economic insertion for approximately 40 years and the prevalence of a *foreign policy of prestige* responded to Brazil's diplomacy ambition of acquiring protagonism in the multilateral realm. Nonetheless, according to Lima's categorizing, the *foreign policy of prestige* was restricted to matters of trade and development. In the current days, the *foreign policy of prestige* could be interpreted as the pursue of a strong *multilateral* presence as means for acquiring soft power, substituting its lack for hard power. Thus, for Lima, what has been interpreted as a search for *autonomy* is actually a typical (realist) search for prestige of a country located in the world's periphery.

In this regard, for her, an *autonomist* foreign policy requires an ambition of international protagonism and some degree of contestation of global rules; a long-

term geopolitical view regarding international relations and the North-South divide; active solidarity with Southern peers. Hence, for her, what has been enduring since the 1950s and 1960s is the active presence of Brazil in multilateral fora of trade and development, with some specific moments of leadership in G-77, presenting a *mediator role* between North and South interests. (LIMA, 2018, p. 42)

Therefore, either for Lima (2018) or Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007), *autonomy* and other signifiers are not seen as sliding, as unstable, but actually as terms, concepts or ‘thermometers’ against which they can compare different periods of time in BFP to assess change and continuity. Then, given my proposal, reframing *autonomy* as a master signifier, its’ chain of significance would be similar to: *realism/pragmatism* - *mediator role/bridge country* - *industrialization* - *development- autonomy*.


5.5. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the main master signifiers found in Brazilian foreign policy (BFP) narratives, considering mostly the canonical literature in the field. The master signifiers found were *miscegenation* (and *racial democracy*), *pacifism* (and its connections, such as *legalism* and *Grotianism*); *development* (which was debated in dialogue with the idea of *coloniality* and *the other West*); and *autonomy* (debated regarding its links to a realist approach to the international).

Considering the concepts proposed by Laclau and Mouffe, the narratives (re)constructed throughout this chapter are also contrasted with disputing ones, which are part of the field of discursivity. Therefore, the dialogue with the master signifiers was also established with other critical literatures from racial studies, postcolonialism and psychoanalysis.

Given the methodological discussion presented in chapter three and the signifiers presented in this chapter, a chart of Brazilian biographical narratives in the beginning of the 2000s could be portrayed as follows in figure 2.

Figure 2: Master signifiers and hegemonic narratives of Brazilian foreign policy identity in the beginning of the 2000's



Source: my own elaboration

As previously discussed, in the field of discursivity are all the discursive possibilities, either envisioned or considered possible by this analyst or not. In this regard, a reservation must be made: there could be many absences of signifiers that are not even possible to be imagined at this point of time, beyond the ones that could also be perceived or imagined by other analysts, with inherently different subjectivities, as in this thesis I counter the positivist idea of impersonal research. In the figure, the master signifiers that are exclusively part of the field of discursivity are the following: Luso-Brazilian, white country, monarchy, Christian, corruption, emerging country, black country, Afrolatinoamerican.

A second element in the figure is the field of contextual possibilities. In this field, there are all master signifiers of narratives that circulate in that point of time but are not hegemonic narratives, but usually disputing ones. Those identity narratives are considered possible at that point in time and have the potential to become hegemonic depending on how the disputes evolve. In the figure, some signifiers were represented both in the field of discursivity and in the field of contextual possibilities or both in the field of hegemonic narratives and of contextual possibilities. This representation has the intent to indicate movement: as those positionings are dynamic and inherently discursively constructed, their centrality in identity discourses can change through time. The signifiers in movement through the area of the field of contextual possibilities are: third world, solidarity, other West, oligarchies, global South, cordial man, Americanism, middle power, regional power. The signifier republic was put in the field of contextual possibilities only, as its central relevance happened at the end of the XIX century and during the democratization that culminated in the 1988 constitution, but in this second instance, it did not play a central role in Brazil's identity discourses, as 'democracy' seems to have played a much more central role. (LESSA; COUTO; FARIAS, 2010)

Finally, the master signifiers present in the hegemonic narratives of Brazilian identity – in BFPA analysis – at the beginning of the 2000s were pacifism, development, autonomy, and racial democracy (the ones that I consider core to the analysis). Other relevant master signifiers, which are also in chains with the four

previously mentioned are: multilateralism, bridge country, legalism, liberal democracy, South American, diplomatic tradition, cooperation, territorial and natural greatness, regional power, middle power.

Mapping the literature and the imaginaries over Brazilian identity and Brazilian foreign policy alongside researchers was, then, central, to construct this figure and to understand what are the hegemonic narratives and master signifiers around which BFPA circulated at the beginning of the 2000s when Lula da Silva was elected and some possible changes in Brazil's identity discourses could be observed. This chapter calls attention to how the field of analysts of BFP have been actively (re)producing the understandings of Brazilian identity and its narratives of past, present and desired future. This realm of the narratives over the Brazilian self, which I understand to be part of foreign policy, in Campbell (1992) terms, is actively informed by the intellectual production constructing biographical narratives, memory, identity narratives.

It is important to increase BFP's reflexivity concerning what kind of narratives we have been reproducing and how central concepts of BFP could be directly related to coloniality, violence and silencing. The narrative of racial democracy, for example, was actively reinforced through BFP, both official discourses and specialists' analysis. Still, in BFP we have almost not explored the idea that our work could be actually reinforcing given discourses about the Brazilian self and its hated other, its ideal of the ego, its past, present and desired future. Those narratives are embedded with unseen hierarchies that, instead of being reconstructed and reinforced, could be questioned, deconstructed and defied by the same intellectual exercises.

6. Analyzing Lula da Silva's government Foreign Policy discourses

6.0. Introduction

As described in the previous chapter, mainstream BFPA is highly based on a narrative of continuity. Around those narratives, orbits an array of widely accepted terms, which can sometimes be taken for granted. Through a (re)construction of Brazil's biographical narratives from the lenses of BFPA analysts, counterpointed with Brazilian Social Thought and critical literatures, including postcolonial and psychoanalytic approaches, I identified the following master signifiers: *miscegenation/racial democracy*, *pacifism/legalism*, *development*, and *autonomy*. Those signifiers are frequently sliding, being constantly rearticulated through discursive practices, such as foreign policy. They are also in chains with others, such as *pragmatism*, *multilateralism*, *other West*, *middle power*, *South-American*, *globalism*, *Americanism*, among others.

Furthermore, a rather insulated, largely unrepresentative, and highly institutionalized Ministry of Foreign Affairs would predispose for a more centralized analysis, also considering that international agreements are autonomously negotiated and signed by the minister or diplomat in charge and have an ex-post approval in Brazil, which increases the political costs of not ratifying. (PINHEIRO, 2005; FARIAS AND RAMANZINI JÚNIOR, 2014; CARMO AND FARIAS, 2018)

In parallel, the logic, and even the terms used in Brazilian foreign policy analysis have been, to a greater extent, compatible with what is being observed at the diplomatic level. Thus, a policy-oriented line in BFPA, scarcely discussing theoretical presuppositions (Gomes, 2014), could then be explained by the still existing and historical close links between academics and diplomats in IR, dating back to the very initial structuring of the field in Brazil. (CHEIBUB, 1985; PINHEIRO AND VEDOVÉLI, 2012; CERVO, 2014)

The hegemonic discourses over Brazilian biographical narratives identified in the previous chapter, alongside their chains of significance, will, in this chapter, be contrasted with the official Foreign Policy discourses during Lula da Silva (2003-2010), to analyze how they relate to each other. Through this comparison, I intend to investigate some of the mechanisms that foreign policy, in Campbell (1992) terms, here represented by Brazil's biographical narratives under the lenses of BFP analysts, inform, constrain or influence the Foreign Policy, here represented by the official Foreign Policy under Lula Government. At the same time, the analysis aims to explore to what extent the official Foreign Policy also influences back the 'domestic' narratives of identity, self, and other (foreign policy). Under this approach, Foreign Policy is not something directed to the 'international', bridging it with the domestic or 'projecting' the domestic preferences, but it is, ultimately, legitimating the very existence of the State.

While part of the mainstream literature in BFP considers that there was no structural change in BFP under Lula as the main objectives of *autonomy* and *development* were kept (VIGEVANI AND CEPALUNI, 2007). Lima (2018), considers that Lula da Silva's government represents a rare moment in BFP, only paralleling the 1961-1964 period, during Jânio Quadros and João Goulart's governments (Jânio-Jango). Lima's (2018) reading is also similar to Leite's (2011), which considers that the moment holds similarities with Jânio and Jango, as well as with Geisel (1974-1979), moments marked by the *globalist* strategy of diversification of partnerships and non-prioritization of the relations with the United States.

Vieira (2018) presents a critical perspective towards the same period, in dialogue with postcolonialism and psychoanalysis. According to him, Lula da Silva's government represented a rupture in BFP identity discourses which displayed Brazil's inherent ontologically insecure and fragmented identity. Not for its sole merit, but as a result of years of activism of the black movements in Brazil, the Lula government supposedly disrupts with the narrative of racial democracy present since the very foundation of the Brazilian Republic and during all the XX century, strongly reinforced in popular culture and diplomatic discourses, to declare that Brazil is a black country,

the second largest after Nigeria, to cite Fanon, to assert that Brazil was conniving with Portuguese colonialism and slaves trafficking, and to reaffirm that there is racism in Brazil (VIEIRA, 2018).

To analyze whether and to what extent this discursive rupture takes place, as well as to reflect upon some of its effects, I propose looking at Lula da Silva, Celso Amorim, and other relevant state authority speeches' identity discourses, from 2003 to 2010, through a qualitative discourse analysis based on psychoanalytic methodologies, as discussed in chapter three. Those speeches will be contrasted with the chains of significance found in the previous chapter, which are:

- a) *Republic - Latin American - miscegenation - pacifism.*
- b) *Pragmatism - unwritten alliance with the United States - legalism/Grotianism - territorial greatness.*
- c) *European workforce - miscegenation - racial democracy - development - other West - great country.*
- d) *Realism/pragmatism - mediator role/bridge country - industrialization - development - autonomy.*

Under the methodology proposed here, some of the relevant questions will be: did the master signifiers *racial democracy* and *miscegenation*, somewhat foundational to Brazilian identity discourses, have been actively denied, contradicted, dislocated or disrupted with the mobilization of its dichotomic opposites? Has a new ego, ideal of the ego or desired future been presented by State narratives of identity or its biographical narratives? Did the hated (racialized) other, the reason for Brazilian underdevelopment in Brazil's national imaginary, stop occupying the place of the scapegoat? If so, how do the new narratives of State collide with collective and elite well-established imaginaries? If not, did the signifier *race/racism* in Brazil occupy a relevant place during the Lula da Silva government in a different way from the previous ones? Have any of the signifiers' identity chains been dislocated? Still open for other

insights and sure that this research might raise many more questions than answers, those are some of the inquiries that I aim to reflect upon.

6.1. Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government and the Third UN Conference Against Racism

1988 is not only the year our democratic Constitution was elaborated, but it was also the centenary of the abolition of slavery. Until then, the festivities were celebrated on May 13th, the day in which Princesse Isabel, daughter of Emperor Dom Pedro II, officially signed the decree abolishing slavery in Brazil. Considering that, the Black Movement articulated a dispute of Brazilian national symbols and the protagonism over the memory of the fight against slavery in Brazil, and proposed the national holiday to be replaced by the anniversary date of Zumbi's - the famous leader of the Quilombo dos Palmares, the 20th of November - murder (ALFONSO, 2019, p. 7-8).

In this context, the Zumbi dos Palmares National March against Racism, for Citizenship, and Life, in 1995, had around 30,000 protesters and is an important milestone for the agenda of the fight against racism in Brazil. The march was central for pressurizing President Fernando Henrique Cardoso to speak with leaders of the Black Movement, which demanded, beyond the change of the celebrations, affirmative actions and access to higher education (ALFONSO, 2019: 7-8). As one of the results of the UBM pressures, FHC publicly recognizes that Brazil was a racist country in 1996 in a seminar discussing public policies against discrimination (AMORIM; CASTILHO, 2018, p. 226)

Hence, even if the 1988 Constitution had already recognized and criminalized racism in Brazil, the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) - between 1995 and 2002 - is known to be the first moment of actual opening for institutional acknowledgment of racism as a national issue. It is worth mentioning that FHC is a famous sociologist influenced, among others, by the intellectual Florestan Fernandes, one of the primary references on the myth of racial democracy's critique. In his

University of São Paulo Cathedra Thesis, published in 1964 as the book *A integração do negro na sociedade de classes* (The black's integration in class society). According to Florestan Fernandes (2008), the racial democracy myth exempted whites from our moral and collective responsibility for the poor and continuous deteriorating socioeconomic situation of blacks and mulattoes in Brazil after the end of slavery in Brazil.

The policies developed during the FHC government were mainly aimed at raising awareness of the urgency of combating racism. Hence, FHC created an Inter-Ministerial Working Group for the Valorization of the Black Population (GTI), with a primary focus on the institutionalization of anti-racism measures and laws, set under the National Secretariat of Human Rights. Among those measures, there was also the assistance in training for Brazilian black organizations to attend the Third World Conference Against Racism, in 2001; the launch of the 2002 National Affirmative Action Program, legalizing affirmative actions; and the implementation of the first affirmative action base in quotas for black and *pardo* Brazilians to work in some Ministries. (MESQUITA, 2021, p. 50-51)

In terms of international politics, the 2001 UN World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance – WCAR, was the third UN conference of the thematic of race, after the ones held in 1978 and 1983. After the end of Apartheid, open racism was no longer the main issue: now it should be dealt in its structural dimension. Brazil was responsible, alongside Kenya, for the working group of historical issues. Even though the conference was obfuscated and run over by the September 11th attacks, there are some relevant results for the topic, which were very controversial between Western countries, mainly: the recognition of slavery and slavery trafficking as crimes against humanity; and the acknowledgment of colonialism as the foundation for racism. (ALVES, 2002)

The preparation events for the 2001 Durban conference in Brazil involved a wide and diverse set of actors and gave great visibility to the critique of racial democracy. President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) established a National Preparatory

Committee, with an egalitarian composition between representatives from the Government and civil society, with special regard to the ones exposed to racism and discrimination, including race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and sexuality. According to a piece authored by the diplomats that headed the Brazilian delegation:

“the most important impact of Durban for Brazil was the change in perception about the very existence and consequences of racism in the country. A new consensus seems to be emerging in governmental, social, and academic circles of opinion makers that racism and intolerance continue to exist in Brazil and must be fought accordingly by means of specific and co-ordinated public policies. Apparently, the myth of racial democracy has finally been replaced with the possibility of building a racial democracy” (SABOIA; PORTO, 2002, p. 241).

Some declarations about the racial component of Brazilian society and its constitution as the second largest black country in the world after Nigeria - which has been attributed to or became famous with Lula da Silva (Vieira, 2018) - were already present during the previous government, and probably way earlier in the spaces where there was the participation of the black movement. As the diplomats describe in their declaration:

“According to official statistics, 47% of the Brazilian population is ‘black’ or ‘colored’, which makes Brazil the largest black country in the world, after Nigeria. The disadvantage of blacks in relation to whites within the general context of the Brazilian population is conspicuous in the business community, at universities and in hospitals. Recent studies evidence and quantify this situation. Further, they highlight the fact that social differentials between whites and blacks have remained unchanged throughout the 20th century. Despite the visible and quantifiable disparity in the social indicators between white and black Brazilians, the denial that racism exists in Brazil has persisted in sectors of government and civil society alike, together with the idyllic characterisation of the country as a ‘racial democracy’, exempt from racist and xenophobic manifestations. However, at the same time, both in civil society and Governmental sectors, a critical mass capable of identifying the singularities of racist manifestations in Brazil began to emerge and organize itself for the fight against such manifestations” (SABOIA; PORTO, 2002, p. 139).

According to the diplomats, the Conference gave Brazil great visibility. The country had the biggest delegation attending the event, showing a very plural national

debate, including the First National Conference Against Racism and Intolerance, held in Rio de Janeiro, in July 2001, with 1700 attendants from all over the country. Brazil also stood out for its positions on discrimination against gender and sexuality, which were kept outside the final document, but in its last remarks, Brazil reinforces its interpretation that the document is the first one to recognize gender as a matter of human rights (OAS, 2001). According to the Brazilian representatives:

Brazil's participation was extremely pro-active and the delegation put forward and debated subjects such as the general situation of people of African descent, indigenous peoples, gender and sexual minorities, among others. Women of colour had an *instrumental* role in the delegation and reflected the commitment and the quality of the contribution offered by that segment of the black activism. Such contribution was acknowledged by the Conference, which elected a Brazilian black woman, Professor Edna Roland, as General rapporteur, following the nomination made by the Brazilian government" (SABOIA; PORTO, 2002, p. 140).

The reports and academic texts on the conference accentuate how difficult it was to reach a consensus (ALVES, 2002; OAS, 2001). According to the Brazilian diplomats, some elements that were there in the Brazilian documents at the beginning of the negotiations did not make it to the end, considering the need of implementation of domestic development policies aimed at discriminated groups to ensure the achievement of human development standards set by Copenhagen Social Development Summit (1995) by 2015. (SABOIA; PORTO, 2002)

In the text, published one year later, the diplomats reinforce that, in reply to the debates stimulated by the conference, and 'aiming at the implementation of the recommendations contained both in the Durban documents and in the report prepared by the Brazilian Preparatory Committee' a National Council Against Discrimination was established at the federal level, with 'balanced' representation between government and civil society. (SABOIA; PORTO, 2002, p. 242) According to Saboia and Porto, the scholarship program for black Brazilians launched by Itamaraty can be seen as one of the responses towards the implementation of policies against racial discrimination in Brazil.

Finally, the diplomats describe the issues debated at Durban were taboo and ‘expose a critical Brazilian reality’. Nonetheless, the Brazilian government was ‘honest’ to admit the problem and show itself willing to fight it alongside civil society. (SABOIA; PORTO, 2002)

Since the Zumbi dos Palmares March of 1995 and the Durban Conference in 2001, it seems there has indeed been a change in Brazilian narratives about racism. In 2002, president FHC declared once more in the ceremony of the Black Consciousness Week ‘*there is still racism in Brazil*’ and celebrated the new scholarship from Itamaraty: ‘[when I was the foreign policy minister] the coloring of Itamaraty was very little. *It doesn't look good [...], it's not Brazil*. Brazil is colorful, not monochromatic.’ (FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO, 2002, my translation) This is an interesting quote to be analyzed because while admitting that Brazil is not free from racism, Fernando Henrique, to some extent, reinforces the racial democracy imaginary when affirming that Itamaraty should be colored because it is what Brazil *is*.

Some of the criticism towards the FHC anti-racism agenda goes exactly in this direction. Some authors mention that it addressed the problem focusing mostly on recognition and not on redistribution (LIMA, 2010 apud MESQUITA 2021, p. 51), which means that it remained incipient and was based in showing the very existence of racism and the social exclusion deriving from it, acknowledging the social reality, while at the same time reinforcing ‘*the positive value of Brazil's racial diversity*’.

FHC's government established foundations relating to human rights and the operationalization of affirmative actions, but, only during the PT government the anti-racism agenda emerged as concrete policies, integrated into Brazil's legal system. In this regard, there is a perception that Lula showed an increased commitment to the domestic implementation of the results of the 2001 Durban Conference against Racism: the UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) (MESQUITA, 2021, p. 51).

6.2. PT, social movements, and the racial agenda at the State level

The black population's social articulation has been strongly present in Brazilian history, even during the military dictatorship, in which social movements were actively persecuted, tortured, and even had their members executed. During the 1970s a great variety of social movements emerged in Brazil with different revindications, but with a common fight for democracy (TRAPP, 2011). Between those, some relevant anti-racist political groups were: *Grupo Palmares* (Palmares Group), founded in 1971 in the city of Porto Alegre; *Centro de Cultura e Arte Negra* (Center of Black Culture and Art), created in 1972 in São Paulo; and the *Instituto de Pesquisa das Culturas Negras* (Institute of Black Culture Research), initiated in 1976, in Rio de Janeiro. There also was (and still is) the so-called Unified Black Movement (UBM), a roof organization bundling many initiatives, which initiated its activities in 1978 and grew stronger during the 1980s (ALFONSO, 2019, p. 7; TRAPP, 2011, p. 237).

The UBM characterized itself as a movement of vindication, protest, and denunciation of racism in Brazil, fighting against the oppression and for the emancipation of the black people. It has been always committed to combat the discourse of racial democracy in Brazil, one of the country's founding myths, as we have been discussing. For UBM, it was necessary to dispute the pacific idea of racial democracy and consolidate the idea that the racial-ethnic relations in Brazil were actually conflictual. According to Trapp (2011, p. 247), *miscegenation* can, in fact, be understood as the opposite of multiculturalism, as it hides under the guard of racial democracy a whitening and conservative discourse.

In this context, for UBM, it was central to rediscuss the foundation of the Brazilian identity:

“The discussion on national identity suffers a setback and takes on new contours. From an identity anchored in the notion of ethno-racial non-conflict, there is a demand for black identity, with eyes turned to Africa and to diaspora blacks. The awareness and the feeling of belonging to blackness and black culture constitute a transnational context of struggles and experiences of the black population, mediated by the political and conceptual potential of the Black

Atlantic, which, according to Paul Gilroy (2001), conforms also the ideas of anti-racism, acting in the constant re-articulation of the political meaning of black identity and culture in different local contexts” (TRAPP, 2011, p. 239, my translation).

Hence, according to Trapp (2011, p. 239, my translation, emphasis added), the Black Movement mobilized a ‘*discursive dislocation of the national identity* towards an ethnic identity, in transnational contexts [...]’. The statistical strategy, still in the 1980s, was to classify both blacks and *pardos* under the same category of afro-Brazilians, demanding a *bipolarization* of ethnic-racial relations, which is the understanding that Brazil is not a multicultural homogeneity in which all have the same opportunities and rights, but that it is composed mainly by two different racial contexts, with different hierarchical and social implications due to structural racism.

The Workers’ Party foundation, in 1980, is contemporary and has its parallels to the structuration of the UBM in Brazil. Lélia Gonzalez, one of PT’s founders and one of the major references to reflect upon Brazilian ‘disavowal racism’, was also a leader in UBM. Even though PT did not create a specific agenda for black political activism, the political party believed that topic should be dealt with in a transversal manner, passing through all agendas.

Abdias do Nascimento, another great leader of the black movement in Brazil, by his turn, was critical of this arrangement and was part of the Democratic Labor Party (PDT), which institutionalized black agendas. Later on, Lélia took some distance from PT, criticizing it for Racism by Omission, as non-central actors in the left were silenced in the European egalitarian dream of the party. (AMORIM; SILVA, 2021, p. 6)

This critical relation between the UBM and PT went on and the black leadership in the party was seen more to the left in the political spectrum. In the 1990s, PT had to rethink its role and the limitations of its project and this was when the strong focus on the class struggles lost space for a more moderated agenda concentrated in an expansion of rights in the democratic system. In the late 1990s, PT opened a voice space in its national congress for black militancy (AMORIM; SILVA, 2021, p. 7-8).

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a former metalworker, was the main leader of PT. He was the central articulator of big strikes in the city of São Paulo from 1978 to 1980 and gained relevance in the bigger political arena due to the deteriorating support for FHC economic policies, as well as strong political activism of social movements in Brazil (ALFONSO, 2019).

When elected, Lula created SEPPIR (Special Secretariat for the Promotion of Racial Equality Policies), led by black leaders such as Matilde Ribeiro (2003-2006) and Edson Santos (2006-2010), and nominated Gilberto Gil for the Ministry of Culture (2003-2008), a prominent black artist and political activist, creating an agenda of cultural rescue and inclusion in the political decision arenas. (Amorim; Silva, 2021, p. 9).

Compared to FHC's working group GTI, SEPPIR has been created as a national agency of affirmative action with a ministry status, established in transversal lines and, thus, capable of reaching local institutions, private companies, and high federal organs; while the GTI was entrusted to put policies into motion only at a federal level (MESQUITA, 2021, p. 54).

Some of its results are due to its capillarity and the way it has allowed for the expansion of racial debates in civil society and the third sector. The creation of the National Council for the Promotion of Racial Equality (CNPIR), for example, created a space in which an advisory body of 44 members was entitled to present proposals for racial equality policies. It was composed of 22 individuals representing the executive branch of government, 19 representing the civil society, and 3 representing race relations experts (MESQUITA, 2021, p. 55).

Another relevant result that arose from CNPIR initiatives was the National Conference for the Promotion of Racial Equality (CONAPIR). The conference happened four times between 2005 and 2018 in different cities and "[...] throughout consecutive state-level stages, which prompted popular debates on racism and the elimination of racial discrimination involving society in a broad sense, and not only the centers of power themselves" (MESQUITA, 2021, p. 55). In 2018 CONAPIR was

attended by 1,200 people from different black movement articulations, which is considered to be an indication of high social engagement.

Finally, another result from SEPPIR was the approval of the Statute of Racial Equality, in 2010, regarded by some as the best possible document that could be approved at that time, which came however with a significant reduction of the racial equality measures first proposed by its critics (MESQUITA, 2021, p. 55).

On the downsides, SEPPIR has not actually achieved the same powers as a State Ministry exactly because of its transversal mandate and its low priority, which resulted in a small operational structure and a low budget:

“Seppir has always been an underfunded institution, with the annual budget allocated by successive governments constituting a limit for institutional action. The 2010 Annual Budget Law set Seppir’s budget at R\$ 70 million, which represented only 0.001% of nominal GDP (R\$ 3.886 trillion). In 2016, this proportion dropped to 0.0003% of nominal GDP (R\$ 6.266 trillion), as the institution had its budget reduced to R\$ 20.827 million. Such budgetary data points to the fact that Seppir was different from well-funded ministries and far from a governmental priority” (MESQUITA, 2021, p. 54).

SEPPIR’s low priority has also been reflected in its institutional instability. Still during PT’s administration, in 2015, president Dilma Rousseff conducted a ministerial reform and attached it to the Ministry of Women, Racial Equality and Human Rights. After her impeachment, the Ministry has been progressively weakened and dismantled (MESQUITA, 2021, p. 55).

SEPPIR created a new relationship between the black movement and the State. In the past, black activists have faced strong barriers to the establishment of federal-level dialogues and their organization in leftist parties, such as PT and PDT was key to this institutional outcome. From the Lula administration’s perspective, SEPPIR was created to reduce racial tensions, including the internal disagreements regarding the racial issues inside PT. Nevertheless, the institution was not as powerful as expected, and groups participating in it have been regarded by outsiders as coopted by the State

and as actors weakening the racial movements, due to the limits imposed by State bureaucracies to their agenda (MESQUITA, 2021, p. 53-54).

The inclusion of interlocutors of the black movement at the level of State happened when there was also a peak of internationalization in the Executive. This process had been occurring since the 1980's reached its highest-level during PT administration. Almost every ministry had its international advisory sector with highly specialized technical personnel for its thematic area, usually led by a career diplomat or, at least, in close contact with Itamaraty (HIRST, 2012).

This process reinforced and, to some extent, unveiled Brazilian society's contradictions that had been silenced at the level of state for a long time. As Amorim and Silva describe:

“[...] the Black Movement's perception of Africa reveals a proposal to break with the perspective of national identity transmitted by the Brazilian State and the nationalist elite (NASCIMENTO, 2016). Although it seems nonsensical to maintain at institutional levels such polarized versions of Brazilian identity – from the elite through Itamaraty and the Movement, mainly through SEPPIR –, it is understood that there is a dialogue that favors the participation of militancy. This began to happen after the preparatory work for the UN Conference Against Racism, in 2001, important for promoting greater reflection on racism and prejudice (ALVES, 2002)” (AMORIM, SILVA, 2021, p. 15, my translation).

Still, as it has been discussed, this process was already ongoing and cannot be attributed to the Lula administration alone. On the other hand, there seems to be some difference in the way PT governments have approached the racial issue in Brazil, as there is a perception that instead of reinforcing racial democracy discourses, it did something different, exploring the hybridism and ambiguity, seeing Brazil as a bi-racial rather than a multi-racial country:

‘It was not a single, but a negotiated, ambiguous view that guided the Workers’ Party’s anti-racism agenda during the Lula and Dilma governments. This agenda tackled racism *through a policy system based on whites and non-whites*, for Brazil was a *bi-racial rather than a multi-racial country*, both socially and economically. Even so, the project promoted hybridism, the result of an ethnic and cultural

mix considered inherent to the Brazilian identity” (MESQUITA, 2021, p. 52).

The ambiguities of the PT governments are enormous and do not end there, while there are institutional, distributive and policy advancements in the fight against racism in Brazil, the homicide and imprisonment levels of the black population increased expressively and kept a rising tendency throughout the years:

“In 2002, there were 45,895 homicides, 55.01 per cent of victims were Black. In 2015, there were 54,361 and 71.15 per cent of victims were Black. With the rightwing forces in government, the homicide rate and racial disproportion increased, reaching 60,559 in 2017, with 76.37 per cent of victims being Black. At the same time, under the PT governments, there was a significant increase in the prison population. In 2005, there were 361,400 incarcerated Brazilians; in 2015, preceding the coup d’état against Dilma Rousseff, that number had grown to 698,600. By 2017, the prison population reached 726,700, 40 per cent of whom were awaiting trial and 64 per cent of whom were Black (while the last census showed that only 50.7 per cent of Brazilians identified as Black)” (ALFONSO, 2019, p. 8-9).

Henceforth, the election of Lula seems to have been both a culmination of a larger social movement in Brazilian society and the institutional permission for closer relations between the black movement and the State. Notwithstanding, while the observable policies to fight against racism were not the central priority, the government had amplified highly distributive policies through social assistance programs such as *Bolsa Família* (Family Allowance), which were very controversial among some sectors of the elite; as well as the implementation of racial quotas, financing, and expansion for university education. Those elements contributed to significant social mobility and inclusion in Brazilian society. On the other hand, the increase in murder and imprisonment of the black population was also a central part of State policies and it exposes a deep fraction of the narratives and perceptions of what is Brazil and who are the desired nationals and the hated others.

6.3. The men behind Brazil’s foreign policy great narratives from 2003 to 2010

Before discussing the government speeches, it would be important to look at the heads thinking Lula's foreign policy with him. Beyond Lula himself, the foreign policy at that time was coordinated by three men: the well-known chancellor Celso Amorim; Marco Aurélio Garcia, a key figure, who was the Presidency International Advisor; and Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, which was Itamaraty's Secretary General until 2009, when Lula offered him a special post of Secretary of Strategic Affairs.

As I understand it, they were the main responsible for the changes implemented during the Lula government's Foreign Policy. Together, they have not only given a greater focus to South-South relations, but also implemented relevant institutional reforms in Itamaraty and in the diplomatic career. The changes were also extended to the processes of formulation and implementation of BFP, with a notorious greater relevance of the position of the Presidency's International Advisor than in the previous governments, as well as with an increased participation of Ministries, organized social movements, and political parties. As discussed, Itamaraty has been criticized for its elitism, bureaucratic insulation, and corporatism, giving it a 'sense of monopoly over what is understood as the *national interest*' and 'aversion to institutional change and, above all, to societal control or interference. (DE FARIA; LOPES; CASARÕES, 2013, p. 468-469) In terms of the structure of Itamaraty and the maintenance of its *esprit de corps* there has been a relevant dissatisfaction among retired ambassadors and senior diplomats. Some of the main transformations were over the recruitment rules, career progression, and new channels of societal accountability and interaction³⁷ (DE FARIA; LOPES; CASARÕES, 2013).

Some of the most relevant institutional changes included the end of the eliminatory character of the English proficiency test in the Exam for Admission to the Diplomatic Career in 2005; the redesign of the exam, with an official reading list; the

³⁷ Among the new spaces of societal interaction was the online availability of the Minister of Foreign Affairs agenda; the presence of the institution on the social media networks; the consolidation of the Alexandre Gusmão Foundation as the official publishing house of Itamaraty; and the support of academic and cultural meetings.

end of the interview stage of the selection (which incurred the risk of subjectivity and, to some analysts, even possibly racism); and the significant increase of the number of positions offered annually. According to De Faria; Lopes and Casarões (2013, p.473) “the number enrolled in the admission examination rose exponentially, from 2,556 in 1999 to 8,869 in 2010. There was also [...] an expansion in the number of cities in which the examination takes place – from 13 to 27.” There were as well changes in the rules of career progression, giving it larger importance to meritocracy and less to seniority and possibly quicker ascension to First-Class Minister.

So, if on the one side they promoted or facilitated institutional ‘domestic’ reforms, on the other, they also gave greater focus to relations with Southern countries, mainly South America and Africa, as well as an increased search for protagonism in international multilateral institutions (such as the UNSC and WTO). This new foreign policy alignments were also allowed by the institutional expansion of the diplomatic personnel, for example with the creation of new diplomatic posts and a great expansion of Brazilian development cooperation initiatives, mainly in African countries. Nevertheless, they also generated domestic criticism, as they were interpreted as a signal of ‘ideologization’ of BFP for the approach of non-traditional partners, as well as for the use of a lexicon favoring narratives of ‘developmentalism’ and solidarity amongst Southern countries.

In this regard, the men in charge of Lula’s government foreign policy were portrayed by the Brazilian media as follows: Marco Aurélio Garcia was in charge mostly of the policies destined to Latin America and South America; Celso Amorim was mainly responsible for multilateral and global Forums; Lula was the ‘bagman’, the ‘traveling salesman’ to Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean; while Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães was Itamaraty’s syndic (LOPES, 2017).

In the last official interview before his death, Marco Aurelio Garcia was asked whether this image was real and affirmed that it indeed existed but needed qualification.

According to him, Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães was known for his temper³⁸, but he had a strong political and ideological identity and knew what the institution needed to become stronger (LOPES, 2017). Indeed, during the period, Itamaraty went through a great expansion in terms of numbers of embassies and recruitment of new diplomats, with changes in the selection process. It generated an overall criticism from senior diplomats, mainly regarding the possible reduction of the quality of the entering diplomats and a possible loss of institutional cohesiveness (DE FARIA; LOPES; CASARÕES, 2013)

Garcia was one of the founders of the Workers' Party (PT) and was its vice-president during Lula's second term. From 1990 to 2000 Garcia was the international advisor of the party, which had an active international articulation. (DIEGUEZ, 2009) He also helped in the creation of Foro de São Paulo, a forum of leaders of leftist organizations of Latin America that became very stigmatized by some sectors of the right which alleged the initiative congregated a communist plan of domination. This narrative is one of the supporters to Dilma Rousseff's impeachment in 2016 and Bolsonaro's election in 2018.

Marco Aurélio Garcia assisted Lula from the choice of Minister Celso Amorim, still in 2002, after Lula's election as president, to the management of most of the crisis and sensitive issues in Latin America, as it was an area in which he had deep connections and political capital due to its activism in PT and Foro de São Paulo (LOPES, 2017). According to the journalist Consuelo Diegues (2009), she approached Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, the General Secretary of Itamaraty during Lula, about the close relationship Marco Aurélio Garcia, had with the South American presidents and he would have declared:

"Marco Aurelio does not embarrass Itamaraty because of its proximity to South American presidents. His friendly relations with those presidents goes a long way and only helps us. It is natural that president Lula listens to Marco Aurélio. They have known each other

³⁸ Saying that Guimarães was Itamaraty's 'Tim Maia', I understand that Garcia refers to this very talented Brazilian singer for his combination of great talent and polemic declarations. Tim Maia was known for not being afraid to indispose himself with other people to make his points clear and be truthful to his beliefs.

for over 20 years. And his office is next doors to the president's” (DIEGUEZ, 2009, my translation).

Furthermore, when asked about whether in previous governments there was an advisor as influential as Marco Aurelio, the Secretary-General could recall no other name beyond the poet Augusto Frederico Schmidt, Juscelino Kubitschek's (1956-1961) right hand. In this context and rare institutional arrangement, according to Dieguez (2009), Lula's Foreign Policy was criticized by the former Brazilian Ambassador in Washington, Rubens Barbosa, considering it not politics of State but as politics of the Workers' Party (PT), based on its ideological affinities. In that regard, Rubens Barbosa declared that “[w]hat the government did was to approximate leftist presidents to counterbalance the neoliberal economic policy that was being practiced here” and that “[t]he foreign policy was the counterpart to calm the most radical wing of PT.” (DIEGUEZ, 2009, my translation).

There is still a need for further empirical research taking the criticism that BFP under Lula would (or even could) be motivated also taking into account the most radical sector of PT, aiming to keep it condescending with Lula's neoliberal economic policies, this perception has been almost absent in the academic analysis about the period. Even the strong criticism which can be seen in the media during that time regarding the possible partisanship of BFP is also not there in the most cited academic papers. Very little is said about how there were disputes not only in Brazilian society as a whole but inside Itamaraty itself, as the views and narratives over Brazilian identity and interests during Lula were controversial between many sectors, including very influential Ambassadors such as Rubens Barbosa. Barbosa was a strong critic of Marco Aurelio Garcia's Latin-Americanism, and even declared: “This policy is a delayed-effect bomb because it only works with a PT government. This is not a policy of the State but a partisan one, based on ideological affinities. How will Brazilian relations with those countries be when PT is not the government anymore?” (DIEGUEZ, 2009, my translation).

Celso Amorim was a career diplomat who had already been Foreign Affairs minister during Itamar Franco's government, from 1993 to 1995, and, after that, was

the Brazilian representative at the United Nations in New York - in a time where Brazil was at the presidency of the Security Council. According to Marco Aurélio Garcia, Amorim was nominated as Lula's Foreign Minister regarding his "diplomatic culture and an extraordinary diplomatic imagination". In this context, he was able to think of Brazil's insertion in the "big dossiers, not as a 'gatecrasher', but in a good position." (LOPES, 2017, my translation) About Amorim's foreign policy agenda, Marco Aurélio declared: "[...] our provincialism, our mutt complex, as we used to say, often did not understand that we were getting involved in the issue of the Iraq War, in the Tehran Agreement, in the WTO; anyway, we entered, in general, well." (LOPES, 2017, my translation)

Amorim affiliated himself to PT in 2009 and, in his last days in office in 2010, Amorim established 10% of quotas in the first phase selection exams for diplomats for self-declared black and *pardo* Brazilians. Following the decisions from Durban 2001 Conference Against Racism, Itamaraty had already implemented in 2002 a scholarship for Afro-Brazilians willing to prepare themselves for the diplomacy selection exam, but Amorim's decision faced suspicion and some negative reaction over a possible opening for frauds, while the new policy was also considered ineffective for promoting equality (AMORIM; CASTILHO, 2018).

The racial quotas, even though being discussed in Brazil since the FHC government, have been quite controversial for a while and the legality of their existence in Universities, for example, was only judged by the Superior Federal Court in 2012. Nevertheless, following the self-declaration criteria, Itamaraty has used the programs of affirmative actions before the law 12.990 from 2014, both for reserving spaces for black candidates as well as for their scholarships. After the promulgation of the law, beyond the places for the general classification in the first phase of the selection process, ten places were added to the classification of self-declared black and *pardo* candidates. However, all of them compete equally in the second phase of the selection process, with no selected spaces for blacks. (AMORIM; CASTILHO, 2018)

To my understanding, this shows still a limited role for racial quotas in Itamaraty and the recent tendencies of increasing of the weight of the English exams in the last years contribute to a reappearance of an elite recruitment of the new entering diplomats: the exam levels expected are of a native English speaker, which makes it unequally favorable to sons of diplomats or high-level elite candidates, or, as a minimum, difficult for candidates who had not enjoyed a heavily English-based high school program, as it is usually offered only in private and often expensive high schools.

To conclude, this section presented an overview of the profile of the men behind Lula da Silva's foreign policy and some of the main bureaucratic/institutional as well as ideational contributions they offered during the period that resulted in a greater understanding of change or adjustments of the BFP from 2003 to 2010. This will be important to have a qualified reading of the official discourses, a task of the following section.

6.4 Lula's government discourse analysis

Regarding the contextualization of the Lula government discussed in the previous sections, now we move to the discourse analysis of the formal Foreign Policy speeches of the period (2003-2010), which will also be guided by the methodology presented in the third chapter and the master signifiers and their chains of significance found in the fifth chapter.

The selection of the text corpus was mostly (but not only) inspired by the editions of the biannual publication of Itamaraty "*Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil*"³⁹ (Brazilian Foreign Policy Review). This publication gathers the speeches the institution considered the most relevant, as well as announcements, notes, messages, and information given by Itamaraty; and, finally, also presents opinion articles or

³⁹ Available at: <https://www.gov.br/funag/pt-br/chdd/historia-diplomatica/colecoes-historicas/resenhas-de-politica-exterior-do-brasil>. Access in: April 30th 2021.

interviews published in the media authored or given by high level statesmen related to foreign policy matters.

It is important to highlight that the discourses revision was not extensive and such an attempt with the qualitative methodology proposed in this thesis could be a standalone dissertation given the amount of material available. Nonetheless, some discourses were selected based on the occasion, the topic discussed, the venue, the time period and the audiences addressed. With a focus in mapping the hegemonic narratives during the period, the methodological expectation was that the discourses would be repetitive regarding its core master signifiers, and this was indeed found.

Henceforth, in the following empirical analysis, I try to cover some of the main ambiguities, possible disruptions, vulnerabilities, and contradictions in BFP narratives and the master signifiers' chains of significance, following what was found in the previous chapter. While going through the empirical material I gave special attention to discourses addressing greater domestic audiences (such as inauguration speeches), African countries/audiences, multilateral institutions (mainly UNGA, UNCTAD, FAO, WTO, World Economic Forum, G8 and G20, and the anti-racist agenda) and European countries/audiences. This qualitative selection was inspired by the literature reviewed and looked for narratives of self and other. It also undervalues some relevant topics of the period and, probably, different cuts could result in finding other hegemonic narratives or other chains of significance that were also relevant during that time. Those other possible findings do not invalidate what is presented here, though, as the narratives found are part of the discursive field and of the hegemonic narratives, as it has been previously defined.

6.4.1 Lula's inaugural speeches

In his Announcement to the Nation, the inauguration speech in 2003, Lula da Silva presents some interesting elements for our analysis. His speech affirms: "[...] we will *recover* Brazilian people's *dignity*, we will *recover* our *self-esteem*." (BRASIL,

2003d, my translation, emphasis added) In this excerpt, we see Lula mobilizing the audiences' fantasies of an idealized (and probably non-existing) past, reaffirming the need to recover something that was lost, which is Brazilians' dignity and self-esteem, two master signifiers anchoring the speech.

Later on, Lula continues: “[m]y role, at this moment, with great *humility*, but also great *serenity* [...]”. (BRASIL, 2003d, my translation, emphasis added) In this quote, da Silva, the agent of the sentence, attributes two qualities to himself, humility and serenity, master signifiers that anchor his image as a wise leader of the people. This perception can be further reinforced, when he affirms:

“[...] you can have the most absolute certainty that a human being can have, that when I cannot do something, I will have no doubt whatsoever of being *honest* with *the people* and say that I cannot do it [...]. But I want you to also be sure that *I, at no time in my life, will fail with the truth to you, who trusted me to run this country for four years. I will treat you with the same respect I treat my children and grandchildren [...]*” (BRASIL, 2003d, my translation, emphasis added).

In this passage, Lula da Silva reinforces his image as a leader by reaffirming himself with the adjective *honest* towards the object, *the people*. He discursively constructs a close and familiar relation of *trust* between a president that puts himself in the role of father or grandfather of the population he represents, as he will take care of them, hence, in the position of a personalist leader and an almost parental authority.

The former president, then, reinforces what, according to him, will be the central issue to be dealt with during his government, the fight against hunger:

“And I want to *propose* this to you: tomorrow, we will be starting the first campaign against hunger in this country. It's the first day of fighting hunger. And I have faith in *God* that we will guarantee that every Brazilian can, every single day, have breakfast, lunch and dinner, because this is not written in my program. This is written in the *Brazilian Constitution*, it is written in the *Bible*, and it is written in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. And that *we are*

going to do together” (BRASIL, 2008d, my translation, emphasis added.).

In this excerpt, Da Silva mobilizes many affects and attachments of the audience, in what appears to be a Left Populist strategy (MOUFFE, 2020). He keeps in the speech the idea of a horizontal dialogue, as he is *proposing* something to *the people*, something they are going to do *together*, calling them directly into the speech. To anchor and legitimize what he presents to be the central front of his political engagement, Lula uses great master signifiers: *God*, the *Brazilian Constitution* (representing the nation), the *Bible* (again resorting to God), and the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (implying that he is also endorsed by the international community).

The first speech analyzed was the first one addressed to the larger audience and does not address directly topics of Foreign Policy. Nevertheless, on the same day, Lula also spoke in an inauguration session at the National Congress (BRASIL, 2008d), in which he discusses some of his views on Brazilian identity and BFP. Arguing that “change” was the great key word of Brazilian society in the elections, he states:

“The time has come to *transform Brazil* into the *nation we have always dreamed of: a sovereign, dignified nation, aware of its importance in the international arena* and, at the same time, capable of sheltering, welcoming, and treating all its children with justice. [...] Brazil is an *immense country*, a continent of high human, ecological and social complexity, with almost 175 million inhabitants. We cannot let it drift along, at the whim of the winds, *lacking a truly national development project and truly strategic planning*. If we want to transform it, in order to live in a *Nation* where everyone can *walk with their heads held high*, we will have to exercise two virtues on a daily basis: patience and perseverance” (BRASIL, 2008d, my translation, emphasis added, p.8).

This quote presents some relevant elements. Lula relies on the collective imaginary of Brazil as the country of the future, a future in which the country finds its deserved greatness as a relevant power in the international arena through a *truly national development project*. This political prominence would finally reflect its material vastness and allow the Brazilian people to be proud of their *Nation*.

At this moment, Lula positions himself in alliance with some of the central narratives (and fantasies) of Brazilian identity and Foreign Policy, as described in the previous chapter. His discourse mainly circulates the master signifier *development*, that, given the material potentialities of the country, only needs a *truly* strategic plan to take Brazil to its great future.

Embedded in catchphrases with many references to “the Brazilian people”, as a united entity, he ponders that “we will have to keep our many and legitimate *social anxieties under control*” probably talking to the many social movements mobilized during his campaign but that now he would have to manage. Lula (BRASIL, 2008d) also portrays “the Brazilian” as a “mature, hardened and optimistic people”, which he is now calling for a great civic task force against hunger.

Defending the union of the nation, Lula also relies upon another major master signifier of Brazilian identity and Foreign Policy, the *miscegenation* and, under my interpretation, *racial democracy* itself:

“Despite all the cruelty and discrimination, especially against indigenous and black communities, and all the inequalities and pain that we must never forget, *the Brazilian people carried out an admirable work of resistance and national construction*. Over the century, it built a plural nation, diversified, even contradictory, but understood from one end of the Territory to the other. [...] This is a nation that speaks the same language, shares the same fundamental values, feels that it is Brazilian. Where *mestizaje and syncretism* have imposed themselves, *giving an original contribution to the world*, where Jews and Arabs talk without fear, *where all migration is welcome* because we know that in a short time, *due to our own capacity for assimilation and goodwill*, each migrant becomes a Brazilian citizen” (BRASIL, 2008d, my translation, emphasis added).

When Da Silva states that *mestizaje* and *syncretism* led Brazil to give an original contribution to the world, he is directly referring to the ideas of Gilberto Freyre and other lusotropicalist thinkers, the founding fathers of the Brazilian myth of racial democracy. (VIEIRA, 2018; LAGE, 2016) On the same line, by narrating Brazil as a *pacific* country in which “Jews and Arabs talk without fear” and “where all migration is welcome”, it puts Brazil as a follower of international human rights norms,

reinforcing the master signifier of *legalism* and *pacifism*. This line also places Brazil as a *bridge-country*, consensus making, which is very important narrative for the country's image as an international *mediator* and a *middle power*.

In this regard, as Lula (BRASIL, 2008d, my translation, emphasis added) affirms: "In my Government, Brazil's diplomatic action will be guided by a *humanist* perspective and will be, above all, an instrument of *national development*." In this quote, it could be interpreted that he mobilizes two master signifiers of the hegemonic narratives of BFP: he evokes an imaginary of respect of human rights and *legalism* (through the signifier *humanist*) as means to achieve *development*. In this sense, according to Lula, the great priority of his government's foreign policy would be the "construction of a South American Continent that is politically stable, prosperous and united, based in *democratic* ideals and social justice". In this regard, he presents as a priority revitalizing Mercosur and South American integration as a political project, beyond the economic aspirations. (BRASIL, 2008d, my translation, emphasis added)

Regarding the relationship with the United States, Lula describes he is aiming for a *mature* relationship, guided by *mutual interest* and *mutual respect* as well as cooperation with the European Union and other developed countries. On the other hand, he affirms he will *deepen* the relations with great *developing countries*, such as China, India, Russia, and South Africa. He also reaffirms "*the deep connections that unite us to the entire African continent* and our willingness to contribute to the development of its enormous potentialities" (BRASIL, 2008d, my translation, emphasis added). In this excerpt, the president uses adjectives such as *mature*, *interest*, and *respect*, showing some emotional distancing and a relation guided by rational and cost-benefit measures. Regarding developing countries and Africa, he organizes the speech in a way that puts them closer, still in a timid way, but implying that in the African continent lies some of the Brazilian ancestry or the *deep connections that unite us*.

In this regard, Da Silva puts aside *Americanism*, the alignment to the United States that has guided BFP in many moments of its history, and gives increased

relevance to *Globalism* (SARAIVA, 2000) or *autonomy through diversification*, regarding the approximation of non-traditional partners of the developing world (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007). Regarding those analytical criteria, it indeed does not represent a major shift in BFP identity discourses, as those are master signifiers that were there already in the field of contextual possibilities.

Nonetheless, Lula seems to start a dislocation of Brazil's ideals of the ego by changing the countries that are considered their friends (BERENSKOETTER, 2007) which affect the identity imaginary not necessarily as a radical other, but as mirror images of an ideal of the self. If the developing countries and Africa are no longer the other and the developed countries, the former colonizers, and, especially the main hegemonic power, are no longer the ideal of the ego, then there is some degree of disconnection between the BFP identity discourse presented by Lula and the sedimented one. In this regard, changing the ideal of ego of a biographical narrative could indeed mobilize the inherent anxieties - or ontological insecurities, as Vieira (2018) writes them - denouncing the very emptiness of identity narratives.

Beyond the bilateral and multilateral relations, Lula (BRASIL, 2008d) talks about the international order and its institutions. He compares the democratization of international relations without hegemonies to be as important to the future of humankind as the consolidation and development of democracy domestically in each state. In this regard, he reinforces *multilateralism* by mentioning multilateral organizations, mainly the UN, claiming to reform the UN security council.

Here, we see the start of the mobilization of *democracy* as a signifier in chains with *multilateralism* and not *liberalism*. The signifier *multilateralism* is, in turn, related to *development* and the developmental rhetoric, by itself, questions the international liberal order. Thus, the signifier *peace* will also be in chains with and dependent over *development*, so the relation *liberalism-democracy-peace* is transformed by the Brazilian rhetoric under the Lula government into *multilateralism-democracy-development-peace*.

This claim can be interpreted as a desire around which almost every BFP discourse during the Lula government circulates, direct or indirectly. Hence, in Lacanian terms, one possible interpretation for the desire for a permanent seat in the UN security council, with some extrapolation, could be taken almost as Brazil's *objet petit a*⁴⁰ that which in the discursive fantasies of BFP it would symbolize that the country had finally gotten *there*, where it is finally complete and has its deserved greatness, also recognized by its peers. Hence, this is a topic frequently taken, for example, as one of the Brazilian priorities in multilateral Foreign Policy articulations during Lula, such as IBSA, G4, and the BRICs.

It is possible to observe that Foreign Policy discourses during Lula, not only from himself but also from his Chancellor and Secretary-General, among others, mobilize the *master signifiers* found in the historical-empirical analysis presented in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, sometimes those master signifiers are articulated in different chains, reflecting a dislocation of the discursive rhetoric, as it will be observed in the case of democracy and peace. But first, to identify the repetition of the pre-existing discursive anchors of BFP, let us analyze an excerpt from Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães' inauguration speech as Secretary-General of Itamaraty, in 2003:

"The *peace and economic and social progress* of all peoples depend on the fulfillment of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations: *sovereign equality of States, self-determination, non-intervention, peaceful settlement of disputes*. These principles are inscribed in the Brazilian Constitution, precisely to guide, on a permanent basis and in each situation, foreign policy. And it must always reflect the words of the *Barão do Rio Branco*: '*I am rather Brazilian*, and I have the duty to place above all, all personal considerations and *my private feelings*, the dignity of Brazil.' The *multipolar world, without hegemonies*, in which all States abide by *International Law* and seek to resolve their disputes *peacefully*, in the world that most interests the Brazilian nation. [...] *Multilateral organizations*, in particular, the United Nations and the OAS, must

⁴⁰ According to Stavrakakis, the *object petit a* is the remainder of the constitution of the subject as a barred subject, functions as a metaphor for the always absent (impossible) mythological subject of *jouissance*. (STAVRAKAKIS, 1999, p.47)

contribute to these goals” (GUIMARÃES, 2003, p, 29, my translation, emphasis added).

The use of the master signifiers *self-determination* and *non-intervention* could be analyzed to be in chains with the signifier *autonomy*, as Guimarães also mentions *sovereign equality of States*. The debates over *self-determination* in BFP have been more strongly mobilized during the processes of late independence of African and Asiatic countries in the XXth century and Brazilian engagement in G-77. The *peaceful settlement of disputes* is connected with *international law* and *multilateralism*, as well as with the idea of a world *without hegemonies*.

Guimarães also relies on the founding father of Brazilian diplomacy and some of the main references of *pacifism* in the BFP: Barão do Rio Branco. As discussed in the previous chapter, leaders have frequently used his image, sayings, and ideas to justify and attribute credibility to different foreign policy actions, not necessarily on the same discursive lines. Quoting Rio Branco, Guimarães relies on the nationalist imaginary, reaffirming that his identity as Brazilian is above all others, reinforcing, from one side of the perspective, the idea of a dedicated diplomat following his duties regardless of his personal preferences.

On the other hand, it could be argued that these quotes also open up space for the interpretation over a pacific imaginary over the Brazilian domestic field, the idea that all Brazilians should abdicate from their private feelings in favor of collectivity. A critical interpretation of this approach, as it has been discussed, is that it can frequently be used in a context of silencing minorities and keep an order that favors elites and oligarchies.

Guimarães's inauguration speech, as the previous analyzed, was very much aligned with BFP historical master signifiers as presented in the previous chapter, with one specific aspect, however, in this discourse, Guimarães seems to be less attached to the developmental rhetoric as well as the questioning of the international liberal order, if compared to Lula da Silva and Celso Amorim. This will be seen in more detail in the following topics.

Overall, it seems that the inauguration Foreign Policy speeches rely very much on the hegemonic discourses over Brazilian identity and its biographical narratives, with only minor dislocations that were already available on the field of contextual possibilities as seen before. Lula's reliance on the trope of *miscegenation* is what surprised me the most, given the possible interpretation that it would have been during his government that a possible disruption regarding racial identity discourses would have occurred (VIEIRA, 2018). The following topics will investigate if this tendency continues or if the posterior moments present different discursive articulations.

6.4.2 Populism and the affective discourses under Lula

Concerning 'domestic' politics, or, as I understand it, foreign policy (CAMPBELL, 1992), Lula strongly affirms how he represents the *new* and the *people* (*not* the elite), even though he kept relying on many master signifiers which were already there, as already discussed. In this excerpt, the master signifier is *democracy*:

“Yes, we have a message to give to the world: we have to *democratically* place our national project in open dialogue, like other nations on the planet, because *we are new*, we represent the novelty that is a civilization designed without fear, because it was designed in *body*, in the *soul* and in the *heart* of *the people*, often *against*⁴¹ the elites, the institutions and even the State” (BRASIL, 2008d, my translation, emphasis added).

Beyond the populist dichotomy of the people versus the elite (MOUFFE, 2015; KINNVALL, 2019), Lula relies on the *autonomy* imaginary when he says “Brazil [...] will have to rely on, above all, itself [...]” (BRASIL, 2008d), a narrative that also dialogues with the nationalist elements raised right after *autonomy*, as we shall see. Nationalism, as it has been previously discussed, is a strong ontological security provider (VIEIRA, 2018), as the nation is one of the main master signifiers of our

⁴¹ In portuguese he uses the term “à revelia” of the elites.

modern era (STAVRAKAKIS, 2007). Lula mobilizes those phantasies by making references to *love* for the country and its symbols:

“Brazil, in this new historical, social, cultural, and economic undertaking, *will have to rely on, above all, itself*; it will have to think with its head; walk on its own legs; listen to what its heart says. And we are all going to have to learn to *love our country* with even greater intensity, *love our flag*, love our struggle, love our people” (BRASIL, 2008d, my translation, emphasis added).

Later on, the then-president ends his speech, with a strong reliance on *nationalism, autonomy*, and a collective *identity* of Brazil:

“Today we are starting a new chapter in the history of Brazil, *not as a submissive nation*, giving up its *sovereignty*, not as an unjust nation, passively watching the suffering of the poorest, but as a *haughty, noble nation*, *boldly* asserting itself in the world as *a nation of all*, without distinction of class, ethnicity, sex, or faith. What we live today at this moment, my companions, my brothers, and sisters from all over Brazil, can be summed up in a few words: *today is the day of Brazil's reencounter with itself*” (BRASIL 2008d, my translation, italics added).

There are some relevant elements to be highlighted from this quote. On the one hand, “*a nation of all*” is the slogan of Lula da Silva’s government, and, in this “all”, according to the discourse, are included all classes, ethnicities, sexes, and faiths. On the other hand, there is: “*today is the day of Brazil's reencounter with itself*”. What these two quotes together tell me is that no identity can divide “us” because, now, Brazil has found its own identity, the result of all of them combined and bigger than all of them. Lula discursively implies that it is embodied by his government project, the perfect representation of Brazilian identity, the one in which Brazil finally encounters its *true* self.

Interestingly enough, this discourse of union contrasts with the traditional approach of ‘us versus them’ characteristic of populist discourses. I would suggest two main for this. The first is that what Lula means by ‘the people’ (as an opposite for ‘the elite’ and as a possible synonym for the Brazilian self) includes people of different social classes, and this ‘country of all’ becomes united because the elite was excluded or taken out of power. The second one, which seems more plausible to me, is that Lula

presents an ambiguous discourse, with a changing nature, talking both to ‘the people’ and to ‘the elite’ and making all of them feel included.

6.4.3 The centrality of *hunger* and its deep connections with *race* and racism

Beyond the populist elements that can be observed in Lula’s discourses, an observable shift in discursive narratives is the frequent use of the master signifiers *hunger*, *poverty*, *misery*, and *inequality*. Those signifiers are mentioned not only in the speeches traditionally addressed to the ‘domestic’ audience, such as the inauguration speech, but also strongly reinforced in international meetings, such as the World Economic Forum, the G8 Expanded Dialogues in 2003, and the General Assembly speeches.

In the opening of the General Assembly in 2004, Lula cites Fanon: ‘I carry a lifelong *commitment to those silenced by inequality, hunger, and hopelessness*. To them, in the tremendous words of Frantz Fanon, the colonial past destined a common heritage: “If you want it, there you have it: the *freedom to starve*”.’ (BRASIL, 2008c, my translation, emphasis added)

Lula’s speeches present an innovation regarding not only the strong focus over the hunger agenda but also by linking it to the issue of security. In 2003, the world was apprehensive regarding the recent 2001 September 11th terrorist attacks and the growing tensions between the United States and Iraq, so the security agenda was central at that point. In this context, Lula addressed the World Economic Forum in Davos, January 2003, by claiming: “It is necessary to admit that, many times, *poverty, hunger, and squalor* are the breeding ground where fanaticism and intolerance develop.” (BRASIL, 2003c, p. 42, my translation) In the same forum, Lula even proposed the creation of an international fund against hunger by the G-7 countries, which is not taken forward by the great powers but ends up fueling the creation of the IBSA Fund against Hunger and Poverty (JARDIM, 2019).

Also in 2003, he connected development directly with insecurity and terrorism in his speech during the G8 expanded dialogues in Evian:

I am convinced that there will be no economic development without social sustainability and that, without both, we will have an increasingly insecure world. It is in this space of social disintegration that resentments, criminality, and, in particular, drug trafficking and terrorism thrive. (BRASIL, 2008d, p. 115, my translation).

Celso Amorim and Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães were aligned with this discursive environment. During the ceremony in which Guimarães was sworn into office, Celso Amorim described what kind of Brazil and Brazilians the diplomats are representing, not only the great Brazil of macroeconomic stability and big numbers, but also the ones in peripheries and, mainly in the Northeast of Brazil, drawing on the imaginary that in the Northeast lies the extreme of poverty in the country and that there are multiple realities and disparities throughout the national territory:

“Some of us here today will be traveling tomorrow to the northeast of Brazil. Another Minister and colleague of ours suggested to me this very trip that we, Ministers of State, will take tomorrow to get to know the Brazilian reality more closely [...] this trip should also be useful for the students of Rio Branco, for young diplomats, so that they *know which Brazil they represent*. That it is not a Brazil only of large numbers, that it is not a Brazil only of macroeconomic balances, but *it is a Brazil of great social deficiencies*, of great *disparities*, but disparities that *we are willing to face* and for which our diplomacy will work intensively, in all fields” (AMORIM, 2003, p.31, my translation, emphasis added.).

Amorim argued that those disparities, even though ignored or unknown by young diplomats and politicians in high decision arenas, will be now *finally seen* and *faced* by the government and the diplomats, again implying that they are representing those who are victims of the social deficiencies and disparities.

This and many other high-level speeches reinforce an imagined geography (SAID, 2012) of Brazil and Lula’s government, in which poverty lies in the Northeast, while in the South and Southeast lies development, the *large numbers* of an industrial country, and that the priority of the government would lie in those regions and populations victims of social deficiencies. It can be observed when Lula said in his

inauguration speech that a mother will always give more attention to their children needing her the most. In this context, during the World Social Forum in 2003 Lula affirmed that the fight against hunger will be his priority, even though he was the president of the entire country and not only of the ones that voted for him.

Even though not directly mentioning race, the Northeast is also the region concentrating the highest number of black individuals in Brazil, while the South and Southeast have the highest number of whites (MESQUITA, 2021). This exposes, to some extent, not only a social and regional but a racial cut in Brazilian representation and identity narratives during the first years of the Lula da Silva government.

As mentioned in the previous sections, Lula inaugurated SEPPIR, a special secretariat for the promotion of racial equality. During its launch, in March 2003, Lula spoke to an audience composed of the black movement, intellectuals such as Abdias do Nascimento, the family of the famous sociologist Florestan Fernandes, and mentioned great black Brazilian intellectuals such as Lélia Gonzalez and Milton Santos. Affirming that the Brazilian State should not be neutral concerning racial matters, and for that, he recalled the main 1988 Constitution and the articles related to the topic:

“They are fundamental objectives of the Federative Republic of Brazil. Item 4 – Promote the good of all without prejudice based on origin, race, sex, color, age, and any other forms of discrimination.

Article 4 – The Federative Republic of Brazil is governed, in its international relations, by the following principles: Item 8 – Repudiation of terrorism and racism.

Article 5 - All are equal before the law, without distinction of any nature, Brazilians and foreigners residing in the country are guaranteed the inviolability of the right to life, liberty, equality, security, and property in the following terms: First, men and women are equal in rights and obligations under the Constitution. The practice of racism – item 42 – constitutes a non-bailable and imprescriptible crime, subject to imprisonment under the terms of the law. [...]

Article 216 of the Constitution: The material and immaterial assets of Brazilian cultural heritage, taken individually or together, bearer

of reference to the identity, action, memory of the different groups that make up the Brazilian society in which it is included. All documents and sites with historical reminiscences of the former quilombos are listed.

Act of transitional constitutional provisions. Article 68 – The remnants of quilombo communities who are occupying their lands are granted definitive ownership, and the State must issue them the respective title” (BRASIL, 1988 apud BRASIL, 2003, my translation).

Seeking to differentiate the SEPPIR initiative from the policies of the FHC government, he affirmed that “the governmental initiatives, related to racial matters, were *isolated* or of merely *propagandistic* character.” Constructing himself in opposition to such merely rhetoric initiatives, Lula prescribed that “the new Secretariat *gives the due importance* to the promotion of racial equality in our country and opens *space for the effective integration* of projects and actions *in the entire government set*.” (BRASIL, 2003, my translation, italics added)

Furthermore, according to Lula, the creation of SEPPIR shows a government priority that is also imprinted in Foreign Policy. It comes as a “positive response of Brazil to the issues raised in 2001” during the Durban Conference against Racism and, considering international relations:

“[...] our country has practically *forgotten Africa*. My government is going to pay attention again to this great continent, which is our *brother* in blood and spiritual roots. In some African countries, Brazil does not have an embassy or even a representative office. We are going to seek greater political, cultural, and commercial exchange, which is essential to our peoples, particularly those who speak Portuguese. I have already communicated to my comrade Celso Amorim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, that this year I want to visit some countries in Africa, to demonstrate that we are going to resume our relations” (BRASIL, 2003, my translation, emphasis added).

The president, then, connects the master signifier *democracy*, central to Brazilian narratives of identity since the end of the 1980’s to *racial equality*, which, even though present in the constitution, has not been fundamental to Brazilian Foreign Policy discourses in any other way beyond the relation with *racial democracy* before. The very idea of racial democracy is defied throughout the discourse as president Lula puts

racial equality as a requisite for the improvement of Brazilian democracy. He places it in the future, as something Brazil does not have yet: ‘Brazilian *democracy* will be all the more substantive the greater the *racial equality* in our country.’ (BRASIL, 2003, my translation, emphasis added)

Hence, Lula presents a dislocation of the signifier *democracy*, which becomes a relevant aspect of BFP in the 1990s (LESSA, COUTO, FARIAS, 2010), related to Brazil’s insertion in the international order, in chains both to *neoliberalism* and *multilateralism*. Under Lula, the chain of signifiers is relatively different, and it could be said that, though the neoliberal measures are kept in the macroeconomic policies, the discourse replaces *neoliberalism* with *racial equality*, this one being in chains with *democracy* and *multilateralism*.

6.4.4 The postcolonial ambiguity and the European ideal of the self

In 2006, in Nigeria, during the Africa-South America summit, Lula affirmed that: “Brazil has deep ties with Africa, which define our own identity. We are the second-largest black nation in the world.” (BRASIL, 2008d, my translation) In this quote, Lula stated that *Brazilian identity is defined by its deep ties with Africa* and portrays Brazil as a black nation, affirming: *Brazil is the second-largest black nation in the world*. Lula, then, continued:

“Today, Africa is an indisputable priority for Brazil. Since the beginning of my government, I have visited 17 African countries and received 15 leaders from the region. I took the initiative to open or reactivate 12 Brazilian embassies in the capitals of this continent. [...] Geology has taught us that, millions of years ago, Africa and South America were united in one big continent. [...] The new geography we are building will not move the Planet’s tectonic plates [...] but it will certainly help to transform the international political and economic reality, bringing us closer politically, economically, socially, and culturally. What brought us to Abuja was the desire to unite Africans and South Americans to make our voice heard. We will form a close alliance between two continents that suffer from the exclusion to which they have been relegated for so long. [...] What we are doing here today is a challenge, it is a challenge to world

politics, it is a challenge to international politics. What we are saying is, quite simply, that *we exist*” (BRASIL, 2008d, my translation, emphasis added).

Nevertheless, Lula’s discourses are hybrid and ambiguous. While willing to resume and expand relations with African countries and properly face racism domestically through the valorization of Brazilians of African-descent and opening for institutional dialogue with social movements, Lula still sometimes exposes the postcolonial ambiguity explored by Fanon, Nandy and others. Lula narrates an imaginary in which, even though Brazil was colonized by Europe, it also owes its parcel of civility, or the “love for freedom” and the “belief in human solidarity”. (BRASIL, 2005b) This can be observed, for example, when Lula was invited to speak in the colloquium ‘Brazil: Global Actor’, organized by the Sorbonne University, in Paris, in July 13th, 2005:

“Our belief in *freedom* as a fundamental value goes back a long way. The ideas of the *French Enlightenment* and the *French Revolution* itself (alongside the *American Revolution*) had a direct impact on Brazil. They were *sources of inspiration for republican ideas and rebellion movements against colonialism*, such as the Inconfidência Mineira, the Tailors Revolution, in Bahia, or the 1817 Revolution, in Pernambuco, my home state. [...] Joaquim Nabuco, from Pernambuco, went so far as to state that “*all our revolutions (before Independence) were ripples that began in Paris*”. Those who repressed the *nativist and republican movements spoke of eradicating “the abominable French principles”*. These are the principles celebrated on the *14th of July*, not only by France but by *all those who love freedom and believe in human solidarity*” (BRASIL, 2005b, p. 49, my translation, emphasis added).

In my perception, this excerpt shows how Europe and the United States are still, at least in this discursive moment, the ideal of the ego, the cradle of civilization. Europe brought to Brazil both colonization and slavery but it was also the source of inspiration for the revolutions against the very European colonialism and slavery, the *inspiration on the fundamental value of freedom*. Joaquim Nabuco, for example, a prominent intellectual and politician, is known for defending the end of slavery in Brazil, while having also been influenced by the white imaginary that informed scientific racism and the whitening policies in Brazil.

Regarding this topic, Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães during his inauguration speech also relies on the racial democracy imaginary:

“Brazil’s friendship with Europe, Africa, and Asia is in our blood. The contribution to the Brazilian social formation of the descendants of peoples from these continents is extraordinary and is reflected in the plurality of our surnames and ethnicities. [...] Cooperation with Europe, economic and political, so important as it was for our development, must be expanded. Cooperation with Africa must find new projects that contribute to making it possible to overcome its difficulties, a policy in which the CPLP will have a valuable role. With the countries of the Near East, whose descendants live here in harmony, we want to help them find a peaceful solution to their differences. With Japan, India, and China, we will do our best to strengthen our relations of all kinds” (GUIMARÃES, 2003, p. 28-29, my translation, emphasis added).

Following Samuel Guimarães’s use of adjectives, cooperation with Europe is important for Brazilian development. Cooperation with Africa still needs to overcome some difficulties that make it not to play a role as valuable as the first. When it comes to cooperation with the Near East, Guimarães puts Brazil in a hierarchically superior position, in which Brazil can *help them find a peaceful solution*, as in the country their descendants live in harmony. Finally, Japan, India, and China are, to some extent, being portrayed as equals, in the same hierarchical level, as there are no markers of hierarchy relating to them. In this sense, this point relies both on an imaginary of racial democracy, as Brazil is marked by the *plurality* coming from all the three continents to which all the country has a sense of *friendship* that is also *in its blood*. At the same time, there is hybridity, as the insertion in this plurality is not horizontal: Brazil seems to position itself as inferior to Europe, equal to China, India, and Japan, in a position to help the Near East and not profiting much from its cooperation with Africa.

6.4.5 Brazil, a leader of the South?

Brazilian biographical narratives have reinforced its role as a *mediator*, as a *bridge* country between the North and the South, a *developing* country, as the *other*

West. In this context, concerning whether Brazil wants to be a leader, Celso Amorim (2003b) affirms:

“We have no pretense of leadership if leadership means hegemony of any kind. But if our *internal development*, if our attitudes [...] of *respect for international law*, the quest for a *peaceful solution to disputes*, *combating all forms of discrimination*, defending *human rights* and the environment, if these attitudes *generate leadership*, there is no reason to refuse it. And it would certainly be a mistake, an unjustified shyness” (AMORIM, 2003b, p. 31, my translation, emphasis added)

In this quote, Celso Amorim relies on some of the main master signifiers of the Brazilian foreign policy discourses to affirm that Brazil will exercise some kind of benign leadership, but *not* a hegemonic one, as it assumes the organic results of its main principles put into motion without any ‘unjustified shyness’. The main anchors in the excerpt are *development*, *international law*, and *human rights*, *pacifism* (a peaceful solution to disputes). To some extent, also *miscegenation* and *racial democracy* when saying “*combating all forms of discrimination*”, as it is not clear if the discrimination to be combated are ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ Brazil and if the country is being understood as a role model on these issues.

In the same line as Amorim, Lula reinforces that Brazil will not be *shy*, nor *reckless*, knowing its limits as a country “[...] with social problems and without important means of projecting military power on the international arena” but aspires to be a full global player (DA SILVA, 2005b, my translation). Further on, Lula affirmed:

“It is evident that wealth and military strength are expressions of power. They do not, however, exhaust the capacity for action and influence that a country may have. The second mistake is to think that Brazil, just because it has a vast territory, abundant natural resources, and a large population, will automatically play a prominent role in the international sphere. Brazil is, fortunately, far from these two extreme perspectives. Our diplomacy is *experienced*, well prepared, and *lucid enough not to be shy or reckless*” (BRASIL, 2005b, my translation, emphasis added).

Again, Lula relies on the connection between the signifiers of *peace* and *development*, a vision that is possible due to its positioning as ‘a country from the

South'. During this and many other speeches, Lula mobilizes and rekindles discourses from the 1960s and 1970s about a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Lula claims for a *new international order*, which guarantees real opportunities of social and economic progress for all countries and for a "reform of the global development model with *international institutions effectively democratic*, based on *multilateralism*, in the recognition of the rights and aspirations of all people." (BRASIL, 2004, my translation, italics added) Once more, the connection between *democracy* and *multilateralism* is observable.

6.4.6 Lula's second term: Brazil as an emerging country?

In his second term inauguration speech (BRASIL, 2007), Lula repetitively mentioned how *emotional* he was, and recalled his personal history of economic vulnerability, which would connect himself to a large amount of the population in Brazil. This reinforces his position as a leader of *the people* (a man born into *poverty*), or the expression of a collective project at the presidency:

"For the first time, a man born into *poverty*, who had to overcome the chronic risk of death in childhood and then overcome despair in adulthood, reached, through the *democratic* competition, the highest office in the Republic. For the first time, the long journey of a migrant, which had begun, like that of millions of people from the Northeast, on a *pau-de-arara*⁴², ended, as an expression of a collective project, at the Planalto ramp" (BRASIL, 2007, my translation).

In terms of Foreign Policy, Lula avails himself of the increasing role emerging economies are playing at that moment, and, regarding also Brazil's leadership in the negotiations of the Doha Round, he resumes some arguments of Third Worldist

⁴² Flatbed truck used to transport migrant workers.

discourses that were for not seen consistently in BFP narratives since Jânio and Jango governments (1961-1964):

“While the world economy’s growth inevitably provides some relief to emerging countries, the relationship between rich and poor nations has not improved. *The solution of the great world problems, such as: the persistent economic and financial inequalities among nations; the commercial protectionism of the big ones; hunger and inclusion of the disinherited;* preservation of the environment; *disarmament;* and the adequate fight against terrorism and international crime; did not evolve. International bodies - especially for the UN - have not kept up with the new times that humanity is living” (BRASIL, 2007, my translation).

On the other hand, Lula updates the discourse by connecting it to one of the core elements of his Foreign Policy agenda: the UN and its Security Council (UNSC) reform, which brings up topics of international security, such as terrorism and disarmament. Concerning Brazil’s search for a permanent seat in a reformed UNSC and the criticism this encountered in the ‘domestic’ realm, Celso Amorim argued:

“Brazilian media says we are obsessed with Brazil’s access to the Security Council. [...] [Brazilian media] is always looking for actions in Brazil - whether sending an election observer to Zimbabwe, sending troops to Haiti, or even helping to the Pastoral of Children Child’s Pastoral in East-Timor – Brazil’s obsession with joining the Security Council. This is not true: Brazil has this aspiration because it thinks the Security Council has to be changed; but it would do those actions with or without the Security Council reform process. [...] because we are interested in effectively *contributing to world peace*. [...]. with Lula’s government, *foreign policy came out of the woodwork*, Brazil [...] started to act in the world in a *non-arrogant* way, but at the same time in a *non-shy* way, *non-submissive*, with the ability to voice its opinion” (AMORIM, 2008, emphasis added).

In this speech, Amorim seems to argue that Brazil has presented a change in its personality, in its role, as something close to Guimarães (2020) role theory approach. This change seems to be only on Brazil’s tone, not changing it’s essence, when the chancellor affirms that the country came out of the woodwork, not being shy anymore, but taking up all its potential, this discourse seems to be compatible with the idea of projecting an external role and maintaining the same corporate identity, separated from the international one (ZEHFUSS, 2001). Regarding this new approach, Lula (2007),

reinforces the *excellent results* of the option towards *multilateralism*, prioritizing the relations with the South but still maintaining excellent relations with the great world powers.

Considering ‘domestic’ issues, Lula da Silva has been strongly criticized by the opposition for his income distribution programs, which have been characterized as populist initiatives to buy the votes of the poorest. He, then, replies to its critics:

“Bolsa Família, the main instrument of Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) – welcomed by poor communities and criticized by some privileged sectors – had a double effect. On the one hand, it took millions of men and women out of misery. On the other hand, it contributed to boosting the economy more equitably. For this reason, *it gained international recognition, and already inspires similar programs in several countries. Our government has never been, nor is it "populist". This government was, is, and will be popular*” (BRASIL, 2007, my translation).

In this excerpt, we can observe that the master signifier *international recognition* is used as an anchor to legitimize the program Bolsa Família, while the discourse also puts two groups in opposition: *the poor* communities that welcomed it *and the privileged* sectors that were against it. In this regard, while still reminding that his biographical narrative as a poor man comes earlier in the same speech, he puts himself on the side of the poor communities, *the people*. Then, he addresses his critics that call him a ‘populist’ and denies it, affirming his government is ‘popular’.

Taking into consideration his ‘popular’ government, he also addresses the increasing anti-politics feeling that had been growing on that moment – and in some other times also the ethical issues of politics, indirectly dealing with the corruption scandals in his government:

“Despite the scientific and technological advances in our world, no more important tool than politics has yet been invented for solving peoples' problems. The world has never lived – as it does today – in a period of such great disrepute in politics. But, paradoxically, politics has never been so essential” (BRASIL, 2007, my translation).

In this excerpt, Lula also makes reference to the post politics sentiment that marks the political environment of the 2000's, as Mouffe (2020) argues. Lula seems to be an example of left populism in Brazil, as the selected discourses illustrate. Including the final part of this discourse, before he names himself as the president of only one cause called Brazil and ends with an anecdote about *God* (mentioned 7 times) and how he has been blessed, Lula portrays his government as empowering, as taking *Brazil to the future*:

“Brazil wants, in a single movement, to answer the pending issues of the past and be contemporary with the future. [...] In ten or fifteen years, Brazil will witness the emergence of a new generation of intellectuals, scientists, technicians and artists from the poorest strata of the population. This has always been our purpose: to democratize not only income, but also knowledge and power” (BRASIL, 2007, my translation).

In 2008 the United States' financial crisis was an important external shock that marks Brazil's foreign policy. During the same period, there was strong domestic questioning over BFP choices to privilege relations with Latin American and other developing countries, which, according to the critics, did not offer much in terms of material gains. In South America, when sensitive issues arose (e.g.: Bolivia's oil nationalization in 2007; or Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela diplomatic crisis regarding the FARC armed group in 2008) Brazil's conciliatory position towards the region was strongly questioned by the domestic media. When, in 2008, the US financial crisis imploded, Brazil's diversification foreign policy was frequently justified and used as one of the main reasons why Brazil was not deeply affected by the critical scenario. Concerning the topic, Celso Amorim argues:

“when it comes to foreign policy, [...] the tendency is to focus on trade figures, on economic investment issues, which are obviously very important, but they are not the only ones. There are things whose importance is only felt when they are lacking. One of them is freedom. When you don't have freedom – it is known that freedom is fundamental – when you do, it is considered a natural thing, like air. Another thing is peace: we always think that peace is something that comes for free, because, fortunately, we live in a relatively peaceful continent, although it has had its problems in the past. So, I would say that the dimension of preserving peace is a very important dimension of President Lula's foreign policy, but it contributes to

business – and those who sell to Venezuela, those who sell to Colombia, those who sell to Ecuador, those who invest in these countries know that it is important. First, in our own region, but even in distant areas. [...] Brazil has been deeply committed to improving the situation of countries like Timor and Guinea Bissau, because *peace*, deep down, is something indivisible and, in one way or another, if there are conflicts, we end up being contaminated. In short, this is the meaning of President Lula's policy: *to contribute to peace is to contribute to avoiding crises*. Contributing to a successful conclusion of the WTO round, insofar as it strengthens the multilateral system, is a way to avoid crises. And act with courage, but also with some caution, in bilateral agreements with richer countries is also part of avoiding crises” (AMORIM, 2008, my translation, emphasis added).

It is interesting how the master signifier *freedom* is articulated by Amorim (2009) in this excerpt as a synonym for what has been usually understood as *autonomy* in BFP discourses. Alongside the mobilization of *peace* it allows for the omission of the signifier *autonomy*, including because, in this case, Amorim is justifying why Brazil is having a participatory (and not an isolationist) role in others countries' policies regarding their own well-being. Though representing a dislocation of the signifier *autonomy* and *non-intervention*, Amorim does it in a subtle way, using the very imaginary of autonomy by implying it without using it: in an *interdependent* world, Brazil is more autonomous (free and peaceful) when it has a constructive and cautious (hence *pragmatic*, which is in chains with *autonomous*) role in outer multilateral and peace processes.

Along the same lines, Brazil's leadership (and non-isolationist) posture is clearly observable in the Doha Round negotiations, as it can be seen in the following passage, Lula's discourse at FAO's regional meeting for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008:

“I can see here the comrade Maluf, President of Consea. It is necessary, comrade Maluf, that we create a Consea⁴³ in each country

⁴³ Consea (National Council for Food and Nutritional Security) was responsible for exercising social control and acting in the formulation, monitoring and evaluation of the National Food and Nutrition Security Policy and System. Activities as a national advisor were unpaid. The Council was given the task of articulating the three levels of government (municipal, state and federal) and civil society (social movements and NGOs) in reviewing the federal

in the world so that food security is part of the State policy and not just the occasional policies of comrades fighters like you. In Brazil, we have already done this. I hope the world does that, because then, who knows, Celso will find it easier, in the Doha Round, to approve an agreement in which *Brazil doesn't need to win, but Europe and the United States have to give in – and those who have to win are the poorest countries in the world*” (BRASIL, 2008, p. 80, my translation, emphasis added).

I would like to draw attention to Lula's (2008) affirmation that Brazil “doesn't need to win [...] those who have to win are the poorest countries in the world”. This reinforces Brazil's image as a benevolent and selfless leader, a representative of the ‘poorest countries’, defending their interests in multilateral negotiations. Therefore, in this discursive moment, the traditional *pragmatism* of BFP is left aside in favor of the mobilization of an imaginary of Brazilian leadership of the so-called “Global South”.

6.4.7 The anti-racist agenda and the ideal of the ego

As has been previously mentioned, the centrality of Southern countries, mainly the connection with African and South American countries, and the narrative of Brazil as the second largest black country in the world, etc, raises the question of whether there could have been a dislocation of Brazil's ideal of the ego. This new narrative can be observed in the following excerpt, part of Lula's second term inaugural speech:

“We are closer to Africa – *one of the cradles of Brazilian civilization*. We made the *South American environment the center of our foreign policy*. Brazil associates its economic, political, and social destiny with that of the continent, MERCOSUR, and the South American Community of Nations. Ladies and gentlemen, it is time for the birth of a *new humanism*, founded on the *universal values of democracy, tolerance, and solidarity*” (BRASIL, 2007, my translation).

Interestingly enough, even though Southern countries do play a more central role during Lula than in the previous governments, this discourse still seems to reinforce

programs then existing and preparing the Plan to Combat Hunger and Misery, with regard to food and nutrition security. It was extinguished during Bolsorano's government (IPEA, 2021).

the racial democracy paradigms of Brazilian identity. This interpretation seems possible when he says Africa is *one of the cradles of Brazilian civilization* or talks about the birth of a – new (or unique, as Brazilian identity as portrayed in *lusotropicalismo*) – *humanism* (is the human being bigger than any racial differences?) of *tolerance* and *solidarity*. So, to some extent, the ‘old humanism’, which Brazil has learned from Europe, as it is observable in Lula’s discourse in Sorbonne (Paris) in 2005, would be replaced by a new one, the result of the combination of other civilizational paradigms.

Let us observe another excerpt, this one from Lula’s visit to Embrapa’s⁴⁴ regional office in Accra, Ghana, in 2008:

“There will be no shortage of those who will say that this office is small. That the initiative is modest. I, for my part, prefer to think of this Brazilian presence as the first seed of something that will grow and expand, bearing fruit for the entire continent. Above all, it is Brazil’s *friendly and solidary contribution to African agricultural development and the fight against hunger on this continent*. A contribution so that our *brothers in Africa* can increasingly have the tools to build their own future. [...] When, in 2003, we decided to *prioritize the relationship with the African continent*, we were very criticized in Brazil. After all, *Brazil was subordinated to a priority relationship with Europe and the United States*, and we understood that Brazil would need to *rediscover Africa*. Brazil has a *historic debt with the African continent*. Free Africans were slaves in my country. But, on the other hand, what Brazilian people today owe much to the greatest forced immigration in human history. The Brazilian people owe Africans *their color, their joy, their dance and much of our culture*. The *mixture between blacks, Indians and Europeans made Brazil a miscegenation with no comparison in the world*. Happy people, festive people, but also people who know their rights, and who know how to render gratitude” (BRASIL, 2008, my translation, emphasis added).

⁴⁴ The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) is linked to the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply. Its objective is to develop, together with partners from the National Agricultural Research System, a Brazilian tropical agriculture and livestock model, overcoming barriers that limited the production of food, fiber and energy in Brazil. Embrapa built a solid network of international cooperation. It has partnerships with some of the main institutions and research networks in the world. Coordinated by the Secretariat for Intelligence and Strategic Relations, the work abroad also contributes to the Brazilian Government’s technical cooperation program, which seeks to transfer and adapt national technologies to the tropical reality of different countries. (EMBRAPA, 2021)

In the abovementioned discourse, Lula not only relies on the *miscegenation* imaginary, but also on the imaginary of the rightful place/way of being of black people: the place of black people is culture, joy. In this imaginary, black people are adequate for playing soccer, samba, but not necessarily for occupying places of status, power or intellectuality. (GONZALEZ; HASENBALG, 1982)

Beyond the *miscegenation/racial democracy*, Lula mobilizes a colonial imaginary when he says that Brazil needs to ‘*rediscover Africa*’. As, usually, the colonial powers’ power-knowledge domination imposes a narrative in which the colonies are discovered, giving them meaning, as if their history began there.

In the excerpts analyzed in this chapter, the ideal of the ego seems to still be the white European. The discourses analyzed resonate with the narratives of *miscegenation* and *racial democracy*, which appear not to be dislocated by other discursive constructions.

This is also observable in Lula da Silva’s discourse in 2008 during the exposition “The Portuguese Court in Brazil”, celebrating 200 years of this historic event and receiving the visit of Portugal’s president Cavaco Silva:

“The *modern* and vibrant Brazil of today *owes much* to the vision and fearlessness of the children of Portugal. Men and women who dared to cross an ocean to build, over successive generations, a bridge of *friendship* and work that so strongly unites Portugal and Brazil. [...] The arrival of D. João VI in 1808 *opened the way for Brazil’s independence*, but also laid the foundations for the deep and lasting friendship that today unites the former colony and its former metropolis. Politically independent, Portugal and Brazil remain *brothers* in their common history and culture. [...] For us Brazilians, *our Portuguese past is a source of pride* and finds expression in the most diverse facets of national life. Our cultures are intertwined with such identity that our heroes and our poets represent the soul of a single people, both Brazilian and Portuguese. [...] This year we also celebrate the fourth centenary of Father Antônio Vieira [...]. In addition to being among the great names in literature in our countries, he distinguished himself as *a defender of the rights of indigenous peoples and black people*. It is one more link between our common past and future in the search for a fairer and more solidary world” (BRASIL, 2008, my translation, emphasis added).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, this idealistic view of the Jesuit Priest Father Antônio Vieira is questioned by representatives of the black movement. Abdias Nascimento (2016, p. 62), quoting lines of Antônio Vieira, shows that the main discourse of the Catholic Church was that the black peoples in Brazil should be grateful to God for having been taken out of their land and given the opportunity to become Christians and serve as slaves as means to achieve salvation. In general, this benevolent view of the catechists and the celebratory and proud relationship with the previous colonizer seems to be compatible with the traditional imaginary of *miscegenation* and *racial democracy* that attributes to the colonizers Brazil's civilizing mission. This can be observed in Lula's (2008) abovementioned words, as he says, the *modern* Brazil *owes much* to the vision and fearlessness of the children of Portugal.

In 2009, there was the Durban Review Conference, aiming to revise the Durban declaration against racism and xenophobia of 2001. Brazil's head of delegation in the conference was the Minister Edson Santos, responsible for SEPPIR at that time. The stronger element in the text, to my perception, is the direct connection between *democracy* and *racial equality*, which were there already in Lula's discourse launching SEPPIR in 2003. As mentioned before, it represents a shift in the chain of signifiers related to *democracy*, which in the 1990s is connected to political and economic liberalism. (LESSA; COUTO; FARIAS, 2010) Differently, in Lula's government, the narrative of a full democracy seems to be in a semantic chain with the pursuit of *racial equality* and not *liberalism*.

Considering that, Edson Santos presents an image of Brazil as a vanguard fighter against racism:

“Brazil will never be absent from debates and commitments in favor of combating discrimination. Regardless of how many are represented here, we will *remain at the forefront of policies to combat racism*, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerances. *Our commitment is historic: it will be honored. Brazil was a pioneer in presenting a resolution pointing out the incompatibility between democracy and racism*” (SANTOS, 2009, my translation, emphasis added).

He further affirms that true democracies are only achieved without racism and discrimination. In this gaze, he portrays the Brazilian population as half afro-descendent and composed of more than 180 indigenous peoples, hence, a *multi-ethnic* and *multi-racial* nation (and not a racial democracy). According to him, SEPPIR is not a rhetorical piece:

“[c]reated in 2003 by President Lula, it represented one of the *first* and *decisive* steps in the *effective* implementation of the Durban Declaration and its Plan of Action. Its mission is to coordinate government action against racism and discrimination against blacks, indigenous, gypsies and other vulnerable groups. The dialogue with civil society is inserted in the administration of the Brazilian government – through joint councils that exercise social control over the governmental actions” (SANTOS, 2009, my translation, emphasis added).

According to him, the “government’s mission is to fulfill the needs of all citizens and treat unequally the unequal” (SANTOS, 2009). In this sense, Santos mentions some of the social programs directed towards the black populations during Lula and facilitated by SEPPIR:

“We created the Black Population Health Policy, removing discrimination factors and humanizing medical care; we instituted the teaching of Afro-Brazilian and Indigenous History in elementary and secondary education, to improve our children's self-esteem; we expanded access to higher education and graduate education through affirmative action at universities. The increase in the volume of social investments, in association with affirmative action policies, brought about significant results in the reduction of inequalities in President Lula's Government: the poor population was reduced from 43% to 30%” (SANTOS, 2009, my translation).

Nevertheless, while the Bolsa Familia (Family Allowance) Program took 11 million families out of misery, around 3500 quilombo communities ‘are still very poor and excluded from the benefits generated by the progress of the country.’ (SANTOS, 2009, my translation).

6.4.8 The government’s reading of its Foreign Policy

During his government, Lula never shied away from affirming Brazil as a *developing* country that, because of that, needed to actively engage in *multilateralism* to be able to adjust the international agenda according to their needs, as in Hirst and Lima's (2006) definition of intermediate states. In this task, Lula openly mentioned that he was inspired by Celso Furtado and Raúl Prebisch's thought (ECLAC's developmentalism that inspired the Independent Foreign Policy from 1961 to 1964), as in a UNCTAD's discourse in 2008⁴⁵.

The former president also proudly talked about the traditional role of the Brazilian diplomatic corps and the institutional excellence of Itamaraty, and how the Foreign Policy serves the *development* goal. This can be observed in the discourse addressing the diplomats at Itamaraty:

"Developing countries need to place their problems at the center of the debate, they must participate in drawing up the international agenda. Brazil is willing to act without arrogance, without megalomania, without hegemonic pretensions, but with the feeling that we are a great country and that we have something to say to the world. For this reason, we are present in the stabilization of Haiti. For this reason, we aspire to reform the UN and its collective security mechanisms. In carrying out foreign policy, I am pleased to always rely on the competence, knowledge and dedication of Itamaraty's staff. You belong to a career in the State, therefore, you are the guarantors of the national interest. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a strategic institution for the Government, demands are growing on the external front, and Brazil's presence and interests in the world have expanded enormously. Our presence in the world is an essential part of our national development project. For this, Brazilian diplomacy needs to rise to the challenges, it needs to have the administrative and budgetary means to adequately fulfill its functions. The improvement of the Ministry's activities requires

⁴⁵ BRASIL. Presidente (2003-2010: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva). Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, abertura da XII Reunião da Conferência das Nações Unidas sobre Comércio e Desenvolvimento-Unctad. Acra (Gana), 20 abr. 2008. Disponível em: <[http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva/audios/2008-audios-lula/20-04-2008-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-abertura-da-xii-reuniao-da-conferencia-das-nacoes-unidas-sobre-comercio-e-desenvolvimento-unctad-acra-gana-14min26s/@@@download/file/20-04-2008%20-%20Discurso%20do%20Presidente%20da%20Rep%C3%ABlica,%20Luiz%20In%C3%A1cio%20Lula%20da%20Silva,%20abertura%20da%20XII%20Reuni%C3%A3o%20da%20Confer%C3%Aancia%20das%20Na%C3%A7%C3%B5es%20Unidas%20sobre%20Com%C3%A9rcio%20e%20Desenvolvimento-Unctad%20-%20Acra-Gana%20\(14min26s\).mp3](http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva/audios/2008-audios-lula/20-04-2008-discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-abertura-da-xii-reuniao-da-conferencia-das-nacoes-unidas-sobre-comercio-e-desenvolvimento-unctad-acra-gana-14min26s/@@@download/file/20-04-2008%20-%20Discurso%20do%20Presidente%20da%20Rep%C3%ABlica,%20Luiz%20In%C3%A1cio%20Lula%20da%20Silva,%20abertura%20da%20XII%20Reuni%C3%A3o%20da%20Confer%C3%Aancia%20das%20Na%C3%A7%C3%B5es%20Unidas%20sobre%20Com%C3%A9rcio%20e%20Desenvolvimento-Unctad%20-%20Acra-Gana%20(14min26s).mp3)>. Acesso em:

investments in the areas of technical cooperation, cultural dissemination, trade promotion and protection of Brazilian communities abroad. [...] In my government, I have spared no efforts to provide Itamaraty with the necessary resources to satisfactorily fulfill its mission” (BRASIL, 2008b, my translation, emphasis added).

When affirming that the diplomats are *the guarantors of the national interest*, Lula reinforces the already strong perception over the special status of Itamaraty, part of state-centric imaginary (mostly earned from Realist traditions) of BFP that sees it as a policy of State and not of government. This special status also justifies to the larger audience the great investments his government made in the material and personnel expansion of Itamaraty, all discursively seen as indispensable investments for Brazil’s *development*.

Lula also mentions moments in which the Foreign Policy during his government has changed its traditional positioning as *non-interventionist* or defender of *peoples self-determination*, both signifiers which are usually in chains of significance with *autonomy*, to justify Brazil’s participation in MINUSTAH and its demand for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. The president does so by mobilizing two discursive constructions. The first, right at the beginning, is the very status of *developing country*, which creates the necessity of Brazil to be participative in the international agenda setting or it will not be able “to place their problems at the center of the debate”. The second, is the mobilization of the imaginary of Brazil as a *great country* and, indirectly, of *miscegenation*, when Lula argues that “*we have something to say to the world*”, the excerpt presupposes or omits that this something is new or unique, what refers to *miscegenation/racial democracy*.

In 2010, Lula was represented in the UNGA by Celso Amorim, as the chief of State was involved in the presidential campaign of his nominee Dilma Rousseff. In this context, Amorim reinforced in his discourse how the two mandates of Lula’s government *changed Brazil*, combining ‘sustained economic growth, financial stability, and the full validity of democracy.’ (AMORIM, 2010, my translation)

The Chancellor emphasizes how “*Firm and transparent* public policies reduced inequalities [...]. Millions of Brazilians conquered *dignity and citizenship*” (AMORIM, 2010, my translation, emphasis added) as the government took over 20 million Brazilians out of extreme poverty and almost 30 million to enter the middle class. This, according to Amorim, strengthened the internal market and *preserved* Brazil from the *world crisis* generated by the financial speculation of the richest countries in the world. Celso Amorim is *proud* to affirm that Brazil has *achieved* almost all Millennium Development Goals and by 2015 would have achieved all of them (AMORIM, 2010).

Analyzing these excerpts, I notice that the Minister successfully mobilizes the heroic act of the State (Ashley, 1989) as well as its masculine attributes (KINNVALL, 2019) as a protector of the nationals from the external threats, such as the *world crisis*, as a *proud* provider of *dignity and citizenship* with *firm and transparent* public policies.

Later on, Amorim places Brazil as a *solidary* and *humanist* actor that shares the development responsibility of other actors as a partner in the international community and reconciles it with its (rational) national interests:

“A country's inability to achieve these goals must be seen as a failure by the entire international community. Promoting development is a collective responsibility. Brazil has been striving to *help other countries to replicate successful experiences*. Over the past eight years, Brazil has moved on the international scene driven by a sense of *solidarity*. We are convinced that it is possible to carry out a *foreign policy with humanism, without losing sight of the national interest*” (AMORIM, 2010, my translation, emphasis added).

In this quote, Amorim placed Brazil as a role model and a *responsible* and *solidary* country that has reached a higher level in the development and moral ladder. Again, the signifier *humanism* appears, this time as a foundation for its *solidarity* and, ultimately, its morality, whereas balancing through the mobilization of realist/pragmatism by mentioning the signifier *national interest*. This places Brazil as something like an older loving brother of an orphan family, which faces the cruelty of the world without being fully-grown and without their parents. The older brother is much more mature than the others, understands how the world works and, keeping his rationality, can both protect himself while helping and inspiring the others. The older

brother is very often the caretaker, the hero, and this position seems also to be compatible in the case of Brazil with the idea of a ‘benevolent Southern leader’.

Affirming that Brazil has raised substantially its humanitarian aid and multiplied its cooperation projects with poorer countries, Amorim described:

“Africa occupies a very special place in Brazilian diplomacy. Since his inauguration, President Lula has been to Africa eleven times. He visited more than two dozen countries. We set up an agricultural research office in Ghana; a model cotton farm in Mali; an antiretroviral drug factory in Mozambique; and vocational training centers in five African countries. With trade and investment, we are helping the African continent to develop its enormous potential and reduce its dependence on a few centers of political and economic power. [...] This year, when a significant number of African countries celebrate fifty years of decolonization, Brazil renews its commitment to an independent, prosperous, fair, and democratic Africa” (AMORIM, 2010, my translation, emphasis added).

Brazil seems to narrate itself as the caretaker of development and of the insertion of international institutions and regimes vis à vis African countries. As it has been discussed, *multilateralism* is a master signifier of BFP and, in the context of the post 2008 crisis, the G-20 resulted from the expansion of the G-7 and a diplomatic victory to some ‘emerging’ countries that could partially be credited to Brazil’s activism during Lula government. G-20 has a central role in Brazil’s multilateral strategies and, regarding the group, Amorim affirms:

“The G-20 meant an evolution. But the Group must undergo adjustments, for example, to ensure greater African participation. The G-20 will only preserve its relevance and legitimacy if it knows how to maintain a frank and permanent dialogue with all the nations represented in this General Assembly” (AMORIM, 2010, my translation, emphasis added).

Concerning *multilateralism*, Celso Amorim cited Lula: “As President Lula says, *multilateralism* is the international face of *democracy*. The UN must be the main decision-making center for international politics” (AMORIM, 2010, my translation, emphasis added). In this excerpt, once again *democracy* appears linked to *multilateralism*. Nonetheless, the signifier *racial equality* was subsumed, which shows a reduced relevance of the topic in this discursive moment and venue.

It seems that Brazil behaved as ‘the bigger bother’ to Haiti, keeping in mind that Haiti’s peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH) was Brazil’s first time as a leader in such an operation:

“In few situations, international solidarity is as necessary as in Haiti. We join the UN in mourning the tragedy that claimed hundreds of thousands of Haitian lives [...]. Haitians know they can *count on Brazil* not only to *maintain order and defend democracy but also for its development*. We are carrying out what we promised and *we are vigilant so that the commitments of the international community are not exhausted in rhetorical demonstrations*” (AMORIM, 2010, my translation, emphasis added).

In relation to South American countries, though, the position seems to be slightly different. As Malamud (2011) describes, in the South American region, Brazil might be a leader without followers, and discursively positions itself in a more horizontal way in relation to the countries of South America. Nonetheless, at the same time, the country tries to establish the region as a space that cannot be seen as the United States backyard anymore, preferably having Brazil as the ‘political entrepreneur’⁴⁶ for South America’s multilateral institutions.

In this context, the relationship with Argentina as a relevant other, or as a “sister nation”, as Lula described, is relevant and placed in horizontal lines:

“[...] Latin American integration presupposes that countries like Brazil [...] [and] Argentina, that is, that the countries of greater economic potential must have solidarity with the poorest countries and help them develop. It won’t do if only Argentina [or Brazil are] rich and all the others are poor. We need to grow together. And, therefore, Argentina and Brazil have a lot of responsibility. [...] I have a thesis that there is no individual way out [...]. How are we going to manage to make the WTO, in the Doha Round negotiations, understand that the Latin American and African countries, above all, minus Brazil and Argentina, because they have the technological

⁴⁶ Here I am borrowing the concept from the theory of coalitions, inspired by Oliveira, Onuki and Oliveira (2007).

potential to compete... But what is the chance that Central America and the African continent have to progress if rich countries, especially the European Union, do not understand that it is necessary to make agricultural products more flexible so that the little production of African countries can enter their markets? If the United States does not reduce the subsidies it applies to its farmers, what chance do the poorest countries have of placing their products inside the United States? Together we can change and democratize the United Nations. Together, we can build, as we built the G-20, in Cancun, which today practically marks all the discussions we are having at the UN” (BRASIL, 2008c, my translation).

Therefore, Amorim (2010) emphasizes that the Brazilian government has strongly invested in peace and integration in South America, fortifying its strategic partnership with Argentina; deepening Mercosur, with unique financial mechanisms among developing countries; consolidating a zone of prosperity and peaceful resolution of conflicts through Unasur, making external interference in the region even less justifiable. Beyond South America, the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CLAC) he also reaffirms the “regional will to broaden to Central America and the Caribbean the integrationist spirit that animates South Americans” (AMORIM, 2010, my translation). The Chancellor also reiterates Brazil’s repudiation towards the *illegitimate* blockade to Cuba and condemned the coup d’état in Honduras.

Amorim, later, summarized the main agendas of the government:

“In the eight years of Lula's government, Brazil developed an *independent diplomacy, without any kind of subservience and respectful of its neighbors and partners*. An innovative diplomacy, but one that does not deviate from the *fundamental values* of the Brazilian nation - *peace, pluralism, tolerance and solidarity*. Just as Brazil has changed, and will continue to change, the world is also changing. But it is necessary to deepen and accelerate these changes. With technological advances and accumulated wealth, there is no longer any place for *hunger, poverty and epidemics* that can be prevented. We can no longer live with *discrimination, injustice and authoritarianism*. We have to face the challenges of *nuclear disarmament, sustainable development and freer and fairer trade*. Be sure: Brazil will continue to fight to make these ideals a reality” (FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO, 2010, my translation, emphasis added).

As previously argued, Brazil’s foreign policy relies on many relevant master signifiers. The mobilization of *autonomy, non-intervention* and *South American* is there

in “*independent diplomacy, without any kind of subservience and respectful of its neighbors and partners.*” The idea of continuity and linearity of BFP is also there when reinforcing the fundamental values of *peace* and *disarmament* (*pacifism/legalism*), *pluralism* (*multilateralism*), *tolerance* (*miscegenation*), and *solidarity* (*developing country*). It also includes Lula’s main discursive innovations, which is the fight against hunger and poverty, also in signifier chains with fight against discrimination and injustice. *Democracy* is there by the mentioning of *authoritarianism*. The words *change*, *injustice*, and *authoritarianism* also evoke Brazil’s activism for reforming multilateral institutions, with special regard to UNSC, WTO’s Doha Round (e.g.: free and fairer trade), and IMF.

Finally, given the material analyzed, the following and final section of this chapter will present how the master signifiers of Brazilian biographical narratives of BFPA were placed or dislocated in the narratives and chains of significance during Lula da Silva, according to the methodology proposed by this thesis.

6.5. Conclusion: understanding change and continuity during Lula through chains of significance

“This prejudice exists, of black and poor people going to visit the theater, which was a rich thing. Once I went to the municipal theater in Rio de Janeiro, at the reopening, I was President of the Republic, man. I felt that there was a part of the elite that was not accepting me being there. Why is it not another one? Why isn't he a more refined guy, this migrant [...] They said that my wife wouldn't be able to wash the windows at the Palácio da Alvorada. Now, that's it, [...] once I was sitting at the table in the Alvorada Palace to eat. And I love chicken feet. [...] Chicken leg made with sauce, you know? And I ordered chicken feet. Then when the guy came to serve a platter full of chicken legs, the guy left and I laughed. You know, I started laughing because I was wondering what this guy's head must be like. During Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government there was a cook, a French chef, who made all those little things [...] and here comes a

guy who likes buchada⁴⁷, oxtail, who likes moqueca⁴⁸, who likes chicken legs, who likes gizzards, who likes sarapatel⁴⁹, it's very different. This country has really changed, guys. [...] I think I was the first experience of alternating power in Brazil, you know, because you had a teacher, a lawyer, but all in the same social caste. I was the first real alternation of power, you know, for a worker to reach the presidency of the Republic of the country. As well as Dilma was the first woman to reach the Presidency of the Republic in the country. [...] I dream that this country will have a black woman [... or] a black man in the presidency" (DA SILVA, 2021, my translation).

The questioning of *racial democracy* in BFP was a process that started before Lula da Silva's government, dating back to the 1980s and 1990s due to the activism of the Black Movement in Brazil. The previous president, FHC, did admit that there was racism in Brazil and instituted some initial policies to fight racism in the country, which are both result but also reflected in Brazil's activism in the Durban Conference against racism in 2001.

Taking into account the critique of the party-ideological orientation of BFP under Lula: to what extent the views from PT were imprinted into Brazilian foreign policy narratives and were mobilized also to contain criticisms inside the party? Those questions would need to be further investigated in other studies, though it seems plausible given the close relation with South American nations, the resumption of a developmentalist (or third worldist) rhetorics, and the relevant role of Lula, Marco Aurelio Garcia (though not enough empirical material on his BFP take was found in open sources), and Celso Amorim, for example.

The Workers' Party has a relation of both critique and close cooperation with the Black Movement and the support of this and many other social movements made Lula's

⁴⁷ Throughout the Northeast, buchada is usually made with the goat's entrails (kidneys, liver and viscera), washed, boiled, cut, seasoned and cooked in bags (measuring about 8 cm in diameter), made with the stomach of the goat.

⁴⁸ Moqueca is a stew, usually with fish, typical of Brazilian and Angolan cuisine. In Brazil, it is a typical dish from the states of Pará, Bahia and Espírito Santo. It can be prepared with fish, seafood, chicken or eggs.

⁴⁹ Sarapatel is a typical culinary food in Brazil's Northeast, usually made with pig guts and other viscera, in addition to the blood curdled and cut into pieces. One of the characteristics of the delicacy is its fat content, which is very high due to the presence of pieces of bacon and tripe.

election possible. In this context, the consolidation of policies and a Foreign Policy that recognizes the Black Africa as a *significant other* still faced resistance at what I have called the *field of contextual possibilities*. Narrating Brazil as a black country seemed still to be unacceptable, traumatic, as well as admitting the racist foundations and realities of the Brazilian state. Considering the hegemonic narratives, one possible interpretation, to be further investigated in more detailed empirical analysis, is that the understanding of Brazil either as bi-racial or multi-racial (but as a majoritarily black country) seemed not to be in the field of contextual possibilities. If it is so, narrating Brazil as majoritarily black was not a possibility in a short period of time without mobilizing ontological insecurity and hatred.

Overall, regarding the material analyzed in this chapter, it seems that the Lula government, though giving a central relevance to other developing countries and to the racial agenda, did not dislocate the white European ideal of the ego. This is so because the government relied strongly on the *miscegenation* imaginary during this ‘look’ or ‘drive’ towards Africa or the South, a signifier which, as it has been discussed in the previous chapter, is embedded in a whitening imaginary.

Regarding dislocation in terms of the master signifiers and their chains of significance related to *race* or *racism*, the main visible difference was including *racial equality* in chains with *democracy*. The signifier *racial democracy* is, then, broken into two (*racial equality* and *democracy*), which slightly changes the significance chain, being also related to the fight against *hunger* and *poverty*, which now becomes: *racial equality - democracy - development (fight against hunger and poverty)*. This replaces the old: *European workforce - miscegenation - racial democracy - development*.

Democracy also frequently appears in chains with *multilateralism*, *development* and *peace*. The chain connecting those looks something like *multilateralism (reform) - democracy - development - peace*. In this sense, the Lula government discursively securitizes the *development* agenda, beyond giving a discursive centrality to *hunger* and *poverty*, an innovation of the period.

Therefore, while concerning the ‘international’ realm, *democracy* is usually in chains with *multilateralism*, *development* (against *hunger* and *poverty*); while relating to the ‘domestic’ realm, *democracy* is frequently related to *racial equality*, which is also related to the fight against *hunger* and *poverty*. Differently from what was observed in the 1990s, the signifier *neoliberalism* seems to be taken out of both chains of significance, even though neoliberal macroeconomic measures remain.

The signifier *autonomy* is also dislocated to justify Brazil’s greater activism, as well as its diversification of partnerships. Examples of this are the sought for a position of leadership and the substitution of the understandings of *self-determination* to an engagement as a leader in MINUSTAH, a conciliatory and leader role in South America, an open activism for joining the Security Council as a permanent member and a political entrepreneur of international coalitions such as WTO’s G20 and IBSA. Brazil discursively places its search for being a provider of international public goods as something *pragmatic* and justifiable by mobilizing the signifiers *interdependence* and *developing country*. Therefore, Brazil becomes the more *autonomous* the more it participates in the international agenda setting processes and the *multilateral* arenas. Hence, the new chain of significance looks something like: *developing country* - *interdependence* - *pragmatism* - *diversification of partnerships* - *international activism* - *multilateralism* - *autonomy*.

All the previous signifiers that presented some kind of dislocation (e.g.: *democracy*, *autonomy*, *racial democracy*, *development*) had already the new possibilities in what I have called the *field of contextual* possibilities, given by societal processes and historical antecedents. This is different for the signifier *miscegenation*, to which there seems not to have been any structural disruption or either with its whitening imaginary.

Nonetheless, it does not mean that the Lula government did not represent any relevant discursive change in that signifier. I wonder if such a political move towards the South and, namely, black Africa, would have been possible without a justification relying on *miscegenation*. I imagine it would probably have been impossible - as it was

not in the field of contextual possibilities before - to dislocate Brazil's ideal of the ego and to disrupt with the *miscegenation* imaginary. I understand that the very consideration of racism in Brazil and the racist foundations of the country, even though in a partial, limited and disconnected way, is enough of a trauma - an encounter with the unsymbolized Real - in itself. In this context, the desire towards Africa is there, as the Brazilian neurosis, in Lélia Gonzalez (1988) terms. The desire towards Africa seems to be there, but it cannot be spoken about, as it is still unacceptable to desire blackness.

The previous analysis suggests that, during Lula da Silva, Brazilian official Foreign Policy discourses brought the desire towards Africa into the field of contextual possibilities. It was not possible yet to break with the white European ideal of the ego, but it, maybe, opens the possibility for the future. This is a possible interpretation from the material analyzed.

Another possible interpretation is that the discursive ambivalence under Lula in narrating Brazil as a black country to African audiences or to declare that Brazilian revolutions and humanism were European heritages were all pragmatic and that BFP narratives would always change according to the audience. This is not incorrect. But then again, it misses the connection with the domestic understandings of identity and how these chameleonic discourses could relate to ontological insecurity and traumatic elements, such as racism.

Finally, a dimension usually not explored by analysts of the Lula period is the populist component of his discourses, though this critique was frequent in the media. Probably the understanding of populism as a negative political trait has something to do with it, and this is what I want to react against. Following Chantal Mouffe, I understand that populism can be an important part of politics and of imagining or making political change. Beyond that, understanding that politics is also made with affects, through the mobilization of love, fear, hatred, etc, can strengthen the studies of BFP, and complement the understanding of the role of foreign policy discourses and their relation to identity narratives. I consider it essential not only to analyze Lula, but

also to what comes after: Dilma's impeachment and Bolsonaro's election. Some initial thoughts over this will be exposed in this thesis's conclusion.

7. The Backlash after Lula

7.0. Introduction

Brazil's international multilateral and South-South narratives faced a relative hiatus after Lula during its successor's government, Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) (CERVO; LESSA, 2014; SARAIVA, 2020). However, after her impeachment process, some elements of Lula and Celso Amorim's foreign policy seem to have been highly disputed, persecuted, or dismantled. An example during Bolsonaro (2019-current), was the exit from Unasur, a relevant regional mechanism created under Lula, and the joining of Prosur⁵⁰ as a more neoliberal and right-wing character initiative.

Though this movement needs to be better investigated, there seems to be a general tendency in the erasing or abandonment of the main agendas and identity discourses mobilized during Lula da Silva. This appears to be even more unsettling if one takes into consideration that his government approval rate was of 80% when he left the presidency, in 2010, while his personal approval rate was of an outstanding 87%⁵¹. Though subject of some criticisms, foreign policy is also analyzed mostly under positive gazes in BFPA, as my previous chapters have shown.

Overall, as it has been exposed throughout this thesis, it still seems that it is the closer look towards the South as a significant other that has to be justified, reframed, or abandoned, this time in official Foreign Policy terms. Under a general perspective, beyond the appropriation and resignification of some Foreign Policy mechanisms – reorienting towards a much more economic diplomacy lexicon – the following governments (Michel Temer [2016-2018] and Jair Bolsonaro [2019-current]) seem to

⁵⁰ Available at: <https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/internacional/noticia/2019-04/brazil-officially-leaves-unasur-join-prosur>. Access in: December 2nd, 2021.

⁵¹ Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-lula-poll-idUSTRE6BF4O620101216>. Access in: December 2nd, 2021.

have established an ideological cleansing of any possible ‘positive’ legacies of the PT Era. They have been disputing collective memories, legacies, or narratives over the period, strongly arguing that Lula’s diplomacy was ‘ideological’, while theirs were either ‘pragmatic’ or represented the ‘truth’ of Brazil. In the historical narratives they have been constructing, PT’s only legacy was corruption, debt, and narratives that divided Brazil instead of uniting its population (ALFONSO, 2019).

To illustrate this movement, and also regarding my willingness to continue the research agenda started in this thesis in further investigations, this chapter will go through some recent developments in Brazilian politics, identity discourses, and Foreign Policy after Lula da Silva (mainly concerning Bolsonaro’s government) in a very panoramic way. Aiming to apply the methodology of the thesis and some of the findings over the Lula period, I hope this initial framework shows initial findings as a preliminary attempt to understand how BFP relates to the recent backlash towards far-right in Brazilian politics, as well as a possible way for the field of BFPA to approach it.

Therefore, the chapter consists of a first section debating the political instability and the scapegoating dynamics after Lula, as well as the far-right ascension in Brazil; the second presents an initial discourse analysis of Bolsonaro’s inauguration speech; the third introduces a discussion on Foreign Policy change under Bolsonaro; and the fourth explores some of the dismantling of racial policies under the current government. In the conclusion, I present a preliminary comparison among Lula and Bolsonaro identity discourses and chains of significance, to be better investigated future research initiatives.

7.1. Political instability, scapegoating dynamics and far-right ascension

In 2013, still during Dilma Rousseff’s government, Brazil went through massive popular protests, with millions mobilized all over the country. The protests started by Movimento Passe Livre (Free Pass Movement) in São Paulo, against the rise of public

transportation prices and in favor of free public transportation. Nonetheless, the manifestations gained enormous popular support after a strong repressive response of the State, until the point that the protests took over the entire country, with no clear agenda and very pulverized interests beyond the general dissatisfaction feeling towards the political order (ALFONSO, 2019).

According to Delcourt (2016), the protests seemed progressist in the beginning, but awakened reactionary sectors of Brazil: the protests showed a gap in the previous center-left consensus built in the country and weakened Rousseff's government. The right, that was until this point ashamed and disarticulated, started to rebuild itself and the president's approval after June 2013 fell exponentially.

Melo and Spektor (2016) describe that while in 2013 the protests carried disapproval regarding public spending, mainly considering the realization of the Fifa World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016, since the start of the investigation Operation Car Wash in 2014, people protested mainly against corruption. Later in 2016, research with the public already showed that corruption was perceived as Brazil's biggest problem (MELO; SPEKTOR, 2016).

The social profile of protesters against corruption (mainly against the Workers' Party, PT) was young (between 20 and 40) educated (at least graduated from High School), and with a monthly income of at least 5 minimum wages. Considering both the profile and action reasoning, those protests against corruption – and urging for Dilma's impeachment – had more resemblance to the protests before the coup of 1964 that inaugurated the military dictatorship in Brazil than with Occupy Wall Street (DELCOURT, 2016).

In this context, it is relevant to consider the relation of moments of polarization and 'exception' with the mobilization of ontological (in)security:

“Emergency narratives call for immediate action and direct interventions, and can justify polarised boundaries. Responding to narratives of emergency is also a way to create order from projections of chaos and flux in which security becomes a ‘solution’ (Walters,

2006). Bordering processes can thus be adopted in order to reinstate state power and an idea of a collective secure self” (KINNVALL, 2017, p. 102).

I am aware of the benefit of history and that some distancing from historical moments can help to better analyze them, as well as to identify what kind of patterns follow. Thus, even as Rousseff’s administration has not been analyzed in this thesis, there are some important considerations to be made, which also open for further empirical studies. The most important is that Brazil is not only a racialized state, but a gendered one as well (MISKOLCI, 2013). Rousseff’s impeachment dynamics cannot be properly analyzed without the idea of gendered nationhood and masculinist foreign policy (KINNVALL, 2017). If Lula could have, to some extent, disrupted the foundations of the main identities and biographical narratives of Brazilian nationhood, at least he was a strong masculine figure, with high credibility about his competence to govern and manage the country (even after corruption accusations). If the Foreign Policy (and also foreign policy, in Campbell terms) under Lula could have touched something very core to Brazilian phantasies of ontological security, which is the racism and miscegenation, Dilma probably touched something else just as central, which is the patriarchal and masculinist gender dynamics.

Differently from Lula, Dilma was constantly perceived and portrayed – under a clear gender bias – as out of control, bossy, not eloquent enough, etc (MARCONDES; MAWDSLEY, 2017). Indeed Lula is known to be a very charismatic leader, a populist (CASARÕES; FARIAS, 2021), while Dilma had no previous political past. In Foreign Policy dynamics, she is known for having reduced interest in international affairs and for having a deteriorated relationship with Itaramaty during her mandate (SARAIVA, 2020, p.17). Beyond that, there was increasing social criticism and politicization of PT’s (mainly Lula’s) foreign policy, accused of being mostly ideological. The corruption scandals involving Brazilian private companies’ international contracts and Brazilian politicians, while the Brazilian economy was presenting signals of stagnation did not make the situation any easier. Therefore, there was an overall critique over Lula da Silva’s foreign policy being established:

“In the 2014 presidential election campaign the PSDB candidate made criticisms about foreign policy, notably about Brazilian investment in Cuba and the limits of the Common External Tariff of MERCOSUR. Opposition leaders accused Rousseff’s foreign policy of being ‘ideological’ or ‘partisan’ and pointed to South America and Cuba as the principal areas of mistakes by the government” (SARAIVA, 2020, p.18).

However, one cannot ignore the media and popular mockery directed first and foremost to the fact that she was a woman. Interestingly enough, the following president, Michel Temer was a more acceptable political figure, as he is male, white, literate, and could hide behind a pragmatic and stabilizing market-oriented image he carved for himself (TEIXEIRA; PINHO, 2018). Bolsonaro, by his turn, would openly affirm that prefers his sons to be dead than gay⁵², or declare to a congresswoman that she did not deserve to be raped because she was too ugly⁵³. Therefore:

“Amidst these controversies, Bolsonaro came to national prominence by giving voice to authoritarian, misogynistic, reactionary, anti-LGBTQ+ and racist attitudes, appealing to a discourse of social order and repression, against corruption and all challenges to the prevailing order, including challenges to heteronormativity, patriarchy and racism, seen as ‘divisive’” (ALFONSO, 2019, p.11).

Lima and Albuquerque (2019), following a rationalist perspective, emphasize the anti-corruption and anti-establishment ideas that elected not only Bolsonaro, but also new names the Brazilian Congress. They consider determinants for understanding the rise of conservatism in Brazil the exhaustion of the neoliberal model after the 2008 crisis and the need for centralizing movements of the State all over the world. As frequent elements in conservative discourses, they highlight communism, anti-PTism, Bolivarianism, corruption, moral conservatism, traditional family, Christian faith, neoliberalism, entrepreneurship, and meritocracy.

⁵² Available at: <https://www.advocate.com/world/2018/9/07/brazils-presidential-front-runner-rather-have-my-son-dead-gay>. Access in: December 4th 2021.

⁵³ Available at: <https://www.vice.com/en/article/j53wx8/jair-bolsonaro-elected-president-brazil>. Access in: December 4h 2021.

Esther Solano (2019) presents empirical research on anti-PT movements and supporters of Brazil's current president, Jair Bolsonaro, in which many declared support for Operation Car Wash and Dilma's impeachment process even knowing they were partial. Solano believes that they supported those processes *because* they were partial. The anti-PT sentiment reached such a level that the running objective was not seeking justice (or less corrupt politics) but destroying the Worker's Party (PT). In this context, the leading judge of the operation until 2018, Sérgio Moro, later became the head of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security in Brazil during the first year and a half of Bolsonaro's government, in what has been interpreted by some analysts as a political movement. Moro is known for committing illegalities in the investigation process while he was still a judge, a process that led him to be admired like a superhero by the anti-PT audience, running outside the law to fight crime and the evil forces, which are embodied by PT.

What many Brazilian analysts seem to have overseen is the potential role played by libido (FREUD, 2013), passions (MOUFFE, 2015), or enjoyment/*jouissance* (FINK, 1997; STAVRAKAKIS, 1999; 2007). Considering those, it would be unrealistic to expect the audience to be seeking (rational, 'cold') justice - and not just selective justice, as observed, applied only to the enemy. The pursue of justice in this case - and the realm of the political in general - is an affective one, permeated by the dynamics of desire and *jouissance*. Hence, the Workers' Party, as the very scapegoat of all dissatisfaction, failure, hatred, and disaffection of these subjects needed to be eliminated, and not just legally punished (SOLOMON, 2015; KINNVALL, 2017).

In a move comparable to previous analysts that studied the rise of conservatism in Brazil, Duvivier (2018) states in an opinion article that it was not anti-PTism that elected a far-right president in the 2018 elections, as there were many other anti-PT candidates. According to him, Brazilians went for the one with the most authoritarian tone, Bolsonaro, because he was able to build a much closer dialogue with 'the people', similar to the identification that former president Lula had.

Then again, what Duvivier may have missed is that it was because of the anti-PT sentiment that Bolsonaro was able to build a common identity to ‘the people’: the appeal of his discourse was only possible through the creation and mobilization of a common enemy. None of the other candidates was able to mobilize popular affections as Bolsonaro, they presented themselves as ‘other than PT’ options and not ‘anti-PT’, and that makes a huge difference.

In this regard, an interesting point Duvivier (2018) makes is that the Brazilian society identifies itself with the homophobic, misogynistic, and shamelessly authoritarian declarations of Bolsonaro. Under a post-colonial perspective, modern subjects, the modern order and, thus, the symbolic order, is a product of the colonial, racist, classist, and misogynist order.

For long the Brazilian scapegoat, or undesired Other, was the black and indigenous populations, made responsible for Brazil’s underdevelopment by scientific racism and whitening policy narratives (VIEIRA, 2018). This scapegoat provides ontological security (security of being, of knowing its own identity) to the Brazilian ruling elite (high-level political and economic classes) and to whom, interestingly enough, the middle-classes identify (SOUZA, 2018). De-stabilizing those power relations could cause many discomforts and a sense of insecurity and that is why things tend to stay as they have always been: hierarchical, racist, misogynistic. The candidate that most represents such an order, and that was able to play with the ontological (in)security of Brazilian society and its autobiographical mainstream narrative was, indeed, Bolsonaro.

In “*Brazilian foreign policy on the divan*”, Milani (2019) makes an interesting analogy that shows some of the limits of the (rationalistic) mainstream BFPA. Arguing that a psychoanalyst divan is a place where the patient reflects over its identity and the role they desire to play on the ‘outside’, regarding the seeking of its autonomy and adulthood. Considering that Bolsonaro created an identity crisis that the divan is supposed to solve (to discover who Brazil *really is*), Milani (2019) claims over the importance of some kind of consensus between the elites regarding what kind of role

or identity Brazil wants to show to the world. He argues that both in 1964 and in 2016, Brazilian elites have risked democracy to avoid dealing with structural reforms, social policies, and the dramatic levels of inequality.

Milani (2019) considers that since Rousseff's impeachment in 2016, Brazil projected a more masculine, white, and privileged image, concentrating most of its energy on the economic agendas. Even though this is not Milani's focus on the article, he briefly describes that Bolsonaro, was elected by his ability to show himself as an antiestablishment candidate, despite his long political career, and by innovatively mobilizing social media and fake news on the internet.

In the first few months of his government, there was a deep tension and competition between the supporting elites of his government (military, judicial, evangelical, and far-right-wing ideologists) over what kind of political/economic strategy to follow. Beyond that, Bolsonaro has been also implementing moral conservatism to build his political authority, willing to limit pluralism in the Brazilian democracy and portraying political adversaries (mostly leftists and intellectuals) as the enemy (MILANI, 2019).

Though showing a relevant and interesting analysis, Milani (2019) is another example of a rationalistic analytical point of view, assuming actors according to rational choice theory (that can discover who they really are), following an epistemic realism, and ignoring emotions and affections as the central mobilizers in politics. As it has been argued throughout this thesis, I understand that approaches considering the discursive, colonial, and libidinal dimensions of identity politics and foreign policy would be essential for a more comprehensive understanding of the current moment.

In "*Why do we vote for Hitler*", an opinion article published during the 2018 elections, Stuenkel (2018) offers a description of why Hitler's party was elected in Germany with many clear parallels with Jair Bolsonaro. Among the elements described, there is the fact that Hitler was a bizarre low-level ex-military that most did not take seriously, famous for his declarations against minorities, the left, feminists, gays, immigrants, etc. People voted for his party, though, because, according to

Stuenkel (2018) Germans had lost faith in democracy and were angry at the traditional elites after the worst economic crisis of the country's history. They were searching for a new leader, a new face, an anti-politician that could make real changes. Even though some were bothered by his radicalism, the establishment parties offered no better options. The economic elite supported Hitler soon enough, after he promised and implemented a clientelist and kleptocratic regime, benefitting special interest groups (STUENKEL, 2018).

In this regard, Casarões and Farias (2021) provide a very accurate description of Bolsonaro's profile:

“Former army captain and long-time congressman Jair Bolsonaro ran on both an anti-Workers' Party and an anti-establishment platform, vowing to fight communism and corruption and to hand back the country to the ‘good citizens of Brazil’, basically white, middle-class, Christian Brazilians. Much along the lines of US president Donald Trump, Bolsonaro's electoral strategy was based on conservative (mostly religious) values, disinformation spread across social media, a bold rejection of political correctness, and a populist style” (CASARÕES; FARIAS, 2021, p.7, references omitted).

Therefore, another point of Hitler-Bolsonaro's parallel presented by Stuenkel (2018), was that Hitler knew how to instrumentalize the media, having a simple discursive lexicon, instead of the bureaucratic lexicon of other politicians, spreading fake news, using catchy slogans, and presenting simple solutions to complex problems as real options. To Stuenkel, Hitler was politically incorrect on purpose, which made him appear more authentic to his electors. Furthermore, Germany had a general sensation of moral crisis, which Hitler promised to face. Many voted for Hitler not taking his threats towards Jews and gays seriously and expected that he would need to be ruled by more experienced counselors (STUENKEL, 2018).

Describing the risks for democracy and the ability to exploit German society's insecurities, Stuenkel affirms:

“Indeed, a more objective analysis shows that just when it was most necessary to defend democracy, Germans fell into the easy temptation of a pathetic demagogue that provided a false sense of

security and very few concrete proposals on how to deal with Germany's 1932 problems. Unlike what you hear today, Hitler was not a genius. He was an opportunistic charlatan who identified and exploited a deep insecurity in German society” (STUENKEL, 2018, my translation).

Considering this scenario, I recall Chantal Mouffe’s (2016) argument that democratic parties’ have shown an incapacity to present alternatives of identifications for the population could have opened the way for right-wing populism. In this context, so the argument goes, right-wing populism offers people some sort of hope and a perception that things could be different, a seductive and appealing alternative for the centrist neoliberal post-political narratives. On the other hand, democratic parties seem to be far from dialoguing with people’s desires and fantasies and, instead of calling for reason, moderation, and consensus, Mouffe (2016) defends that they should engage in actually promoting identifications, necessarily choosing an adversary (possibly the neoliberal hegemonic order and its defenders), what would make it possible to create an ‘us’.

7.2. National discourses under Bolsonaro: analyzing the inauguration speech at the Planalto Palace

Jair Bolsonaro’s inauguration speech, on January 1st 2019, is an important example of the use of sliding signifiers as a mean to portray strength, stability, and protection against the phantasmatic/imaginary enemy of socialism. Overall, the speech is directed to reaffirm his figure as representing the defeat of socialism in Brazil, making an allusion to PT’s ‘threat’ of returning to the executive presidency, considering that no far left-wing party had significant voting in the elections.

He portrays himself as a strong, humble and (almost) chosen by God figure: “This moment is priceless. To serve the homeland [*pátria*] as Chief Executive. And this is only being possible because *God preserved my life*” (2019, my translation emphasis added), making reference to the attack he had suffered, having been stabbed during the first round of elections campaign.

In this context, Bolsonaro highlights: “[...] this day was the day that *the people* started to break free from socialism [...]”; also “We cannot let nefarious ideologies come to divide *Brazilian people*. Ideologies that destroy our values and traditions, destroy our families, the foundation of our society”. He also reinforces: “We have the great challenge to face the effects of the economic crisis, record rates of unemployment, of the *ideologization* of our kids, *distortion* of human rights and *deconstruction* of the family” (2019, my translation, emphasis added).

Further on, he relies on the feeling of insecurity not only in public, but in private spaces as well, probably referring to changes in Brazil’s moral system, which is highly patriarchal (SCHWARCZ, 2019), sexist (MISKOLCI, 2013), and racist (NASCIMENTO, 2016), regarding recent changes and social demands over dignity for women, LGBTQIAP+ and black populations. In this context, he argues that ‘this ideology’ takes insecurity *everywhere*:

“It is also urgent to end the ideology that defends criminals and criminalizes policeman, which led Brazil to face an increase of violence and organized crime numbers, takes away innocent lives, destroys families, and *takes insecurity everywhere*” (BOLSONARO, 2019, my translation, emphasis added).

Overall, considering the above mentioned, Bolsonaro mentions “family” 4 times during the speech, “ideology” 5 times, and “God” impressively 7 times, in a relatively small speech, of 832 words. On the other hand, “democracy” is mentioned only 2 times. In the same fashion, he affirms the existence of a previous order when Brazil was a great nation, which I understand to be not only before PT’s rule at the presidency but - relying on intertextuality and other discourses by Bolsonaro - but probably referring to the period of the civilian-military dictatorship in Brazil (1964-1988). Hence, he affirms: “We have a great nation to *rebuild*” (BOLSONARO, 2019, my translation, emphasis added). In this regard, he claims to know and to represent the interests of *Brazilians* without any bias, even though we cannot be sure of who those Brazilians he is talking about are. Further on, he continues: “We are going to take out the ideological bias of our international relations”, and “this country has been governed serving

partisan interests that were not the interests of *Brazilians*. We are going to *reestablish* order in this country” (BOLSONARO, 2019, my translation, emphasis added).

Throughout the speech, Bolsonaro portrays and reinforces the division between “the people and their interests (which he claims to represent)” and “the previous corrupt rulers”, which is compatible with a traditional understanding of populist discourses. In this context, Plagemann and Destradi (2019) describe that populist discourses create a separation of society into two antagonist groups: ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, arguing to be the only real representatives of ‘the people’. In terms of foreign policy, it means that populist leaders act as gatekeepers of the ‘national interest’, understood in very narrow terms, and discursively point out who are the nationals and who are the enemies (not necessarily located outside the State borders, but certainly located outside citizenship and rights access discourses) from whom their masculine and strong foreign policy would protect the national citizens from (KINNVALL, 2019).

Nonetheless, different from them, I do not understand populism as an essentially dangerous or negative movement. Following a perspective closer to Laclau (2005) and Laclau and Mouffe (2001), I believe populism is the reason for politics, as all identity and society articulation need libidinal investments. Identity will always represent an incomplete representation, a simplification of reality, as accessing it is impossible, as it is impossible to be in a political realm that is free from ideology (purely administrative) or free from a partial perspective of the world, that has chosen something to anchor its beliefs and emotional attachments on. This is also why I consider Bolsonaro’s claim to represent the “real” Brazilian people and its interests inherently problematic but, also, a very powerful discursive tool, that mobilizes affections and generates popular engagement – which probably contributed significantly to his election as Brazil’s president in 2018.

One of the major concerns regarding Bolsonaro’s presidency is his admiration towards the Brazilian dictatorship period and his disrespect towards democratic institutions. Even though in his discourse he affirms that he will respect the constitution and Brazilian democracy, in other moments he has stated otherwise. In this perspective,

an apparent contradiction in his speeches is the articulation of the idea of a powerful state with the defense of neoliberal policies, which also represent an apparent contradiction between different support sectors of his government: the great capital (mostly represented by Banks and some industrial sectors) and the nationalist ones (a relevant portion of the military sector). In this regard, Chacko (2018) reminds us that the right-wing nationalist wave we see in the contemporary world can be seen as actually related to neoliberal ideology, as further processes of neo-liberalization require strong state intervention.

At the end of his speech, to emphasize the idea of stability and closure, he relies on the (possibly) major master signifiers that exist in the modern era, God and the nation-state (reinforced also by the symbol of the Brazilian flag), inviting the audience to fight to defend the nation with their own lives: “Brazil above everything. God above all. This is our flag, which will never be red. It will only be red if our blood is necessary to keep it green and yellow” (BOLSONARO, 2019, my translation, emphasis added).

The analysis of Bolsonaro’s inauguration discourse at the Planalto Palace on January 1st, 2019 is a clear portrait of how far-right politicians have been successfully articulating master/empty signifiers while playing with the audience’s ontological insecurity and actively (re)constructing the nation’s biographical narratives of who is the Brazilian self and who is the other against its identity is constructed.

Bolsonaro’s government, which proudly enunciates discourses such as ‘*we* are the *real* Brazilians’ seems to be now settling a ‘new-old’ foreign policy, delineating discursively the ones who ‘*are*’ Brazilians, who will be upheld and supported - in Mbembe (2019) terms -, and who will be excluded, left to die or exterminated. This turn to far right seems to be embedded in racism and sexism, deeply invested in master signifiers, such as the slogan: *Brazil* above everything, *God* above all; and legitimized by discourses, scapegoats, and regimes of truth.

7.3. Foreign Policy change under Bolsonaro

In terms of official Foreign Policy, Bolsonaro's nomination of Ernesto Araújo for Minister of Foreign Affairs has been a relevant disruption on the historic narratives of continuity. Araújo was a relatively young diplomat, with divergent views from what are considered to be the main lines of BFP according to the institution's historic views (SARAIVA, 2020) Considering some of the long standing approaches on continuity in BFPA, Saraiva argues:

“Within the framework of this profile of continuity, there exist papers which defend with theoretical rigor the existence of continuity in foreign policy in terms of its objectives and patterns of international insertion. Burges (2016) combines different perspectives of analysis and concepts accommodating a long duration perspective of Brazilian foreign policy with consolidated beliefs, with glimpses of continuity of a well structured diplomacy and the structural limits of the Brazilian economy. Despite the ideological features which marked the foreign policies of the PT administration, there predominates in his work the presentation of a monolithic and singular ‘Brazil’. Lafer (2001) highlights an identity of Brazil which acted, at the same time, as a factor of the ‘persistence of the international insertion’ of the country, as well as its singularity. Itamaraty played an important role in the construction of this. However, this discourse of continuity hides discontinuities or changes which can be identified in empirical studies” (SARAIVA, 2020, p. 6).

Nonetheless, for her, the changes in government after Lula, considering mainly Temer (2016-2018) and Bolsonaro (2019-current), clearly demonstrate that BFP is characterized by change, highly occasioned by domestic factors. Brazilian Foreign Policy under Bolsonaro went through a change probably not seen since the military coup of 1964, the Government Castelo Branco, which also represented an inflection after a great expansive Foreign Policy towards Southern relations (LIMA, 2018).

For Guimarães and Farias (2021), Bolsonaro's foreign policy rejects the elements of the International Liberal Order that have been central to BFP throughout its history, mainly: *multilateralism*, *multiculturalism*, and *regionalism*. Those elements were replaced by new ones, as Bolsonaro mobilizes the construction of a new Brazilian self-image, composed by: *anti-globalism* (as possible synonym for *anti-Communism*) and *religious nationalism*. According to them:

“Religious nationalism speaks to the administration’s purported national aspirations, loosely drawn on what they believe is the ‘real’ people. Anti-Communism is a reference extracted from an idealisation of Brazil’s civilian-military dictatorship that came to power through a coup d’état in 1964. During the presidential campaign, Bolsonaro shrewdly tapped Brazil’s post-war generation’s anti-Workers’ Party sentiments by equating it to Cold War communism. Finally, anti-globalism, a novel concept in Brazil’s political lexicon, was imported directly from Trump’s foreign policy narrative— and, subsidiarily, from other populist radical right leaders, such as Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu or Hungary’s Viktor Orban [...]. They see globalism as a master conspiracy theory through which financial capitalists collude with left-wing parties, media, universities, and international bureaucrats to control the world. Their ultimate goal is to acculturate societies, undermining traditional values of family, nation, and God through the widespread imposition of progressive and cosmopolitan worldviews. In the own words of (former) Foreign Minister Araújo, ‘globalism is the economic globalisation that became driven by Cultural Marxism. It is essentially an anti-human and anti-Christian system. Today, to have faith in Christ means fighting against globalism, hose main goal is to break the bond between God and man, making man a slave and God irrelevant’ (Araújo 2018)” (GUIMARÃES; FARIAS, p. 11-12).

Therefore, Araújo argues for the need to ‘liberate’ Brazilian foreign policy from the hands of the Left, and that it is good to be a pariah in a world dominated by cultural Marxism (GUIMARÃES; FARIAS, p. 17). Araújo presents offensive declarations against the Chinese, Brazil’s largest economic partner, as well as the Arab countries, as Bolsonaro was elected promising his evangelical electorate he would transfer Brazil’s embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (contradicting Brazil’s historical position on the matter). Those have been observed as ‘ideological’ moves from Bolsonaro’s government, as they go against Brazil’s economic interests (SARAIVA, 2020) Here, Saraiva (2020) seems to rely upon the master signifier *pragmatism* to construct her analysis.

It is very interesting, nonetheless, how the master signifiers of Brazilian biographical narratives according to BFPA as a field still appear as relevant to official Foreign Policy discourses under Bolsonaro, even if what is at stake is the denial of one

of them, it still mean that they are a reference. In this regard, Ernesto Araújo, while speaking at the UNSC, called on countries to stop using the word *multilateralism*:

“I think we should avoid the word ‘multilateralism’ to talk about international or multilateral institutions. Words ending in ‘ism’ normally designate ideologies: Fascism, Nazism and Communism. Let’s not make ‘multilateralism’ an ideology’ (ARAÚJO, 2020 apud GUIMARÃES; FARIAS, 2021, p. 14).

Finally, it is also interesting how some of the master signifiers of BFPA found in the literature are also mobilized by Guimarães and Farias (2021) methodology to analyze change under Bolsonaro. The authors rely upon *multilateralism*, *regionalism*, *multiculturalism* (this one probably in chains with *miscegenation*). Though we do not go for the exact same signifiers in our approaches, chapter 5 of this thesis has presented how *multilateralism* and *regionalism*, for example, have not been interpreted as end in themselves, but as a result of *pragmatic* calculations, therefore as means to achieve *development* and *autonomy*.

7.4. Bolsonaro and the dismantling of the anti-racist agenda

The anti-racist agenda, one of the core elements of Lula da Silva’s identity discourses, is considered “a menace for right-wing conservative politicians” (MESQUITA, 2021, p. 66). It is currently “threatened with prompt dismantling by the Bolsonaro government. [...] [As i]t has become clear that Brazil is going through a setback with a view to the reconstruction of society” (MESQUITA, 2021, p. 66). In this sense, “the right-wing negates the racial inequality problem” and seeks a “homogeneous, colorblind society with no identity politics, nor a minorities-framed anti-racist system (MESQUITA, 2021, p. 66).

In contrast to previous leaders, Bolsonaro’s election has shocked analysts also because the current president has long presented racist discourses. According to Alfonso:

“In a speech he delivered in 2017 in Rio de Janeiro, he attacked members of Brazil’s Black *Quilombola* (maroon community), when he stated that ‘The lightest African-Brazilians there [in the Quilombo community] weighed no more than seven *arrobas*’ (unit of measurement used for livestock, similar to one bushel). As president, he claimed that the armed forces ‘had not killed anyone’, in reference to the killing of a Black man, shot by more than eighty bullets in Rio de Janeiro. Weeks later, in a nation-wide television interview, he said that he had ‘already had enough of this talk of racism’. [...] ‘The Indians do not speak our language, they do not have money, they do not have culture [...] How did they manage to get 13 per cent of the national territory?’ ‘you can be sure that if I get there . . . There will not be a centimetre demarcated for indigenous reservations or quilombolas.’ ‘If I’m elected, I’ll serve a blow to FUNAI [Brazil’s department for indigenous affairs]; a blow to the neck. There’s no other way. It’s not useful anymore.” (ALFONSO, 2019, p.2)

Later, Alfonso (2019) presents more details on the outraging lines of Bolsonaro:

“In April 2017, during a speech held in an elite club in São Paulo, Bolsonaro attacked Brazil’s *Quilombolas* [...] In his words: ‘Has anyone seen the Japanese begging? Because they are a dignified race. They are not like that race at the bottom or those ruminating minorities.’ He continued [...] They do nothing! I think they’re not even fit for procreation anymore.” (ALFONSO, 2019, p.11).

On the murder of Evaldo Rosa, with 80 (eighty) rifle shots from the armed forces in the city of Rio de Janeiro, in front of his family on April 7th, 2018, Bolsonaro declared: “The army did not kill anyone. The army belongs to the people. We cannot accuse the people of murder. There was an incident. There was a casualty. We lament that the victim was an honest, working citizen.” (BOLSONARO, 2018 apud ALFONSO, 2019, p. 12) One month later, the then-candidate affirmed that racism is a “rare thing” in Brazil, arguing that this kind of narrative was dividing Brazil: “All the time pitting Black against white, homosexual against heterosexual, father against son. [...] I have had enough of this.” (BOLSONARO, 2018 apud ALFONSO, 2019, p.12)

Beyond President Bolsonaro, in 2018 Brazil elected the most conservative Congress in 40 years⁵⁴, this allowed for a new coalition among the Legislative, the Executive, and military leaders focused on dismantling the anti-racist agenda. The federal budget was deeply reduced, compromising the transversality and de-institutionalizing many national policies of anti-racism and racial equality, such as the Youth Homicide-Combating National Plan, Sinapir, and Brazil *Quilombola*. Seppir was “practically deactivated after the secretariat was relegated to a [powerless office at] Ministry of Human Rights”, the SNPIR, while “black movement agents and other civil participants [were removed] from Cnpir.” (MESQUITA, 2021, p.68) Overall, Bolsonaro’s government has been extinguishing social participatory mechanisms, one of the pillars of democracy of our times (LAVALLE; BEZERRA, 2021 apud MESQUITA, 2021, p. 68).

In the recent past, Brazil has been an important international player in the anti-racist agenda, defending the International Decade for People of African Descent (2015-2024) at the UN, supposed to “reinforce black people’s citizenship rights within the African diaspora” (MESQUITA, 2021, p. 67). However, Bolsonaro’s government has gone for the opposite:

“The assumed ‘absence of racism in Brazil’ argument is cogent for the president’s allies, be they black or white, inside or outside the government and the wider political system. [...] As a result, the Palmares Cultural Foundation’s Afro-Brazilian culture-preserving mission has been distorted, and the institution is now almost shattered; Seppir has been weakened so that its action could be kept paralyzed, and the institution is stuck in this meaninglessness until today; and long-established racism-fighting ministries, such as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Human Rights, are being run by racially unreasonable authorities. Broadly speaking, Bolsonaro attempts to dismantle what has been built to widen the anti-racist agenda since the 1988 Constitution. Hollow institutions are at the forefront of nothing when it comes to achieving racial equality” (MESQUITA, 2021, p. 67).

⁵⁴ Available at: <https://diplomatie.org.br/o-congresso-mais-conservador-dos-ultimos-quarenta-anos/>. Accessed in: 20 january 2021.

Bolsonaro's ally, the Federal Deputy Hélio Lopes (known as Hélio Negão for his dark black skin) has published, on November 21st, 2019, the day after the Black Consciousness (Zumbi dos Palmares) day an Op. Ed. entitled "Our Color is Brazil", in the Brazilian newspaper Folha de S. Paulo⁵⁵. He argues that social quotas should replace racial quotas, as those are anti-national and absurd. Commenting on the article, Mesquita (2021, p. 67) argues that "Brazilian society is facing a democratic crisis related to the government denial of racism, among further causes".

The Palmares Foundation, currently directed by Sergio Camargo, has also been actively disputing the black movement memories and histories in Brazil, publishing opinion articles on the foundation's website arguing that Zumbi dos Palmares would be a made-up myth by Marxist, leftist, and communist leaders (MESQUITA, 2021, p. 69). Then, Bolsonaro and his allies mobilize an imaginary that combines 'miscegenation' and scapegoating against the anti-racist agenda. During the Black Consciousness (Zumbi dos Palmares) Day in Brazil 2020, Bolsonaro posted on Twitter:

"Brazil has a diverse culture, unique among nations. We are miscegenated people. Whites, blacks, browns, and Indians make up the body and spirit of a rich and wonderful people. In a single Brazilian family, we can contemplate a greater diversity than in entire countries. The essence of the Brazilian people has won the world's sympathy. Yet there are those who want to destroy it by putting conflict, resentment, hatred, and class divisions in its place. Those are always masked with 'fighting for equality' or 'social justice' mottos, all in search of power" (BOLSONARO, 2020 apud MESQUITA, 2021 p.71-72).

Therefore, the dismantling of the racial agenda, a central element of Lula da Silva's image and legacy, has been put into motion during Bolsoraro's government. Nevertheless, in my view, Bolsonaro does not necessarily have to be understood as an exceptional case. One possible explanation could be that he merely unveils all the

⁵⁵ Available at: <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/opiniaio/2019/11/nossa-cor-e-o-brasil.shtml>. Accessed in: November 20th 2021.

violence and hatred long hidden in the narratives of racial democracy (GONZALEZ, 1988; NASCIMENTO, 2016; MUNANGA, 2019).

7.5. Conclusion: Is Bolsonaro's election a reaction?

Though it requires greater empirical analysis, Bolsonaro's election seems to indicate, from the initial results of my study, a strong need for reframing Brazilian biographical narratives and everything they include: master signifiers, chains of significance, phantasies of identity and ontological security, significant and hated others, mirror images, understandings of past, present, and future. Whether the PT periods represented a (traumatic) encounter with the *Real* racist, colonial, violent foundations of Brazilian (symbolic) identity narratives of *pacifism*, *miscegenation/racial democracy*, *autonomy* and *development* is yet unclear. Yet, it appears to me that this extreme 're-ordering' and search for stability that the election of a chauvinistic, masculinist, authoritarian figure, relying upon narratives of religious nationalism and far-right Christianity (CASARÕES; FARIAS, 2021) can be a reaction towards something.

An initial comparison between Lula and Bolsonaro shows the populist character of their discourses as their greater similarity, as well as their greater political strength (in terms of the ability of mobilizing audiences). However they represent different positions in the political spectrum, surveys have shown that they talk to very similar audiences and directly dispute electors. It seems odd that the literature on BFPA over Lula has not systematically analyzed its populist character, while it is happening with Bolsonaro (e.g. CASARÕES; FARIAS, 2021). As I understand it, the field of BFPA cannot take 'irrationality', passions, emotions, affections or attachments seriously only when they are considered negative or dangerous to democratic institutions. As I see it, also by following a growing relevant field of analysts (e.g. SOLOMON, 2015; MOUFFE, 2015; SUBOTIC, 2016; KINNVALL, 2017; VIEIRA, 2018; SANDRIN, 2021, etc.), they should always be considered in the analysis.

Some central elements of inflection in Bolsonaro, in comparison to Lula, indicate that those moments could be directly related. First, the mobilization of the anti-PTism sentiment, also taking PT as a synonym for a communist party, as a scapegoat mechanism for the election process of Bolsonaro.

Second, the strong political instability (since Dilma's 2014 elections and her impeachment in 2016), polarization and judicialization of the elections, which culminated in the imprisonment of Lula da Silva to render him ineligible when he had the greater vote intentions. This perception is also reinforced when taking into consideration that Lula's ineligibility decision that has been recently revised due to indication of partialities in the process.

Third, a strong change in BFP lines towards an almost automatic alignment with the United States under Donald Trump, openly criticizing China (Brazil's main economic partner), it became an international pariah (CASARÕES; FARIAS, 2021). Moving away from South-South relations (Lula's main foreign policy footprint), Bolsonaro and his previous chancellor, Ernesto Araújo, even presented an aligning with Israel, acting against Brazilian commercial interests with Arabic states, a great destination of Brazilian meat exports (SARAIVA, 2020). The automatic or 'ideologic' (SARAIVA, 2020) alignment with Bolsonaro becomes even more interesting if one takes into consideration symptomatic scene starred by Bolsonaro, whispering to Trump that he *loved him* while receiving a 'it's nice to see you again' as reply⁵⁶.

Finally, if Lula da Silva's greater Foreign Policy footprint was the increased priority of South-South relations (also with a protagonist role of the fight against *hunger* agenda), domestically Lula has been known, beyond income distribution policies such as *Bolsa Família*, for the increasing of the anti-racist agenda. Henceforth, the dismantling of the racial policies, a central element of Lula da Silva's legacy in terms of foreign policy discourses (CAMPBELL, 1992) seems also to be a reaction

⁵⁶ Available at: < <https://istoe.com.br/bolsonaro-diz-i-love-you-para-trump-que-desdenha-bom-te-ver-de-novo/>>. Accessed in December 15, 2021.

against Lula da Silva's agendas. This is so especially considering the deep connection of the domestic antiracist agenda with the official Foreign Policy identity discourses of Brazil as a black country, having Africa as a significant other. However, as it has been mentioned, to my perception, Bolsonaro does not seem to be an exceptional case, but the rule. His election seems to represent a long enduring order of violence and hatred based in a whitening imaginary, which has been concealed by narratives of *racial democracy* and *miscegenation* (GONZALEZ, 1988; NASCIMENTO, 2016; MUNANGA, 2019).

Henceforth, though it will require larger investigation, while Lula and Bolsonaro are similar in their populist discourses, as well as in their reliance over the signifier *miscegenation*, Lula seems to mobilize it in a different way given its relation to democracy. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, though in an ambiguous way, Lula seems to have broken the *racial democracy* signifier into two different signifiers: *democracy* and *racial equality*, having the later as a condition for the former. On the other hand, Bolsonaro seems to mobilize the signifiers *miscegenation* and *racial equality* in their older chain of significance, which relied more heavily in the whitening imaginary.

Therefore, Bolsonaro's chain of significance for *miscegenation* looks close to: *Miscegenation – Racial democracy – Whitening/performing Whiteness – USA as ideal of the ego - Development*. Considering Lula's chains of significance which I have previously proposed: 1) *racial equality - democracy - development (fight against hunger and poverty)*; and 2) *developing country - interdependence - pragmatism - diversification of partnerships - international activism - multilateralism - autonomy*. They mobilize very different meanings for similar signifiers and a great amount of this change is made visible also through the significant others and the ego ideal(s) present in the narrative.

To conclude, some relevant elements that I have overlooked in this initial analysis should be taken into consideration for a better understanding of Brazilian biographical narratives under Bolsonaro. The first are the greater narratives, discursive chains, *field of discursivity* and the *hegemonic narratives* of the military, which is a

great amount of Bolsonaro's government base and provides part of the ground for his rhetoric and for the collective imaginary that considers him an adequate leader. The other are those same elements (discursive chains, *field of discursivity* and the *hegemonic narratives*) for the emerging conservative Christianity, one of his major societal bases. Related to this, there is also another dimension highly overlooked in this thesis, which is the gender, patriarchal, and masculinist dynamics of Brazilian society.

Thus, in this chapter I presented an initial and partial approach over the contemporary moment, exploring some of the possibilities given by my methodology and previous findings on Lula. I have considered Bolsonaro's election and discursive constructions to be a possible reaction over a greater discomfort (or even traumatic moment) of the past. This (possible) trauma/discomfort, could have been triggered by Lula da Silva, but might also have much deeper roots, which are probably colonial (racist, patriarchal), and libidinal.

8. Conclusion

‘We’ also do foreign policy: The ‘international’ is here, and it is discursive, libidinal, and colonial

Overall, this thesis has considered the role of foreign policy (CAMPBELL, 1992) narratives in constructing national biographies, in portraying who is the Brazilian people, which will be protected and have their civil rights guaranteed; and who is the other that shall be excluded, incarcerated, left to die or killed (MBEMBE, 2019; NASCIMENTO, 2016). The existence of an ‘other’ allows for the construction of a fantasy that the country might, someday, arrive to the future, to guarantee that the country arrives to the future (SANTOS; GOMES; FERNÁNDEZ, 2019; PAULA, 2019), fulfilling its promise of *autonomy*, *development* and *greatness*. BFPA analysts are part of this narrative mechanism and, thus, have a relevant role in (re)producing identities, knowledge and truth. Official Foreign Policy, then, is informed and constrained by those narratives, while has the power to influence them back.

If all subjects and identities are narratively enacted through subject positions, they are all ontologically insecure. What makes those identities and positions of subjectivity endure is our attachments towards them in the dynamics of desire (inherent lack) and search for wholeness/enjoyment/*jouissance* in the very symbolic order.

Thus, by looking specifically from the BFPA literature, I have found some master signifiers and chains of significance around which Brazilian biographical narratives circulate (in our collective search for *jouissance*, stability, security). I have found that their emergence is always entangled with a specific social, historical context, but it was to its narrative enactment (not their real meaning) that I wanted to look at. Their origin is still deeply related to the diplomatic narratives and, if on the one hand show the need for a more critical engagement with those, they also present a very low engagement with theoretical discussions/presuppositions, including the methodological,

epistemological and ontological impacts of their tacit beliefs. This shows, as well, a mismatch with FPA as a broader field, which has become quite theory-oriented. Though very frequently including terms such as ideas, identities, social construction, etc, in their studies, the field seems to still approach those in a loose and imprecise way.

Those master signifiers such as *pragmatism*, *autonomy* and *development* are repeatedly found in the BFPA analytical constructions and it is usually against them that the analysts assess change and continuity. The advance in the field towards discussions of the domestic/bureaucratic determinants of foreign policy are a very important contribution to break with this greater pattern (e.g. CASON; POWER, 2009; PINHEIRO; MILANI, 2013; RAMANZINI JÚNIOR; FARIAS, 2016). Nonetheless, I believe the field has space for an even greater expansion, one that takes seriously the discursive, libidinal and colonial dimensions of foreign policy.

Therefore, I have argued that the way the field of BFPA has been assessing change and continuity needs to be restructured. In this context, also instigated by the recent developments in Brazilian politics, as the previous chapter briefly discusses, I looked at how BFPA analysts have been interpreting Lula da Silva's (2003-2010) foreign policy. Though there was no consensus on whether it represented structural change, a paradox of 'change in continuity', or continuity (SARAIVA, 2020), it seemed clear to me that what the majority of analysts were trying to understand, explain, or frame was Lula's closer look to Southern countries, mostly to black African, but also South American countries.

Taking into account psychoanalytical approaches to FPA, as well as Brazilian Social Thought contributions, inspired by Vieira's (2018) discussion, I wondered if this deeper look to Southern countries could have represented/been interpreted as a change in Brazil's mirror images. Brazil's mirror images, both the ego (its self-image) and the ideal of the ego (what it wants to be) could have been changed under Lula da Silva's foreign policy discourses? Though I cannot answer that question because my review on discourses during Lula's government was not extensive, what I have observed was that there might be no simple answer to that. Brazilian identity discourses under Lula

were as ambiguous as they could be. While the country has been narrated as a black country, the narratives as the European countries as the cradle of civilization (thus the ego ideal) were still present. As I see it, both the erasing imaginaries of *miscegenation/racial* democracy as well as the disputing narrative of Brazil as a bi-racial nation were there, varying also according to the audience.

This ‘variation of foreign policy discourse according to the audience’ could take me to a rationalist/*pragmatism* interpretation, but I prefer to understand political realities as permeated by passions and as mobilizing passions in the audiences (MOUFFE, 2015). Therefore, I did not intend to answer what was the *real* intention of a discourse or even the *real* elements of Brazilian identity, but the effects of discourses?

By contrasting the hegemonic biographical narratives of BFPA, through their master signifiers and their positions in chains of significance, with Lula’s Foreign Policy discourses, I had some interesting findings. Lula da Silva’s Foreign Policy strong reliance on the *miscegenation* or even *racial democracy* imaginaries were a surprise to me. However, taking the racial dimension of Brazilian identity narratives, there was a noticeable difference in the inclusion of the signifiers *racial equality* in the chains of significance with *democracy*.

Therefore, the previous frequent signifier of *racial democracy* has been broken into two, *racial equality* and *democracy*. They were placed, as well, in relation to *fight against hunger and poverty*, which was an innovative BFP agenda under Lula da Silva, mainly regarding the centrality those topics had in Brazilian speeches. The new chain of significance under Lula concerning *racial equality* was, then: *racial equality - democracy - development (fight against hunger and poverty)*. Under Lula, this replaced the old one: *European workforce - miscegenation - racial democracy - development*.

The signifier *democracy* was also highly mobilized in another sense, mostly when concerning the ‘international’ arena. In speeches directed to ‘international’ audiences, the signifier *democracy* has been applied in significance chains with *multilateralism*. So, if ‘domestically’ *democracy* has been mobilized alongside *racial equality* and *fight against hunger and poverty*, ‘internationally’, it was directed to a

rhetoric of reform (democratization) of international institutions. Therefore, in a different take from the previous periods, the term *neoliberalism* is left out of both the chains of significance under Lula da Silva's foreign policy, even though the macroeconomic guidelines of his government were still neoliberal.

Another relevant dislocation of signifiers concerns *autonomy*. Under Lula, *autonomy* was applied to justify Brazil's higher engagement as a leader (e.g. in MINUSTAH; taking a conciliatory role in South America, or seeking a permanent seat at the UNSC), often argued as *non-indifference* or as a *solidary* position (AMORIM, 2010). In this context, the approach of *autonomy* as *non-indifference* under Lula substitutes the traditional understandings of *self-determination* that has been part of BFP rhetoric in the past. In contrast, Brazil discursively places its search for being a provider of international public goods as something *pragmatic* and justifiable by mobilizing the signifiers *interdependence* and *developing country*. Therefore, Brazil becomes the more *autonomous* the more it participates in the international agenda setting processes and the *multilateral* arenas. Hence, the new chain of significance of the signifier *autonomy* can be described as: *developing country* - *interdependence* - *pragmatism* - *diversification of partnerships* - *international activism* - *multilateralism* - *autonomy*.

An interesting analytical conclusion my methodology allows me to make is that all the previous signifiers that have presented some level of dislocation under Lula, noteworthy, *democracy*, *autonomy*, *racial democracy*, and *development* had already the new discursive possibilities available at the *field of contextual possibilities* due to previous historical and societal processes.

The same was not found for the signifier *miscegenation*, in which there seems not to have been any relevant or structural disruption (mainly considering its whitening imaginary). I believe that, also due to this, the consolidation of policies and a Foreign Policy that recognizes the Black Africa as a *significant other* still faced resistance at what I have called the *field of contextual possibilities*. As it was not there yet, and given the traumatic *Real* dimension of racism, narrating Brazil as a black country seemed still to be unacceptable, as well as admitting the racist foundations and realities of the

Brazilian state. However, the desire towards blackness and black Africa is there, even though it cannot be properly spoken about (GONZALEZ, 1988), as this, due to its traumatic dimension, (possibly) creates some narrative slips, sometimes it is there, sometimes it is not, sometimes it is just the opposite.

Though there was not a visible dislocation of the chains of significance of *miscegenation*, it seems to me that the BFP discourses (in its both dimensions of official discourses and ‘domestic’ identity narratives) during Lula da Silva *brought the desire towards Africa to the field of contextual narratives*. Hence, if it was not possible yet to break with the white European ego ideal, it (possibly) opens the possibility for it in the future.

In general, also inspired by Gomes (2014), I would say that I have tried to disrupt the very mainstream perception of what foreign policy (in general sense) means to BFPA studies. I hope I could, at least from an initial effort, demonstrate Campbell’s (1992) mechanism in practice, applied to BFP. I understand that this other (not so new) understanding of what foreign policy is - essentially discursive, not connecting a well-defined ‘inside’ to a well-defined ‘outside’, but constructing the very frontier of what is ‘domestic’ and what is ‘international’ - allows for very relevant studies. This approach takes as active part of foreign policy the elements that are part of regular people daily lives, such as social media, pop culture, journalism, and other elements of the micropolitical (in Foucault’s terms). This allows for a closer understanding of foreign policy and how our daily lives also inform and are informed by that appearing ‘far-away’ international, the official Foreign Policy, which is also right here, in every discourse we (re)produce.

We, Brazilian Foreign Policy analysts, also do foreign policy.

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