Gustavo Alvim de Góes Bezerra

A SEA OF SILENCES

International Relations and the Politics of Slavery in 19[th]Century Atlantic

Thesis presented to the Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais of PUC-Rio in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doutor em Relações Internacionais.

Advisor: Prof. Roberto Vilchez Yamato

Co-advisor: Prof. James Matthew Davies

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Bibliographical data

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> *Todas as cartas de amor são*
> *Ridículas.*
> *Não seriam cartas de amor se não fossem*
> *Ridículas.*
>
> *Também escrevi, no meu tempo, cartas de amor,*
> *Como as outras,*
> *Ridículas.*
>
> *As cartas de amor, se há amor,*
> *Têm de ser*
> *Ridículas.*
>
> *Mas, afinal,*
> *Só as criaturas que nunca escreveram*
> *Cartas de amor*
> *É que são*
> *Ridículas.*
> *(…)*
>
> *Fernando Pessoa, 1944*

Vocês todes são ridícules. Obrigado por serem-no.

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Abstract

Bezerra, Gustavo Alvim de Góes; Yamato, Roberto Vilchez (Advisor); Davies, James Mathew (Co-Advisor). A Sea of Silences: International relations and the politics of slavery in 19th Century Atlantic. Rio de Janeiro, 2022. 360p. PhD Thesis – Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

This thesis proposes an engagement with International Relations from the perspective of 19th Century Atlantic slavery by looking to Brazilian and US archives that date from the 1800s. The argument developed in the following pages is centered on the possibility of articulating forms of belonging not defined in spatial terms. Developing a political thought premised on 19th Century Atlantic Slavery is a way of focusing on the political phenomenon without conditioning it to the state spaciality. This emphasis on the politics, instead of on the spatiality, allows for considering new ways of belonging and new approaches to the delimitation of space. In this thesis I develop them by proposing a debate on the concept of Empire. In characterizing Slavery as an Atlantic Empire, the role of States goes from being the creating force of slavery to managerial bureaucratic entrepots within a dimension of politics that encompasses difference instead of denying it. The argument is built along 6 chapters (the first being the Introduction). Chapter 2 presents the insufficiency of IR as a discipline, profoundly dependent on the abstract idea of citizenship, to account for slavery. This violent labour exploitation system is disciplinarily incomprehensible either as a project – of keeping the different within the borders – or in the possibility of accounting for the enslaved population itself. This challenge to the disciplinary theoretical framework is the foundation upon which, from the third chapter onwards, the conceptual argument builds through the reading of historiography and archives on slavery. In chapter 3, I address the bibliographies of slavery that deal with enslaved people as labour and the bibliography that characterizes them in their social lives in order to build a more accurate portrait of these people. Chapter 4 focuses on the other cohort of people: the citizens. White men from the US and from Brazil actively maintained slavery and its articulation in their imaginaries of the Atlantic. Chapter 5 addresses the antinomies of Liberalism by considering how it was dependent on slavery at the same time that it operated to make slavery invisible through the lenses with which it reads the 19th Century. In chapter 6, I fully articulate

the concept of Empire as a way of interpreting a political dimension that stands above States – without denying them – and whose politics directly impacts on the lives of citizens and non-citizens encompassed within its domains.

Keywords

Slavery; 19th Century; Atlantic; Empire; Liberalism

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Resumo

Bezerra, Gustavo Alvim de Góes; Yamato, Roberto Vilchez (Orientador); Davies, James Mathew (Co-orientador). Um Mar de Silêncios: Relações Internacionais e a política da escravidão no Atlântico do Século XIX. Rio de Janeiro, 2022. 360p. Tese de Doutorado – Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

Essa tese propõe um engajamento com as Relações Internacionais pela perspectiva da escravidão atlântica do século XIX ao analisar arquivos brasileiros e estadunidenses daquele centênio. O argumento desenvolvido nas próximas páginas é centrado na possibilidade de articular formas de pertencimento que não sejam definidas em termos espaciais. O desenvolvimento de um pensamento político que tenha como premissa a escravidão atlântica do século XIX é uma forma de focar no fenômeno político sem condicioná-lo ao espaço estatal. Essa ênfase na política, ao invés de na espacialidade, permite considerar outras formas de pertencimento para além de cidadania, consequentemente, a delimitação de espaço não como ponto de partida, mas como consequência. Nesta tese, eu desenvolvo essas formas de pertencimento e essa forma de espacialidade por meio de uma discussão sobre o conceito de Império.Ao perceber a escravidão como um Império atlântico, o papel dos Estados deixa de ser a força criadora desse fenômeno social e passa a ser o de administrador burocrático de uma dimensão política que inclui a diferença ao invés de negá-la. O argumento da tese é construído ao longo de seis capítulos (o primeiro sendo a Introdução). O capítulo 2 apresenta a insuficiência conceitual da disciplina, dependente da ideia abstrata de cidadania, para dar conta da escravidão. Esse sistema violento de exploração do trabalho é disciplinarmente incompreensível, seja como um projeto – de manter a diferença dentro das fronteiras – seja como lente para fazer sentido da população escravizada propriamente. Esse desafio para o arcabouço teórico disciplinar é a fundação na qual, a partir do terceiro capítulo, o argumento conceitual é construído pela leitura historiográfica e de arquivos sobre a escravidão. No capítulo 3 eu abordo as bibliografias sobre escravidão que lidam com as pessoas escravizadas como trabalho e a que caracteriza escravidão pela sua vida social de forma a construir um retrato mais preciso dessas pessoas. No capítulo 4, o foco é direcionado para o outro grupo de pessoas: os cidadãos. Homens brancos dos EUA e do Brasil que ativamente

mantiveram a escravidão e suas articulações nos seus imaginários do Atlântico. O capítulo 5 aborda as antinomias do liberalismo ao considerar como ele foi dependente da escravidão ao mesmo tempo em que invisibilizou a escravidão pelas lentes que usa para ler o século XIX. No capítulo 6 eu desenvolvo por completo o conceito de Império como uma forma de interpretar uma dimensão política que está sobre os Estados – sem os negar – e cuja política impacta diretamente na vida dos cidadãos e não-cidadãos incorporados nos seus domínios.

Palavras-Chave

Escravidão; Século XIX; Atlântico; Império; Liberalismo.

Table of Contents

Un hombre de las viñas habló, en agonia, al oído de Marcela antes de morrir, le reveló su secreto:

- *La uva* – le susurró - *está hecha de vino.*

Marcela Pérez-Silva me lo contó, y yo pensé: Si la uva está hecha de vino, quizá nosotros somos las palabras que cuentan lo que somos.

Eduardo Galeano (2007)

(…)

Me lo contó: él era un niño desesperado que quería salvar a su padre de la condenación eterna y el muy ateo, el muy tozudo, no entendía razones.

-Pero papá – *le dijo Josep, llorando –. Si Dios no existe, quién hizo el mundo?*

-*Tonto* – dijo el obrero cabizbajo, casi en secreto –. *Tonto. Al mundo lo hicimos nosotros, los albañiles.*

Eduardo Galeano (2007)

Que noite mais funda Kalunga
No porão de um navio negreiro
Que viagem mais longa candonga
Ouvindo o batuque das ondas
Compasso de um coração de pássaro
No fundo do cativeiro
É o semba do mundo Kalunga
Batendo samba em meu peito
Kawo Kabiecile Kawo
Okê arô okê

Quem me pariu foi o ventre de um navio
Quem me ouviu foi o vento no vazio
Do ventre escuro de um porão
Vou baixar no seu terreiro

Capinam & Roberto Mendes, 2015

1.
Introduction

1.1.
The Words

There is no plural for the word violence in English. Thus, the expression *As violências da escravidão* is translated to English as "slavery violence". It took me a long time, from the moment I began writing this thesis, to stop writing "violences". Each time Microsoft Word would indicate a mistake, I reacted with a mix of surprises. Some of them stemmed from the disbelief that I had it wrong – again, and some out of a doubt on the potential of it to express the multiplicity I was aiming at without the "s". At some point I stopped putting the "s", but I still have not fully got over the doubt. Every time I write it, my thoughts go: "Seriously? No 's' in 'violence?'"

In this thesis, the missing "s" in violence is going to be noticed time and time again since this is a thesis on slavery, and there is an inherent difficulty to relate to slavery as labor and as marginalization in the same narrative. In other words, this means there is always a silence engraved in slavery narratives. The movement of bringing slavery to a discussion taking place within International Relations – IR – aims at facing both silences – the disciplinary one and the difficulty to articulate these two folded characters of marginalization, which are enabled by this structure. The way to approach slavery must encompass its meaning as labor exploitation just as much as the dynamics of identity building that is inscribed in it – at the risk of, violently, silencing an aspect of slavery. The relation of IR with slavery is in itself a violence, I argue. The disciplinary oblivion to the matter is constitutive of the discipline, even in Brazil which still considers the history of IR as the European history from the 19th Century onwards.

My search for the missing "s" led me to Reinhard Koselleck's understanding of concepts. He begins his "*Begriffsgeschichte* and Social History" with the following passage:

> According to a well-known saying of Epictetus, it is not deeds that shock humanity, but the words describing them. Apart from the Stoic point that one should not allow oneself to be disturbed by words, the contrast between 'pragmata' and 'dogmata' has

> aspects other than those indicated by Epictetus's moral dictum. It draws our attention to the autonomous power of words without the use of which human actions and passions could hardly be experienced, and certainly not made intelligible to others. (Koselleck, 1985, 73)

How does "the autonomous power of words" behave in cases such as the one of this thesis, in which the words have to be written in English while at the same time convey the meaning of the deeds and the meaning they have in Portuguese? The autonomy is delayed, thus, by the multiple processes of translation happening as this thesis is written from Rio de Janeiro, based on the Brazilian experiences with slavery as a point of departure.

But in addition to the issue of translation, Koselleck is also arguing about time. The representation of the deed through words is the possibility of it to shock those who were not present in the moment of the deed afterwards, at a latter time – or even, those who were present at the moment but that experienced it through other feelings, perhaps dread, fear, rage, or any other that orbits around the lexicon of violence (so many feelings around it, and yet, no "s"). Words – autonomously – would be able to convey shock after the moment. However, in this idea of time, we will need people using and discussing the words that could better account for the deeds in question. What would happen, timewise, if instead of discussing an issue, the words were there to promote silence? The deeds were done, they were experienced and left consequences – in people and in spaces – and yet, no one talks about them. Sure, there would be no shock, but would there be something else missing? Can we account for the consequences of silence?

This thesis will inhabit this space: that of translation efforts while discussing something that has been neglected in IR: Atlantic slavery in the 19th Century. The idea of translation here comes from Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000, 72-96) especifically from his realization that there is more to translation than to account for the correct word-choice in another idiom. Semantics relates the context in which a given word is used as well as the social meaning it conveys. Chakrabarty centers his analysis on the idea of labour and how enchanted – to stick to the Weberian term he employs – it still is, in contrast to the Western experience, which portrays the labor history in a narrative of disenchanting of society. Labor, in certain parts of India, he argues, not only is a

production process; it is also a social experience connected with the religious experience. To the extent that Chakrabarty is trying to offer an interpretation of labor departing from the Indian experience, instead of accepting the European version as the universalizable mode, I want to propose a widening of the IR discussion. To this end, I will depart from the 19th Century Brazilian experience, which entails labour and social marginalization.

Translation is an important issue concerning slavery. To some extent, the inhabited worlds of the enslaved person and the slaveholder are untranslatable to one another. This is not a result of missing words. There is something about the life experience which, due to being so far apart, seems untranslatable. This can be illustrated, for instance, in the following situations: a slaveholder, if attacked by a robber, could report such event and portray it as violent to someone enslaved? Or could someone enslaved, after not having worked for two or three days for whatever reason, come to experience boredom in the same way as a rich person would? There is more to the communication than solely the enunciation of the words, and precisely this impossibility of communication between these two sets of people constitutive of slavery is what I am referring here as the translation that is central to this thesis. So, if language is central to the idea of the nation-state (Anderson, 2006), the lack of communication between slaveholders and enslaved populations is central to the understanding of slavery as a political space of its own.

1.2.
Slavery: another Empire

It is important, nonetheless, to specify the point of departure to the understanding of slavery. For the purposes of this thesis, it will be defined as the concept of Atlantic Slavery, namely as:

> [A] concept used to make reference specially to two phenomena: the transport, to the Americas, of people kidnaped in Africa and their exploitation in the production of market goods and spaces in the American continent. Both dynamics are constitutive of the Atlantic, be it in the fluxes that put in contact spaces, be it through the labour that transforms the natural space and builds social spaces. Recognizing that the

transformation of the spaces had particularities in each region of the Americas in which enslaved labour was used, one can observe the economic sense of the employment of those people in forced labour was central to the development and transformation of capitalism and, to make sense of this transformation, it is important to observe the process in its intersections and in its historical development, less by the immediate geographical constrains of where it was enforced. (Bezerra, Yamato, Salgado, 2019, 426).[1]

The main point here is the effort to deal with slavery as a phenomenon framed by the Atlantic instead of understanding it as a set of concomitant phenomena taking place within different state borders across the Atlantic. The idea is not to deny the peculiarities of the experiences with slavery, rather to recognize that there is a uniting thread that articulates the Atlantic space. I take this approach from the concept of "Second Slavery" developed by Dale Tomich (Tomich, 2004) and to which I will come back and discuss at length in chapters 2 and 4. The central point in Tomich's argument is that 19th Century Atlantic Slavery had many specificities that distinguished it from previous experiences with slavery in other spaces and even in the Atlantic in the centuries previous to the 1800s, during which it was enforced by Europeans along those shores. What I aim to do in the next chapters is to build upon this tradition, but going forward from considering the Atlantic Slavery as a unity, I want to propose the Atlantic Slavery as capable of articulating its own understandings of belonging and space. This unity with its own understandings of belonging is to propose an understanding of slavery as an autonomous political dimension that exists above States. Such proposition is not a way of dismissing the States as the juridical institutions that made slavery legal, and, consequently, an inescapable part to the understanding of the phenomenon as a whole. Instead, it is to argue that there is more to slavery than the legal frameworks that constituted it. There is a racist view of the world inscribed in a system that enriched many and that helped to build, spatially, the Atlantic. This unity, constituting a sense of belonging and operating above States, is what led me to the second goal of this thesis – after discussing slavery and its constitutive role to the Atlantic – which is the conceptual discussion of Empire.

By considering slavery as this unity, in the next chapters I will address not only those who were victims of the violence(s?) of slavery, but also its perpetrators. There

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[1] Author's translation from Portuguese.

is a powerful divide between victims and perpetrators that is encapsulated by slavery, as it brings the constitutive divide that State-centrism taught as always being outside within it. By incorporating the division, the interaction with difference and the relevance of borders change their roles (in comparison to State-centrism). That way, the different becomes the constitutive feature of the unity while the borders become blurred and lose meaning. These two moves of incorporating the difference and of uncertainty regarding State-borders and its meanings to politics are core to the following pages and to the concept of Empire that I develop throughout the navigation of Atlantic slavery.

I believe that it is important to look closely to the notions of victims and perpetrators as the inhabitants of this Empire. To the extent that there is an absoluteness to these categories, it is undeniable that the experience of wealth in 19th Century Atlantic Empire of Slavery implied a connection with the enslavement of black people. This divide between two poles is not to imply that there is a continuum between the two by offering a path to liberty. By framing these poles as an Empire, I argue that there is no way of solving the contradiction that structurally distinguishes them. Each group had their own experience of what this Empire meant and yet, each group's experience was dependent upon the existence of the other group. The depth of this differentiation is analysed in every chapter following this introduction and is synthetized by the idea of silence itself: a differentiation so profound that the concepts held by the liberal-contractualist tradition are unable to make sense of at the other side of the continuum.

The recourse for engaging in the conceptual discussion of Empire follows the effort of offering centrality to the enslaved person in the political conceptualization of belonging. In reality, this is a way of challenging the necessity of framing slavery in liberal terms, a way of trying to fit this category in a State and, consequently, trying to understand the enslaved person as the antithesis of the citizen. The antithesis of the citizen is the other citizen who finds in another State his/her political identification. To the enslaved person one does not deny citizenship, one denies the recognition of humanity. The concept of Empire is helpful because it allows for an elaboration upon

the multiple hierarchies that it brings with it. In order to argue that even if one can advance towards having their humanity recognized, there are so many hierarchical objections that must be overcome that doing it becomes virtually impossible. This distance is the social manifestation of the impossibility of communication between slave-holders and enslaved people. The concept of Empire, other than that of the State, allows for dealing with difference in such a way that it does not aim at achieving homogeneity. And this is central to the larger conceptual contribution I aim to make by delivering this thesis: a way of politically treating the difference without having a project of incorporation, nor of elimination, of the different. A difference that is envisioned forever different and yet indispensable to the political, economic and social projects. Slavery as an Empire implies that there were projects gravitating around it. Political, economic, social projects and ideas of future relied in white citizens having access to the commodities of freedom and black people being denied their humanity.

The effort of building the concept of Empire departing from the premise of silence imposes a two-folded challenge, which consists, on the one hand, of the need to characterize the silence – literally out of nothing. Following this characterization, the second half of the challenge consists of proposing a concept able to encompass that which was characterized. The concept I have already anticipated, that of Empire. At this point, it is important to highlight that even thought I bring the concept of Empire based on the 19th Century Atlantic experience with slavery, I do not claim it to be the sole experience to be framed as such. The conceptual effort of discussing Empire is an effort of contributing to other forms of thinking politically, which are not constrained by State borders. To come out with such notion of Empire as I am proposing it to be, it is necessary to articulate different critical contributions to think politically and spatially. The first movement towards this political and spatial way of thinking comes from discussing how to account for the enslaved person through questioning Orlando Patterson's proposal that slavery is social death (1982). This critique drinks in Rancière's (1999) dichotomic reading of police/politics by arguing that enslaved people in the Atlantic are a part with no part to the extent that they have the political potency of disruption, thus making the thinking politically around slavery necessarily consider this potency, not present in the biopolitics tradition. This is a critique that I

put forward by questioning Achille Mbembe's concept of Necropolitics and its use as a metaphor for the absolute power of the State over people. Upon this discussion of belonging, I turn to Henri Lefebvre (1991) and Rob Walker (1993) to think spatiality in a way that would differ from the territorial trap as presented by Agnew and Corbridge (1995).

With this discussion, I build the concept of slavery as an Empire with no unity within it. The construction of difference and the ways in which it was enforced throughout this thesis will be gradually built through the chapters before arriving at the sixth chapter, in which the idea will be fully presented.

1.3.
International Relations

When I mentioned in the previous section that I needed to characterize the silence out of thin air, I was thinking in terms of the discipline. The next chapter is exclusively dedicated to it, but it is important to highlight that despite the dimensions of Atlantic Slavery, it does not occupy a disciplinarily space. This demands that other fields of knowledge and authors be mobilized to articulate an argument that is translated disciplinarily and, sometimes, from Portuguese to English. It is important to address this disciplinary silence since it not only is the point of departure of this thesis but also because it is a way to make sense of the debut of this introduction that takes into consideration concepts and translations and accounts for them.

It is nonetheless challenging to present the silence due to that which constitutes it: the absence of references to support the claim, leading to a somewhat tautological conundrum. Being aware of this extra layer of difficulty, I want to argue on the silence by way of two moves. The first is considering the discipline in its territorial approach to politics. State-centrism is only the clearest manifestation of a dynamics of understanding politics in terms that are constrained by borders so that the understanding of slavery in terms of borders loses sight of some of the violent dynamics that force my hand to put an "s" after the word violence. There was one spatiality in

which to haunt for someone and categorize him/her as slave was allowed. There were other spaces in which these people accounted as slaves had their labor striped from them and yet, there were spaces in which the people who benefited from other people's labour enjoyed the wealth accumulated and discussed liberty and freedom as foundations of the modern Western society. To follow this spatiality frame that is ordered in terms of States would require me to choose one of those spaces and consider how slavery molded it. In doing so, other spaces – and dynamics – of slavery – would remain silenced. By categorizing slavery as an Empire, I am emphasizing the phenomenon to be investigated while also establishing its geographic aspect as secondary, mainly because to be centered in one space is to accept that other violent dynamics integral to slavery would not be consider.

The second move that helps me argue on the disciplinary silence on slavery is a consequence of how Western IR is framed. Here, I am thinking in terms of Stanley Hoffman's argument portraying IR as an American Social Science (1977). This social science is interesting because it is composed of two strong traditions. One tradition framed the theoretical debate – at least since Morghentau's 1948 book, which discusses the US challenges during the Cold War. The other is the historical rationale operating in the background of this theorical approach that is, in turn, centered in the European historical experience. This tradition is not only in terms of mainstream historical approach – similar to Kissinger (1957, 1994), Keene (2000, 2014), or Watson (1992). By asking for a provincialization of Europe, Chakrabarty (2000) is advancing a critique towards European Marxist traditions as well as towards their way of reading labor as a non-religious process. That way, the North Atlantic works as a connector between the theoretical and the historical disciplinary traditions, and in this connection, the one which prevails is great-power politics, leaving little – if any – space for anything else. The different grounds on which IR narrative and slavery stand are representative of the silence that I want to address.

In order to make this argument less abstract, I propose that we consider, for a moment, the year of 1648. In 2001, Andreas Osiander published "Sovereignty, International Relations and the Westphalian Myth", in which he argued that the

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Westphalian Peace is not the origin point of the contemporaneous notion of sovereignty. Osiander's text defines 1648 as a myth constituted mainly during the 19th and 20th Centuries that served to legitimize of a certain form of State and politics that were consolidated in Europe. The academic institutionalization of History as a discipline throughout the 18th and 19th Centuries, according to the author, favored the consolidation of such myth. For Osiander, the key is not about questioning the Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück's, but the narrative that comes along with them, which argues that they would be where something new appears: the origin of International Relations.

The year of 1648 is also important in the South Atlantic. In Rio de Janeiro, a fleet commanded by Salvador de Sá e Benevides and armed by people from the region – the *Fluminenses* – left the port towards current Angola in order to expel the Dutch and re-establish the Portuguese dominium over that section of the African coast. At the same time, in São Paulo, Raposo Tavares began what would be the last expedition – *bandeira* – leaving São Paulo towards continental hinterland (reaching as far inwards as what is now Peruvian territory) in order to find indigenous populations that could be used as a source for enslaved labour in spaces dominated by the Portuguese colonial enterprise (Alencastro, 2000, 237). The success of the maritime expedition and the return of the Paulistas in 1651 with the conviction that the populations they found were not big enough to sustain the enslaved labour structure demanded by the Portuguese colony are two events that have impacted the Portuguese colonial enterprise in South America and in Africa. Both the reconquering and the knowledge developed on the size of the indigenous population enabled the project of space in which Brazil would be formed in the South Atlantic, at the cost of the destruction of the Angolan population (Alencastro, 2000, 325). The year of 1648 may be a myth on dealing with sovereignty, but it is no myth on the history of Atlantic Slavery, and as I argue in the fifth chapter, the importance of the 17th Century, to the 20th/21st Centuries reading of the 19th Century cannot be ignored. 1648 is central to this narrative centred in the Atlantic and the lives it moulded and took away.

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At this point, it is imperative for me to add a caveat to clarify what I am addressing in this thesis and how staggering Atlantic Slavery was. The project "Slave Voyages" estimates that more than 12,000,000 people were kidnapped from Africa and sold as enslaved in the Americas, or participated in more than 34,000 transatlantic voyages, between 1514 and 1868[2]. These estimates do not even account for the people who were born enslaved, whose records are scattered, if existing at all. The number of people and the centuries during which Atlantic Slavery lasted impose a degree of silence, one that answers to the staggering dimensions of the traffic and the absurdity of the violence committed against those people.

By taking the Brazilian experience with slavery as a point of departure, this dissertation is an effort to bring the discussion on slavery in the Atlantic in the 19th Century to the history of International Relations. It is curious to notice that just like in the mainstream European history of International Relations, which also begins in the 19th Century with Napoleonic wars, Atlantic slavery also finds this important reference point in 1648. The dispute for Angola demonstrates that the control over the enslaved trade in 1648 was already understood as a defining factor of the possibility of success in the colonial enterprise developed in the Americas. This dispute also shows the historical aspect of hierarchies and inequalities in IR. The hierarchization of spaces – the European space that invades, the American space that is produced as a result of the exploitation of the African space – and people – help to highlight the multi-layered complexity of the colonial process, in which many parts are moving concomitantly.

As a 17th Century event, the dispute over Angola, works as the condition of possibility to the Atlantic structuring in the following decades and centuries. It is as this condition of possibility that I bring 1648 to the introduction of this thesis, with the intention to face the Atlantic in an important moment of modernity: the second half of the 19th Century, a period of history that is not always considered as more than the European expansion over-seas interested in conquering space and augmenting capital (Hobsbawm: 1977, 1989, Joll, 1990). It is possible to say that this is a prolific century

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[2] "Slave Voyages" is a database that aims at consolidating spread information on slave voyages in a website in which this information can be accessed by anyone interested. The data is available at: https://www.slavevoyages.org/

in silencing histories of non-white people beginning elsewhere and un-accounting for that labour deployed to the production of the spaces. The path to address these silences is to propose this history of slavery which can offer some new insights on the events of the 1800s.

Within this context, what did it mean to be an enslaved person in 19th Century Atlantic? By asking this question, I am at the same time mobilizing the identity question directly articulated with labour and with the history of concepts. All of these elements are situated within the disciplinary constrains of IR. The challenge that it poses is on how to articulate these moving pieces at the same time. It is possible to map some developments with regard to identity in IR by focusing on refugees, migrants or indigeneity (see Rojas, 2014, 2018); yet the issue of enslavement is of a different sort. The way through which the spaces were produced in the US and in Brazil created a dependency on the enslaved person, a different relation than those relations that are fully marginalized or not even granted the right to enter the country. This tense and ambiguous relation of despise/necessity that is constantly articulated in the 19th Century is something that challenges the idea of the International in a way so that studies on refugees or on migrants are not helpful. These categories are attributed by States according to criteria of belonging. In that case, Slavery has a different rationale because the slave never actually belongs anywhere. Prior to the kidnapping in Africa, s/he was not a slave and, once enslaved, in the Americas s/he does not belong. S/he is necessary – the reason why s/he is brought against his/her will in the first place – but to say that s/he belongs would be inaccurate since here the enslaved person is not accounted as a holder of rights; rather as a property. Finally, in the state of not belonging, the slave cannot claim nationality in a space in which s/he cannot be or does not want to be. As I have argued, there is no space in which the slave can seem to belong; however, the category of slave occupies an undisputable presence in the history of the Atlantic. Thus, to centre a political interpretation in this category demands, then, an understanding of the reach of the potential of disruption that they bring with them, and as proved by the Haitian Revolution on the eve of 19th Century, that potential of disruption was Atlantic (James, 1989, Buck-Morss, 2009, Sá, 2019).

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The centrality of the enslaved person in this analysis challenges the idea of belonging as well as the category of space, as I have been arguing. However, one dimension of this challenge that I have not yet addressed is the fact that it offers centrality to a group of people completely marginalized within the States they inhabit. In other words, no enslaved person opted to be enslaved. Yet, slavery is central to the understanding of the Atlantic in the 19th Century. Hence the challenge here is: how to account for politics in those terms? This imposes the necessity of dealing with the group of people who operated slavery as a set of projects that cared little for borders. More than the enslaved populations, slavery also accounted for the slave-holders so that any analysis that would care to offer an interpretation of slavery without accounting for these perpetrators would be incomplete. This Empire, divided in the possibility of communication, likewise depended on an unsurmountable divide: the people around whom it was organized inhabited a structure developed to marginalize them.

To claim that the slave belongs to the international is not to deny that Brazil and the US inscribed slavery in their legislations; it is to claim a different grounding for these people, one that would have another relation with spatiality. It is from there that I elaborated the idea of Empire, because it was this loose articulation in the Atlantic that created the conditions of possibility for slavery to be legalized in the States in which it was legal. It is also by acknowledging that slavery is a condition different than nationality, a condition to which people were forced, not born with, that I prefer – as did Luiz Gama (Alonso, 2015) – to use the term enslaved. I believe that this is a subtle but sustained way of marking that enslavement was a constant action. One that was specifically aware during the 19th Century, the period central to this thesis.

It is particularly important to characterize slavery at this moment in time because this was also the moment in which liberalism was on the rise in the European discourse. This is why the concept of Second Slavery, developed by Dale Tomich (2004), is the point of departure to the conceptualization developed within these pages. His argument is not that it is possible to notice a change in the practices of enslavement in the 19th Century, but rather that the Atlantic context in which these practices were taking place demanded a distinction from the meaning held by the concept previously.

The transformation of labour relations in Europe, the strengthening of the idea of liberal man, and the Haitian Revolution created a new background to the concept of slavery that rose along with the 19th Century (Tomich, 2004). What Tomich brings to the fore is that the increased importance of slavery in the 19th Century's Atlantic context was accompanied by the consciousness of its violence. In the chapter that Tomich introduces this concept, he states:

> Indeed, the strength and effectiveness of anti-slavery thought and action contributed importantly to the nineteenth century's self-consciousness as a period of the growth of human freedom and moral and material progress. During this period, slavery came to be understood as the antithesis of the emergent forms of polity, moral sensibility, and economic activity: it formed the negative standard against which the new forms of freedom were defined (Tomich, 2004, 56).

Nonetheless, the number of people transported from Africa to the Americas in the 19th Century until 1875 (the last recorded year of entry, according to the Slave Voyages database) was of 3,873,579 people. There is a tension in this consciousness and in the numbers referring to the period which Tomich explores and that are important to this thesis. It is important to account for this tension given that it highlights the fact that slavery is not an issue only for those submitted to violence. It is also constitutive of those who actively participate in the enforcement and continuity of this practice if, for nothing else, at least as a consequence of this tension that he presents. Rafael Marquese and Tâmis Parron (2011), with regard to this notion, created the concept of "Proslavery International", which they developed within the umbrella of Second Slavery. Their goal was to denaturalize slavery as a given trait in Brazilian history in order to recognize that, to the same extent, there were efforts to abolish slavery. There was also a concerted political effort that succeeded in maintaining slavery, in spite of the liberal background under which it developed.

Thus, in order to account for slavery, it is necessary to account for what can be a less obvious, but important section of it: the active part of enslavement, the people who opted to hold enslaved people under their power. This poses a methodological challenge to this thesis which will be clearer once I present the chapters and its contents, but that for now can be synthetised here by the fact that, since I am articulating history of the same period with opposing ambitions, the archives on which I rely on are

different, hence leading me to different framings in different chapters. If, on the one hand, I want to highlight the historical importance of a large number of people silenced in the discipline of IR, on the other I want to contextualize the words of another group of people who have not been forgotten by history, but rather who has received a pretty lenient treatment by it.

The effort of engaging seriously with the issue of slavery is the main reason why this research has the word silence in its title: I was not able to find systematized and critical thought on enslavement in IR. This occurred not only in the non-Brazilian research. In Brazil, the sole references to slavery that I could find framed it as an issue dealt with by Brazilian foreign policy (Cervo, Bueno, 2008). As I mentioned earlier, it is possible to see research departing from people other than "the citizen"; however, I was still not able to find a disciplinary effort to situate slavery. Is the figure of the enslaved person one that marks the possibility of thinking in terms of a different kind of other: the kind that is welcomed, at the same time that it is denied? In order to better situate this question, I will elaborate a little on the concept of slavery.

1.4.
Labor and/or Personhood

Slavery has been used to refer to many social situations in history. David Biron Davis (2006) articulates this issue in an entirechapter that begins exactly by discussing the difficulty of working with a concept that is used from the time of the Babilonians to that of the Tupinambas (an indigenous population in Brazil) (Davis, 2006, 27). The totalizing notion that the concept of slavery brings within itself is perhaps responsible for the fact that this concept is applied in many different historical contexts of violent exploitation of labour and human hierarchization. Milton Meltzer's definition on the slave is a good departure to reach the understanding of this universal category:

> Like cattle, a slave can be bought, sold, hired out, exchanged, given as a gift, or inherited. For, in theory, a slave is legally not a person. In most cultures he has had no individual rights and has enjoyed no legal protection. The law bothers with him only to ensure his complete subjection to his master (Metlzer, 1993, 4).

There will be exceptions to this definition, but it works as a point of departure to the discussion since it puts the aspect of "holder of rights" as a central reference to the

definition of the enslaved person. It is as if saying that the enslaved person is the necessary physical presence that is rejected. Rejected as presence, not as labour, for s/he is the constitutive other who inhabits society; the one whose labour is indispensable to the constitution of society despite the prejudices held against him/her.

The matter of the holder of rights is then useful to understand the differentiation between enslavement as a model of labour exploitation different from other structures. The main counterpoint that comes to mind on this regard is with servitude as an institution that marked European History up until the 19th Century.[3] However, the serfdom relation established the attachment of the serf with the land (Osiander, 2001, 273-4). It did not define him/her as a property or tradable good from the feudal lord to whom s/he was submitted. This difference is crucial to the extent that it resonates with European history regarding a sense of belonging to the space in a linearity that will lead to nationalism. The idea of labour force as being detached from land and from society is in itself a challenge to a discipline which rarely attends to labour as an important feature of analysis and whose trajectory is marked by the preoccupation with space. In this sense, it is as if slavery fitted all criteria of invisibility. Hence, the choice of the criteria of silence.

This ubiquity of slavery is curious – as well as sad. David Eltis and Stanley Engerman (2011b) state that it is rare to find a population that had not engaged in an enslavement dynamic – be it as a victim or as perpetrator of the practices. The motive for curiosity is that this proposed universal dynamic emerges in an autonomous way in populations that developed without contact one with the other. The comparison between Europe and Islam is especially interesting, since throughout centuries not only Islamic populations were enslaved by Europeans, but also European populations were enslaved by Muslins, in dynamics that were established throughout the Mediterranean. Just the fact that the word slave is the same used to refer to a European populational group points to how the dynamic of imprisonment and forced use of labour is not an Atlantic invention (Eltis, Engerman, 2011b, 6).

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[3] The concomitance between the abolition of slavery in Brazil and in USA and the end of serfdom in Russia was thought in a connected way in the book organized by Ivana Lima, Keila Grinberg and Daniel Reis (2018).

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The progressive strengthening of the Slaves as well as other Catholic and Muslim population around the Mediterranean makes it more difficult for the cross-enslavement of these populations to occur. In turn, this creates the demand for other populations to be enslaved in order to satisfy the Mediterranean market. Eltis and Engerman (2011b) see in this process, which took place between the 14th and 16th Centuries, a transformation that began with the denial of the enslavement of those with seemingly shared identity traits and that ended with the pursuit of the populations of non-Mediterranean Africa.

This seems to be a turning point to the relation between race and enslavement. The practice was widely attached to the destiny of those who would be defeated in wars. Enslavement was seen as an alternative to death and termination. The submission and the loss of rights are the alternatives that lead enslavement to be seen as "social death": the continuity of life in the form of labour, but the end of it as a holder of rights (Patterson, 1982). Pre-Atlantic enslavement, according to Eltis and Engerman (2011b), understood that the social death of the people subjected to it was the flip side to the possibility of the expansion of social life of the enslaver population. Given that the men were to a great extent executed, to incorporate women and children from other origins in the new cultural environment increased the populational contingency and made future reproducibility more likely. These incorporations limit the possibility of a population to claim homogeneity. The analysis that allows for the possibility of social incorporation does not constrain the authors to say that "[it] has tended to be regard across cultures at best as a particularly hard and unfortunate fate, and at worst as the ultimate degradation for any human being" (Eltis, Engerman, 2011b,12).

The horizon of assimilation is broken to the same extent that the racial aspect of enslavement deepens in the production of the Atlantic. The justification of enslavement as a process of Christianization of populations that had no contact with the gospel, as well as the debates questioning if the Amerindians or the African had souls point out to the way in which catholic cosmology dealt with the possibility of accepting those people in Christendom. It was during the production of the Atlantic that this issue was suppurated, and that the racial aspect became determinant as defining the difference

between those who were (or should be) free and those who were (or should be) enslaved.

Enslavement, ultimately, is universal since it is the term used to define those who, inserted in society, are not recognized as people or holders of rights of their own. To be enslaved is, thus, the inclusion through the exclusion. In the words of Giorgio Agamben (1998, 11), "Bare life remains included in politics in the form of exception, that is, as something that is included solely through an exclusion." However, this is a tricky definition, for to the extent that this quote makes justice to the legal condition of the enslaved person, it falls short of the centrality of the enslaved person in the production system. This tension is particularly acute in the 19th Century, a period in which there was already an existing debate on the value of labour and on the centrality of it to the production of wealth. The absoluteness of this condition of enslavement challenges not only IR, but the historical narratives as well. It is possible to see how there is a divide between texts that articulate slavery as labour (Williams, 1944; Prado Jr., 1961; Parron, 2020; Salles, 2008) and that include in it the generation of wealth, and texts that deal with enslaved people as an effort to acknowledge their social lives (Slenes, 2011, Chaloub, 2006; 2011, Castro, 1995). This is not only a matter of theoretical approach to the research problem in question. It is also a consequence of the width of the research that is necessary to address the condition of enslavement in terms of its constant denial concerning citizenship. I am only able to propose an articulation of this emphasis because this research is preponderantly bibliographical.

In this thesis, I want to reflect on the possibilities of considering those who are excluded from IR theory and the consequences of centrally placing those who were reduced to shadows in the analysis to the notion of the international. The word shadow is used by Achille Mbembe as he speaks of slavery and racism (2003, 17, 23, 22). It is a choice of words that resonates with his idea of necropolitics as the complete governance over marginalized groups that are obliterated by the violence of the State that ends up erasing their existence. To some extent, IR does precisely that to enslaved people. It erases their existence by focusing on the State while it thrives on the wealth produced by them that was channelled to the North Atlantic trade system. To break the silence on these people is a way of thinking through a different framing, one that is able

to account for the enslaved people in terms of the articulation of their labour and identity. As such, challenging the explanatory potential of necropolitics which reduces the experience of enslavement to violence. I do not challenge the violent reading proposed by Mbembe. On the contrary, from the very beginning of this Introduction, I have been precisely speaking exclusively of it. However, I challenge the idea of this amount of violence as being exceptional, as well as the condition of framing it through the lenses of the State.

These challenges, in conjunction with the categorization of the international as the metaphorical space of belonging of the enslaved person, point me back to the discussion initiated by Naeem Inaytullah and David Blaney, namely of IR and the problem of difference (2004) and the argument they make on the disciplinary potential of discussing difference. Slavery highlights a necessary difference inside the State; however, within the borders that naturalize the citizen and the liberal lexicon of politics, slavery is interpreted as exceptional violence. Then, to the extent that it is practised within the State, slavery should be read by the lenses of the international. The State is the necessary actor that initiates the differentiation between citizen, non-citizen and enslaved person, but the default of the liberal lexicon of reading non-citizen as foreigner is insufficient. This relation between slavery and the State as a category that is dependent yet not belonging to it works as a representation of the tension through which this thesis navigates: that of proposing a debate on the concept of Empire while arguing that this same Empire is not completely independent from the State.

I argue that slavery was a dimension of Atlantic politics in the 19th Century. A dimension of politics that stood above the States, eventually even competing with them for the loyalty of the people in the echelons of power. Here, Slavery in the Atlantic is defined as an Empire, not competing for territorial matters, not claiming frontiers drawn in maps. Rather, as a dimension of politics that recognized the States and their autonomy but existed as a political structure belonging to those who organized the Atlantic space and commanded the production of the spaces around it (Lefebvre, 1991). This unity, this dimension of politics, is what I propose to call an Empire. The Empire of Slavery in the Atlantic.

A rather under-developed concept, Empire is extensively used especially as a reference to 19th Century history. Be it in the form of self-proclaimed emperors/empresses who nominally transformed their monarchical States into empires, be it through – mainly – the Marxist debate on the expansion of Europe overseas, Empire became the definition of extensive frontiers, continuous or not. I propose a definition of Empire detached from State-borders; instead, as a political dimension that is defined by the allegiance that it commands and with the potential of being reclaimed wherever, understood as a legitimate claim.

This Empire, nevertheless, was divided. It was composed of the enslaved people, whose body constitute it to the extent that they produced its wealth and gave it meaning. It was also composed of the elites that shared an understanding and political-economic projects. In this Empire, liberalism, racism, and violence all played their role in the maintenance of order.

Regarding the issue of enslavement, it is important to highlight that this analysis takes Brazil as a point of departure. The goal of doing so is not to fall into methodological nationalism, but rather to consider the long-lasting experiences with slavery and the accumulated social thought on slavery developed on these shores in order to help with the exercise of decentering the discipline.

1.5.
Sources and Chapters

Having situated this thesis in broad strokes on the debates it aims to engage with, I want to situate the following chapters in their dual role of discussing slavery while proposing a conceptual discussion of Empire. The first thing to notice as I am going through the chapters is that the transition from one to the other is not necessarily smooth, since each of them will look to a specific section of the Empire, hence composing the pieces of the argument, to be concluded in the last chapter. Since each chapter addresses specific features, each articulates a different set of bibliographies.

This thesis will consist of mainly bibliographical research. Originally, it was thought as a way of analysing archive material more closely. Nonetheless, in light of such a vast existing bibliography on the matter – and completely overlooked by the

discipline – it seemed more logical to frame some of it in terms which could be brought to a disciplinarily discussion and see where it would take me[4]. This ended up leading the analysis to a political imaginary conceptualized out of the processes of marginalization and silencing. Instead of focusing on how the idea of belonging builds political institutions, or of focusing on how certain experiences do not comply with the normative imaginaries, this thesis faces the experiences of silencing and violence as the norm, not as the exception. The concept of Empire is put forward out of this reframing of normalcy that transformed bodies into borders and, with it, comes the critique to the understanding of extreme violence as the exception rather than the norm. It is upon realizing this kind of violence as a dominant pattern that I elaborate my critique.

That said, I hereby will present the chapters[5]. The second chapter situates the absence of slavery in IR in two ways. In the first section, I develop how I will work with the concept of slavery throughout the thesis by situating it in the 19th Century, specifically in 19th Century Brazil. The second part is divided into four movements that aim to decenter the discipline of IR, progressively advancing towards the argument and arguing on the effects of finding abstract subjects other than the sovereign man (Ashley, 1989). Next, I argue that liberalism plays a role as a shared culture in 19th Century Atlantic and reflect on what this means to the understanding of slavery. In the third movement, I push forward through the disciplinary bibliography on racism to reach the final movement on the potentiality of history as a mechanism of erasure, not necessarily of remembering. With that, I am able to reveal where I am coming from.

The third chapter is an effort to put together the bibliography on slavery in Brazil by acknowledging the social life of these people while also considering their economic

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[4] I was able to incorporate some documents of the US National Archives in Chapter 4. Although I understand that they contribute to the argument, I would not go as far as saying that this research is also an archival one. Even so, there is space to continue this research in the future by looking at other material available at the USNA as well as to other archives that are prone to providing complementary material.

[5] It is relevant to clarify that PUC's guideline demands the introduction to be numbered as a chapter. Consequently, the very first chapter is numbered as the second, the second as the third and so on. In order to reduce the potential for misunderstanding that this may generate, from this point on I use the number of the chapter as the way to correspond to it. This results in a formal inexistence of chapter 1 since the following chapter is number 2 and will be referred to as the second chapter, the folowing referred to as third, and so on. I apologize in advance for any possible misunderstanding that may emerge as a result of this format guideline.

importance as enslaved labour. In it, I begin to build the conceptual framework of the idea of Empire by introducing Rancière's (1999) concept of politics out of his proposition of "the part with no part" and Orlando Patterson's (1982) proposition of equating slavery to "Social Death" in the discussion of nationalism/citizenship. The enslaved person as latently political leads me to a discussion of racism departing from the Brazilian social thought, especially considering its interface with the discussion on democracy and the idea of belonging.

The fourth chapter is perhaps the one in which the challenges of writing as a consequence of the different archives are more clearly manifested. To a certain extent, it is also a representation of the divide that marks this proposed Empire. In the first half of the chapter, I present the final years of slavery in Brazil as the struggle to conquer abolition. This is done in such a way to contextualize the wide-spread notion in the bibliography that the abolition in Brazil followed a progressive path from 1850 to 1888. The second half of the chapter deals with the other section of the Empire elite: the Dixies and how their spatial imaginary incorporated Brazil through the figure of the enslaved person during the three last decades of slavery in the US. In this chapter, I advance my argument on spatiality through an articulation of Lefebvre (1991), Walker (1993), Agnew and Corbridge (1995), and Mbembe (2003).

The fifth chapter is the prelude to the proposition of Empire of slavery developed in the sixth. In it, I engage more seriously and systematically with John Locke as a representative of liberal contractualism. This is the backdrop against which I elaborate on the ties between slavery and capitalism and present slavery as the instrument of the production of space for the first time.

The sixth chapter is the one that serves as a conclusion to the argument I built all the way. The effort of decentering the narrative in the second chapter, bringing slavery to the fore in the third, presenting a divide in the fourth, and articulating the Atlantic space in the fifth leads me to this final chapter. In it, I present in depth my take on Empire and how and why I see slavery can be properly understood as one. This chapter, in which I advance what I want to see as a conceptual contribution to the discipline, aims at treating the word Empire as a concept in itself, detached from the concept of Imperialism and its political disputes. To the extent that this distinction is

counterintuitive, I point out to the fact that Imperialism derives from the political use of Empire by the European powers in the 19th Century to qualify their territorial ambitions. My argument is that there is, then, room to elaborate conceptually on the noun Empire without challenging Imperialism or the critical contribution it brought to the understanding of the capitalist expansion.

There are many moving parts in this history. There are many lives considered in these pages and I cannot end this introduction without mentioning this. The abyss that separates Western civilization from any kind of humanity can find a milestone in Atlantic Slavery. The dimension of violence, of erasure and greed that were mobilized in the 358 years during which slavery and the slave trade produced the Atlantic is something of another dimension. The least we could do is to put an "s" after the word violence when addressing slavery as a subject.

Over the five years during which I developed this project, I tried the exercise of trying to consider what some of those people went through. I tried to conceive the middle passage, the experience of sailing through *kalunga*, just to die at arrival. The absolute lack of meaning that was given to some lives and the entitlement of being convinced that someone was indeed the rightful owner of anyone and that, from this condition, the destiny of other human beings would be determined. Sometimes I think about the people who lived through this process and perhaps never even had a name. In thinking through this kind of possibility, I am torn between the (im)possibility of the two following questions: Can this person be remembered? Can this person be forgotten? The lack of clarity in terms of one being able to be remembered or forgotten can be synthetised as the insufficiency of the words and concepts we have to account for this kind of lived experience, in disciplinary terms.

All of this leads me back to the beginning of this Introduction citing Koselleck's quote and the importance of words to communicate the deeds. The translations from Portuguese to English, from the 19th to the 21st Century are the ways I have to navigate the conundrum posed by the two questions in the last paragraph. It is only fitting that these tensions surrounding translation are present while elaborating the concept of Empire out of the 19th Century Atlantic Slavery, as there is an inherited divide in it between the enslaved and the enslaver. The unity they compose – Slavery – is

dependent on the maintenance of that divide, responsible for two such different world experiences. This unity, then, is only possible by incorporating the borders. But not in a way of homogenising them; rather to have the sovereign power of maintaining it differently, withing as a constant reminder of its power of creating death, wealth and erasure. I find this to be a conceptual challenge that I can summarize as slavery *violences*.

Rio de Janeiro has a neighbourhood called *Saúde* which is literally translates to as "Health". It is near the old port of the city, close to the dock at which many enslaved people arrived from Africa. In early 1996, as she worked on a renovation of her house, Merced Guimarães dos Anjos found human bones in her backyard. It turns out that her house, along with a significant part of the surrounding blocks, were built upon what had been, for 60 years, the cemetery of those unable to survive after arriving in Rio de Janeiro from the middle passage. The knowledge of the previous use of the terrain was scattered in historical research, and the residents had no information that their real estate was an erasure of such proportion. I can think of no better image to represent how our society is grounded on violences, silences and erasures.

I can only hope that by thinking politically through the figure of the enslaved person, that we can contribute to do some justice to their lives.

2.
Other Histories, Other Internationals

This chapter is organized in two main sections. The first offers an overview on the approach to slavery adopted in this thesis, firstly with a wide overview of the concept, then narrowing it down to the 19th Century, specifically in Brazil. The second section proposes four movements to observe the possibility of considering slavery in International Relations and the consequences of the silence of the discipline on this subject. These four movements are representative of the four main disciplinary issues that this thesis addresses to challenge the constitutive silences. The first movement is the liberal premisse inscribed in the abstract idea of a person, the second is the first step in the effort of articulating discussions on labour and identity. The third deals with the disciplinary efforts for accounting for racism and how, in these works, slavery is not accounted for. Conversely, the fourth movement deals with History not as an effort of remembering, but rather as a technology of forgetting.

These are big propositions, and it is not impossible for them to seem off and unarticulated. This is a consequence of trying to characterize a disciplinary silence. As noted in the introduction, the task of characterizing a silence is an enormous one, precisely because one has no systematized bibliography to rely on. In the introduction, I also mentioned that there were many moving parts in this thesis and that they had to be put in motion in this chapter. The effort of breaking the inertia does not always seem logic at first. Some perspective is necessary in order to see how these different pieces are articulated. Thus, I expect this second chapter to gain more clarity as the arguments are being built along the chapters.

These two sections aim at laying the ground for the two arguments brought by this thesis, which are mainly that: there are non-European histories inscribed within International Relations; and that these histories can help the framing of International Relations in non-State-centred perspectives. These two arguments shall be sustained by a proposed approach to International Relations centred in the enslaved person. In doing so, the goal is to displace IR to the periphery to better understand how the labour of these enslaved people produced Atlantic spaces. By proposing a non-European History account, organized around enslaved people and their labour in 19th Century

Americas, I want to build the conditions for the peripheries to be key to interpreting the centre, and not the other way around. This proposed inversion is what offers meaning to the movements developed here.

2.1.
Other Histories

1648 is core to the narrative of IR as the origin point of the concept of sovereignty that developed to an understanding of non-intervention in internal affairs by the end of the 18th Century (Krasner, 1999, 20). The History centred on this narrative of borders and sovereignty is one that depicts European politics throughout the 19th Century in its articulations between heads of State attempting to rearrange borders and claims to authority after the Napoleonic wars on the turn of the 1700s to the 1800s (Kissinger, 1957, 1994). When Andreas Osiander (2001) stated that Westphalia was a myth, he questioned the political presupposition that we now see as emerging from the Münster and Onsabrück treaties.

Luiz Felipe de Alencastro deals with Westhphalian negotiations in his book on slavery during Brazil's formation as a State. Amongst the many territorial arrangements on the making, Portugal saw no option other than formalizing the loss of Pernambuco to the Dutch West India Company (WIC). The European Realpolitik made a State loose its sovereignty over a territory to a private company. What would revert this European agreement was the mobilization of Rio de Janeiro that put together a fleet to attack the Dutch in Angola, recovering the region and weakening their position in the Americas (Alencastro, 2000, 229-233). Only by demystifying Westphalia, by treating it as a historical phenomenon, that it becomes possible to see other histories originating.

It is relevant to begin this section with a nod towards the argument developed by Isaac Kamola (2020) on how self-centered IR is as a discipline constituted by a scholarly debate that creates the justification for itself. This self-centeredness is part of the justification of this thesis: if it were not for the twisting and turning around its discourses on State and politics, it would be possible to incorporate other histories and glances to the array of narratives that compose the discipline. This displacement that I

am proposing here is another example of the curious ways in which this discipline operates (Kamola, 2020, 4): we treat it as if it were something malleable and mutable, as an "agentic thing".

This displacement of IR comes with some challenges, since the bibliography on slavery is most frequently divided between those who engage with the economic features of the system and those who care more about other aspects of social life. In this thesis, I will engage with these two streams in order to cover a more complete range of bibliographies that would better represent what would mean an IR centred on the enslaved person.

On the economic stream of the History of slavery in the Atlantic, it is relevant to recover what came to be known as the "Brenner debate" on the origins of capitalism. In an article published in 1976 by Robert Brenner, he contested the relevance of Marx's thesis that the enclosure of the fields is the moment of creation of capitalism because this is a specific characteristic of England's historical process, not liable of being found in other spaces during the same time, say, for instance, in regions of France (Brenner, 1985 [1976]). Brenner's argument follows that, as a process that necessarily connects many spaces of the world, how is it possible to identify an initial moment of capitalism that can be seen as exceptional and different from the process in which it is immersed?

To reclaim the "Brenner debate" in this thesis is not simply a movement of situating the adjective "capitalist" within this modern international. To do so is also to be aware of an issue that is profoundly relevant in Atlantic slavery: the coexistence of modernity with a supposedly non-modern system of production. Since its practices predate modernity, what are the chances of such slavery being understood as a feature of the modern international?

Eric Williams' Slavery and Capitalist (1944) deals exactly with the possibility of the Atlantic Enslavement model being understood through the lenses of European capitalism. In this book, Williams not only establishes that the European capitalism was capable of coexisting with the Atlantic slavery, as the system was dependent on this labour to develop. His main point was to question the Imperial British narrative that sustained that the combat against slavery was a consequence of the humanitarian movement. His effort is to argue that the abolition reflects a broader economic context,

related to the impact of the British Empire on US independence and, consequently, on the reordering of the naval fluxes that resulted thereof; the downfall of productivity in the British Caribbean; and, overall, on the role played by the resistance of the enslaved.

Williams contributed to the debate by bringing the economic perspective to the analysis of the adaptability of the premodern model to modern capitalism. From that book, it is possible to argue that slavery had a relevant financial impact to the British economy and, consequently, to the development of the Industrial Revolution. Williams opens the debate with which Patrick O'Brien will contribute, in 1982, with the text "European Economic Development: the contribution of the periphery", in which he argues that the contribution of the periphery to the development of Europe's capitalism was not relevant.

O'Brien's contribution to the debate sees itself as the final contribution to the discussion between slavery and capitalism. Relying on an argument of authority derived from the use of quantitative methodology, he develops an analysis of the profits earned with the endeavour of slavery in the Americas and concludes that the gains were marginal. Despite his original intent, O'Brien himself came to question his conclusions on that matter (O'Brien, 2006) and the text as a whole as he came to realize that a purely quantitative methodology was not enough to address the contact between these two phenomena, for there is an ideological treat that, if absent from its constitution, was developed through practices in this process.

This space created between the silence in International Relations on slavery and the relations between slavery and capitalism as well as racism and capitalism show how the politics of time is relevant to this research. The polemic put forward by the Brenner debate on the emergence of capitalism and on the transformation of social relations that made possible the configuration of the economic relations in the modes of exploitation and profit – was a process developed in a certain time length that is interpreted from certain non-neutral parameters. These parameters establish a political-economic reading of time that is encapsulated by History (Blaney, Inayatullah, 2010).

David Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah (2010) critique on Economy goes in the direction of pointing out the difficulty of establishing the differentiation between History as events that took place and the Political Economy as an analysis of the

behaviour that looks to the evidences, sources and data from the past in order to build a discourse on 'the real" present (Blaney, Inayatullah, 2010, 8). Criticized according to a Lacanian reading of the concept, this real is therefore detached in time from that past. It is detached in the sense that the past is already gone and that the present is the time of the possibility of action.

Following the reading of Constantin Fasolt (2004), Blaney and Inayatullah (2010) denounce the colonization of time with the adoption of the parameters of hours, days and years as a way of understanding time as attached to production and progress. The effort of challenging this coloniality of time is a rupture with the notion of the present, thus that challenges the notion of the present as privileged time, of analysing the past and going towards progress.

It is through this resort to Fasolt that Blaney and Inayatullah make their critique to International Political Economy and its liberal reading of the world. The reason therefor is that it creates the myth of the economic growth as a solution to poverty without recognizing that the bigger the growth, the more profound the inequality is, for inequality is not a consequence of the conjuncture. Rather, it is structural, a consequence of the system of production as it is established. The classic Political Economists are aware that the modernity is an imposition done through the colonial process, as "They [Political Economists] understand that something deeper about the human condition is at stake: ways of life are displaced and values are lost in this imposition." (Blaney, Inayatullah, 2010, 4)

This quote from Blaney and Inayatullah anticipates two processes: the first is the liberal belief in an essence that is capable of justifying the exogenous imposition of beliefs and ways of enacting. The second is the denouncing that this imposition is violent and that this violence can even strip the meaning of lives. Modernity is a temporally and geographically situated project and, as the Brenner debate has pointed, these are matters that do not account for colonized spaces. The Modern Capitalist Order – as they call it – is a European project that justifies this collectivization of different cultural particularities due to the possibility of agency that they had in the dynamics which derives from the expansion of productivity capability that by chance developed into modern Capitalism.

Other Histories, Other Internationals

In this project of modernity, of Europe and of liberalism, the maintenance of an old practice meant the transformation of its meaning. That is what happened with the practice of enslavement in 19th Century's Brazil. This new meaning of enslavement is what came to be known as Second Slavery.

2.1.1.
Second Slavery and the Atlantic Space

In 1850, the Eusébio de Queiroz Act put an end to the participation of Brazil in the forced migration of people in the form of the International enslaved trade a commerce that used to consume a good chunk of the country's financial capital. The impact of this decision was the creation of an exceeding amount of capital that began to be employed in initiatives to improve the country (Cervo, Bueno, 2008; Schwarz, Starling, 2015). The rupture of this commerce is a landmark because it established the end of one of the main colonial economic inheritances (Bethell, 1970). It also inserted itself in an important process of the Brazilian State during the *Saquarema* Period[6] (Mattos, 2004). 1850 is an important year since it was the year in which the more conservative wing of the Imperial elite was able to promulgate the law that regulates the acquisition of land for the first time since independence. It was known as Land Law and whose meaning can also reference the law of the land. That same year, the commercial Code and the centralization of the National Guard under the command of the Central Government were approved. The end of the trans-Atlantic trade also favoured this strengthening as it helped to ease the conflictual relation with the United Kingdom, a dispute that was so polarized on the issue of trade of the departing that ended up with the seizure of Brazilian ships by the British Navy at the entrance of the Guanabara Bay (Basile, 1990).

The idea consolidated in Brazilian historiography that from this point onward enslavement can be understood as a national issue does not take into account that

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[6] *Tempo Saquarema* or Saquarema Period is the title of Ilmar Rohlaff de Mattos' book that addresses the way through which the Conservative Party – nicknamed the Saquaremas after a city in the state of Rio de Janeiro – were able to stabilize the Imperial state following a succession of cabinets between 1848 and 1861, after a series of upheavals and instabilities which characterized the First Reign and of the Regency Period.

modern slavery is, at its core, an international project to which a fair amount of attention must be given. Modern slavery exceeded itself in creating the distinction between free and enslaved people. Grovogui (2013), reading upon Trouillot (1995), presents the understanding of slavery during Kant's time as "the most potent metaphor for the absence of liberty." (Grovogui, 2013, 251). Slavery, as a metaphor, does not lose potency with the end of the Brazilian participation in the trans-Atlantic trade even 50 years after Kant's death. Thus, even when the forced migration was no longer active, the strength of the violence against the enslaved was still perceived well beyond national borders. As a metaphor, the idea of the enslaved person went beyond national borders and helped to create the distinction not only between countries, but between peoples and their appearances.

The attachment of the skin colour to the condition of enslavement was an innovation from modernity (Blackburn, 2010). That innovation, which stemmed from the colonial Brazilian period, left a strong impression in the country's and in the Atlantic history. The retrieval of the curse of Ham[7] was done in such a way as to establish the connection between the offspring of Noah's grandson with African peoples – even though the Bible does not leave space to infer this – and that in the Book of Genesis there is nothing said on the colour of the skin of Ham's offspring (Davis, 2006). To establish this relation between people of African descent and this family lineage is to allow for the building of a narrative that black people would be doomed to inferiority and servitude (Blackburn, 2010; Carvalho, 1998b; Vainfas, 1986). This was an important narrative in the transformation of slavery into a commercial practice. That way, the enslaved condition would no longer be situational and would be structural to black people.

Ethnicity being in the origins of this enslavement dynamics identifies the inequality in the basis of the constant violence against black people. This dynamic of inequality is strengthened by the impetus, in the 19th Century, of enslavement. Dale

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[7] The curse of Ham is presented in details in chapter 6. The curse was spelled upon the descendants of Noah's son, Ham. It was an angry response by Noah to an offense delivered by his son. Ham's offspring would be forever bounded to serve the offspring of his sons as a consequence of laughing at his father as he was drunk and naked. Catholicism's efforts of legitimizing African enslavement led to an identification of Africans – or Ethiopians – a noun used in the 16th and 17th Centuries to refer to Africans as the descendants of Ham (Davis, 2006).

Tomich (2004) sees this impetus and develops the concept of "Second Slavery". The main aspect that would differentiate that 19th Century's phenomenon from colonial slavery would be its strength, despite being antagonistic to the emerging liberalism and to the British ambitions of putting a stop to this forced migration. Tomich (2004) argues on how the 19th Century, even without substantial change in the enslavement practice, made a profound change in the meaning of the enslavement of people. The emergence of liberalism, and with it, the emergence of a logic of liberal society, along with the idea of the liberal individual, harmed the maintenance of the collectivist logic that was core to enslavement thus far. If there was suffering in the life experience of black people, it would be justified as a way of purging their sins – in a personal level – and as a contribution to the society in a collectivist perspective (Vainfas, 1986). The progressive individualization of life and laicization of discourse through the 19th Century operated a profound transformation in the meaning of enslavement in this period.

The middle passage, the name by which the voyage of the kidnapped Africans who crossed the Atlantic came to be known, progressively ceased to be naturalized and started to be seen as illegitimate. In the British Parliament, abolition started to be defended as an increasingly important issue to be enforced by the British Navy. This was the platform for religious movements that saw in the trade of the leaving an outrage to Christian morality. The thesis that this movement was based in English religious altruism, as seen in the last section, was attacked by Eric Williams (1944). He saw how the fight against enslavement was in fact a way of addressing the downfall of the profitability of the enslaved labour and, as a consequence, of the Haitian independency that took form in an enslaved revolution that frightened the British and their colonies in the Antilles. The Second Slavery, therefore, helps to understand the energy of enslavement throughout the 19th Century, which apparently took place against a liberal perspective endorsed by religious discourses and commercial interests. This means that the emancipation promised by Liberalism looked at the individuals only through their political potentialities.

The changes in capitalism at the turn of the 19th Century and the transformations in the meanings and disputes that addressed the enslavement of people of African

descent in the Atlantic is what Dale Tomich developed in his proposal of Second Slavery. The complexity of the transformations that were underway is only possible due to the existence of the space of contacts, namely the Atlantic Ocean uniting the British parliamentary discourses; the Haitian Revolution; the fears of the British settlers in Jamaica and in other Caribbean islands; Brazilian plantations; ports in Africa with kidnapped people; and the tensions of the then recently independent US. The Atlantic as a political space is only possible to the extent that it is a consequence of the potential of contacts and of the communications it allows for. These communications challenge the narratives limited by national boundaries and shed light to the spaces of exchange that go through these points.

In the preface to the Brazilian version of his book, Paul Gilroy wrote:

The concept of space is in itself transformed when it is incarnated in a communicative circuit that enabled scattered populations to talk, interact and more recently even to sync significative aspects of their cultural and social lives (Gilroy: 2012, 20-21).

The 19th Century is the condition of possibility to this sync addressed by Gilroy. It was slavery, in that century, that constituted the Atlantic and allowed it to incarnate a circuit. To the extent that Gilroy is interest in understanding the communication in the North Atlantic circuit, the Second Slavery offers the path to acquiring more clarity in the constitution of that circuit. In reality, it is a larger one, as it is not constrained to the North Atlantic, which is the object of analysis defined by Gilroy. This possibility of incorporating disciplinarily slavery gives space to a discussion in the sense of which terms the communication can be held on, as well as the place for violence within it.

2.1.2.
Second Slavery in Brazil

During the monarchical period in Brazil (1822-1889), the saying "Brazil is coffee. And the coffee is the Valley" was common and a way of reinforcing, the centrality of the Paraíba Valley in the Imperial economy while highlighting the equivalence of such economy with coffee production (Muaze, Salles, 2015). Ricardo Salles, in 2008, published an analysis of Vassouras, a village along the course of the river which, in the 19th century, was one of the world largest coffee producers

(Marquese, Tomich, 2015, 36), and entitled it as a continuation of this saying as: "And the Valley was the slave". The relation of Brazil to slavery is intense not only during the 19th Century. It goes back to the beginning of the colonization and of the occupation of the Atlantic coast of South America by Europeans. In chapter 6, I discuss the debates on the enslavement of Africans, and how central it was to the colonization. This centrality of slavery to the production of Brazilian space is the main motive to depart from the Brazilian experience with slavery and from the bibliography developed here to think in terms of which contribution it offers to IR.

It is relevant to highlight this relation between Brazil, the Paraíba Valley and enslavement, specifically Second Slavery, since the three date approximately from the same period. The flight of the Portuguese royal family to Brazil in 1808 turned Rio de Janeiro into the capital of the Portuguese Empire and thrusted the city into a new dynamic which imposed the necessity of improving the existing infra-structure that would facilitate the access to the colony's heartland. One of such accesses was called "*Caminho Novo da Piedade*, that cut across São Paulo's Paraíba Valley" (Marquese, Tomich, 2015, 36). The soil quality and the geography of the region enabled the establishment of plantations along that path, created by men of commerce from Rio de Janeiro who, in their majority, traded enslaved people and used these proprieties to invest in a new agricultural production that took time to mature, but had a promising market after the fall of the Haitian production following the country's revolution. This new product was coffee (Marquese, Tomich, 2015; Parron, 2020).

Thus, the opening of the Valley to plantations is a process already inserted in the dynamics of the second slavery, hence in the shadow of the British Industrial Revolution and its equivalent capitalism. because the fact that the 19th Century Paraíba Valley is considered a continuation of the Brazilian coastal colonization dated from the 16th Century is precisely the reason why it is possible to talk about continuity rather than rupture in this situation.

Tomich (2004) discusses how enslavement, justified in terms of an instrument of evangelization, has conceded Brazil a position of centrality in the beginning of the territorial occupation of the Americas in the 16th Century yet did not work as a way of understanding the dynamics in the 19th Century. This disruptive reading, however,

contrasts with José Murilo de Carvalho's (1998b) argument that enslavement was representative of Brazilian society given that it preceded the independence of the country itself. Enslavement conceived as a civilizational project that expands Christendom is important not only as a consequence of the definition of the nature of labour it contains, but also as a consequence of linking the analysis and debates on the issue to the Catholic Church and to the Christian cosmology. This solid structure that justified Brazilian enslavement for so long, rooted in the sermons of Father Antonio Vieira, was substituted by the discourses from the more conservative members of the Conservative Party, the ones that in the jargon of the time came to be known as "Stuck Conservatives". Both authors' readings on the matter of enslavement in the Empire of Brazil demonstrate the complexities of the subject and the possible readings that it brings with it. For if Tomich (2004) seeks to understand the meaning of slavery to the conformation of a specific dynamic in the Atlantic of the 19th Century and, from this flux, to understand the space occupied by Brazil, Carvalho (1998b) on the other hand understands enslavement as limiting the freedom of the working population, therefore, as a continuity of practices that date all the way back from the colonial period.

The extent of this historiographic debate is enormous and has to do with the lenses used to argue on the matter of slavery, be it the geopolitical understanding of it, be it the societal meaning of enslaving a section of the population. This thesis puts forward an understanding of the politics of slavery, considering the meaning of labour and of racial discrimination interwoven in the 19th Century. This argument accounts for the origins, although difficult to define, that left scares and threads which help us have a glimpse of the processes endured until arriving in the century of Liberalism.

From this interpretation, a bisection between rupture or continuity that the second slavery represents, it is curious to notice that it responds as well to a different legal ground. Or to put it properly, to a different illegal ground, for the trans-Atlantic trade of enslaved people was an illegal practice in Brazil since 1831, when the Feijó Law, the first law that prohibited the entrance of enslaved people in Brazil, never revoked, was promulgated, albeit never enforced. This means that legally speaking, all enslaved people that entered Brazil from 1832 onwards were illegally enslaved. A consultation

to the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database[8] shows that the first years after the law's promulgation saw a decrease in the arrival of enslaved people in Brazil. However, from 1832 until 1850, the estimation is that 896,231 kidnapped people arrived in Brazil (Slave Voyages) to be not only enslaved, but illegally enslaved.

Thus, it is safe to say that the second slavery in Brazil not only took place in another geographical context under different underlying meanings and boosting another commodity. It also occurred in illegal grounds, for in the total volume of over 2,300,000 people that arrived in Brazil in the last 50 years of the middle passage, almost 900,000 arrived illegally in order to produce wealth in plantations owned by the elite that was occupying positions in parliament and in the cabinets. In that case, members of the elite such as Paulino Soares de Sousa and João Maurício Wanderley (the Baron of Cotegipe), who fought for the maintenance of the slave labour in Brazil did so in order to keep the *status quo*, even if this meant a change in the legitimization of enslavement. The silence was also present in the illegality of the matter.

The concept of second slavery resonated strongly with the historical research developed in Brazil. Ricardo Salles, Rafael Marquese, Leonardo Marques and Tâmis Parron work within this framework that sees the change in the meaning of practices of enslavement. By paying attention to the meaning of the nature of labour, the debate on the origins of capitalism is an important feature for these authors. Furthermore, Tomich (2004) strengthens the perception that enslavement is a complex system that not only unites the coasts of Africa, Brazil, the Caribbean, US and European countries, but that also conceives the multiple linkages that are articulated in this network, for the link that is originated in the enslaved traffic can also outlive it.

Paul Gilroy (2012) presents how

> [T]his cosmopolitical approach takes us necessarily not only to land, where we find the special ground on which it is said that national cultures have their roots, but to the sea and to sea life, that moves across the Atlantic Ocean allowing for the development of more fluid and less fix planetary cultures (2012, 15).

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[8] The website www.slavevoyages.org is the repository of information over 600 Atlantic voyages of the Atlantic enslaved trade. Based on the catalogued voyages, the site also offers estimations on the numbers surrounding the trade (people kidnaped, voyages made, and so on). David Eltis and David Richardson, the two original heads of the project, published a book in 2008 celebrating the launch of the website. Their first chapter on the book offers more details on the origins and goals of the project (Eltis, Richardson, 2008).

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The Atlantic as a space of movement, the space that is not static as the State, is privileged to understand the contact and the interaction between the areas that are borders to this ocean that, as the ocean itself, are characterized by cultures that transform themselves and that are not static as the notions of race or of nation presuppose (Gilroy, 2012 18).

2.1.3.
Slavery and International Relations

The main reason for this thesis to be a research project on silences is the fact that it is difficult to find a systematized and critical thought on enslavement as a relevant feature of IR as a discipline. The silence to which I make reference here is not addressing enslavement as a contemporary practice, as done by Kevin Bales (1999, 2005, 2016). His work's relevance in denouncing the use of forced labour is of remarkable importance, but represents a practice that is socially condemned and that can – as the rule – be legally persecuted by law-enforcement (Bezerra, 2018). Enslavement in the 19th Century, by contrast, in particular the Atlantic trade, is a different process as a consequence of the volume of people that had been enslaved (3,959,879, according to the Trans-Atlantic Slave Voyages Database, between 1801 and 1866 – the year of the last recorded trip). It is hence part of a system centred in the commerce and exploitation of people that, contrary to the enslavement analysed by Bales (1999), does not comprise a closed system, but a set of different cases under the same rationale.

Enslavement in the 19th Century, when analysed closely is a phenomenon capable of operating what Siba Grouvogui (2013) considers to be essential to a post-colonial analysis: a different question, one capable of dislocating a historical narrative. To a great extent, thus far I dealt with the historical aspect of the Atlantic system in the 19th Century, not considering, however, the specificities in the literature of the history of IR, specifically understanding it as a disciplinary institution and hence meaning the historical readings made in the field. I am referring specifically to authors such as Henry Kissinger (1957) and James Joll (1990) as exponents of a Realist historical reading and to Adam Watson (1992) and Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (1984) as

authors of a tradition of the English School of IR. Those authors wrote European Histories in which whenever other regions of the world are included; they occupy a marginal space. The critique to the marginality is not in the sense of not considering the multiple hierarchies in the modern international, but of acknowledging those hierarchies to recognize that events in those peripheral spaces are also relevant to a global historical narrative.

Kissinger and Joll give good examples of narratives that focus their analyses in European statemen that decided the fate of the world according to their will and interaction between themselves in Europe. My goal here is not to deny that such men and such wills tried to define the destinies of the world from their cabinets, but rather to develop a narrative able to recognize agency in actors and spaces other than Berlin, Wien, London or Paris. Kissinger's (1957) effort of narrating the Restauration after Napoleonic wars with no mention to the impact of the Haitian Revolution, which defeated two French armies and one English invasion, is an example of the silencing of such narratives.

Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, be it in their co-authored book "*The Expansion of International Society*" (1984), or in the latter sole enterprise written by Watson, "*The Evolution of International Society*" (1992), admit the centrality of the State model that they define, following discussions from the English School as an International Society that is Eurocentric and expands towards peripheral spaces of the International System. This movement of expansion is characterized as a movement that constitutes international hierarchies, and, as a consequence of such narratives, finds passivity in autochthonous new spaces, occupied by Europeans. These are narratives on the constitution of the frontiers and of spaces that do not consider the peoples who were part of those movements.

The historical narrative[9] that considers spaces cannot be dissociated from the theories that are entangled in it. In that sense, State-centrism, be it from the perspective

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[9] Recovering an argument developed further in Bezerra, Salgado, Yamato (2019, 429), I consider a difference between historical narrative and historical perspective on the grounds that the first deals with the effort of building sense in a succession of events articulated in nets of causality. On the matter of historical perspectives, I come to understand the semantical sense that guides the construction of the narrative, meaning the actors and spaces whose voices one chooses to listen.

of Realism (manifested in Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 1981 or Mersheimer, 2001) or from that of the English School (Bull, 1977, 2002), offers the theoretical structure necessary for the observation of politics as a domestic feature of States and the interaction between these structures as a dynamic of another sort, a politic that needs to be qualified as "international", answering the dynamics impinged upon it by the anarchy of the domain that it inhabits. Martin Wight (1995 [1966]) presented a synthesis of this approach when he argued that there is no international theory as a consequence of international politics being a minor section of political theory.

> The reason is that the theorizing has to be done in the language of political theory and law. But this is the language appropriate to man's control of his social life. Political theory and law are maps of experience or systems of action within the realm of normal relationships and calculable results. They are the theory of the good life. International theory is the theory of survival (Wight, 1995, 32).

Wight writes considering the space of normalcy and the space of survival as opposing poles of reality. The dislocation that this thesis aims to do relates to the possibility of merging the space of normalcy and that of the struggles for survival in the same space. In order to be seen as such, the fundamentals of the discipline should be questioned. By recasting Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the French Revolution and the totalitarian revolutions of the 20th Century as the "three most powerful influences" (Wight, 1995, 23) on the development of political theory, Wight frames politics as the descendent of the laicization of the State, the consolidation of the State and the dispute between State and society. Wight's neat historical progression, which points to a development towards liberty of man from all collective constrains that seem to hold him back, fails when it claims universality. It seems to be the idea of the "sovereign man", denounced by Richard Ashley's 1989 book chapter, who is blind to the fact that the struggle for survival can be a political one. I will get to this with more details in chapter 4. However, for the time being, it suffices to say that to frame politics as the result of national phenomena establishes the political parameters as solely national. What would happen outside the State can be either national somewhere else: a matter of bureaucracy or of exceptionality in the terms of wars. The exercise of framing slavery as an international project is a way of disputing the narrative of the history of IR with a non-State-bordered phenomenon, therefore allowing for another way of thinking the politics of the international.

It is interesting that the authors that are framed as Realists or members of the English School resort to history in their approach to IR. Walker (1995) argues that the historical approach to the discipline is an alternative to the structural approach, with the main difference being in the potential to identify politics in the narrative. Finding history, thus, is to find politics in the international, and in finding politics Wight's argument does not hold itself. The historical narrative of the international is not made of national histories alone. It is also a history that occurs in spaces produced by agents other than the nation. The politics in the international, therefore, depends on more than the State.

This other politics is played not only by statesmen that, to some extent, embody the State in their interactions and, consequently, transform the State into an actor that rationally reacts to stimulus interpreted from its reading of the foreign environment. This embodiment, however, is rather specific, for it is masculine, it is white and it is European. In the same way as the rationality, it is rather specific: it follows the Cartesian-illuminist European tradition, as presented by Ashley (1989). This description is what Wight denounces as not being theorizable to the extent that it is the extension of national politics. But national history is not the only history in the international. It is the history that narrates the constitution of a specific politics, the sort of politics that specifies the rationality of actors in their historical trajectory of constitution, defence and, sometimes, border expansion.

Enslavement destabilizes this structure since it creates challenges in the sense of necessity, of looking to the people that are part in this process of imprisonment and subjection to force labour, hence dislocating the narrative of constitution and the maintenance of borders. In the same way, enslavement makes one conceive the existence of other people whose existence implies agency, and whose agency allows for the possibility of other rationalities and – why not say? – other emotions. The rationalist premises, therefore, are questioned and another glance should be able to observe International Relations.

In the introduction of their 2015 book, Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda and Robbie Shilliam make an interesting movement, an inspiring one to this thesis. They begin by presenting the disciplinary racism (2015, 2-3), its historical origins and its

importance to the constitution of IR. By the end of the text, however, they reaffirm the privileged space of this field to articulate different knowledges and wisdoms (2015, 9-10) as a consequence of the privileged space that it occupies – as it is in contact with other disciplines.

Since enslavement is already situated as a phenomenon of multiple violence and intense exploitation, its perception as epitome of inequality is easier to be understood as an omnipresent example (Grovogui, 2006). The construction of this example is relevant since it helps to understand Inayatullah and Blaney's statement on International Political Economy:

> As we have seen, the losers in the competitive process are not just banished to oblivion; they become parts of a pedagogical and emulative project in which the winners become teachers and models for the losers. This pedagogy of competition, however, works to partly erase the very difference that it claims to value. (2004, 143)

Enslavement not only functions as a discourse on absolute inequality. It also became a pedagogical process of teaching civilization to the enslaved ones. This interpretation of inequality is interesting since it allows for a better understanding of the whole process of enslavement in the continent, by shedding light into how the discourse changed from the expansion of faith to the economic legitimation having the same note: the potentiality of overcoming this condition, in both cases they could learn the features of sociability necessary to their emancipation. The issue here is that the enslavement was taken for granted, and the hope of education/emancipation is nothing but false, for the racism embedded in the primordial motives for the enslavement will not fade away once one becomes Christian/or citizen because the changes in belief do not alter the phenotypes that identified them as enslavable.

This movement of interpreting inequality as a contextual aspect of International Relations is central to the comprehension of enslavement as an international dynamic, one that offers the possibility of interpreting other phenomena of constructing difference. Anievas, Manchanda and Shilliam (2015, 6) narrate how du Bois re-signified his concept of colour line after his visit to Warsaw ghetto. Analysing this capacity of reinventing the ways of differentiation and violence is that I argue on the importance of enslavement to International Relations. After all, it is a long-lasting phenomenon of building difference that is contemporary to the birth of the modern

State and of capitalism on its industrial phase. Thus, it is not impossible that enslavement has left consequences to contemporary politics.

To face enslavement and the commerce of peoples from Africa to the Americas is a way of conceiving the building of hierarchies of International Relations as a variation of the constant effort of homogenizing politics into European patterns through international narratives that fulfil their role as homogenizing and teleological. The European State-building and the effort of replicating the same logic in other spaces of the Globe as a consequence of the colonial process operates in the sense of understanding hierarchies as results from historical processes of European expansion. This expansion in itself is not sufficient to understand the hierarchies and, in this sense, the English School of International Relations is an excellent example since it deals with such expansion without problematizing it (Bull, Watson, 1984; Watson, 1992)[10]. But the way in which the spaces were articulated is central for a better understanding of the origin of these hierarchies that became naturalized and were reproduced in time.

To develop this critique is a responsibility not taken lightly. It is a true challenge to develop this thesis focusing the intellectual effort on a population so central to history but whose humanity was not granted. This means that this critique needs to include the enslaved women men and children who were put under unimaginable amounts of violence and whose anonymous lives should not be the point of departure to a systemic critique that would treat them as numbers, instead of people. The effort of recognizing these peoples is manifested in this thesis by the critique developed on Achille Mbembe's concept of necropolitics (2003), with regard to lives completely submitted to violence. Through the debate surrounding this notion, I want to recognize the infinite difficulty of the task of dealing with those peoples with the respect and deference they were denied in life.

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[10] Ole Weaver (2002) proposes a 4 phases chronology of the English School starting in the 1960's with the last phase beginning in 1992. This is to say that this chronology does not account for Christian Reus-Smit's works (1999, 2011, 2013), nor Edward Keene's (2000, 2014), authors who could represent perhaps another phase in this chronology to the extent that they offer a problematization to the expansion/evolution of International Society, albeit not going as far as to compromise their Eurocentrism in full. It is by considering Weaver's chronology and the contribution of these two authors that I argue that the problematization is not enough. The 2017 edited volume by Tim Dunne and Christian Reus-Smit celebrating the Expansion of International Society (Bull and Wight, 1984) is an example of the constrains of a full-blown critique of the English School elaborated by themselves.

Other Histories, Other Internationals

The effort of looking at the enslaved in this thesis does not seek to establish "levels of analyses" as a consequence of the innocuous that such discussion can represent since, as a phenomenon, enslavement was too constrained or liable to be restrained to one section of the society. Enslavement happened concomitantly on the bodies of the people, on the resistance of the enslaved, on the shipment of peoples – and their arrival – to foreign land, on the buying and selling of human beings, on extended temporalities (for the centuries that it lasted) and shorter ones, happening on the lives reaped in the fields of forced labour or those mined in search of mineral wealth and of the lives that were not able to see the other margin of the Ocean. And most of all, slavery happened within the ethical and legal debates surrounding the institution of enslavement itself.

What is at play here is not any traditional form of sovereignty based on a tripe of "a subject who has to be subjectified, the unity of the power that has to be founded, and the legitimacy that has to be respected." (Foucault, 2003, 44). When changing the frame to the enslaved person, these categories do not fit, as the subject to be addressed is of a different kind. This means it is not a subjectification in the sense of becoming a vassal to a sovereign: rather it means to be subjected to whatever by whoever. Thus, power is not united: it is as divided as a consequence of existing "owners" of people and, on the matter of legitimacy, it is not carved out of respect, but out of fear, for those with legitimacy were empowered to be violent against enslaved people. Foucault is clear in his 1976 lectures that he is defining his notion of sovereignty from the European experience – more specifically, from the French and English experiences – and this tripe relates to a pre-19th Century Europe. His concept of traditional sovereignty does not speak directly to the experience of a colonial experience of enslavement. But the change on the right of sovereignty that he points as happening in the 19th Century does so:

> I think that one of the greatest transformations political right underwent in the nineteenth century was precisely that, I wouldn't say exactly that sovereignty's old right – to take life or let live – was replaced, but it came to be complemented by a new right which does not erase the old right but which does penetrate it, permeate or; this is the right, or rather precisely the opposite right. It is the power to "make" live and "let" die. The right of sovereignty was the right to take life or let live. And then this new right is established: the right to make live and to let die (Foucault, 2003, 241).

This new right is related to a series of technologies of information that helped European government better understand and control their populations. Such set of technologies allied to this goal is what Foucault defined as biopolitics. Biopolitics is pretty much the State's answer to "the population as a political problem" (Foucault, 2003, 245). As such, it is a double faceted problem: political – to the extent that it is social – and biological – as this society is composed of people whose collective health impacts the political power that can be hammered. Concern with health and the environment on which the population lived came not out of a humanitarian approach to fellow humans, rather as tactics of control and ways of improving forecasts and estimates on population.

The development of biopolitics lead to the instrumentalization of racism, Foucault goes on, within the State. And here, again, the experience of a slave-State distinguishes from the experience of a European country, for racism would lead to the goal of eliminating other populations so that the superior ones would prevail, hence making social life supposedly healthier and purer. This is not the experience developed out of enslavement. Racism was not a death sentence, due to the necessity of the labor of these people to the development of the economy and the construction of societies – on the broader sense of all that the expression construction of society can entail – in the colonies.

Like Tomich (2004) and his category of Second Slavery, Foucault is also looking at the transformations brought to the political scene by the 19th Century. The intersection between the labour in the Americas and the technologies of control of life is the issue that I will articulate as the Empire of Slavery in the last chapter: an instrument to interpret the Atlantic Slavery in the 1800s, considering the contextual transformations in meanings that Tomich (2004) pointed out in building the concept of Second Slavery.

However, in order to do so, it is important to push forward the idea of biopolitics. In that sense, I do that by finding in Achille Mbembe's concept of necropolitics the way of going forward in this discussion of biopolitics to address the intermingling of political power and human body. Necropolitics is a powerful concept that will be discussed throughout this thesis in dialogue with different authors. Mbembe is

developing upon Foucault's biopolitics[11] and aiming at those who fall short – or who have exceeding credentials – to be subjects of biopolitics and, consequently, need another concept to address their existence:

> In this essay I have argued that contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death (necropolitics) profoundly reconfigure the relations among resistance, sacrifice, and terror. I have demonstrated that the notion of biopower is insufficient to account for contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death (Mbembe, 2003, 39-40).

As a matter of fact, Mbembe analyzes the contemporaneous practices of oppression to which the notion of biopolitics would be insufficient to make sense. At this point, it is valid to punctuate the possibility of an observation excessively based on contemporaneity. The possibility of wanting to make comparisons between the sufferings of enslaved that produced the Atlantic and the case of the Palestinians in Gaza following the construction of the argument surpasses the limits of the considerable, and, that is the reason why I find his restriction to "contemporary forms of submission" is bothering. Mbembe's proposition that necropolitics is a reconfiguration of "the relations among resistance, sacrifice and terror" is a powerful conundrum. However, by falling back in the figure of the enslaved person as the image of the "emblematic and paradoxical figure of the state of exception" (Mbembe, 2003, 21) as a reference to the occupation of Palestine (Mbembe, 2003, 27), he does not seem to analyze slavery as a phenomenon on its own right. Rather, he seems to recover it as powerful parallel in his analysis of Palestine. And here lies the bothering part: even in the creation of this concept within the realm of biopolitics, slavery is a point of comparison. To retrieve Koselleck's quote cited in the beginning of the Introduction on the deeds not shocking people, but words shocking people (Koselleck, 1985, 73), Mbembe's argument built as if slavery became a word mobilized to shock people

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[11] An attentive reader asked me why not engaging with Giorgio Agamben's 1998 "Homo Sacer" here as well since, following, Foucault he is also an important reference to the development of Mbembe's rationale on sovereignty. There are, actually, two motives for not doing so. The first is that Agamben develops his argument from the standpoint of exception. His recuperation of Schmitt is precisely on this way of characterizing the sovereign as the one who can decide on where the norm can be suppressed. Conversely, my argument is that slavery was no exception, rather the norm. The second point is that this exceptionality from which Agamben departs leaves him with an analytical point of view still centred in "How to deal with life?" while Mbembe makes an effort to centring his analyses on death – an effort that I see critically but is nonetheless present – and this effort of privileging death over life speaks to the broader argument I am developing in this thesis.

unbothered by other deeds. This is a move that bothers to the extent that it inflicts a naturalization on slavery and reinforces the unproblematized use of the word with potential to universalization in any place, any time.

"Because the slave's life is like a "thing", possessed by another person, the slave existence appears as a perfect figure of a shadow" (Mbembe, 2003, 22). If Siba Grovogui (2016) identifies enslavement as a metaphor – par excellence – of the lack of liberty, Mbembe, by defining the enslaved as a shadow, improves that metaphor, temporality wide, for it is no longer restrained to the 19th Century, since, as a shadow, it can be cast further away into different periods in time.

However, Mbembe's intake on biopolitics not only is this anecdotical of "shadow". His effort is to point out that if technologies and politics work in order to define belonging, it is also possible to make a genealogy of the exclusion not by focusing on life but rather on death as the true definer of sovereignty (Mbembe, 2003, 12-16). My issue with Mbembe is that by focusing on death, he is not doing a categorization different from Foucault. He is only painting a dimmer portrait of a world in which power inflicts pain, not only curtails freedom, and there is already death in life, for that matter. The question is: Is there something else? My argument is that there is. This something is slavery, that should not be defined within the scope of necropolitics since it is not the opposite of citizenship, and not the flip side of biopolitics. To center the analyses on slavery as I am proposing is to ask for another understanding of the idea of control that is dependent on the State, just as much as it depends on another set of legitimations.

2.2.
Other Internationals

Having set the stage by framing slavery in the 19th Century Atlantic departing from Brazil and the challenges it poses to the disciplinary understanding of history, in this section I intend to make four movements in order to displace the discipline towards the Atlantic. It is important to highlight here that the focus is on IR as a discipline, specifically, addressesing that which came to be known as mainstream IR: statecentrism, European perspective and illuminist rational approach. It is clear enough

that this metric does not account for the whole of the discipline: it is a part of it. A larger part, no doubt, but one that has seen the strengthening of the critique it faces. It only takes a look into the program of the most important IR conferences to see the width of this critique. To reach beyond these conferences, it is also possible to account for the academic production inscribed in the discipline that is written in languages other than English advancing the critique on mainstream IR. In Brazil it is a strong trend, one that the publication of a special issue of the journal Monções on theory of IR in Brazil in 2019, written exclusively in Portuguese speaks to. My engagement is not with these productions, it is, rather, if English literature with wide-spread attendance that tend to set the pace to the discipline.

Having said that, it is important to consider that many of the authors with whom I engage in order to build my critique have, already, their framework to think the international as a phenomenon. Though, as they were not inscribed in IR as a discipline (Kamola, 2020), I read them as outsiders that can offer some new perspectives to the critique I structure through-out. It is completely pertinent the argument that this is an arbitrary and institutional definition, however, to the extent that these intelectuals did not saw themselves as IR scholars, I feel that it is not an injuste categorization.

The sections that follow will address how the focus on the enslaved person can serve the discipline to widen its horizons by changing the focus from the citizen and the State by denouncing how the notion of time is defined in terms of the State, recuperating previous authors who dealt with disciplinary racism and by addressing the silence that is constitutive of other tentative histories. I chose to call each subsection as a movement influenced by Paul Gilroy:

> I have settled on the image of ships in motion across the spaces between Europe, America, Africa and the Caribbean as a central organizing symbol for this enterprise and as my starting point. The image of the ship – a living, micro-cultural, micro-political system in motion – is especially important for historical and theoretical reasons that I hope will become clearer below. Ships immediately focus attention on the middle passage, on the various projects for redemptive return to an African homeland, on the circulation of ideas and activists as well as the movement of key cultural and political artefacts: tracts, books, gramophone records, and choirs (Gilroy, 1993, 4).

Gilroy's idea of movement as connection, as a middle passage and as a project of return speaks volumes to the idea of politics that I understand as the most insightful, for it is constantly in the making. It is never arrival, it is never stasis, it is only

sometimes States. The reason for calling the subsections that will follow as "movements" is, from the get go, to indicate that the aim here is to understand politics as movements and, consequently, something difficult to be constrained to the borders of the State.

Gilroy was the first author I had contact with in the development of this research who proposed a more conceptual approach to the Atlantic. His idea to look to the US in order to develop a better understanding of the life of those in the UK is a way of challenging the "structures of the nation and State and the constrains of ethnicity and national particularity" (Gilroy, 1993, 19). The Black Atlantic helped me to figure out how to articulate a narrative of contact as something different from a narrative constrained by borders. Alencastro (2000), another important work for this thesis, helped to think of contact as well, but at the end of the day, the latter was thinking in terms of Brazil, how the country came to be what it was when Alencastro's friends were assassinated by the military government.

In terms of Brazilian bibliography, I think that Costa e Silva (2003) is the best comparison to Gilroy to the extent that, by calling the Atlantic Ocean Atlantic River, he highlights how it modelled the contact between Africa and Brazil instead of emphasizing the geographical distance. This thesis is located in the encounter of the Black Atlantic and the river called Atlantic. It is, thus, in terms of movement that I set the analysis in motion, by trying to articulate concepts to deal with people and spaces caught in this "*pororoca*".

2.2.1.
First Movement: Where and who, if anyone anywhere

Modern slavery only makes sense when thought through the logic of difference. It is the sign of sin, it is the dammed (grand)son, it is the different ethnicity, it is the one that is no citizen – nor human. However, in the 19th Century, the different was not exterminated, nor was s/he included. The enslaved person occupies a very specific locus in the formation of States. This locus is so specific that it is difficult to frame, despite Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney's perspective on the problem of difference. The reason therefore is because the modern political spaces that were

constituted through the use of enslaved manpower were done so in a different way, other than that usually reproduced by European narrative on the constitution of the State. It occurs not as the exclusion of difference from its borders, as the French did with the Huguenots in the 16th Century, but as a very specific way of dealing with those populations.

> We suggest a different interpretation of international society in which the problem of difference is pervasive. The bounded political community constructs (and is constructed by) others both within and beyond its boundaries. The other lurks as a perpetual threat in the form of other states, foreign groups, imported goods, and alien ideas and as difference within, vitiating the presumed but rarely, if ever, achieved "sameness". Internal others are managed or governed by some combination of hierarchy, eradication by assimilation or expulsion, and tolerance. External others are left to suffer or prosper according to their own means, interdicted at border crossings, balanced and deterred, or in appropriate cases, subjected to coercion or conquest. Our responses to others seem, as explained in the introduction, perpetually drawn toward Todorov's equation: difference is translated as inferiority and thereby subjected to eradication (Inayatullah, Blaney, 2004, 39-40).

Inayatullah and Blaney seem to have felt in the territorial trap acknowledged by Agnew and Corbridge (1995) in equating nation with State. In such a scenario where the two are equated, the description of the authors offers a precise analysis. However, when the State does not equate with nation, their proposition falls short. As a matter of fact, it is in the use of Todorov's double movement as a way of assimilating difference and reinstating homogeneity that they misstep their argument. For, as a consequence of this logic, the authors would have accepted the equivalence between State and nation as the sole possibility of modernity – be it as a consequence of the annihilation of difference, be it as the incorporation of the difference to the national model.

The Brazilian case shows that there is at least one situation in which the constitution of the modern nation as a project succeeds the establishment of the State (Carvalho, 1998a, 1998b), but with caveats that do not allow for the elimination of the difference nor for the incorporation of the difference to the nation. The adoption of enslavement forces a different approach to the Brazilian case due to the key role that the constitutive alterity played in the country and to the necessity in denying any limitation to the social incorporation of black populations while it was enforced. In fact, the first half of the 19th Century, when the historical narrative proposed by Vanhargen was established as the official narrative by the Brazilian Historical and

Geographical Institute affirming that Brazilian nationality was composed by the harmonious union of the three races (white, indigenous and black), enslavement was at its highest. This discourse has laid the ground for the narrative developed later on "The Masters and the Slaves" by Gilberto Freyre ([1933], 2005), a book that, at best, relativizes violence against enslaved populations, and whose resonance in Brazilian social thought is still so powerful. In either case, the fact that the physical presence of the black population does not mean that they have actually been incorporated to the nation is not considered.

In their reading of Walker (1993), Inayatullah and Blaney identify an instability that would be typical of modernity which it is likely to find a solution in the two possibilities that Todorov lays for the issue of the difference: incorporation or annihilation. The problem here is that there is no solution to the problem of modernity in the way posed by Walker, for the exclusion is a constant movement that is necessary for the maintenance of the dynamic of modernity itself. In more theoretical terms, Walker is proposing an interpretation that derives from his reading of Derrida. Therefore, he questions the possibility of a movement that would create stability, since the idea of a stable subject is, in itself, an abstraction. The subject is present inasmuch as his absence is present. Tzvetan Todorov sees differently. For him, the "I" is an absolute presence, a point of departure for his argument. His first paragraph is:

> My subject – the discovery self makes of the other – is so enormous that any general formulation soon ramifies into countless categories and directions. We can discover the other in ourselves, realize we are not a homogeneous substance, radically alien to whatever is not us: as Rimbaud said, *J'est un autre*. But others are also "*I*'s: subjects just as I am, whom only my point of view – according to which all of them are out there and I alone am in here – separates and authentically distinguishes from myself. (Todorov, 1984, 3)

To use Todorov as a way of making stable a definitive modernity that was first elaborated in terms derived from readings of Derrida is to change the concept of the subject of modernity. It is a way of offering a stable telos for modernity, as if the difference was representative of a period of modernity that could be overcome in modernity itself. For the critique of Inayatullah and Blaney is still a critique on the grounds of modernity.

To produce another idea of encounter, it is possible to rely on Jean-Luc Nancy, whose idea of the challenges of the encounter resonates better with the Derridian move which the authors inherit from Walker. To Nancy (1990), communication is not a bridge, once it is incomplete: there is something missing in the exposition that one makes to the world; therefore, we never achieve it to express what "is" the "I", if there is something that we can say that is this "I" which represents something more than the abstraction of the liberal individual. This incapacity of reaching the wish for communication of the "I" is not something that one suppresses the society nor will it collapse the interaction between the multiplicity of "Is". Instead, people will constantly deal with the difficulty of dialoguing with the incomplete messages that result from the efforts for communication. Nancy points, therefore, to language and interactions that constitute themselves in the process and in the interaction; they do not materialize as a result of a previous plan:

> But the individual is merely the residue of the experience of the dissolution of community. By its nature – as its name indicates it's the atom, the indivisible – the individual reveals that it is the abstract result of a decomposition. It is another, and symmetrical, figure of immanence: the absolutely detached for itself, taken as origin and as certainty (Nancy, 1990, 3).

To conceive International Relations as being composed by this multiplicity of individuals that are no more than incomplete versions of the self, that are part and consequence of the societies from which they originate, is the possibility of thinking a completely different discipline from that which assumes an idea of a universal rational individual as parameter. And here, it is important to point out the difference between the abstraction of Nancy's concept – an effort to articulate the incomplete presence and, consequently, the multiplicity of possible individuals – and that of the universalization of the liberal concept of autonomous, rational and sovereign individual, criticized by Richard Ashley (1989) as the abstract personification of the universal and the consequences it brings with it.

Ashley's critique to the liberal subject and Nancy's proposal of a concept to offer sense to human action are points of departure to inhabit International Relations. This is a necessary move once we notice that there is more to the modern international than the European white male liberal individual, which is the point of departure to the

abstractions on politics that populate the discipline. Other spaces were inserted in the modern international through different historical processes that resulted in a different set of shared assumptions and political background. The experience of the Atlantic space with the enslaved labour in economic activities developed in colonial spaces in order to indulge the thirst of industrialized Western countries for commodities (Williams, 1944) is one of such processes that resulted in a different subjectivity than the liberal abstract pattern. Articulated that way, Nancy and Ashley offer a powerful framework to think alternatives to the impoverished figure that serves as point of departure to the political imaginary.

The disciplinary silence on slavery demands the reconstruction of the subject of the discipline. The sovereign man (Ashley, 1989) and the modern subject (Walker, 2018) are some of the concepts adopted to refer to this idyllical liberal man gestated in 1648 but that only in the 19th Century realizes his potential in full. Ashley (1989) and Walker (2018) do not propose an alternative point of departure to the interpretation of politics because, for them, in doing so, other subjectivities are necessarily silenced. This is an argument I do not refute, but that I believe should be taken with a grain of salt. The abstract liberal idea of citizen and the potential of invisibility that it creates is one thing; yet the proposition of an abstraction that is centred in the experience of marginalization of enslaved people is another. There is, unfortunately, more grounds to relate to this violently treated group of people than there are to relate to the white western man. An abstraction that would not be claiming disciplinary universality can be grounds to facilitate the inhabitation of the field by a plurality of points of departure relatable to the violent terms of enslavement in the 19th Century Atlantic. Second Slavery is especially interesting as a marker for this purpose, to the extent that it works as a way of upholding Liberalism as a marker of the divide between the worlds of citizens and enslaved people in the 19th Century. It is an interesting concept that will help navigate two of the realities that inhabit these shores at that time. This divide is a reminder that necropolitics does not invalidate biopolitics. To the extent that they are different – and perhaps– these two concepts, target different sets of people albeit during the same period. They are both mechanisms of control accounting for experiences held

during the 1800s, but one acts within the realms of citizenship and the other, on the sphere of enslavement.

It is from this idea of subjectivity that relates to the construction of individualities as a consequence of power relations that it is possible to come back to the notion of encounters. Roxanne Doty (1996) speaks of Imperial Encounters as the moments in which "North and South" meet and the spaces of development and underdevelopment are defined. One can be certain that such definition does not derive from a horizontal exchange based on dialogue.

> Arguably one of the most consequential elements present in all of the encounters between the North and the South has been the practice(s) of representation by the North of the South. By representation I mean the ways in which the South has been discursively represented by policy makers, scholars, journalists, and others in the North. This does not refer to the "truth" and "knowledge" that the North has discovered and accumulated about the South, but rather to the ways in which regimes of "truth" and "knowledge" have been produced (Doty, 1996, 2).

The encounter is the possibility of building alterity and establishing logics of power and domination that go beyond the warlike dominion and are established by the construction of knowledge on the other. This knowledge, when interpreted through the lenses of inferiority derived from phenotypical differences understood as biologically sufficient to define difference – namely, in the sense of inferiority – operate by ways of downgrading. The scientific knowledge that is established in the process creates a world organized in such a way that each one possesses a defined space. To question the "defined space" is to question a thought structure that dates back to Antiquity to propose harmony and the belonging as central logics. By producing knowledge on the encounters in such a way as to denounce the development of knowledges of subalternalization in the periphery – that are necessary to the construction of discourses on liberty in central spaces – results in an inversion of the logic of power and knowledge that destabilizes the discipline while denouncing the categories and presenting the instability of the notion of individual.

To identify the international as the space of the difference and to build the State as the space of homogeneity through the process of submission or annihilation of those that do not belong to certain parameters is to come back to the argument of Inayatullah and Blaney (2004). My intention is to depart from it but taking this argument further

by acknowledging the possibility of States in which the territorial trap is more evident since not only the abstraction of the equivalence between State and nation is flawed, but also the nation itself was made through the denial of the workforce. The production of space, thus, is dependent on a section of the population made into pariahs on which the State, and its citizens, were completely dependent. This is the case of Brazil: a country that had slaves within its borders, but never completely internalized the enslaved person within the nation. This leaves me with the question that if the international is the space of the difference, what does that space mean to cases in which the issue of the difference is so constitutive of the State itself (be it materially, or socially)? If instead of saying "International Relations and the problem of difference" we were to say "difference and the problem of International Relations", what would it mean? By dislocating the discipline to the figure of the enslaved person, my goal is precisely that: to establish the point of departure on something unknown, forgotten, silenced, and seeing where this leads to, instead of departing from an already embattled notion of anarchy and the eternal process of eugenics that is the dynamic of State building.

Luiz Felipe de Alencastro (2000) argues that the space of the construction of Brazil is in the South Atlantic. He argues that throughout the 17th Century, there was an autonomous agency in the relation between the colony and the Portuguese metropole. This relation, however, is not to deny the condition of coloniality that conducted the occupation of Brazilian territory, rather, to say that the colonization was not done worrying if the population would become homogeneous. The Portuguese colonial space was seen as a space organized in such a way as to favor the commerce of the enslaved people and of the goods developed through their labor. However, as Alencastro (2000) himself argues, the orientation towards an enslaved trade through the Atlantic is a consequence of the agency of the – then – provinces of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in their dispute towards being prominent in the colonial space. As presented in the Introduction, this rivalry lead Anônio Rapsoso Tavares to his incursion in South America's heartland searching for enough indigenous people to enslave as an option to the Atlantic trade, embattled as a consequence of the conquest, by the Dutch, of the Portuguese colony of Angola. The option of Rio de Janeiro to reconquer Angola

and to reopen the trade is the one which proves to be more effective, mainly as a consequence of the number of people that could be kidnapped and transported to America. But there is also a geopolitical aspect that should not be ignored: this is the option that articulates the Portuguese colonial space. What arrives from this dispute between Rio and São Paulo is not only the possibility of agency of colonial territories, but also that the enslaved person should not be essentialized in a certain profile as if it were predetermined. Slavery should be seen as a form of exploitation of labour in certain parts of the world in a certain moment in History that creates the enslaved person of that specific moment in time.

When Inayatullah and Blaney (2004) focus in America by analyzing the contact between the native populations and the Europeans – not accounting for the enslavement of people kidnapped in Africa and brought to these shores – America as the colonial 'contact zone', using the expression by Mary Louise Pratt (2007, 9), is restricted in its capacity of dealing with the difference. The reason therefore is that the encounter that happened here was more complex, for the constitution of America as a space is a process that is only complete when one considers enslavement as the production of this space. The debate regarding the enslavement of native populations has, in the enslavement of African populations, its condition of possibility. Therefore, the constitutive outside of the subjected alterity for the native populations is established not as a consequence of being defined as superior, but due to their condition of absolute submission. Thus, to make sense of the colonial encounter without considering, at the same time, Europeans, Americans and Africans and the possibility of enslavement that the first group brought over the other two, is to see only segments of the picture. By looking only to a segment of this it becomes more likely to essentialize different roles. Thus, the European as the rational one – the one that discusses the possibilities and advantages in the enslavement of other populations – the American as the inhabitant of the space who lived a peaceful life prior to the arrival of the Europeans and the African who are brought to these shores to produce this space as a consequence of their

enslavement. This narrative, with its essentialized roles, is not very different than that of Vanhargen.[12]

Blaney and Inayatullah (2004, 8) defend the idea of seeing International Relations as a powerful space to deal with difference/ the different(s) as a consequence of it being the antithesis of the space of homogeneity represented by the State. Therefore, they open the possibility to analyze the phenomenon of slavery – even though they do not deal with slavery – through this other spatial logic: "the international". It is, thus, through the international that I propose to understand new forms of alterity that were central to the production of spaces charged more with similarities than different, but that were understood as a series of national phenomena. By looking to slavery through the non-national lenses, the goal is to propose a new function to the bordering: instead of defining the terms of belonging, the border is read in terms of the marker of hierarchical relations within it. To be on one side or the other of the frontier is to say if you are a citizen or enslaved. Instead of understanding that the borders mark the space of homogeneity, I want to see what happens when we think – spatially – considering the marginalizations within different borders as the definer of homogeneity. Hence the importance of having a point of departure other than the sovereign man (Ashley, 1989) or the modern subject (Walker, 2018), because the State borders come along with them.

For that matter, it is important to clarify my understanding on alterity. This concept is usually regarded as attached to the contribution of Todorov and to the notions of an "I" and of an "other" that are absolute and present. It also establishes the possibility of the "I" to recognize the "other" as a different "I", therefore entitled to the same rights and responsibilities as "I" am. The notion of alterity that I propose in this regard to slavery is an effort to detach from an essential "I" and its individualistic and self-centered premises and to be more attached to a collective perception. In order to

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[12] The nomenclature adopted here was deliberated as the inhabitants of the continents being accounted for solely as inhabitants of the continents that we now recognize as such: Europe, America and Africa. I understand that calling Americans can cause a little confusion at first, as if I would be referring to US citizens, however, I trust that by this time the temporality of this section is marked in a period where such relationality regarding the concept would not be so direct as it is today. This option is also a way of causing some discomfort in the necessity of essentialization of American native populations as something other than Americans.

do so, I propose an idea of alterity through the reading of Paul Gilroy's "*Black Atlantic*" (1993) and his effort of de-stabilizing collective cultural identities directly related to nationality in the way that it is built, namely in a rational and coherent historical narrative. As a consequence, I propose the substitution of the moment of the encounter for the narrative of coexistence as a way of reconstructing the idea of alterity.

It is important to argue, however, that the notion of coexistence that I propose here does not presuppose peace nor harmony, but interaction, it is to be understood as sharing the living space or as frequently interacting. This proposal has to do with the idea that the construction of alterity through an individual "I" establishes the possibility of reinventing the ideal model of the "I" *ad infinitum* through characteristics that are always excluding due to their ideational character, given that they do not actually represent anyone. This proposal of alterity is one that augments the fractures in the historical narratives of harmony and constitution of peaceful interactions, for it expands the "encounter" proposed by Todorov and dislocates this encounter as the important temporality. Paul Gilroy (1993) creates exactly this fissure when dealing with the cultural relations between the US and the UK by looking at the interaction between black communities in both shores of the Ocean. It does not encounter and it does not deal with the stereotypical US nor UK citizen. There are more people in there, and those people tell other histories. My argument is that these other histories can point to other internationals as well.

This logic of alterity is more political on the grounds that it recognizes a dynamism in the processes of approximation and distancing that affects every person that can even think they are not defined by specific moments. To deal with this alterity in a political way is also to deal with it in a non-anachronical way, for since the social relations are not defined by social categories – juridical and belief systems – historically situated, to focus on the relations instead of the moment can indicate the way in which the relations transformed in time. In other words, the comprehension of alterity in this form deals with difference not as synthetized in a moment, but on how this difference manifests and reproduces itself in the cultural narrative in which the person recognizes him/herself constantly as incomplete in the cultural identity in which s/he is immersed. This constant lack of familiarity regarding one's own social insertion

can be made evident not necessarily in the cultural narratives, but in the fortuitous encounters "lost in time" that succeed in individual lives.

This alterity that constitutes itself in the movement and reinvents itself at all times finds its limits in what Eduardo Viveiros de Castro interprets from histories narrated on the contact between native American and the Spanish in Hispaniola Island, and how the contact with the unknown culture resulted in the former asking themselves if the invaders were gods, and in the Europeans asking themselves if the native population they encountered were animals:

> If this is really how things transpired, it forces us to conclude that, despite being just as ignorant on the subject of the other, the other of the Other was not exactly the same as the other of the Same. We could even say that it was its exact opposite, if not for the fact that the relation between these two others of humanity – animality and divinity – is conceived in indigenous worlds in completely different terms than those we have inherited from Christianity (Castro, 2014, 51).

Viveiros de Castro is pointing to the limits of being able to communicate to the Other the exact meaning of the image of the Same have as a consequence of being immersed in different spaces of meaning. The limit is not in contact, in the encounter or in the process of construction of alterity, but in language: always insufficient and limiting (Nancy, 1990, 15). Focusing on communities, Jean-Luc Nancy (1990) is interested in the relations that constitute it or, rather, that allows them to emerge. Nancy understands the individual as "merely the residue of the experience of the dissolution of community" (Nancy, 1990, 4). This abstract figure – the individual that relates to Ashley's (1989) sovereign man or Walker's (2017) modern subject – is an insufficient figment of imagination to the extent that language is insufficient to articulate – through speech – the ultimate individual experience: death. The impossibility of articulating "I am dead" – within the specter of reason and non-literary works – imposes the limit of language to articulate what "is most proper and most inalienable" (Nancy, 1990, 14) of individuals. The moment of death is the moment in which the "I" is no longer. It is the moment in which "I" conjugate "is" as a sign of the detachment of the mechanisms that rule over presence.

The moment of death is the moment in which community manifests since it is in that moment that people structure around the idea of other – dead – instead of the "I"s.

Community is thus forever moving in the absence of the individual and the presence of the people that compose the collective.

Nancy's notion of the insufficiency of communication as an instrument to bring people together and his idea of death as the instrument for the manifestation of community is central to this thesis. Not only because it brings the idea of silence as constitutive but to allow for an elaboration on necropolitics and the vision of death – not life – as the organizer of politics. Death is not the realm of the sovereign man nor of the modern subject.

Such digression on alterity is relevant in order to look at slavery through the concept of necropolitics in a way that is not restricted to a criticism on the disciplinary silence, but in one that acknowledges that these processes of enslavement resulted in many encounters and many manifestations of alterity that manifested themselves as sentiments. Those sentiments will remain in silence: a silence representative of the incapacity of representing the individual in all of hers/his details. That does not mean that its consequences will not manifest (or have been manifested) in many forms in the constitution of the discipline or of the spaces built as a result of the dynamics of enslavement.

As a result, the enslaved people are representations of the transformation of human beings in "a perfect figure of a shadow", or "death-in-life" (Mbembe, 2003, 21). "Indeed, the slave condition results from a triple loss: loss of a 'home', loss of rights over his or her body, and loss of political status. This triple loss is identical with absolute domination, natal alienation, and social death." (Mbembe, 2003, 21). The enslavement that has constituted this absolute domination is the first experience of biopolitics that Achille Mbembe sees as possible of being categorized as necropolitics: such an absolute control over the bodies that the idea of biopolitics is insufficient. For Mbembe, "under conditions of necropower, the lines between resistance and suicide, sacrifice and redemption, martyrdom and freedom are blurred." (Mbembe, 2003, 40). It is through this insufficiency of biopower and biopolitics that Mbembe proposes that it is possible to make sense of enslavement, for it is the most elaborated way of presenting the multiple and concomitant violences that are inflicted in a person.

Mbembe's (2003) argument that the enslaved people are not seen as people, since they are not allowed any control over their bodies, and, beyond the bodies, the conditions of violence under which they are held denies them the socialization therefore we cannot even talk about a community since "a community implies the exercise of the power of speech and thought" (Mbembe, 2003, 21). The point of contact between Mbembe and Nancy in the approach to death, seems not to relate to their definition of community. In this dispute between these approaches to community, it is worth remembering that, for Grovogui, slavery is the most powerful metaphor to indicate the absence of liberty (Grovogui, 2013, 251). That may be understood as another loss because to have such a loose definition of slavery is the possibility of attributing a meaning to her/his existence or her/his body that may be different from that totalizing category of enslaved. However, it may also point to the possibility of Mbembe defining slavery as deprivation of traces of life to which the access was more difficult. Treating slavery as the most powerful metaphor of absence – of freedom or of whatever else – is a way of ignoring the resistance that those people held against the set of violences to which they were submitted, and this is a violence in and of itself. On chapter 4, I discuss that with more vigor, but it is focusing on the possibility of resistance as a consequence of communal ties that I challenge this idea of absence of community that Mbembe sees as a consequence of slave owners.

Thus, this condition of deprivation of the peoples who were so central to the constitution of the Atlantic space leads to the question of how to think enslavement in International Relations politically? Is the figure of the enslaved person one that marks the possibility of thinking IR no longer in binaries (citizen, non-citizen) by articulating a different kind of otherness: the kind that is welcomed, at the same time that is denied? Is it possible to go beyond the perception of Grovogui (2013) of the enslaved person as a metaphor and try to see them as actors in the making of the world, therefore recognizing the specificities of the enslavement in the 19th Century and the role of enslavement in that period of the constitution of Capitalism?

2.2.2.
Second Movement: Function and time

If the first movement identifies the denial – non-subjects in no space, the second brings with it the confirmation of the function of enslaved populations. Their function is the *sentido* of enslavement. Here I dwell with the Portuguese meaning of the word *sentido* that can be translated as "meaning", as "direction" and as "felt". As I said in the last movement, sentiments and affection are not possible to be retrieved. However, the other two senses of the word are useful to the purpose of this movement, for the issue is not only the meaning of the practice, but also the direction to which the enslavement of peoples in the 19th Century points. This movement, therefore, accounts for enslavement in its temporal feature: its persistence in time along with the changes in the meaning of the practice.

Caio Prado Jr., in a seminal book on Brazilian Colonial History called the second chapter of his "*Formação do Brasil Contemporâneo: colônia*"[13] "The *Sentido* of Colonization". The first sentences of the chapter read:

> Every nation has in its evolution, seen at distance, a certain '*sentido*'[14]. It is perceived not in the details of its history, but in the assemble of facts and essential events that make it through a large stretch of time. One observing that assemble, dismissing secondary events that always accompany and, many times, make it confusing and incomprehensible, will not miss the perception that it is created of an uninterrupted master line of events that succeed themselves in rigorous order always tilting to a certain path (Prado Jr., 1961, 13).[15] [author's translation]

Prado Jr. is a counter example to this thesis. He looks to the colonial period of Brazil searching for the contemporary Brazil, instead of looking to it in the potentialities that it had for what came to be and what it did not. In this sense, his meaning of "*sentido*" falls closer to the idea of direction. History defined by the direction towards contemporaneity. This history defined by the future is framed by the clear-cut categories of "Material Life" and "Social Life" as the name of the book sections points to. This direction determined by the inequalities of the contemporaneity of the author defines *sentido* as a post-determined direction. By not committing to a

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[13] The book was published by University of California, Berkley as "The Colonial Background of Modern Brazil" in 1971 – ten years after this edition with which I am working.

[14] In quotation marks in the original version.

[15] I have not had access to the English version of the book, so the quote is translated by the author from the 1961 edition of the book in Portuguese.

translation to the Portuguese word, the goal here is to distance myself from teleological readings of history while transiting between the potential translation of *"sentido"*,

The first movement saw alterity as a way of thinking the subjects that take part in multiple processes of encounters. The persistence of the enslavement in the Atlantic space allows one to think that this alterity was denied, or failed to exist. However, to conclude so is to expect that the encounters would lead only to positive acquaintances. Slavery shows that by recovering encounters we are on our way to reattribute meaning to these encounters, for we can evaluate them. One is then able to find politics in the encounters. This movement of confirmation allows to see that these encounters lead to a fork that hierarchizes the relations and offers variations on the meaning of the life of the people encountered. These hierarchizations and *sentidos* characterize enslavement in the Atlantic space.

In order to work with the idea of encounter with difference, I will recover David Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah's (2004) notion of 'culture' that offers a most synthetic definition of the term:

> To summarize, the language of *culture* draws attention to the construction, maintenance, and transformation of meaningful and purposeful schemes of existence as a common human endeavor, yet also as multiple, diverse, and often competing human projects. Thus, we might add, the human project itself is coterminous with what we have called the "contact zone", exhibiting the varied possibilities admitted by cultural encounters (Blaney, Inayatullah, 2004, 15).

Culture is, therefore, at the same time the differentiation from nature – due to the transformative action of humanity – and its community life, built in part due to the process of transforming nature itself. The possibility of "cultural encounters" to which the authors make reference depends on the premise that cultures are multiple and developed from communal social experiences. This is the same premise that allows Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2014) to denounce the dichotomic relation between nature and culture:

> The notion of multiculturalism becomes useful here on account of its paradoxical character. Our microconcept of nature fails to acknowledge veritable plurality, which spontaneously forces us to register the ontological solecism contained in the idea of "several natures" and thus the corrective displacement it imposes. Paraphrasing a formula of Deleuze's on relativism, we could say that Amazonian multinaturalism affirms not so much a variety of nature as the naturalness of variation – variation as nature. The inversion of the Occidental formula of multiculturalism bears not simply on its constitutive terms – nature and culture – as they are mutually determined by their

respective functions of unity and diversity, but also on the values accorded to term and function themselves (Castro, 2014, 74-5).

So, to the same extent that the cultural encounters proposed by Inaytullah and Blaney (2004) argue that there are multiple cultures that can meet at any given time/space, it is also important to highlight that Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2014) defends the idea of the divide between culture and nature being in itself a definition of a standpoint aligned with a western view and understanding of the world (Castro, 2014, 74-75). I do not challenge Castro on his perception and effort of situating language in terms of Amerindians perspectivism. However, this thesis notion of silence resides not on the idea of "beings in the world" that are not translated (nor I wish to deny these existences). The silence I want to address is that of those who enabled the construction of culture and that nevertheless were completely ignored, not only because of their "otherness" manifested in the bodies, but on the ambivalence that society held towards their labour. That said, this rationale is working within the Western world and lexicon, because it is not necessary to go beyond it to listen to the whispers of difference. These whispers are heard through the cracks found in the Western production of space itself.

Roxanne Lynn Doty (1996) proposes the analysis of unequal relations that are stablished from the contact of Europeans with populations from other spaces, a contact that resulted in the constitution of the North-South divide (both in the practices and in the logics of differentiation). Doty identifies the passivity in the process of building a narrative. A process led by the North (Doty, 1996, 11). Following this logic, hierarchy operates through the constitution of a center from which power emanates in the form of the constitution of meaning to the relation that is stablished (Doty, 1996, 7). The notion of culture is built in this process because, while making part of a hall of differences, practices and habits, it makes possible to discriminate and submit those that are not Europeans. The definition of Imperial Encounters derives precisely from the hierarchization according to which they operate.

Blaney and Inayatullah (2010) argue that the concept of culture is built in such a way that allows for the differentiation of relationships that are established following other logics that are not the occidental logic formatted by capitalism. Once they re-read classical European Philosophers, Political Scientists and Political-Economists – such as Adam Smith, James Stewart, Adam Fergunson, Georg Hegel and Karl Marx – they

note how the buildup of political and economic thought is a practice spatially located in Europe that differentiate those who belong and those who do not belong. "We regard political economy as an effect of the Western's desire to differentiate the West from what it deems as savage or barbarous others" (Blaney, Inayatullah, 2010, 11). They are proposing a denaturalization of capitalism through its cultural, and essentially unequal, characteristic (Blaney, Inayatullah, 2010 3). It is only through this logic that it will be possible to accomplish the authors' proposition:

> An investigation of the cultural constitution of political economy involves exploring an identity formation that splits self and other. It also requires articulating the transgressive vision that lies within the necessary overlap of self and other. We find in this space the modern "West's" most sacred and enduring social and political ideals, its greatest fears and anxieties, and potentially powerful alternative visions of social and political life. Exploring this terrain also means recognizing that political economy is a cultural encounter (Blaney, Inayatullah, 2010, 18).

Doty (1996) talks about Imperial encounters as the building up of hierarchies between different groups, but Blaney and Inayatullah (2010) talk about Political Economy as a way of synthetizing a broader critique to the colonial process of building hierarchies, for this construction is not only political. It is also economic, to the extent to which these two concepts can express – in the modern coloniality – different spaces of rule. To define capitalism as a culture – a term capable of synthetizing the economics and politics of Europe that expanded itself in colonial projects – is a way of offering a critique to this European modernity following the acknowledgement that it is no more than a set of texts (Osiander, 2007, 3) and not a set of events – encounters. In the same way that Viveiros de Castro argues that there is validity in stepping outside of this dichotomy culture/nature and seeing the world(s) that we can see through it, I believe that the fusion of the Western idea of Economy and of Politics in the idea of a Western culture is a way of better situating what the Atlantic in the 19th Century contributed to in terms of creating the subjects that would populate it. This larger idea of culture that shares the idea of language discussed in the previous movement: a language that segregates within a culture that dominates. This idea of culture, a sort of unity shared through the Atlantic, is important to the notion of Empire that I will develop in full in the last chapter of this work.

Doty highlights that the event in itself has no meaning, which is given as a consequence of interpretations (1996, 5); nevertheless, she talks about events, while Blaney and Inayatullah see in the Western Political Economy tradition a way of identifying the origin of this modernity. They are looking into the construction of the logics that allows for the interpretation to which Doty makes reference, hence they offer a more profound critique when they argue on the sense of a Cultural Political Economy (Blaney, Inayatullah, 2010, 24). In this thesis both are important, because to the extent that in chapter 4 I develop further on the people that inhabited this culture, in chapter 5, I discuss some of the texts that were important to the construction of the Empire of which this culture is representative.

Following these perspectives, to think enslavement continues to be a challenge, for people were enslaved to work, therefore to transform nature into culture to the extent that "the language of culture" allowed for the "construction, maintenance, and transformation of meaningful and purposeful schemes of existence", as articulated by Inayatullah and Blaney (2004, 15). However, the operative nouns "as a common human endeavour" (Inayatullah, Blaney, 2004, 15) are left behind in this Atlantic community centered in slavery. Thinking culture in those terms in this space points to the tension within this Empire in one of the two ways. It can either be by not recognizing humanity in all people, or, by accounting for a version of humanity limited to the likeness demanded to be considered human. Modern enslavement operates in a transformation of the logics of work and in its social meaning since the transformation of natural world is no longer enough to the inclusion in the cultural world. The cultural aspect is important to help dimensioning the exclusion of enslaved people since it was their work that produced the space (Lefebvre, 1990) – thus they were indispensable – at the same time, they were marginalized politically and economically. By keeping the idea of culture proposed by Inayatullah and Blaney (2004) and setting aside the proposition of Castro (2014) of the unity between social and natural, the goal is precisely to take into account that the marginalization of the enslaved people happened despite the fact that their actual labour was what created the material culture of the Atlantic in the 19th Century. Through this lenses, Orlando Patterson (1982), calling slavery social death due to the depth of the exclusion it entails, should be accompanied by the following

question: whose death? Since it was the enslaved that built the society, shouldn't s/he be considered the socially living? The long-lasting exclusion generated by slavery, does not mean that it was not a dynamic system. In fact, it was really not stationary, and saw changes in the meaning of enslavement, as will be discussed in chapter 5. Nevertheless, the practices did not transform in the same way as their meaning did, for the different sense of enslavement did not affect the route of the ships, the ports in which they arrived or the chains used to arrest people.

To say that the exclusion was long lasting does not equate to say that the exclusion had the same meaning for different people in different times, but that the meaning of being an enslaved person would no longer mean to be the one who does not belong to Christendom. Eventually, the enslaved person could convert to it, a process which could be enacted through forced labour, but s/he would still be of a certain origin and thus bring in their own bodies the marks of exclusion. Marks one could not toss aside even if they were to achieve their freedom. This change in the meaning, from the 16th to the 19th centuries, affects the expectations one could have for one's own life.

Considering that space is more than the definition of limits, enslavement was the responsible for the transformation of nature into culture, thus the production of space (Lefebvre, 1990), but the meaning of enslavement is not static and this transformation has to do with the transformation in the political-economic relations of Eurocentric Capitalism of the 19th Century. The practice of transforming the natural world into culture and to exclude from participating in the community those who actually worked is a marker in the transformation of meaning.

Siba Grovogui points to the procedural aspect of this building of meaning:

> The Idea of a self-contained and superior Europe did not become authoritative until after the seventeenth century when the Christian emporium of Europe was first projected metaphysically as a separate and self contained civilizational sphere. This professed uniqueness of Europe was upheld by the Enlightenment and subsequent ideologies. Related discourses claimed that Europe alone possessed reason (rationality), science (positivism), and sensibility (pragmatism). These discourses did not merely disavow Europe's connections, debts, and relations with other regions. They cast other regions as sites of violent cultures (Grovogui, 2006, 27).

To talk about Europe as cohesive occurs from the moment in which there is the production of meaning in European development. This is a process that not only

accounts for territorial expansion, but also for changes in internal politics. Blaney and Inayatullah (2010) show how this culture was built through Political Economy and Philosophy texts from the late 18th and the early 19th century, written by authors who acknowledged that this European modernization was a process of violence that imposed value to other kinds of life (Blaney, Inayatullah, 2010, 4).

The central point here is the claim to the universality of this process, which is no longer contained in Europe. While representing the challenge that the idea of a global community represents, Jens Bartelson (2009) affirms that the notions of universal communities are imperial projects, since the impossibility of articulating a universal thought originated – and it will always originate – from particularity (Bartelson, 2009, 4-5). While building his argument within the logic that the construction of a society is the construction of the texts from this society, Bartelson talks about Kant, Hegel and Schmitt as the typical authors in this construction of discourse of a community that proposes itself to be universal, yet that is only the expanded projection of its own cultural particularities. If Bartelson's (2009) proposal is to identify how the universal ideas expanded from Europe towards the rest of the World, Blaney and Inayatullah (2010) point to the fact that this variation is residual, since once they are inserted in a spectrum of European thought, be it economic or political, then the conception of totality inherited from the Enlightenment that manifests itself in its best shape in Liberalism is already granted. It is this teleological thought of modernity that is the condition of possibility for the non-European be categorized as backward and the Europeans as the advanced ones.

The language used in this comparison already indicates which is the background of the debate on the conception of time. It is not History, as a space of the narratives on the human actions, but the idea of time itself, as seen by Blaney and Inayatullah (2010, 8-9), as a bourgeoise – thus European – concept that is established from the logics of work. It is labour logic which offers sense to past and future[16]. The former as

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[16] This section is thought through the proposition of Blaney and Inayatullah on time, so here I am pushing forward my argument from the point they let me at. I understand that this is not– nor could it be – a final intake on the notion of time and I acknowledge that the bibliography on the subject is as vast as it is interesting with contributions of authors with great contributions, such as Jacques Le Goff (1980), Constantin Fasolt (2004), Reinhart Koselleck (1985) and Ashis Nandy (2001). Specifically in IR, Paulo

a narrative that offers sense for thinking the latter (Blaney, Inayatullah, 2010, 9). As a fruit of modernity by excellence, this dichotomic distinction between past and future is clear; however, it does not define the role, or the limits of, the present. To think the present as the time of working is a way of making sense of the marginalization of those whose identities are attached to labour, be it the free-worker or the enslaved person. In the case of the enslaved person, such present inserts itself in the logics of necropolitics and life becomes an eternal present, in the sense of an invisibilization of the past and the impossibility of thinking the future.

Still reflecting on this time frame proposed by Blaney and Inayatullah (2010), it is interesting to think how the idea of culture refers to this relation between the idea of time. Here I am thinking specifically about the kind of discourse that, by the 19th Century, justified slavery on the grounds of the backwardness of black peoples and how uncivilized they were (Slenes, 2011). This kind of discourse did define the two temporalities inhabiting the present, with the backward labor producing the imagined space having the future in mind. Perhaps the present is the constitutive point of contact between these two distinct universes.

It is the building up of this constitutive present that allows for the comprehension of enslavement being perpetuated until contemporaneity, which can be noticed in Roxanne Doty (1996), who comprehends the North-South relation as a hierarchical relation of constitution of meanings through European Imperial Encounters with colonized spaces. It can also be found in Anna Agathangelou (2013)'s text, which sees enslavement as a logic of exclusion that allows for the contemporaneous exclusion of queer and that, to some extent, works as a marker of abnormality that allows, for example, the incorporation of Western gays and lesbians in the canons of normality. The enslaved person of the 19th Century, in as much as any queer person in contemporaneity, brings in his/her body the markers of exclusion and of abnormality in the international space, one characterized by hierarchies. The extension of this relation between slavery and the readings of Doty (1996) and Anagathangelou (2013)

Chamon presented a PhD thesis (2018) offering a Foucauldian reading of concepts that fluctuate the notion of time within the constraints of the discipline.

goes even deeper to the extent that Foucault's "Society Must Be Defended" uses the idea of racism to construct the concept of biopolitics.

Doty (1996) and Anagathangelou (2013) use the notions of colonialism and slavery to better understand the present and its forms of exclusion. Although this movement has much to contribute to the field of IR it is necessary not to immobilize the meaning of slavery. This practice represents exclusion, but the understanding of slavery is only possible – if at all possible – in the social context it has operated. Therefore, the meaning of slavery is different depending on the historical moment one analyzes. Historically situating the meaning of slavery is the way in which we are able to see the denaturalization of enslavement, and the socially developed tools at a certain time to legitimize that practice.

Hereby, I am siding with Reinhart Koselleck in his differentiation of word and concept:

> The persistence and validity of a social or political concept and its corresponding structure can only be appreciated diachronically. Words that have remained in constant use are not in themselves a sufficient indication of the stability of their substantial meaning (Koselleck: 1985, 85).

The challenge of differentiating "words" from "concepts" rests in his approach, which reads: "A concept is not simply indicative of the relations which it covers; it is also a factor within them. Each concept establishes a particular horizon for potential experience and conceivable theory, and in this way sets a limit." (Koselleck, 1985, 84). The challenge in the differentiation is thus the context in which the word is used, and the context of the words can only be given by the political and social insertion of the word. The idea itself that the word slavery derives from slav and became relatable to the experience mainly of black people points to the transformative meaning of concepts that, not necessarily is attached to a material world changing in the same pace, as noted by David Biron Davis (2006, 49-50). This leads me back to the Second Slavery, as discussed in the first section of this chapter, and to the necessity of the term to differentiate forced labour in the context of liberalism from colonial slavery[17].

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[17] Colonial Slavery is a term used by Tomich (2004) to differentiate Second Slavery. I will not dive into it at the expense of deviating from the subject at hand here, but this concept seems to be created as a form of differentiation *in totum* from the 19th Century case. The colonial experience previous to 1801 began in 1534, saw the unification of the Portuguese and Spanish crowns, the emergence of the selling of people to the US and the independence of the 13 colonies, just to keep with top-of-mind events that

To look into the Atlantic Enslavement in the 19th Century is to read into enslavement as something that is derived from colonial slavery, at the same time that it has developed into something else. This perspective is better understood by this passage of Marx and Engels "German Ideology" in which they discuss the steps forward to what they propose in the Hegelian philosophy:

> This conception shows that history does not dissolve, as a "spirit of a spirit", in the "self-conscience", but that in each of its stages we find a material result, an increase in the production forces, a relation historically established with nature that the individual establishes with the others; relation that each generation receives from the previous generation, a mass of productive forces, capital and circumstances that, even though they are, in one hand, modified by the new generation, on the other it prescribes to the former its own conditions of life and grants a certain development, a special character – that as the circumstances make men, just as men make the circumstances (2007, 43) [author's translation].

Marx and Engels are dwelling with the Hegelian tradition of giving emphasis to the spirit and foregoing with the specificities of the time in which one is living. By looking at the ways in which inequalities generated difference in their Europe, Marx and Engels go on to develop a critique on the logic of dealing with the abstract idea of men, universality, or – worse even – labour. This explains the importance of labour at the root of the minimum condition needed to produce life (Marx, Engels, 2007, 32-33).

This effort of historically situating labour and its impact on the Atlantic Enslavement is better represented on the historiographical debates surrounding Atlantic Enslavement in the 19th Century by the concept of Second Slavery, put forward especially by Dale Tomich (2004). Second Slavery differentiates from colonial slavery not by any set of practices, but due to the meaning of the transatlantic traffic of enslaved people that brought, to Brazil alone, 4 million people in a moment in time when liberalism was on the rise, after the Haitian Revolution and contemporaneous to the independence of the countries in the Americas. The practice of enslavement, in this context, brings with it a different meaning than the one it had until the 18th Century. It

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would not enter the arch of liberalism beginning at the end of 18th Century. I am not sure it is possible to assert that slavery had the same meaning during these full 250 years at a closer look. In itself, this research on the conceptual history of the Atlantic Slavery is a full-blown research project. Yet, for the time being I am keeping the scope of this thesis to this dichotomic view with Second Slavery as a thematic delimitation of the matter.

does not mean the opposite of British free labor amidst Industrial Revolution; rather, it was a condition of possibility for it to happen (Tomich, 2004).

It is as a consequence of this reading of the Second Slavery debate – mainly due to the contribution of Dale Tomich (2004), Tâmis Parron (2011) and Ricardo Salles (2008) – that the systemic aspect of Slavery in the 19th Century becomes clear and how constitutive it was to International Relations. A view that gives more importance to this phenomenon than the reading of Agathangelou (2013), for instance. Slavery is the sign of differentiation and of exclusion in International Relations, but it is also the condition of possibility to the development of the European economy. Thus, slavery is a way of connecting not only different economic dimensions (that of Europe and that of the colonies in the Americas). It is also the way of understanding the change in the meaning of labour that will mean no longer the transformation of the material world into the cultural world, but will be synonym with the cultural exclusion of those who do not have a place in the world.

The change in the meaning of labour is inseparable from the emergency of liberal capitalism and from the constitution of hierarchies in IR[18]. People that have been enslaved throughout 19th Century were the personification of the intersections that made these transformations possible. In other words, it is only by understanding the 19th Century's Atlantic slavery that it is possible to comprehend liberal capitalism. Not by any change in the practices of enslavement of the people in chains, but due to the relations that are intrinsic to the liberties and enrichment in Europe and forced labour

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[18] The understanding of Liberal Capitalism is aligned with Giovanni Arrighi's (2011) chronology of capitalism developed having as inspiration Braudell's intake on the cycles of capitalism. Arrighi establishes the third cycle of expansion of capitalism as the British cycle that develops from mid-18th Century all the way to the first World War and the subsequent emergency of US's cycle (pg. 6-7). The definition of capitalism with which Arrighi works is the following: "An agency is capitalist in virtue of the fact that its money is endowed with the 'power of breeding' (Marx's expression) systematically and persistently, regardless of the nature of the particular commodities and activities that are incidentally the medium at any given time" (Arrighi, 2010, 8). It is important to highlight in this passage the qualification "regardless of the nature of the particular commodities". For on page 182, the author writes: "The capitalist organizations that specialized in long-distance trade were always involved in some kind of production activity. Besides storage and transport, they often engaged in some processing of the goods they bought and sold, and in the construction of at least some of the means and facilities required by the storage, transport and processing of commodities". If we are to read this passage thinking of the enslaved person as the commodity, Arrighi is referring to a form of de-humanizing those who were caught in the middle passage.

and lashes in Brazilian or Southern US. Plantations in the Americas were the other side of the coin in the construction of a facade of clean and pure modernity in Europe.

I began this movement discussing culture and I am closing it presenting the premises I rely on to discuss labor and capitalism in 19th Century. The broad range of ground covered is a statement to what is at stake when dislocating the discipline. By proposing the interpretation of slavery in the Atlantic as an Empire, I want to keep Inayatullah and Blaney's proposition that "the language of *culture* draws attention to the construction, maintenance, and transformation of meaningful and purposeful schemes of existence" (2004, 15). By saying that Liberalism was this shared culture of the Empire that created the conditions of possibility of so many silences, I acknowledge that these silences were the ground for the discipline of IR itself.

2.2.3.
Third Movement: Disciplinary Racism

The conclusion of Robert Vitalis' The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture (2000) begins by quoting a conversation he had with a friend after a presentation on the exclusionary system that the oil production by US nationals creates in current Saudi Arabia. His friend would have confronted him, asking what he had expected to occur. This interaction added to his reading of Brian Schmidt's *The Political Discourse of Anarchy* (1998), lead him to the conclusion that "race is already known, banal and commonplace, not worth noticing. Race is 'really' something else. Race is a 'language that most would today find offensive and inappropriate'" (Vitalis, 2000, 353).

Vitalis' anecdotical example represents how the discipline has naturalized exclusion on its racial narrative departing from a pre-established perspective that it analyzes fall on subjects whose race is unimportant. However, the truth of the matter is that these attributes were made invisible in the process of analyzing. This notion is aligned with the premise adopted in this thesis of not distinguishing between IR as a set of practices and the intellectual endeavor, as if one would be distinguishable from the other, as if there would be no resonance of "the real world" with theorical reflection. Built as a space of denial of what is not domestic by classical theories and as a space of difference by critical approaches, the international, as a phenomenon, plays a large

role in creating silences. Most of the time, these silences entail the violence perpetrated against – or hidden by – narratives and by the theoretical approaches that make these narratives legitimate.

For Vitalis, this violence is not new since he engages with the racial discussion in International Relations through the work of Du Bois and his notion that racial segregation is established by a color line that differentiates spaces of belonging as a reflection of phenotypes. While doing so, it establishes the productive power of laws that hierarchize (Vitalis, 2000, 343). Du Bois was a pioneer in using the categories developed to address racial segregation, as he observed the experience of black people in the US as an instrument to interpret other hierarchized racial relations after his visit to the Warsaw ghetto (Anievas, Manchanda, Shilliam, 2018, 6). Du Bois shows how universal this concept is and how it offers a key to interpreting international events. As any other concept, the color line has the potentiality of informing narrations on world phenomena, not needing to rest incapsulated in national narratives as representation of specificities typical of black reality in the United States. Universality can also be proposed by black authors.

Vitalis (2000) relies in Stanley Hoffman's (1997) definition of International Relations as a United States discipline to argue how the white supremacy idea was important to the constitution of International Relations and, specifically, of its historical narrative that developed from this field that, as he points out, did not have any prominent black author in the year 2000, thus making this supremacist argument actually a distinguishing aspect in the field (Vitalis, 2000, 336). This racial marker of the discipline defines the point of departure and establishes the rationale from which it will operate and the parameters with which it will make possible to reckon with violence and the standards of normality, as it happens with humanitarism and its paternalistic institutions (Vitalis, 2000, 338). Within Vitalis rationale, the disciplinary role played by Woodrow Wilson is exemplar. To the discipline, Wilson was a stateman that opted to join the great war of his time and, more importantly, proposed another logic to the future of international politics through envisioning the League of Nations. This disciplinary founding father – honored with the first chair of International Relations being named after him in the University of Aberstwyth – was also the

responsible for the exhibition of *The Birth of a Nation* in the White House, an apologetic piece to the Ku Klux Klan (Benbow, 2010). The convenience of building histories of adjectivized politics – international/domestic – is not confronting the eventual consequences that derive from the points of contact between liberalism and racism.

Vitalis' argument is in the sense that a discipline that naturalizes violence is extremely useful as a form of power, and International Relations fits very well in this profile, since it represents a specific kind of violence that is naturalized: the ever distant and rationalized dispute between powers at war. The white traditional narrative (exemplified in the sorts of Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 1981; Mearsheimer, 2004) acknowledges wars as typical aspects, inseparable from international politics, IR is the same narrative that is silent on any form of discrimination (Vitalis: 2000, 334-5). However, to the extent that these two narratives are disciplinarily insulated, there are traces that show how they can be approximated if the language adopted is able to translate the phenomenon. I have addressed understanding of language in a previous movement and how the understanding of language adopted hereby is one that privileges silence and misunderstanding. The gravity of this understanding – and its consequences – is reforced if one considers that it operates within the specter of Du Bois' (2007) double-consciousness: "this sense of always looking at oneself through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity" (Du Bois, 2007, 8).

Vitalis' book "*White World Order, Black Politics*" (2015) examines this divide between domestic/international politics and its artificiality by looking to the development of departments of International Relations in influential US universities and the constitution of Africana departments. The lack of intersection between the professorship and the students of these two courses demonstrates how, despite the Harlem Renaissance movement being the first opportunity in which International Relations was theorized in the US (Vitalis, 2015, 9), its legacy was constrained into Africana studies, as if to mean that it dealt exclusively with domestic politics. The institutionalization divide is thus created:

> Political scientists typically understand the tradition of international relations scholarship to be race blind. States, not races, have always been the discipline's basic

unity of analysis. The 'security dilemma' leaders confront is the timeless problem that constitutes international relations as a discipline, based on ideas the practitioners now routinely trace back to the ancient wisdom of Thucydides and Machiavelli, unaware that the genealogy is an invention of the Cold War years. The specialists contend, further, that if people of color are not read or taught it is because they have not written books and articles that shaped the field or that matter to others working in it now. It cannot be because the hierarchical structures Americans have built, including the discipline itself, using the biologically false idea of race, are to blame (Vitalis, 2015, 19).

15 years after his article, to some extent Vitalis is still dwelling with the fact that IR is a US discipline. However, it is a discipline that is made white, somewhat intentionally, to the extent that it reflects a more widespread racism. This marginalized thought of International Relations is called Howard School by Vitalis after the DC area University that polarized much of the US black intelligentsia that made through PhD programs in other prestigious – albeit white – universities, later to become faculty in Howard. The first generation – the pre-Howard generation, so to speak – included W. E.B. Du Bois.

The first edition of *The Soul of Black Folk* was published in 1903 and contains the powerful passage quoted above on double consciousness. The book has a beginning that is even more telling of Du Bois's view on International Relations:

Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked by some through feelings of delicacy; by others through the difficulty of rightly framing it. All, nevertheless, flutter around it. They approach me in a half-hesitant sort of way, eye me curiously or compassionately, and then, instead of saying directly, How does it feel to be a problem? They say, I know an excellent colored man in my town; or I fought at Mechaniscsville; or, Do not these Southern outrages make your blood boil? At these I smile, or am interested, or reduce the boiling to a simmer, as the occasion may require. To the real question, How does it feel to be a problem? I answer seldom a word (Du Bois, [1903] 2007, 7).

Du Bois anticipates Inayatullah and Blaney in more than 100 years in elaborating the problem of difference, an embodied difference since he already realizes that the borders are defined not in the rigidity of geographical terms but instead in the much lighter – though perhaps more effective – veil that stands between the two worlds and the two languages that the black people must dominate.

In the introduction to their edited volume "*Race and Racism in International Relations: confronting the global colour line*" (2015) Alexander Anievas, Nivi Machanda and Robbie Shilliam recuperate Du Bois' conceptions on Double Counsciousness, the Veil and the colour line. The authors contextualize Du Bois and his

research agenda more as a preoccupation with the politics of differentiation than as an effort of making it a conceptual project aiming at translating the experience of a particular community. It is interesting to notice that, contrary to the mainstream IR lexicon, Du Bois' proposition of instruments of analysis centers the experiences of marginalized, not the abstract discourse on State politics. The recognition of Du Bois as an author fit for Africana departments is a statement in itself not only by making evident that the discipline recognizes or ignores authors as it sees fit, but in so doing, defines whose voices can theorize universally and who is allowed to speak about specific realities.

The creation of the distinction between IR and Africana passed through the definition of who were the refereed subjects of each discipline. As any other effort of definition of belonging, it is mainly a process of exclusion. It is not about priorities, as a potential gentler way may indicate, rather it is an option on the visibility provided by the theorical framework and historical narrative. Visibility is a choice of the writer that gives form to the world. Part of the process of turning certain people – in the first movement this aspect was more developed – invisible in the discipline has to do with the precedence that the State has over the people as a category of analysis. Persaud and Walker (2001) frame this issue in the following way:

> The theory of international relations has shown a famous aversion to complex and multiply contested concepts. It has been especially silent about race, as about many other practices that cannot be quickly reduced to claims about the necessities of states in a modern state-system (2001, 373).

Persaud and Walker's critique is a way of reading Charles Mills' "*Racial Contract*" from 1999 to International Relations. Departing from a critical view on contractualism as a State theory, Mills identifies the racist premises on which the State, immersed in a European political tradition, resides. For Mills, this movement is a form of building bridges in such a way as to make possible the mutual comprehension between political theory and minority groups that are part in this state politics (op. cit.: 4). That is important to highlight, although that what Mills calls racial contract is not a substitutive for the social contract as a whole, since "The 'social contract' is actually several contracts in one." (Mills, 1999, 9), it is only one side of it. This perspective, together with his overall perception of racism as a project that organizes societies in

terms of whiteness, points towards his perception that it is possible that this racism operates in a hierarchy different from that of the State. In Mill's words:

> [I]n all cases 'race is the common conceptual denominator that gradually came to signify the respective global statuses of superiority and inferiority, privilege and subordination. There is an opposition of us against them with multiple overlapping dimensions: Europeans versus non-Europeans (geography), civilized versus wild/savage/barbarians (culture), Christians versus heathens (religion). But they all eventually coalesced into the basic opposition of white versus nonwhite (Mills, 1999, 21).

Errol Henderson (2015) developed a critique of Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism departing from Mills' concept. Having the notion of anarchy inherited from the contractualists as the center of the theoretical engagement with the discipline is a way of inscribing in the theoretical development that would depart from its racial prejudice. This racialization of the debate departs from the understanding of the classics on what anarchy meant and who were seen by them in contexts of anarchy. Henderson recuperates the dualism pointed by Mills that is also present in Du Bois: "There is one set of assumptions for whites and another for nonwhites." (Henderson, 2015, 29).

This dualism is important to the argument that I am starting to assemble on the interpretation of slavery as a political dimension in the Atlantic. It fits the overall argument because to recognize that the color line that segregates enslaved people from white citizens is not a way of denying the existence of the other side of this, nor is it mutually constitutive. It was a way of conditioning the existence of black people that inhabited this Empire. And, in order to account for this, it is important to navigate the color line itself, since it is not enough to tell the history of the people enslaved without acknowledging that slavery was also a set of political decision enforced until 1888 by white people. Navigating through this insurmountable frontier demands the recognition that the silence on the importance of enslavement to the construction of the modern world encompasses the silence on the supporters/sympathizers of enslavement who, most of the time, are seen as "men of their time". Racism – as the saying goes – is a problem of white people, so in order to deal with it, it needs to be denaturalized as a "trace of the time" and racists have to be referred to as racists – especially in the case of a racism which finds its way into naturalization in contractualist liberalism, as Mills (1999) and Henderson (2015) point out.

I want to stress the development of the movements made thus far. If the first one engaged with the limits of the idea of individual which is the point of departure of Liberalism and how it makes possible the invisibility of other people, the second movement discussed the possibility of Liberalism as the culture that enforced the Atlantic. Now, I am recovering other authors who address the embedded racism within this liberalism that we call disciplinary home. If the liberal subject and liberalism in the form of the State were forms of making other people whose histories can be the point of departure for other internationals invisible, it is possible to argue that the racial contract stands for the guiding abstract logic inscribed in this liberalism. The racial contract stands for as the diffuse liberalism articulated loosely throughout the 19th Century Atlantic Space political lexicon. To put it bluntly, the racial contract would represent to the Empire of Slavery what the idea of the Liberal Contract would represent to the 19th Century state.[19]

This proposal dialogues with Lucy Mayblin's 2013 text, in which she observes the development of liberal thinking and of the conception of humanity itself throughout the 19th Century via the debates in British Parliament on the issue of the abolition of slavery. Her analysis shows that despite the fact that the humanity of the enslaved people was no longer questioned, the system of thought that developed in the justice system and in the interpretations of law did not account for this change and were still largely influential on the political thought that followed.

I believe that these critiques go hand in hand in the questioning of the prevailing narratives of the discipline. Those which we can call traditional International Relations theory (liberalism and realism) center the State mainly due to two reasons. The first is that – as discussed in the first movement – these theories actually emulate the suppression of what they see as anarchy – as a consequence of their focus on power measurements – and set the scene for the constitution of formal hierarchies that would, eventually, substitute the State. The second aspect is that, despite aiming at the

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[19] I find it relevant to state that by situating politically the social contract in the 1800s I am not saying that the they were developed in this period. Here I am supported by Mills who is not situating his concept temporally and is articulating the contractualist tradition as one. Personally, I am situating the social contract in the intersection between Liberalism and Contractualism as the focal point of my critique, specifically on the Second Treatesie of Government, by John Locke, as will be clear in chapter 5.

suppression of the State, the State is still, disciplinarily, the main object of analysis. Debra Thompson (2013) adds up to these critiques by pointing to the fact that "[r]ace was born in the transnational realm and bred to be central to discourses of modernity, empire and capitalism." (Thompson, 2013, 139). By relating the issue of racism to the rise of the nation-state, the Atlantic trade of enslaved people and the formation of capitalism, Thompson accuses the transformation of the phenomenon of racism. For her, the transformation of racism took place from an international practice to a nationalized dynamic, not only in the sense of internalizing it through the discourse of self-sufficiency that derives from the maintenance of slavery – even after the abolition of the Atlantic traffic of enslaved people, but also as a way of manifesting easily in practices naturalized due to the constitution of the State as a racist structure that seeks eugenics (Thompson, 2013, 146). Debra Thompson (2013, 146) closes her text by saying that the issue of race is so strong that it is constantly re-articulating itself having the State as its point of departure. This relates to Charles Mills' critique that the racial aspect reinvents itself in the Racial Contract, and that the white supremacism has established itself as a cornerstone of US development replicated in the international insertion of the country in Robert Vitalis' (2000) view.

Roxanne Doty (1993) talks about how the debate on race in International Relations still suffers with a supposed connection of this concept with a perception of the physical appearance, in an interpretative effort that is still strongly connected to the inheritance of enslavement and imperialism (1993, 452). Doty proposes a detachment from this immediate linkage of the racial inequality with a phenotype. For her, the racialization, which emerged in the Atlantic enslavement, is manifested in more sophisticated ways, namely as a consequence of other dichotomies that are only possible as a consequence of racist premises that create hierarchies and multiple exclusions (Doty, 1993, 460). Doty's (1993) critique to racism operates in a logic that does not seems worried with the distinction between what would be considered internal politics and what would seem like international politics. Politics would be less constrained by borders; it would be constituted in the intersection between different actors and the limits imposed by this diffuse racism.

These contributions point to a group of concepts and practices that had been constructed in the wake of the enslavement of African populations and which are central to International Relations. In light of its notions such as nation-State, Theory of International Relations and Capitalism relate with the late 18th Century Liberalism. The question is: How do they relate with the disciplinary silence on the Atlantic enslaved trade? The emergence of these concepts and practices that had been traditionally related to the liberal logics starts to make more sense when comprehended as a manifestation of racism embedded in the theoretical construction that tries to explain these social phenomena. The narrative of the international capitalist contemporary order detaches itself from an origin and development in British liberalism, and is dislocated to the ocean and the movements of people that cross it.

Thus, in closing this section, it is important to reinforce Robbie Shilliam's (2012) argument that, also reading into the second slavery, challenges the origin of contemporary economics in British Liberalism:

> Within the archives of eighteenth century English and Scottish thought, freedom – or 'liberty' was a crucial concept in so far as it clarified the promise of Enlightenment as an escape from slavery in both its social and natural determinants. As part of this clarification, Enlightenment thinkers often paid special attention to the Atlantic slave trade and slavery in the American colonies. Yet curiously, contemporary scholars of political economy tend not to follow the prompt of their archival interlocutors (Shilliam, 2012, 591).

The same period, relatable subjects, and yet a discrepancy on the archives helped create a form of an economic liberalism that detached from an economic perception of liberalism. Concepts of liberty or freedom circulate in both, but when translated to the history, it is possible to see how the worlds portrayed have different populations. The issue here is: even though – more faithfully to the spirit of Enlightenment – the political thinkers acknowledged the matter of slavery, in doing so, were they committed to slavery or to freedom/liberty? In chapter 5, I will argue that they were in fact committed to the former, and this may point that these two – supposedly – different traditions may be condensed more easily than it would seem possible at first glance.

When the Liberal rational and sovereign man (Ashley, 1989) is no longer seen as truthful, but as a theoretical abstraction, that is, when the liberal premises that ground the idea of the autonomous individual all-aware of his actions are questioned, and the

analysis becomes centered on the enslaved people, the change goes deeper than seeing capitalism as a project that does not grant freedom for all. This is to accept that capitalism is a political structure based in dynamics of constant reinvention of the patterns of differentiation and exclusion (Shilliam, 2012). As Blaney and Inayatullah (2010) had already pointed out, it is the constant reinvention of exclusions. This capitalist order only makes sense when systemic practices of violence and of the subjectivities constituted by these practices are considered.

2.2.4.
Fourth Movement: History as silence

The function of modern slavery and the transformation of its meaning represent the profound legacy that this structure of forced labor legated to the international capitalist order that expanded from Europe. As seen in the first movement, the historical narratives built from the silencing of this violence and, mainly, as a consequence of the silencing on the relevance of enslavement to the consolidation and expansion of the European capitalist model. In this section, I propose an interpretation of this process of silencing and what it has constituted.

Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) proposes a reading of Indian history that would not be done using theoretical markers constituted from the European experience; consequently, markers that force the interpretation of Indian history to its parameters and to the lenses it builds to see the world. Chakrabarty's critique is especially interesting because it is aimed at the Marxist historical tradition, one that is itself considered critical as a consequence of the denunciation of the dynamics of domination that are framed by the bourgeoise State and its structure of production. Chakrabarty looks into the epistemological and into the ontological Indian traditions for the foundations that would allow for a narrative that would not fall into the colonial parameters, even if they were to be disguised in Marxist terms.

Chakrabarty movement is inspiring in order to think International Relations from Brazil and considering the Atlantic Enslavement. The diversity of spaces produced by institutionalized violence in the form of the Atlantic human traffic encompasses a plurality of epistemologies and ontologies that are overwhelming. Thus, I chose

another perspective to build a critique: the articulation of silences that rest in the sight of a bibliography created in the Atlantic. This movement will allow for the unraveling of another narrative, which has as a point of departure, facts and phenomena that will highlight different spaces and narratives in the History of the Atlantic.

In an effort to better understand the historical turn that marked the discipline in the beginning of the 21ˢᵗ Century, Nick Vaughan-Williams (2005, 117) states that this has been done without a prior debate on what the field understood as History. Vaughan-Williams shows that the incorporation of post-structuralist traditions generated a dispute inside the field of History among scholars in late 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s. This historiographical debate did not spill out of History partially due to the movement of reading only a part of the debate that was underway. Thus, this incorporation occurred in a moment of intense debate; nevertheless, the way in which it was incorporated by the discipline of IR did not took that into account. What happened, then, was an acritical incorporation of History as an authoritative discourse of origin that should orient International Relations debates.

While denouncing the rough and acritical movement that it represented, Vaughan-Williams is also questioning this historical turn influenced by Derrida, specifically influenced by the notion of differance:

> The difference between differance and difference is not audible in French: whenever we say differance it is unclear or 'undecidable' whether or not we are referring to differance or merely saying the French word for 'difference'. The difference between the two terms is only ever discernible in the written form. But the difference between differance and difference is symptomatic of something more than merely the substitution of one letter for another. Of course 'e' does differ from 'a'. Yet, Derrida's point is that this difference is not one between static, coherent, self-present elements. In other words the difference is not produced between 'this (e.g., 'e') and 'that' (e.g., 'a'). Rather, it is only because of differance in the first place that there is a difference between 'this' and 'that': it is only because there is no-thing outside of the field of spatio-temporal differences in which every-thing acquires a meaning that we can speak of differences between 'this' and 'that' (Vaughan-Williams, 2005, 127).

The concept of *differance* as the difference that constitutes the possibility for a narrative that is hegemonical and that does not need to be mentioned so to establish a contraposition to other narratives is especially useful in the attempt of seeing enslavement through the silences. Specifically in the case of the History of International Relations, this presence in the absence is even clearer since IR's narrative

is so focused in the dynamics of power in Europe that the enslavement – a process that is a condition of possibility to the narrative that Europe creates of itself – is completely ignored and receives no space whatsoever.

The main contribution of Vaughan-Williams' text is his conclusion that it is not possible to differentiate the writing of history from the writing of theory (Vaughan-Williams, 2005, 134). The consequence of this indistinction between history and theory is the challenge of proposing the contact with other fields of knowledge that may have contributions to the analyses of the international/difference. In the case of History, the debate on Second Slavery is dealt observing the international as a phenomenon that allows the linking between spaces through the transportation of enslaved people and commercial goods. Instead of seeing the international as the space of war, or to analyze trade exclusively in terms of profits and gains, Second Slavery offers new understandings – political understandings – to dynamics with meanings cemented in the disciplinary understanding as unidimensional. International Relations as a discipline will be undisturbed by the possibilities of enlarging its horizons and including different narratives while considering its theoretical premises as discourses of truth that make it impossible for the contact with different fields of knowledge.

The historical reading through the logics of difference enables a movement that had been proposed by Richard Ashley in 1989: the necessity of occupying the discipline with people different from the rational man who puts himself in the discipline in disguises such as Waltz's (1979) three levels of analysis. This "sovereign voice of man" (Ashley, 1989, 246-271) is the condition of possibility for the (allegedly) historical narrative that Waltz (1979) has the goal of synthesizing. The sovereign man, a rational one, works like "Karl Marx's historical 'modes of production', and 'long-cycle' theorists' historical 'phases' (…)" (Ashley, 1989, 263), thence offering the constitutive element of the historical reading. What happens is that Waltz's narrative reproduces a logic that does not offer the possibility of change, since he had built a model in which violence is internalized not as rupture, but as continuity; differently from Ashley (1989) contraposition, based on the possibility of change.

This rational man who occupies such an important place in Ashley's argument (1989, 265-6) is a Foucauldian reading of a conception of man developed by Kant.

Ashley shows that this Kantian man as a condition and parameter to knowledge is limited by his immersion in his own historical context. Foucault's proposed solution to this limit – following Kant's own logic – is to acknowledge men as sovereign in relation to History. It is from this perception that the heroic figure of the rational man, capable of being conscious on his limitations and on differentiating between those who are historically contingent and those who are essential to him, therefore to whom he must submit.

> (…) The modern construct of sovereignty thus invokes the heroic figure of reasoning man who, by acknowledging those essential limitations he is obliged not to criticize but only to obey, affirms the absolute foundations upon which he shall ground his reason, his will to truth, his courageous struggle to transcend all those historical contingencies that would deny his infinite powers (Ashley, 1989, 266).

It is through this logic that Ashley reinserts the individual in the issue of the Waltzian historical narrative. Not by engaging in his proposal of the level of analysis, but destabilizing this premise by pointing that, in the original conception of a system, which relies on Kant, the idea of the rational man is indisputable and inseparable from the conception of History.

Ashley identifies a tension between theory and history, which he proposes to solve by seeing historicity as the possibility of theoretically destabilizing the rational man and question his sovereignty over time. Ashley puts forward two possible approaches to History offered by modernity. The first which, he reads from Roland Barthes, is history "understood to occupy the order of the *lisible* text: the order of the already written text that need only be read for its implications and towards which the reader properly adopts a passive attitude" (Ashley, 1989, 263). The second possibility is that of the *narrative*: a way of answering "what questions" "[A] narrative is a representation that arrests ambiguity and controls the proliferation of meaning by imposing a standard and standpoint of interpretation that is taken to be fixed and independent of the time it represents." (Ibid). These two notions of history are centered in his reading of Derrida's logocentric demand for a point of origin, "the sovereign source of truth and meaning" (Ashley, 1989, 261). This logocentrism is prone not only to operate in dichotomic tropes, but actually to hierarchize historical difference that can lead to giving voice to singular interpretations and creating silences. The historical difference, thus, works in such a way as the different of the trope becomes a non-

present, an omission, as if a difference outside time itself. Historicity would work as a second insertion of time in the concept of history: the recognition that there is a role played in the moment in which History was written that accounts for the shape and form that History acquires. Present, thus, is the perpetual deferring in the *differance* of History. The present is, then, incorporated into the past at the same time that it is the marker between past and future, to the extent that on the triad of definition of time it is the most difficult to define, because "is". The duration of "is" is indeterminate, to the extent that "is" is absolute. Consider, that to define past and future one can only do so by conjugating the verb in different times or by qualifying the present. From the latter, both the results "is not yet" or "is already over" qualifying the verb in different articulations of absence.

The proposal of historicizing is the possibility of reinserting the politics that happen in the moment of action in the narrative of International Relations. Likewise, to historicize is the possibility of bringing the historical with the temporal discussed in the previous movement closer to one another, since this process defines the focus not in the future – the space of consolidation of projects defined in the past – but instead in the dynamics of action and of the decision making that would have happened in the present had it not been incorporated into the past.

Ashley (1989) was recuperated by Vaughan-Williams (2005) for criticizing the recent "historical turn" that the discipline was experimenting. Drawing into Ashley's discussion and in his own reading of Derrida, Vaughan-Williams' main claim is that historicity is turn into History and when it migrates to International Relations, it becomes "the problem of history": "in other words the impossibility of getting historical interpretation one hundred percent right, glossed over if not ignored entirely" (Vaughan-Williams, 2005, 117). I am left wondering if by framing this challenge as a problem, he is not himself in search of a solid ground – not differed nor deferred – in order to articulate a disciplinary truthful claim to reality.

Vaughan-Williams' effort of claiming something outside the discourse of historicity led him to state:

> Instead of projecting the radical uncertainty of historical meaning into its object of study the preference in IR is to impose a form of interpretive closure on the historical record: 'a [form of] representation that arrests ambiguity and controls the proliferation of

meaning by imposing a standard and standpoint of interpretation that is taken to be fixed and independent of the time it represents.

The imposition of such a standard and standpoint of interpretation implies the necessity (and possibility) of a stance outside of both history and politics from which it is possible to arrive at a singular understanding of what is often referred to as historicity: 'dispersal, difference, and alterity across time and space'. Such a stance is of course fantastical (Vaughan-Williams, 2005, 117-118).

This stance would be fantastical only if it was to be understood as a claim to uniqueness. Rather, it is something tangible to the extent that, in Ashley's account of historicity, it is the way of dealing with the historical discourse of truth and accounting for the multiplicity of texts on histories.

This debate is relevant since it shows the necessity of contextualizing the history of the Atlantic Slavery of the 19th Century. This context is defined preponderantly by two dynamics: firstly, by the acknowledgement of the specificity of slavery in the 19th Century – having as background the Haitian Revolution, the emergency of political and economic liberalism and to the anti-enslavement campaign in England (Tomich, 2004). This intake intends to denaturalize enslavement as a feature of that historical moment. Enslavement as non-natural, as an aspect of culture, is understood as another moving part in the political disputes of the time. To some extent, the difficulty of noticing the change in meaning of slavery is due to the fact that the practices and violence that have characterized it were not aspects that changed in the 19th Century. Rather, the movement is relative due to the changes in context presented by Tomich. The meaning of slavery is the one that changed and this is relevant to be taken in consideration for the purposes of this thesis.

The second dynamic relevant to this context happens in the possibility of acknowledging the politics in time, therefore saying that the enslaved people were also political actors. And here it is important to highlight the relevance of the option for the term "enslaved", one that helps to see enslavement as a condition of people who have been themselves, or had their ancestors, submitted to the violence of the kidnapping, of the middle passage, of the forced labor, and that of having had the color of their skin linked to a subaltern condition. This condition is not absolute, in the sense of reducing those people to the category of slave. To acknowledge these people as enslaved is to point to the fact that they had possibility of agency. Mbembe (2003, 71) argues that the

process of subjectification is so profound that, given the extreme conditions imposed by slavery, the limit between resistance and sacrifice is less clear. The point is that there is more to the enslaved person than the subjectification to which s/he was submitted. Those people had agency upon their own lives and the difficulty of understanding if what they do is resistance or sacrifice resides, perhaps, more in us than in them.

Having said all that and being faithful to Derrida's "*Il n'y a pas de hors-text*"[20] (Derrida, apud Vaughan-Williams, 2005, 125), and partly also to Koselleck's perception that the words, not the deeds shock the world (Koselleck, 1985, 73), I would like to propose a synthesis to these rather complicated few paragraphs. The discussion of time that I am reading from Vaughan-Williams' and Ashley's take on Derrida sees the present as a border. This border is always moving and is constantly being redefined in order to fit the perception of time one has. The border, thus, is. The border also allows the contact between people inhabiting the spaces it separates. On one side of it, one can find those living in the future, making plans for the physical space they inhabit, the physical space they consume, and the physical space they exploit. On the other, live the ones inhabiting the past, where labor remains the way of transforming nature into culture. This divide is marked by a constant deferral, that of by the "is not yet" and by the differ of the "is already over". They meet in the present: the figment of time always deferred and always different where labor executes the plans violently communicated to them.

2.3.
Conclusion

Luiz Felipe de Alencastro ends the Preface to "The Trade in the Living" as follows:

> In the corners of the world, there is a moment of truth in which many things are defined. Mine happened in 1972-3, when I received, abroad, news coming from Brazil that three of my colleagues from University (Brasília University and from Aix-en-Provence) had been murdered by the dictatorship. To understand their death, understand Brazil, was what I wanted to do from then forward, it is what I intend to do in this book dedicated to the memories, always present of Heleny Guariba, Paulo de Tarso Celestino and Honestino Guimarães (Alencastro, 2000, 10). [author's translation]

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[20] "There is nothing outside the text".

Which is the point of departure of politics to societies that were constituted due to the violent dynamic of slavery and from the lies regarding the liberal individual? What is the possibility of political action in social contexts constituted in such a decisive way by practices of violence? How far back in History can one go to make sense of lost affects?

Luiz Felipe de Alencastro defended his thesis in the University Paris-Ouest Naterre in 1986, 13 years after receiving the news on the assassination of his friends. His thesis was entitled *Le Commerce des Vivants – traite d'esclaves et Pax Lusitana dans l'Atlantic Sud XVIe – XIXe siècles.* The book originated from his thesis was only published in 2000, 27 years after the assassination of his friends.

The History that Alecastro has written is not neutral nor does it respect the temporalities consolidated by bourgeoise logic. Time, for him, is defined by the affects that political gestures mobilized in the constitution of Brazil and how this History of the 16th and 17th centuries help to make sense of the 21 years of military government in Brazil in the 20th Century. The liberal individual will never make sense of these historical times. Another concept is necessary to make sense of these political structures, because it is not simply by mobilizing unproblematized concepts that this comprehension will be achieved. It must account for the different constrains that are built in these different moments.

This chapter aimed at hinting at the issues that will be addressed in the following chapters. It works, thus, as a sort of introductory chapter, laying the grounds on which the next chapters will push further. In other words, this chapter aims at presenting the disciplinary silences with which the next chapters will engage in order to articulate a critique while decentering IR. This is the reason for the two sections: the first contextualizing slavery in 19th Century Atlantic, and the second using this contextualization identify the silence. A silence on the who, the where, the when and the what of the discipline. The modern international to which Walker (2018) referred is not a space of homogeneity – although it claims to be. It is a space of multiplicity inhabited by many different peoples. The effort of bringing this critique from Brazil teeters on methodological nationalism. I would rather conceive it as the possibility of relating bibliographies produced in Brazil with other bibliographies, but I recognize

that I will not be the judge of that. It is clear to me, however, that bringing another set of archives to the fore enables the dislocation of the discipline.

The Empire of Slavery in the Atlantic was not a phenomenon with solely one *sentido*. In reality, while it was the main connection between the coasts of the Atlantic, its justifications ranged from the expansion of Christendom to the role it played to the maintenance of trade through the Ocean. It seems to be only pertinent to see that the disciplinary silence on slavery follows a set of discourses on justifying it. I do not believe that there would be people who deliberately thought and decided not to include slavery in State-system narratives or within the *raison d'état* types of logic. The argument goes in seeing that deliberate efforts of erasing slavery in other narratives created the condition under which omitting Atlantic slavery was not an issue to International Relations. The "it just doesn't fit" justification is not a minor one, especially considering a discipline that uses its own texts to legitimize its existence (Kamola, 2020).

It is possible to find in the next pages something on structural racism and the non-linear ways in which history constitutes politics, and disciplining slavery as two different phenomena: one in the US and one in Brazil. This created not only methodological nationalism. It also contributed to the essentialization of slavery in the histories of these countries. As national features, "they" were invisible to IR and the rest is history – or not in this case. To argue that International Relations was constituted as a consequence of the silence of this sort is a primary goal of this chapter. Another one of its goals is to build on bibliographies that argue on the diverse silences and how IR, modernity and capitalism were constituted as a consequence of silences that have a lot to say about one another. This effort was thought by way of four movements that tried to display the possibility of exploring the fissures in the narratives of the international.

By definition, this is an ongoing process, but a necessary exercise to International Relations, especially the IR in Brazil, for knowledge is built upon affects, bodies and peoples. To denaturalize modernity and its many forms of creating and recreating hierarchies and segregations is part of the commitment with the construction of critical knowledges.

It is by way of thinking the affects that it is important to highlight the assassination of Marielle Franco and Anderson Gomes on March 14th, 2018. The crime of their violent death has a deep connection with the discussion on this chapter. The reason therefore is that they manifest the incomplete temporality of enslavement that does not acknowledge the right of black bodies to occupy spaces of power as legitimate, especially if the occupation of such spaces is a critical one. It also has much to say on the collateral death, "non-intentional" – to the extent of the possibility of using this term on someone who opens fire against targets that are not seen – of people who work, whose lives are not valued and whose death is not missed, for their existence is restricted to their capacity of working.

When Alencastro (2000) talks about the death of his friends, he tries to figure out how the Brazilian State developed in such a way that it became possible for agents of the State to execute a citizen, without due trial, according to the interests of the government. I believe that sometimes the State is not the answer. We may want to think politically in ways that the State is not the sole political arena. In so doing, political violence can be understood as a language in a non-Weberian way.

3.   People with no Rights

3.1.
Introduction

Slavery, in Brazil, precedes law. As an institution, in Brazil, it is actually prone to challenge the rule of law: it was so with the *Paulistas[21]* challenging rules from the Portuguese Crown for not enslaving Indians in the *sertões[22]*, as discussed in the last chapter; with *Maranhenses[23]* uprising against Jesuits for their right to make prisoners in tribes under their thumb, as will be discussed in the fifth chapter; and, after independence, Brazil never actually had a law allowing for the trade of the living. In an intervention in the *Câmara dos Deputados* – the lower house of the country – the writer and representative from Ceará José de Alencar said that the end of slavery had to be "a natural fact, as its origin and development [had been]. No law established it; none could revoke it." (Alonso, 2015, 62)[24]. Alencar made this intervention in 1867, a year prior to becoming Minister of Justice of the Empire. It is not clear if Alencar's point came out of defiance or of ignorance, but the fact of the matter is that in 1831, Brazil promulgated the first law abolishing enslaved trade. The law was never enforced, thus making the final 19 years of trans-Atlantic enslaved trade in which Brazil took part a crude and long-lasting crime central to the consolidation of the monarchy in the country, while seemly reinforcing Alencar's argument.

In this chapter, I look to the Brazilian bibliography on enslaved people in Brazil, specifically on the Paraíba River Valley. The goal here is to draw, from the long-lasting Brazilian experience with enslavement to build an understanding of this phenomena that would allow for a reading of history in terms others than that of citizen/non-citizen. This will, necessarily, demand that I put in perspective a series of concepts that are intimately related to citizenship in order to, as argued in the introduction, begin the building of the concept of Empire to which I will come in the last chapter. The resort to this bibliography on enslavement will be done by referring to authors that

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[21] Inhabitants of the Province of São Paulo.
[22] Hinterland.
[23] Inhabitants of the Province of Maranhão.
[24] Author's translation from Portuguese.

contributed to the discussion on concepts that orbit experiences of belonging that have been incorporated into IR. As a consequence, the next five sections of the chapter will dwell with the issues of labour, citizenship/nationality, racism and politics departing from the lenses of Cedric Robinson's (1983), Eric Hobsbawn's (1992) and Benedict Anderson's (2006), Achille Mbembe's (2003), and Jacques Rancière's (1999). Prior to that, however, it is necessary to argue on the humanity of the enslaved person, hence the title of first section: "enslaved people as people".

The idea that enslaved people were people is a non-tautological truth that needs to be addressed – as all other parts of this thesis – not disputing the ontology that made them have their personhood lost, rather through silences on the established scholarship that naturalize the view of the enslaved person as something other than a person. This section on personhood is a way of articulating last chapter's discussion on the (im)possibility of the individual being capable of enunciating his/her own death due to the uniqueness of the experience of the Africans that traversed the Atlantic, the *kalunga*, aka, the land of the dead.

It is important to keep in mind that by reading into the historiography on slavery in Brazil I am siding with scholars from the Global South that bring to the fore arguments that are not frequently read in IR. Thus, to the extent that W.E. B. Du Bois is known to Mbembe and Robinson and can be seen in their work, something different can emerge by using these authors to read Hebe Matos Castro (1995) and Emília Viotti da Costa (2010a, 2010b), for instance.

This articulation between different texts and traditions speaks to the second point that is important to highlight on that bibliography: my understanding of the reason why this departure from the Brazilian context would not configurate methodological nationalism. The option of departing from the experience in a specific Brazilian region – the Paraíba Valley – is a way of having an important body of work from which to read while proposing the incorporation of slavery in IR. By the end of the chapter, my goal is to have demonstrated that, albeit not considered disciplinarily, the smooth articulation between these two bodies of literature (Brazilian historiography on slavery and IR go-to references) strengthens the two main arguments I am pushing forward with this thesis. The first is that the disciplinary silence on slavery is not a matter of

ontological incompatibility; rather, it is an epistemological consequence of a discipline that cherishes the premises on which its foundations are built. The second argument which the thesis enforces is the one that this phenomenon that I am addressing as slavery is an Atlantic one. Although there are particularities of the geographical experiences, the pattern on which these particularities are built is shared on the shores of the Atlantic, and it is through the Brazilian experience on the Paraíba Valley that I want to better articulate this which I am calling a "pattern" into the concept of Empire.

The centrality of slavery to the State imaginary in Brazil can be grasped, for instance, by looking to the centrality that it plays in the literature, commonly referred to, in Brazil, as the interpreters of Brazil. Gilberto Freyre, Caio Prado Jr., Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, Celso Furtado, Oliveira Viana, Raymundo Faoro and Florestan Fernandes all had something to say about the legacy of slavery to the country (Lage, 2016). However, the country was not thought in terms of the enslaved person, who albeit necessary, was also invisible (as seen in the last chapter). The resort to the bibliography that I propose in the next pages shows the insufficiency of understanding slavery as the opposite of citizenship and presents the potentialities in thinking spatially while having slavery as a point of departure.

The centrality of comparing citizenship with slavery is a recurrent issue in José Murilo de Carvalho oeuvre. On his piece first published in 1988, he compares the different reasonings that had served the agenda of enslavement to argue on how it became to be equated to *raison d'Etat* following the independence, for "Now, it was an issue dealt by citizens of a country in formation, to which enslavement represented a much more serious problem. The problem was no longer one of metropolitan economy or Christian morality. It was pure and simple of forming a nation" (Carvalho, 1998a, 48).

In 2008, Carvalho published a short book on the history of citizenship in Brazil. In the first chapter, just after stating that between 1822 and 1930 the sole relevant thing on the perspective of the progress of citizenship was the abolition of slavery (Carvalho, 2008, 17). He goes on to say that "By the time of independence, there were no Brazilian citizens, nor Brazil as a fatherland" [author's translation] (Carvalho, 2008, 18). It is relevant to contemplate that the category that preceded independence, which continued

after it and that hence did not need to be taught or agreed upon, was slavery. Of course, as Carvalho has shown (1998a), the reasoning had to change on the justification, but the fact of the matter continued with pretty much the same material conditions that determined it.

The issue of enslavement is a very prolific one. Much has been written on the matter, culminating in what can be understood as two main perspectives, namely: one considering the impact of the enslavement on the economics, and consequently, on the politics of the countries where it was implemented, and another stream of investigation considering the social impact, and the legacy of enslavement on the life of those who suffered that violence. In this chapter, I want to build the argument on slavery departing from the notion of Atlantic Enslavement (Bezerra, Salgado, Yamato, 2020), meaning that to the extent that the point of departure of this text is enslavement in Brazil, I want to understand it as an Atlantic phenomenon that can help widen the disciplinary perspective. There are many segmentations in the bibliography on slavery, not only in terms of methodological nationalism, but the abovementioned divide between slavery and slave trade on the possibility of considering people only for their labour or disregarding their labour and considering them for their sociability. The goal of Atlantic Enslavement is to try to articulate these narratives by minoring the role of States in the process. Some authors (Tomich, 2004; Parron, 2011) wrote about enslavement questioning the profound divide that nation borders represent; however, in order to put forward my argument on enslavement, it is imperative to go even further. It is necessary to consider enslavement through its economic and political sense in relation to the role it played in the socialization that resulted from it in the first place.

It is not unusual to have chapters working as literature reviews, especially in a topic with such great array of books and debates. Some of these reviews had resulted in remarkable presentations of the state of the art in the debates, for instance Robert Slenes' (2011) book which put Brazilian and US bibliography in perspective on the issue of enslavement, and Tamis Parron's (2011) book, which offers a segmentation of the bibliography in groups that frame the matter of enslavement through similar perspectives. My way of navigating this bibliography is by framing the matter of enslavement through the five issues that articulate the divides that constitute the

Atlantic Enslavement although with no pretension of exhausting all that has been written on it. It is important to keep in mind that the goal here is not to offer a discussion on personhood, labour, nationalism/citizenship, racism or politics. The goal is to use the framework of these discussions to read the historiography on the slavery in the Paraíba Valley in order to build a framework that can be useful to a widening of the discipline.

3.2.
Enslaved People as People

It causes no surprise that the enslavement of Africans and people of African descent was possible due to a process of de-humanization which they suffered. People were not seen as people during centuries – something that I will address more extensively on the fifth chapter. Thus, it is important to reaffirm: enslaved people were people. In order to articulate this peopleness this section situates them within a social context that was invisible to those who inhabited the other side of the colour line, the side in which people did not need to prove that they were people.

Charles Ribeyrolles was a French man who, in 1861, published "*Brésil pittoresque*". What sets aside Ribeyrolles' text from the writings of other foreigners travelling through Brazil at the same time is that his text was recovered by Robert Slenes' analyzes of enslavement in the 19th Century (2011). Slenes' book, called "*In the* Senzala*, a flower*"[25] [author's translation], engages in a direct dialogue with the following passage from Ribeyrolles':

> The squalid famine does not enter the habitation of the slave and in it decidedly one does not die of inanition, as in White Chapel or in the tows of Westminster. But in there are no families, only litters. Why would the father feel the stern and holy joys of labour? He has no interest what so ever in land, in the crops. Labour, for him, is just distress and

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[25] I found no direct translation to "senzala" to English. It's a word used to account for the buildings, dungeons or basements where enslaved people lived; it is an enslaved imprisonment site. Slenes has a more detailed and etymologically accurate definition of senzala in a paragraph worth quoting: "[T]he bantu origin of the word "senzala" may be the more significative. One of the current meanings of *sanzala*, in kibundu (the language of Mbundu and the free language in a large area of Angola at the time of the slave trades), is "residence of the servers in an agrarian property" or yet, "place of living of people other than the main house": This is the exact meaning that the word acquired in Brazil. The main meaning of this word, however, is "hamlet" – probably a prior meaning to the others and, in the historical conditions of Central Africa (where a new hamlet was frequently formatted by migrants who were parents), which probably heavily carried the connotation of "familyhood". (Slenes, 2011, 155-6)

sweat, it is servitude. Why would the mother keep her cubicle and children clean? The children can be taken from her at any moment, as the chicks and goatlings from the farm, and she, herself, is nothing more than an autonomous moving[26] [thing/person].

Nevertheless, there are, on those huts, sometimes, distractions and joy, the bestial distractions and joy from intoxication, in which one never talks about the past – one that is pain – nor of future – that is closed.

Once I saw in a London hospital, a dying French workman. He asked for his old hat; there he secured a dry, naked rose branch, kissed and expired. What did this rosebush said to him, what did it made him recall? Fatherland, perhaps, his mother or fiancé.

In the negro cubicle, never I saw a flower: it is so, for there never I saw hopes nor recollection (Ribeyrolles, Charles, apud Slenes, Robert, 2011, epigraph). [author's translation]

It is no exaggeration to say that Slenes whole book is a way of answering to the multi-layered eurocentrism presented in Ribeyrolles understanding of the senzalas, and, consequently, too much of common sense that was still present on the understanding of the phenomenon on the third decade of the 21st century.

Effectively, it seems that there was no report of finding flowers in a *senzala*, however, much can be said about the presence of fire, or hot ashes, in those places. These fires, Slenes argues in his last chapter (239-261), brought with them multiple meanings of found affection and care, that Ribeyrolles missed, but went beyond it. The meaning of fire in bantu culture, the one to which can be traced the precedence of most enslaved people who arrived to the plantations in Southeast Brazil (Slenes, 2011, 252), has a lot to say on the continuity of family and lineages. Slenes argues (Slenes, 2011, 246) that the bantu sub-groups, coming from Central Africa, had a shared tradition of putting down the domestic fire when the ruler died, only to ask the new *soba* or *nganga bakulu* – if Ovibundo or Mpangu – a sample of his fire to light it back home. This ritual stood not only for the recognition of the new ruler, but also reaffirmed the ties with the ancestors. It is possible to imagine that the importance of such ties has only grown after the arrival of these people at their captivity destination.

Slenes gives a strong emphasis to the construction of lineage among the enslaved populations that arrived in Brazil in the 19th Century, as he demonstrates with the discussion regarding fire. These traditions that enact the lineages and the notions of

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[26] The text reads "semovente", a Portuguese word that does not defines if it referring to a human, or a non-human, an ambivalence that I couldn't properly translate to English.

belonging are important for they reveal the path for us to see the flowers in the *senzalas*. This way, they show a strong connection between past and present and lay a path for the future understanding of the trajectory. The violence enacted upon those who were kidnaped in Africa and brought to the Americas inserts many other layers of meaning in such traditions. Take, for instance, the Ovimbumdo culture, in central Africa. Their understanding of death was such that they understood that those who died of suicide or in battle should be buried in craves near rivers, as a way to facilitate troubled souls to find their way to the *Kalunga*, the land of the dead (or death itself), more easily. For the ovimbumdos, the ocean stood as the *Kalunga*, the same ocean they crossed under extreme conditions to work in plantations (Slenes, 2011, 255). The meaning of the trauma it may have inflicted to the ovimbundos to be put on a ship and carried through the land of the dead is hard to grasp and I find it curious that Slenes only shed light into this tension of the Kalunga and its relation to fire as the last bit of information of the book, for I understand it to be central to the perspective of the middle passage to the life of those people. The possibility of understanding the middle passage as the transit through the *Kalunga* relates with the discussion on the first movement (section 2.2.1) in the last chapter. Jean-Luc Nancy's (1990, 14) proposition that the community would form around the death of one of its members in the moment in which the ultimate personal endeavor – death – would be made impossible to be articulated by the one dying, finds a completely new conception in the extreme situation of the slave ship – a situation in which what Nancy thought as metaphor becomes almost descriptive.

On a completely different register, the middle passage may mean birth. Maria Bethânia sings *Yáyá Massemba*, a music by Capinan and Roberto Mendes with the following stanza – in Portuguese: "The one that gave birth to me was the womb of a ship/ The one that listened to me was the wind on the hollow/ From the dark womb of a basement/ I will arrive at your yard" (Capinan, Mendes, 2015) [author's translation]. To the same extent that the idea of traversing the *Kalunga* is the possibility of thinking Nancy's idea of death no longer as a metaphor, the same journey is the condition of possibility of thinking in terms of another life in the lyrics sang by Bethânia. Not a good life, not a life of opportunities, nothing of the sort, but a new life nonetheless, one in which one is born on shore, after leaving the ship – a second womb. This birth to a

new life – once again, new to the extent that it is completely different from the old one – is the condition of possibility of treating the Atlantic as such, and no more as *Kalunga*. In order to have a glimpse on the trauma of the journey, it is important to acknowledge the middle passage in the cultural terms of those who suffered through it. However, the moment of the arrival is that in which *Kalunga* becomes the Atlantic, for in this moment, oppression is operating and those who arrived are (again?) alive and are submitted to it.

Slenes first presented the material significance of constantly having a fire in the *senzalas*, for, though the common-sense points to these spaces as being barracks in which everyone would be kept together, he shows that this was not necessarily true. You could have had a *senzala* that would be a conglomerate of small huts around a common yard, especially so in relatively small properties (Slenes, 2011, 166). Or, in larger plantations, perhaps there would be, indeed a great barrack, but there would also exist sort of private accommodations to couples that would choose to marry and have an offspring. In these private spaces, fire would be of great importance in a series of ways. For once, it would keep the temperature more comfortable during the nights, while the smoke that it generated would keep away insects helping to keep grains and other foodstuff (Slenes, 2011, 240). There is, however, another material reason, pointed by a European traveler in Africa, Joachim John Monteiro who, analyzing the building technique of the Mwissikongo, a Bakongo people, argued that they understood that the grime produced in such fires helped to keep termites out of the hut while acting as black varnish to the interior of the construction (Slenes, 2011, 241-2).

On the matter of the residence of the enslaved population, Hebe Matos Castro argues that the prevalence of the *senzala* as this complex environment presented by Slenes was more prevalent after the combined laws of 1850 which transformed enslavement in Brazil (Castro, 1995, 36). The year 1850 is a landmark for this, since it was the year in which not only the trans-Atlantic Enslaved trade was abolished in Brazil, and in which the first regulation on buying and selling land in the country was promulgated. There is no coincidence there, given that it reflects a concerted effort on keeping a controlled access to rural property, invalidating ways that used to be considered valid in the access to land, such as simply occupying the space. It can be

understood that, in the same way which the Land Law saw to keep a strong grip on the domain of rural properties, the abolition of the Enslaved trade through the Atlantic worked to concentrate the property of enslaved labour force on great properties, as the rising price of the kidnapped labour brought to Brazil restricted the market on people. The input it had to the maintenance of a centrality to the plantation system to Brazil is remarkable. It also resulted in changes in the demography of the enslaved population since no longer the majority of it came from Africa. Slowly, less dynamic regions of the country started selling their enslaved populations to the coffee plantations in the Paraíba Valley and to the sugar-cane producers of Campos dos Goytacazes (Castro, 1995, 39). The west portion of São Paulo, the frontier of the coffee production would not feel this change so much, for in the region, new labour relations were being experimented. In the first two regions, however, Senzalas became the norm, and small properties in which the enslaved people would sleep in the same -small - house as her/his master were more difficult to find (Castro, 1995, 36).

To affirm that the West *Paulista* was experimenting with new labour relations is to say that over there the incorporation of the European labour was first experimented. The 1850 Land Law[27], on its 18th Article, had the prevision that the Central Government would annually bring, at the expense of the Treasure, certain number of free settlers to work during a specific period on agriculture or services provided by the government (Brazil, 1850). The occupation of the land was directly tied to the government obligation to provide foreign labour force. It is interesting to see that the people referred to in this law are addressed as foreigners, and that the 17th Article of the law is stated that: "*The foreigners that would buy land, and there stablish themselves, or that would, at their own expense develop any productive activity in the country may apply to citizenship in two years-time* (…)" (Brazil, 1850). [author's translation]

Possession of land meant not only access to freedom. It also signified being closer to participate in the hierarchical election system in which voters (with a minimum annual income of 100.000 réis) choose electors (with a minimum annual income of 200.000 réis) who actually casted the vote to representatives in the General Assembly

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[27] The law's official name is Law n° 601 from September 18th, 1850.

(to be elected, the man should had a minimum annual income of 400.000 réis) (Brazil, 1824)[28]. This structure of access to rights mirroring the net income is the other side of the coin to Hebe Matos Castro's argument: that freedom would mean ownership to the extent that an enslaved person would be able to buy his/her freedom, thus leaning towards being white, since "*freedom was, originally, a white's person attribute that made social insertion and property easier*." (Castro, 1995, 38) [author's translation]. This is a conclusion she builds the assembling the references to the colour of the people who appeared in court and their social condition. The closer to being white, the more established the freedom of the person (Castro, 1995, 34). On the other end of the spectre of the experience with freedom, Sidney Chalhoub (2011) presents some examples of enslaved people that committed crimes in order to immediately present themselves to the police. This not only shows a comprehension of the legal system, it also presents enslaved people as active subjects in their own lives since they understood the legal punishment to be a better option than the labour in coffee plantations (2011: 218-222).

Hebe Matos Castro's book is an interpretation of 19th Century Brazil and the beginning of the 20th Century done through the analyses of court fillings during the period in the Southeast Brazil, through which she expands her analyses. One that I find especially telling is the following:

> What made the sample of free-man gathered here such homogeneous one [the sample of witness in judicial procedures]? It was not, as it main seemed, their involvement with Justice, for the defendants, in almost 100% of the cases, were slaves. It was, it seems to me, their daily personal involvement (in a horizontal sense) with slaves. From this perspective, the witness here gathered represent the less fortunate social groups in the world of the free-men, with an expressive participation of freed-men and their descendants, allowing for a privileged approximation with the experience of freedom, how it was perceived as a counterpoint and in relation with the experience of slavery (Castro, 1995, 46). [author's translation]

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[28] In fact, since the promulgation of the Constitution in 1824, the electoral system passed through two major reforms. The first, in 1860, established electoral districts with one representative in each (Holanda, 2004, 98). In 1881, the parliament approved a reform of the electoral code that simplified the election by eliminating the voters and in practice establishing the direct election. The elimination of voters did not mean their incorporation as electors, it only meant their exclusion from the electoral process. As a consequence, prior to this law, 13% of the population was entitled to participate in the electoral process. Following its approval, the number of participants was reduced to 0,2%. Only in the election of 1945 would the participation surpass the percentage of people who participated in the 1879 election (Basile, 1990, 284). This reform was the first time in which the illiterates were openly excluded from the electoral process. This would only be reverted with the 1988 Constitution.

There is much to unpack in this passage from Hebe Matos Castro. For starters, the criminalization of those in contact with enslaved people. The criminalization of the lower sectors of the society comes with no surprise to a society in which the labour force is not considered part of that society. It also indicates that there would be another way of solving controversies between those who belonged to the higher strata of society. Either negotiation between equals or subservience from the – so called – liberal professionals – to the elites.

There is a racial component to this passage as well. Hebe Matos Castro argues that there is a gradation on the colour scale of the people in Brazil that is defined just as much from the phenotypical characteristics as from the status people might have in society, be it free or enslaved. There is no doubt that white people from European descent, would be at the top of the social structure. Enslaved populations would be at the bottom, frequently called "*pretos*", acquiring the same meaning as *niggers* would have in English. What Hebe Castro shows by reviewing the cases she analyses is that there is no reference to a free-person as a *preto*, only as a *pardo* – a finding that, for her, debunks the idea that this category would be an indicative of people with lighter skin (Castro, 1995, 34). Her study of the justice system in Rio de Janeiro is almost an empirical work on Du Bois' colour line. It is as if the justice system itself worked as the divide. The importance of the colour of the skin as an identifier of the person can be attested by the fact that this information was constantly referenced as a way of characterizing people in the processes the author analysed, together with name, name of parents, place of origin and occupation.

Castro affirms that the hierarchization during the first half of the 19th Century was more accentuated given the differentiation between enslaved populations born in Brazil and those that came from Africa, these being, at the bottom, along with the enslaved people born in Brazil arguing that the Africans should be destined to harder tasks than those born in captivity (Castro, 1995, 177).

On her analyses of processes, Castro was able to show that of the population of enslaved people able to acquire their manumission (in a universe of 1.206 processes), 85,9% of them were enslaved people born in Brazil already. Having complete clarity on the matter that the volume of manumissions is not comparable to the volume of

people kidnapped in Africa[29] (Castro, 1995, 161), it is an interesting phenomenon, nevertheless, for it worked as a way of transitioning from *preto/criolo* to being *pardo[30]*. The prevalence of people born in Brazil that were able to acquire their liberty is a sign that the freedom for black people in Brazil demanded social capital – not only money – acquired generationally. This notion reiterates the idea that the author puts forward that not only freedom was hard to acquire, it was likewise always in jeopardy, for the possibility of being captured and re-enslaved was real. Thus, freedom depended not only on the exchange of money for your rights, but on the ability of assuring that the community in which one would fixate oneself would account for his/her freedom (Castro, 1995, 35). That is, the expectation an enslaved person ought to build from the remote possibility of freedom would never be a self-evident truth as the freedom enjoyed by white citizens. The community had to enforce it, otherwise the State could revoke it.

Freedom, thus, had to mean belonging, for the community was the condition of making sure that one was kept free. Castro (1995) herself makes a great analysis of the bulk of the free population in Brazil in the 19th Century. Contrary to the historiography that deals with the household names of the monarchy, Castro deals with the relations of those who dealt with the institutionalized justice system and navigated the spaces of freedom and captivity, many times operating in negotiations regarding different skin colours.[31]

Castro (1995) and Slenes (2011) are both focusing on the rural experience of the second half of the 19th Century. Sidney Chalhoub, on the other hand, is looking at the

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[29] It is never too much to recall that the estimate of the project Slave Voyages for the period between 1801 and 1850 accounts for a number of 2,367,327 people who were brought to Brazil as a consequence of the trafficking.

[30] Not having adopted the "one drop policy" in Brazil, the gradient of one's skin colour would put s/he as more or less subject to prejudice. The notion of *pardo* could be translated as lighter skin. Lélia Gonzalez talks about this extensively (2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d).

[31] On the matter of poor free people on 19th Century Brazil, Maria Sylvia de Carvalho Franco (1983) is the more solid reference that point to the complexity of the society and fighting the simplicity of the proposal of understanding the enslavement period as a pre-capitalist system, equating it to a shallow interpretation of the Medieval period in Europe. Her book is situated within the Brazilian sociological tradition of trying to articulate the European body of literature in the Humanities with the Brazilian historical experience. By looking to these non-obvious figures of poor-free-white men, her book is situated within this loosely defined category of interpreters of Brazil, but perhaps in a more critical phase – if I can call it that, in which the debate on race and class disputes was already resituated by the work of Florestan Fernandes.

experience of enslavement in Rio de Janeiro during that same period. By also analysing court fillings and the interaction between enslaved people and law enforcement, he is arguing how enslavement moulded the capital city of the country and lead to the necessity of profound urban intervention in the first years of the Republic in order to erase that (Chalhoub, 2011, 30-31). The complexity of the experience of those people in that city is so profound that it was not uncommon to have enslaved people committing crimes just to surrender themselves to the police. The logic, as pointed out previously, was that the punishment they would have in jail or with forced labour would be better than a life labouring in the coffee fields of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais or São Paulo (Chalhoub, 2011, 218-219). The emperor was actually playing a role in this process by commuting the penalties, which led land-owners from Campinas to demand the enforcement of harder punishments than those that were being implemented so that they would not continue to motivate the slaves to flee (Chalhoub, 2011, 222). Chalhoub presents cases of slaves who were captured in the city: after all, it was not a perfect hiding place; however, the potential it had to help people to reinvent themselves and build their hiding place shows the complexities of slavery, the kind of complexity that go as far as to make the capital city of the last slave country of the Americas go through urbanistic reforms in order to erase the features of slavery once the Republic is inaugurated.

Slenes reconstructs important features of the life in Southeast Brazilian plantations in the 19th Century. Features that sometimes portrait surprising similarities with the bourgeois life of the period. For instance, the relevance that marriage had in the expectations of improvement of one's life as the condition to leave the barracks to a private accommodation and the possibility of developing new projects (Slenes, 2011, 167) once more worth conditions were accomplished through marriage. It is important, however, to take this comparison with a grain of salt, for the material and racial conditions couldn't be more different. Nevertheless, I found this similarity noticeable once it says a lot about these two worlds that, despite all differences, shared the same time frame.

What I find more important in Slenes' contribution is the way in which, by disclosing the conditions of life and death in a plantation, he dismisses common

sensical notions as the fulltime control and slashes, putting in perspective that such control did not need a lock on a door at night, for the technologies of control over life and death are of a different kind and deals with people who are profoundly traumatized, if nothing else, for having traversed the land of the dead while alive(?).[32] Such traumatic processes through which the enslaved peoples had been submitted also put in perspective their idea of family, enforcing that of ancestry, a more broad one considering Central Africa, between the basins of the Zaire and Kumene rivers, and the ship that gave birth to them in the coast of the Atlantic. The ambiguity of the name *senzala* plays a role in this idea of the formation of the enslaved family as this dichotomy which, to an extent, is formed in the framing of enslavement, while, at the same time sees in marriage a rite that makes possible new things, also framed by enslavement, no doubt, but nonetheless a window to new perspectives.

Hebe Matos Castro argues that:

To become an African slave in the Americas was such a painful experience of resocialization in adverse conditions, that for some years now, have been receiving the deserved attention from historiography. It allowed, sometimes, the discovery or construction of an impossible African identity that was unthinkable in Africa itself (uniting Males and Iorubas in Bahia) or allowing for the self-discovery of a linguistic and cultural identity among the Bantos in Rio de Janeiro (Castro, 1995, 162). [author's translation]

It is not to say that the kidnaping of those people created an opportunity of coming to find this unity, nothing like that. This passage works as a way of complementing Cedric Robinson's argument on the effort of erasure in the sense that the populations brought to America were faced with by the movement itself of defining the people by a colour.

The 'Negro' that is the colour black, was both a negation of African and a unity of opposition to white. The construct of Negro, unlike the terms 'African', 'Moor', or 'Ethiope' suggested no situatedness in time, that is history, or space, that is ethno-or-politico-geography. The Negro had no civilization, no cultures, no religions, no history, no place, and finally no humanity that might command consideration (Robinson, 1983, 81).

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[32] Undoubtedly this evokes a debate on Achille Mbembe's Necropolitics, a debate initiated in the second chapter and that will continue on the fifth. The question mark points to another author with whom I'm engaging further on: Orlando Patterson and his notion of Social Death.

Instead of being erased, these populations found themselves as different in this side of the Atlantic and built communities by finding/developing common grounds which, it goes without saying, are not national nor State-centric – they are of another sort. Hebe Castro (1995) is knowingly developing an analysis that considers, along with the enslaved peoples, those who were relatable to this stratum of society. By considering the small dimension of the Brazilian elite, the fact that the 1872 census accounted for 4,2 million black and brown free people, 3,8 million white people and 1,5 million enslaved peoples, she argues that we can see a non-society. Such absence is a consequence of the lack of minimum conditions of inclusion. as she puts it: "social exclusion, cultural disarrangement and economic marginality" (Castro, 1995, 40).

Slenes (2011), Castro (1995), Chalhoub (2011) propose a reading of the enslaved people as people to the extent that they were aware of their choices, saw the environment in which they were immersed, and acted accordingly. They had limited options and they played with what they were handed, yet, they did so through the fissures of the society – or non-society, to keep Castro's notion – they operated their survival, which encompassed more than being reduced to non-human, or exclusively a form of labour.

3.3.
Enslaved People as Labour

In 1890, Aluísio Azevedo published *O Cortiço*[33]*,* an important novel in Brazilian literature. Set in Botafogo, a neighborhood of the Imperial capital of Rio de Janeiro in an unprecise date in the mid-1800s, the plot tells the history of two Portuguese men and their diametral different lives. The first one is João Romão, a poor man that received the property of a small grocery from his former boss and works his way through little coups and thefts to build a *cortiço* in the adjacent terrain to the grocery he now owns. His partner in his schemes and thievery is a slave woman – Bertoleza –

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[33] *Cortiço* is how are called buildings in which many people and families live in somewhat precarious situations. The English translation of the book received the title "The Slum". I find this translation to be misleading to the extent that "slum" is used to translate the *favela*, that stand for an area occupied somewhat haphazardly by many different low-income residences. Since the book is clearly addressing the condition in one building, rather than in an area, in order to avoid miss-understandings I will keep with the original – Portuguese – title of the book in referencing it through the chapter.

whose "owner" lives in another city and to whom she pays, monthly, for her journeys. Already in the first chapter, both characters are brought together in a relationship that is definitely not defined in terms of affection, rather of a dynamic of convenience in which she works to keep the grocery store and the *cortiço* running while he represents her and takes care of her money. The second polarizing character in the novel is Comendador Miranda, a wealthy man who moves to the two stories house by the grocery with his wife – a woman from low nobility with whom he had a dysfunctional marriage, and their daughter. The plot develops in such a way that these two men come closer together, and with converging interests, apart from their original animosity.

I find Romão and Bertoleza's relation illuminating of a broader portrait of a slave-based society in the 1800s Atlantic. As mentioned above, they were accomplices in the plots to faster develop Romão's business; however, the first to fall in one of his schemes was Bertoleza herself who allowed him to be the manager of her money and believed him – since she was illiterate - when he presented her a document and said it was her manumission. It is important to highlight that to say she was an accomplice with him is not to say that they were operating in equal terms. Her routine was marked by different tasks she had to take care of, while his was more characterized as managerial functions, meaning he pretty much was an overseer of her activities and kept all the money that emerged from it. Further along in the book, Bertoleza no longer fits the interests of Romão and he denounces her as runaway slave and she is arrested, leaving an enriched Romão unimpeded to enjoy the money he owns due to her life and labour.

In last chapter's Second Movement, I addressed Caio Prado Jr. (1961) book on colonial Brazil and how it was a counter example on the use of *sentido* to the argument I am building in this thesis. Prado Jr. is interesting to be recovered here, for although he deals with a different time frame, focused on colonial Brazil, he is didactic in terms of the way he organizes his book. The sections around which he frames his chapters are "Occupation", "Material Life" and "Social Life". This makes it representative of an understanding of society by segmenting life experiences in defined categories. Bertoleza shows that these categories are evidently limited in trying to portrait life experiences as a mix bag of territorial experiences, wealth production and social

interactions. Thus, to the extent that *"The Colonial Background of Modern Brazil"* works as a counter-example to this thesis, *"O Cortiço"* offers some insights that may prove valuable in interweaving material and social lives.

In the last section, I tried to present enslaved people in a contextualized way: by beginning with the constitutive aspect of death (following the articulation between Jean-Luc Nancy and Achille Mbembe presented in last chapter), the legal system as the frontier between the worlds of the free and of the black, and finally the family experience with home and marriage. There is no doubt that much more could be added on those regards to the text in the last section, but in the over-all view, I believe that it works as an introduction to the enslaved people in Brazil. Having gone through that first introduction, I find it useful to bring the aesthetic subjects (Shapiro, 2013) of *O Cortiço* to help me build my argument through the next pages. Literature has a way of articulating portraits of social phenomena which are able to account for details and minutia that scape academic efforts of categorizing social action/interaction in terms fit to develop disciplinary critique/analyses. Unfortunately, in emphasising the difference between political, social, economic and other dimensions of (social) life in order to build a neat portrait, the details that are neither political, nor social, nor economic are dismissed as they do not fit the predetermined categories of analysis. I understand Shapiro's aesthetic subjects as the possibility of translating to IR – or to humanities at large – the traces of life, little figments of every-day life, that can be central to a character in a novel or a film at the same time that can be disciplinarily invisible or incomprehensible due to difficulties in categorizing traces that are not clearly political, economic, or social. Traces of life that fall in in-between disciplinary categories. Shapiro's concept of the aesthetic subject helped me make sense of the explanatory potential that bringing aesthetic subjects to the fore can add. After all, these subjects inhabit the imaginary of slavery and – bringing back the argument of Koselleck presented in the last chapter – they enact their part in transforming slavery from a word into a concept. Shapiro defines the aesthetic subject as the "characters in texts whose movements and actions (both purposive and non-purposive) map and often alter experiential, politically relevant terrains" (Shapiro, 2013, xiv). As such, it helps to navigate the bibliographical divide that either understand slavery as giving emphasis

to the long-lasting social consequences it generated, or to the economic role it had as labour which enabled the generation of wealth.

Azevedo, in his romance, seems to capture it all: the disposability of black people, and how they are seen as pawns in their master's game. It also captures the ways they were exploited, through work and otherwise, to the benefit of white men who used the profit they made to perpetuate the exploitation and increase their earnings. The agency of the enslaved person is also recognized mostly in Bertoleza. This character tells a lot since it is only by seeing the novel through her glance that one can realize that to the extent that she was struggling all along in order to accomplish her wishes, the challenges posed to her as a black-enslaved woman were unsurmountable and made it impossible for her to play the same game as the freemen[34].

In the same way that in last section I discussed how Robert Slenes built his book as way of engaging with Charles Ribeyrolles quote of the flower in a *senzala*, *O Cortiço* offers a credible representation that builds an eloquent argument confronting Orlando Patterson's assumption of boundaries in his interpretation of slavery: "However great the human capacity for contradiction, it has never been possible for any group of masters to suckle at their slave's breast as infants, sow their wild oats with her as adolescents, then turn around as adults and claim that she was polluted" (Patterson, 1982, 50).

"Slavery as Social Death" (1982), by Orlando Patterson, is a seminal book on slavery as a social phenomenon. In order to address the violence and lack of freedom that is possibly observed in many spaces at any different time, Patterson's main contribution is to argue that the social idea of people that are alive but that do not find in the society in which they are inserted the recognition of their life is historically and geographically recurrent, thus, these people would be socially dead. Such condition,

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[34] It is important to highlight that the exercise of looking to 19th century writers as sources to develop broader social interpretation is not a novelty. On the contrary, Roberto Schwarz analysing Machado de Assis in *Um Mestre na Periferia do Capitalismo* ([1990] 2012) is an important reference in the academic debate. Another example is the trajectory of the literary critic and professor Antônio Candido that navigated Brazilian literature extracting from poems and novels interpretations on different historical periods. His *Dialética da Malandragem* (1970), in proposing an interpretation of *Memórias de um Sargento de Milícias*, by Manuel Antônio de Almeida, shows that this exercise that I'm proposing with *O Cortiço* is not only not new, but also dialogues with an important intellectual tradition of the Brazilian Political Thought.

Patterson argues, is more often than not the commutation of actual death (Patterson, 1982, 5), a way of keep on breathing. Patterson proposes two universal ways in which an enslaved person would be socially dead. It would happen either because s/he fallen in war or because s/he became a pariah in their community (Patterson, 1982, 44). Either way, it at least implies that the phenomenon could be transitory, especially considering the descendants of the fallen. David Biron Davis (2006: 31) highlights another aspect of Patterson's concept of social death: that the enslaved person is "uprooted from an original family, clan, ancestors, and even legal descendants (since his or her children become the property of the mother's owner). At least in theory and in law, the slave has no legitimate independent being, no place in the cosmos except as an instrument of her or his master's will" (Davis, 2006, 31).

From the standpoint of someone thinking through the phenomenon of slavery in the Atlantic in the 19th Century, it seems that these proposals have their limitations. The 19th Century slavery as a phenomenon cannot be thought through regardless of the extent to which the distinction between society and natural world got a grip in Europe and its colonial experiments. To say that is to consider that the phenomenon I am analysing in this thesis happens in a moment in which the social significance of labour had profoundly changed. The idea of enslavement was no longer that of replication of social life – meaning either the exploitation of labour necessary to produce food and housing for a community or the idea that the incorporation of these people would improve the natural growth of the community. The experience of labour in the monoculture fields of coffee, sugar cane, cotton or indigo in the Americas can hardly be argued as experience of replication of social life in the terms laid by Patterson. However, it was central to the maintenance of the culture of the Atlantic (and my use of the term culture is in relation to that developed in last chapter's second movement – section 2.2.2). Capitalism has no place in Patterson's analyses, yet it is central to the colonial experience in the Americas in the 19th Century. At the same time, the uprootedness interpretation recovered by Davis is one that can be contested by the last section. This is not to deny the violence of the kidnapping, but to argue that in the vilest conditions to which they were submitted, those peoples were able to articulate themselves in new social relations despite of slavery. So, yes, they were uprooted and

yes, they were in very vulnerable situations with regards to their social bonds with other enslaved people. Nevertheless, this does not mean that they were completely vulnerable to the will of their "owners". There were spaces of resistance and negotiation that allow us to see some life in them.

Going further in Patterson's book, I find chapter 7, entitled "The Condition of Slavery", of special interest in order to show how the author himself seems to be unable to sustain the idea of a single meaning to the word slavery through space and time. Dealing with 19th Century US and a myriad of Ancient and non-European experiences in a chapter in which Patterson aims at developing the experiences of slavery – exemplified in the names of the subsections "The Peculium", "Marriage and Other Unions", "The Murder of Slaves", "Crimes against Slaves by Third Parties", "Delicts of slaves" – he is faced with the difficulty of going forward with the abstraction of his concept. Especially since he is framing the experiences, actually, within an effort of proposing civil and criminal codes for enslavement throughout, his analysis results in the proposition of a "four-point scale to code the societies" (Patterson, 1982, 198).

His effort brings me back to the exceptionality of the 19th Century experience – and it is important to restate that by clamming the exceptionality of the 19th Century, I by no means aim at saying that the other experiences can validly be put together without erasure. Slavery in the 19th Century saw a change in its meaning (as the debate on the second slavery presented in the first section of last chapter argued) that only happened as a consequence of that context. This change strengthened an erasure so profound and pervasive as the Eurocentric glance that is still present. Like Reyberolles searched for a flower in the *senzalas* we are still looking for liberal rationale in the behaviour of enslaved people. I find eurocentrism in Patterson's reading as a generalization of enslavement has the liberal experience with law as point of departure. By bringing back the division with which he organizes his chapter 7, he offers a framework to the analyses on the grounds of a liberal understanding of the world. A closer reading of the sections reveals a conundrum, for how to account for the murdering of slaves if they are already socially dead?

The Brazilian experience with law and enslavement is interesting to be recalled here. The Independence of Brazil in 1822 came after 322 years of colonization and

inherited the institution of slavery from the colonial past. There is no law, in the liberal definition of the term, that created the institution of slavery in Brazil. The country's first constitution, adopted in 1824, recognized slavery but cannot be understood as the *fiat* of creating it. Thus, slavery inhabits the historiography of the country naturalized, in a narrative of the progressive advancement of liberty, since the laws approved from 1850 to 1888 are understood as progressively restricting the population that can be enslaved. This allowed for the legal norms of the 19th Century to be presented as the ground on which liberty was built, while it actually operated as a way of legitimizing enslavement. As a consequence, the uphill battle of many against slavery was portrayed as a progressive march towards liberation and equality[35]. Another consequence of the framework of this liberal notion of law is the institutionalization of oblivion that the proclamation of the Republic in the year following the abolition of slavery in Brazil caused. Having been abolished during the monarchical period, slavery was an issue of the past and did not need to be accounted for during the Republic.

The goal in engaging with Patterson is to question the idea of social death. The first section of this chapter was an effort of portraying the challenges and limits imposed on the lives of people in captivity, but, as said previously, emphasising that there was life in it. Looking to slavery by putting an emphasis on the feature of life, that is: looking to the potency of being in the world instead of falling back on the limits imposed by the violence of slavery, one must account for labour as a component of this potency – of social life – and, as a consequence, it is not possible to argue that those who build the spaces occupied by the society and produced the wealth of that society are socially dead. Perhaps the social death concept could be attributed to those whose accumulation happens with the exploitation of the labour of others.

Among the court papers findings of the 19th Century, delivered by Hebe Castro, there is an interesting one:

> The qualification of free witness in civil and criminal rulings that I analysed for the period, the colour of the skin was an always present information, associated with a very specific form of social-professional qualification. While the slaves were associated to

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[35] In next chapter I will deal with this subject with more attention, actually referencing the last years of enslavement and how conflicting it was in Brazil. For the time being, however, it is worth mentioning Angela Alonso's 2015 book in which she makes a strong contribution to the canon by her recovery of how conflicting the process of abolition was, being fully contested all the way through.

some kind of 'service' ('farm service', 'carpenter service'), free men "lived from" something. Generally, they 'lived from their assets and tillage', but also 'from his newspaper', 'from his carpenter's craft', or simply 'from agencies' (Castro, 1995, 37). [Author's translation]

There is no way that those who serve are dead, but it is clear that the life of the other segment is profoundly dependent. Literally, they live from someone else's labour, just like Romão was dependent on Bertoleza to live, at the same time as she was deposable to him. Romão and Bertoleza as aesthetics subjects help to highlight make more evident the intersection between labour and identity which works at the same time as a marker of identity and a system of labour exploitation and – consequently – of wealth accumulation. It is not trivial to show how. There are too many moving parts in a narrative on slavery that finds the intersection between identity and wealth production, and yet, at the same time, it is to some extent made clear by the "distribution of the sensible", in Shapiro's reading of Rancière (2013, xv). The way through which the representation of the enslaved person and the citizen occurs in "*O Cortiço*" makes the former a speaking subject that is alive "socially" and "materially" while making her way through life. This leads me to my critique on Patterson's concept of Social Death. He goes along with the established distribution of the sensible that accounts for the distinction between these two worlds, the social and the material, with the social defining the terms in which the material would be interpreted. The goal here is to challenge this divide by way of rebuilding enslaved people as people – first section – and in here, their work as labour. In so doing, the expectation is to build on Azevedo's contribution of disrupting the distribution of the sensible by making evident that the enslaved person is as good as a subject as any other subject. The way in which the liberal reading of the 19th Century was prone to reinforce the distribution of the sensible that silenced slavery is the goal of chapter 5.

To some extent, Patterson tries to immobilize the concept of slavery by inferring that it had the same meaning throughout its duration. He seems to have mistaken the word for the concept, in Koselleck's (1985) definition of both which I have discussed in the first chapter's movements. By framing all experiences of enslavement in one single logic, Patterson mixes experiences in which it was a way of the dominant social group to keep its grip into society with that in which kidnapping was only a way of

maintaining the reproduction of the productive system, as was the case in 19th Century Atlantic. It seems that the difference between the personal experience of having the horizon of social incorporation – even in other generations – and that of intergenerational marginalization is one that escapes Patterson's analysis even in the potency of the creation of communities in one case or another.

Cedric Robinson, on the other hand, has a more sophisticated reading of History as a process in which there is a constant negotiation between what is new and what is baggage from previous experiences. By looking at the racial traces of European history, he disputes the idea of the emergence of capitalism as an alternative to feudalism as a clear-cut process:

> No class was its own creation. Indeed, capitalism was less a catastrophic revolution (negation) of feudalist social orders than the extension of these social relations into the larger tapestry of the modern world's political and economic relations (Robinson, 1983, 10).

This quote, along with the following, helps the understanding of the reading he has on the transition from feudalism to capitalism and on how the racialization of enslavement was inscribed in the transition operated within the European context:

> The events of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries intervened in the processes through which feudalism was ultimately displaced by the several forms of capitalism. The consequence of those events were to determine the species of the modern world: the identities of the bourgeoisies that transformed capitalism into a world system; the sequences of this development; the relative vitalities of the several European economies. And the sources of labor from which each economy would draw (Robinson, 1983, 17).

Thus, capitalism was the development of a process that brought with it features of feudalism and did not strike as a lighting of class consciousness. The goal here is not to debate the origins of capitalism nor its efforts of building legitimization through historic narratives. However, as Second Slavery debates (Tomich, 2004, Salles, 2008, Parron, 2011) demonstrate, the specificity of slavery in 19th century Atlantic lies in its timing, of happening in the transition between feudalism to capitalism, then of paid labour. Slavery, thus, occupies a tricky position in the formation of space in the Atlantic, for it establishes an absolute condition to the enslaved peoples, while other parts of the world are facing identity transformations. For instance: Robinson, as seen, argues that the transition from feudalism to capitalism was a movement in which features of medieval Europe were taken to the rest of the world, in a world-system logic, while Losurdo looks at the same historic moment and highlights the dispute

between sections of European society on the issue of slavery. By putting Jean Bodin side by side with Grotious – a contemporary – or John Locke – whom he preceded in some decades – Losurdo finds

> Not only was slavery not a residue of the past and backwardness, but the remedy for it was to be sought not in the new political and social forces (liberal in orientation), but, on the contrary, in monarchical power. Thus argued Bodin, but thus likewise argued Smith two centuries later." (Losurdo, 2011, 33).

This preoccupation with the possibility of framing slavery within capitalism is not strange to Brazilian Social Thought. Slavery reduced to unpaid labour and a comprehension of Marxist historiography as a collection of predetermine tropes favoured the interpretation of economic accumulation as a systemic dynamic, leaving less space to the enslaved people as characters in that history. Caio Prado Jr. (1961[1942]) is exemplary of this. An Economic Historian writing in 1942 on the Brazilian colonial period, Prado Jr. sees the Brazilian independence as the completion of a period that *"had already accomplished all that it had to accomplish"* (Prado Jr., 1961, 5), that had achieved and reached its "*sentido*". Looking to the meaning of the colonial enterprise by European states, Prado Jr. estates:

> In its whole, and seen both through a global and international perspectives, the tropics colonization becomes a vast commercial enterprise, more complex than the former trading posts, but keeping the same character that it had, destined to explore natural resources of a virgin territory to the profit of the European commerce (Prado Jr., 1961, 25). [author's translation]

In the end, Prado Jr. is arguing how the colonization determined the economic and political situations of Brazil in the 1940's, understanding capitalism from the perspective of Brazil. Thus, instead of seeing the expansion of capitalism through the Atlantic as a European process that adapted to a new set of conditions, he reads it through the perspective of Brazil keeping on being a peripheral economy. So, to the extent that the Marxist tradition is present in the classics of Brazilian Social Thought, the perspective through which it is read does not seek the change, rather the continuity inscribed in the historical process,

A counterpoint to Prado Jr.'s reading of such segmentation is offered by Gilberto Freyre, a conservative author who offers an interpretation of colonial slavery more focused on change, on how the colonial background allowed for the development of a racial democracy in Brazil. He reaches this conclusion by offering a more positive reading of the colonial interaction between masters and slaves through a comparative

approach with Southern US that led him to conclude that the Brazilian experience with slavery was less violent, thus allowing for a less segmented society in the 20th Century (Freyre, 2005 [1933]). Prado Jr and Freyre both are writing during the 1930's and 1940's and sowing the field to debates that would follow by authors such as Florestan Fernandes ([1965] 2021) and Maria Sylvia de Carvalho Franco (1976, 1983) who would see the limitations of this crude Marxist interpretation brought to Brazil with no mediation, as well as the necessity of offering an answer to Freyre's argument of a harmonious society in Brazil.

Framing the debate as between feudalism and capitalism may not fit so perfectly with the historical experience. The embattlement against slavery by the *Ancién Regime* and the connivence of Liberalism with it challenges the perception of an evolutive and prescriptive interpretation of events. In order to understand the 19th Century in general and the Atlantic in particular, it may prove more instructive to look at the social dynamics of labour and accumulation than to try to interpret the beginning of capitalism and the end of feudalism. The Atlantic Slavery during the 1800s sees itself in the middle of this transition being implemented in the peripherical spaces of accumulation. No wonder the difficulties in framing it when the silence on the matter is prevalent. Having said all that, the figure of the aesthetic subject is even more relevant in portraying the social phenomenon.

If last section – the first of the chapter – began with death as the point of departure to the understanding of slavery, here I argued against the idea of the enslaved person being socially dead: labour being what allows for the creation of value should be understood as social life. However, the understanding of enslaved labour as labour – in similar grounds as one understands factory workers as labourers in 19th Century England – is not automatic. It resonates with the "distribution of the sensible" as Shapiro's (2013) reading of Rancière indicates. As long as enslaved people are only "slaves", they do not need to be seen as people nor as workers. They are something else, which has another history all together – a history of slavery, of "social death" – thus offering no challenge to the framings of International Relations. By arguing that "slaves" are enslaved people and that their actions are not only social actions, but labour as well, on the next section I will take this discussion further by addressing the

idea of nation – and of citizenship – departing from this parameter of the enslaved person.

3.4.
People with no Flag

Slavery in Brazil precedes Brazil as a country. This historical anteriority helps to put the commitment of the country with that institution, which did not need to be created by way of legislation after independence into perspective, only to continue to be enforced by slaveholders.

This anteriority may offer a great input into many of the social dynamics that can be observed in the centuries from its adoption to contemporaneity. In the last sections, I have hinted to how it was read by Economic History and a few of the classical "Interpreters of Brazil". My intake into this phenomenon is to see how the literature on the matter can offer insights that might speak to the modern international. So far, by understanding International Relations as the problem of the difference (Blaney, Inayatullah, 2004), it is possible to see that by framing slavery as difference, that there are some new venues open in thinking disciplinarily. In this section I want to explore the idea of political belonging when confronted with the idea of slavery, and this is where the anteriority of slavery to Brazil as an independent country is important: for it is an important feature to account for in a section on nationalism. What does this anteriority say about the possibility of thinking nationalism in terms of enslaved people? For once, this enforces the prevalence of narratives of 19th Century Brazil in which the uphill battle against the maintenance of enslavement is portrait as a progressive march towards liberation and equality. The effort of building a liberal State that would mimic European experiences is portrayed in the traditional historiography that deals with the institutional history of the country[36]. Such history is marked by the dispute between the political parties whose – supposed – distinction was not reflected

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[36] Throughout the 19th Century, it is possible to see both England/United Kingdom and France as important references to the politics and institutional development in Brazil. Due to methodological constrains and spatial limitations, I have opted to follow the thread of England/UK as reference and the approximation it leads to Liberalism in the reading of John Locke and so forth. The French influence in this liberal construct and the connections it allows to see (perhaps a proximity to Haiti yet to be explored?) and the political imagination that may rise from it is open to the continuance of this research.

on the composition of its ranks[37]. It should go without saying that, in this scenario of homogenous elite and an extensive population of enslaved people, the idea of building a liberal State is one that blurs the line between history and wishful thinking. However, despite the evidence against it, the idea that Brazil could build a liberal State in the 19th Century has strong roots, even after much has been argued against the liberal categories.

I find the colonization of Brazil to be central to the creation of the phenomenon of modern slavery due to the fact – that will be explored in more depth in the fifth chapter – that it is the space in which slavery lasted for longer. Thus, in the same way that the English experience is inescapable to Locke's theorization on citizenship and State, the South-Atlantic experience with slavery allows us to reflect and explore ways of politically acknowledging for this experience and long-term impacts. I will elaborate more on the spatial notion of the Atlantic from the next chapter onwards, using a rearticulation of the senses of belonging enticed by the State from the perspective of the enslaved person.

As a consequence, after dealing with the social and work dimensions of the life of a slaved person I turn now to articulate the notion of belonging as possible from a political perspective. The parameter to this articulation is the insufficiency of the concept of citizen as a parameter to the enslaved person. Consequently, the liberal concepts are the point of departure of the next few pages. The liberal literature would lead to the notion of citizens, those recognized by the State as entitled to claim rights from the State. In itself, this presents an interesting turning argument from the abstraction of the social contract represented by the citizens' agreement in order to found the State. Either way, those recognized as citizens are allowed rights – sometimes mistaken as privileges – which include the possibility of having uprises against tyrants seen as legitimate. At least John Locke saw that way.

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[37] Most of the reign of Pedro II was marked by the existence of two political parties and the history of their political (electoral or not) dispute is told in some important historical works, amongst which Ilmar Mattos (1987) and Jeffrey Needell (2006) stand out. By highlighting the homogeneity of these parties, I am not contesting these two authors. Rather, I am arguing that there is more in play contributing to their homogeneity than against it. In order to argue for the homogeneity, I rely in Carvalho (2007) who favours, in his analysis, the dynamics of constitution and maintenance of the political elite instead of the ways in which this homogeneity is blurred by party politics.

However, before diving in the idea of citizenship, it is important to notice how similar its fate was – disciplinary speaking – to the notion of space, as it has been immobilized within State borders. To the same extent that there are challenges to the capture of territoriality by the State, there are challenges to this limited comprehension on citizenship. Here I am thinking in terms of critical citizenship studies developed by Aoileann Ní Mhurchú (2014), Kim Rygiel (2010) and Peter Nyers and Kim Rygiel (2012). The bibliography to which I will turn, however, is not this to the extent that I want to present a critique to the centrality of citizenship. I want to address the same target they are addressing. However, I am not departing from the same point as they do, inasmuch as my challenge to citizenship comes not from a goal of enhancing the concept itself, rather from the perspective of bringing slavery as an experience made invisible, due to the centrality of citizenship to the constitution of the idea of State, to the forefront of the debate. Thus, my concept of citizenship is brought down to its bare minimum: those who claim citizenship are those entitled to claim rights before his/her state. Thus, women, refugees, migrants, who inhabit the outskirts of the discipline, are those who aspire for citizenship.

Now, in place of citizenship, consider the debate regarding nationalism. Eric Hobsbawn (1992) and Benedict Anderson (2006) have both experimented with the subject in impactful ways to the research that would follow them. The first contribution that both bring is the de-essentialization of nationalism situating it as "cultural artefacts of a particular kind" (Anderson, 2006, 4). These artefacts, as Anderson put it, challenged both Marxists and liberals alike, to the extent that they are the consequence of "a complex 'crossing' of discrete historical forces" (Anderson, 2006, 4), not the development of an ideology. Anderson's definition of nationalism is the name of the book: an imagined community, with no proper definition of its limits and a loose sense of belonging. In arguing for the construction of this concept, Anderson highlights three constitutive paradoxes of nationalism:

> (1) The objective modernity of nations to the historian's eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists. (2) The formal universality of nationality as a socio-cultural concept – in the modern world everyone can, should, will 'have' a nationality, as he or she 'has' a gender – vs. the irremediable particularity of its concrete manifestations, such that, by definition, 'Greek' nationality is sui generis. (3) The

'political' power of nationalisms vs. their philosophical poverty and even incoherence (Anderson, 2006, 5).

These contradictions are tension points that situate in time the political phenomenon that nationalism represents, which at the same time puts a pin on an interesting process of offering one definition to different processes. To account for it is to offer another dimension to nationalism as homogenization, since it happens not only within its borders, but also naming different processes that were happening around Europe. As put by Hobsbawm: "Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round" (Hobsbawm, 1992, 10).

Hobsbawm (1992) offers important insights on how nation/national/nationalism creates a lexicon of words whose meaning is mutually dependent but with no clear conceptualization as from where it is departing other than the equation "nation = state = people" (Hobsbawm, 1992, 19).

> We cannot therefore read into the revolutionary 'nation' anything like the later nationalist programme of establishing nation-states for bodies defined in terms of the criteria so hotly debated by the nineteenth-century theorists, such as ethnicity, common language, religion, territory and common historical memories (Hobsbawm, 1992, 20).

This is not to criticize the author, rather to stress Anderson's argument featuring the lack of philosophical development on this subject and how nation, nationalism and nation-state communicate even with no conceptualization[38]. Hobsbawm is precise in arguing with his equation that nation is linked to territory (Hobsbawm, 1992, 19). In so being, nationalism is inescapably an essentialization of the expected characteristics of the people of a certain region – a point on which both Anderson and Hobsbawm are arguing. In so being, it also becomes an erasure of labour to the extent that, as argued in the movements of last chapter, the social space is different from the natural space by consequence of the labour expended on it. There is no space to accept nationalism as a natural truth while accounting for the traditions and spaces shared as consequence of the labour and other social experiences shared collectively. Now, consider the situation in which those whose work constitutes space are not deemed as part of the imagined community. To frame history with the narrative of nationalism is to frame it with a

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[38] Specifically on the matter of the nation-state, I will explore this subject more in depth in the fourth and fifth chapters, recovering John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge (1995) in their critique of the nation-state by way of the concept of "territorial trap".

non-universalizable ideology, instead of framing it with the notion of entitlement to rights, inscribed in the notion of citizenship. This is not to say that the claim to citizenship is universal, for it is not, and the multiple examples of people dispossessed from rights in the modern international prove it. Rather, it is to say that it brings the discussion to more tangible criteria than the figment of belonging of nationalism. Both concepts are tributaries to the State, but citizenship allows for the recognition of agency of the citizens and a clear implication for the excluded ones: no access to rights and ability to speak – thus to demand anything – from the State.[39]

In his 7th chapter, "On political or Civil Society", from the Second Treatise, John Locke does not refer neither to nationality nor to citizenship. Throughout the chapter, he speaks of a belonging to political community which rises from family. However, his idea of belonging is not a vague one and relates directly to having access to rights:

> Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one society, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political, or civil society. And this is done, where-ever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme government; or else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for hereby he authorizes the society, or which is all one, the legislative thereof (Locke, 1980, 47-8).

Locke is not talking, in this passage, about citizenship nor nationalism, but he is referring the idea of belonging to a society, a notion that will be understood as belonging to a State following the understanding that it is the State that follows the state of nature in the history of political development. The State is the *locus* of politics. Reading this passage with Balibar's (2015, 5) statement that the "'Bourgeois' revolutions" shaped the meaning of citizenship allows for the framing of the passage within the nation-state. Locke is a representative of these revolutions and made his part in the construction of an understanding of the world that does not account for the different subjectivities. Balibar wrote a book on John Locke pretty much sustaining that he was the first philosopher to argue on "personal identity", therefore anticipating René Descartes in his casting centrality to the individual (Standford, 2013, 7). This

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[39] Étienne Balibar (2015) brings back the debate on citizenship that may prove useful to those interested in deepening the read on the subject. To the object of this thesis, I will keep with the minimum definition of citizenship – upon which Balibar develops his critique – proposed by Hannah Arendt as "right to rights" (Balibar, 2015, 41).

analyses, however, is done not by observing the Second Treatises; rather, by analysing Book II, Chapter XXVII "Of Identity and Diversity" of "*Essay Concerning Understanding*" (1694). In this section, as well as in chapter 4, I am focusing on the book of 1690, the one understood to be his most compelling political statement – the reason why I will not dive deeper in Balibar's contribution. Yet, it could not be neglected that the potential first philosopher to think the individual in his personality – not as a biological or material existence only – was, to say the least, indifferent to slavery. As if silencing on slavery.

This quick detour to the distinction between nationalism and citizenship lenses while writing history is a way of showcasing the structural difficulty of addressing the issue of enslavement. It is possible to grant the enslaved person the non-citizen status as a consequence of the lack of rights – and I will address this issue later on. The feature of nationalism, on the other hand, is one that does not address enslavement. As it tries to emulate the European experience with (supposedly) relatively homogenous populations, it frames the discussion into a category that renders the experience of enslaved people completely invisible.

Locke is writing his Second Treatises of Government observing revolutionary movements in England. He is thinking through the transition that it represented towards a modern State featuring representativeness and the institutionalization of limits to the power of the King. However, Locke, who happened to be partner in a company that profited from the selling of African people to the Americas (Losurdo, 2011, 3-4), was not considering the situation of those whose life he traded upon. Those he saw as merchandise, enslaved peoples were not seen as endowed with the same legitimacy to an uprising. In Locke, it is possible to see arguments contrary to the violent imposition of the State against anyone, since he advocates for challenging the tyrants who would be in disarray with the "civil society", imposing themselves on it and ignoring the rights and lives of their subjects.

To make justice to the author, Locke's most famous book would not envision the conditions of building a State in a non-European country – it is arguable if he would have considered States to be a possibility in any other continent except perhaps the British colonies in North America. In these states he saw no conflict with enslavement

to the extent that he drafted the North Carolina constitutional provision that granted ownership over enslaved people (Losurdo, 2011, 3). There are interests at play in colonies in recognizing Liberalism as a "one-size fits-all" theoretical approach since this project arrives with the glow of central capitalist States and a rhetoric of universality while allowing for the invisibility of extensive portions of populations that do not fit the basic parameters of citizenship. The two-fold movement of attributing a universality to a parochial text, while ignoring the history and the dynamics of the spaces to which this discourse is brought, allows for a crystallization of the concept of citizenship. It becomes such a central concept that we actually make an effort of interpreting history of slavery through it, as if enslaved people would be the antithesis to citizens, a telling misconception, for what is denied to someone enslaved is not a citizenship, rather his/her humanity. The opposing condition of being a citizen in a country is being a citizen somewhere else. The condition of enslavement operates in another logic, one that sees the person as not being entitled to any respectability. If the marker of slavery were to be the absence of citizenship, the expected behaviour towards an enslaved person and a foreigner – considering that the foreigner is someone expected to hold citizenship abroad – would not be so different. The racial difference that marks that one does not share the nationality, together with the absence of rights – indicative of a foreigner – merge in the figure of the enslaved person. To this insufficiency of meeting the criteria of belonging was added the forced labour, thus making insufficient for the criterion of citizenship to define slavery.

If instead of defining the abstract citizen as the point of departure to the writing of the history of the modern international we would lean towards the idea of the enslaved person as the point of departure, we would have a completely different perspective on the trajectory and on the current dynamics of politics. The ubiquitous State optics, for instance, would be challenged for there were/are similarities in the categories of exclusion that do not depend on the direct manifestation of the State – as is the case of citizenship. I am addressing the possibility of questioning what Walker (2004) called the "triple exceptionalism", centred in the liberal rationale that can constitute the individual, the State and the system of states through the *fiat* of the sovereign deciding what is the rule and what is the exception (Walker, 2004, 248). In

my proposition of centring politics on slavery, the borders are within and the different is no longer outcasted. This actually becomes the point of departure to the project as a whole, since slavery is thought not around the citizen or the master; it is structured around the enslaved person in a constitutive contradiction. These notions of homogenous belonging are, consequently, always lacking in their attempt to address slavery.

Orlando Patterson's concept of "social death", addressed at length in the former section, although falling back on the complexity of the enslaved society, which denied every right to those people yet was also extremely dependent on their work, say a lot on the experience that the people under the violence of slavery suffered. Being socially dead is a powerful way of relating with the idea of a person spending much of his/her existence trying to prove – legally or on other spheres of life – that s/he is actually a person. This is less than an analytical abstraction and more of a reality of many minorities that do not fit the parameters stablished by the citizenship framework and do not fully comprehend the distinction between rights and privileges as both equally distant.

The fact that there has never been a law that made slavery legal in Brazil allowed for the legal norms of the 19th Century liberal State to be presented as the ground in which liberty was built, while it, in fact, operated as a way of legitimizing it. This brings me to the last abstraction of the liberal State: the idea that, within Hobsbawm's (1992) equation that "nation = state = people", legal norms would constitute society. Those who wrote histories of Brazil through institutions were unable to see how the "socially dead" resisted and negotiated their lives with the conditions they had at their disposal in spaces unseen by institutionalized justice. An aspect that can be ratified by the fact that it was only in the 1990s that a book like Robert Slenes' *Na Senzala Uma Flor* was written.

This chapter was thought as a way of dealing with categories that are usually used in order to make sense of the modern slavery. This section, specifically, was thought through the silent opposition to the idea of citizenship, and on this matter the book by Gerald Horne (2007) is a potent example. This book is an effort of inserting Brazil in a narrative of the US experience with slavery. To the extent that the Caribbean has been

seen as part of slavery as an economic phenomenon, at least since Eric Williams 1944 classical "*Capitalism and Slavery*" in political analysis the processes were nationalized and read by national history only. Horne undoubtedly understands slavery as a hemispheric phenomenon; however, he insists on enforcing the role States had on it – especially the US – a position that is made clear on the first page of the book: "This book argues that U.S. slavery is better understood in hemispheric terms – the Slave South saw in an alliance with Brazil a formidable hedge against future relationship with the North (…)" (Horne, 2007, 1). What I challenge in his analyses is not how slavery was apprehended by Southerner elites in relation to Northerners, nor do I question the point he makes on how it was politically interesting to act upon the converging interest of Brazilian government in putting forward pro-slavery agenda. Rafael Marquese and Tâmis Parron (2011) used pretty similar lines of thought and argumentation while inverting the perspective. These authors were interested in understanding the impacts in Brazil of the abolition of slavery in the US. Notwithstanding the importance of Marquese and Parron's to the original project of this thesis and the relevance of their and Horne's research, both of them are still State-centric proposals of dealing with slavery, rather than centring the analyses on the experience of enslaved people. And what I mean by State-centric can be synthetised by Walker's (2004) notion of "triple exceptionalism": these books are still framed by slavery as the "other" within the State that allows for the constitution of the citizen, the citizen's wealth and the citizen's political structure. While what I have been arguing in this chapter is on the effort of dislocating the focus to the enslaved people, it is not an effort of trying to speak for those people, rather to consider another perspective, different from that of the abstract notion of citizen and see what political possibility emerges from it. To the extent that the State and the citizen are mutually dependent to exist as we know them, to keep on considering the State as the sole frame with which to interpret slavery is to forgo other political possibilities that the enslaved person can help to see. This other political frame does not challenge the validity of the State as a historical phenomenon Instead, it argues that there is more to politics than the State and, to the extent that the State is necessary to the existence of slavery, it is but one aspect of the phenomenon. Thus, to the same extent that there are citizens and that through them one can build a political structure,

there were also enslaved people that could point to other political imaginaries. These two political phenomena existed and articulated one with the other, with some fractures allowing to see figments of one side on the other, for instance, by allowing one to see how nationalism is negotiable when dealing with slavery.

In "*The Deepest South*" (2007), it is possible to see that Gerald Horne thought the book through the issue of the traffic of enslaved people, then transitioning to the impact the enslaved labour had to State institutionalized politics. In the first section of the book, the passages in which the interchangeability of US and Brazilian flags is acknowledged are recurrent (Horne, 2007, 36; 39; 46). The allegiance, thus, is not to the State, it is to the traffic of people and follows the logic not of the sovereign countries, but rather of the convenience needed to navigate in the Atlantic. To argue that this is an economic rationality guiding the actions of rational actors is to atomize and naturalize the process of transportation of these people. There is another spatial logic at play here which deals with people and the occupation of space considering a logic other than that of the State. "States are interchangeable", seems to be the message from these captains.

Rafael Marquese and Tamis Parron in their 2011 text "*Internacional escravista: a política da Segunda Escravidão*"[40] dive into the Reading of the Second Slavery as a way of reading the aftermath of the Civil War in the United States as an event of hemispheric consequence, considering that the result of the dispute between Northerners and Southerners in the US, to an extent, set the fate for the other remaining slave-intensive spaces in the Americas: Cuba and Brazil. Marquese and Parron add another layer – in comparison with Horne (2007) – to the dynamics of the politics of enslavement, which is the dispute with the UK at this point in the 19th Century regarding the Atlantic commerce of people. British pressures are understood as inputs from an economic rationale to adapt to new trade and production logics centred in London. Despite being still largely State-centric, this looser sense of Economic disputes whose impacts permeates the spaces rather than hitting States top to bottom is an approach that I find more attuned with the pervasiveness phenomenon of slavery.[41]

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[40] Slavery International: the politics of Second Slavery, in a free translation.
[41] In chapter 4, the issue of abolition of slavery and its politics in the Atlantic will be analysed more closely considering these discussions in its details.

My argument regarding Marquese and Parron (2011) is that the exchanges that are seen in the scope of 19th Century Atlantic Slavery are not constrained by trade deals or the rights to costal navigation with foreign flags (Marquese, Parron, 2011, 107-9) – practices typical of foreign trade in the period. Rather, they expand through practices that allow for the deepening and reproducibility of slavery by considering it not as multiple national phenomena, but as an Atlantic phenomenon, just as the concept of Second Slavery (Tomich, 2004) proposes. In light of this, Horne's finding of similarities in the loop-wholes (in South Carolina and Brazilian legislations) which allowed for the maintenance of the trading of enslaved peoples by arguing that those who were already enslaved elsewhere could be sold as slaves despite prohibitions of slave trade (Horne, 2007, 132) points to this exchange in practices that allowed for the maintenance of the violence of the trade of people and of practice of forced labour. At the same time, this finding points to the transformation in meaning of slavery and the argumentative spin created in order to define it as a permanent trace, not as a condition. This spin is interesting because it uses practices of African populations (if not buying from Africans, who the traders would be buying from?) as the legal grounds on which they create the legitimation for the enslavement of Africans. As a consequence, the effort of finding an origin history that would legitimize slavery works neatly to the extent that it finds an a-historical legitimation, since there would be no history for those who are not seen as civilized. This justification for slavery is a powerful move, since it uses the hierarchy between the spaces in a way as to consolidate the divide between them.

The argument here is not that there is no hierarchy between the countries in the American hemisphere playing a role in the trade, but instead, that the ordaining hierarchy of this space is between master and slaved person. To address it properly, we have to also add this dimension to geopolitical analyses, in light of what Marquese and Parron had done analysing slavery phenomenologically, considering the 19th Century context. In that same sense, Pedro Salgado argues: "the rise of capitalism simply creates the possibility of new geopolitics related to the strategies of reproduction and spatialization of particular actors who are promoting the geopolitical expansion of capitalism." (Salgado, 2020, 441). Chapters 4 and 5 will be dealing more extensively

with the idea of space and geopolitics, I just saw fit to anticipate this layer to the debate for, as argued by Salgado (2020) and Alencastro (2000) Brazil is constituted in geopolitical process that can only be understood considering the Atlantic space, slavery, and the colonial experience.

This hierarchical relation between master-slave will be the constitutive relation that will define casuistically the rights and duties of people, thus creating the spaces of un-institutionalized justice substituting nationality and citizenship. The latter is nulled both for master and enslaved, given the difficulty of legally framing the person with sovereign rights over other people. The enslaved experience naturalized extreme violence to the extent that one is prone to mistake resistance with existence, as Mbembe (2003) has alerted to.

On this note I find important to clarify a reference which I handled through this section: Eugene Genovese's Afterword in *From Rebellion to Revolution* (1979). I will excuse myself in a long quotation that not only I find powerful but that says a lot on the meaning of the flag to enslaved populations:

> What did the Fourth [of July], the Declaration of Independence, and the 'flag of *our* country' mean to those illiterate slaves and freedmen? Were the slaveholders right in sometimes asserting that their chattel heard nothing more than bombast, either rendered as meaningless excitement or unfortunate incitement to primitive assertion and license? Corporal Prince Lambkin provided an unforgettable answer. An ex-slave transformed into a tough soldier, he rose to speak to his fellow black troops in Colonel Higginson's regiment. […]: "Our mas'rs dey hab lib under de flag, dey got dere wealth under it, and ebryting beautiful for dere chilen. Under it dey hab grind us up, and put us in dere pocket for money. But de fus' minute dey tink dat ole flag mean freedom for we colored people, dey pull it right down, and run up de rag ob dere own. [immense applause]. But we'll neber desert de ole flag, boys, neber; we hab lib under it for *eighteen hundred sixty-two years*, and we'll die for it now" (Genovese, 1979, 136-137 italics and spelling from the original).

If corporate Lambkin were to conceive other spatialities of power, develop another sense of belonging, would he wrap himself around the flag? Was he to know that slavery lasted, in the US, from 1619 until then, not from the year zero, and that previous to that other politics were in place, would he be so enthusiastic? It is the believe that the answer to these two questions is "no" that led me to call this section "people without flag".

3.5.
Racism: including through exclusion

The invisibility of life along with the contempt for labour and the inability to attend the criteria to fit national or citizenship parameters are the features that I developed in the previous sections of this chapter. Here, in this section, my goal is to point how they lead to racism as the criteria that would incorporate former enslaved populations to the society. The idea in this section is in fact to argue that racism is the way through which incorporation into society occurred after the abolition, highlighting that that abolition would not mean surpassing racism, rather its transformation.

The name of this section is a nod to a passage by Giorgio Agamben's "*Homo Sacer*" that I already used in chapter 1: "Bare life remains included in politics in the form of exception, that is, as something that is included solely through an exclusion." (Agamben, 1998, 11). Agamben belongs to the biopolitics tradition that Achille Mbembe read and joined in contributing with his concept of Necropolitics, However, to the extent of the subject of this thesis, his concept of "bare life" do not resonate profoundly to the extent that fails to deal with the dimension of labour. Agamben is looking to the Holocaust and he is addressing the forms of dehumanization developed in the concentration camps: absolute forms of exclusion in which all that is left to people is the identity of exclusion, not even labour exploitation is of interest of the perpetrators of violence, it is bare life: the minimum of the minimum. Nevertheless, this idea of including through exclusion is a play on words that resonates with the experience of 19th Century slavery that I am developing. It accounts for the tension and the contradiction experienced in the slavery States in which there were those who were included via their citizenship, and those who were included by way of slavery. The latter, were people that were included in the social context in abject conditions, however indisputably included to the extent that their labour was essential to the production of space and culture.

This tension is the one that I built through the chapter until this moment, where I aim at addressing the end of slavery in Brazil and how the project of including through exclusion lingered even after the abolition. The afterlife of slavery in Brazilian society

is a prolific subject, and Florestan Fernandes is an important reference in thinking through this inheritance:

> The extinct regime did not completely disappear after Abolition. It lingered in mentality, in behaviour and even in the organization of men's social relations, even of those that should be interested in a complete subversion of the *old regime*. It is difficult to emphasise enough the sociological meaning of this complex reality. It shows us that the black person and the *mulato* were, so to speak, cloistered in the state[42] condition of "freed" and in it they remained a long time after the legal disappearance of slavery (Fernandes, 2021, 269). [author's translation]

This "complex reality" to which Fernandes points is what I am calling the inclusion by exclusion. Such incorporation by denial is a way of denouncing the project that would derive from the inevitability of that people and the need for their work, or at least their existence as potential work force on the new country while profoundly rejecting them. At last, the goal is to propose a history of the institutions centred on the figure of the enslaved people, rather than the other way around.

Clóvis Moura is a Brazilian sociologist who, in the 1970s, wrote a book entitled *O Negro: de bom escravo a mau cidadão?*[43](1977). In it, he analyses the process of not incorporating the former enslaved people in the labour force after the abolition of enslavement and he argues that the colour line that marks the labour force that is privileged in the last decades of the 19th Century in Brazil: European migrants. These constituted the industrial work force of the factories that begin to open in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, while the black people were coming to the main cities living precariously and struggling to find job positions.

It is important to notice that the last decade of the 19th Century to which Moura is referring is also the first decade of the Republic in Brazil. A year after the abolition of slavery in the country, thus in 1889, a military coup led to the deposition of D. Pedro II and allowed for the foundation of a new Republic, the United States of Brazil. The republican movement is understood to have its roots in the Republican Manifesto from 1870, published in São Paulo as the ignition that would result in the Itu convention, in 1873, the first time the party would assemble (Schwarcz, Starling, 2015, 302).

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[42] Here the word "state" is used in the sense of sections of a society in which the boundaries of belonging are clearly marked between portions of the society.
[43] In English, "The Black Person: from a good slave to a bad citizen?"

From this manifesto, two sentences tell the most. The first is the sentence that made the document famous "*We are from America and we want to be Americans.*" (Marinho et all, 1870) [author's translation]. Being "America" the substantive used to refer to the continent is also used to refer to the country creates a play on words that is interesting to see, especially considering the migration of Dixies after the end of the Civil War to São Paulo specifically (Horne, 2007). In any case, it attests to the perception of the negative exceptionality of Brazil as a monarchical regime in a continent of Republics that rose, following the independence of the US, once the Spanish colonies began to declare their independence.

The second quote from the document is the last paragraph prior to the conclusion, which reads: "It is thus that the dynastic principle and the lifelong duration of Senate terms are two flagrant violations of national sovereignty, and constitute the main flaws of the 1824 Constitution." (Marinho et all, 1870) [author's translation]. The document is completely silent on the matter of slavery (or "the servility question", how it came to be known at the time), while the duration of terms and the succession of the emperor were seen as the main issues to be addressed. Schwarcz and Starling (2015, 301) argue that the silence on the issue of slavery was on purpose, not to compromise the potential support of the plantation owners to the cause of the Republic. It is a way of tacitly arguing that slavery is a problem of the Monarchy and that the republicans would not need to address.

In the last section, I argued that the anteriority of slavery to Brazil seemed to legitimized the justice system and legislation as the realm in which the battle for liberty should be thought, while it actually served as a legitimation of violence. The argument I intend to deliver in this section follows the same rationale: the Republic, following so close the abolition of slavery, and the understanding that they represent aspects from the same crisis, allowed for slavery to be understood as a done deal by the time of the inauguration of the first president. Florestan Fernandes' (2021) argument goes this way in his analyses of social inequality in Brazil. He focuses on the city of São Paulo, whose growth is linked to the Republican period and with the development of "a competitive social order" (2021, 271).

> As paradoxical as it seems, it was the *omission* of white men – and not their action – that resulted in the perpetuation of *status quo ante*. It seems that, as the "white men" were

only able to apply a small section of the techniques, institutions and social values inherent to the competitive social order, and even so in more restricted and confined sectors (…), the field was left open to the strong survival of patterns of social behaviour variably archaic. Amidst these patterns of behaviour, norms of old etiquette of racial relations passed to the new historic era and revitalized themselves (…)" (Fernandes, 2021, 271). [author's translation]

The myth of the racial democracy in Brazil would emerge as a consequence of the inaction of engaging with the consequences of the abolition of slavery in the country. The law that abolished slavery did not address, within its two articles[44], the incorporation of the former enslaved people to the society. The proximity between the abolition and the proclamation of the Republic helped to create this mismatch between what Florestan Fernandes called "racial order" – marked by the divide between "white men" and "black men"[45] and the *mulato* – "and social order", characterized by the nominal equality of "white" and "black" men in face of the law – "of the class society" (Fernandes, 2021, 287). These two orders and the construction of the myth of the racial democracy walked hand in hand in the perpetuation of inequality in Brazil. Speaking about racial democracy in Brazil, Fernandes states:

> The myth in question had some practical utility, even in the moment in which it emerged historically. It seems that this utility was made evident in three distinct dimensions. First, generalized a self-righteous state of mind, allowing to claim responsibility for the incapability, or for the irresponsibility, of the "black men" to the human drama of the "population of colour" in the city, to which they vouched with indisputable indexes of economic, social and political inequality in the ordain of racial relations. Second, exempted "white men" of any moral obligation, responsibility or solidarity, of social scope and of collective nature, towards the sociopathic effects of the abolitionist spoliation and of the progressive deterioration of the socioeconomic situation of the black person and the *mulato*. Third, revitalized the technic of focusing and evaluating the relations between "black" and "white" people by exteriorities or appearances of social adjustments, forging a *false conscience* of Brazilian racial reality (Fernandes, 2021, 276). [author's translation]

This dual transformation that happened between May 13rd 1888 and November 15th 1889 is profoundly constitutive of the experience with slavery in Brazil, if nothing else, because it was framed as a problem of the Monarchy from the beginning. And, with it being addressed – in the next chapter, I will deal with the political process that led to the abolition – in the twilight of the Monarchy, seems to have been the perfect

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[44] Article 1: Slavery is declared abolished in Brazil from the date of this law; Article 2: All dispositions to the contrary are revoked. (Brazil, 1888)
[45] Fernandes uses quotation marks when referring to racial tropes.

excuse for white men in power in the Republic just not to care about it. If we compare, for instance, the two articles of the abolition law with the broad array of elements dealt with by the Land Law, it becomes patent that regulating land ownership was a subject that allowed for a minutia detailing that found no equivalence in the importance given to the future of enslaved people[46]. Actually, the fate of former enslaved people would be defined in its minutia with the arrival of the new regime. This is how, just like in 1822 the independence of Brazil began with the *de facto* distinction between people who were enslaved and citizens, in 1889 the United States of Brazil was inaugurated with formal equality for everyone in the country.

At this point, it is important to stress the fact that the historiography of slavery and racial relations in Brazil is strongly marked by comparative efforts of seeing it in relation to the US[47]. The next chapter will deal with slavery in the US more extensively, the idea of the segregation that marked the country from the end of the Civil War until the 1960s it comes with no surprise. The Jim Crow laws marked a clear distinction between rights among US citizens. With the formal recognition of equality between white and black people in Brazil, along with studies that pointed to the marked difference when considered the equivalent situation in US, the status of black people in Brazil was understood as more favourable. No matter in which of the historiographical waves one would be situated, the general consensus is that the formal discrimination observed in the US did not happen here. This is a statement I disagree with. In fact, I argue that the legal mechanisms of segregation adopted by the new Republic were actually more effective in segregating than the experiences of the US South, not only for it achieving the same goal, but also because they did so without the

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[46] Angela Alonso (2015) argues that this is a sign of how contentious the subject was: even this vague two-articles law was approved by a thin margin, given that anything else would not have made it through the threshold.

[47] Both texts by Emília Viotti da Costa (2010a; 2010b) used in this section attest to this fact, even with the drawing of a definition of the schools of thought on the matter. It is interesting to notice that one of the chapters is entitled "From slavery to free work" and it deals exclusively with slavery, whereas not a word on the navigation of the free labour environment and how to adapt to these new dynamics was mentioned, only reinforcing my argument that the abolition and the Republic came at the same time a concomitance that helped in the erasure of the black slavery past. Just as argued by Chalhoub (2011, 30-31), the urbanization of Rio de Janeiro during the early years of the Republic aimed at erasing the black memories of the city.

embarrassment of publicly and openly acknowledging it. Firstly, it is important to have clarity on a few legal aspects of the Brazilian Republic.

In its Article 70, the Constitution of the Republic (Brazil, 1891) defined those who were entitled to vote in national or state elections. In it, the document defines that homeless and illiterate people, along with the lowest ranks of military and members of religious orders, were not granted this right. Moura (1977, 30-2) talks about the extensive migration which took place from the countryside towards the cities following abolition. The people arrived in São Paulo or Rio de Janeiro with possibly no networks and lived in precarious situations, perhaps even becoming homeless. Also, it is reasonable to infer that the people enslaved would mostly be illiterate.[48] At last, this is what is possible to infer from an analogy with the Navy in the same period, a branch of the military in which the majority of the low ranks sailors were black (Schwarcz, Starling, 2015, 331).

The following article of the constitution deals with the suspension or loss of Brazilian citizen's rights. The loss applied to those who would naturalize in a foreign country or would accept a job or pension by a foreign government. Other than these cases that could be understood as opting out of Brazilian citizen for another national filiation, the suspension also applied in two cases as sanction: in case of physical or moral incapability; or to those found guilty in criminal offenses, while its effects lasted. The lack of details on what is understood to be "moral incapability" together with the analyses developed by Hebe Matos Castro (1995) on how the enslaved people and poor people were more often called to address the courts point to the fact that those more prone to be understood as morally incapable would be former enslaved people. Not to say that in a country where the government had an active policy of whitening the population, being black could be easily understood as physical incapability.

This is an analysis of the constitution alone. The Criminal Code, which became law in 1890, also offers an interesting perspective on the legal ways through which segregation became law: it had a whole chapter – its last – in which it criminalized

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[48] It is important to consider that the literacy referred here is Portuguese. The reconstruction of the market for al-Quoran as the best seller book in 19th Century Rio de Janeiro made by Alberto da Costa e Silva (2013) is a precious text and works well to attest the literacy of enslaved people in Arabic while allowing for an inference that other languages were also spoken to perfection by the enslaved people.

vadiagem and *capoeiras*. The definition of a *vadio* by the legislation is as follows: "No longer perform profession, craft or any action that result in ways of earning a living, not having ways of subsistence and defined housing; earn a living by means of prohibited occupation or openly morally offensive" (Brazil, 1891) [author's translation]. The penalty for *vadiagem* was prison for fifteen to thirty days and the obligation to sign a term of adjustment of conduct in which s/he commits to finding a job within 15 days after doing his/her time. If the person were between 14 and 20-years old s/he could be committed to "industrial disciplinary establishments, where they would stay until completing 21 years old" (Brazil, 1891) [author's translation]. The following Article established: "In case of breaking the term of adjustment of conduct, this would mean relapse and the offender will be arrested, for one to three years, in penal colonies in sea-islands or at the borders of the national territory; to this end, existing military prisons can be used" (Brazil, 1891).

Capoeira, in turn, is a more telling aspect of the world divided by the colour line. Take this passage from Schwarcz and Starling:

> Through devotion, we enter in a world of dialogue. Many Africans, in arriving at Brazil, converted by the force of the system, embraced Catholicism and its saints, but changed their names, appearances and contents. On the other hand, added a new pantheon, to the extent that, without denying their kings and divinities, they discretely worshiped them during festivities in which they revered Portuguese nobility or Christian saints. The same happened with practices such as capoeira. The name comes from the bushes that grow after the native forest was torn down and the wood was cut by the slave. Nevertheless, it gained another sense. Originally a fight, in the colony it was described as a dance that helped to entertain. It is a good parody: a dance that is a fight, saints who are *orixás*. Slavery created a universe of disguises and negotiation (Schwarcz, Starling, 2015, 97). [author's translation]

To this date you will find people taking capoeira as a dance when it actually is a fight developed by the enslaved populations. The term, at the dawn of the Monarchy and the beginning of the Republic was used as a substantive. "*Os capoeiras*" were understood to be the black violent men that would represent a menace to public order. The violence the capoeiras represented, though, were profoundly political. In the final years of slavery, with the country in the brink of social unrest, these men held their ground fighting the forces of the State (the Army and police forces) mobilized to enforce slavery as a political project (Alonso, 2015, 234, 326). Basile (1990, 291) talks about the *Black Guard*, a group organized after the abolition by José do Patrocínio and

constituted of former enslaved people whose role was to attack republican rallies. The irony of being former enslaved people the ones who literally fought against the Republic defending a political structure that relied on the exploitation of their labour, demonstrates how, in the end, the Republican project succeeded in framing slavery as a problem of the Monarchy that ended with that regime. That backlash of the Imperial family being understood as the saviours of the enslaved people – specially princess Isabel who signed the law in the absence of her father – was a non-issue since the Republic was not thought for the capoeiras. On the contrary, the political and legal structures were designed to marginalized them. [49].

Prevented from voting; dealing with the possibility of having their rights suspended due to physical or moral incapability (it is possible that being a *vadio* or *capoeira* would be enough to attest for moral incapability); dealing with the possibility of being arrested for not having a job and having to find a job within 15 days or relapsing and being sent to isolate prisons; and having its cultural features criminalized, in the form of *capoeira*. These are the features of legal exclusion that were thought of as ways of criminalizing and segregating the former enslaved people. It is important to highlight that these were national legislations, different from the US experience, where Jim Crow was constituted as state laws with the national government eventually stepping in with the Civil Rights Act. The difference regarding the US is that, in Brazil, the façade of a citizen's Republic substituting a slave-based Empire allowed for the perception of a more racially harmonic society and helped to build the infra-structure needed to discriminate without openly saying so. This is the essence of the myth of the racial democracy.

As happened with the beginning of the monarchical rule in Brazil in terms of helping to naturalize slavery, the end of the Empire helped to grant a clean-start to segregation with (supposedly) universal rules which, silently excluded black people by not accounting for the material difference between them and white people. This is a racial contract, to bring the concept of Charles Mills (Mills, 1999), that goes without saying and that allows for a plausible deniability regarding racism for those who

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[49] More on *capoeiras* and *vadios* can be read in Reis (2010), Santos (2004) Soares (2004) and Souza (2010).

elaborated it. It is built inside the project of liberal State without the expense of having to segregate. The myth of racial democracy – a Brazilian reading on the racial contract – reminded me of a quote in Lélia Gonzalez of Millôr Fernandes that ironically stated: "There is no racism in Brazil, for the black knows his place." (Fernandes, apud Gonzalez: 2018a, 235). The idea that racism is the explicit exclusion or marginalization which is vocally articulated is used as a defence of those who, inhabiting the racial contract, are rightfully and materially citizen and deny being complacent with racial discrimination. Florestan Fernandes, on this matter, argues:

> It must be understood that nothing of this was born or happened under the purpose (declared or hidden) of *causing harm to black people*. In the purest Brazilian tradition, such thing would not be elevated to the sphere of social consciousness; and, where one would uncover such thing (be it in the attitudes or in behaviour of certain migrants or in anachronical discriminations kept in certain institutions), from these same social circles would emerge the cry of alarm and categorical reprobation (Fernandes, 2021, 273). [author's translation]

What these authors have being saying is that a racism which is institutionally built in the form of slavery becomes racism not as a matter of option, but as default, and to not account for that particularity is to remain within the myth of the racial democracy.

I have already mentioned that the bibliography on slavery and race in Brazil has been strongly influenced by the US experience and it is no novelty that the comparison between the "one drop rule" adopted in the US with the policy of "whitening the population" adopted by the imperial regime and maintained through the first segment of the Republic. Emília Viotti da Costa (2010b) addresses this twist that the Brazilian had done to the eugenics of racial theory of the late 19th Century. Faced with the extensive black population of the country and the inescapable part it played in the country, the policy adopted was a long term one: encouraging Europeans to migrate to Brazil so that, progressively, the country would become whiter (Costa, 2010b, 375-6). This whitening policy would have created what Costa, critically quoting Carl Degler (1971), calls the *mulato* as an "exhaust valve" (Costa, 2010a, 359), meaning the in-between category of people that allows for the two extremes to be in contact and

diminish the tension between them.[50] The fact of the matter is that this whitening policy created a society divided into a gradient of colours that hindered the self-identification as a black person and enforced a personal reading of the phenomenon, in which one would be perceived as whiter as richer s/he was. This points to two different phenomena. The first, articulated by Emília Viotti da Costa, is the "black with a white soul":

> The denial of prejudice, the belief in the "whitening process", the identification of the *mulato* as a special category, the acceptance of black individuals among the white elite strata made it more difficult for black people to develop a sense of identity as a group. In another manner, created opportunities for some black or *mulato* individuals to move upwards in social scale. Despite of being socially mobile, black people had, however, to pay a price for their mobility: they had to adopt the perception that white had on the racial issue and of black people themselves. They had to pretend to be white. They were 'special' blacks, 'blacks with white soul' – common expressions employed by Brazilians from higher classes every time they referred to their black friends (Costa, 2010b, 377). [author's translation]

The totemization of the black person that would rise in the social ranks – together with the whitening policy – fits with the overall argument developed by Costa as to the collective experience of slavery: regulated by an ineffective bureaucratic State (Costa, 2010a, 356) and mediated by a universal religion – Catholicism – which, differently from the US quaker, for example, would not see the emergence of contestation to the practice in itself (Costa, 2010a, 357).

The second phenomenon can be understood as elevating the experience addressed by Costa to it's extreme. The argument is developed by Lélia Gonzalez (2018a; 2018b) when arguing that the black body is seen, socially, as no more than the body itself be it by being explored labour-wise or sexually-wise. It is in the former category that the black woman who dances samba fits. She would not be a dancer, rather, a *mulata* and if the options that are open to her are either that of super-exploitation as domestic worker or as a samba dancer, Gonzalez argues that the latter would be a better choice (Gonzalez, 2018a, 232-3). The construction of the person as a body, as a totem, also plays in another level, as Gonzalez (2018c) points out: the gender divide. If the access to the higher echelons of society is a tortuous process for

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[50] In this text, Viotti da Costa is addressing mainly two US authors who had put forward analyses of Brazilian slavery: Stanley Elkins (1959) and Carl Degler (1971).

black people, it is even more difficult for a black woman who has to deal with sexism not only from white men, but from black men as well. The adherence to a prevailing perception on beauty that favours white aesthetics, many black men that are able to cross the income barrier opt to marry white women, in the same way as white men, thus relegating black women to the fringes of society in multiple ways (Gonzalez, 2018c, 370).

3.6.
The Death With no Part

The intention of this chapter is to portrait that there are other ways of "being in the world" that are different than that of the sovereign man (Ashley, 1989). The bases that I have presented until now brought me here: to theoretically framing the enslaved person. I do so by thinking with Achille Mbembe and Jacques Rancière. I want to sustain that there is more to the enslaved people than their physical existence and Jacques Rancière's definition of politics helps me to assemble this argument. The idea that politics exists as latency in the lives of those marginalized until the moment in which they rise has a strong resonance on what I am building in terms of conceiving slavery as a political dimension of the Atlantic, to which the enslaved person is so central and yet completely marginalized. However, as I have already pointed out, the conceptual framework of this thesis is being developed progressively chapter by chapter. Consequently, I want to explore Rancière's notion of "the part with no part" (Rancière, 1999) in relation to the debate on slavery and social death/life developed from the reading of Orlando Patterson (1982) and Achille Mbembe (2004).

Mbembe's concept of Necropolitics, already presented in the last chapter, when discussing the incomplete presence, focused on the idea that enslaved people could be relatable to shadows of existence. Now, with a lengthier reading of slavery, it is adequate to dive a little deeper into his proposition, which was developed in a paper published in 2003 and draws, more directly from his 2001 book "*On the Postcolony*". Delving into the Foucauldian lineage of thinking power, Mbembe begins his text by thinking on the politics of death before stating: "I turn now to sovereignty, expressed predominantly as the right to kill" (Mbembe, 2003, 16). This is an important point to

stress since, disciplinarily, in IR, sovereignty is more relatable to the Weberian proposition of sovereignty as the legitimate monopoly of violence (Weber, 2004, 33), a definition that fits with the disciplinary inclination of being State-centric. To the extent that the Foucauldian reading of sovereignty has been addressed in the last chapter, what needs to be addressed now is that the fact that he is addressing colonial slavery in the Americas does not conflicts with the argument I am developing. The reason therefor is that, as I have pointed out, the marker of Second Slavery is more contextual than changes in practices of violence and coercion, and Mbembe's argument is based on the practices that enforce enslavement, rather than its meaning. Situating slavery in the colony is a way of marking time just as a way of marking the space of order and disorder. But to overlook his intake on the spatiality of slavery, it is relevant to elaborate a bit on his intake on slavery.

First of all, Mbembe uses the plantation experience to address the violence in Palestine. This recuperation is due to the fact that "Any historical account of the rise of modern terror needs to address slavery, which could be considered one of the first instances of biopolitical experimentation." (Mbembe, 2003, 21). The problem is that the part of the State in the violence of slavery is around the sovereign – abstract – moment of creation. The creation of the legal space in which the sovereignty was transformed in right to property manifested in the world as the body of another person. Within this rationale of Weberian sovereignty, it is interesting to see how slavery challenges the premise of the legitimate monopoly of violence since, it works as a consequence of the threat of the use of violence being more diffuse. Every master had the right to use violence against the person/people enslaved by him/her. A country adopting slavery, consequently, abdicates from the Weberian idea of sovereignty. Thus, the use of slavery as a precedent to contemporary Palestine has its limits on the identification of the violence, for to the extent that the State creates the conditions of possibility to the violence of slavery, it is in fact the overseer or the master who exercises violence, in the exercise of his personal right. The crises the Monarchy in Brazil experienced with the Army during the 1880s (discussed in chapter 4) talk about the tension present in using the State forces of repression to reclaim private property.

This is the kind of crisis the Israeli Army does not face when it engages against Palestinians.

Mbembe's idea of slavery seems to fall on the same aspect I criticized in Orlando Patterson's concept of Social Death because it abstains from putting in perspective the issue of labour that is present in the slave experience – be it in a colonial or independent State. Still on this issue, I find important to highlight that Mbembe categorizes the experience of Palestinians by relating it to never-ending: "[it] appeals to exception, emergency, and fictionalized notion of the enemy." (Mbembe, 2003, 16), thus allowing for the projection of future. In the Atlantic Slavery, there was no such horizon. Violence was the instrument to exploit labour from the enslaved body and, as such, was part of a routine, normalcy and concrete experience of the inhumane.

The comparison proposed by Mbembe, nevertheless, is a powerful one and to the same extent that it approximates the experience of the enslaved person, it has much to say on the Palestinian experience. There is a passage that I find specially telling of the violence:

> The violent tenor of the slave's life is manifested through the overseer's disposition to behave in a cruel and intemperate manner and in the spectacle of pain inflicted on the slave's body. Violence, here, becomes an element in manners, like whipping or taking of the slave's life itself: an act of caprice and pure destruction aimed at instilling terror (Mbembe, 2003, 21).

Here, it is important to go back to the discussion between Eric Hobsbawn and Perry Anderson in section 3.4 and the importance of shared language in the construction of nationalism. It is important to do so because, to the extent that I am progressively building the argument of slavery as another dimension of politics, Mbembe's proposition of violence as manners, or as the language shared between all spaces of the Atlantic, points to a shared notion of accepted pattern of behaviours and expectations that reinforces this unity that I am calling Empire. From the language of violence emerges another feature of this Empire: its borders. To the extent that the State is insufficient to offer meaning to slavery, and also considering that slavery had space in North and South America, the marker of its limits was, consequently, the tolerance to the violence perpetrated against black enslaved bodies. This is another concept of border. And here resides the vagueness of this concept of borders, because it rests to be defined by the notion of violence. Does it end with the final whip? Is it manifested

in the final textiles or cups of coffee consumed in Europe or the US? Does it stand to this day in the inequality of wealth between North and South Atlantic? With or without this digression, the minimum to be considered as border is the enslaved body in the plantation. Those bodies in those spaces are the social manifestation of labour, a labour that only transcended the frontier of volition of the master into social practice of the enslaved body due to the unequivocal violent command of the whip.

This has been where Mbembe, in dialogue with Patterson, has taken me: the insufficiency of the State as a parameter of slavery. However, to the extent that this dialogue allows for a challenge on the idea of sovereignty, and consequently on the dynamics of politics in a Weberian understanding of it, it is pressing to articulate an understanding of politics fitting to an emphasis on the people participating in the community, rather than on the space occupied by the community. This concept is brought by Jacques Rancière in his *Disagreement* (1999). It is strategic to build this dialogue in this section, at the end of this first chapter presenting the argument (as the last chapter was on showing the disciplinary silence) since this will help offer the transition from discussing enslaved people here to the debate on the US and Brazilians elites in the construction of spatiality in next chapter.

Rancière's concept of "the part with no part" helps to make sense of my argument of slavery as a dimension of politics in the Atlantic centred on the enslaved person who, at the same time, is barely understood as a person at all. The distinction he proposes between politics and police is useful in thinking this chapter and the next within Atlantic slavery. Enslaved labour was the cornerstone for the production of the Atlantic space. By definition, enslaved people were not part in the decision making of the Atlantic. In this chapter I have presented enslaved people in order to show how they represented politics in its latency. The next task will be to present the other side of the coin to demonstrate how the institutions and projects under which captivity and forced labour bloomed had nothing to do with politics. It happened as a consequence of the negotiation between elites, not under the threat of change derived from those with no part reclaiming participation.

It is pertinent to take a step back in order to present Rancière's proposition of the part with no part. Going back to the origins of the Western political thought, Rancière

recuperates Plato and Aristotle's debates in order to define politics. This recuperation leads him to state that "What the 'classics' teach us first and foremost is that politics is not a matter of ties between individuals or of relationship between individuals and the community. Politics arises from a count of community 'parts', which is always a false count, a double count, or a miscount." (Rancière, 1999, 6). This constant miscount is Rancière's way of presenting the political aporia: the moving struggle that is constantly posing challenges to be dealt with. In his own words:

> The struggle between the rich and the poor is not social reality, which politics then has to deal with. It is the actual institution of politics itself. There is politics when there is a part of those who have no part, a part or party of the poor. Politics does not happen just because the poor oppose the rich. It is the other way around: politics (that is, the interruption of the simple effects of domination by the rich) causes the poor to exist as an entity. The outrageous claim of the demos to be the whole of the community only satisfies in its own way – that of a party – the requirement of politics. Politics exists when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution of a part of those who have no part (Rancière, 1999, 11).

Key here is "having part". Because in challenging the idea that everything is political – *"if everything is political, then nothing is"* (Rancière, 1999, 32) – he is pushing to an understanding of politics as something different than power dynamics consequently, allowing for an understanding of it that would move past the Weberian constrain of boundaries and transcend it.

> Politics exists because those who have no right to be counted as speaking beings make themselves of some account, setting up a community by the fact of placing in common a wrong that is nothing more than this very confrontation, the contradiction of two worlds in a single world: the world where they are and the world where they are not, the world where there is something 'between' them and those who do not acknowledge them as speaking beings who count and the world where there is nothing (Rancière, 1999, 27).

Politics happens in the moments where difference emerges and claims its space. Discussing Todorov in the first movement of the last chapter, I argued how his idea of the encounter was insufficient to articulate alterity since the encounter happens once, and the difference I am working with would not be pacified with a single encounter. It is important to recuperate this passage here because the notion of difference discussed in it is central to the articulation of the idea of unity I am developing with the notion of Empire and, although Todorov (1984), as much as Rancière (1999), works with the idea of the specific moment of the encounter, or of the politics, Rancière sees that the difference interacts previously to the moment of changing the partition of the sensible.

There is a period that builds up to the moment where those who were part of the oppressed portion of society challenge the oppressors searching their voice. Different from Todorov (1984), the difference is not found, it is built instead.

"Being part" of a social group or of a group being a part in the social structure is predicted by Rancière and this is no novelty. The step of understanding politics as the struggle of the part with no part in having part is what makes his understanding of politics interesting. Politics is that which can challenge the partition of the sensible[51] through the rising of the part that has no part against the powers of being that keep it apart. And my argument is that the enslaved populations in 19th Century Atlantic are that "part", in latency. It is the possibility of challenging the partition of the sensible, as understood at the time. As discussed in section 3.2, Robert Slenes' argument in *"Na Senzala, Uma Flor"* rests precisely on this divide between "the world where they are and the world where they are not", in the words of Rancière (1999). There is a world in which fire stands as lineage and life, and there is a world where fire is not a flower. Both worlds existed concomitantly, dependent on one another, and yet, profoundly separated. The difficulty of surpassing the challenges of the partition of the sensible is presented in Greg Grandin's "*The Empire of Necessity*". One can argue that Grandin's portrait of the incapacity of the captain of US Navy ship coming abord the vessel Tryal to realize that there had been an upheaval and that the ship's owner and captain, Benito Cerreño was being held hostage, is a testament to the difficulty of seeing Africans as more than enslaved people. Even after spending nine hours onboard, captain Amasa Delano was incapable of realizing that the enslaved people had made a mutiny and took over control of the ship. The idea that Africans could have taken control of a ship manned with a European crew challenged the partition of the sensible, and yet, it occurred.

Politics for Rancière would be basically contingency, since there would be no way to build a structure encompassing challenges to the partition of the sensible: "The foundation of politics is not in fact more a matter of convention than of nature: it is the

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[51] In section 3.1. I used the term "distribution of the sensible" whereas hereby I am employing "partition of the sensible". This has to do with the texts addressed in each section: Rancière's English translation with which I am working in this part uses "partition", while Shapiro (2013) – with whom I was working in section 3.1. – adopts "distribution of the sensible" as a translation.

lack of foundation, the sheer contingency of any social order. Politics exists simply because no social order is based on nature, no divine law regulates human society." (Rancière, 1999, 16). It is by recognizing this that I say that enslavement is politics in latency: for it was the latent potency of politics that could erupt around the Atlantic. As it did in the vessel Tryal, in Haiti, in Palmares and in many other revolts that took place during those centuries. Politics, however, is not all. Rancière sees it articulated with another concept that he proposes. This concept is his way of referring to power manifestations that might have been called politics. It is the concept of "police". If politics is characterized by him as what has the potential to challenge the status quo, the "police" stands for the ways of power to be read as politics. Police does not mean only the State in its bureaucracy and coercive apparatus; it stands for everything that sustains the power in its legitimacy (Rancière, 1999, 28-9). In this characterization, Rancière offers another blow to the centrality of the State. By not creating an equivalence between State and forms of control, it is understandable that other political dimensions are possibilities within the spectre of the police. And it is here that Rancière offers the liaison between this chapter and the following one. Chapters with such different focus, structured in such a different way and that nonetheless fit together as a consequence of the proposition of politics – represented by this chapter - and police – explicitly presented on the next – adopted in this thesis.

Enslavement and citizenry are important features mobilized in the proposition of Empire that I am just beginning to articulate; they present distinctive forms of belonging. As such, more than to present these two concepts, it is important to consider how one interacts with the other in order to understand the tension that was present within the 19th Century Atlantic. In the section from which I took the following passage, Rancière is discussing a revolt from Roman plebeians in the Aventine Hill that disturbed the order of things by claiming their voice in speaking their wishes and, consequently, becoming "being with names". This is how the author sees the intersection between politics and police:

> Spectacular or otherwise, political activity is always a mode of expression that undoes the perceptible divisions of the police order by implementing a basically heterogenous assumption, that of a part of those who have no part, an assumption that, at the end of the day, itself demonstrates the sheer contingency of the order, the equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being (Rancière, 1999, 30).

The tension of politics latent in slavery marked the 19th century Atlantic police and, consequently, lingered in this space longer in the form of the latent politics against racism.

And here we have it: the death with no part is the way of addressing the subject of death, such a strong presence when discussing enslavement, read politically. This idea is summarized by Rancière in one sentence: "Politics is not made up of power relationships; it is made up of relationship between worlds" (Rancière, 1999, 42). The world of the citizen and the world of the enslaved, is my proposed reading.

3.7.
If Only Bertoleza Knew…

In section 3.2, I addressed the romance "*O Cortiço*", by Aluízio Azevedo and used it to summarize the argument on the connection between exclusion of the people and exploitation of labour. What I did not address was the fact that Azevedo's naturalism movement was a response to Brazilian Romantism a movement that, just like in Europe, aimed at creating narratives of grandeur and heroism to build national sentiment.

Lélia Gonzalez (2018d, 374) argues against Romantism and its long-lasting consequences to the construction of aesthetics dialoguing with romance and fairy tales. She claims that this movement allowed for the elaboration of narratives which marginalized other perceptions of beauty while rendering otherness invisible. Her critique does not go as far as to quote close relations that José de Alencar, a politician and one of the most distinguished Brazilian romantic authors, had with the politics of maintaining slavery in Brazil (Marquese, Parron, 2011, 110).

Schwarcz and Starling (2015, 286) name the chapter's subsection in which they address Romantism in Brazil as "The indigenous must die so that the Nation prevails" which pretty much summarizes the idea. To remain only in literature, not adventuring into opera composition or paintings, the narrative adopted by romantic movement was that of Brazil as the descendent of peaceful union between Portuguese and indigenous populations. Black populations are not mentioned – a symbolic movement regarding their absence from the national sentiment. Truth be told, Adolfo Vahrnhagen, the first

historian to publish a book on the History of Brazil, contested these narratives, but his contestation had little impact (Schwarcz, Starling, 2015, 288).

There is, perhaps, no direct link to this; however, the debate on romantism and the construction of narratives of History of Brazil always guides me back to Gilberto Freyre. Freyre's "*Master and Slaves*", first published in Brazil in the 1930s is largely translated and is a marker on the myth of the Brazilian Racial Democracy. By reading plantation slavery in paternalistic lenses and minoring the violence to which men and women were subjected, Freyre's narrative is put by Emília Viotti da Costa (2011a, 346) side by side with the voyageur's narratives on slave-holding farms. The structural racism supported by centuries of slavery was maintained by the laws of the new regime that, officially, held no commitment with slavery. Freyre's narrative of racial democracy helped building this illusion that, in fact, strengthened racial segregation.

Gilberto Freyre, who became a federal representative (*deputado federal*) for the state of Pernambuco in the 1940s, and later on, a supporter of the 1964 coup, is an interesting character to follow to look into the articulations of racism in the aftermath of abolition. For instance, during his time in the lower house of Congress, he was the proponent of the law that created the Institute Joaquim Nabuco, aiming at developing "sociological studies of the conditions of life of the Brazilian worker from the agrarian region of the Northeast" (Brazil, 1949) [author's translation]. The institution was named after the politician who was, institutionally, the greater proponent of the abolition and who, like Freyre, was from Pernambuco. The sociologist whose most influential oeuvre helped to sustain the myth of racial democracy proposing this homage to the author of *The Abolitionism* ([1883] 2003). This is a profound synthesis of the ideology of segregation that was intrinsic to the Brazilian abolitionist project: a masked racism that pays tribute to the abolitionist, therefore reinforcing its disguise.

Joaquim Nabuco wrote a letter to José Veríssimo, an acclaimed romanticist, who, by the occasion of the death of Machado de Assis, was one of the most influential Brazilian authors and, published an article honouring the diseased writer. In the letter, there is the following passage:

> Your article in the paper is wonderful, but this sentence gave me goosebumps: '*Mulato*, was in fact a Greek from the best epoch.' I would not have called Machado a *mulato* and I believe that nothing would hurt him more than this synthesis. I pray you that you

remove it when you make it to permanent pages. The word is not literary and it is pejorative, only needing to understand its etymology. For me, Machado was white and I believe that he saw himself as such as well… (Nabuco, apud Costa 2010b, 378). [author's translation]

The etymology referred by Nabuco is that the substantive *mulato* is a derivation from *mula* (mule in English). In the intricate colonial effort of trying to account for every case of ascendency, the Portuguese defined *mulato*(a) as the descendent from a white person and a black person. The derivation from mule comes from the original proposition that being mixed-race one would be sterile (Gonzalez, 2018c, 360). The word that is now profoundly offensive was, until the 1980s used as a patronizing way of referring to a man and with slightly sexual connotation when used in the feminine.

The same Nabuco that took Machado de Assis to be a white person wrote in his 1883 book:

Slavery, for our happiness, never did sour the soul of the slave against his master – collectively speaking – nor did it create between the two races the reciprocal hatred that naturally exists between oppressors and oppressed. For this reason, the contact between them was always exempt of rough edges, outside slavery, and the black folk found all avenues open in front of him (Nabuco, [1883] 2003, 40). [author's translation]

Nabuco, like Freyre, is such an interesting figure in this process of transformation of slavery within Monarchy into veiled racism in the Republic. Florestan Fernandes, in engaging with Nabuco, argues that he finds two structural problems in his argumentation. The first is that Nabuco never proposed the subversion of Brazilian racial structure, only wanting to adjust its juridical structure (Fernandes, 2021, 278). This reading of Florestan on Nabuco in reality condenses part of the argument that I build in this chapter and aspects of the next as well. In criticizing a figure that was central to the abolitionist battles just as much as influential in the building of the historiography of this transition from the Monarchy to the Republic with his body of work, Florestan points to Nabuco representing the contact between the development of a historiography that frames abolition as a legal contribution from the Monarchy to the country; while making evident how such framing attended the material interest of this political actor that developed a career in the Brazilian foreign service during the Republic, with an important passage as the first formal Brazilian ambassador in Washington.

The second structural problem Florestan Fernandes sees in Nabuco is that the abolitionist project in adjusting the legal terms of the juridical maintenance of class hierarchy, never actually aimed at challenging the social privileges and domination of white people in the racist society (Fernandes, 2021, 278). In this reading, the Monarchy was the price the white elite had to pay so that the racial domination of Brazil by white men continued uninterrupted. A profile of the men in higher offices will show that the Republic did not bring with it new names, only inflicted a change in the pronouns people in power used to address one another.

Thomas Skidmore in his "*Black into White*" (1976), a book on the intellectual life in Brazil at the first lights of the Republic until the 1920s frames his analyses on the seemed contradiction that the rise of the institutional fight against slavery in Brazil happens just as the supposedly scientific eugenics is also on the rise (Skidmore, 1976, 65-70) in forms varying from Historic narratives to Darwinist skull measurement. But Skidmore seems to be mistaking abolition with racism, because the end of slavery meant the end of racism just to those who saw to gain politically out of it, such as Nabuco and Freyre. The politician who was the voice of the abolitionist movement in parliament (Alonso, 2015) was himself created in a plantation farm and seem to have found in the cause a suitable political banner for an ambitious politician[52]. And the adherence to the discourse of peace between the races automatically releases anyone from the responsibility of having to position oneself in the matter of racism.

This connection that I am proposing between Nabuco's and Freyre's racism reminds me of another. Machado de Assis, the above-mentioned writer, is one of the founders of the *Academia Brasileira de Letras*. He was the founder of the chair 23 and chose José de Alencar as its patron, the novelist and politician so influent in the Romantic movement and in the politics of maintenance of slavery in Brazil. Contrary to the clear line that connects Nabuco and Freyre, the one that connects Machado and Alencar is not that clear for me. It wouldn't be impossible to be just a light irony from the *Bruxo do Cosme Velho*[53]. As he had warned: "- You must never use irony – That

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[52] Angela Alonso has an interesting biography -in Portuguese - on Joaquim Nabuco (Alonso, 2007).

[53] Alfredo Bosi (1999) wrote a book on Machado de Assis in which he argues that "Thus, the problem regarding the situation of Machado de Assis in our literary history is apparently settled via simplification. After Alencar, who *romantically* erected the figure of the Indian, the colonial tradition and the purity of

mysterious little twitch at the corners of the mouth, invented by some decadent Greek, caught by Lucian, transmitted to Swift and Voltaire, typical of the sceptics and imprudent freethinkers" (Assis, 2018, 271).

This chapter began with a discussion on death not by chance. Here I am proposing a dialogue with two important authors in thinking slavery and violence: Orlando Patterson and Achille Mbembe, and to begin with death is to say that, sometimes, there is more to death than what meets the eye. The idea of social death by Patterson fails to see how dependent the Atlantic world was on enslaved labour in order to build the material conditions for its development. At the same time, in recovering the historiography that tries to portrait the life in *senzalas* as the adaptation of African inheritance, my goal is to contest the idea of Necropolitics as a totalizing experience. There was life in the *senzalas*, there were social experiences in there. To think otherwise is to keep on searching for flowers while a fire is burning in front of one's eyes.

Aluísio Azevedo's *O Cortiço* is also an important part of this chapter. By bringing it to the thesis, I want to highlight that the difficulty in finding an academic account of slavery that deals, at the same time, with identity and labour may find in literature an alternative. This chapter aimed at that: articulating enslavement not only as an identity, but also as labour. Thus, inhabiting a space that is at the same time of denial by social marginalization and of necessity due to the fact that it is only by their

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patriarchal behavior as subject to his fiction and his criteria of value, came Machado de Assis who would have, *realistically*, penetrated in the meanders of the *Fluminense* society, that is, the present, already urbanized and, to a certain degree modernized, to the extent that it kept in its core the decomposition of the slave system and of the imperial homogeneity." (Bosi, 1999, 151) [author's translation]. Machado de Assis first novels were romantic novels and would come as no surprise if he were to be influenced by Alencar in the writing. However, in his late years, Machado has distanced himself from Alencar and his style, thus the hypothesis that I rase for this to be an ironic move. In another book by Bosi, "*Concise History of Brazilian Literature*", he ends his section on Machado de Assis with the following paragraph: "Machadian fiction constituted, by the formal equilibrium it has reached, one of the permanent paths of Brazilian prose towards depth and universality. But it must not be transformed into an idol: it would not suit an author that made literature a recurrent denial of all myths." (Bosi, 2015, 161) [author's translation]. I understand this passage as a heads-up because, perhaps, by looking with much seriousness to historical facts, we may miss the meaning of it. This is the difficulty with irony, and this is exactly the motive for me to propose a reading of this naming as an ironic gesture. The ultimate irony could be the writer that build myths all-around to be made a myth, himself, in part by the gesture of another writer that ended up seeing literature as the space to challenge myths and portrait more complex phenomena.

labour that culture (as defined in last chapter) and wealth are built. This is why Bertoleza is so important: she is almost literally the primitive accumulation of Romão and is delivered to the police when he finds no more use for her.

The last two paragraphs walked through the first two sections of the chapter that attempted to present enslaved people as people and to account for their labour. The third aimed at thinking nationalism and citizenship through the perspective of the enslaved person. This is no minor challenge if one accounts that slavery is not the diametrical opposite of citizenship exactly as a consequence of the tension between identity and labour – denial and necessity – that is at play at all times in this relation. The incompleteness of this relation is an important thread that I leave open in order to rearticulate in the fourth and fifth chapters when proposing another form of engagement with politics and spatiality having the enslaved person as the point of departure.

At least the fourth section aimed to recover the after-life of slavery as racism in Brazil. It did so by not saying that racism only existed after slavery, but by showing how the development of the abolition and the proclamation of the Republic enabled the development of a series of legal rules that – as Florestan Fernandes (2021) has argued – served the white man more as a consequence of his inaction. The façade of equality that the Republic brought only reiterated the social divide inherited by the Monarchy, but now remains with the backing of the rhetoric of "equality in face of the law" as the pilar of the myth of the racial democracy in the country.

This chapter has a broad scope. But this width is necessary in order to bring to the fore the insufficiency of characterizing the enslaved person as either labour or identity. The difficulty in accounting for the identity side and the labour side inscribed in the notion of slavery can be indeed overwhelming and Bertoleza also speaks to that, after all, through the whole novel she believes to be a freed-woman. Perhaps this was a way of Azevedo saying that to account for being exploited in their labour and having to deal with the social stigma of being an enslaved person was too much. The irony here is that Bertoleza has settled with the life she had because she believed she was already a freed-woman. Bertoleza, in her ignorance, relieved the *Kalunga*: unknowingly, she travelled through the land of the living and the land of the dead by negotiating her roles in society.

4.   The Atlantic That Slaveholding Made

4.1.
Introduction

The last paragraph in the acknowledgements of Eugene Genovese's "The World that Slaveholders made" reads: "I hope that no violation of protocol has been committed by my selection of the tile, which was suggested by one of Gilberto Freyre's lesser known and untranslated books, O Mundo que o português criou" (Genovese, 1971, x). I have ended last chapter proposing connections between Brazilians who were immersed in debates of slavery and racism between late 19th and early 20th centuries. In this chapter, I want to propose another sort of connections: those between slaveholders in Brazil and in the US during the second half of the 19th Century in order to have a better understanding of the world they created.

Genovese's book offers a particular contribution to this chapter: it evinces the connections that marked slavery in the Atlantic. Not only that, but the fact that Freyre was a profound conservative author lending his title to a historian trying to frame slavery in the US through Marxian and Marxist readings offers a glimpse on the complexities of ideas, which do not necessarily flow directly and without mediations. Thus, to the extent that I propose the understanding of slavery as an Atlantic phenomenon, I do not want to discredit other dynamics that were at play at the same time on the shores of the Atlantic, namely nationalism, geopolitics, and economic interests – which may have influenced the politics of slavery. There were many political processes concomitantly happening, mutually influencing one another and competing for the loyalty of the political actors which will be mentioned in the next pages. My goal is to introduce slavery as one dimension of politics in the Atlantic which influenced national projects and decisions on territorial expansion. In other words, the goal is to think Atlantic slavery spatially having as parameter slavery as a project.

Having argued on the non-space of the enslaved person on the theory of International Relations (chapter two) and developed on the experience of enslavement in Brazil in the 19th Century to argue for another abstract ideal subject (chapter three), I arrive at this chapter aiming at discussing the strong ties which connected the slavery

experiences in the Atlantic and helped constitute the Atlantic slavery. I do so in two ways: firstly, by discussing the politics of abolition in Brazil and then by recuperating the imaginary of slavery as the connecting point between Southern US and Brazil.

The issue of "silence", a thread on which I have been arguing throughout the thesis acquires another dimension on this chapter. Many are the silences that build upon the experience of Atlantic Slavery, some of which are gone with archives that no longer exist, some gone with the people who experienced them, and some which were perhaps unable to be transcribed – the experience of travelling through the *Kalunga*, for instance – even if those people could be interviewed. However, in the next pages I want to build upon two silences which motivated this project in the first place and – truth be told, are not complete silences. Perhaps, they are whispers. They are addressed in two of the following three sections of the chapter, named after books which are essential to the arguments pushed forward. The first section will deal with enslavement in Brazil from 1870 onwards, therefore accounting for the silence on the efforts for maintaining slavery in Brazil and denaturalizing it as an inescapable truth of the period. The second section will present a debate on how the notion of space is understood in this thesis, working as a transition between the first and the third sections. In this last section I will look at three US influential figures – two politicians and one important member of the Navy – in order to address the second silence. The goal here is to see how the political imaginary of US slaveholding incorporated Brazil between the 1840s and 1860s. In order to address these silences as I understand them, it was necessary to sacrifice historical linearity. This might disturb the faint hearts, but it works as a reminder that this thesis never intended to propose another narrative to slavery, but rather address silences within existing narratives. It is up to the conclusion to tie together the two different threads in one coherent proposition.

Next section is thought in dialogue with Angela Alonso's 2015 book on the movement of abolition in Brazil and aims at holding accountable those who went out of their way to *maintain* slavery in Brazil. I find this an important move because it problematizes the most common way in which the uphill battle to abolish slavery is portrayed as the unstoppable walk of History. I challenge narratives such as Robert Conrad's which states: "For which reason, thus, finally emerged a true abolitionist

movement in 1880, that triumphantly emerged from the fight against slavery, only eight years after?" (Conrad, 1975, XV). The idea that the abolition in 1888 is a triumph to the abolitionist, rather than to the slaveholders, is to misread the historical process. There is no doubt that the end of slavery should be celebrated, but the fact that Brazil was the last country of the hemisphere to abolish it – more than 60 years after the UK had done so in its colonies and more than 20 years after the US ended its civil war – is a sign of strength of the movement that supported it. As I have discussed in last chapter, the naturalization of slavery in the policed – in Rancière's (1999) terms – history of the country framed legal fights for abolition as the path to abolition rather than the working of the legitimation of the system within the normative frame. The strength of slavery lies in being able to find the space that reinvented it in modernity.

The second section is drawn upon the possibility of imagining space out of the constraints of the State being the sole spatial imaginary one would have, or, as Agnew and Corbridge had put it, out of the territorial trap (Agnew, Corbridge, 1995) and offering the *rationale* behind the idea of thinking space through slavery – Atlantic Slavery, to be more precise. This leads to the third section, thought in dialogue with Gerald Horne's "*The Deepest South*" (2007). Horne's argument regarding the contact between US Southerners and Brazilian elites in the maintenance of slavery is my point of departure to discuss the Atlantic Slavery. If in the last two chapters I centred in bringing to the fore the figure of the enslaved person, with this chapter, my goal is to argue that the connection between slavery in Brazil and in the US is tied together not only as an economic project but as a political dimension of the Atlantic. To that extent, it is important to recuperate a concept that will be important going forward: that of "Atlantic Slavery".

Following the *rationale* of the last chapters, of gradually incorporating concepts and trends as I go instead of presenting all at once in the beginning of the thesis, this moment in which I am turning the discussion to the elites that organized and structured the Atlantic Slavery is that in which I advance in the thesis by no longer trying to rebuild the personal experiences, but instead, by looking at the political dimension. This is why now I bring the concept of Atlantic Slavery that I developed previously in an article written jointly with Pedro Salgado and Roberto Yamato:

[it's] a concept used to make reference specially to two phenomena: the transport, to the Americas, of people kidnapped in Africa and their exploitation in the production of market goods and spaces in the American continent. Both dynamics are constitutive of the Atlantic, be it in the fluxes that put in contact spaces, be it through the labour that transforms the natural space and builds social spaces. Recognizing that the transformation of the spaces had particularities in each region of the Americas in which enslaved labour was used, one can observe the economic sense of the employment of those people in forced labour was central to the development and transformation of capitalism and, to make sense of this transformation, it is important to observe the process in its intersections and in its historical development, less by the immediate geographical constrains of where it was enforced (Bezerra, Salgado, Yamato, 2020, 426) [author's translation].

What is relevant in the concept of Atlantic Slavery is not only the effort of working as a signifier of the commerce of enslaved peoples and their exploitation labour-wise. It is also offering the conditions of seeing the Atlantic as precisely what allows for many phenomena that have been historically understood as distinct manifestations of national events to be understood as parts of a whole. Treating slavery as an Atlantic phenomenon opens the possibility of envisioning the political articulation that allowed for slavery to linger until the end of the 19th Century.

4.2
Bureaucracy, Plantation and *Branqueamento*

The 1992 Spike Lee's film biography of Malcolm X begins with a speech by the main character in which he states:

Brothers and sisters, I'm here to tell you that I charge the White man. I charge the White man with being the greatest murderer on earth. I charge the White man with being the greatest kidnapper on earth. There is no place in this world that that man can go and say he created peace and harmony. Everywhere he's gone he's created havoc. Everywhere he's gone he's created destruction. (…)

He can't deny the charges. You can't deny the charges. We're the living proof of those charges. You and I are the proof. You're not an American, you are the victim of America. You didn't have a choice coming over here. He didn't say, "Black man, Black woman, come on over and help me build America." He said, "Nigger, get down in the bottom of that boat and I'm taking you over there to help me build America." Being born here does not make you an American. I'm not an American. You're not an American. You are one of twenty-two million Black people who are the victims of America (Lee, 1992).

The question I bring in this section is that of responsibility. Who is responsible for the maintenance of slavery for the time it endured in Brazil? In whose name? At

the end of the day, against whom are the charges referred to on the speech brought up? This is central to the understanding of the connection between the enslavement experiences to the extent that it allows for a better comprehension on how slavery was a dimension of politics in the shores of the Atlantic.

I understand that this is a fictional political speech[54] addressing a collective experience and, consequently, it uses the language available to it to make reference to that experience and to the ways of dealing with its consequences. This is to say that after a critique of the liberal State and the presuppositions of justice that it entails (discussed in the former chapter), it seems to be – and may indeed be – an incongruence to return to the language of this rationale (accountability, charges and so on) in order to denounce it. However, as I argued in chapter two, to the extent that I recognize the existence and the political potency of other political imaginaries, in this thesis I do not want to resort to it. The intention here is to account to the State and the political conundrums that the State, when confronted with slavery, creates. These conundrums lead, inevitably, to tensions such as this: arguing with the language of the State to "charge" those who build the State with dynamics that the State itself legitimized in the first place.

I have been arguing on the multilayer complexities of 19th Century slavery and – with the references used to create a history and legitimize its permanence as a social and economic phenomenon. The goal here is not to simplify this process by calling by name José de Alencar, Paulino de Sousa, João Maurício Wanderley, Antônio Saraiva and the representatives that voted against the bill that abolished slavery in Brazil in 1888 as the sole responsible for the endurance of slavery all along up to that year. The goal is to argue on the political mastery of these men as they kept defending and enforcing slavery long after the UK and the US had abandoned it. It is only by recovering their names and the role they played in the process that we can account for "the charges" which are due to them. This is not a celebration of their legacy, but this answers to the necessity of remembering in order to denaturalize slavery from the history of the 19th Century. This means that this Century, marked by slave-holding

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[54] I was not able to find a reference to this speech as having been actually made by Malcom X; as a consequence, I that it is a piece of fiction that builds upon his biographical experience.

South in the US, the dependence of other parts of the Northern US (with textile and ship industries) on slavery, and the economy fully dependent on slavery in Brazil, was the result of the political commitment of the elites in Brazil and in the US with enslavement – not a necessary characteristic at the time.

It is important to account for the fact that the parameters with which I am engaging are not the only possible. Lélia González, for one, has proposed other set of parameters. Her recognition of language as an important space of creation and resistance has led her to propose the concept of *Pretoguês* (*preto +português*/ black + Portuguese) as a language that is different from the Portuguese both as an idiom transformed in the rhythm, accent and words; as well as in the connotation of the potentiality of the language and what it can mobilize as resistance (González, 2018d). *Pretoguês*, as well as the transformations that the enslaved populations enacted in French, Spanish and English, is a strong marker of *Améfrica Ladina* resulting from the participation of people of African descent in the construction of the continent. Gonzalez (2018d) is articulating knowledge from another perspective and set of parameters than those in this thesis. The reconstruction I am proposing here is not on those grounds. Rather, it is on the grounds of using the stablished perspective and reconstructing it through the silences, hence the necessity of navigating the contradictions of trying to articulate a critique of history within the parameters which that sequence of violence reinforced throughout the years. González talks about "an active forgetfulness of a history punctuated by suffering, humiliation, exploitation, ethnocide" (2018b, 331) [author's translation]. But to the extent that she denounces the active forgetfulness of black populations, my goal in this thesis is to argue that there is another powerful and concomitant movement in the writing of history: a naturalization of phenomena as way of disguising the volution of economic interests and ideological inclinations as a neutral representation of a time.

Consequently, the angle I use to address this in this chapter is that there is also an active forgetfulness of the names of those whose positions of power were actively used to articulated the maintenance of slavery in Brazil. Opposite to the one González (2018) is referring to, that tells the history of slavery without considering the enslaved, the active forgetfulness that I want to address here, is the one that makes it impossible

for the "charges" – fictitious or not, metaphorical or real – to be brought against José de Alencar, Paulino de Sousa, João Maurício Wanderley, Ferreira Viana, Afonso Celso Jr. and José Antônio Saraiva, amongst others. The dismissal of the strong opposition these politicians held against the efforts of abolishing slavery has had two deleterious effects in the 19th Century's narratives. The first is that it allowed for the naturalization of slavery as a feature of a specific period, instead of narrating it as a contested violence. On this matter, the effort developed in last chapter to reconstruct the history of slavery and the racism that outlived it syntheses the argument of it being a contested process. The second feature, closely linked to the first, is the preposterous idea that the humanity of a segment of the population would not be tautological; rather, that it would be a pertinent subject to political discussion. Also referring back to the last chapter, I want to stress the idea that slavery is not the opposite of citizenship. The enslaved person is denied his/her humanity, and the effort of conquering the recognition is a political one. To summarize, the argument covers two bases: the power of telling a history is such that it allows for violence to be naturalized in the historiography as a feature of the time, while the recognition of humanity in everyone is a cause of political debate.

4.2.1.
First Act: 1871 and the Free Womb Law

The text that brought me to the object of study of this thesis was an article in a Journal by Rafael Marquese and Tamis Parron called "The Slavery International: politics in Second Slavery" (2011) in which they articulate Brazil, USA and Cuba in the first half of the 19th Century. The text is centred on how slavery faced similar challenges in these three spaces and how it struggled with relatable setbacks in all of the three spaces. It was in that text that I first noticed how the story of slavery is told by emphasizing the march towards abolition and how little the role of those who worked in order for it to be viable is discussed [55] This text was the first through which

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[55] It was only later that I came to know that the PhD thesis of Parron would go on to be published as *A Política da Escravidão no Império do Brasil (1826-1865)* in which he analyses slavery in Brazil in the first half of the 19th Century considering the premises of Second Slavery.

I came in contact with the concept of Second Slavery, its insightfulness, and how it is easily relatable to critical IR.[56]

The second important reference to this section is Angela Alonso's "*Flowers, Ballots and Bullets: the Brazilian abolitionist movement (1868-1888)*" (Alonso, 2015). The title of this subsection is a reference to this book that elaborates on the ways through which slavery was fought in the last decades of 19th Century Brazil in an articulation of artists and politicians. Making reference to the Spanish Moret Law (which freed Cuban enslaved older than 60 and new-borns), and to the articulations among key figures – such as André Rebouças, a black engineer, and Joaquim Nabuco, the politician mentioned in the last chapter, and British, Spanish and French abolitionist movements, Alonso accounts for the importance of the *boomerang effect*. As she puts it, this effect was aimed at mobilizing advancements in the Brazilian front of the combat against the institutionalization of this violence. Although Rebouças and Nabuco were the household names of the movement, the ones able to articulate more closely with the crown, José do Patrocínio and Luiz Gama, must be remembered as central to the articulation of the resistance. In Gama's case, he was a pioneer in terms of using courts to fight for the liberty of enslaved people (Alonso, 2015).

By calling the supporters of slavery by their name, as she does with Paulino, José de Alencar, Ferreira Viana, João Wanderley, Afonso Celso Jr., and presenting the lenience of the crown to the issue even when the country was set to enter a civil war (Alonso, 2015, 323), Angela Alonso presents another narrative of the long and tortuous process of abolition of slavery. This narrative is one that points to the consensus on slavery in the institutional "police"[57] that was breached two times between the 1860s and 1888: at the occasion of the two legislations that marked the abolition process: the free womb law and the abolition law.

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[56] In the next chapter, I will explore more extensively the concept of Second Slavery and Dale Tomich's (2004) contribution to the discussions on Atlantic Slavery. For the time being, it suffices to say that it mainly aims at bringing the idea of slavery in 19th Century Atlantic as a category of analyses in itself that is manifested in different shores of the Ocean and that connects phenomena in each of these spaces. (Tomich, 2004).

[57] The use of "police" here – and in the next appearances of the term in this chapter – is actually applying Jacques Rancière concept that is presented with more detail in the last section of chapter 3. However, as a quick synthesis his point is that politics happens only when "the part with no part" challenges his/her/their absence from the spaces of power. Everything else is police as the instruments that hold the distance between "the part with no part" from the spaces of power (Rancière, 1999).

In 1871, 64 years had passed since Britain abolished slavery in its Atlantic colonies, 6 years since the end of US civil war and one year after the approval of the Moret Law in Spain (which still had control over Cuba). That year the free womb law was approved. The essence of the law – to offer liberty to those born from the womb of an enslaved mother – was challenged by the law itself. The first qualification of this liberty was in the first paragraph of Article 1, which read:

> The refereed descendants would be under the authority of the masters and their mothers that are obliged to raise and care for them until they complete 8 years. When the son of the slave woman arrives at this age, the mother's master has the option: either he receives the amount of 600$000 from the State, or he enjoys the services of the minor until he reaches 21 years of age (Brazil, 1871). [author's translation]

The effectiveness of this law was close to null. In the first qualifier of the article that defined the liberty of the sons and daughters of enslaved women, maintenance of the child as a slave until the age of 21 was established. The funds that should be destined by the central government, provinces and cities to compensate the masters that should opt for the emancipations of the child at the age of 8 were never fully implemented (Alonso, 2015, 107), and the law stipulated that if the master said nothing, it was understood that he had opted to keep the person within his captivity. For those reasons, the supposed freedom of the womb would be implemented only from 1892 onwards (when the new-borns would be 21). And, if within these 21 years the supposedly free woman born after 1871 were to have a child, s/he would also be submitted to the same criteria of 8 or 21 years, therefore leaving open the perspective of entering the 20th Century with active slavery.

One of the most representative figures of the conservatism and of the resistance against the abolition was Paulino José Soares de Sousa. Son of the Viscount of Uruguay and nephew of the Viscount of Itaboraí – two of the most prominent figures of the Conservative party during the first years of Pedro II's reign, he represented the intertwined relations between the government's bureaucracy and the plantations (Alonso, 2015, 52). Alonso narrates how he progressively inherited the position of party leader from his uncle during the years in which the debate on abolition gained steam, which made him representative of the resistance to the abolition. Paulino's stance during the debates at the House of Representatives is illustrative of the resistance against the Free Womb Law put up by the elite: "The servile question! On this matter,

Mr. President, in which I speak forced by the necessity of the debate, since on it I made the purpose of not manifesting any opinion" (Sousa, apud Alonso, 2015, 59). [author's translation]. Thus, silence was used as a strategy for deflating the debate.

The strength of the opposition against abolishing slavery was such that the version of the law that was approved was a weak version based on half of the Spanish Moret law. The inspirational piece of legislation saw not only the liberty of the offspring of the enslaved women, but also the liberty of the sexagenary. If both sections were to be adopted in Brazil, there would be a clear cap on slavery in Brazil – 1931 – invalidating the perspective of delaying the end as a consequence of new generations being born. In Brazil, the resistance to this provision was such that the full strength of one of the most respected politicians of the period, the Viscount of Rio Branco, was needed to pass the project in 1871 (Alonso, 2015, 78). Even with the support of this important name of the Monarchy who put his weight to have this project approved, the law was a diluted reading of the Spanish version of the text[58]. The other half, the liberty of sexagenary, would only become law in 1885.

The free womb law saw the dissemination of the discourse of "slavery of circumstance". Seeing that the moral grounds for slavery have been lost, the justification became a loose articulation of three arguments: the deleterious effect of the project – justified by the social instability that would follow the separation of families; the futility of the reform – José de Alencar argued that one could not use a law to abolish something that wasn't started by a law; and the threat of rebellions that the law could encourage (Alonso, 2015, 61-64). With the passing of the law, the discourse of the slavery of circumstance was adapted to account for the economic dependency of the slave force. A discourse that would be sustained until 1888 (Alonso, 2015, 330).

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[58] The approval of the 1871 law is remarkable because it sees D. Pedro II as the sole guarantor of the project by personally supporting the position of the Viscount as head of cabinet. This is the sole moment in which the crown plays a part in the support of weakening slavery in the country, also the reason why it is safe to say that the position of the crown, in the overall dispute, was somewhat distant. As I characterized, this was the first act in the legal battle for abolition, and the only time that the Emperor mobilized his political capital in support of the movement. For the next 17 years, the position of the palace would be if not of not intervening on the matter, of openly supporting the maintenance of slavery through the support of the conservative head of cabinet which weakened the 1884 movement of contestation of slavery (Alonso, 2015).

At this point it is pertinent to make a little detour in order to address the change in the discourse of support of slavery. This detour will anticipate a few subjects which will be addressed in the next chapter, but the discussion on the justification of slavery needs to account for the 16th Century discourse that defined the moral grounds of legitimacy of this practice articulating ideas of religion and war. The writings of monks and priests that developed then will only be substituted in terms of legitimation by these economic discourses of 19th Century. The long silence on this discussion regarding the grounds on which slavery stood is, in itself is exemplar of the politics of silence, precursor of the silence of Mr. Paulino de Sousa in Parliament in 1871. To not speak about the issue was a way of operating within the terms of a practice that would find in itself its own justification, while postponing the realisation that the movement of the moral compass was tilting away the support of slavery on the grounds of religious conversion of infidels. This is not to say that the change in justification changed the racial differentiation on the root of this process. However, the change from the religious discourse to a discourse based on illuminist rationality is symptomatic of the adaptation of the discourse grounded on the premisses of truth of each period: from the religious discussion on souls to the imperative necessity of economics. The bottom line is that there is a great difference between the 16th and 19th Centuries regarding slavery. In material terms, as Marquese and Parron (2011) argue, the end of slavery in the US made the continuity of slavery in any part of the Atlantic virtually impossible in the long run. After that, the articulation, be it nationally and internationally, against slavery was powerful – as Alonso (2015) shows. The fact that Brazil was able to sustain slavery until 1888 is, thus, not a sign of strength of the abolition movement, rather, of the supporters of slavery and of the discourse of economic necessity of the country which went against the material conditions of their time for over 20 years.

This change in discourse can be found in official statements adopted at the time of the end of slavery, in 1888. The first is a quote from the Imperial Princess, Isabel, when addressing congress in its first session on May 3rd 1888 (ten days prior to the voting on the abolition):

> The extinction of the servile element, by the influx of national spirit and individual liberties, in honour of Brazil, advanced pacifically in such a way that today it is an

aspiration claimed by all classes, with admirable examples of abnegation coming from the holders.

When the private interest itself comes spontaneously to collaborate so that Brazil would detach from the unfortunate inheritance that the agriculture's need had maintained, I trust that you will not hesitate in erasing from the homeland laws the sole exception in which figures the opposition to our institution's Christian and liberal spirit" (Regente, 2019, 665). [author's translation]

The distance from slavery came spontaneously from the holders themselves (!) fulfilling a demand from both Christian and liberal institutions. According to that interpretation, it was only the slow pace of adaptation of the agriculture that held the transformation for so long. Following that logic, there was really no grounds on which slavery could be justified except the necessity.

Answering this message, the Lower House of Congress (Câmara dos Deputados) wrote the following proposition, 9 days after approving the project that ended slavery:

We have untied ourselves, madam, from the ominous legacy that, only by constraint of the agriculture culture we had maintain to this day; we have reinstated to human personhood the integrity of their dignity; faced with the principle of political equality, we have consecrated the uniformity of the civil condition, thus we have eliminated from the legislation the sole repugnant exception with the moral base of the homeland law and with the liberal spirit of the modern institutions (Azevedo et all, 2019, 668). [author's translation]

On November 20th, as he addressed the General Assembly (both houses of parliament held together) in its closing section, D. Pedro II alluded to the abolition in the following terms: "Brazil gave, through this act, new testimony of its suitability to all moral progress." (Brasil, 2019, 670) [author's translation].

This detour into the moral justifications of slavery in the decade following the debate on Free Womb is my way of arguing the divide that existed between the moral discourse and the legislative battles. If the first had already buried slavery as a feature of the past, the politicians, most of whom slaveholders showed signs of strength by having as the main advance of the abolition since 1850 – the end of Brazilian participation in the Atlantic trade – a law which had no effective impact other than defining the abolition of slavery in the early decades of the 20th Century. It all took place despite what Marquese and Parron (2011) perceived as the material conditions of slavery in the hemisphere being doomed by the end of slavery in the US.

The main victory of 1871 was, definitively not the liberty of a new generation, but the acceptance that the future – the distant future – would be one in which slavery would no longer exist. For the slaveholders, the solution to slavery had been reached: now it was to let time do its bit and wait until all of those born after September 1871 where the sole ones in captivity and their ancestors had died. Then, already in the 20th Century, only then would slavery arrive to a "natural" end. Without the laws having to intervene on it.

4.2.2.
Interlude: hierarchizations

Dealing with different dimensions of politics – geopolitics in the case of Marquese and Parron (2011) and institutional dynamics of power in the case of Alonso (2015) –the effort of not taking slavery as a feature of history but rather, as a fighting arena with distinguishable sides in which the space for compromising is miniscule if existent at all, becomes noticeable. The unsaid consequence of this view of slavery is the recognition that the definition of humanity is not a fact; instead, that the concept is up to a political dispute. Sidney Chalhoub's (2006) argues exactly on this vein when he argues that the decision on the humanity of people – and therefore their ability to have recognition as human beings, was politically negotiated in spaces different from those on which the people most affected by such decision circulated. The poignant example of the decision on the maintenance of slavery falling completely to the master with the person under his rule unable to have a say, as defined by the free womb law, speaks to that.

Chaloub uses another debate articulated as a consequence of the free womb law to think through some of these issues. He is analysing the debates on the categorization of the infants born from enslaved women after the law of the free womb (1871), considering the differences between being a freed person or an *ingênuo*[59], meaning, a person born free and therefore entitled to every right of a citizen. As he himself puts it:

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[59] The literal translation of *ingênuo* is naïve, but the translation falls short from the idea which "ingênuo" encompasses, since it is not a matter of naïveté; it is about being un-stained by slavery. For me, this definition speaks to the relation of slavery in Brazil and Catholicism: to the same extent that the original sin is a stain in every person transmitted from the conception, so was slavery. The rupture of that cycle

> According to Perdigão Malheiros [judge and politician who wrote and influential book on slavery in the 1860s], manumission restored those who had been slaves to the state of personhood. Thereafter, they could exercise rights and activities like other citizens: constitute a family, make contracts, acquire property, pass on a legacy even when dying intestate, and dispose of property through sale, trade or a last will and testament. Nonetheless, he remarked, freedmen were deprived of some political rights (needless to say, freedwomen exclusion from political life was taken for granted, much in contrast with the Beneficent Society of the Congo Nation) as a 'result of the more general prejudice against the African race, from which the slaves in Brazil' descended (Chalhoub, 2006, 76).

As argued in the former chapter, enslaved people did constitute family, made contracts had property and passed on their will, but they did so through other channels, unofficial channels. The possibility of manumission opened the door to the possibility of doing so through the legal means of the Imperial bureaucracy. However, keeping them out of the political process by not recognizing in them the possibility of the right to vote (since to vote one should have a certain amount of wealth), the black population would thus be constantly one generation late in their incorporation in the political process. Manumission had to be paid twice: in money and in time to result in free citizenship.

In a dynastic monarchy, it is not surprising to have an hierarchization that puts the monarch as the top of the structure that gives sense to it and that intervenes in the disputes. Chalhoub, however, is arguing that to the extent that such hierarchy is there, there is also an inverted hierarchy at play here. One that has the enslaved woman as parameter of total absence of humanity that evolves gradually – to the same extent that a duke precedes a baron – to the free man. What is curious to notice is that in this hierarchy, the operative notion is to distance oneself from the absolute, rather than coming closer to it, as is the case in monarchies. The pinnacle of this distinction is a concept that is unapplicable to white men: that of the "free man". A white man was not a free man, he was a white man: freedom was not on the realm of possibility to these men, it was a certainty. As a matter of fact, these men were not even white men, they were solely men. Freedom was assumed once one was white. The issue of being a free man was not only to differentiate the white from the enslaved man, it was a marker that

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would create a new personhood, one in which the person would be uncompromised with the knowledge of the phenomena that preceded him/her.

differentiated the latter from freed man as well and, in so doing, this term also becomes a marker of time, determining if the freedom had at least one generation or if s/he was the first person in that lineage to experience it. The phenotypical characteristics would be central in defining if one would participate in the hierarchy of slavery or of the aristocracy. These two hierarchisations have their identifiable absolutes with the emperor and the enslaved woman and they have a similar relation with the State, for at the same time that there is no emperor without an Empire, there would not have been slavery without the complacency – to say the least – of the State in the 19th Century. However, to the extent that the emperor depends on the Empire to exist as such, Brazil needed the enslaved people in order for the country to exist as it did in the 19th century. And it articulated this existence through parameters that were recognizable beyond the State itself: phenotypical aspects. The shared language of racism allowed for the interpretation of racist-centred slavery as a possible dimension of politics in itself that goes through the political spaces of the Atlantic.

Chalhoub's 2006 text begins with a passage of the analyses of a petition made by the Beneficent Society of the Congo Nation (which I will address in the next chapter) by the Council of State to have its status approved. The analyses of this text ends with the following comment by the historian:

> This document is valuable because it consists of one of the most precious and clear expressions I have ever found of the making of contemporary Brazilian racial ideology: the idea was to produce silence on the question of race as a prerequisite to achieving the ideal of a homogeneous nation (Chalhoub, 2006, 75).

The idea of silence relates strongly with the argument pushed forward by Angela Alonso and the perception that institutional "police" (Rancière, 1999) was not a space in which the abolitionist movement was able to enter. It was an elite space and the works of José Murilo de Carvalho have shown how homogenous the elite was in Brazil. His 2007 book is divided in two parts. In the first one, he analyses the elite in Brazil while, in the second, he goes on to discuss the bureaucratic front of the Brazilian Monarchy. While much has been argued about the institutionalized history of 19th Century Brazil[60], the profiling of the Brazilian elite done by Carvalho is yet to be

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[60] Ilmar Mattos (1987) and Needel (2006) have written important texts on the structuring of party-politics in different periods of the Empire and Angela Alonso has written on the impact of the generation that joined state bureaucracy in the 1870s to the transformation of the last years of the regime (Alonso, 2002).

matched. From the process of socialization in Coimbra, then in the Brazilian Law Schools, passing through the different positions in the administration in Church and in finance in order to find the career paths followed by the majority of Brazilian politicians, Carvalho's conclusion is that the State was the larger employer of the Empire (Carvalho, 2007, 98), and the most common vocation between the members of the elite. Going through the census and other sources the author mobilized so to conduct a profiling of the members of the country's elite, he reports that more frequently than not the members of the top layer of Brazilian society were referred with only one professional affiliation, most of the times, there bureaucratic position. Therefore, hindering to establishing the connection between the rural background of the higher strata of the elite with the public positions its members held. The author's conclusion on the topic is that "The dominance of public employees on the political elite indicates, actually that the representants of society were at the same time representants of the State" (Carvalho, 2007, 116).

My original idea, from reading Marquese and Parron (2011), was of writing the history of the pro-slavery movement in the same way as the history of anti-slavery has been told was matured when I realized that the history of pro-slavery movement was the "police"[61] history of the 19th Century. The reason therefor, was the fact that, as Carvalho has argued, the elite was attached to the plantations and interchangeably occupied, positions as politicians or as high-level bureaucrats[62]. Thus, my intention of finding a non-state centred narrative proved to be unrealisable since the connection between the plantations and the halls of power was inescapable. By framing history in terms of "police", the progressive abolition becomes the argumentative line that allows for portraying those who fought against slavery pretty much fighting against windmills, since those who supported slavery remained silent. In this narrative, the cabinets, under the direction of the crown, promoted the agenda of abolishing slavery with little

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[61] See the discussion on Rancière (1999) on the last section of chapter 3 .

[62] The level of dependency – and control of the State despite the regime – was such that Carvalho tells the anecdote of viscount Sinimbu "(…) lider of the Liberal Party, son of a plantation owner and he himself a plantation owner, who lived, by the end of the Empire, only with the income he had as a retired magistrate and as a life-long Senator to the empire. This dependency led the new Republican government to grant him a pension even though he had no role in the Republican coup or government." (Carvalho, 2007,113)

acknowledgement to social movements as extra-parliamentary ways of doing politics. Alonso (2015: 351-2) argues that the anti-slavery movement was the first social movement in Brazil, profoundly dependent on the connections with foreign advocacy groups and with artists in the country.

The connection between bureaucracy and plantation owners is such that it is difficult to distinguish where the interests of one end and those of the other begin. There is not much silence here. However – keeping on the trope of hierarchy and how it lingers/transforms – on the other hand, the *branqueamento* policy is one which began during the Monarchical period and that made its way through the Republic with the clear goal of making the Brazilian population whiter. Thinking through the construction of racism intertwined with modern slavery and the fact that slavery was a state-policy, the *branqueamento* must be understood in relation to the process of abolition and to the space of labour in society. Angela Alonso (2015, 121) reiterates the concomitancy of the process of abolition – specifically the free womb law – with the effort of encouraging migrants to come to Brazil. This close relation leads me to think on the process of transformation of slavery in the Atlantic that mutated into Second Slavery and saw its transformation into racism detached from labour[63]. It is important to notice how the combat of slavery did not mean the combat of racism; therefore, it should come with no surprise that the idea that *branqueamento* was a concurrent goal to the abolition of slavery, not a consequence thereof, nor existing prior to it. But, possibly, as a movement stronger than the abolition. On this note, by comparing the two policies, it is interesting to notice how the *branqueamento* was a long-term goal that could be implemented with bits and pieces, while the maintenance of slavery demanded a continuous effort, since it was a contentious project with much more measurable results.

Since the first chapter, I have been making the case for the inescapable relation between modern slavery and racism. In this section, with the issue of *branqueamento*, I am recuperating a thread with which I ended the previous chapter: the persistence of racism even after the abolition of slavery. If there I focused more on how racism outlived slavery, here my goal is to argue that racism is central to the comprehension

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[63] Next chapter will address this with the due attention.

of these two concomitant hierarchies that operate at the same time in the same spaces: that of enslaved people and that of citizens. Emphasizing that slavery and racism are two different processes is analytically important in order to deal with questions such as: Which relations can one draw from the politics of abolition and from *branqueamento*? The victory in terms of postponing the end of slavery, along with the first steps of the *branqueamento* happening while slavery was still legal – by way of the regulations established in encouraging white European migrants to come to Brazil – points to the fact that the two were independent politics, though connected by the colour line that marked both. The idea that the *branqueamento* would be a consequence of the arrival of European migrants in Brazil to substitute the labour of enslaved people is a narrative that can be easily articulated. However, it falls short in two aspects. The first is that it merges slavery and racism as one single trope that meets the issue I have accounted for in last chapter when arguing that there is a divide in the literature between those who account for slavery solely as labour and those who account for it solely as an identity issue. Racism was a constitutive part of the politics in the Atlantic as a whole in 19th Century and, as such, it definitely played a part in slavery. However, to ignore that other, concomitant, policies executed in the same period were also based in racist premises would be to merge slavery and racism all over again.

The second aspect is to face the abolition of slavery in Brazil as a loss and, at the same time, a victory to the pro-slavery elite. A loss to the extent that the best option for them would be to continue with slavery full stop. The victory side is the fact that they outlived the expectation laid by the material conditions after the abolition in the US (Marquese, Parron, 2011). However, to the extent that this was a loss to the pro-slavery group, it was a victory to the abolition movement. Thus, in framing the abolition as a "police" process, disregarding the social movement that stood by the abolition, the narrative of having a plan and control of the process with one seceding the other fits in a better way.

The extent to which slavery was conducted by a homogeneous elite which was able to postpone the abolition to the eve of the 20th Century without the necessity of compromising anything in terms of reparation, and while being able to get a clean slate to continue with its status and producing coffee during a non-ouverte racist Republic

seems a lot like if the winners of the abolition were the members of the elite, not the liberated people. It is never enough to highlight that I mean no disrespect to the life of those who fought against this cruel system and who suffered under it. I have no doubt that to those who were under it, the end of enslavement was a profound win; however, had it arrived earlier, it would surely have been even greater. The strength of the resistance of the slaveholders allowed them the victory of a late abolition.

4.2.3.
Second Act: 1880s and the final battles

The 1880s were the stage of the one project debate and two law approvals that took down slavery, at last, in Brazil. The first landmark is the debate on the original project of the law which would grant liberty to the sexagenary enslaved population. In order to do so, the Emperor appointed, in 1884, Manoel de Sousa Dantas, an experienced politician, to form the cabinet. Robert Conrad reported this appointment on the following terms:

> In June of 1884, when the Senator Manoel Dantas accepted the Emperor's invitation to be the head of a reform cabinet, Brazilian slavery was already moribund. Persecuted, condemned, perhaps even rejected by public opinion, it was only actively defended by a small part of population. This minority, however, was far from being defeated (Conrad, 1975, 255).

The reforms proposed by Dantas aimed at weakening slavery, while, to an extent, introducing to slaveholders the cost and responsibility of caring for the enslaved population that no longer was fit to labour. The three main propositions that were encompassed by the project were: liberty for the sexagenary enslaved population; expand public funds to buy the liberty of the enslaved population; and abolish the inter-provincial human traffic. The issue of the liberty of sexagenary was by far the more delicate among all. To be a sexagenary in 1884 meant being born in 1824. Since legally[64], the slave traffic was abolished in 1831, by the time the project was under

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[64] It is important to clarify the use of "legally" in the passage. In 1831, answering to British pressure, the General Assembly – as the Congress was called at the time – prohibited the Brazilian participation in the trans-atlantic slavery trade. It had little effect on the slavery, aside from reducing the number of people brought to the country by means of kidnapping in 1832 and 1833. It had no long-term consequences to the extent that it was completely ignored by the legal world until Luís Gama and his

debate, in 7 years all of those who came from Africa would be free and, gradually, the enslaved population already born in Brazil would likewise be freed.

However, as pointed out earlier, the Brazilian withdrawal from the trans-Atlantic traffic took place only legally in 1831. The approval of what became known as the Feijó Law[65] occured as a response to the pressure done by the British since 1808, when they brought the Portuguese Royal Family to Brazil fleeing Napoleon (Schwarcz, Starling, 2015, 172-199), but it was never actually enforced (Conrad, 1975, 31-32). The end of the Brazilian participation in the traffic came only in 1850 with the promulgation of another law. It was Luiz Gama's judicial activism that recuperated the 1831's law in the second half of the 19th Century and brought it back to the political debate by calling for the liberty of all of those who were brought to Brazil after 1831 (Alonso, 2015, 87-90 and 103). The fact of the matter is that the registration of the year of birth of the enslaved that arrived after 1831 was constantly adulterated so that they would remain legally enslaved (Alonso, 2015, 242). That meant that the population, on average, most probably, was younger than the records showed)[66]. Then, the cry of the coffee growers was not over losing their 60-year-old pickers; rather, with the loss of all of those who actually were between 40/45and 60 years old.

The year of 1884 also gained prominence in the history of slavery as a marker of geographical definitions, as it had been in the 17th Century with the disputes on the enslavement of indigenous populations or the African populations. Beginning with the province of Ceará, on March 25, following to Amazonas on April 24, the provinces began to declare themselves slave-free (Moraes, 1986, 186-188). Although, they lacked legal authority to declare the abolition of slavery, the dates were chosen as celebratory to the declarations that the provinces no longer had any enslaved people within its borders. The last to become free got their manumission either by the public funds, or

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legal activism tried to have people freed based on the grounds that they arrived in the country after the law was approved, hence making their captivity illegal (Alonso, 2015, 101 and 205).

[65] Named after Diogo Antonio Feijó, a progressive priest who occupied the – elected – position of regent for a period between the abdication of Pedro I and the coming of age of Pedro II, who was still a child when his father left for Portugal.

[66] In order to understand the magnitude of this practice, it was portrayed by Alonso (2015) in quoting Rui Barbosa as saying that by the 1880s, more than half of the enslaved population was over 60 years, a fact that would point to an average age expectancy higher than the non-enslaved population (Alonso, 2015, 242).

received it as a celebratory gift granted by the holder as part of the celebration; this nonetheless actually highlighted the marginality of these provinces in relation to the country's economy. Conrad (1975, 207-8) argues that the reduction of the enslaved population in those provinces was a consequence of these populations having been sold by the North/Northeast to the South. This process started soon after the end of the Brazilian participation in the trans-Atlantic trade, an argument that is relatable to Hebe Mattos Castro (1995). She saw in the end of the trade a change in the meaning of holding enslaved people: gradually, the number of citizens claiming ownership over one or two people reduced, while the number of people held in captivity in the plantations augmented. This concentration in a relatively small part of the country was not missed by the pro-slavery movement. João Maurício Wanderley (in 1854) and Antônio Moreira de Barros (in 1878) proposed legislations that would make the interprovincial trade financially impracticable so that these enslaved people would not leave their provinces, therefore keeping the representatives committed to the institution of slavery (Conrad, 1975, 207-8). Neither of the two legislative propositions went further and, as predicted, the interprovincial slave-trade continued and the provinces not inserted in the coffee production were progressively distancing themselves from slavery, a process which began to culminate in 1884 with Ceará declaring itself slave-free. The tide seemed to favour the abolition movement and began to economically affect the plantations. The perception of a weak moment in slavery plunged the price of enslaved people around the country and banks were no longer accepting chattel of enslaved people as assurances for mortgages (Alonso, 2015, 251). Alonso talks about how the pro-slavery sectors of society tried to articulate themselves in this moment when the abolition was on the rise and the prime-minister was supportive of it (Alonso, 2015, 252-53).

The country was divided in terms of geography and in terms of the economy. However, it is also possible to say that the division was one and the same:

> On the report by the Ministry of Agriculture, which appeared on 1884, one finds these suggestive numbers:
>
> Slaves existing in the North (including Bahia) – 403,098.
>
> Slaves existing in the South (including Mato Grosso) – 840,752.
>
> Total: 1,243,850.

> From the existing slaves in the South the three mentioned provinces had nothing less than 692,910, distributed as follows:
>
> Rio de Janeiro – 263,755;
>
> Minas Gerais – 255,888;
>
> São Paulo – 173,267.
>
> From these numbers we can see that the last three provinces mentioned had an additional amount of 141,970 slaves than all other of the Empire and the Court!
>
> This justifies the reception that Minas, Rio e São Paulo had to the *mot d'ordr*e from the Centre of Tillage and Commerce of the Court, firing the reaction, giving advice to farmers to establish centres of defence of agriculture against that which they called "anarchical movement, helped by the madness of government and incited by the whims of the emperor" (Moraes, 1986, 65 –format from the original text) [author's translation].

Three provinces held more than 55% of the enslaved population of the entire country. These were the provinces with stronger economies as well, thus their importance to the political debate. The articulation of the Centres of Tillage[67] is representative of a turn of the tide that took place in the parliament as well.

The Dantas cabinet would fall in the following year (1885) as a consequence of the lack of support the cabinet found in the parliament, a parliament which had a majority from his party, the Liberal Party. In 1884, the Emperor, chose to back the cabinet, then called for new elections to form a new parliament[68]. The result of the elections was another conservative parliament, opposing Dantas' project. Having to choose once more between cabinet or parliament, the Emperor chose the former, allowing for the formation of a conservative cabinet, headed by José Antônio Saraiva.

Saraiva was a fixer for the emperor. In 1881, he had been called to pass through Congress a piece of legislation on the electoral system which – actually reduced the number of people allowed to vote. At this point, he was called to put the situation with

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[67] Alonso points to the fact that 49 of these Centres – which she calls clubs – were created in 1884. Of those, 39 were situated either in the Paraiba Valley – a region that accounts for the production of coffee in the Provinces of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo – or in the so-called *Zona da Mata*, in Minas Gerais, a region of older occupation which also produced coffee (Alonso, 2015, 252).

[68] At this point it is convenient to clarify that in Brazilian Monarchy the cabinet was formed by the Emperor that held the 4th Constitutional Power of the country: the Moderating Power (*Poder Moderador*). The inspiration for this inclusion in the Constitution came from Benjamin Constant's proposition that there should be an apolitical power that would offer an oversight to the other three. This obligation, in Brazil, fell to the Emperor. In situations such as this one at hand, in the Dantas crisis, it was up to the monarch to keep the cabinet (the council of ministers) and call new elections or to support the non-confidence vote from the lower house and ask for the entitled power to form a new government. (Needel, 2006, 34).

the sexagenary law at rest. Saraiva occupied the position from May to August 1885, just the necessary time to make changes in the proposal and to see it through the Assembly. Rui Barbosa, an eminent abolitionist said that "while the former [Dantas' proposal] was a step towards liberation, 'an abolitionist transaction', the project prepared by the new ministry was a 'slave capitulation'." (Conrad, 1975, 270).

There were three main changes made to the original project. The new proposal established that liberty would then be granted to those with sixty years, but it would not be granted at once. There would be the necessity of three years of service as a way of indemnity. Liberty would be given, then, to those with 63 years of age. On the matter of the impact of the 1831 law, the subject was twisted: as stablished in Dantas' project, there would be a census on the part of the enslaved population. However, instead of asking where the slave her/himself where s/he came from, it would ask on the parents, 'if known'. Another aspect of the sensus is that it would not take into account the logs of the enslaved people. What this meant was that those who had their ages falsified in order to appear old not to be categorized as entering the country after 1831 would have their ages falsified/corrected in order to be characterized as under 60. With that, slaveholders did not need to deal with the consequences of falsifying the date of birth of the enslaved. From then onwards, they needed only to fill "unknown" in the filiation form (Alonso, 2015, 282). The project stipulated even a fine for those who stimulated or who would cover for slaves on the run (Conrad, 1975, 271).

On the matter of the impact of the price of the enslaved in the economy, the reviewed project inflated the price of the enslaved (Alonso, 2015, 283; Conrad, 1975, 270) and offered financial reparation to the master as a consequence of freeing the elder – a provision which did not exist in the original version. If the master would choose to transition to free labour, the law also defined the payment of a stimulus to incentivize this transition. There was no provision to offer any indemnity to the freed people, nor any provision to the former master to offer any kind of support to those granted freedom. The issue of the indemnity is telling of the structure of the project because, in buying the enslaved person from the "holder's", the State was actually inflating the market. Thus, as put by Alonso quoting senator Cristiano Otoni (2015, 283) the Saraiva project offered inflated indemnities as a way to counterbalance the decline of prices

and, consequently, to de-incentivize the liberation of the captivities. If in the Dantas' project there was a provision regulating a minimum wage to be received and some legal institutional support after liberty, the Saraiva project anticipated the *rationale* that would be applied with the abolition: that of recognizing freedom without any support whatsoever. Still on the matter of finances, the project re-arranged the funds: a part of the originally provisioned amount to be applied in freeing the enslaved population would be destined to finance migration, thus, not only slowing the pace of liberation, but working in such a way as to favour the augmentation of prices of the people enslaved. At last, the original project defined December 31, 1889 as the last day of slavery in Brazil. This law would prolong it until 1934 (when those who were registered as being born in 1871 – prior to the free womb law – would turn 63 years old).

The 1871 loss of the slave-holders was transformed into a barricade against further gains and the Saraiva speech to the Lower House defending the project proved that. The circumstance-slavery was stressed by the head of the cabinet (Alonso, 2015, 284). After the approval of the law, Saraiva resigned the position: the approval by the Senate was a done deal. In a year's time, the tide had radically changed and created space for the perfect storm or the following years, with rising clashes between social movements and State forces.

The implementation of the law also prompted some tricks. The most relevant of them was one on the issue of the traffic of enslaved people through the provinces. The law stated that "The residence of the slave is untransferable to any other province other than the one in which he would be registered by the time of the promulgation of this law." (Brazil, 1885). However, the city of Rio de Janeiro, as capital, was constitutionally detached from any province, so it was called the neutral municipality of the court. This led to the interpretation that the law established no impossibility of Rio de Janeiro being exempt of this prohibition (Alonso, 2015, 289). This is an important point since, as mentioned before, the 1880s reinforced slavery as a way of understanding space. The city of Rio de Janeiro, being embraced by the Province of Rio de Janeiro, the one which had borders with São Paulo and Minas Gerais, had, for obvious reasons, a regular communication with all provinces, thus being convenient for the landowners of these more economic dynamic provinces to have the capital as

the trade-centre of enslaved people. Not only that, but also the disputes showed how the system was working for only a specific region of the country and leaving all other provinces apart of these dynamics, exactly as João Maurício Wanderley and Antônio Moreira de Barros have feared (Conrad, 1975, 207-8).

Having presented the debate on a law project promised at the beginning of this section, I now present the two laws that ended slavery in the country. The first is the one promulgated on October 15 1886, law number 3,310. This law, despite its importance, is rarely mentioned in Brazilian historiography. I find it one of the most important moments in the history of the process of abolition and of the formation of the liberal State in Brazil because this law made physical punishments against enslaved people illegal. The silence regarding it is mirrored by the references to how slavery had already ended in the years leading to 1888. A treat on this narrative of progressive march towards abolition that I have been criticizing since last chapter is this unexplained, though powerful idea of *spirit of time* that would suffice in justifying mass slave escapes and uprisings that are naturally inserted in the narrative of the last years of slavery. Schwarcz and Starling (2015) offer an interesting example of this narrative. In the last chapter dealing with the Monarchy, there is a section addressing the comparison between the free-womb law and the sexagenary one. In the next page, in another subsection, the portrait of unrests and mayhem is created (2015, 305-307). The effort of this section has been to contextualize the law-making process within the disputes taking placein society. The discussion on the enforcement of this 1886's law in the plantations is one worth having, since the legal provision was that the scourge had to be authorized by a judge (Brazil, 1830: art. 60; Brazil, 1835) but the historiography is somewhat laconic in addressing the use of violence by slaveholders on the people under his/her control[69]. I understand this law as the claim, by the

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[69] The text of Andrei Koerner (2006), Mary Karasch's (1987) and Eduardo Salla's (1999) books are among the few exceptions which detail the issue of punishment. However, to the extent that Koerner (2006) and Salla (1999) are dealing exclusively with prisons and jails, Karasch (1987) is addressing the life in Rio de Janeiro, thus accounting for the procedures and spaces used to inflict violence on enslaved people. The enforcement of violence against enslaved people in plantations is possible to imagine as fitting more arbitrary patterns not only as a consequence of the probable distance from the nearest judge, but also following an understanding of disregard for the law that can be inferred by the way that the Feijó Law from 1831 was completely ignored by slaveholders.

Brazilian Empire, to, at last, have the monopoly of the legal use of force, no longer sharing it with plantation owners.

Angela Alonso (2015, 300) does not attribute much importance to this law. She argues that this was a strategy used by the Brazilian government not to fall much behind Cuba, as if there was a loose idea of embarrassment derived from being the last space in which slavery was legal in the Americas. Evaristo de Moraes (1986, 244) marks that as an important moment in the progression of the legal status of the enslaved person: a progression towards citizenship. Robert Conrad (1975, 287), in turn argues that the conservative cabinet acted in response to the death of two out of four enslaved people charged with the penalty of 300 whips by a jury in the city of Paraíba do Sul. The death of the two was published in the conservative newspaper *O Paíz*, in an article signed by Joaquim Nabuco, motivating a public debate that arrived in the Senate by the hands of the former chief of cabinet, Manoel Dantas. Conrad argues that the importance of Cuba to the matter was only marginal.

In any case, the anonymity of these two people is a deafening silence, for the transformation it provoked is not a minor one. The legislative debate on this issue was punctuated by questioning if the abolition of physical punishments wouldn't be *de facto* abolishing slavery. There are two ways of addressing what this law would mean. The first is the legal meaning of it. Legally speaking, slavery would continue to the extent that some people would still be seen as property, although as a modified institution, once their bodies could no longer be tortured. The second way of addressing it is by looking to the political dimension of this law – political in Rancière's (1999) terms of the inclusion of the part with no part because it empowered enslaved people to leave their places of exploitation. Thinking this law in relation to the 1831 law can say a lot on the divide between police/politics because, to the extent that the project done during the regency was a response to British pressure, it was not able to empower people who were fighting slavery. It allowed, *ex post*, for people to argue in court for their right to freedom and, as a consequence, contributed to the idea of the State being understood as the path to freedom while it worked as a legitimizer to slavery by acknowledging the possibility of this institution to exist in the first place. As the 1886 bill became law

legislating upon people who were already within the State, the subject of the law was less abstract, hence working as a path to politics.

The best representation of the widespread notion of the liberty that the 1886 law promoted was the escape of 150 enslaved people from Capivari, in São Paulo, who headed to Santos. These people, led by a man called Pio, fled slavery and passed through the city centre of other important cities in São Paulo, such as Itu, causing commotion, but with no report of violence. They were heading to Santos because the city had already been declared a free city and, from there, the main port of São Paulo, they would head to Fortaleza – in Ceará – or Manaus – in Amazonas. This movement seem to have mobilized many references. If on the one hand the underground railroad was a well-known practice in Brazil and subject to at least one article by José do Patrocínio in 1883 in the *Gazeta da* Tarde, an abolitionist newspaper in Rio de Janeiro (Alonso, 2015, 305), on the other, it is hard not to remember the Spartacus revolt in Rome[70].

This movement was a peaceful one; nonetheless, it was seen as a great threat by the central government, causing it to order the mobilization of troops to intercept the march before it reached the Jabaquara quilombo, on the outskirts of Santos. Outside the city of Cubatão, the last before Santos, the march was met by the cavalry that shot many dead – amongst whom Pio –dispersing the movement. Thirty people arrived in Jabaquara and were greeted as heroes. This happened in October 1887. The centrality to the promulgation of the abolition law is undeniable. The volume of military people mobilized to stop this march caused Marechal Deodoro da Fonseca, president of the Military Club, to officially announce that the military was against slavery (Conrad, 1975, 306). This was the spark to the military crisis that began to distance the military from the plantation landowners as a consequence of their different views on slavery.

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[70] Spartacus was a gladiator who, by escaping the gladiatorial training-school with some other slaves began an uprising in Ancient Rome which actually became threatening to the Roman Empire in the end (Bradley, 2011, 364-365). The image of the slave revolt that threatened the Empire became strong in the collective imaginary to the extent that the Marxist movement in Imperial Prussia was named after Spartacus. Bradley (2011) argues that the Howard Fast novel and Stanley Kubrick movie on the movement actually take some poetic licence on the goals of the original uprising that would never have intended to promote a classless society with gender equality.

The months that followed the approval of the 1886 law were months of great transformation in the country. In the words of Robert Conrad:

> In early March, the state of the Nation was critical. In the majority of the country, both to North as to South, slaves march to urban centres and, although the masters were, in every aspect, surrendering to new demands, there was still the danger of an open conflict. If, on the one hand, the economy of São Paulo plantation was almost normal, truth is that, in the provinces of Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro, as well as certain parts of North, the economic outcome was seriously deteriorating. (…) A rapid change was essential, be it to landowners, be it to slaves, since the continuing uncertainties regarding their situation could mean more misery and danger to former slaves and unforeseeable difficulties to landowners, perhaps even the destruction of their aristocratical way of life (Conrad, 1975, 327) [author's translation].

The events led to the necessity of the law of abolition as it came in 1888, with one operative article: "It is declared extinct from the date of this law, slavery in Brazil." (Brazil, 1888). With the country on the edge of war due to the antagonisms between the pro and anti-slavery groups, the masters were forcing for a longer period of adaptation. The terms – the term, to be more precise – of the law could have been worse, with the abolition postponed for some years after more unpaid labour by the freed population. The resistance to it was carried out by, mainly, representatives from Rio de Janeiro. From the 9 votes against the project in the House of Representatives, 8 were from Congressmen from Rio, while in the Senate, Paulino and Baron of Cotegipe were the main voices against it (Conrad, 1975, 330).

It was in those terms that the second important law of the 1880s was signed. The one that abolished slavery, at least legally, from Brazil. As I said at the end of the last section this still seems like a poignant lost to me. I must say that this is not the tone of any of the historians I read on the matter. Conrad (1975, 336) talks about "David beating Golias" while Alonso (2015) and Moraes (1986) cannot help but to reproduce a cheerful atmosphere that the signing of the law created. However, seeing through an Atlantic frame, this is a victory that took a long time to be accomplished. The pro-slavery camp had lost the geopolitical backing of Southern US in 1865. They accepted that, morally, slavery was no longer defensible in the eyes of the religion nor in the broader social relations to the extent that the terms "slavery", and "slave" were tacitly banned and substituted by "servile element" (Regente, 2019). All of this came with rising tensions (Basile, 1990; Alonso, 2015, 331) – as a consequence of different

positions specifically on the issue of slavery – with the group which had the material conditions to become an alternative elite group to the plantation-owners: the military forces, especially the Army (Carvalho, 2007). This is why, to the extent that it seems like a victory, the end of slavery in Brazil can likewise be understood as a loss.

The supposed progressive path towards freedom in Brazil in the second half of the 19th Century was extremely ineffective. The free womb law, considered the great victory, was uncapable of enforcing the liberty of the sons and daughters of enslaved women since it would only come to fruition in 1892, four years after all enslaved people being fee. Of course, it resulted in the liberties of those owned by the State, prohibited to have enslaved people from then on. The 1885 law also had minor accomplishments by conquering liberty for those who were over 60 by the time it was approved. On this matter, the numbers are, deliberately, not clear to the extent that, as aforementioned, one of the main issues during the discussion of the sexagenarian project had to do with "how to age" people. Alonso (2015, 283) reports that Senator Otoni would expect 107,331 people (out of a total enslaved population of 1,186,272) to be freed by the law of the sexagenarian, while Conrad (1975, 279) says, quoting other sources: "Official numbers of captive with 60 or more years is over 90,713, however, only 18,746 people were registered as sexagenarians in 1886 and 1887." The scale of how low these numbers (approximately 1.5%) becomes even more glaring when put in perspective in real situations. Two brothers, the Earl of São Clemente and the Earl of Nova Friburgo had, jointly, 1,900 enslaved people under captivity in the late 1880s (op. cit: 326). Using the numbers informed by Senator Otoni (Apud. Alonso, 2015) to understand the percentual it would represent, and the data presented by Conrad, to make a comparable percentage, the approximate number of sexagenarians expected to be found amongst those 1.900 – and thus freed – would be something between 171 and 29 people.

The strength of the slaveholders was so significative that on June 19 1888, a project was introduced in the Senate by the Baron of Cotegipe asking for the equivalent of 20 million pounds of indemnity to the former masters. This request led Joaquim Nabuco to call, in the House of Representatives, for the destruction of the books with records of enslaved people of all municipalities of the country, so that there would be no record to support such claims (Conrad, 1975, 334).

The history of the second half of 19th Century Brazil is not a history of abolition. It is, rather, a history of maintenance of slavery. The strongest victory, the 1871 law, was able to free a small number of people and the fine print was made in order to withhold the impact that the law was supposed to have on socitey.

4.3.
The Space In-Between

Before continuing the analysis of the elites, it is important to offer a little more clarity on the notion of space assumed in these pages, just as way of contextualizing it. Along with the previous chapters, if the first presented the discipline, the second presented the enslaved people and, consequently, the distinction between police and politics, this chapter is reserved to the idea of space. By building on the resilience of slavery in 19th Century Brazil presented in the last section, hereby I want to present the framework I have adopted to support the concept of space with which I am working. To the extent that the last section was centred exclusively in the Brazilian context, the overall argument is on the Atlantic as a spatial dimension articulated through slavery. In the next section I will show how the context I presented until now related with the politics of slavery of Dixies in the US. Thus, this section is the glue that puts together these two sections structured in such different ways.

In the last chapter, I began to hit this spatial understanding, specifically when I discussed Florestan Fernandes and his work and situated it in the city of São Paulo and arguing that the experience in the fields would be different. In the last section, I went further in presenting how, within Brazil, spaces of freedom began to form and to attract fugitives towards Ceará and Amazonas. This spatiality, profoundly linked to the politics of slavery, is the opposite rationale of the movement that I will present in next section, that is looking at how to approximate slave-spaces. However, both logics point to the same trend: thinking spatially not in terms of State, but of slavery. This contextualization is made in the articulation of the contribution that Lefebvre (1991), Agnew and Corbridge (1995) and Walker (1993) made to thinking spatiality in IR. Walker (1993) and Agnew and Corbridge (1995) specifically criticize the State-

centrism of the discipline while Lefebvre offers the tools to think in terms of other references to space.

The first pages of Lefebvre's "*The Production of Space*" make the case for a difference between mental and real space. Mental space would be the idea of space, and real space would be the "physical and social spheres" (Lefebvre, 1991, 6). These two concepts are separated by an abyss, and the attempt to equate both leads to nothing more than the erroneous naturalization of spaces – a process reinforced, according to Lefebvre, by the development of Cartesian geometry and the idea that the lines can limit spaces. States are a good example of the effort in identifying mental spaces in the concrete experience. The notion of boundaries that define the space of politics and the notion of belonging to a homogenous group is an abstraction which can only manifest itself in real space through labour. This is a category that is considered in abstract and disregarded in the practice of differentiation attributed to the borders. When thinking in terms of States, one is not often referred to the labour that allows for the differentiation between the sides of the borders. The central issue, thus, is not Lefebvre's two concepts, but the mistake of supposing that there must exist an equivalence between them, because there is not. To say that there is such an equivalence would be to disregard the labour necessary to build the real space and the politics derived from that process of construction.

Lefebvre's proposition of the pilling up of spaces (Lefebvre, 1991, 8) adds to this proposition that thinking spatially does not demand thinking of borders and limits. It is a corroboration of the denunciation he makes in the first page of the book of the impact that the Cartesian thought in Spinoza, Leibniz and the Newtonians had in thinking through space. This is an important point because it liberates the space from the imposition of the abstract thinking of the State and the political forms it presupposes to it, more usual than not, articulated in liberal terms.

Another issue that is relevant to be made clear is that when talking about the production of spaces, Lefebvre is referring to social practices of creating meaning in spaces. Not necessarily building new constructions out of bare ground. For the purpose of this thesis, that is interesting due to two reasons. The first is that it allows for the interpretation of space as political *loci* according to the usage that the people in the

space would make of it, thus limiting the power of those who would define the purposes of spaces to the limiting definition of those allowed within them. Politics has its space in *senzalas* just as much as violence is perpetrated in the parliament.

The second reason for the importance of this argument to this thesis is that it allows for thinking space in parallel to the processes of populational movement. Here I am thinking about the Atlantic Slavery and how possible it is to articulate the different spaces – physical and social, Brazil and the US, the Paraiba Valley and the Mississippi Valley – connected by this process. This also allows for making the difference between mental and real spaces even clearer, for once the real space connects the ports of Africa with the ports of America and the routes from the ports to the plantations, the mental space is not connected in the same way. Rio de Janeiro, London, São Paulo, Charleston, New Bern and New Orleans are connected not socially, by the lives, but by the projects that demanded slavery.[71] It is important to realise this dichotomy and, more than that, to realise how these two spaces would never really fit together, because although one is dependent on the other, they assume different connections and different spaces. This is not to say that the enslaved people did not think abstractly about the space they occupied. It is only to acknowledge the violence to which they were submitted.

The last two paragraphs represent an effort to answer the question posed by Lefebvre himself: "What term should be used to describe the division which keeps the various types of space away from each other, so that physical space, mental space and social space do not overlap?" (Lefebvre, 1990 14), to which my answer is: social division of labour.

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[71] An attentive reviewer, questioned me after reading this section: "Thinking with Lefebvre, is there a way that we *can* think of these lives as connected socially? It would not be in the same way that a close family group in a household is connected socially, of course, but the ways whith which the economy, the market connects people unknown to each other, separated by the social division of labour, or the ways through which a national press connects people unknown to each other in national identity politically: these also describe *social* spaces.". My answer to this question is that Atlantic Slavery enforced a colour line that divided the "haves" from the "have nots" and here lies my doubt about the possibility of projecting that those who were buying goods produced by enslaved people would be socially connected to this person whose humanity it is not guaranteed that s/he would account for. This is why I choose to run with the idea that projects connected the ports, not social connections. Another layer to this answer is the fact that in itself, life is a concept in dispute when discussing slavery. Hereby I am thinking not only in terms of the Middle Passage and the journey through *Kalunga*, but also in terms of the idea of social death, proposed by Patterson and how disputable it is. If there is still dispute on the idea of life, then how to accept a notion of society?

In his effort of making the thought on space as more than the State-centric categories, Lefebvre is also advancing a critique to the State as the sole representation of space. To some extent, this critique is also in Walker (1993), when he states that "Either Thucydides and Hobbes merely require a few footnotes to bring them up to date, or the globalist millennium is just around the corner." (Walker, 1993, 136). From the doubt on the possibility of bringing to the $20^{th}/21^{st}$ Centuries classical political texts with no consideration for the change in the context that comes with it, I find the question posed by Lefebvre a more manageable: Is it possible to consider the State as the same as the Greek or the Italian City-State? The answer is no. Because there is more to the space than to be reduced to State, just as there is more to the State than its spatiality. The misuse of the concepts blurs the understanding of what is being proposed in the classical political texts, since the comparison between classical Athens with a State is not a direct one. This move of destabilizing the readings of classical texts while pushing the ground of the State as a certainty is Walker's (1993) move. It is an interesting one in order to build upon this groundless (literally, rather than figuratively) move: the critique of time in relation to space.

Lefebvre states:

According to Hegelianism, historical time gives birth to that space which the state occupies and rules over. History does not realize the archetype of the reasonable being in the individual, but rather in a coherent ensemble comprised of partial institutions, groups and systems (law, morality, family, city, trade, etc.). Time is thus solidified and fixed within the rationality immanent to space (1991, 21).

Marxism would try to reinstate time as revolutionary time. But, by then, the damage was pretty much done. This idea of space that Lefebvre is calling Hegelian which is equated to the State and that results from a specific historical time, however, is insufficient to deal with slavery. How coherent can the system of law or family be – to keep with the subjects dealt in chapter 2 – in a State in which enslavement is a possibility? In chapter 5, I elaborate more on my criticism to the incapacity of the Liberal State – the Liberalism developed by Locke – in dealing with the enslaved person. Lefebvre helps to build this criticism with the notion that the Liberal State can create the facade of homogeneity in which the institution of coerced labour is erased, since it cannot be accounted for within the same rationality. Slavery is thus a rupture in the homogeneity of the time within the State to the extent that it is the manifestation

of people living within the borders, though materially in another time and disavowed to act in space in the same way as citizens.[72] I take the notion of State here as the bare minimum, as a territorial definition.

In being a rupture in the homogeneity within domestic societies, slavery can also mean a rupture in the idea of time. John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge (1995, 50) argue that the discovery of other parts of the world coincided with Europe coming to terms with its idea of past. Barbarism, paganism, are terms used to refer to Americans, Africans and Asians which were terms also used to refer to parts of Europe in a pre-Christian age. Slavery meant having those pagans and barbarians within borders. Domesticated – to the extent that they were within – nevertheless not included.

Agnew and Corbridge (1995) synthesize the Hegelian fusion of space and time into State in what they call "territorial trap". The disciplinary importance of this vision on space is made clear by what the authors call contextual factors as well as territorial conceptions of State. Their argument is developed considering much of Lefebvre's contribution and, in so doing within IR, they are also not only thinking State as a political institution in different terms, but also contributing to the discipline (which is so profoundly territorially-bound) to denaturalize the State as a feature of space. One of the factors that they raised and which is possibly the most compelling one is the following: "In political science literature the term 'nation-state' is often used as synonymous with territorial state. This seems innocent enough, but it endows the territorial state with the legitimacy of representing and expressing the 'character' or 'will of the nation." (Agnew, Corbridge, 1995, 83). In chapter 3, I discussed the idea of nation, but not the category of nation-state and this is pertinent to highlight because the composed noun that these two abstract concepts summon is powerful to the extent

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[72] At this point, it is important to highlight that the understanding of State with which I am working here is essentially a spatial definition. This is important to point to since Rob Walker has published more recently proposing other discussions on the subject of State, considering the differentiation that is possible between European/non-European or Civilized/non-civilized States. These are the tensions I see him articulating in *After the Globe, Before the World* (2009) and in "The Double Outside of the Modern International" (2016) and are representative of a preoccupation with the meaning of State, not necessarily with its spatiality as he is interested in analysing in *Inside/Outside* (1993). Thus, despite the fact that this is an older contribution, it speaks more directly to the point I am raising in this thesis, which cares not so much for the multiple hierarchizations of States at play in international politics based on racist tropes as for the necessity of the State as the container of politics. Of course, that these hierarchizations are happening and had happened in international politics, but they can help see politics from dimensions of spatiality other than the State.

that it creates an identity between a population and a space/political construct. One that would seem to attend Lefebvre's proposition that the space is produced as a result of the social dynamics that compose it. It would indeed fit the prescription if they weren't two abstract concepts that combined build a generic and pretentiously universal definition of political *loci*.

This proposition on the nation-state is an important one which leads me back to Janice Thomson (1994) who is trying to figure-out, within Weberian debates on State formation how the State assumed control over violence taking out of the picture private actors that played important roles as controllers of the apparatus of violence extraterritorially. Her categorization of violence is one that does not account for slavery since she is thinking in terms of system of States and using it to frame the idea of violence. Then, violence is categorized as armed forces. Her contribution, though, comes from the extent that she offers a dialogue with Agnew and Corbridge on this debate of State and nation-State, especially through the passage:

> These practices [of private companies making treaties with each other and with foreign governments, governing subjects of their home states, raising armies and even coining their own money] suggest that little more than a century ago, the state did not monopolize the exercise of coercion beyond its borders. This means that the state, portrayed in theory as monopolizing coercion, is distinctively modern. It emerged only after some three hundred years of state-building. This new state form, which I will call the national state, reflected a redrawing of authority claims such that authority over the use of violence was moved from the nonstate, economic, and international domains and placed in the state, political, and domestic realms of authority (Thomson, 1994, 11).

The debate on nationalism is one that I went through in the last chapter and hence I will not recreate it here. However, to the extent of the subtlety of it, it is important to highlight that this is a loosely defined term and that the quote by Hobsbawm that I used within this debate in last chapter says a lot on the matter: "Nations do not make states and nationalism, but the other way around" (Hobsbawm, 1992, 10). It is not by accident, thus, that the process addressed by Thomson is state-building, not nation building. This is a violent process as Thomson hints to while discussing the issue of violence. This violence being used to build this national community is interesting to notice since, to the extent that the issue of slavery and violence has been discussed throughout the thesis, nation and nationalism could have been understood as fitting an interaction of another sort. Especially since Hobsbawm (1992) – and Anderson (2006)

to that extent – and Agnew and Corbridge (1995) emphasise the aspect of nationalism relating to the result in creating an identification relatable to many people that can be used in such a way as to mask the constitutive violence of this process, one that can last longer, for instance, considering how this invisibility relates to the construction of Agnew and Corbrdige's concept of nation-State.

By diving on Thomson's point, the following question can be made: How to differentiate the violence against the slave from the violence constitutive of nationalism? The longer answer to it is being elaborated in this thesis. The short one could be that, to the extent that the violence used in nationalism is constitutive of something of an abstract collectivity, the one used in slavery leads to a little more than wealth production. This is an important point to shed light upon because it speaks to the lack of differentiation which circulates around the notion of violence: privateering, mercenaries, piracy are all understood as violence just like the torture against another human -being, defined in terms of slavery. However, it is relevant to contextualize violence in terms of "against whom" is it being yield? Or yet: what is the purpose thereof? Because in Thomson's (1994) problematization violence is understood as a contestation to the liberal premisses of the "monopoly of the legitimate use of force" (Weber, 2004, 33) while founding the State. She is working within this contradiction. The contradiction with which I am working is of another sort. It is the dependency on the State to make the violence of slavery legal, while the legitimacy for slavery works on a dimension other than that of the State – one that I am calling Empire. Thus, to the extent that the phenomena Thomson is analysing work around an ambiguous relation with the Weberian premise of the State in its extraterritoriality, slavery imposes the necessity of the legitimate use of force no longer being a monopoly of the State within the territory claimed by the State. Contrary to seeing exceptions in an exceptional place – "the international" – slavery is a tension operating within the terms of the spatiality of the State. A result of finding legitimacy in something else other than the State is the proposition that another spatiality can be articulated. Thus, the possibility of saying that the issue here is not the tropes around civilization/eurocentrism as argued by Walker (2009, 2016) is not to claim that these tensions are false. It is just to say that there is something prior to them: a discussion on the silence(s) created by the State and

the categories of belonging (citizenship and nationalism) that are dependent on it. The move of centring a discussion on slavery is an exercise of seeing how dependent we are in thinking politically on State-centric terms.

At this moment, though, I would like to go back to Agnew and Corbridge (1995) and the "territorial trap" developed by them, to point to the fact that, to some extent, it is indeed sprung itself. State became the prevailing form of thinking politics, many times categorized as nation-state. Such a strong prevalence that thinking without it demands unpacking concepts that hide in plain sight such as: that what constitutes spaces are people (Lefebvre, 2009, 27-30).

Lefebvre's proposition "(social) space is a (social) product" (1990, 26) is in itself the manifestation of the Marxist challenge to the homogeneity of State as a category. Even if, for the sake of the exercise, the differentiation between space and State that I am trying to reproduce were suspended, the idea of the social that is embedded in the space challenges the proposition of universality of the State model. The relationality will direct the analysis to different social experiences, thus, the possibility of identifying States other than the Liberal States, perhaps some of which not even accounting for the premise of homogeneity. This has no relation to the meaning of "product" in this proposition and its ambiguity. Is it the idea of product to signify something that is the result of a process of social interaction, or is it to mean a tradable good valued in monetary terms?

This discussion on Lefebre leads me to a point regarding a passage from Walker. In the chapter thought as a critique to territorial State and dealing with Kant, rather than Hegel –the continental philosopher quoted by the references in this section thus far – he states "For Kant, freedom is something that occurs within the state" (Walker, 1993, 137). This is a relevant affirmation because, Hegel's intellectual predecessor did not share his view of the State as locus of history, thus strengthening the punch line.

On the following page, another striking sentence: "Kant aspired to the continuities of universal reason from the perfectible individual to the perfectible species." *(*Walker, 1993, 138). This sentence is inserted in a critique of Waltz's argument of creating a theory of IR that actually proposes a State-vision for what the international would mean. It is important to account for the fact that – differently from

the first sentence and differently from Hegel to that matter – there is no equating of universal with the State. The perfectibility of the species is on the realm of reason, not of experience, thus it is not a matter spatially situated, since, once this perfectibility creates a mental space, it will not find a perfect match to it in the physical world. It seems to be an aporia, the idea of the Sate as the space of freedom not being the same as the space for the perfectibility of the species.

The reason of quoting these two sentences is to enforce the argument of thinking space as something else. However, differently from Walker, I am proposing yet another category. One that can emerge from the disciplinary silences. For instance, to say that freedom is something which occurs within the State is not to argue that imprisonment happens anywhere else, nor deny it at all. It is just to silence about it while considering the presence brought by its antithesis. Claiming the universal reason as an instrument of perfectible personality does not account for the impact of naturalized/ "Police" violence as a guiding principle of interaction.

Flipping these two categories already puts the proposal in a non-dichotomic zone for it is not claiming to be universal as Kant's categories nor is it questioning the validity of Kant's claims to the European experience. What I bring to the fore is the possibility of moving with the kaleidoscope and see the image that it proposes. It is not even to challenge Euclidean perspectivism nor challenge Newton's premises (Walker, 1993, 129). The goal is just to change the ground from which the points that define the space are seen and seriously consider the form that arises therefrom. Having in mind that the form is not the goal because it is no longer the State and the premises that come along with it, this other form would be another category of space.

This proposition of moving with forms and changing the grounds guided me to question what it would mean, sovereignty-wise, to propose another political thinking in spatial terms. It was in Walker (2010) that I found the grounds to elaborate this in terms of other spatialities:

> The *problem* of sovereignty, I will suggest, remains with us, perhaps in dramatically new forms. Nevertheless, the specifically modern articulation of space, time and political identity that has enabled an historically contingent account of what sovereignty must be to work as a ground of all political authority – as the site of constitutive distinctions both between authorities and between legitimate and illegitimate authority – is arguably losing *its* authority, and on many grounds. In whatever way we might now manage to

respond to the problem of sovereignty, it will not be by assuming that there is a necessary correspondence between a capacity to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate authorities, and a capacity to distinguish between a territorial space of domestic jurisdiction and an external world beyond (Walker, 2010, 51).

Walker is analysing politics in the 21st Century, but, precisely because of that, he offers a valuable context to the understanding of sovereignty. Legitimate/illegitimate authority and territoriality are thus the main features composing sovereignty. This is relevant because to the extent that I have been talking about politics and space, the spectrum of sovereignty would not lie far. Especially in light of the discussion on violence and legitimacy developed after Thomson (1994). While presenting the inhabitants of the Empire, I characterized it within a dichotomy of citizens and enslaved people; in arguing about politics, there were the realm of Politics and that of the Police; discussing spatiality I am proposing the reading of Empire while not completely denying the State as a consequence of its role in making slavery legal. All of this to point to the fact that there is a trend of dichotomies operating all along which, at this point of the thesis, poses the following challenge: How to deal with sovereignty following this rationale?

The approach of proposing Empire has been to depart from disciplinary discussions regarding the State and twist it according to the constraints of Empire and see where it leads. In thinking sovereignty in terms of authority, Walker (2010) is articulating authority and legitimacy as the main trends in this process. This is enlightening because within Empire, these two categories are not together. The discussion of section 4.2.2 on hierarchizations pointed exactly to that: there were two hierarchizations happening at the same time within the Empire. One having the enslaved woman as epitome of exclusion and the other having the white man, whose most powerful representation in Brazil was the crown, as pinnacle of belonging. These two hierarchies met in the contact zone of freedom and poverty in which free-man and white poor man interacted. The fact that there two hierarchizations meeting in a space where freedom was mediated by the courts (Castro, 1995) is representative of how the Empire worked to divide authority and legitimacy. The authority side laid with the inhabitants of the trope of citizenship, while the legitimacy of this structured rested

with those enslaved, because the base for a slave system consisted of the enslavement of segments of the population.

Considering a space which is defined not in terms of boundaries, but of enslaved labour, the first question would be: Who would be the subject of this sovereignty? Would it be the enslaved person or the white citizen? It is important to highlight that this is not a question to be defined in terms of inside/outside, because not being the subject of sovereignty does not erase the historical fact that the divide of hierarchies discussed in last chapter was a component of the Atlantic Slavery. Considering that, the answer could not be other than that the sovereignty lies in the enslaved person, because s/he is the one who is socially alive[73] and who holds the political latency of change in the Atlantic[74]. This answer comes with no illusion regarding the complete marginalization that these people experienced in the Atlantic. However, to the extent that the white people is just as part of slavery as the enslaved people, given that slavery is a system of exploitation – as this chapter is aiming to argue by exposing the members of the elite who fought for the maintenance of the system – the authority of legalizing violence rested on the legitimacy embodied by the very people who themselves suffered with this same legalized violence. This crude cycle is what leads me to argue that the subject within this Empire was the enslaved person. The role of the citizen was a parasitical one, aligned with the critique that I have developed on Orlando Patterson (1982) and his concept of "social death". Enslaved people were socially alive, as the centre around which the Empire was structured.

Recovering Lefebvre (1990) and the idea of mental space as space, it is possible to argue that thinking slavery in the Atlantic as a space was a rationale developed not by the enslaved, rather by the members of the elite. This marker of the colour line speaks to Walker's long quote on the previous page and the two problems of contemporaneous sovereignty that he sees: the challenge to legitimacy and the difficulty to distinguish "domestic jurisdiction and an external world beyond". These two challenges that Walker sees in today's world can in fact be articulated to this idea of Atlantic Slavery as space. On the legitimacy aspect, the acceptance that the moral

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[73] I have presented a critique to Orlando Patterson (1982) in the third chapter, to which I will come back in the sixth chapter.
[74] Thinking Politics in Rancière's (1999) terms as the eruption of demand of the part with no part.

grounds on the defence of slavery have been lost by the Brazilian elite – as portrayed in the last section – speaks for itself, as it was no longer justifiable within the rationale of the State. It was articulated in terms of economic necessity, and yet it was so resilient that it lingered even after the geopolitical conditions of its continuity were no longer present. The difficulty in distinguishing the political spaces is better presented in the next section, specifically by Henry Wise's divided loyalty.

Atlantic Slavery becomes, then, a space created by its own dynamics of sovereignty with its own dynamics of authority, legitimacy and delimitation. Its limits, though, were done using the colour line: an efficient technology that balanced the inside/outside tension in order not to alienate labour. The final feature of this space, which offers a logic to it is provided by Shilliam (2009), who argues that when the "African slaves came to form the dominant group of peoples crossing the Atlantic instead of Europeans (free or indentured)" (Shilliam, 2009, 79), a new grammar was developed, bringing with it a new syntax. This grammar, operating the language of violence, is one that articulated the Atlantic in a cohesive way.

As he criticized Security Studies in late 1980s, early 1990s, Walker claimed that "The spatial limits of the State become the limits of theoretical reconstruction." (Walker, 1993, 140). It is not solely the spatial limits; there is also the meaning attributed to the lives and bodies of the people that inhabit that space. Because space, just like the State, is not a tautological truth. It can be mobilized in material, concrete ways, just like it can be articulated in ideational ways. The crossing of the Atlantic, argued by Shilliam (2009) is a perfect example thereof: it resulted in the dominant group of people crossing the Atlantic being Africans, however, as a consequence of a European project.

4.4.
The Upper North

Henry A. Wise is a recurrent figure in the literature on southern politics in the antebellum Confederacy and reconstruction periods[75]. He is one of the plantation men who were "at the Helm of American Foreign Policy", to use Karp's (2016) subtitle. He belonged to the brotherhood of men that saw to themselves to succeed and define those who were or were not citizens (McCurry, 2010). Wise is an important reference, specially, in Gerald Horne's (2007) "*The Deepest South*", the book after which this section is named and that aims at analysing the relation between Brazil and the US, focusing on how slavery moulded the spatial imaginary connecting the two.

Wise was not only a political man in a period marked by slavery; he was a true believer of racial slavery as a marker of US society since it was inscribed in the constitution and constituted the bases of the "institutions of our country, our safety and our welfare" (Wise apud. Horne, 2007, 67). His commitment with this institution led him to the – probably – most notorious act of his political career: preside, as governor of Virginia, over the execution of John Brown for his role leading the insurrection in Harper's Ferry, in 1859 (Horne, 2007, 68). However, his passage in the mission[76] of the US in Brazil in the 1840s may, as well, be reputed as profoundly important to the white's politics intertwined with slavery and slave trade.

Gerald Horne has called his book on the diplomacy between the US and Brazil in 19th Century "Deepest South", with its perspective operating from the US towards Brazil. However, his South is our North, the Upper North, and in this section reading particularly upon Horne (2007), Karp (2016), Simpson (1985) and McCurry (2010), I want to contextualize the Southerner elite, especially in antebellum period. The option of looking prior to Civil War results from the adoption of Matthew Karp (2016), understanding that the Southerners took control of the foreign policy instruments of US, turns them into the spokesmen on behalf of the country. Karp's argument speaks

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[75] Craig M. Simpson published a biography on Henry A. Wise in 1985. The book "A Good Southerner: the life of Henry A. Wise of Virginia", by the University of North Carolina Press is the best reference for more details on his political and ideological trajectory.

[76] The position we now-a-days call ambassador, was then referred to as head of the mission to the country.

profoundly with Horne's (2007) and the one shouldered by this thesis: the distinction between North and South US regarding the issue of slavery, which is painted in broad brushes as being against and pro-slavery respectively, when seen in detail, shows that the line segregating one and the other was not so easily drawn. Wise is representative of the nuances of this US elite.

This section is divided in three subsections. Each is focused on a specific decade and the role a representative of the US establishment had in thinking the links slavery forged between Brazil and the US between 1840 and 1860. As presented in last section, the goal here is not to argue that this imagination was cohesive nor to say that it followed a direct line between the characters that are remembered here. The argument goes more in the direction of making the case that slavery empowered political figures in the US to imagine space – and consequently politics – involving Brazil in ways that were not State-centred, rather slave-centred. And the fact that these imaginations are not in direct contact with one another allows us to speculate if this imagination was so pervasive to the point of having been manifested in different people in different decades.

4.4.1.
1840s: Henry Wise

The three-year period in which Wise was minister to Brazil (August 1844 to August 1847) follows the 11 years he spent as a representative of Virginia in the US House of Representatives. He left before the end of his 6th term to come to Brazil, leaving behind "a reputation as one of the South's most spirited critics of abolitionism." (Karp, 2016, 72). Wise was appointed to the position of US minister to Brazil under the presidency of John Tyler (slaveholder from Virginia), while John C. Calhoun (also a slaveholder but from South Carolina) was the Secretary of State. The 1840s is the second of the three decades Karp understands as being part of a foreign policy of slavery (Karp, 2016, 7). During those thirty years, he argues, the main positions on foreign policy were occupied by southerner slaveholders who strengthened the US Army and Navy so they could stand against Mexico and Britain, respectively to defend slavery in Texas and to keep the British at bay. Institutionally, the perception held by

the Secretary of State, the office responsible for US foreign policy was parallel: "to the southern diplomats in and around the presidential administration of John Tyler, it was obvious that Brazil, like Cuba, occupied a vital position in the larger hemispheric battle between freedom and slavery" (Karp, 2016, 70). To be minister in Brazil meant to stand for the interests of slavery in another space.

Wise is an interesting character to represent the slaveholding US elite because he also represents the tensions and contradictions inherent to this community. The simplification of differentiating Southerners and Northerners on the relevance of slavery to their constitution is a double simplification. On the one hand, it fails to account for industries which floated around slavery – ship building being one, perhaps the more important of them all – and that were profoundly attached to the selling of kidnapped people. On the other hand, the idea of slavery as a simple concept in which slaveholding elites are necessarily homogeneous – like Carvalho (2007) argues they were in Brazil - fails to deliver on the multiplicity of interests it accounted for. Wise offers the possibility of revealing the limits of these simplifications.

The timing of Wise's mandate in Brazil coincides with the years prior to the effort of internalizing slavery in Brazil: the end of the trade and the consequent transformation to the country following the change in the institution (as discussed in chapter 3). Under the pretence defence of the US flag being used in transatlantic enslaved trade, Wise was vehement in terms of denouncing what he saw as the hypocrisy of northerners that profited from the trade while being critical of the products that resulted from enslaved labour.

> The Agnes, which was sold on the coast and brought over about [600] slaves was owned by a Quaker of Delaware who would not even eat slave sugar', while 'the owner of the 'Herschel', a vessel which has made several trips to the boast under the charter party of notorious slave-traders here, is also an owner of an abolition newspaper in Bangor, Maine. His name is Dow. In public I am told he rebuked his [captain] for engaging in such a charter, and in private told him to do so again, as it was very profitable (Wise, apud Horne, 2007, 74).

Horne goes on to say that Wise saw this practice as the repetition of what the Yankees had done to southerner states, of monopolizing the trade of people kidnapped in Africa. Then, the complaint resided on the fact that the US flag was being used as a way of securing the passage in the South Atlantic since the British would not stop and

search a ship with the stars and stripes. The rentability of the trade was the main factor pushing for the maintenance of the trade. Wise argued that the profit could fluctuate from 600% to 1.200% by ship, a solid incentive for the "Quaker from Delaware", "Dow, from Maine" and other invested in the business to twist and turn their ethics and the American law (Horne, 2007, 72) to have a part of that profitability (Horne, 2007, 75-76). The profit of US Northern states could pull from the slave traffic ran not only from the traffic itself, but from the shipbuilding as well (Horne, 2007, 58).

Northerners caring for the profit that could be generated from the trade of Africans is the main differentiation between US North and South. For the states where the slave work was used more extensively, it was the backbone of social and political organization, not only a matter of profit. This distinction led to resentment by US southerners, who saw themselves exploited by profiteering northerners. The development of different interests regarding the trade of the living reinforces the similarity shared by the whole country: the importance of slavery. In that regard, a southerner can offer a more honest insight:

> Slavery, he thought, was 'interwoven with our very political existence, is guaranteed by our Constitution, and its consequences must be borne by our northern brethren as resulting from our system of government, and they cannot attack the system of slavery without attacking the institutions of our country, our safety and our welfare (Horne, 2007, 67).

Matthew Karp (2016, 74-75) argues that there would be a difference between the interpretations of Simpson (1985) and Horne (2007) on the motives for Wise to oppose slavery in Brazil. I wasn't able to find in Horne the passage that would have served Karp to base this distinction. In reading Horne, Karp understood that Wise's interest was to weaken Brazil, made strong by this ever grater influx of labour to work in the country's plantations. This is an important remark because, to the extent that Horne is analysing US foreign relations, not having evidence of a dispute that could be framed in terms of strength offers a different logic than that which was applied to interpret other bilateral relations, for instance, those between the US and the UK. The dispute opposing the beacons of the Anglosphere seemed to operate in the realm of a dispute of force and prevalence on the Atlantic. It fits the foreign policy lexicon of great naval powers challenging one another on the circulation of the Atlantic, but how to account

for the foreign policy in which the consideration for the strength of another country is not comparable?

Horne argues that Wise's true interest in opposing the African trade from Africa to Brazil could also be related with the plan, by the navy officer (US, and later CSA Navy) Mathew Fontaine Maury who envisioned the colonization of the Amazon basin with the enslaved population from the US (Horne, 2007, 4-5 and 68). If the tension with the ship industries of Baltimore and Providence illustrated the distinction between the traffic of enslaved people and slavery as a project, Wise's ambivalence towards Maury's project reinforces the complexity of the politics in the realm of slavery. Treating it as a monolithic project, as if there were no dispute in it, is a way of ignoring the layers of politics involved in it. If, in the first section of the chapter, I dealt with the political battles to account for the humanity of people and the abolition of slavery, here I am arguing in the sense that politics is also at play in the future of slavery as a broader project. Literally broader, to the extent that it is a project that encompasses the Atlantic with the view on space that I discussed in the previous section. This was a project which, in the mid 1800s did not exclude Britain, for the occupation of India was not done with paid work. The fact that London would denounce the trade of Africans did not mean they were done with enforcing racial hierarquization and forced labour. In the words of Mathew Karp:

> The wheel of global development was turned by forced labor and racial hierarchy – the reciprocal energies of both bondage and empire. In the 1850s American slavery and European imperialism shared an ideological bond that reached far beyond 'manifest destiny', territorial expansion, and failed filibuster invasions of Cuba and Nicaragua (Karp, 2016, 159).

The solidarity of Dixies with British, French and Dutch on their expansion through Africa and Asia (Karp, 2016, 158-160) reinforces the hierarchy on racial terms as a feature of similar projects – but with different agendas – which articulated US and European elites. It is remarkable, for instance, that in 1842 the Northern border between US and Canada was pacified, while the dispute on issues of slavery were on the rise (Karp, 2016, 51). Slavery was not polarizing in humanitarian terms as was the case of the UK against Brazil and the US. It was actually a geopolitical move made by the British that saw greater interest in exploiting colonies in Africa and Asia. Wise was

aware that this was a geopolitical move aiming to undermine the Atlantic space in order to 'transfer the production of tobacco, rice, cotton, sugar and coffee' to 'her possessions beyond the Cape of Good Hope' (Wise, apud Karp, 2016, 75).

Wise's combativeness with the enslave trade was a consequence of his perception that it was the sole feature of the maritime activities held by the US capable of bringing naval conflict with the UK in the Atlantic. A liability, thus, from those who were profiting were the Yankees, not committed to the cause, so to say. These traders, Wise would argue, were putting the US in danger of war against England, since the British had already forbidden the enslaved trade in the Atlantic and these shipowners were using the US flag as a defence against being searched in high seas (Horne, 2007, 74). Wise seemed to be aware of how common it was for the ships that arrived in the African coast with Brazilian or Portuguese flags to set sale to the other side of the Atlantic with the stars and stripes in order do diverge attention from British Navy. The British, they knew, were reticent in engaging with a ship with the US flag, especially after the negotiations the British held with them in order to share responsibility for patrolling the sea (Horne, 2007, 74). Wise wanted these traders to face their crimes before American law which already prohibited the participation in the trade. He did so by going after the US consuls in Rio de Janeiro and in Victoria who were lenient with this commerce, as well as sending US citizens back to the country so they would answer for their deeds in support for the trade:

> During his years in Rio, he [Wise], personally investigated between twenty and thirty cases of suspected American involvement in the slave trade. He sent several vessels home for condemnation, along with about a dozen American citizens, although only one appears to have been convicted. He grilled every American consul in Brazil about each rumor or suspicion, however implausible, that came to his attention. He revoked the credentials of several American consuls whom he suspected of conniving in the slave trade (Simpson, 1985, 64).

Wise had a political career prior to his departure to Brazil. With his time in the House of Representatives prior to his nomination to Brazil, he was a politician with close connections in the presidency of John Tyler, to the extent that Horne stated that he was "one of President Tyler's best friends" (Horne, 2007, 70). With Secretary of State John C. Calhoun, who had been Vice-president under John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson between the 1820s and 1830s, Wise was also close, to the extent that

he was instrumental in making him Secretary of State. His importance was such that Calhoun recommended to the administration of James Polk that he be kept in Brazil not to run for the presidency in 1848 (Horne, 2007, 70). This is important to say in order to contextualize Wise's option to pursue the goals which Calhoun recommended him to achieve: keep a good relation with Brazil, by ways of cutting a commercial treaty, and explain the policy of the US towards Texas (Simpson, 1985, 61). To the extent he failed miserably on the first account – since he brought both countries to the brink of war on his pursuit against enslave traders a subject dealt in detail on next chapter – (Simpson, 1985, 64; 69), he was able to communicate clearly the politics towards the lone-star Republic.

This communication did not limit itself to officially informing authorities that Texas was the frontier of slavery in North America and that to stand for it was a way of standing against England. The allegiance he held to slavery as a project made him suppress his first obligation (of approximating commercially Brazil and US) in order to fulfil the second regarding US interest towards slavery. The clear divide he had on the distinction between the slave trade and slavery reflected a political stance he held within US politics, where the trade was championed by Northerners, not seemingly, by US southerners, as committed to it as a project, rather than being interested only in the profit it could generate. The southerners, conversely defended slavery as a cultural aspect of the South on which the North profited. Wise`s commitment to slavery lead him to oppose slave trade and, consequently to be ostracized in Rio de Janeiro. Simpson argues that Wise must have had doubts regarding slavery and that this would have made him dislike slavery to the extent he did. I quote:

> Wise's actions are incomprehensible without appreciating both the moral reprehension the slave trade elicited in him and his doubts about the efficacy of slavery as a social system. Adams and the abolitionists, he must have thought, had a point. The trade was barbarous and cruel. He would show his enemies that a Southerner and a slaveholder was decent enough to respect human dignity and to reprobate kidnapping and man-stealing. As he wrote shortly after taking up his mission: "the fact of my being a slaveholder, is itself a pledge & guarantee that I am no *fanatic*, foolishly & wickedly bent on running amuck against any lawful property or trade; and that I find the same old interest at work here & now, to fasten American slavery on Brazil, which in our early history fastened its condition of a slave state on Virginia (Simpson, 1985, 65).

Wise is reaffirming his commitment to slavery in a passage – Simpson argues – is representative of his conversion to a sort of humanitarianism only because he argues that he is no fanatic. Wise's quote in itself is arguing that slavery was not a matter of fanaticism, but of "lawful property" to which he was committed. If Simpson found that the debates with John Quincy Adams would have had an impact in Wise's interpretation of slavery, this quote was not a representation, for it only states the minister's commitment with slavery thought he opposed the continuity of the trade. Simpson's classification of this differentiation as a representation of Wise's "respect to human dignity" seems to fit more a precipitate judgement. His posture is relatable with the political dispute in US at the time.

In a correspondence with the State Secretary James Buchanan, in 1845, 12 years prior to becoming the last president prior to the Civil War, Wise argued on the profitability of the slave trade to Brazil reaching 1,200 percent of the investment, and then went on to complement that the gender imbalance that privileged the traffic of male slaves would keep Brazil dependent of the traffic for the foreseeable future, since there was no sign of diminishing the necessity for reposition of the labour force, nor for the country to be autonomous in keeping this only via vegetative growth of the population. Horne (2007, 68) relates Wise's antagonism to slave trade with regard to Maury's proposal of using the Amazon as a destiny to enslaved people from Southern US. This move that he, the anti-slave trade, supported, was not characterized as a slave trade. It would function as a way of releasing some pressure off southern US states and would, potentially, be an enterprise with potential to benefit Wise himself, a slaveholder. Horne is explicit in relating Wise's view to Maury's project – which will be discussed in the next section, though Maury's articulation would happen in the first half of 1850s, period in which Wise would hold no official position.

It is important to characterize the bitter end of Wise's passage as minister in Brazil. He left in 1847, after one year as a pariah in Rio de Janeiro (Horne, 2007, 74). Although Buchanan, the Secretary of State, and president Polk supported him in his stand-off with the government in Rio de Janeiro, his return was seen with relief in Washington due to the friction he created in the relation between the two countries, a

sentiment that he seems to have understood while retreating from political functions (Simpson, 1985, 69).

4.4.2.
1850s: Matthew Maury

The year of 1850 saw the end of the trade of enslaved people in Brazil not as a consequence of Wise's efforts during the 1840s, but rather as a consequence of political negotiations and pressure by the English Navy (Simpson, 1985, 67). This change in the scenario was concomitant with the Amazonian occupation project defended by the Virginian naval officer and superintendent of the National Observatory at Washington, Matthew Fontaine Maury (Bell Jr, 1939, 494)[77]. Bell Jr. characterizes the project of using enslaved people to occupy the Amazon as pretty much a Maury's project that lasted between 1849 and 1855 – period during which the officer published his pieces. The main argument he puts forward was that the Amazon River should be open to free navigation and commerce for ships of any nationality. Relying on the defence of the interests of the countries of the basin of the Amazon River that were upstream and should not be reliant on Brazil to access sections of their countries that were otherwise inaccessible, Maury tried to put the US government behind his goal of ending Brazilian exclusivity. He accomplished some support in the presidency of Fillmore and, by 1850, arranged for two naval officers to make an expedition on the basin (Bell Jr, 1939, 495).

If in his first memorial submitted to the Secretary of the Navy, on March 1850, Maury made an explicitly reference to the "over-population" of slaves in the South as a motive for his proposition, the final report of the expedition – a 63-page book published in 1853 with no clear reference to slavery. At most, it speaks of settlement and cultivation:

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[77] I wasn't able to have access to archival sources of Maury, though it was possible to trace that the Library of Congress (Washington, DC) has a substantial collection of his papers and, through references in Gerald Horne (2007) it was possible to see that the archive of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relation also has some interesting correspondence between him and Brazilian authorities in the first half of the 1850s. Due to the current pandemic, however, the archive is closed and the collections are not available on line. The main source on this figure, thus, is a 1939 paper by Whitfield J. Bell Jr. Horne makes reference to a biography on him from 1930, by John M. Wayland "The Pathfinder of the Seas: the life of Matthew Fontaine Maury", which I was likewise unable to access.

> The time will come when the free navigation of the Amazon will be considered by the people of this country as second in importance, by reason of its conservative effects, to the acquisition of Louisiana, if it be *second* at all; for I believe it is to prove the safety-valve of this Union. (…) But while the free navigation, the settlement, and the cultivation, and the civilization of the Amazon is pregnant with such great things, it is an achievement which is not to be worked out by the hand of violence, nor it is to be accomplished by the strong arm of power (Maury, 1853, 63).

Though comparing to the acquisition of Louisiana, it is important to notice that Maury makes no statement on the acquisition of the Amazon region. This piece, thought as an intervention on the public debate (to the extent that on the foreword Maury acknowledged that the four chapters were actually articles that he rearranged in order to come up with the book) aimed at creating support for the project in a United States already tensioned by the issue of enslavement. It is important to make the caveat that he did not call for the annexation of the region because he may not necessarily have wanted it. Considering that the US restrained itself of conquering Cuba by force after the proposals of buying the island were declined by the Spanish government, the risk of fostering a rebellion and ending up with a new Haiti was not worth it (Karp, 2016, 187). If Amazon would be Texas or Cuba, it is difficult to know. What is certain is that once again slavery was central to thinking the Western coast of the Atlantic spatially. Maury actually put forward two proposals. On the one hand was the idea of US citizens settling with the enslaved people under their control on the region; on the other, was the option of Southern US becoming a supplier of enslaved people to Brazil (Bell Jr, 1939, 498-9)[78].

The response of the Brazilian government to Maury's proposal was to articulate with the countries on the Amazon basin to kill this proposal as soon as possible. The procedure of the US settlers in Texas, albeit still Mexican territory, and the subsequent excuse it generated to the independence and prior annexation moved the Brazilian government to stand against the project and to offer infra-structure to the navigation on the basin under the monopoly a company authorized by Rio de Janeiro. In 1866, a year after the end of the Civil War and, consequently, of slavery in the US, Brazil opened

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[78] It was to this second proposal that Horne referred when explaining the possibility of Henry Wise to be interested in developing a business of being a supplier of enslaved people to Brazil (Horne, 2007, 68).

the Amazon River to the navigation of ships of any nationality, excepted for war vessels (Cervo, Bueno, 2008, 102-7).

Amado Cervo and Clodoaldo Bueno (2008) offer a proud narrative of the defence that the Brazilian elites were able to articulate against the expansionist volution of US. There is no surprise there considering the nationalist trope of foreign policy discourses. However, the debate between the Brazilian elite and Maury's proposal seems off. Not as a consequence of the political projects one or the other were defending, as this is circumstantial. The perspective of the debate that was not matching was in the sense that, to the extent that Maury was thinking the connection between two of the biggest rivers of the continent and how they created the potentiality for the connection between the Southern North and the Northern South, the Cabinet in Rio de Janeiro was thinking in terms of national borders and sovereignty.

> Repetitively, Herndon's patron [Maury] emphasized that the Valley of the Amazon was 'but a commercial appendage of the Mississippi', closely connected to it by prevailing currents and winds… according to Maury, a tree cut at the headwaters of the Missouri River and another cut at the headwaters of the Amazon would meet in the 'Straits of Florida' if each was allowed to float freely. The Amazon and Mississippi River basins, then, comprised… part of a vast undeveloped commercial empire which could be dominated by southern ports, such as New Orleans and Norfolk… in a climate he believed… congenial to cotton, rice, tobacco and sugar cultivation, Maury expected southerners to settle, transplant their institutions, move their slaves, and become a virtual colony of the Mississippi Valey (Horne, 2007, 116).

Horne's passage is revealing of the interests at play in Maury's Project: a colony of the Mississippi, not a US colony. This passage is interesting because it is one thing to think colonization in terms of countries, but it is telling to think of it in terms of valleys. I already presented, in the first chapter, the 19th Century saying in Brazil which alludes to the importance of the coffee production: "Brazil is the valley". Referring to the Paraíba Valley, a zone socially created by the expansion of the coffee production after the independence (it will be explored more in the next chapter). Maury's proposition of colonizing the Amazon valley by Dixies, by men from the Mississippi river, is something of another sort, especially since it is ambivalent with regard to the role slavery played in it. To the extent that slavery is thought as the engine to the exploitation of the Amazon valley, this exploitation is also portraited as something of a problem to be delt, a posture never adopted by the pro-slavery Brazilian elite. There

is, to say the least, an ambivalence towards slavery in Maury's project (Bell Jr., 1939, 498-9). The idea of "safety-valve" used by Murray himself in the passage quoted points to the possibility of seeing slavery as a threat of social unrest or a feature of society that should be exported. These are interesting to highlight because the idea of expansion in the Paraíba Valley was not so pervasive. During the 19th century, the valley expanded only within its own boundaries. The Amazon, São Francisco, Tietê, Cuiabá, Tocantis, Paraná, and other valleys were not thought as the potential expansion of coffee plantations. Rather, they were seen as a territory to which access should be restricted. Dixies, or Yankees for that matter, were not welcomed, but for the sake of territory, not for a competing project. It is important to highlight this difference because it accounts for some differences in the understanding of the contact between slavery and the national project in Brazil and the US.

To the extent that the idea of "colony of Mississippi Valley" fudges the idea of slavery to the spaces in which it operates, Maury reveals the ways in which he thinks the territory ought to be built. Maury is offering a different way of think space. It is a challenge because instead of thinking the spaces that are built and that are put in contact with one another, we are challenged to think the movement and how, occasionally, it builds the spaces.

It is interesting to note that, no matter the latitude, these rivers run to the Atlantic: the point of contact of slavery. However, as the rivers run in different landscapes, they sediment differently, as shown by the differences we are able to acknowledge in Southern US and in Brazil, for instance. To begin with, the necessity of qualifying the part of the US to which I am referring while accounting for the entirety of Brazil, even though "Brazil is the valley", is a sign of the different landscapes through which these rivers ran. One of the main differences on the sediments laid by these valleys is the way in which slavery was institutionalized in the countries. The distinction between the interests amongst enslavers and enslave traders, or the multiple hierarchies between enslaved and freeman that marked the trajectory of these people. As in rivers, the sediments of the valleys of enslavement drift against their will. It is only in certain spots, due to some conditions, that these sediments accumulate, build dams and change the course of the river.

These dams are situated within States, however, those who build them cannot be constraint to the politics of those spaces solely in terms of State. It would be to lose sight of the meaning of the disputes that were at play. The dispute between slavery and being against slavery was not one of humanitarianism – as Wise's denouncing of the hypocritical northerners' ship owners had made clear. Of course, looking in perspective, we can articulate that one side of the dispute, by supporting the end of bondage held a moral higher ground – as discussed in the first section of the chapter, a dispute that those who were against abolition gave up on disputing all together. Nevertheless, to the extent that the abolition of slavery did not signify the end of racism, rather its institutionalization into other forms of exclusions – as discussed in last chapter, it is not a long shot to argue that what was at play in the dispute was not slavery *per se*, rather the dynamics of accumulation, the construction of space and the definition of the prevailing dynamics of modernization.

The idea of accumulation here is central. In the first part of the chapter, I discussed how the enslaved person became central to Brazilian economics not only on the production side but also as a measurement of wealth against which loans could be taken. The issue of accumulation however, acquires a whole different meaning in the 19th Century. Arguing on this matter, Dale Tomich is precise: "The second slavery consolidated a new international division of labor and provided important industrial raw materials and foodstuffs for industrializing core powers. Far from being a moribund institution during the nineteenth century, slavery demonstrated its adaptability and vitality" (Tomich, 2004, 69).

The imbricate relation of "Politics", "Police" and accumulation is at play in the 19th Century Atlantic in such a way that immobilizing the spatial imaginary only in terms of the State is a way of ignoring a lot of other dynamics that are not constrained by the borders. This is a thread which will continue in the next sub-section, dealing with James Webb in the construction of space and in the notion of modernization.

4.4.3.
1860s: James Webb

The last chapter of the thesis is where the threads on space will come together in my proposition of Empire. However, before that, I find it important to come back to a discussion on State, this time focusing on the tensions that slavery created in the US. Matthew Karp (2017, 239-41) stresses how the secessionist movement in the US situated itself in a European context prone to secessions. Be it in Belgium or Hungary, the idea of secession, Karp argues, was a legitimate plea. Karp highlights, though, that in the European cases, it was not possible to see the elite of the State seceding holding prominent offices, in the years prior to it, while still in the original State. This contradiction was a characteristic exclusive to the Confederates States of America (CSA).

Consider, for instance, the case of Richard Kidder Meade. Despite not being a cabinet member, he had an important position to the administration as minister of the US to Brazil (between December 1857 and July 1861). Meade's commitment to slavery, and the bond he saw it created between the US and Brazil, made him refer to it as "an institution common to both countries, fixed and deeply rooted in their soil." (Meade, apud Karp, 2017, 146) when he presented his credentials to the emperor, in 1857. Horne (2007, 159-60) argues that his commitment with slavery led him to discuss with D. Pedro II the subject of secession even prior to the start of the civil war. His commitment was so public that the New York Times published a piece affirming he was a "firm advocate of a 'grand Pro-Slavery alliance with the Brazilian Empire.'" in February 1858 (Horne, 2007, 160).

Onuf and Onuf (2006) bring another feature to the debate on secession: the notions of legitimacy and honour. By inserting the secessionist movement within the construction of the idea of civility and manners from the European Enlightenment until the 19th Century, the authors reinsert US in the European grand-narrative of European civilization as a direct tributary of that tradition. What is interesting are the twists and turns that are necessary for the discourse of honour to adjust to a society in which slavery is an important cultural feature. Not only that, but also to situate the agrarian mode of production of the US South in the scheme elaborated by Adam Smith, which

establishes it as the pinnacle of development trade and negotiation (Onuf, Onuf, 2006, 91).

> Only in Europe could one find civilized nations. There were few slaves in civilized nations, no harms, and no despots. Beyond those few nations, there were a great many slaves and more than a few despots. Modern civilization was thought to be different because of the value it placed on liberty. Organized as sovereign states, civilized nations were free. Yet states were free within the limits set by a common system of law and morality, one that had progressively resolved the contradiction between liberty and slavery in liberty's favor.

> The United States presented a peculiar problem from this point of view (Onuf, Onuf: 2006, 103).

This conundrum in which the Southerners elites found themselves made them create a facade in elite social interactions centred on the adaption of honour and civility to dictate the well manners that ruled their interactions. The menace against slavery that represented the election of Abraham Lincoln was understood as a challenge to the South honour, thus the call for a duel in the form of the declaring secession (Onuf, Onuf, 2006, 107-8). Onufs' proposal of interpretation of the war seems to be a potent metaphor on the leading for 1861, but with not much to say on the material conditions that built up the antagonism[79].

The idea of challenge and of a duel point to a male rationale on the interaction framed by honour. This point resonates with Stephanie McCurry's analysis of the conflict. By calling the civil war "the brother's war", McCurry is highlighting the maleness of the choice of resorting to war. Her argument goes on to say how the Confederate States of America was actually motivated by the idea of reinforcing that which was their idea of people: "The Confederate States of America would represent a new birth of liberty: theirs was to be a proslavery nation and a white man's Republic." (McCurry, 2010, 13). In this State, the first to be founded on the premise of the "modern scientific truth of negro inferiority" (McCrurry, 2010, 12), the space of women was also a minor one, with less social rights and definitely without political rights.

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[79] The book has a section, on its first half, that contextualizes the dispute, called "Markets and Nations" developing pretty much Smith's argument of the meaning of market and the assumption 'Smith took for granted that home markets coincide with national boundaries, that many countries benefit from access to more extensive foreign markets, and that material conditions impede the movement of goods within some countries' home markets." (Onuf, Onuf, 2006, 55).

Differently from the US constitution, McCurry makes the point that slavery was explicitly recognized in the constitution of CSA to the extent that Article 1, Section 9, read: "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law denying or impairing the right of property in negro slaves shall be passed." (McCurry, 2010, 78). The idea of property was core in here, and to a certain extent was also the one ruled on the condition of women whose citizenship was acquired as a consequence of the marriage with a Dixie (McCurry, 2010, 79). A "band of brothers" is the expression recurrently used by the author to represent the *ethos* of the fight of the secessionists, that, like brothers, held an idea of unity: ideal and always elusive. Emotionally charged unity based on the pseudo-scientific reasoning of white supremacy.

Onufs' and McCurry's arguments were anticipated, to some extent, by the speech W. E. B. du Bois gave in his Harvard graduation ceremony of 1890. With an attendance that included the son of Abraham Lincoln (Karp, 2017, 251), du Bois made his speech entitled: "Jefferson Davis as a Representative of Civilization" from which I quote:

> I wish to consider not the man, but the type of civilization which his life represented: its foundation is the idea of the strong man – Individualism coupled with the rule of might – and it is this idea that has made the logic of even modern history, the cool logic of the Club. It made a naturally brave and generous man Jefferson Davis – now advancing civilization by surdering (sic) Indians, now a hero of a national disgrace called by courtesy, the Mexican War; and finally, as the crowning absurdity, the peculiar champion of a people fighting to be free in order that another people should not be free. Whenever this idea has for a moment, escaped from the individual real, it has found an even more secure foothold in the policy and philosophy of the State. The Strong man and his mighty Right Arm has become the Strong Nation with its armies. Under whatever guise, however a Jefferson Davis may appear as man, as race, or as nation, his life can only logically mean this: the advance of a part of the world at the expence (sic) of the whole; the overweening sense of the I, and the consequent forgetting of the Thou (du Bois, 1890, 2).

Du Bois went on to argue that Davis was a representative of the Teutonic civilization with the romantic fleur that this idea of civilization brought with it in the late 19th Century. This idea of chivalry and heroism sustains an idyllic notion of citizen which reached its peak with the Confederacy, but that is also constitutive of the Union that fought it. Du Bois argues that the encounters of the Teutonics and the Africans with "civilization" were different. "The Teutonic met civilization and crushed it – the Negro (sic) met civilization and was crushed by it" (du Bois, 1890, 4).

The Civil War, was not a dispute between civilizations; rather, a dispute on modernity within this Teutonic civilization inserted on this other side of the Atlantic. Slavery that has constructed the South not only through the labour force that effectively created the material conditions of possibility for the society, but also as it was the banner under which even unionists stood in order to have their right to enslave.

Previously, I presented the recovery that Nicholas and Peter Onuf (2006) make of Adam Smith's notion of stages of society and how the concepts were twisted and turned in order to fit a non-American context. This is a clearly tricky matter, for if the authors argue that the expansion of the slave system allowed for a more hierarchized society, thus profoundly civilized (Onuf, Onuf, 2006, 104), the degree of civilization would be so high that the "constraint" of "exterminating the natural enemy" would have led to the perseverance of the "inferior race" in the South". This delay in the "natural course" would be the ultimate representation of civilization (Onuf, Onuf, 2006, 335). This is the same rationale argued by Matthew Karp (2016, 152-3) who criticized the necessity of framing this discourse on modern, or pre-modern, categories that seem to fall short from the view of the world to which the political agents of the time seemed fit.

Progress, modernity, advancement… Then, as now, are terms that are up for dispute. The belief that the South was aware of a notion of backwardness and opted to stand against the industrious North as a way of holding the spirit of modernity is another teleological construction of history that does not account for the sings the period was giving. Russia still maintained serfdom, imperialist European powers were using coolies and apprentices on their colonial domains (Karp, 2016, 153) and Brazil saw staggering numbers of people brought to the country through unlawful trade during the first 50 years of the century. Not only examples were plenty, but the justification was also abundant to support it. Craniology - the study of the human skull in order to argue for differences in intelligence – advanced by the Philadelphian Samuel George Morton was the basis for the white supremacist thought developed on the South. On the same vein, Arthur de Gobineau, a French aristocrat who served as minister of France in Brazil, inspired racialist thought with the publication of the *Essay on the*

Inequality of Races (Karp, 2016, 165). These ideological defences of slavery stand together with the vision of development those men were seeing:

> A burst of research has reconfigured familiar social and economic data in strikingly unfamiliar ways. In the decade before the Civil War, we now know, the slave South was urbanizing at a faster relative rate than England, France, or the U.S. Midwest. By 1861 it claimed almost ten thousand miles of railroad track, more than any European nation, with a larger number of railroad depots and junctions per white citizen than the northern states. Even by the old Yankee standard of 'cotton manufactories', southern industry seems to have grown faster and to have incorporated slave labor more successfully than its critics previously allowed. These statistics do not exactly transform the conventional estimate of the differences between antebellum northern and southern society. In absolute terms the North was far more urban and far more industrial: this brute fact remains. Nevertheless, it now seems clear that slavery did not entirely forbid the kind of economic development customarily associated with modernity; it only assured that this development took a distinctive shape (Karp, 2016, 151-2).

There were no "ideas out of place" in the South. The vision of the future seemed bright for slavery: they were not alone world-wise, they were supported by evidence and "science" and the growth allowed for hope in terms of the defence of the true values on which US was founded. Slavery stood at the core of every aspect of the South's culture, which saw itself as the true keeper of the US project. To exemplify the argument, the 1860s saw an extrapolation of the tension that Henry Wise portrayed in the 1840s. The tension between slavery as culture and slavery as profit – to put it bluntly – became the main point of tension between Northerners and Southerners and the issue around which the dispute for modernity articulated itself.

The context of the 1860s is more complex than the others because it demands an introduction to the Civil War, as the last paragraphs had pointed to. Besides that, the Brazilian participation in it is less studied, and there lies the importance of James Webb to this sub-section. General Webb was named by Lincoln to substitute Meade the as minister of US in Brazil. His nomination came with the beginning of Lincoln's presidency and was framed by the Civil War, so much that among the first directions he received from the Secretary of State was to swear an oath of allegiance to the Union (Department of State, 1861).

To have his time in Rio framed by the civil war meant that the general had to devote most of his time dealing with maritime subjects. The deepest South was also a space in the dispute of the Civil War, with each side using what they had more at their

disposal: the Yankees using the legitimacy of the institutional recognition between formal states and the Dixies capitalizing with the ties that bound enslavers together.

The correspondence between James Webb and the Secretary of State William Seward, between 1861 and 1863 offers and interesting perspective on the matter. The central figure on it is a pirate fleet headed by the Alabama which also include the vessells Florida and Georgia along with 3 other ships. Webb referred to this as a pirate fleet because the North did not recognize the South as a State; hence, the flag they held had no value at sea. At the same time, he considered they a British pirate fleet, since the Alabama never actually docked in the US (including the CSA, to the extent that, in their view, was the same country), and being built in a shipyard in England, should be considered a British issue. Nevertheless, the damage it was causing to the bilateral commerce of US and Brazil was relevant. In his dispatch 48, from the 23rd of May 1863, Webb informs that a minimum of 61 ships – 49 only to the Alabama - had already been lost (sunk or incorporated to the fleet) by the pirates[80]. Webb reports on the same correspondence that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Empire, Marquis d'Abrantes, tacitly allows for the US Navy to engage with these ships in Brazilian national waters. In the report, he informs that in his conversations with the Marquis, he anticipated that when the fleet will be sunk, he will convey his apologies to the cabinet for breaking the neutrality Brazil assumed towards the conflict.

Not to spend time in the idea of neutrality in politics, it is interesting to notice that this, *de facto*, did not occur. Not only the Brazilian government was supporting the government of the Union, but the pirates, the confederates, were also receiving support in the ports of Bahia and Pernambuco, a support not only in terms of allegiance, but in material terms as well. In Dispatch 52 from July, 8 1863, Webb informs that he sends together with the dispatch a document – not copied in the book of correspondence – by a subordinate in the Custom House, in Bahia, informing of a British vessel that arrived with coal and ammunition for the pirates. He then goes along to report a situation responsible for "the first time since I have been here, I was at a loss how to treat this dispatch from d'Abrantes." (Legation of the US in Rio de Janeiro, 1863e, 118). In the

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[80] In the same correspondence he says that in other counts, the Alabama alone would have intercepted 64 ships.

referred document the Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the US minister that in the same port that the Georgia received the material from England, the commander and the crew were celebrated – with balls and parades – by the President of the Province and the population more broadly.

It is interesting to make a sidenote on the importance of Britain in the correspondence. It supplies the fleet, it builds the ships[81] that would enforce the CSA Navy and, in the end, profits from the coffee trade from Brazil to the US due to the US ships being targeted and the British counting with the British Navy as protection[82]. England, "our maritime rival", as Webb refers to it in Dispatch 52, is constantly portrayed as an enemy of US, with whom war is just eminent (Dispatch 48, Legation of the US in Rio de Janeiro, 1863d), even with the idea that the British would assemble a strong naval force to intervene in the blockage of some of the Southern ports.

England is specially an adversary due to the disputes on the Atlantic; however, this correspondence shows a discontentment with France as well. The interference of France in Mexico was read by Webb as a proxy war following the interests of the Confederate: "Slidell [John Slidell, envoy of the Confederacy to France] and his co-conspirators, always contemplated after their separation, to conquer Mexico, and make that city the seat of government of the great <u>Slave Confederacy</u> extending from Maryland or Virginia to the Isthmus" [emphasis on the original] (Legation of the US in Rio de Janeiro, 1863a, 47).

The vision of space is always entangled with slavery. Even under the Lincoln administration. The cases mentioned above work in that way, but so does the document that I found the most revealing in that batch. It is the Dispatch 33, from July 21 1862, issued from the Secretary of State to the legation in Rio de Janeiro, in response to Dispatch 17, from May 20 of the same year[83] (Department of State, 1861). There is a

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[81] Webb, in Dispatch 52, from July 8, refers to ships that are being built in England that officially belong to the Chinese emperor, but Webb is sure that they actually were to supply the Confederate Navy.

[82] The information of the British profiting from the commerce between Brazil and the US is in Dispatches 46 (Legation of the US in Rio de Janeiro, 1863b) and 47 (Legation of the US in Rio de Janeiro, 1863c). On the first, the minister denounces US ships that are using the Union Jack in order not to become targets.

[83] In my visit to the US National Archives, I did not have enough time to photograph all the material I wanted. Unfortunately, the copy book of the correspondence sent from Rio that ends in November of 1862 was among those documents I did not register. Thus, I'll be working only with the Dispatch 33 from Washington.

noticeable difference between the correspondence that was sent by Webb and the one received by him: usually the minister in Rio wrote between 5 to 10 pages, while the responses he received were much shorter, many times only acknowledging that the dispatch was received and that the Secretary agreed with the directions offered by the general. Dispatch 33, however, is different. It is 20-pages long and begins with the information that the correspondence it is responding was submitted to president Lincoln. It goes on reconstructing the argument of the original letter that seemed to argue on the proximity between Brazil and US as the biggest countries in the continent and still adopting the use of slavery. It goes on, then, to argue on how the human geography of slavery was changing in Brazil due to the end of the transatlantic enslaved trade, and how it was now an internal flux of people leaving the Northern provinces and coming to the South of the country. Webb would have argued, that a void in the labour force would be in formation in those provinces, then, asked for permission to negotiate a treaty with Brazil in order to resettle the former US enslaved people in in Brazil. Webb would have argued that "owing to the nature and exotic augmentation of free white men, the slaves so becoming freedmen will be superfluous as laborers" (Department of State, 1862, 99-100).

It is only just to report that the authorization is not granted, but that Seward argues further on:

> slavery is the cause of this civil war, and debates upon the present treatment and ultimate fate of slavery give to its [undiscernible] and to the Government which is engaged in suppressing it, much of their relative strength and their relative weakness results equally from the same debates (Department of State, 1862, 103).

I found no other mention of this project on the correspondence exchanged. But it is one of the most interesting documents I found for it is representative of the transition that the end of slavery needed to operate – especially in the US, where Lincoln's decree of September 1862 only announces that he would abolish slavery in the Southern states in January of 1863, meaning that there were a lot of caveats. The transformation on the status of the black populations, however, did not mean they would be treated as fellow citizens, they were "superfluous as laborers". The true questions, the ones Seward did not have an answer to give since they were still being debated, were: besides laborers,

what else were they? In this additional potential other category, were they still superfluous?

Humanity not taken for granted, tolerated due to the necessity of their labour, space thought in terms of slavery, slavery transformed in pure and simple racism, all of this is clear in this passage by Webb. It seems to synthetise the argument I have been building thus far and it articulates closely to the speech by du Bois in 1890. That dispute that Henry Wise thought was so profound, when seen from another perspective, actually presents more similarities then Wise would have noticed. It also articulates with the idea of Shilliam (2009) that as Africans were the bigger group to cross the Atlantic, a new grammar was created. The proposition of the people of African descent being transported to Brazil show how the inflections were conjugated in order to adapt to the new (con)text.

This section began with Henry Wise: the defender of slavery in Brazil, opposer to Yankee interests in ship manufacturing, defender of drunk sailors in Rio, and defender of the execution of John Brown. His passage through Rio de Janeiro did not help his political career much, a probable reason for him having laid low for some years afterwards. In late 1850s and early 1860s, however, he was trying to reinsert himself politically, reason why he became a representative in the Virginia state parliament. In recounting the tense session in the Virginian state legislature that deliberated the secession of the state, Stephanie McCurry portraits him as the "hothead from the eastern shore" of the state that "organized an alternate convention to meet in case the deliberation went towards remaining in the Union (MCcurry, 2010, 73). Not satisfied with that, Wise seems also to have organized a plot to kidnap the governor, if needed be (MCcurry, 2010,74).

Slavery was a banner that was defended within the "Police" in the US as well as in Brazil. Sometimes – as it is in the case of Wise – the boundaries between the two countries were not marked with clarity: he was a defender of slavery as a political project in any latitude, even if it impacted his political career.

The three characters presented in this section and that now inhabit these pages are almost like aesthetic subject as defined by Shapiro "characters in texts whose

movements and actions (both purposive and non-purposive) map and often alter experiential, politically relevant terrains" (Shapiro, 2013, xiv). The omnipresence of Wise in the spaces where slavery was being discussed, Maury's commitment to the opening of Amazon to the colonization by the Mississippi and Webb, minister of a government amidst a civil war resulting from political disputes on slavery, arguing for the export of free black people are almost caricatures of the Atlantic slavery during these three decades. Their political stance resonates profoundly with the name of the chapter/ the name of Genovese's book: a world created by slave holding figures. They imagined that world, inhabited it and articulated for its continuation.

Finally, the engagement of these three with slavery fits as another step in the argument that slavery was neither exclusively political nor indisputably national. A part of it – its legality – was defined by law, however the bulk of the project, its legitimacy, belonged to Atlantic imaginaries and saw economy, geography and modernity as projects of the whole, not of States. This is the operative logic recurrent throughout this section: thinking spatially the whole of slavery because, if the 19th Century inaugurated a new grammar, and if the enslaved person is the part with no part, then s/he is the political subject *par excellence* and, thus, we should try to think politically departing from this subject and this grammar. This is not to deny the existence of Brazil and the US nor the diplomatic articulations between them, but to argue that slavery is a subject that operates in another spatial dimension of its own. It is not relational between States, it is pervasive to them.

4.5.
Conclusion

"Brazil is the Valley" and "Manifest Destiny" are also possible titles to the first and third sections of this chapter. They locate in time the analyses that I bring in each section, while unveiling some differences in the national processes between the two countries. The more evident one is the idea that the Civil War puts a stop on slavery in the US a few years after the destiny being fulfilled and the West Coast being reached. While the Valley is a metaphor that will endure in 19th Century Brazil for its entirety.

The second difference, and perhaps the more dismissive one, is the idea of space that both entails. Brazil being defined in static terms while the US being represented by an ideal of territorial greatness not constrained by a verb in time or space. This US idea of space and "Police" reached Brazil recurrently in the 1840s, 1850s and 1860s, until the Civil War ended and some Southerners came to live in Brazil. Not in the Amazon Valley, but in the Paraíba Valley – after all, Brazil was the Valley.

This chapter was the effort of situating slavery spatially on the Atlantic's shore and, in this vein some notes are needed. The first is the definition of space. The chapter began with the discussion on Atlantic Slavery as merging the many different parts in which slavery can be segmented – nationally, as trade, as labour, as identity – and yet the two more analytical sections were defined nationally and in land. How come? To argue that it is the Atlantic Slavery does not mean that the focus will be ships at sea, rather that the shores are connected and slavery is part of these connections, these movements – to recall the first chapter – or this battered Highway – so to use the term Shilliam (2009, 73) borrowed from Alfred Maham. Nor does it mean that by focusing on the Atlantic, that the State should be overviewed. The State is a historical fact, just like slavery. The point is that in order to fit slavery to State much has to be left out.

The second note is the option for looking to the elites in order to account for the space. Slavery is violence and in order to think spatially about the space that slavery created and how it did so, I believe that looking at those who perpetrated the violence is the best way to understand the creation of the space. Clearly that the enslaved people also found their ways of rethinking space: Quilombos, flees to Ceará or Amazonas were forms of resistance. But slavery was a project and the white men who acted upon it must be charged for their responsibility (Lee, 1992). Charged not only for creating slavery but also for creating the forms of erasure and silences that the Brazilian abolition portrayed so potently. This after using the State as a way of legitimizing slavery through the disguise that it was the legitimate space for fighting for freedom. This raises the question if the notion put forward by Karp (2017, 71-2) and by Marquese and Parron (2011) is correct – both in more direct terms than Horne (2007) – in terms of thinking if the maintenance of slavery in Brazil was dependent on the same kind of violence being enforced in the US?

My answer would be no. The idea of a hierarchical scheme of national relations through which a stronger US would determine the trajectory of the social relations in Brazil seems rather structural and lacking in political analyses. This is not to say that the discrepancies in naval forces or industrial capabilities were not there. It is only to say that this does not fit as an explanation for slavery as a phenomenon in the Atlantic. The deteriorated portrait that Webb transmits of England and its support to the Confederate States is profoundly discrepant with the complicity adopted by the Brazilian government towards Province presidents who allowed for the commanders of the pirate/Confederate ships to be celebrated in their capitals.

I take Karp's, Marquese and Parron's and Horne's argument to the extent that they account for the bond that existed between the US and Brazil due to slavery. However, on the moment they fudge elite and State as one and the same and as the locus of politics, they fall in the trap of hierarchizing spaces, creating precedence and measuring strength in terms of armed forces. I cannot help but find it somewhat curious, since, as argued in the first section, the adoption of slavery challenges the State's monopoly of the legitimate use of force.

This hierarchy between countries that these authors propose – and my disagreement with it to the extent that it limits the political reading that is present in the phenomena that these people represent – led me back to an interview with the Brazilian thinker Maria Sylvia de Carvalho Franco (1976). When the interviewer posed the question "Brazil, being a colonial country, has its source of ideas in Europe. How the transference of the European ideals is processed, and how original are the ideas resulting from which?" [author's translation]. Her answer begins by rejecting the premise used to question her and goes on to say "colony and metropole do not relate to modes of productions essentially different, rather they are particular situations that determine one another in the internal process of differentiation of the world capitalist system, in the immanent movement of its constitution and reproduction" (Franco, 1976, 62) [author's translation]. I am not arguing that Brazil was a colony of the US – though as I have presented, this notion was not completely out of the picture for some US politicians. However, the rationale adopted by Karp (2017), Marquese and Parron

(2011) and Horne (2007) surely mimics this relation, so it should be discarded or at least viewed with scepticism because this dependency would occur both ways.

This argument is in fact similar to one that Roxanne Doty espouses in "*Imperial Encounters*" (1996):

> The fact that particular meanings and identities have been widely taken to be fixed and true is indicative of the inextricable link between power and knowledge. This link, in effect, stops the signifying chain, at least temporarily, creates a center, and permits meaning and identities to become naturalized, taken for granted. The naturalization of meaning has had consequences ranging from the appropriation of land, labor, and resources to the subjugation and extermination of entire groups of people (Doty, 1996, 7).

This naturalization relates profoundly with this chapter since is a feature enabled by silence. Be it the silence about those responsible for sustaining slavery throughout, be it the silence about other forms of political imagination that account for slavery not as a trope of the time, but the ground on which identities are created.

I take Franco's response in order to say that it is definitely not a relation between colony and metropole, but it is not helping either to try to mould US-Brazil as a core-periphery relation. Brazil and the US were part of a political experiment that manifest differently in both spaces due to contingencies. That which these two manifestations of slavery have in common is how incomplete it becomes once trying to frame it into the State. It generates a lot of silences and does not allow for the comprehension of what is at stake, for the departure point of this political thought is not the citizen, it is the enslaved person.

The enslaved person is the one who will produce spaces and wealth and the one in the back of the mind of the policy planners thinking in terms of enhancing accumulation.

To close this chapter, I think that it is telling of the traces of connection that we inherit from 19th Century slavery, this passage on the visit of Jimmy Carter to Brazil, in 1972 while he was Governor of Georgia. In The Brazilian embassy – still – in Rio de Janeiro, Eugene C. Harter, an American diplomat that also had Brazilian citizenship, lobbied for the governor to visit Americana, a city in the countryside of the state of São Paulo. Carter, that, when president would bring US-Brazil relations to one of the lowest

points of the trajectory as a consequence of the disregard for Human Rights of the military government in Brazil (Cervo, Bueno, 2008, 407-410), went to Americana, visited the cemetery and paid his tributes to the confederate soldiers buried there (Harter, 1985, 10-11).

Americana, word with the same meaning in English as in Portuguese even with the same ambivalence (one original from America be it referring to the US or to the continent) is a city founded by the confederate that fled to Brazil after the Civil War in order to rebuild their lives as slave-holders in the last country in which it was possible in the Americas. Eugene Harter, a descendent of this wave of migrants found solace in this history and wrote a memoir-like book on the experience of his family fleeing the unjust Yankees. On the first page of the introduction, Harter writes: "It [to migrate to Brazil] was a solution for the dilemma of living in a modified South, where the defeat and the Yankee invasion menaced that smooth character of the community and mores that characterized Southerners. In Brazil they could survive with dignity" (Harter, 1985, 7) [author's translation]. On the following page, relating the experience of a 4th of July pic-nic in Americana, the author writes: "The experience is something similar as to look to a mirror in order to find your own image, slightly twisted. Could it be the expression in the eyes, the body language, the darker skin?" (Harter, 1985, 8) [author's translation].

The migration of Dixies to Brazil is referred by Alonso (2015) as well, and the visit of Jimmy Carter to Americana is well registered even with photographs. The power of Harter's book is the clarity of tropes that survived – then – 120 years of history the feeling of injustice for having lost the war and the – supposedly – veiled racism in the last sentence. In trying to differentiate the descendants of Confederate soldiers from other Brazilians, Harter might just have made them closer than he imagines.

5.
Worlding the Atlantic: slavery liberalism

5.1.
Introduction

I concluded the first chapter's third movement proposing an interpretation of Liberalism as the culture of the Atlantic, by offering a relative cohesiveness to events happening in 19th Century through the spaces of that ocean. This is the thread from which I want to build this chapter, which works as a very elongated introduction to the closing chapter "State-less Empire".

That said, this chapter will work as an introduction in which I am reinforcing the plan laid out in chapter 1 – Introduction – that defined the second chapter as the effort to show the lack of disciplinary effort in looking to slavery. The plan anticipated the third and fourth chapters as spaces in which I elaborated that the racial difference between citizens and enslaved people was a divide that, despite its profundity, worked not as an inside/outside division, rather as a constitutive part of the political structure that entangled the Atlantic. Until now, in looking to different sources and addressing different groups of Atlantic inhabitants, I understand that I presented how the Atlantic has been produced with a constitutive divide marked in terms of the colour line citizenship and labour as the two sides of belonging. Having said all that, this chapter begins a concluding section of this thesis by laying the ground for the comprehension of what it is people belonged to. In other words, it falls to this chapter to present the understanding of the Atlantic that its inhabitants produced.

On this matter, I will excuse myself to cite a long quote from Alencastro (2000) which signals the point of departure:

> Approximately 1.200 voyages were made from African ports to Brazil to sell, during the three centuries that it lasted, circa of 4 million slaves here [in Brazil] that arrived with life. Let alone the traders and the sailors, other people – free people – travelled in those ships, the sole transportation method between the two continents. There were few cabins in the *tumbeiros*. At night and with bad weather, one could not risk him/herself by staying in the first deck. As a consequence, some thousand regal servants, merchants, settlers and priests travelling from Africa to Brazil – to stay here or as a scale to go to the Metropole, closely saw and heard the martyrdom of the deported, during six or more weeks. Nevertheless, the direct references to the 16th Century crossing can be counted in the palm of one hand.

(…) "This is the most painful navigation that is in the world", wrote fryer Piacenza. There are a few more narratives of the 17th Century and a greater number in the first half of the 19th Century, sometimes compulsorily transcribed into inquiries. In total, the number of testimonies known on the Portuguese, *brasílicos* and Brazilian *tumbeiros* is no greater than thirty. Many come from foreigners, but none of them comes from the priests who were the most frequent travellers of the route, the Portuguese Jesuits. Why? Because there were, most certainly, instructions from the brotherhood so to avoid such narratives. It is the only reason I find to explain the aberrant silence of sources on this matter: the Church, the missionary, the Europeans, the *brasílicos*, all knew that the drama of the Atlantic trade stood alone despite the fact that Europe, in that time, was defined by war and hunger. They knew and they hid it (Alencastro, 2000, 85-86) [author's translation].[84]

Alencastro's quote is important because it depicts what it meant to sail from Africa to Brazil. This depiction makes the Atlantic less of an abstraction and more than a self-evident geographical definition of a body of water thought in terms of the geopolitical rationale that articulated military activities in Africa, the Americas and Europe. The Atlantic produced by slavery accounts for the troubled coexistence of enslaved people and slave-holders and with cross-allegiances to State and to racism and wealth accumulation, as I discussed in the former two chapters. This production of the Atlantic happened in a two-folded way: on the one hand, white men with their plans in Mississippi, the Paraíba, and the Potomac imagined spaces according to their will and interests. On the other, black people, not accounted as human-beings, were the labour that built those spaces according to the plans and interests of the white few. Slavery, in this thesis, is accounted as the intersection between these plans and the actions that made them real, while the Atlantic accounts for the space in which slavery was widely accepted not only as an economic endeavor, but also as portrait of the beliefs and shared culture that connected the elites' imaginaries and projects in the 19th Century.

Having laid out the argument that the Atlantic was produced, this chapter and the next aim at presenting how it can serve as an interpretative lens of analysis.

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak begins the chapter "History" of her "*A Critique of Postcolonial Reason*" arguing that the feminist historiography has to excavate

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[84] *Brasílico* is a denomination used by Brazilian Colonial historian to refer to people from Brazil in the period previous to the independence. It is a way of differentiating from the term *Brasileiro* – Brazilian – that refers to those from Brazil after the ties with Portugal were broken.

informants to build narratives to compete with those already established. Being a woman from a postcolonial society imposed even greater challenges to the extent that this overlapping of peripheral identities would make the promise of "a fully just world [is] impossible, forever deferred and different from our projections" (Spivak, 1999, 199). She goes on then to say that the peripheral position of a woman on the Global South was a privileged space to think a "geography of worlding" (Op. cit: 200). I am not a woman nor a descendent of enslaved people; however, I am Brazilian and, as such, I understand slavery as a constitutive feature of the society in which I inhabit and an insightful interpretative way of reading International Relations. This is why I put up the effort of building an understanding of history which departs from it.

By proposing worlding the Atlantic, I want to engage with Spivak's (1999) use of the term. This is not to say that it was developed by Spivak, as it was not: she draws her use from Jacques Derrida's 1980 "The Truth in Painting" who, himself, is in dialogue with Martin Heidegger's "Origin of the Work of Art" ([1950] 2002). If Heidegger sees in the aesthetic process of creation the point of origin of creation, Derrida would argue that there is no origin in there, only process defined in the term "work" that would condition the possibility of "art" (Spivak, 1999, 212, 428). Spivak, however, proposes worlding as a verb through which the readings of the world can articulate different narratives on times and spaces already discussed in conservative terms.

There are, thus, two issues at play on worlding. The more bluntly present in Spivak's incorporation of the term is the matter of perspective in narrating history. The other, not so clearly present in the above description but one which is constant in the discussion from Heidegger through Derrida to Spivak, is the discussion on origin. These are the main features with which I will deal in the next three sections. I will firstly deal with the matter of origin in two sections: on the first by diving in Liberalism, specifically looking to the role of John Locke's "*Second Treatise of Government*" disciplinarily. On the second section, I engage with the problem of defining an origin point to slavery, and the articulation of this origin challenge to relate it to racism and capitalism. The last section is the one in which I deal with the issue of perspective. In it, I engage with Luis Felipe Alencastro's (2000) subtitle – the formation of Brazil in

the South Atlantic – in order to argue that, to the same extent, the Atlantic was formed in Brazil as well.

Alencastro's quote above is an important one because it shows the need to go back beyond the 1800s to better understand the dynamics at play in that century. It also makes it clear, as discussed in chapter 2, that history can be instrumentalized as a tool of forgetfulness. This is how one can understand that a shared experience of the agonies of kidnapped people testified by the "thousand regal servants, merchants, settlers and priests travelling from Africa to Brazil" was erased because it was out of official accountings of the records and, consequently, was left out of the historical recollection. The dread, suffering and agony of traversing the *Kalunga* was communicated, but the ones listening opted to not memorialize it. The perception that "They knew and they hid it." is core to the understanding of the Atlantic.

5.2.
Thinking through Liberalism

Roberto Schwarz, sociologist and literary critique, wrote "Ideas out of Place", a text in which he criticises the incorporation of Liberalism in Brazil during the 19th Century. The Brazilian slavery society would lack the material conditions for the effective development of a liberal society. Rio de Janeiro, in particular, would be marked by the incorporation of a bourgeoise discourse that had to adapt to social conditions in which the interactions were based on the exchange of favours and personal loyalties between free people who would fall short from the proposed idea of modern societies. Schwarz's (2014) text is actually an interpretation of Machado de Assis' sarcastic criticism of Rio de Janeiro's society. I will not engage with Schwarz's premise that ideas have their own place, since this is a whole other discussion for another time. I want, thus, to start this section with a quote from him developed his critique on the incorporation of Liberalism in Brazil that already came from a critical reading of Liberalism:

> Even the most miserable of the favoured saw in it – the favour – one's own free person, that which transformed instalment and counter-instalment, no matter how low they were, in a ceremony of social superiority valued in itself. Backed by the infinite harsh and

degradation that it denounced – meaning, by slavery, from which both parts benefited and excel in differentiate from – this acknowledgement is of a false connivance multiplied, still, by the adoption of a bourgeois vocabulary of equality, merit, labour and reason. Machado de Assis will be a master in these meanders. However, it must be seen the other side. Immerse that we are, still today, in the universe of Capital, that have not developed its classical form in Brazil, we tend to see this combination as entirely disadvantageous for us, made only of defects. There must not have had any advantages, however, in order to properly appreciate its complexity, consider that the bourgeoise ideas, at first standing against privilege, from 1848 on had turned apological: the wave of social fights in Europe had shown that the universality masks class antagonism. Therefore, in order to properly sustain the ideological timbre, it is necessary to consider that our improper discourse was hollow even when used properly. Note, in passing, that this pattern would repeat itself in the 20th Century, when many times we swear, believing in our modernity, according to the shabbiest ideologies of the world. To literature, as we shall see, results from that a unique maze, a sort of hollow within the hollow. Here still, Machado will be the master (Schwarz, 2014, 55) [author's translation].

"Hollow within the hollow" is a poignant way of defining the incorporation of Liberalism in Brazil. Denouncing how a shabby ideology was erroneously appropriated in a country where the conditions for adopting it were lacking.

The point at which my argument part ways with Schwarz is when he accepts that Liberalism necessarily denounces slavery. This is a premise for him that I do not believe to stand after thorough reading of liberal thinkers contemporaneous to slavery.

Liberalism is a stream of thought that developed in many fronts with a good number of thinkers through time. From this variety of people and contributions, John Locke stands as an important reference as he developed his ideas within the context of the Atlantic. This led me to read Locke and a few of his current interpreters to better situate the critique on Liberalism that I want to push forward here.

Before reading Locke, I find it interesting to contextualize the author and the text a little. The first thing to point out is a fact recuperated by Duncan Bell (2016). In making a history of the concept of Liberalism, he points to the fact that Locke's "*Second Treatise of Government*" was a completely marginalized book whose arguments did not cut to the political debate more broadly. Emphasising the fact that Locke's most impactful text was his "*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*", his entrance in political discussions was completely marginal, while he enjoyed recognition for his philosophical contribution to Empiricism (Bell, 2016, 76). Bell's argument is corroborated by Hans Aarleff text in "*Cambridge Companion to Locke*".

In this text, called "Locke's Influence" Aarleff writes extensively on the resonance that "Essay" had on philosophical circuits, while the silence on the Second Treatise was absolute.

This silence is what led me to the core of the ambivalence: the dispute on the concept of Liberalism. Bell (2016, 74) argues that the concept was born in the first half of the 1800s and only got traction as representation of a more cohesive political movement after the foundation of the Liberal Party in the UK and its consequential identification with it. Already more than 100 years past the Second Treatise, and yet, it remained in oblivion.

> It is both striking and symptomatic that in Britain, so often seen as the incubator of liberalism, Locke was not widely regarded as a liberal – let alone a paradigmatic one – until nearly a century after liberalism emerged as an explicit political doctrine. Several generations of self-identified liberals somehow failed to recognize him as one of their own. While Locke's nineteenth-century biographers celebrated him as one of the greatest of philosophers, their verdicts on his political writings were far less positive. Acknowledging him as a leading Whig ideologue who exerted a major influence over eighteenth-century political thinking, they almost invariably rejected his theoretical arguments as defective and obsolete. In so doing they painted a microcosmic picture of his general reputation during the Victorian age: "Locke meant the *Essay*", not the *Treatise*.

> Most accounts of the historical development of modern political thought contended that there had been a radical break – both intellectual and political – at the end of the eighteenth century. A new world had dawned, and there was little space in it for Lockean political theory. Liberalism was figured as the progeny of this gestalt switch (Bell, 2016, 76-77).

Another dimension to Schwarz's (2014) proposed hollowness to identify Liberalism is brought to the fore. The question is not the dispute around the concept of Liberalism, rather how is it that Locke somehow "evolved" so to be incorporated, retrospectively, as a Liberal having been a Whig ideologue? That which Bell identified in some of his sources of Locke having "foundational role in Liberalism today" (Bell, 2016, 73) points to the same critique that Schwarz (2014) articulates of the Bourgeoise after 1848, defending privilege instead of standing against it. The radical break that Bell identifies at the end of the 18th Century leads me to think in other markers accounted for the 19th Century: on the one hand, the Second Slavery (Tomich, 2004); on the other, great power politics and the historical legitimation (Bull, Watson, 1984;

Kissinger, 1994) of a discipline caring for – almost exclusively – for diplomatic and military disputes between powerfull States.

The role of "foundational Liberal" that Locke holds contemporarily (Bell, 2016) has been built from the early 20th Century onwards, beginning with the necessity of responding to the articulation of the workers movement at the rise of the 20th Century (Bell, 2016, 75). This turn towards a Lockean Liberalism was consolidated between the 1930s and 1950s in the UK and the US, specifically with the idea of "liberal democracy" as the alternative to extremisms to the right and to the left of the political spectrum (Bell, 2016, 81-82). Interesting enough, this is the same period of the consolidation of IR as a discipline, specifically, "an American social science" (Hoffman, 1977, 41).

The transformation of Liberalism into a Whig system of thought would have been motivated by the French Revolution which brought more progressive discussions to the political arena (Bell, 2016, 75-76), expanding the participation to include people who, in 1680s England were not part of the revolutionary movement. The recovery of Locke's image as a father of Liberalism would in the institutionalization of Political Science and, consequently, of IR result in a more conservative discipline. To the extent that the 19th Century history was going to be read through the lenses of late 17th Whiggism. With that, 100 years of European history and social struggle were erased. This is an interesting situation in which, under the excuse of confronting totalitarianism, the history of confronting the *Ancien Regime* would be peeled off so as to fit 20th Century Liberal democracy.

In reconstructing this history, Bell (2016) makes reference to the French Revolution and how it was bypassed by this recovery of Locke. I cannot help but wonder if by remaining silent on the French Revolution, the silence on the Haitian Revolution and its political consequences to the Atlantic space was not buried even deeper? This question leads me to the second discrepancy that is important to address in dealing with Locke: his connection with the colonization of the Carolinas.

> Locke's colonial activities would nonetheless be irrelevant to the interpretation of his political theory if they had left no trace in his major writings. Such traces are especially abundant in the *Two Treatises of Government* and have been sufficient to sustain a well-developed 'colonial' reading of Locke's political theory (Armitage, 2004, 603).

Locke was secretary to the conglomerate of British men with land in the colony of Carolina. Among those men was Anthony Cooper, first Earl of Shaftesbury, a patron to Locke and with whom his political life was entangled. Locke's direct connection with this colonial enterprise lasted for – in total – a decade between 1669 and 1700 (Armitage, 2004, 603). The exact date of publication of *Two Treatises* is disputed, but it is accepted to be between the years of 1679 and 1682, a period within which Locke was not directly entangled with the colonial administration, but still in close contact with Shaftesbury and his political project. That fact, added to, the proximity of Locke to the writing of the "Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina" (1669), the main law of the colony and we arrive at the following statement: "The *Fundamental Constitutions* assumed the existence of slavery and affirmed the absolute powers of life and death of slaveholders. They also erected the first hereditary nobility on North America soil" (Armitage, 2004, 607). The hereditary nobility Armitage is referring to is the landgraves of the colony, who would not have to respond to checks and balances.

Racism inscribed in the intellectual tradition of Liberal-Contractualism is no novelty. Charles Mills (1999) wrote a classic book on the matter. This book has been influential in critical IR, working as an important reference to Errol Henderson's (2015) text describing how inscribed racism is in IR theoretical discussions in the edited volume by Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda and Robbie Shilliam on Race and Racism in IR. Contrary to Mills, albeit inspired by him, the context in which I want to read Locke is a geopolitical one, of the Atlantic, not the disciplinary construct of Liberalism that, as denounced by Bell (2016), tells more about the 20th Century than of the 17th.

To sum up these discrepancies, one is left in the 20th Century with the recovery of a conservative (Bell, 2016) and profoundly immersed in the construction of the framework of a slave-holding non-democratic society (Armitage, 2004) political philosopher as the reference figure of Liberalism. It is departing from these discrepancies that I will analyse his take on the State.

John Locke's Two Treatises is accepted as a landmark in Political Science, specifically for offering a lens to read the transition to modern politics (Mello, 2001, Chevalier, 1973). It is understood as a symbol of European governments becoming

more representative and less absolutist. On that note, it is recurrently articulated in opposition to Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan, which stands for the defence of absolutism. This representation of Locke replicates a narrative of advancement by considering his contribution a step forward in the construction of a rather more progressive politics since he stands for liberties and against a tyrant. In Locke, it is possible to see arguments contrary to the violent imposition of the State upon anyone.

It is interesting to notice that following the chapter "Of the State of Nature" is the chapter "Of the State of War". This condition is profoundly individualized: "The *state of war* is a state of *enmity* and *destruction*: and therefore, declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled design upon another man's life *puts him in a state of war* with him against whom he has declared such an intention" (Locke, 1980, 14). This is important to highlight because to the extent that the state of nature is socialized, the state of war is personalized, in the individual. This notion of state of violence puts great importance on the meaning of violence, which is interestingly complemented further along the chapter:

> (…) where-ever violence is used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to administer justice, it is still violence and injury, however coloured with the name, pretences, or forms of law, the end whereof being to protect and redress the innocent, by an unbiassed application of it, to all who are under it; where-ever that is not *bona fide* done, *war is made* upon the sufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right them, they are left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven (Locke, 1980, 16).

By establishing the individual as the point of departure for his analyses, Locke defines a low bar for the tolerance regarding State violence. Thus, it seems that he has, at arm's length, the possibility of upheaval against the State that would be in disarray with the "civil society", imposing itself on it and ignoring the rights and lives of the subjects of the king. To his understanding, it makes no sense to have a leader that would impose himself since this is a contradiction with the very notion that generates civil society "Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one society, as to quit everyone his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a *political, or civil society*" (Locke, 1980, 47).

The citizen is a constitutive part of the society, to the extent that he can stand against it if he sees himself under a tyranny. This is clearly stated in the last two chapters of the book – "Of Tyranny", and "Of the Dissolution of Government" – in

which the possibility of sizing property, even more than liberty, is presented as grounds on which people can uprise (Locke, 1980, 111). People walk a fine line between being citizen – perhaps subject even, since he is writing in England – and a subversive who will stand against the State. There is a judgement to be made on the society that Locke builds, and he is entitled to fight for the building of that society and to claim for his representativity.

It is worth addressing, in this discussion on Liberalism, a context made evident by Lynch (2017) when recuperating the relevance of Edward Burke to the political thought in Brazil during the 19th Century. For him, at the same time that it is necessary to situate historically the author in the political context in which he is writing (one in which the categories of Liberalism and Conservatism did not yet exist), it is important to notice how the understanding of these thinkers is a political action in itself. To that, he adds that the definition of the schools of thought departing from these figures is to some extent arbitrary – in the sense that is not for them to say – and necessarily anachronical, for they are used to help us think aboutquestions with which they were not dealing, for they were addressing the political debate in which they were immersed (Lynch, 2017, 317)[85]. But being in a peripheral space and recuperating these authors, in Lynch's reading of Drew Maciag (Lynch, 2017, 314), allow for the disclosure of layers of communication that were not evident while dealing with the original subject. Having said that, Lynch is able to deal with the many strains of conservatism and how they manifested – in their multiplicity – in Brazilian politics[86], many times intersecting with what we now know as Liberalism.

While Lynch was worried with the debates regarding State formation, thus the lineage that he traces from the Viscount of Cairu – a relevant Portuguese politician in the turn of the 18th to the 19th Century inherited by Brazilian court – all the way to Ruy Barbosa's constitutionalism in the late 1800s and political activism all the way into the

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[85] Lynch argues on the centrality of the 1930's Karl Mannheim oeuvre to the institutionalization of the professional study of ideologies and the lineages that followed, be it Liberalism, Conservativism or otherwise (Lynch, 2017, 317).

[86] "There is no *conservatism*, but *conservatisms*; in the same way, they not always harmonize, frequently competing and clashing against each other. *Illustrated reformism, state conservatism, cultural conservatism and liberal conservatism* are nuances that a consequential study of ideologies or lines of thinking of Brazilian Political Thought must consider" (Lynch, 2017, 315) [author's translation].

1920s, I want to follow another path. By understanding the production of Liberalism as this *post-factum* frame applied to make sense of the past and how it influenced narrative on the empowerment and recognition of political subjects, I intend to discuss the everlasting movement of exclusion that it has produced and still reproduces. Having said that, it is worth comparing, with the Lockean take on the matter, the perspective developed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, specifically his understanding of the general will – in a sense, a moral compass that always strikes the true and righteous developments of the society. This general will is different from the collectivity of individual wills to the extent that it finds to reach for what is best for the collectivity, not being affected by the disputes amongst individual goals (Rousseau, 2002, 46-7).

To put Locke and Rousseau together in order to do justice to the so-called Liberal tradition is to find a difficult balance between empowered individuals able to fight the State in the case of being oppressed, at the same time of conceiving the State as able to interpret what is best for the entire society, as responsible for decodifying the general will. To be a citizen is to have a say in that structure: to be intended as one of the people whose will is accounted for in the general will or a person whose discontentment is seen as legitimate enough to be accounted for under the threat of the system losing support. These differences between the two liberal thinkers matches Lynch's argument that these schools of thought, or the political practice they enforce, are not always monolithic. There are disputes and debates in the Liberal arena just as much as there are conservatisms in Brazilian Political Thought (Lynch, 2017, 315).

Considering these divisions, it is possible to understand that the dispute also revolves around the definition of citizenship. While Rousseau is more worried with defining population and nationality, to an extent, Locke takes it for granted, hence dealing more closely with the multiplicity of people that comprise the collectivity. To an extent, Locke is drawing a continuum in which there are many categories that one can occupy as a person. One of such categories is that of foreigner, a category which is not necessarily bad seeing that his intake on the foreigner is the person who is beyond the capacity of punishment of any State that is not his/her own (Locke, 1980, 10). It is an ambiguous category, to the extent that it seems to privilege those citizens from stronger countries, therefore reinstating the personal level hierarchies that are typical

of international politics.[87] A completely different situation, to which there is no ambiguity, is that of the slave-person. This condition of enslavement is defined by Locke as:

> But there is another sort of servants, which by a peculiar name we call *slaves*, who being captives taken in a just war, are by the right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. These men having, as I say, forfeited their lives, and with it their liberties, and lost their estates; and being in the *state of slavery*, not capable of any property, cannot in that state be considered as any part of *civil society*; the chief end whereof is the preservation of property (Locke, 1980, 45).

Locke's position on the matter of enslavement comes with no surprise. After all, not only was he profoundly involved in the British colony of Carolina (Armitage, 2004), he was also a partner in a slave trade enterprise (Losurdo, 2011, 4). However, to say, as he does, that the enslaved people are held in consequence of having being vanquished in a just war is to recycle an argument that was already on decline[88]. This argument resonates with Orlando Patterson's concept of "Social Death" already discussed in chapter 3. The argument fits a Lockean society to the extent that, in such a context, the goal is to preserve property and an enslaved person seen as someone deprived of rights is understood no longer as a person, rather as someone else's property. The enslaved person has no active role in defending property, s/he is rather the passive agent who is regarded/kept as someone else's property. This Lockean frame highlights, through another angle, the limit of Patterson's critique and how it operates in such a way that actually reinforces the marginality of those enslaved. Not only does he not account for the centrality of labour in the construction of space, his critique also stresses an un-human condition of property.

In Locke, the issue of labour is connected with claiming rights over property. On this matter, the argument developed by Mills (1999, 67) and incorporated by Henderson (2015, 30) is an interesting one to the extent that they elaborate upon

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[87] This hypothesis gains steam when contextualizing the treaty politics that England was putting forward, specifically with Portugal, on the second half of the 17th Century. The treaty signed in 1654, by the Republic of England, established especial courts to Englishmen living in Portugal. Tamis Parron understands it as a way of allowing for religious freedom in a country that had inquisition, while recognizing that the English had a stronger hand in negotiating it since Portugal was still dealing with the independence from Spain and the conflicts with Netherlands (Parron, 2020, 437-438).

[88] For a more detailed account on the connection between Locke's intake on slavery, see Losurdo's analysis (2011), especially between pages 40-44.

Locke's passage that "God gave the world 'to the use of the Industrious and Rational', which qualities were indicated by labor" (Mills, 1999, 67). Labour, in the sense of the ability to transform the environment, not money – whose existence Locke accepts in the state of nature (Mills, 1999, 67), is the condition to claim authority over any space. And it is the abandonment that the Englishmen would see in the Americas that would legitimize them to claim authority over the colonies.

I want to emphasize this aspect of Locke recognizing the existence of money in the state of nature. This is important because, on the one hand, it blurs a particular meaning of state of nature whose idea is of an undefined moment in time prior to the structuring of the State as the political *locus*. On the other, its adoption creates an interchangeability between labour and money that generates a confusion on where value lies. A confusion that is interesting to be fomented by a Liberalism that is being re-structured at the shadow of the development of the European labour movement in early 20th Century.

Consider the following passage:

> Thus *labour*, in the beginning, *gave a right of property*, wherever any one was pleased to employ it upon what was common, which remained a long while the far greater part, and is yet mor than mankind makes use of. Men, at first, for the most part, contented themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their necessities: and though afterwards, in some parts of the world, (where the increase of people and stock, with the *use of money*, had made land scarce, and so of some value) the several *communities* settled the bounds of their distinct territories, and by laws within themselves regulated the properties of the private men of their society, and so, *by compact* and agreement, *settled the property* which labour and industry began; and the leagues that have been made between several states and kingdoms, either expressly or tacitly disowning all claim and right to the land in the others possession, have, by common consent, given up their pretences to their natural common right, which originally they had to those countries, and so have, by *positive agreement, settled a property* amongst themselves, in distinct parts and parcels of the earth; yet there are still *great tracts of ground* to be found, which (the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind, in the consent of the use of their common money) *lie waste*, and are more than people who dwell on it do, or can make use of, and so still lie in common; tho' this can scarce happen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use of money (Locke, 1980, 27-28).

This is a rather long quote, but an important one to the extent that it synthetizes much of Locke's argument. This synthesis is going to be reflected in the understanding of liberalism in the 20th Century and, consequently, in the disciplinary field of IR. Firstly by presenting labour as a feature of the past – the original way of obtaining right

to property, with an unclear relation to money that is not referred as "created", rather the use is portrayed as a consequence of the increase in population and stock. Then, there is this abrupt transition from the individual experience (in this past moment in which labour granted right) to the communities settled that develop into "states and kingdoms" which, by now already have "natural common right". This new source of right – the agreement between mutually recognized States – allowed for the expansion and colonization of "distinct parts and parcels of the earth", where "there are still great tracts of ground to be found, which (the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind, in the consent of the use of their common money) lie waste". This last section of the quote closes the cycle by framing the difference in terms of development, consequently, addressing it in a unidimensional way as a matter of temporal distinction that separate those who developed into States and those who opted not to. Upon refusing not to join, their land lie waste. Unidimensionally because the sole feature that seems to operate in this paragraph is that of time, beginning with labour (and money?), developing onto communities, then States. The moment in which the difference is inserted in this narrative is by portraying those who did not join the development trajectory and, consequently, were left in the past.

Property is the operative concept in Locke, not production. Operative concept not only on the issue of wealth but as an important aspect in terms of the condition of being a political subject. This perception on labour points to this other silencing of the enslaved person: the limited possibility of having anything to the extent that one was already property. It is upon this tension that I want to elaborate the next section, by recuperating the characteristics presented in the fourth chapter on spatiality and production and in this first section on the construction of Liberalism in order to account for the racialization that is so present in the construction of the Atlantic space along with capitalism. In these processes, the goal is to account for the layers of silence that help to conceive what is hidden. By recovering Locke in the 20th Century, the movements towards democratization of the 18th Century are automatically diminished in the intellectual trajectory. On the other hand, it shifts the debate that social movements were raising (Bell, 2016) in terms of production to that of property. A movement that, subtly, alienates even further the debate on enslavement, not only as a

consequence of their absence from 17th Century British context, but also due to the fact that, in not having their personhood recognized, they were understood as property, rather than owners, hence unable to account as participants in society.

This tension between existence and silencing that is manifested in the relation between the liberal State and the enslaved person is central to the proposition of thinking other political structures and spaces, which I want to develop in the next section, specifically to think the Atlantic in terms of capitalism and racialization.

5.3.
Slavery and Capitalism: transformations and racialization

In the process of recovering Locke and the construction of Liberalism in the 20th Century my argument is that the ideal of the individual pushed forward by it should be understood with some caveats. The limits to the definition of who is understood as being part of the civil society, as defined by Locke, exist and consequently impact the understanding of political participation within the State. Dislocating the discipline to the Atlantic as proposed in the first chapter, means also dislocating it to the figure of the enslaved person to the extent, that, as discussed in chapter 4, the body of the enslaved person was constitutive of the Atlantic as a produced space. The Atlantic has a great potential of allowing for the understanding of political entities not bounded by borders, thus connecting Europe to non-European worlds through political processes, meaning, the contact with the difference that brings with him/her the potency of the political. In chapters 3 and 4, I dealt with the reasons why I find this subject relevant. From that discussion, I want to propose other lenses of analysis.

In order to put forward this analysis I would like to take into account the first paragraph in Chakrabarty's (2000) book "*Provincializing Europe*":

> There cannot be any capitalist production without a working class. But there can be, as Marxists have often pointed out in the recent past, capitalism that subsumes precapitalist relationships. Under certain conditions, the most feudal system of authority can survive at the heart of the most modern of factories. There is nothing in the logic of the market or profit that guarantees an automatic transformation of individuals into citizens. This poses interesting problems of narrative strategy for historical accounts of working classes in countries where the struggle to achieve a certain degree of "liberal" practice in everyday life comes long after the beginning of industrialization. In these contexts, the master-slave dialectic reproduces itself far more often than does the phenomenon of the rule of the citizen (Chakrabarty, 2000, x).

Although IR is a Liberal discipline[89] centred in contemporaneity since its creation, the role of the 19th Century in the construction of the disciplinary narrative is central in order for the discipline to justify itself. In this process, is almost as if IR became a historiography of its own, articulating readings that would not, otherwise, coexist. The teleological reading of 19th Century Northern-European History as a way of explaining 20th Century politics leads to the confusion between categories of analyses and historical phenomena. This is the reason why Chakrabarty's take on Marxism is so important. His critique on Marxism is useful the following pages in seeding the ground for dealing with the exploitation of labour, albeit not in a relation that includes payment. Enslavement as a project is a multilayered one, accounting not only for labour, but for racialization as well, and the politics of these two aspects are happening in the Atlantic as a background for disputes and accumulation processes. As the author states in the quote, labour does not guarantee citizenship. This is the hidden "police"[90] of Liberalism that I want to challenge.

5.3.1.
Multiple Beginnings for Slavery

The issue of modern slavery is interesting because, dealt widely by historians, you can find a never-ending effort to define its origins. The practice of forcing groups of people to work without giving them a choice not to do so is registered in History in a set of political and historical contexts throughout the world. There are so many examples that the Cambridge University Press published a four-volume series of "World History of Slavery" in an effort to cover the subject in full: from the enslavement of Jews in the Babylon exile to contemporary cases of forced labour

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[89] As I write this sentence, I acknowledge Isaac Kamola's 2020 text on the difficulty of justifying IR as a field for, on the most evident note, the lack of an "object" on which to rely, and the ways in which we, in Academia, try to interact with this corpus as our own by "bringing" ideas and concepts to it as if it were an entity in itself. I stand behind his argument and agree with the notion that the discipline can work as a room of mirrors distracting us from the subjects of our criticism. Nevertheless, at the same time, I find myself submitting a thesis for a PhD in International Relations, therefore, falling in the same trap that the author points he has felt: the conundrum of the critique.

[90] I am using the term "police" here aligned with Rancière (1999) and his dichotomic view as politics being the emergence of "the part with no part" while everything else would be framed in the category of "police".

(Bradley, Cartledge, 2011; Eltis; Engerman, 2017). This offering of a historical perspective matters because it operates in two ways. It can be understood as the same practice that is repeated since the beginning of time – not accounting for the changes in the contexts in which it operates – and, conversely, it also offers the potential legitimization of the commerce and enslavement of people in the 19th Century by a practice which goes back to immemorial times:

> Although it is from the ancient Near East that we have the earliest writings, we can be sure that they do not attest to the origins of slavery. We believe those go back much further into the past, before the rise of societies organized as states, to simpler polities that have been called chieftanincies (Snell, 2011, 6).

Thus, the effort to establish the origins of slavery as this concept that defines those who occupy the upmost marginal space in any society is flawed, for it seems that this is an effort which, by definition, will never attend to the necessity of going as far back as necessary in order to recover those who were the first to be put in chains and whose rights to possession over their own bodies were retrieved from them.

In the catholic universe, the telling of the history of slavery is one that addresses the enslavement of the Hebrew people by the Egyptians. The flee of the Hebrews, led by Moses from the captivity to freedom in the promised land became known as the "Second Alliance" between God and humanity. This is not, however, the most ancient passage in which slavery is accounted for in the Bible. It is present, actually in the first book of the Bible, the book of Genesis, and has a somewhat unclear meaning in the constitution of the first alliance between God and humanity.

Between chapters 7 and 9 of the book of Genesis, one can find the tale of Noah and his family. Having done that which God determined he should do, Noah, along with his wife, sons and daughters-in-law, survived. After the deluge, when God's anger had faded, Noah got drunk with wine and fell asleep naked. While sleeping, he was seen by one of his sons, Ham, who quickly enough told his brothers, Shem and Jafet who, without looking at him, covered their father. When Noah woke up and was told of what happened, he cursed the sons of the sons of Ham, condemning them to serve as slaves to the descendants of Shem and Jafet.

"To be dressed" in the Jewish-catholic tradition is related with the original sin, for it is only when Adam and Eve are expelled from heaven that they realize that they

were naked and look for something with which to be dressed. As the Bible does not go further on the subject after the cursing, one can understand Noah's fury as the fear that God would break the alliance made with him at the end of the deluge, thus provoking God's rage. The lack of clarity on the biblical text has generated a long debate on the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions on the meaning of this curse. On the subject, David Biron Davis (2006) says:

> As for the sin committed, according to two traditions, found in the Jewish midrashic literature, Ham had either castrated his naked father, to humiliate him and prevent the future conception of any further siblings, or, as another third-century Talmudic debater speculated, Ham had sodomized his unconscious father. (In the laws of Leviticus 18, which also prohibit male homosexuality, 'uncovering nakedness' is a euphemism for sexual intercourse.) Yet on a far less extreme level, the scrupulous care shown by Shem and Japheth to cover Noah without glimpsing his naked body suggests that simply staring at him would have then been regarded as an egregious offense. It has been argued that in ancient Mesopotamia, 'looking at another's genitals' was seen as a way of obtaining illegitimate 'mastery and control', for which slavery, or "losing all mastery and control", would be appropriate punishment. Ham supposedly worsened this sin by laughing contemptuously, in front of his brothers, after he had viewed his father's body" (Davis, 2006, 65).

To see that the archaeological evidence points towards inconclusive evidence of the origin of slavery in the same way that the debate on the biblical discussion on the subject projects us to a legitimization prior to Christianism (or Judaism, to that matter) could mean that the issue should not be the origin of slavery in modernity; rather, how was it that slavery came to be entrenched with racism in modernity and, as a consequence, socially degraded essential labour to the maintenance of society itself?

It is worth reiterating that the issue of enslavement is one face of a larger process of transformation that led to cartesianism and the construction of a Eurocentric logic of modernity built upon a series of genocides and epistemicides (Grosfoguel, 2016). In the same way as Chakrabarty (2000), Grosfoguel (2016) builds upon the complexities of an intricate reading of the political processes not reduced to patterns of wealth accumulation nor to class categories, for the issue is not only capitalism, but a series of phenomena that potentialize the dynamics of oppression and inequality-building that it allows for. In this logic, enslavement seems to be a powerful synthesis, to the extent that it consolidates in one phenomenon the dynamics of geopolitics related to European

expansion; wealth concentration as a consequence of this politics; labour exploitation; the othering in racial terms; and the transformation of the meaning in time.

This transformation is significant and situates the debate in the change of the discourse that legitimized the kidnaping of people in Africa and their transportation to the Americas. To focus on the transformation of discourse is somewhat similar to the effort of finding the origin of slavery's story to the extent that it is difficult to precisely tell what sets the 19th Century apart from other times. In the next subsection I will focus on the transformation in capitalism, here I am mostly dealing with the essentialization of African people and of people of African descent with slavery properly. The issue is that the essentialization of slavery with a determined group precedes the identification of enslavement and Black people. David Biron Davis, (2006, 49) presents the etymology of the term slave. He claims that the word derives from the Latin *sclavus*, a direct derivation of *Slav* used in Latin to refer to slaves – people of Slavic origin. This identification dates from the early medieval period during which the traffic of people of Slavic origin for forced labour purposes made use of *servus* and *mancipium*, Latin words than used to refer to the idea of slavery fall of use. Davis states that the venture of kidnapping people took them from the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov and brought them to the fringes of the Mediterranean (Davis, 2006, 49). Robin Blackburn (2010, 54) in turn, argues that the East of the Adriatic Sea became the European Slave coast in the late Medieval period, supplying Vikings and Italians alike with the labour force of people of Slavic origin. The idea of slave as someone of Slavic origin instead of someone from a random region of Africa is not intuitive in a country shaped by the enslavement of people in modern times, and, perhaps adds another layer of silence to the process. I use "perhaps" to mark a doubt: were we to memorialize the slavery that constituted us with another name, in order to adapt it to the experience of black people in the Atlantic, would we be honouring them, or would we be making their descendants relieve their suffering? This doubt points me back to Mbembe's quote that "[the] subjulgation of life to the power of death (necropolitics) profoundly reconfigure the relations among resistance, sacrifice, and terror" (Mbembe, 2003, 39). Mbembe is arguing that the exceptional conditions of slavery blur the lines between concepts that are otherwise clearly defined. Consequently, this question on how to address the 19th

Century would never find a clear answer. Falling back into Koselleck (1985, 73) once more, would there be a way of putting the meaning of slavery-related deeds into words?

Still on the matter of the history of slavery, David Biron Davis has a passage which I find helpful in dealing with these transformations in meaning and in violence: "The ultimate choice of black Africans and the related evolution of anti-black racism were not the results of a simple linear progression of events" (Davis, 2006, 50). The essentialization that resulted in the naming of slavery happened previously to its identification with Africans, thus, Africans became connected to Slavic people. This process is so profoundly naturalized that this evident similar etymology is erased by the transformation that ocurred in the Atlantic from the 16th Century onwards.

Ronaldo Vainfas' book from 1986 "*Ideologia e Escravidão: os letrados e a sociedade escravista no Brasil Colonial*"[91] traces the way in which the discourse among prominent intellectuals that circulated between colonial Brazil, Portugal, Rome and other European spaces connected with the Atlantic, saw the transformation of the grounds in which the enslavement of people from African descendance came to be justified. Vainfas puts together the argument of four intellectuals, mainly priests, who between mid-17th and mid-18th century discussed the legality and the ethics of enslavement. The first of these is Antonio Vieira, a Jesuit priest born in Lisbon in 1608 who died in Salvador in 1697. His intellectual work began in the 1630's and extended throughout his life to his last days, leaving a great volume of texts. On the subject of slavery, his argument is structured in two important paths: the first is to equal slave to black people (Ethiopian, as mentioned in Psalm 87). The second argument made by Vieira, in a baroque way, is to equal the suffering of the enslaved people to that of Christ in the cross, therefore arguing that their suffering was, actually, their redemption, in the same way that Christ's was necessary for the redemption of humankind in the Christian thought (Vainfas, 1986, 96-97). In a newspeak sort of argument, Vieira argues: "In the process of transfiguration, slavery is *happiness* and *miracle* and the slaves must thank what *seems to be captivity, but it is actually, salvation*" (op. cit.: 97) [author's translation].

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[91] A free translation would be: Ideology and Slavery: the educated and the slavery society in Colonial Brazil.

Vieira's prominent role in Vainfa's reconstruction of the legitimizer speech on slavery in colonial Brazil is no exception in the literature, rather the opposite. According to Luiz Felipe Alencastro (2000), the priest developed the most influential arguments to enable the legitimization of slavery as a result of this lengthy production during his almost 90 years. Vieira's works is also central to literary studies as a consequence of his texts being among the first to be written in what is now Brazil. Not only that, but Vieira was also representative of the interests of the Jesuits who held important stakes in the Christianisation of indigenous populations, so to defend the freedom of these populations meant strengthening the role his congregation had in the colony. This defence included the possible use of contradictory arguments when dealing with indigenous and Africans.

> If Palmares were to last Brazil would finish. Three years later, in a formal opinion on the indigenous of São Paulo, Antônio Vieira would argue in the other direction. Going against the will of his superiors Jesuits in Brazil and in Portugal, he acknowledged the right to escape of Indigenous held captives by the slave-hunters from São Paulo. He had a strong argument in a period of intense piracy by moors in Mediterranean and the Atlantic: to make the Indigenous stay in São Paulo under the pretext of the economic survival of that part of the colony 'would be the same as if the captives of Algiers were obliged not to run nor seek their freedom by another path in order to keep the same Algiers'. Under the undeniable right to escape, the captive indigenous from Paulistas were equal to the European Christians captured by the Islamic pirates from Algiers. The quilombolas, however, were inexorably doomed to persecution, captivity and death (Alencastro, 2000, 344-5) [author's translation].

Vieira was a relevant figure in the production of the Atlantic. Not only was he a priest who travelled multiple times through the Atlantic and who experienced the colonization in locus, on the ground. He was also adviser to the King of Portugal and, more than his fellow Jesuit priests of the colonial period, was an important figure in the elaboration of Portuguese colonial and foreign policy.

Although born in Portugal, he moved to Salvador at an early age in 1614, where he joined the Jesuit brotherhood. As will be dealt with later in this chapter, the 17th Century was a crucial period in the History of Portugal. It suffices to say that, by the time of the birth of Vieira, Portugal and Spain were united under Felipe IV after the king of Portugal, D. Sebastião, died trying to invade Morocco in the battle of Alcacer Quibir (1580), leaving no heir. From 1625 on, the Dutch started to engage with the Portuguese colony, a dynamic Vieira accompanied closely as he had to write reports on the issue to the Jesuits in Lisbon. His interventions in colonial politics lied not only

within interventions aiming to elaborate policy or to report events. His privileged position in the colony allowed him much visibility, which proved useful within the purpose to support slavery. Salvador, the then capital of the colony, the place where the Portuguese apparatus was stronger and the point of contact with Lisbon was the right place to support the policy of the crown to the Atlantic, and the position of a priest added the moral ground to draw the attention of the audience to intervene in the political debate. One of the interventions that became well known is the sermon of the Rosary, preached in 1633, in which he made the comparison between enslaved people and Christ, reiterating the suffering that they were put through "Christ Passion happened in part at night, without sleeping, in part during the day, without rest, and such are your nights and your days. Christ naked and you naked: Christ not eating, and you starving: Christ in all mistreated, and you mistreated in everything" (Vieira apud Bosi, 2011, 73) [author's translation]. These similarities would aim at making the enslaved people conform with their existence instead of uprising for freedom in the pursue of better conditions. The rationale seems to be in the lines of: if God himself endured this sort of humiliation, why should it be different to an African?

Vieira is a key character in this history partly because he was able to write part of the history of Portuguese colonization. Vieira, called by the Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa "Emperor of Portuguese Language"[92], is understood by the history of Brazilian literature as one of its first authors, due to his sermons being written in Brazil during the two periods in which he inhabited Salvador (the initial years of his priesthood and then, from 1681 until his death) and the years during which he was the head of Jesuits in Maranhão, between 1653 and 1661 (Vainfas, 2011). During these three periods, Vieira was an active player in the colony's politics.

The period in which Vieira was in court, he was nonetheless still immersed in the politics of the colony, be it by trying to find capital to invest in the colonization of Brazil, or by deliberating how to deal with the situation in Pernambuco – which by then, had been invaded by the Dutch. In this regard, Vieira had a strong position of

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[92] O céu strela o azul e tem grandeza. / The Sky brights the blue and has grandeur
Este, que teve a fama e à glória tem, / This one, that had the fame and whose has the glory,
Imperador da língua portuguesa, / Emperor of the Portuguese language,
Foi-nos um céu também. / Was, for us, a sky as well   (Pessoa, apud Bosi, 2011, 1).

selling it to the Dutch and keeping the colonization in the areas that were still under Portuguese domain (Vainfas, 2011, 153-167). In order to back his argument, he wrote in 1648 "Assessment in favour of handing Pernambuco to the Dutch", in which he addressed the military weakness of the Portuguese and how unlikely it would be to prevail in war to reconquer that land, that went from the north of Bahia all the way to Maranhão.

The "Strong Paper" – as it came to be known, despite the fact of portraying a weak kingdom – is a relevant issue for it puts in perspective the geopolitical knowledge of the priest, and his assessment of the scenario in which Portugal was inserted. Vainfas (2011, 166) states that Vieira understood that the important thing was to secure the commerce of enslaved people from Angola, and Pernambuco was collateral to it, since this is precisely what would allow for the flourishing of the Portuguese domain. Of course, history does not happen according to one's plans, and the Pernambucanos expelled the Dutch from the occupied territory, in the same way as the Fluminenses expelled them from Angola.

In his biography of the Jesuit, Vainfas elaborates how the priest navigated his allegiances to the king and to his brotherhood. During the reign of D. João the IV, during the years in which he was in court, the Papacy had yet to recognize the sovereignty of Lisbon as a separate State from Spain – it was not until 1640 that Portugal separated from the Spanish and regained its independence. The service to the king posed a challenge to the vows of obedience Vieira had taken to his brotherhood. It may have been so during the nitty-gritty of the events there were times in which it was difficult to accommodate. However, on the larger picture, with the benefit of time, it is easier to see that Vieira actually allowed for the accommodation of the interests of both parties. His period in Maranhão exemplifies exactly that he was able to grant to the Jesuits the right of defining the legal and just enslavement of Indians, while strongly defending the monopoly of Portugal to the commerce of enslaved people (Vainfas, 2011, 192-204). This stance he took would not make him popular in São Luiz – he would, in fact, be expelled from the colony – and would end up fomenting the Beckman revolt.

Alfredo Bosi (2011, 72-76) attributes his platonic and Agostinian perspective of the divide between body and soul to try to understand the possibility of denouncing the violence against enslaved people while arguing that it was necessary.

> Only the duality allows for the separation of the destinies. The aching flesh is mortal. The devotee soul is immortal; and it is the survival to the temporal death that will open the door of hope to the enslaved. The outcast black people, sons of Eve, hope the final transmigration, not from Africa to the Americas, but from the Americas to heaven (Bosi, 2011, 75-76) [author's translation].

On the same matter, Vainfas (2011, 53-54) sees the diametrical opposite as reference for the position adopted by Vieira. Saint Thomas Aquinas, an inescapable reading in the formation of the Jesuits, inspired by Aristotle, would understand that some are born to command and some to obey. Vainfas goes on to say that, on the perspective shouldered by Vieira, albeit evil, enslavement was just and necessary for the ordering of the world, thus pointing to a lack of moral coherence compensated by a theological coherence. This incoherent coherence is even more evident since the Christianising of the Africans demanded enslavement whereas that of the natives did not.

It is important to highlight that the dichotomy between the liberty of native populations and black people is not necessarily as direct as can be anticipated by first sight, for as Vainfas puts it

> The great love that he [Vieira] felt by the indigenous people, and recommended to the field missionaries, was an abstract love, nothing more than the caritas recommended by the apostles. Vieira, more than any Jesuit in Brazil, was a colonizer of souls, preoccupied with salvation of the indigenous' only spiritually (Vainfas, 2011, 199) [author's translation].

The understanding of native and black people was not an absolute one: being the defender of the enslavement of Africans did not mean that Vieira felt anything special regarding the natives. On the contrary, he only tolerated these populations with the goal of Christianising them in Jesuitic missions. The relation between religious belief, labour and the creating of the colony in the 17th Century is intricated. It is clear that there were many hierarchies operating at the same time (religious/ European- non-European/ strength / knowledge of the space), but through the analyses of Vieira's life, it is possible to see that the distinction between African people and native populations fits more into a pattern of interpretation than necessarily the reality on the ground. For

instance, in certain moments Vieira would agree with the motives presented in order to allow for the enslavement of some of those under the jurisdiction of the Jesuits (those who would have lost a tribal war, or that would have been sentenced to death, or in the case of having lost a just war perpetrated against the colonial). So, by applying the European legal apparatus, he is equating the natives to Africans, since these practices were no longer applied in the interaction among Europeans. Even when the issue was the relation of the Portuguese with native populations, Vieira showed some ambivalences, since not all populations received the same treatment by the Jesuit priest. The biographers of Vieira with which I am developing this section use different examples in reconstituting his life. In the different events portrayed, it is interesting to see how, for instance, Bosi (2011, 40) shows the priest preoccupation in rebuilding (in 1652) a Jesuit mission in the Marajó Island that was destroyed by native population (in 1642) and is dealt in its minutia when reporting to Portugal. Vainfas, on the other hand, tells the tale of the Nheengaíbas, responsible for the death of a priest in 1643, and who were never defended from enslavement by Vieira (Vainfas, 2011, 199).

The duality between the secular and the religious performance of Vieira is possible to be seen even in his prophetical work. The death of the Portuguese king Sebastião in Northern Africa greatly impacted the imaginary of the Portuguese population and instigated the idea that the king would return to recreate the glories of the past. Vieira was not immune to this idea, and both his biographers agree that his prophetical work began in late 1640's. The main idea defended by the priest was that Portugal was destined to be the Fifth Empire (following the Assyrians, the Egyptians, the Persian and the Romans). The resurrected Portuguese king would, among other things, reconquer Jerusalem, kill the Otoman Sultan and reunite the 12 tribes of Israel. This thousand-year kingdom, would be ruled from Lisbon, would not contrast with Rome and with the role the Pope would maintain as the representative of the true faith.

After this long immersion on Vieira, it is important to address two other Jesuit priests, figures of minor historical impact. Luiz Felipe de Alencastro (2000) in his telling of the history of the constitution of Brazil through the enslaved traffic in the Atlantic sees the role of Vieira as disproportionately important compared with other writers of the same period, given that he understands the Jesuit to be the main

responsible for the consolidation of the slave ideal in the Portuguese colony during the 17th Century. Vainfas (1986), nevertheless, understands Vieira within an intellectual history of legitimating the grounds on which this slavery was practiced.

One of the precursors of the debate on which slavery was based and someone who would strongly resonate with Vieira was an Italian Jesuit called Jorge Benci. Writing in the second half of the 17th Century, Benci recovered the Augustinian reading of the curse of Ham as the legitimization of slavery in the Bible, preparing the grounds for the notion that black people were naturally destined to enslavement (Vainfas, 1986, 96).

The arguments developed by João Antonio Andreoni, aka Antonil, also active during the 17th, yet whose writings were to be published only in the beginning of the 18th Century (Vainfas, 1986, 88), and by Manuel Ribeiro da Rocha, whose book dates from 1758, represent another rationale. Both build arguments on less religious grounds. Antonil mainly developed the idea that the enslaved were the arms and legs of their master, hence being necessary to the maintenance of the production of the colony (Vainfas, 1986, 98), while for Rocha, as long as enslavement was perpetrated in the observance of the canonical and civil law, acknowledging for the just war arguments, enslavement could not be contested (Vainfas, 1986, 99).

It is in that same period that we observe this discussion between ways of legitimating the enslavement in Brazil that John Locke is writing his "The Second Treatise of Government". In chapter IV "On Slavery", Locke is arguing against this practice, not only with arguments in favour of freedom, but also with the structure of the text in which he makes reference to the Exodus, the book in the Bible in which the flee of the Hebrews from Egypt is narrated. The following chapter, "Of Property", begins with the following sentence:

> Whether we consider natural *reason*, which tells us that men, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence: or *revelation*, which gives us an account of those grants God made of the world to *Adam*, and to *Noah* and his sons, it is very clear, that God, as King *David* says, *Psalm* cxv. 16. '*has given the earth to the children of men*'; given it to mankind in common (Locke, 1980, 18).

This excerpt makes clear that the use of the religious discourse to the legitimization of enslavement is not the sole reading from the Bible by Locke. Religion

was also the point of departure to the definition of the inheritors of the Earth. The trick here is who counts as "man"? The hierarchies operating in the Atlantic already in 16th Century show that this definition was more arbitrary than it would appear at first glance, and here the exclusion is more encompassing than slavery, for this debate deals not only with indigenous people, but with Jews and Muslims as well. Grosfoguel (2016, 40) argues that "as a result of the impact of the conquest of the Americas in 16th Century, the old racist discourses of European religious racism, before and after the Crusades, transform into discourses of racial discrimination." So, if colonialism is the development and improvement of techniques, one can say that the racism is one that developed further with the conquest of the Americas, and that the Valladolid trial, in 1552, which opposed de Las Casas and Sepúlveda did not account only for the souls of indigenous people, but for other non-Christian populations as well.

Locke's text works as an interesting point of comparison with the normative debate that was happening in colonial Brazil. Locke's denouncement of enslavement and recognition that law does not have a value in itself – as did the effort of legitimization by Manuel Ribeiro da Rocha – strikes a difference between the two. For Locke, the value of a law depends on the legitimacy of those who elaborate it. He points towards his own argument of a possible rebellion against injustice that Vieira saw as denied to the descendants of Africans in colonial Brazil. It needs to be restressed that Locke makes an effort of erasing the enslaved people from his narrative, while Rocha actually accounts for them, hence making it more difficult to conceal the real interests that are at play.

What matters to the analyses of enslavement is not the first case of restriction of liberty of a group of people that were "socially dead" (Patterson, 1982), so to say. The issue is to see how the legitimization was built to the process of massive and industrial enslavement of people due to the colour of their skin. In criticizing the use of history by International Relations, Richard Ashley (1989, 261) uses Derrida's concept of *Logocentrism*:

> By logocentrism, Derrida means a practical orientation and a procedure at once presupposes, invokes, and effects a normalizing practical expectation. This is the expectation that all interpretation and practice must secure recognition and power by appeal to some identical consciousness, principle of interpretation, or necessary subjectivity having at least two qualities. First, it is regarded as a central interpretive

orientation – a coherent sovereign voice, if you will – that supplies a unified rational meaning and direction to the interpretation of the spatial and temporal diversity of history. Second, as a sovereign voice, this principle is itself regarded as a pure and originary-presence – an unproblematic, extrahistorical identity, in need of no critical accounting (Ashley, 1989, 261).

This claim of origin that I identify in these narratives of slavery is one which every time I encounter, refers me back to this passage of Ashley reading Derrida. It demands a linearity in history able to match the passing of the years with a similar unproblematic succession of events. But in this matter specifically, it asks for the identification of identical practices that would result in identical consciousness and, consequently, would mean the same practice. This to say nothing of the tension that the term itself – *logocentrism* – brings to the fore when considering slavery as an extremely violent practice and how to account for the "knowing" of it.

To look for a clear trajectory that would link chiefdoms prior to Babylon to the Portuguese dominion in the Atlantic is to miss the point that the Atlantic was a whole new dynamic. A dynamic that saw the enslaved as a person, whose labour was necessary to enrich European powers. What is interesting in this structure is to see how the seeds of the justification of this process developed more in the South Atlantic than in the Mediterranean or the North Atlantic. As Vainfas put it:

> It is, no doubt, another time. A time of reflections, when one had found that the slave belonged to the social universe of the colony, and that, not only it was merchandise, and a work force for his master, he was also a person who felt hunger and had emotions. Those people ran away and revolted against the master's order imposed upon them. The acknowledgment of this discover would be distinct, sometimes answering with mere repression, sometimes seeking to avoid that the up-rise. Between the coercive obsession and the normative intention, a new discourse was built: the slavery ideology would go beyond all pragmatic limits of the master's power and conquered, more than before, the worry of the intellectuals (Vainfas, 1986, 91) [author's translation].

Slavery had become indispensable in the 19th Century Atlantic. Independently from its origins and, to some extent, independently from its justification as well. As discussed in chapter 3, at some point, it lingered on the grounds of necessity to Brazil's economy.

5.3.2.
Slavery and Capitalism in 19th Century South Atlantic

In the previous section, dealing with the racialization of slavery in the black body, I argued that the link between essentialization and slavery actually preceded the enslavement of Africans and people of African descent. In this sub-section, arguing on the intersection between slavery and capitalism, I will discuss how the transformation in the meaning of slavery that took place in the 19th Century had, prior to it, established the material conditions for its development. Thus, it is necessary to understand that the second slavery is more of a temporal marker in the transformation of slavery and racism than anything else.

Consider, for instance, the period that Robin Blackburn (2010) identified the Adriatic Sea as the European Slave Coast, which would match the Genovese cycle of accumulation (in Giovanni Arrighi's (2010) terms). The transition to the Dutch, British and then American cycles of accumulation would not mark any relevant change in meaning or in the process itself, except for an increase in the volume of the accumulation which had never been seen before. Arrighi's narrative to the history of capitalism is representative, on a smaller scale, of the similarities between the history of slavery and the history of capitalism. It is not about an origin point, rather, it is about framing history in such a way that historical processes are understood as the sequel of one another. This similarity in the narratives points to the challenge of articulating these two together, an endeavour already accomplished by Dale Tomich (2004).

In 2004, Dale Tomich published "*Through the Prism of Slavery: labor, capital and world economy*" in which he proposed the category of "second slavery" as a category to differentiate the slavery that occurred in the 19th Century from the dynamics that took place in the centuries prior to it. The main reasons for this differentiation of slavery would be the changes the Atlantic was facing in the turn of the 18th to the 19th Century. These changes can be summarized in three. For one, politically, Liberalism was a political force on the rise as a consequence of the American, French and Haitian Revolutions. The political and economic consequences of the uprising lead by Touissant L'Overture to the Atlantic world in the dawn of the new century would be the second reason, whose changes were profound. They plunged the most productive

European colony in the Americas (Tomich, 2004, 80), forced the restructuring of commercial flows, and allowed for the emergence of fears of rebellions of the same kind in other spaces – an example thereof being the 'Haitianism', a constant fear pervasive to Brazilian politics in the 19th Century[93]. The last aspect, a structural one, is the change in the world economy resulting from the British adopting a new ground by fighting (Iberian) colonialism for the prevalence of free-market. These characteristics are all happening in a reasonably narrow period of time and brought with them a profound change in the meaning of the exploitation and commercialization of the enslaved working-force.

Tomich wants to analyse this new world by proposing an understanding of enslavement as an Atlantic phenomenon that can allow for a better understanding of Marxist theoretical categories. He carries out this criticism in two fronts. On the one hand, he criticizes the World System approach for its excessively structural understanding of history, downplaying class dispute as a constitutive aspect of the world. On the other, he criticizes Robert Brenner by saying that:

> Brenner, like Dobb and Laclau, emphasizes the primacy of the social relations of production in determining both the character of a given mode of production and the contingent outcomes of class struggles in determining the transition from one mode to another. (…) From this perspective, capitalism is identified exclusively by the capital-wage labor relation. This economic relationship is constituted through the free laborer's sale of her or his labor power (Tomich, 2004, 40).

By putting both side by side, it is easy to see that they stand as approaches that make one another invisible while dealing with the same issue: history of capitalism. And, while they do develop their own take on the matter, both develop historical narratives of the 19th Century that not only do not consider slavery, but are also built in a way that makes it impossible to consider it. In Wallerstein, the invisibility is manifested in a narrative that shows no regards for politics, building a structure of almost determinist dynamics of the conditions of development and of market formation. Tomich takes Brenner as a representative of a historiography which stands as the antithetical perspective, seeing capitalism developing through the class struggle.

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[93] Célia Maria de Azevedo has a classical book, published in 1987, on how black people inhabit the imaginary of the Brazilian elites. For a more IR centered approach, Miguel Borba de Sá defended a PhD thesis on how *Haitianism* developed and how it would still be present and manifested in the UN Peacekeeping operation that Brazil coordinated in Haiti.

Tomich sees slavery – this, albeit central, completely dismissed phenomenon – as a way of putting together a narrative able to make a more accurate interpretation of the history of the 19th Century.

It is possible to propose this centrality of enslavement by diving deeper into the instruments developed by these interpretations. In the class struggle model, he proposes reading the importance of the proletariat as a historically situated example rather than a category to which all over-exploited classes should equate in order to identify class struggle. In Wallerstein's structural approach, Tomich proposes that other Braudelian categories be retrieved so that the structural reading from world-system would not seem so deterministic. In order to do so, he proposes to recuperate "event" and "conjuncture" as temporal categories that are helpful in the construction of a multi-layered history that is able to deal with the political dispute and with the structural system.

Tomich is proposing to consider the changes in the world economy context on the eve of 19th Century by looking at the way slavery played a relevant role in the fabric of that economy and that world. The concept of the Second Slavery is, thus, his effort to make two different and interconnected statements. The first is that it is not possible to consider 365 years of slavery in America as one and the same thing, for the world did not remain the same during those years. The second is that not to acknowledge slavery as part of Capitalism is to read the phenomenon rather superficially.

These ideas are developed further in a text published in 2021 in, which he argues for the "Original Accumulation", as opposed to primitive accumulation, as something that "is neither repeated, nor is it permanent feature of the capitalist system" (Tomich, 2021, 522). This accumulation would have happened during the Genovese Cycle and would be a consequence of the trade, since capital reflects circulation, not production (Tomich, 2021, 524). This is where, in Tomich's reading, Arrighi would have had it wrong, since his focus on the Euro-Asian commerce was misleading, for it was a luxury trade in which a division of labour was not formed. Something of another sort was that which the Portuguese did in the Atlantic, by establishing "relations with African polities and built the infrastructure of a modern slave trade that was capable supplying the expanding need for slave labor throughout the Genovese cycle" (Tomich, 2021, 532).

Tomich argues that this is a process of another sort because, differently from European medievalism, in which power reflected the amount of land one had, in the system put forward by the Portuguese, the issue was not land, rather, the labour that would work it:

> The Portuguese Crown granted extensive tracts in its colonial territories on the condition that grantees made them productive. The amount of land available commonly exceeded the amount of land that could be effectively exploited. The origin of the Atlantic slave plantation was not the distribution of land, but the implantation of a slave labor force. The concentration of the slave labor force generated the concentration of land and subordinated nature and labor to commodity production. The regimentation of collective slave labor producing specialized commodities of the world market created the plantation as a modern, capitalist form of agricultural organization. The exploitation of the soil was determined by the number of slaves at the disposition of the proprietor. Land had no value apart from the slaves who worked it (Tomich, 2021, 536-537).

Tomich is arguing that the Portuguese crown saw an inversion of medieval logic, for people were not attached to their land, rather, land was attached to people, since the amount of land represented by the new colony only made sense as a result of production, and given the amount of land, production would be determined by labour, not by land. All the time in the life of an enslaved person would mean labour since to be fed or sleep, in such rationale, would mean only the maintenance of the labour force, focusing only in production: "The cost of slave subsistence is not a return to labor." (Tomich, 2021, 538). This is central in the argument that the movement towards the occupation of the Americas forced the accumulation of capital to re-invent itself and, consequently, offered new meaning to the processes that undertook in these spaces.[94]

To take a counter-point to this narrative on rights and the spaces occupied by oneself, John Locke offers an interesting perception on the issue. On the second chapter of "The Second Treatise", Locke argues "I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men: but before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me by, what right any prince or state can put to death, or *punish an alien*, for any crime he commits in their country." (Locke, 1980, 10) Sovereignty, thus, is a matter of belonging, not of location, and in an expanding Europe still transitioning from Medieval period, it comes as no surprise. However, it poses a direct challenge to the possibility of considering the

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[94] It is worth noticing that Tomich's approach on the issue collides directly with, Caio Prado Jr. argument that the colonial period in Brazil presented feudalist characteristics. Prado had adopted a reading of Marxist extremely focused on the expererience of European States with capitalism. Caio Prado Jr. is until today profoundly influential in historian debates in Brazil and in Marxist studies as well.

already established reality of the people who were enslaved. In the eyes of the European States, under the logic presented by Locke, they were under no one's sovereignty, so their enslavement was not necessarily condemned by the English author, for though he may have built his argument against it as I have pointed before, it is relevant to see that the reading of the enslavement with the condition marker of the belonging is a way of making the reading ambiguous. To exemplify that, consider the second sentence in the chapter "Of Slavery": "The *liberty of man*, in society, is to be under no other legislative power but that established, by consent, in the common-wealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact, according to the trust put in it." (Locke, 1980, 17). Here, Locke is conditioning the possibility of enslavement to the rule of the legislative power constituted by his own community. However, if the jurisdiction to which he answers is not conditioned by where he is, but by where he is from, them it seems that there is a loop-hole in the rationale that allows the enslavement, say, of people kidnapped from Africa.

In the following paragraph, Locke goes on to talk about how one cannot adjudicate against one's own liberty, in the same way as one cannot act against one's own life. However, in the paragraph succeeding he goes on to state that:

> This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else but *the state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive*: for, if once *compact* enter between them, and make an agreement for a limited power on the one side, and obedience on the other, the *state of war and slavery* ceases, as long as the compact endures: for, as has been said, no man can, by agreement, pass over to another that which he hath not himself, a power over his own life (Locke, 1980, 17-8).

It is important to have clarity on what Locke means when he talks about contract, an atemporal agreement sealed in an untraceable past, thus, a way of offering legitimacy to a practice that, by then, one might want to argue. This notion of contract is powerful in the transformation of history in legitimacy for a practice that had kept the name but that was referring to a different meaning. His own effort of differentiating slavery from drudgery (Locke, 1980, 17-8) shows his acknowledgement of the fact that there was a difference between forced labour in different times and spaces.

This process of rendering the African enslaved invisible operated in John Locke's text can be denounced through David Eltis' (2000) "*The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas*". On the first page of the book, Eltis states:

It is nevertheless inconceivable that London, Liverpool, Nantes, or Amsterdam could have received complete cargoes of Africans on slave ships to be sold in public markets, as Lisbon and Cadiz did throughout the eighteenth century. Yet these northern European cities were in countries with the harshest and most closed systems of exploiting enslaved non-Europeans in the Americas (Eltis, 2000, 1).

In the previous chapter, I have argued that slavery, by the 19th Century had already lost the moral battle to the extent that it was no longer openly defended by Brazilian elites. This dive into Locke's Second Treatise makes me wonder if, already in the 17th Century, this was a position that could cause embarrassment if openly defended. For Locke, being partner in a company that sold people and was deeply involved in the constitution of the colony of the Carolinas, makes it impossible for him not to be considered as unaware of the role that the enslavement had in the Atlantic, especially in the 17th Century. Nevertheless, the issue on his contemporary manifestation is all but ambiguously treated in his book in a 2-page chapter. This is an important aspect to have in mind, since for contemporary studies on the enslavement in the Atlantic (Tomich, 2004, 2021; Eltis, 2000; Alencastro, 2000), the 17th Century is the turning point in the configuration of the Atlantic as being produced in the minds of slaveholders and built by the enslavement of Africans whose bodies were traded across the ocean.

5.3.3.
19th Century Slavery: the place where Capitalism met Slavery

The great issue that puts together the bibliography that deals with capitalism is the pervasiveness of the aspect of transition to it. Capitalism is prone to transform itself and it is in the spectrum of these transformations that one can see the changes in the meaning of enslavement and in the meaning of labour:

(…) early modern Europeans shifted property rights in labor toward the individual and away from the community. This trend was consistent with either free or slave labor. With respect to Europeans it led eventually to the former. As applied to non-Europeans (at least in the eyes of Europeans) it led to the latter. Europeans who had initially worked in the plantation fields as non-slaves gradually withdrew from such activities from the mid-sixteenth to the late seventeenth centuries, though in the absence of Africans and Amerindians (and after the attendant rise in wages) some would no doubt have continued to work under such conditions (Eltis, 2000, 23).

Considering Eltis' intake on the transformation on the meaning of labour, which evolved from a collective endeavour to a personal attribute, it is possible to see that, in itself, the differentiation of labour to be developed by those who are European and those who are African or indigenous is already operating. The distinction is one that segregates on grounds that are inherited, for the racial definition of the enslavable and non-enslavable people was already present in 17th Century debates between priests in the Portuguese dominium. The term "*Negro Africano*" – Black African – is constant in the passages quoted by Vainfas (1986), and the qualifier of the substantive "African" should not be ignored in the construction in its written form, nor on the image that it helps building which legitimizes the enslaved as the Black person.

An attentive reader of this text, in this passage made an important observation regarding translation. He noted that in Portuguese the expression *Negro Africano* has as substantive *Negro* and as qualifier the adjective *Africano*. The translation of this expression to English would be Black African. However, in so doing, the meaning of the words change in the expression. The noun becomes African that is now qualified by the adjective Black. This means that, to the extent that the translation implies, it is possible to have more than one kind of African, while the original Portuguese expression implies that there can be more than one *Negro*. And indeed, there were different kinds of *Negros*. In history books dealing with early colonial Brazil, it is not uncommon for the expression *Negro da terra* to appear (Shwarcz, Starling, 2015, 66), which is roughly translated as "Black from the land" as a reference to the enslavement of indigenous populations. Later on, during the period of gold exploration – beginning in 1699 with the discovery of Gold in the hinterland of the colony, it received slaves from the Gold Coast, region that in Portuguese became known as *Costa da Mina* (Mine Coast). These enslaved people were known as *Minas* or *Negros da Mina* (Shwarcz, Starling, 2015, 88). All this to say that, indeed, there were different *Negros* in Brazil, and, as pointed by my reader, the emphasis lied not in being *African*; rather, in being Black[95]. The marker of alterity, thus, becomes the notion of "Black", not of African. On this matter, it is worth recuperating Robinson's (1983, 81) argument that in

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[95] I am reticent in using the word in Portuguese because I am aware that, in English, it is a charged term and I do not take it lightly, so I would rather keep with a mistranslation.

categorizing a group of people as a colour, in reality the movement is of depriving those from a history and disconnecting them from space. In silencing on the traces that define the colectivities of those peoples – tribes, ethnic groups, set of beliefs – slaveholders were inflicting another violence in treating as unity such plurality.

Besides, it is important to notice that, all of these characterizations happened prior, or concomitantly to 1619, and the development of slavery in the Thirteen colonies and its inclusion in the trade's circuit. Meaning that it is not impossible – actually, it is rather likely – that the Portuguese word was adopted in the US as a consequence of the role that the Portuguese had in the construction of the Atlantic trade of the living. Its incorporation into English would have been limited to the meaning of African since the debate on the enslavement of native populations was not one that the Portuguese shared with the colonization of North America. Considering this hypothesis to be true, the essentialization between the practice of forced labour and a specific population that I discussed in the previous subsection and which preceded the enslavement of Africans may have been accomplished in the Anglo-Atlantic with the word *Negro*, making it clear that although part of the same Atlantic Slavery as Brazil, each held its specificities.

Developing further on the issue of enslaved labour and its importance to the economic development of capitalism, Onur Ince's book on *Colonial Capitalism and the Dilemmas of Liberalism* (2018) comes to add to the confusion the colonial capitalism, arguing that "capitalism emerged within the juridical-political framework of 'the colonial empire' rather than the 'nation-state'" (Ince, 2018, 4).

The intersections between capitalism and the dynamics of coloniality become progressively clear; therefore, the aim of trying to differentiate these two seems rather difficult, for capitalism is not the result of a clear-cut European-process, but a series of intellectual (Grosfoguel, 2016) and geopolitical (Tomich, 2004) dynamics that resulted in the prevalence of the West over other spaces. Tomich (2021) also stresses, although in not such a clear-cut way, the intersection between capitalism and coloniality.

> Once established, the capital-wage labor relation reproduces itself through its own processes on an expanding scale, but it is by no means a closed system. Rather, as the most productive form of value production it reconstructs the global hierarchy of labor, the division of labor, and the world market. Here is the movement from original accumulation to capitalist accumulation, from world market as premise of capitalist

production to world market as product of capitalist production. The wage labor-capital relation becomes the organizing hub to the capitalist world-economy (Tomich, 2021, 526).

Tomich is proposing an understanding of capitalism through the hierarchy of labour conditions, and it is clear in his analyses of enslavement that the bottom of this structure lies on places in which labour is not free. It seems, thus, that labour can be the key of thinking these two oppressions: capitalism and coloniality.

The effort to engage with these two categories is one that proposes a displacement of IR, the category of the enslaved people taken hostages by the Atlantic slave trade is of special significance, for they occupy a central role in the structuring of the Atlantic routes of commerce and travel, they have their strength and labour stolen from them in the system of forced labour to which they were submitted, they were central in the debate – held by white men – which led to the racialization of the enslaved trade and the enslavement as a whole. Nevertheless, the enslaved African in the Americas is constantly forgotten in the narratives on recognition.

The space that the enslaved person occupies is of undeniable importance to – and it is justified in terms of – productivity and economy. Nevertheless, it is completely made invisible in terms of political representativity and it is socially dead in such a profound level of abstraction that the result is the debate presented by Vainfas (1986). Thus, the enslaved subject is that which makes unstable the dichotomy that the native populations constitute along with the modern State. The relation of the enslaved person is of another sort because s/he has no bonds with the land in which s/he is held captive other than violence, and the efforts of establishing other forms of organizing social life in the colonial space are dealt with the anger demonstrated in the rages against Palmares.

Anievas and Nisancioglu have an interesting contribution to the debate on History of International Relations that is made clear in the following paragraph:

> In both senses, then – as social relations and as process – it might appear to make more sense to talk about *capitalisms* rather than capitalism. Indeed, a central thesis of this book is that the history of capitalism is a multiple, polyvalent one, irreducible to any singular process or social relation. Nonetheless, we argue that there is a certain unity to its functioning that renders necessary the study of the capitalist mode of production as an intelligible (albeit contradictory) object of analysis (Anievas, Nisancioglu, 2015, 9).

Brazilian History with enslavement is representative of how important it is for maturing a critique to capitalism that accounts for that which happened to sections of the world not only as spaces of consequence of choices made in Europe, but accounting for such spaces as active participants in the development of these choices. Brazilian colonial experience, for instance, shows how this was a central space in linking enslavement, racial phenotypes and Liberalism by way of the religious occupation of the land. The effort of trying to make these sorts of connections is an effort of worlding (Spivak, 1999) the Atlantic in another way. If not via the mobilization of subaltern voices, at least in trying to mobilize texts that are not usually read together.

The way in which racial prejudice developed itself along with the consolidation of the enslaved trade through the Atlantic is an indication of the multiple layers that compose this historical context. These layers are a way of denouncing the insufficiency of the World System approach, as well as efforts that try to locate the origin of capitalism in space and time. Instead of following that path of the origin of slavery, the debate should focus on discussing how it was that slavery found legitimacy.

This subsection closes the discussion on origin by pointing towards the other arm of "worlding", that is, the discussion on perspective. The literatures on slavery, capitalism, racism and liberalism tend to have as premise the presence of States. Along the next pages, I want to propose that in the 19th Century, we assume the existence of the Atlantic, manifested through slavery, in order to understand the leaps and bounds that are necessary to undergo in order to naturalize the State.

5.4.
Living (?) in the Trade: the formation of South Atlantic in Brazil

This section is thought in dialogue with Luiz Felipe de Alencastro's "*The Trade of the Living: the formation of Brazil in the South Atlantic*" (2000). In it, I analyse the arrivals of enslaved people in order to see how is it that one can understand the production of Brazilian territory through the Atlantic shore. It is pertinent to do so because, since the lives of those people were silenced, the traces that they left can be seen through the volume of people arriving. This is a way of telling the history of the

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Atlantic that accounts only marginally for those who developed the mental space of the ocean – people like father Antonio Vieira or John Locke.

As discussed in section 5.2, the concept of Second Slavery is relevant as a way of proposing the observance of different meanings for the practice of enslavement which, even in the absence of significative change in practice in time, came to have different meanings as a consequence of the change in context. Following this lead, I look to the numbers on the estimative of Africans locked in ships and transported to Brazil available at the database Slave Voyages. The numbers compiled from the databased were segmented in 25 years intervals and resulted in the two tables bellow, one representing colonial slavery - Table 1 with the arrival numbers from 1500 until 1800 – and the other representing Second Slavery in Brazil – Table 2 with the arrival numbers from 1801 to 1850, the year in which Brazil left the trans-Atlantic enslaved trade.

Table 1 Colonial Slavery in Brazil – arrival of enslaved people by region					
	Amazonia	Bahia	Pernambuco	Southeast Brazil	Totals
1551-1575	0	0	2,928	0	2,928
1576-1600	0	6,644	19,180	5,600	31,424
1601-1625	0	54,449	90,694	38,108	183,251
1626-1650	0	81,518	53,505	56,840	191,863
1651-1675	0	111,633	45,776	80,285	237,694
1676-1700	2,044	117,932	92,326	82,549	294,851
1701-1725	3,976	209,491	121,301	138,405	473,173
1726-1750	4,830	264,094	80,993	181,805	531,722
1751-1775	26,014	191,993	76,923	231,632	526,562
1776-1800	47,965	239,489	79,835	294,109	661,398
Totals	84,829	1,277,243	663,461	1,109,333	3,134,866

Source: Slavevoyages.com.

These four columns represent the four larger areas of entry ports and reproduces the way in which the site presents the information. It is important to highlight that the name of the areas is defined in spatial terms that do not speak to the contemporary geographic imagination of Brazil, however, observing the coast line of the country, and the spatial dynamics in which each section was entangled. Thus, although it may seem

inconsistent to understand the state of Ceará as an Amazonian port – since it is categorized as part of Northeast Brazil in contemporary terms, not as a Northern State, as Pará and Amazonas – it is understandable that Ceará's coast faces North, whereas Pernambuco and Bahia face east, therefore dealing with different tides and navigation systems[96]. As a consequence of being beyond the Cape São Roque, it is understandable that Ceará was more affected by the economic dynamics intrinsic to the North and Amazon Forest than to the sugar and coffee dynamics in southern regions.

The division adopted by the site, thus, stands for the geo-economics of the colony and the main ports are important hubs in the comprehension of the dynamics. The fact that these ports are points of arrival of the Africans reinforce the relation between the Africans and their relevance to the construction of space, in many different dimensions, in Brazil.

In the effort of telling the history of occupation of Brazil by the arrivals of Africans at the coast, I chose to highlight three periods in Table 1. The first of these periods is Pernambuco between 1651 and 1700 (in grey). These years are significative because, from the first half of the 17th Century, the Northeast of Brazil had been entangled in the wars that opposed the Dutch and the Spanish (Alencastro, 2000, 118-243; Schwarcz, Starling, 2015, 58-63). It is worth remembering that from 1580 until 1640, Portugal and Spain were united under the Spanish crown due to a rupture in the succession line of the Portuguese royal house. During those 60 years, Brazil was a colony to Spain and the Northeastern coast was a front in that conflict. The Dutch first conquered Bahia between 1624 and 1625 (Alencastro, 2000; Schwarcz, Starling, 2015), when they were expelled by the Iberians. In 1630, they changed focus, targeted and conquered, Pernambuco and its surroundings, a colony that was as prosperous as Bahia (Schwarcz, Starling, 2015, 59). There, they were able to stay for 24 years before being expelled by the uprising of the people who inhabited the colony with the help of the Portuguese, once more, independent from Spain. It is pertinent to recall that

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[96] On the matter of the difficulty of cabotage navigation in Brazilian coast see Alencastro: 200, pp- 57-63. The Cape São Roque, the place in the coast of Brazil where it no longer faces East and starts facing north was, in colonial times, the limit between the two Portuguese states in America: Maranhão and Brazil. The tides and wind regimes are so difficult that, at times, the fastst way from Maranhão to Salvador had to be through Lisbon.

Antonio Vieira was in Salvador – and reported to the Jesuits of Portugal – during the invasion of Salvador and latter during the invasion of Pernambuco (Bosi, 2011; Vainfas, 2011).

The occupation of the coast of Brazil came alongside with battles for the control of portions of Africa as well. The dominium over the Portuguese colony in Africa – the region that we now call Angola – helped the Dutch to keep a steady hand in the traffic of the kidnapped people from Africa and to pose a real threat to the Iberian colonial endeavour(s) during that time. It is this conflict and the resulting fleeing of people from this area and the arrival of new land-owners, with a more intensive use of enslaved people in their farms that serves as an explanation to the volume of enslaved people more than doubling from one period to the other while the growth of enslaved people in the Bahia and in Southeast regions saw a slower increase, due, probably, to the Dutch dominion over Angola (therefore a difficulty in the offering of enslaved people) and, in the case of Bahia, also a reduction of the network's reach due to the Dutch colonization of a section of what used to be the Portuguese/Spanish colony.

After the Dutch were expelled from Pernambuco, the Portuguese saw the necessity of occupying the North of Brazil, hence the beginning of the arrival of enslaved people to Amazonia and the Amazon Forest, immersed in another project of colonization and another sort of economic exploitation, one profoundly attached to the Jesuit congregation.

The second highlighted set of cells (highlighted in medium blue) is the period of 1701 to 1725 in Bahia, Pernambuco and the Southeast. The increase on the commercialization of enslaved people happens at a moment when Pernambuco is reclaimed by the Portuguese and following the discovery, in 1697, of gold in the heartland of Brazil, in the region that is, nowadays, Minas Gerais – a name which is literally translated as general mines. This discovery led to a conflict between other colonial provinces regarding the exercise of influence over this new promising region. Bahia, representing the interests of the crown, and São Paulo, a village founded far from the coast aiming to be more independent from Lisbon and wishing to rise with the exploitation of indigenous labour. These two villages represented the two opposites in the colonial project and stood in opposite sides in what came to be known as the

Emboaba's War, whose victory went to the *soteropolitanos*[97], representatives of the interest of Lisbon. This helps to explain the surge in demand for enslaved labour arriving in the port of Salvador, in the same period that a surge happened in the port of Recife (Pernambuco) and Rio de Janeiro as well. The difference is that while the numbers of the South-east kept on rising, Pernambuco would soon stabilize in a lower base line and Bahia would see an uneven demand until the end of the historical series, reflecting more local and regional dynamics than issues relating to the colony as a whole.

The end of this dispute between the two regions of the colony made clear the interiorization of the colony and inaugurated a new dynamic for the Portuguese occupation of Brazil, one it was not used. The mining industry was not so self-sustained as the agriculture, thus the development of more villages and the necessity of new ways to access the region. The main new way developed was the *Caminho Novo da Piedade* (literally, the New Way of Piety) that offered a quicker access to Minas from the coast arriving not in Bahia, but in Rio de Janeiro (Schwarcz, Starling, 2015, 117). This new access to *El Dorado* made evident that the economic dynamism of the colony was tending towards the south. The dimension to which the economic headed south is made evident by this passage of Ciro Flamarion Cardoso:

> Caio Prado Júnior and José Jobson Arruda give the data that show the strength of Rio in this new economic sector [sugar production]. By the end of the 18th Century, Rio de Janeiro concentrated 616 *engenhos*, in comparison with the 806 in Northeast. And, to the years between 1796 and 1811, the port of the city of Rio de Janeiro (through which left the sugar production from Minas and São Paulo as well) exported 211,459,104 pounds of white sugar and 60,709,632 pounds of brown sugar. The numbers of the two categories of sugar exported, in the same period, were, respectively of 180,379,456 pounds and 153,506,656 in the case of Bahia; 195,717,824 pounds and 26,162,816 pounds from Pernambuco (Cardoso, 1990, 122) [author's translation].

The fastest access to Minas Gerais and a capacity to match the production figures of the more established productive provinces of the colony made the case for the transfer of the colonial capital to Rio de Janeiro, in 1763, amidst the Portuguese modernization reforms put forward by the Marquis of Pombal (Cardoso, 1990, 119).

By then, Minas was already consolidated in terms of the occupation and exploitation of gold and diamonds, and the connection between the mines and the coast

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[97] Inhabitants of Salvador, capital city of the colony, located in Bahia.

allowed for the constitution of a new sort of occupation in the path, one of subsistence and that sustained the travellers. These two changes happening at the same time, namely of the economic axis of the colony and the new dynamic of occupation of Southeast posed new challenges to the circulation of gold and people – theft and quilombos, not to mention the environmental challenge of it all due to unknown animals and insects that made the journey even more threatening (Schwarcz, Starling, 2015: 118). The change of the capital city to Rio also helped to approximate the Portuguese colony's centre of power to the Spanish area of domain set in Buenos Aires, in the mouth of the Plata River, its main connection port in the South Atlantic.

Those changes in the pattern of occupation of the territory would result in the steady growth of the arrival of enslaved people in the ports of the Southeast in the following years – the third highlighted segment of Table 1 (in light blue). It is due to the volume of people that arrived in these 75 years in the region that this destination ended the period of colonial slavery as the second main larger region of arrival of enslaved people, second only to Bahia. However impressive the number of arrivals, it represents only a fraction of what the second slavery period would bring.

Table 2					
Second Slavery in Brazil – arrival of enslaved people by region					
	Amazonia	Bahia	Pernambuco	Southeast Brazil	Brazil unspecified	Totals
1801-1825	66,339	282,043	191,529	557,491	33,350	1,130,752
1826-1850	11,533	175,876	105,047	934,521	9,600	1,236,575
Totals	77,872	457,919	296,574	1,492,012	42,950	2,367,327

Source: Slavevoyages.com

Table 2 shows the figures of the arrival of enslaved people in Brazil in the 50 years prior to the end of the enslaved people traffic to the country. In those 50 years, the number of people kidnapped that arrived in the country was 2,367,327. That figure is *only* 767,539 smaller than the number of people who were brought to the colony in the 250 years prior to it. It took 50 years to bring to Brazil the same amount of people that had been brought throughout the first 225 years of enslavement. From those arrivals, 980,650 people arrived on the coast of the province of Rio de Janeiro (slavevoyages.com), approximately 800 km large. This number represents more people

than those who were taken to Pernambuco in the previous 250 years, even though the region was central to the disputes between the Dutch and the Spanish. This is no minor accomplishment and, to build on Tomich's argument, it does not mean the same.

Brazilian independence from Portugal was declared in 1822, but it is no stretch of argument to consider Brazil independent since 1808 with the arrival of the Portuguese royal family fleeing the invasion of Portugal by the French Army during the Napoleonic wars. In this context of independence, Brazil was seeing the emergence of a new economic dynamism following the development of the coffee plantations in the Paraíba Valley (Schwarcz, Starling, 2015).

If the use of enslaved people in the colonization of Brazil was thought as a way to articulate the Portuguese occupation in the South Atlantic, the meaning of the process was of another sort by the 1800s. Then, the bet on this specific violence was doubled down to the development of another area with a new crop with the goal of reaching the foreign market without the necessary interference of Lisbon to the trade. Slavery, by now, would be developed within the logic of liberal capitalism and amidst the constant fear of slavery uprising – by then known as, and recognized by the historiography, as *Haitianism* (Azevedo, 1987; Sá, 2019, 66-104).

This manifestation of liberalism in the insertion of Brazil in the transatlantic trade can be paralleled with the British 1788 Act, which regulated the number of people that could be transported on slave ships. The transport of kidnapped people would now be regulated in a poignant demonstration of how the *rationale* regarding the trade was changing. To treat enslaved people as a cargo that must receive a minimum of attention in order to secure the capital already spent on each trip is a role that the British proposed to develop along the 20 years between the Dolben Act and the 1807 Slave Trade Act. The trade acquired another meaning once it was dealt in those terms.

Tomich seest the emergence of Liberalism as a constitutive aspect in the building of Second Slavery. The Dolben Act points in this direction of the sort of thinking that can be related to Economic Liberalism. Adam Smith's "*The Wealth of the Nations*" (1776) criticizes the way in which England managed its enslavement compared with the way in which the French treated their captive populations:

> But, as the profit and success of the cultivation which is carried on by means of cattle, depend very much upon the good management of those cattle, so the profit and success

of that which is carried on by slaves, must depend equally upon the good management of those cattle, so the profit and success of that which is carried on by slaves must depend equally upon the good management of those slaves; and in the good management of their slaves the French planters, I think it is generally allowed, are superior to the English. The law, so far as it gives some weak protection to the slave against the violence of his master, is likely to be better executed in a colony where the government is in a great measure arbitrary, than in one where it is altogether free. In every country where the unfortunate law of slavery is established, the magistrate, when he protects the slave, intermeddles in some measure in the management of the private property of the master; and, in a free country, where the master is perhaps either a member of the colony assembly, or an elector of such a member, he dares not do this but with the greatest caution and circumspection. The respect which he is obliged to pay to the master, renders it more difficult for him to protect the slave (Smith, 1993, 348-349).

It is a rather long quote, but at the same time it is an important one, not only for it addresses exactly the core feature of the Dolben Act: the issue of "management" of the enslaved-labour force in order to better succeed in the production of sugar cane in their Caribbean possessions, but to the representativeness of the passage to some tensions that permeate the Liberal thought to this date and that are already visible in this passage. The first tension is between the structuring of the State (which he argues is present in the British colonies in different structures derived from their own organization) (Smith, 1993, 348), and the management of the enslaved population, since the "arbitrary" "genius of their government [French Colonies]" does not constraint the magistrates to intervene in some authority's dealing with his possessions. That is the case because the authority is appointed by Paris, it is not autochthonous as the authorities that emerged in English colonies due to the lack of interest by the crown.

The second tension is the trade-off identified by Smith in the colonies between the productivity and that which he classifies as arbitrary governments, that intervene in the handle of the private property by the settlers. The colony is the place where "if they [owners] do not manage it [private property, in this case slaves] according to his liking, it is much easier for him to give some protection to the slave; and common humanity naturally disposes him to do so" (Smith, 1993, 349).

In characterizing slavery as "unfortunate law of slavery", Smith seems to be connected with Locke and to the Brazilian elite in 19th Century in the reticent acceptance of this violence. His defence of compassion towards enslaved people is a way of naturalizing the violence while enacting benevolence with the wealth accumulated through the exploitation of the enslaved people's labour. The 1788

Dolben Act, by regulating the transport of the kidnapped to the Americas, synthetizes these features by organizing the bodies in a more efficient way through the understanding of life as commodity.

Padre Antonio Vieira, Adam Smith, John Locke and William Dolben are men who inhabit this history of the Atlantic as thinking slavery in its connections through this ocean. The mental space they create, with justifications and acts of benevolence to compensate, is one that can be told through the movement of black bodies in ships and the number of people arriving in each port. This points to a geography less static and more centered in the movements of people and the way these movements give meaning to space.

There is another dimension to the constitution of the Atlantic Space to which these men are conniving: the silence on the transportation by sea – the one that Dolben tries to improve.

5.5.
Conclusion

In a text from 2006, Sidney Chalhoub writes about the debates that the Council of State, an arm from the Brazilian Government whose institutional role was to advise the Emperor on the matters of higher interest, was caught in a debate surrounding the issue of the nationality of enslaved men and women and freedmen and women who wanted to join a lay society thought in the image of the Brotherhoods, catholic communities built around the devotion to the saint of choice of a parish. In a State that had no sort of welfare structure, to be part of such societies was a way of having a sort of safe network to run to.

In the text, Chalhoub lays bare how the silence on the issue of race was a project discussed, and recorded to posterity, in the documents of the higher echelons of Brazilian Government. In his words:

> This document is valuable because it consists of one of the most precocious and clear expressions, I have ever found of the making of contemporary Brazilian racial ideology: the idea was to produce silence on the question of race as a prerequisite to achieving the ideal of a homogeneous nation (Chalhoub, 2006, 75).

Barbosa (2011, 141) reminds that the Constitution of the Empire established as members of the social embodiment of the nation freed enslaved men who had been born in Brazil. Therefore, an enslaved person, born in Africa, who would acquire his or her freedom in Brazil would not be able to claim nationality. S/he would be very close to the status of the enslaved person who, as Perdigão Malheiros has put it, is as if legally dead, deprived of every right, and possessing no representation whatsoever" (Malheiros, apud Chaloub: 2006, 76). As I have argued earlier, the discussion on citizenship to the enslaved person is one that advances on the assumption that the enslaved person was understood as a person, therefore fit to claim citizenship. I understand the process of de-humanization of enslavement as able to set this issue in dispute.

The fact of the matter is that by framing enslavement in State optics, what we are doing is maintaining this idea of life constrained by the liberal parameters, including the logic of life as the recognition of citizenship by the State. That which I began to build in this chapter and that I will develop further in the next is the possibility of understanding the Atlantic Slavery as a political system in itself. This is not a construction that begins in this chapter. It is actually the culmination of the discussion on discipline, space and the people that succeeded in the previous chapters and led me to propose the identification of the Atlantic as an Empire.

Seeing this Empire is not to deny the States, rather to propose the centrality of the enslaved person in thinking the space politically. The centrality of the enslaved people does not aim to imply any compliance with this political project since it does not challenge – nor wish to romanticize – the unspeakable violence perpetrated against that people. The challenge is, then, posed to the framing of the violence, to one that helps grasp the dimension of it. To talk about Empire is to recognize whose labour built the 19th Century and where that labour was deployed. The violence accounted here includes senseless debates on legal minutiae that only afflict those who live on the margins, on the border of legality, and whose logic seems to be nothing more than to extirpate time that otherwise would have been spent on something useful.

I began this chapter by arguing that the Lockean citizen is the one to which the right of rebelling is guaranteed, therefore, the one waking the tenuous line of being

citizen and rebel, if rebelling, faced with the odds of confronting the State in order to change it. The enslaved person was always facing the odds against the State. It was not a matter of choosing; rather, a fact of life. The State never provided anything for him/her, not even the correct framing for the understanding of that which s/he was put through and had to undergo.

6.   Stateless Empire

6.1.
Introduction

The Atlantic has been analysed by many as an important political space, and some of the works developed on this subject have directly influenced this thesis. Luís Felipe Alencastro (2000), Alberto da Costa e Silva (2003), Dale Tomich (2014), Rafael Marquese and Tamis Parron (2011), and Paul Giroy (1993) are among those whose contributions helped me to develop my arguments thus far. Yet, despite their brilliancy and insurmountable contribution, these authors share a premise that I do not follow. For them, States are the political arena in which slavery is battled upon in the Atlantic. In other words: they are State-centric. Be it by politically thinking how international pressures will bend political action (Marquese and Parron 2011), the framework under which marginalized people would live their lives (Silva, 2003; Gilroy, 1993), or the telos that would help make sense of a past of wide-spread – and to some extent – senseless violence (Tomich, 2004; Alencastro, 2000), the State is present all along and, in so being, their argument is limited by their premise. In the previous chapter, with the effort of thinking through worlding as a way of challenging the impossibility of the question of origin while engaging with the dispute on the perspective on addressing the 19th Century history of the Atlantic, I began to propose another way of thinking slavery politically. With that in mind, I started establishing slavery as the premise of Atlantic history, instead of States, in order to see where that proposition would lead to.

The title of this chapter comes as a way of summarizing the effort of the next pages: that of dissociating State from Empire as a way of arguing that the concept of Empire can have more meaning than to express a few countries' expansionist politics. It is clear that States were needed to legitimize slavery, but the State is an incomplete frame to the understanding of slavery. It is an important part thereof, but alone, the State offers an insufficient account of that which is withdrawn and imposed on enslaved people. That is why the concept of Empire has explanatory potential here: it does not invalidate the importance of the State, instead, it only points to the fact that there are some issues operating above it.

In the bibliography on Atlantic History, Linebaugh and Rediker (2000) are the ones closer to thinking beyond the territoriality of the State. The "Hydrarchy", as they call it, is a form of politics and economics that happened within pirate ships sailing through the Atlantic. Such organization of the outcasts of the 17th Century Atlantic, is nonetheless thought of as a sort of denial of the State, since the ship was understood as the space in which people of different backgrounds and languages could live in a self-organizing way. But the ship was not self-sufficient, hence the failure to reach a complete denial of the State. Sooner or later, it still needed to port, and then the ideas exchanged within the ship would reach the land and new information would arrive just to travel to the next destiny. The Hydrarchy stood more as a vessel containing and transporting information to different ports than as an alternative to the State per se.

My intent in this chapter is not to propose an alternative to the State. Rather, it is to explore the possibility of yet an-*other* political dimension in the 19th Century Atlantic: the dimension of Empire. In order to do so, I have divided this chapter into four sections that, will close the process of offering a conclusion to the threads pulled in the three first chapters which was initiated in the previous chapter. Considering the last chapter as a sort of lengthy introduction to this one, I will, through the next pages, dive into the concept of Empire and its underdeveloped potential of illuminating intricated political interactions as is the case of slavery in 19th Century Atlantic. The first section will start with this discussion by recovering it from where the previous chapter left off: the discussion of Imperialism in 19th Century Brazil, however tilting the debate to specific bibliography in which slavery is considered in the political potency of the enslaved people. This first section will lay the ground to the second section, in which I discuss the meaning of the Empire as it is presented by academic bibliography. In the third section, I develop the proposition of treating slavery as an Empire and explain the meaning I propose to this concept. All of this just in time for the final section, in which I discuss the workings of this Empire's hierarchy.

Like Linebaugh and Rediker (2000), the idea is to see the Atlantic as a space in which thinking politically does not equate with thinking within the State. Nor does it mean to deny the State as a political arena even though, differently from these two authors, I am not discussing outlaws, rather my goal here is to think slavery as an

exceptional international phenomenon. Exceptional in that it allows for the possibility of envisioning an international dimension of politics that directly impacts discussions of recognition, power and sovereignty.

6.2.
Slavery, Empire, Imperialism

I will resume the discussion from where I left it in the previous chapter. After having settled with an Atlantic construction of Brazil and the comprehension that, due to the 19th Century's characteristics, it represented a different moment in the history of slavery in the Atlantic, the first pertinent aspect to highlight is the frailty of the idea of States as definers of space. See, for instance, what the framing through which the Second Slavery talks about the History of Brazil. The turn of the 19th Century brought a new political context – the independence from Portugal – a new crop being produced in a previously untouched region of the country in a process concomitant to a repositioning of Brazil in the world economy mirrored by moves in the Brazilian elites from the city to the countryside. This section will deal with these questions and the debates they motivated, but I would like to begin it by highlighting that these profound changes occurred all at once – and yet, we insist in observing the continuity by calling all of this "Brazilian History" since it all took place within what are, now, Brazilian borders. The 19th Century represents a rupture, more than a continuity, if we are to think in terms of States, however, in the dynamics of production of space and wealth accumulation we can see patterns stronger patterns of continuity.

This allows me to engage with the bibliography of imperialism that I want to understand through the context of slavery. The framing of slavery as Second Slavery allows for the formation of a new set of histories and practices that constituted new parameters and traditions, answering the need to adapt knowledges from other spaces to the new land to where they were violently brought. These people who arrived as labour developed their ways of dealing with the conditions they were presented with and, in doing so, they developed other forms of political engagement and social life which is not always accounted for in the narrative of the 19th Century history. To some extent, every action that would not be work related can be understood as an act of

resistance. So, having passed through the narrative of understanding the formation of Brazilian territory through enslavement, it is the case to engage with the history of enslaved people during the 50 years that accounted for almost as many arrivals as the previous centuries of enslavement combined, a period recurrently characterized by being strongly influenced by British foreign policy (Bethell, 1970, 2011; Cervo, Bueno, 2008).

In Brazilian historiography, the economic impact and the foreign policy consequences of the treaties signed between Great Britain and Portugal as payment for the transportation of the Portuguese royal family from the Napoleonic invasion to Brazil are well stablished marks (Bethell, 1970; Basille, 1990). These treaties, later renewed as payment to London for its support on the recognition of Brazilian independence, led to the opening of the Brazilian market to British imports at lower taxes than the established trade houses owned by Portuguese in Rio de Janeiro. Seen as a bad trade deal that was enforced by the British in a moment of great need by the Portuguese, in the historiography, its consequence is understood as a State with budgetary constraints until the 1840s, when the treaties were not renewed and the government was able to impose a more suitable taxation.

Such one-layered narrative does not account for the wider consequences of these treaties. Tamis Parron argues that the way British traders entered the Brazilian coast was a force that pushed Brazil to double the bet on the enslave-plantation model (Parron, 2020, 16-17). Parron argues that Brazilian-Portuguese traders who were very well established in Rio de Janeiro saw themselves pushed out of the trade due to the arrival of British trade houses that had more advantageous trading terms in export/import market. As a consequence, these Brazilian-Portuguese traders found the alternative in a region yet to be explored: the Paraíba Valley. There, they found the possibility of investing in extensive land properties to grow coffee, with intense use of labour. Parron's text is a deep study on the meaning and practices related to trade and treaty policy developed by London. Going as far back as the 17th Century, he argues on the relevance of these treaties for British enforcement of capitalism on its terms and for the reinforcement of international hierarchy.

To build upon Maria Odila Dias argument,[98] the interiorization of enslavement would hence be an unintended outcome of the expansion of British capitalist interests in the Atlantic. This is not to say that the British are to blame for enslavement in 19th Century Brazil. Instead, it is to point to the already pacified idea that unattended consequences of economic expansion of central economies are expected results especially in the frontiers of peripheral spaces of capitalism. To make the departure point to this argument through an articulation between Parron's (2020) and Dias (1972) is a way of establishing that there is a connection between economic and social history that should be read ensemble in order for one to have a more encompassing history of the 19th Century.

On the consequences of the change in the import/export markets in Rio de Janeiro, Leslie Bethell (2011) says "Already in August 1808, between 150 and 200 tradesmen and commercial agents formed the core of a prosperous British community in Rio de Janeiro." (Bethell, 2011, 22). Bethell understands that Brazil was under the "British informal Empire", with which he wanted to reference the fact that the British had more favourable trading terms than the Portuguese namely colonisers. This reading develops a history built in a narrative that does not care for the experiences of those who were the most affected by the experience of hierarchizing spaces, since it works as sanitization of the economy by framing it in commercial terms instead of accounting for the dynamics of production. As a consequence of such kind of narrative, this section was thought as a way of offering a more complex glance on the reading of the hierarchy of space by incorporating other people who were silenced along the narratives of "Police"[99]. In doing so, my goal is to present how insufficient this is to consider solely the economic consequences of the tariffs shock without caring for the impact it had on Brazil's participation of in the enslaved trade.

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[98] Maria Odila Silva Dias has an important text on the process of independence entitled "*A Interiorização da Metrópole (1808-1853)*", or the Interiorization of the Metropole (1808 – 1853) in a free translation, in which she analyses what she considers to be the unique case of Brazilian independence process, one in which the formal independence arrived prior to the legal independence (1808 and 1822 respectively), and as a consequence of disputes among the ruling colonialist, not tied to the formation of any notion of nationality, which would only arrive during the first half of the century (Dias, 1972).

[99] In this thesis, I have opted to follow Rancière's (1990) dichotomic reading between "Police" and "Politics". The essence of the argument is that Politics only happens in moments in which "the part with no part" claims incorporation in the power struggle. All other interactions, especially those categorized under "institutional politics", are defined as Police. I have elaborated more on this subject on chapter 4.

I want to highlight the expression "British informal Empire" employed by Bethell. This is a recurrent approach in his scholarship on the relation between Brazil and the UK, one that can be traced back to Gallagher and Robinson's 1953 text on the British expansion during the 19th Century. Actually, the authors recognize that the authorship of the concept is of one Dr. C. R. Fay in the *Cambridge History of the British Empire* (1940). However, it is after their reading of the term in comparison to the Marxist tradition that it regained traction. The goal of Gallagher and Robinson's text is to engage with the Marxist debate of the time, which downplayed the "mid-Victorian" imperial expansion in order to better accommodate it to Lenin's proposition that "the high stage of capitalism" would only arrive after 1880. This accommodation would propose that

> Their [Manchester school] argument may be summarized in this way: the mid-Victorian formal empire did not expand, indeed it seemed to be disintegrating, therefore the period was anti-imperialist; the later-Victorian formal empire expanded rapidly, therefore this was an era of imperialism; the change was caused by the obsolescence of free trade (Gallagher, Robinson, 1953, 2).

Their text goes not only in the sense of rebuking the incomplete hall of historical events that would support this affirmation. They actually went on to diminish the difference between formal and informal imperialism: "Thus mercantilist techniques of formal empire were being employed to develop India in the mid-Victorian age at the same time as informal techniques of free trade were being used in Latin America for the same purpose." (Gallagher, Robinson, 1953, 6). This idea of Brazil being part of the informal British Empire was latter incorporated by Leslie Bethell who produced extensively using the concept[100] (1970; 2011). Either way, both – Gallagher and Robinson, and Bethell further exploration of the matter – marked contribution to thinking hierarchies of the modern international by way of saying that there were more similarities than differences in the dynamics of the formal and the informal Empires. Thus, to the extent that it was effectively more accurate in pointing the similarities, this concept loosened the meaning of Empire. It was no longer colonial dominium; it also included the expansion of economic interest.

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[100] The selected texts to exemplify Bethell prolific production reveal a career of 41 years developing on the same subject.

Another approach to this period in the historiography can be represented by Tâmis Parron's (2020) analyses. He points to a more complex understanding of politics as he tries to see politics (a common-sensical understanding of the term) as answering to unattended consequences, leading to unexpected outcomes. Simply put, it means: to try to understand how a phenomenon unfolds in different ways, not accounting exclusively for an action-reaction system. Here, trying to grasp the phenomenon of enslavement in some of its complexities is the reason why I want to turn to the visions that enslaved people had on the matter.[101]

Isadora Mota (2017) deals with great detail with this sort of multilayered politics that rift through the 19th Century enslavement politics, as she puts it: "The world of

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[101] Upon reading this passage, one attentive reader asked me why not use this opportunity to bring up Robert Brenner in his contributions to the Marxist debate on transition which I only referenced in passing in a comparison with Wallerstein. To the extent that this is a pertinent demand based on proper grounds, I take this footnote to dive a bit on Brenner. Firstly, I just want to state that the preoccupation with Brenner is unparalleled with Wallerstein due to the entry that the latter has on the discipline of IR given his world system approach. The Brenner debate, on the other hand, seems to be more cryptic to a discipline that is founded on Lockean Liberalism (see previous chapter). Brenner is using comparative history methodology in order to answer the question that I put roughly as: why did capitalism developed in England at the same time that in Eastern Europe the bet was on serfdom? Now, this is an interesting question because it deals with the profound transformation that Europe saw developing, one that is messy to the extent that it deals with a variety of aspects ranging from demographic transformation, changes in markets and changes in the meaning of the land which led to wealth accumulation to a few and a some-what generalized class struggle. Brenner's contribution, and the reason why the Brenner debate is named after him, is because in his article, he opened up the messiness of this debate by exposing the number of moving pieces that it contains, which had been, until them, synthetised in a few simplified models. With that in mind, I want to go back to this reader's question: why not recuperate Brenner?

To the extent that Brenner's contribution to the debate is paramount – as is the the case with structuralist reading developed by Wallerstein – I cannot miss the fact that the first is still dealing with the European context of the transition from Medieval to Capitalism. To use his articulation of class struggle, for instance, in order to account for the tensions between enslaved and slave-holder (or, to keep in Parron's terrain, between the Portuguese dislocated and the British installed in the commerce circuit of Rio de Janeiro) would demand an articulation of meanings of wealth, property and labour that would be exogenous to the 19th Century Atlantic. Brenner was not trying to develop a concept that would be generalizable – differently from Rancière, for instance, who developed the dichotomic division between Politics/Police as a framework to see the world, as I incorporated in the text. At the same time, I feel that it is a tricky move to try to articulate this idea of class struggle with no intermediation, because it risks ending up falling in a Eurocentric move, as previous Brazilian social thinkers ended up doing by taking Marxist categories and reading them as necessary steps in social-political-economic development. This is just an example of the complexity that doing so would entail. Throughout this thesis, I have called enslaved people as "the part with no part" because they bring with them the political potential of rupture. However, I cannot see in those people the idea of class deemed necessary to incorporate Brenner "class conflicts" (Brenner, 1985, 12) into the Atlantic context. This inability of mine relates to the fact that their political potency did not focus on shattering Locke's social contract and developing another system of production and distribution. They aimed at having recognized their humanity – a debate already pacified between Europeans by the 19th Century.

'Second Slavery' was one full of contradictions" (Mota, 2017, 7). The contradictions that are better represented by the case of St. John D'el Rey Mining Company:

> That is not to say, however, that abolition was the cause of every British subject living in the tropics. Throughout the nineteenth century, British citizens and companies not only held slaves all over Brazil but were also the unlikely protagonists of scandals over the illegal enslavement of African recaptives. The St. John D'el Rey Mining Company operation in Morro Velho, Minas Gerais, is a case in point. The largest British slaveholding organization in Brazil endured a lengthy court battle in 1879 for unlawfully holding 300 liberated Africans as slaves for twenty years (Mota, 2017,36).

This is representative because the historiography on 19th Century enslavement sees in the British a push towards the abolition of captivity. The impetus of freedom that is most frequently attributed to the British is one which has a lot to do with the idea of a supposedly moral higher ground that the Europeans would have in advocating for abolition. This case offers a better understanding of how morality can be bent due to the concrete circumstances surrounding it.

The fact that some British citizens were dragged to a litigation in Brazil points to the traditional frame of understanding enslavement as a debate featuring nations as the actors in dispute. However, this is not the sole way of interpreting the events. According to Mota, "blacks did not speak a language of nationalism." (Mota, 2017, 35), this was a white-man's world. In the debate which black people wanted to join, the debate on freedom, was one white men had not much interest in, since, as discussed on chapter 4, freedom was not understood as an issue, for white men were just men, there would never be doubt on the question if they were free or freed.

Having history being institutionalized in this rationale of the construction of the narrative of the nation state (Osiander, 2001), it is no surprise that historical narratives favour the idea of the State as a centralized omniscient figure. With this framing, the enslaved seeing British ships as tokens of freedom even though British owned mining companies in Brazil and had a strong presence in coffee transatlantic trade comes as irrational. This movement is where lies an important part of the cruelty on the discourse of rationality of the State actor, because, as a consequence of establishing the rationality of the State, the same omniscient rationality is expected from the enslaved person who is only worried about saving his/her life, not, necessarily, about tackling the system structurally. Thus, instead of having the personal fight for freedom as an operative

ethical preoccupation, the focus turns to the supposed contradiction inscribed in not differentiating the nationality of the boat in which one would flee from the participation of that country in the trade that would support slavery in Brazil. Consequently, the most reasonable action that one can take when faced with liberty deprivation, which is to flee, is shadowed by the fact that the flag under which one looks for freedom is, in fact, responsible for slavery in the first place.

On the second half of the 19th Century, the tensions opposing Brazil and the UK on the issue of enslavement reached their apex. In particular in the 1860s, the countries severed diplomatic relations due to the accumulation of tensions on the matter of enslavement in Brazil. It is important to make a detour on the relevance of enslavement and on the trade of enslaved people to the relations between Brazil and the UK. Ever since the flight from the Portuguese Royal family to Rio de Janeiro from the Napoleonic armies, the Portuguese had reiterated their commitments to ending trade and abolishing enslavement (Holanda, 2003a; Parron, 2020). The historiographical readings of the dispute between Portugal/Brazil and England regarding the treaties of 1810, 1817, 1825 and 1827 take for granted the fact that the goal was to maintain enslavement all along, for this institution was already so entrenched in the country's culture. Thus, the repetitive disrespect to the treaties signed is understood as victories over the British who were trying to meddle with national politics. In such narratives, the possibility of framing slavery as an international matter is limited to the possibility of it being understood as no more than a theme of Brazilian foreign policy (Holanda, 2003a, 2003b; Cervo, Bueno, 2008).

The consensus on the capability of the Portuguese and Brazilian foreign service disregards the possibility of the goal of abolishing enslavement having indeed existed. This naturalization of slavery in the history of Brazil and its definition as a subject around which the country's foreign policy would accumulate victories against an imperial power is an effective way of articulating slavery as a national catalyser. Assembling Alencastro's (2000) argument that Brazil was formed in the South Atlantic with the household names of the monarchy passing through the foreign office in the duration of their career points back to José Murilo de Carvalho's (1998) argument that in preceding Brazil as a country, slavery was an important feature of national identity.

Through this reading, slavery not only built Brazil in material terms; it also played a role in the narrative of national pride on which white men built their images as founding fathers that thought and acted in the most auspicious ways and whose achievements are inscribed as parameters of success to contemporary politicians or public servants.

One such men, known through the epithet of patriarch of Brazilian independence, José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, happens to have been a notorious abolitionist. One passage of the text he wrote, which the soon to be Emperor, Pedro sent as guidance to the Brazilian representatives to the Constitutional Congress held in Lisbon after the 1820s Porto Liberal Revolution, reads:

> (…) require vigorously equally, the handle of the legislature on the improvement the fate of slaves, favouring their gradual emancipation and conversion of immoral and rough men in active and virtuous citizens; watching over the masters of that same enslaved so that these treat them as Christians, and not as rough animals, as dictated in the Royal letters of March 23rd 1688, and of February 27th 1798; however, all of that with such circumspection that the miserable slaves do not complain such rights with uprisings and insurrections that may bring about scenes of blood and horror (Silva, 1821, 8) [author's translation].

However insufficient the *slow, gradual and safe* abolition may seem, the passage in itself shows how progressive it is when compared with the royal letter from 23 years earlier, according to which enslaved people were dehumanized. The acknowledgement of humanity among the enslaved would be sufficient to make Bonifácio be seen as a radical republican, leading him to exile (Holanda, 2003a, 188-190) during the government of Pedro I.

The second aspect that may lead one to think that the goal of abolition may actually have existed by the time of the independence is a subject present in all of those treaties: the fact that the Portuguese trade of people was possible due to the fact that it was not international, as it worked within the boundaries of the Portuguese world (Holanda, 2003a, 394). This argument first emerged in the 1810 treaty and was later reinforced in the 1817 treaty which forbade the trade of enslaved people in the North Atlantic. During the negotiations for the 1820s treaties between Brazil, Portugal and the UK, an issue that was agreed upon was that Brazil would not incorporate Portuguese African territories even if asked to do so by them (Ibid). The most viable way of continuing to kidnap people in Africa would have been not to agree with those terms. Not putting on a fight with the formal abdication of incorporating Angola can

be interpreted, at least, as being ambiguous towards the continuity of slavery following independence.

By bringing up those treaties and José Bonifácio, the aim is not to side with Parron's (2020: 19) perspective that, structurally, Brazil was pushed to maintain enslavement due to the treaties of free trade signed with the British. Holanda (2003a, 388) quotes José Bonifácio and Pedro I during the 1820s negotiations as voluntarily being committed with free trade on the terms put by the 1810s treaties that Brazil kept low tariffs to import goods from England resulting in the social and economic consequences addressed by Parron (2020)[102]. The same negotiations that demanded the end of enslavement, in a sense, conducted to the interiorisation of the practice in the Paraíba Valley and the production of coffee due to the inability of realizing the impact that the change in tariffs would have in the overall economic structure of the colony. Again, this is not to say that the slave-owners were not culpable for the violence they constantly committed. Especially considering that those people were already seen as people, no longer as animals from a different species – consider Bonifácio's terms in the recommendation to the representative as proof. Rather, the goal is to argue that the slaveholders' confort-zone was granted not by Brazil or the UK, but by the articulation of the politics of enslavement itself. The main justification to the maintenance of enslavement in the 19th Century was already economic, not only to the slaveholder, but to the country and the tariffs it was able to apply to the legal trade of people (Parron, 2011, 51).

This context of the politics on the treaties between Brazil and the UK is relevant to the understanding that the inability or incapacity of implementing the abolition of enslavement in Brazil escalated existing tensions between the country and Britain to the point of leading to the Christie Affair[103]. Understood as the apex of a 40-year

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[102] The 2011's book by Parron offers a more thorough analysis of the politics of enslavement from the arrival of the Portuguese royal family to the second half of the 19th Century. The first chapter specifically deals with the period between the arrival of the Portuguese royal family in Rio de Janeiro until the end of the reign of Pedro I. Developing a different argument from the one, he drafts on his 2020 text – on the link between the economics of it and the effect on the county's occupation – here the author argues to the seriousness that the issue of at least, the abolition of trade of enslaved people received until the abdication of the first Emperor.

[103] Named after the responsible for the UK mission in Rio de Janeiro, William D. Christie, the Christie Affair is how the literature came to address two incidents involving British Navy in Brazil: the sinking of a British ship in southern coast of Brazil and people stealing the cargo that came to shore and the

tension between Brazil and the UK on the matter of enslavement and enslaved trade, this crisis culminated in the blockage of the port of Rio de Janeiro by the British Navy between December 31 1862 and January 5 1863, and the apprehension of 5 Brazilian ships that threatened to engage with the blockage. The crisis was solved with the payment of an indemnity by the Brazilian government as a compensation for the cargo lost on the sunk ship in the Brazilian Southern coast, narrated by Cervo and Bueno (2008, 83), as a demonstration of strength against the imperial ethos of the British, who also demanded an apology for the arrests of the sailors. On the same subject, Basile (1990) argues that the Emperor himself intervened in the pacification of the matter after "The streets of the capital were being taken over by crowds in uproar threatening to attack the British legation" (Basile, 1990, 256-7) [author's translation]. If the capital was inflamed against the British, there is also notice of uprisings celebrating them.

Isadora Mota (2017) contrasts the support and the donation of month wages to the cause of defending Brazilian independence with upheavals in support of the British. Besides the arrest of a black free man, Sebastião Maria, in the region close to the site of the wrecking of the ship for inciting insurrection and insulting the Emperor (Mota, 2017, 35-6) in cities deeper in the countryside, the effects of the affair were also felt. In Campinas, in the São Paulo province, for instance, one magistrate anticipated any official declaration and founded the *Sociedade Patriótica Campineira*, as a way of preparing for confrontation with the British if the tensions were to escalate and become war. To justify the creation of this civil militia to the president of the province of São Paulo, Silva Bueno wrote:

> After the Sociedade was created, rumours started to emerge here and there with regard to these slaves and at this shop about those, and from that road they said this and that, and on the bridges, water supplies and fountains where they usually gather, and they were overheard talking (it is said) whatever it is about a revolt, the Englishmen, etc., for it is a fact that they either count on their protection, or at least there is founded reason to fear some hostile manifestation on the part of the slaves in case there is a breaking off with England (Silva Bueno, 1863 apud Mota, 2017, 25).

This is a rich passage because it points to the unattended and uncontrolled situations in which people can exchange information, even in such a controlling society

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arrest of three drunk British sailors in Rio de Janeiro between the years 1861 and 1862 (Basile, 1990, 256-257). After these events, the diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed only to be recuperated in the 1865, when tensions escalated in the Brazilian southern frontier (Basile, 1990).

as the plantation-centred society of the Paraíba Valley. Even in light of a quintessential manifestation of Necropower to the extent that the Valley was the centre of coffee production in Brazil, information also flowed with little possibility of containment. This important passage highlights the fact that by challenging the conventional ways we have to look and understand archives and flows of information, for when dealing with statesmen and their communications, the protocols, the meetings are registered. The same cannot be said about those who are relegated to enslavement, since the ways in which communication was established were kept undisclosed on purpose, in order to safeguard those involved in it.

The effort I propose here is to contextualize the debate on Imperialism in 19th Century Brazil under the scope of Second Slavery, developing on the idea that slavery is a complex structure which is not attained by borders nor nationalities. The addition brought by this section is the ambivalent role played by Britain in this context, because to the extent that it was the centre of the 19th Century capitalism, the Union Jack was the symbol of hope at the personal level to those enslaved every time it appeared in the ports of the country. A hope that would only increase once the British made the possibility of protecting fleeing enslaved people in British vessels legal (Mota, 2017, 41).

The duration of the enslavement articulations in the Atlantic and the depth and length of the dispute on the issue of abolition, not to mention the relevance of this exploitation of labour to the insertion of Brazil in the economic circuits of the 19th Century, all point to the centrality of the enslaved person to the politics of the Atlantic. To seriously engage with this centrality is to go beyond the State-centred analyses and make an effort of seeing politics through other perspectives. By challenging the State-centrism, I am all together questioning if the category of citizen is the only in which one can be politically constitutive. By understanding that enslavement is a political dimension of the Atlantic, it is possible to engage in the narratives that crossed the ocean through different perspectives.

For instance, bringing up the discussion on chapter 4 on Brazil as a space for the US Civil War, it is possible to adopt some other perspective on the matter. The case of the vessel Sumter arriving in Maranhão offers another good example that allows for

the comparison between two perspectives. Silvana Barbosa (2011), while looking to the US representative to Brazil, the Brazilian Emperor, and the politics between formal governments in Rio de Janeiro and Washington, has the following perspective on it:

> In fact, relations between Brazil and the US were already shaken by then, due to the issue of the privateer Sumter, a ship of confederate flag which, in September 1861, had set anchor in Maranhão and, with the permission of the province's president, had brought coal and other provisions on board. The US government treated this ship as a pirate one and, in an official statement, expressed its discontent with the attitude of the [Brazilian] government which was, in essence, a way of taking sides in the war that was unfolding (Barbosa, 2011, 134) [author's translation].

Isadora Mota, by looking to the same episode, understands through a completely different perspective:

> In September of 1861, the anchoring of the Sumter and the Powhatan in Maranhão prompted rumours of an uprising in Santa Maria de Anajatuba, a rural village located on the right margin of the River Mearim, about sixty miles from the provincial capital. Soon after the arrival of the vessels, black freedmen formed clubs all over São Luís, in which they met with slaves to discuss what to expect from the Americans, whom they presumed to be abolitionists.

> The slave Agostinho, accused of leading the movement, learned about the docking of the Sumter at one of these "clubs" and promptly alerted his fellow slaves in the village of Anajatuba to the fact that freedom was on the way, for "they only waited for the war steamer to disembark her troops." Several enslaved workers then fled sugar and cotton plantations or refused to work for their masters, having proclaimed themselves free in anticipation of American armed support (Mota, 2017, 84-5).

To keep in formal aspects, the use of language of power in Barbosa's text is recurrent (privateer, flag, permission, president, government), while Mota portraits facts on the ground with more detail (the name of the village and where it stands) in a narrative that is necessarily incomplete. The parallel between these two texts in reality shows us the amount of information we take for granted in traditional historical narratives, for no one is left wondering how the information about the arrival of a Confederate ship in the port of São Luiz arrived at the president of the province, as it goes without saying that there are officers of liaison whose duty is to report information of that sort. Nevertheless, there will be many who would question: how was Agostinho aware of the Civil War? Did he speak English? Was he allowed to travel by himself? These questions are the sort of pieces of information that circulates in Linebaugh and Rediker's Hydrarchy. They represent the questions that exist when one is faced with

the uncharted territory and, consequently, cannot fit in the known and predictable patterns. This unpredictability is the reason why the authors made a comparison between the life at sea and the mythological creature, a parallel that works even when seen through the perspective that I want to build – that of the contradiction of US and British ships being seen as totems of freedom while the US and Britain operated as economic powers whose economic interest helped to enforce slavery in Brazil.

In State-centred narratives, the "belonging to the State" is the thread that links the phenomena happening to different people in different locations. Their idea, in fact, refers to control in the sense that by remitting to the higher echelons of power, the reader will have the more encompassing narrative on a subject. As such, they lay bare the facts upon which the other facts will make sense. In such narrative, without realizing, we assume omniscient actors, for instance, that the port authorities had full knowledge of the consequences of allowing the docking of the Sumter.

Conversely, the history that focuses on the marginalized is one that is at peace with not being completely aware of the possibilities that unfold on the margins and on the spaces not accounted for, since in them lies not only resistance, but mainly life – the kind of experience to which one does not need to attribute sense nor purpose.

On the same book in which Silvana Barbosa's texts is found, there is a portrait of the Brotherhood of Black Men of Saint Elesban and Saint Ephigenia in Rio de Janeiro by Mariza Soares (2011) in which the politics in this representative institution is presented as inclusive and innovative, accounting for an institutionalized democratic process of electing representatives in which relevant spaces were occupied by women. While introducing her text and showing the strategies of resistance, Soares says: "Therefore, while manumission was a juridically defined condition, liberty was something that the slave earned in his daily life" (Soares, 2011, 411) [author's translation]. To the extent that it allows for following in a Liberal narrative detached of the material conditions of daily life and romanticization of the resistances, Soares quote is relevant in arguing that there is hope in spaces of resistance, because these are "socially alive" spaces.

This reference to the same Brotherhood of Black Men presented in the conclusion of the last chapter discussing the limits and possibilities of citizenship speaks to the

potency of their experience in articulating their own space in such an inclusive political structure. This remits me to chapter two and the discussion on the limits of Mbembe's concept of Necropolitics, as a reminder that this concept can also be totalizing, defining the people by their condition of enslavement. And there was more to those people: they were able to resist, to build the world and to inhabit the Hydrarchy, to the extent that their entry to the Lockean political society was not an option. Actually, it is interesting to notice that from a State optics, the enslaved people were actually slaves. Nothing more, nothing else. It is necessary to adopt the State optics to stand with Mbembe and his concept. Only in adopting a statist perspective can we consider them chattel, not populus.

The next three sections will deal exactly with the potential of thinking space along with marginalized subjects, making what I am proposing as Empire clearer. In a way, closer to Linebaugh and Rediker's Hyrarchy as a consequence of the profile of the people who compose this polity. However, differently from them, since instead of thinking as an alternative to the State, I want to propose a concept that stands above it, and in so being, this concept needs to articulate the "outcasts" just like the elites in the same political structure capable of admitting both of them.

6.3.
Meanings of Empire

There is a consent in historiography in International Relations that the State is the form of government that prevails worldwide as a consequence of the fall of Empires and city states in the consolidation of the European modern period (Spruyt, 1994; Nexon, 2009)[104]. Andreas Osiander (2001), presenting the complexities in the process of the Thirty Year's War and Arno Mayer (1981) arguing that the First World War was

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[104] Although ignored by the anglophone tradition, the French tradition also focus almost exclusively on States to build its political analyses. Even Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, author of "Every Empire Shall Fall". (1992) doesn't refer to another political structure other than the State in his book. He does not even explain what he understands by the title of his book. For a more detailed history of the thought tradition of the French School, from Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle (even with the contribution of Pierre Milza), see Robert Frank's *Pour L'histoire des Relations Internationales* (2012).

the last breath of the *ancient Regime* are both arguing by the same logic, which assumes that the modern period is organized around the State as the primary political institution, even though the Empires that preceded it were not monolithic in its structure, nor faded rapidly by the end of 1648.

The 19th Century saw the re-emergence of the notion of Empire as two-fold: if the dawn of the century saw Napoleonic expansion leading to the formal end of the Holy Roman Empire and the coronation of a French Emperor, by the time it ended there were more nobles claiming the higher crown than it would be expected for a title that, in its origin, would stand alone in precedence. In this sense, "Emperor" became a European title that said little more than: "My borders spread wider than yours". This spread could stand for a geographical or historical notions of borders and, at the end, meant little if any difference from other European territorial States.

The second meaning of the concept of Empire developed in the 19th Century has to do with the colonial expansion of European States in the end of it (Hobsbawn, 1989). This new phase of colonial expansion by European countries came to be known as overseas Empires. The French and the British Empires are better representations of this phenomenon (Pitts, 2005). The case of Britain is particularly interesting, for Queen Victoria was crowned Empress of India, while remaining the queen of Britain. In doing so, she differentiated herself from the fellow monarchs entitled Emperors. This led Arno Mayer to differentiate the English situation as queen-empress instead of emperor-king, as the others (Mayer, 1981, 149). On that same note, David Cannadine (2002, 108) pinpoints the coronation of Victoria as Empress as the beginning of the "invention of tradition" in England, one which would last until, at least, World War I bending the idea of history in suggesting that the traditions developed on the second half of the 19th Century remoted far back in time.

This denomination of Empire was taken at face value in the contemporary literature and in the further developed body of work. No theorization of Empire emerged following this expansion of the European countries that would rival with the theorization of the State institutionalized in Political Science and Political Philosophy. The closest to a theorization would manifest in the form of the Marxists debates on Imperialism. But Empire and Imperialism are different categories and one should not

suppose that Empire is the one that enacts imperial policies. The extent to which Empire and Imperialism are accounted for as two different concepts lies in a passage by Gallagher and Robinson who, in discussing Imperialism, stated:

> The conventional interpretation of the nineteenth-century empire continues to rest upon study of the formal empire alone, which is rather like judging the size and character of icebergs solely from the parts above the water-line.
>
> The imperial historian, in fact, is very much at the mercy of his own particular concept of empire. By that, he decides what facts are of 'imperial' significance; his data are limited in the same way as his concept, and his final interpretation itself depends largely upon the scope of his hypothesis. Different hypotheses have led to conflicting conclusions. Since imperial historians are writing about different empires and since they are generalizing from eccentric or isolated aspects of them, it is hardly surprising that these historians sometimes contradict each other (Robinson, Gallagher, 1953, 1).

Seeing that the idea of Empire was – and actually still is – up for grabs, while the discussion on imperialism has a clearer definition of scope is interesting, especially due to the lack of clarity in the meaning of Empire, which can lead to the perception that its meaning derives from imperialism. Understanding these two concepts as different is a step in the understanding that imperialism is the politics enforced by expansionist countries until the end of the Second World War. Some of these countries came to be known as empires. Yet, this is a political denomination, not an analytical category. It is to denounce this lack of conceptual development in relation to this term, and to propose my definition of Empire as a political dimension that lies above the States, that I develop the current section.

The 19th Century European expansion, mainly towards Africa and Asia, coincides with the independence of Latin American Countries that had been colonized since the 16th Century. The situation of these newly independent countries generated a *sui generis* situation, for they saw the expansion of European capitalism towards them, but this movement happened without the suppression of the independence and the *de juri* submission to European countries. Their independence did not result in an economic autonomy with regard to the British interests. This was discussed in the first section of the chapter by looking to the Brazilian case, using Gallagher and Robinson (1953) to better understand the British economic expansion. The Brazilian economic history of the 19th Century offers a case study of this concept and the scholarship of Leslie Bethell is centred in the application of it to the Brazilian case (Bethell, 1970,

2011). Bethell refers to that 19th Century as "the long 19th Century" (Bethell, 2011, 31), therefore echoing Arrighi's reading of the transition to the 20th Century and Hobsbawm's take that the Age of Empires only with the beginning of World War I.

This temporalization, however important to the extent that it reflects relevant phenomena that impacted Brazilian politics. It excessively focuses on economic parameters, such as the economic prevalence of Britain and the City of London to the trade that involved Brazil and the lending to the government, and how, despite Britain's centrality, the US was already the biggest market for Brazilian products (Bethell, 2011, 20-21). In a sense, anticipates a transition to US centrality that would be consolidated at the end of World War I and the beginning of the "short 20th Century" (a process described in chapter 4).

The following passage by Leslie Bethell works as a synthesis that helps clarify the use of the term empire by focusing on the treaties of commerce that have been dealt with in the last section:

> The treaties between Portugal and Great-Britain, and Brazil and Great-Britain for the abolition of the slave trade in the first three decades of the 19th Century, the British diplomatic pressure for the fulfilment of the Portuguese and Brazilian obligations under the treaties, the use of the British Navy in open sea for the suppression of illegal traffic and, finally, the action of British Navy against the slave ships in Brazilian territorial waters in 1850, forcing the Brazilian government to suppress the traffic, could be understood as the best example, perhaps the sole example, of enforcing the British Imperial power that can justify the use of the concept 'British Informal Empire' in the case of 19th Century Brazil (Bethell, 2011, 26-7).

It is easy to notice how, in these readings of Empire the notion that the organizer element is economic in State-centric terms lies, albeit not so deeply. It is the economy that defines the empires that go on to occupy other spaces, then putting in motion the practices of dominance, and in each of these empires, there are those who profit more and that are seen as the centre[105]. Thus, the notion is that Empire would be a consequence of Imperialism, and not the other way around.

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[105] This idea of Empire is not something that distant from Giovanni Arrighi's (2010) temporalization of cycles in the European History. It has a lot to say on the matter of the cycles of accumulation by portraying them in a logic and rational way and the way through which one follows the other. Arrighi's perception on the long 20th Century does not exactly fit with Hobsbawm's temporalities which were referred to earlier as the age of Empires. That is a consequence of Arrighi's effort of going further than the Kondrotief cycles of accumulation could lead (Arrighi, 2010, 7), therefore using a macro-economic take to a more systemic analytical project. In turn, Hobsbawm is trying to make sense of shifts that are

Matthew Karp (2016), by reflecting on US Foreign Policy in the 19th Century, also considers the notion of empire as a useful one to spatially think the relation between the US, the Caribbean and Brazil. He goes a step further than the tradition of Empire shouldered by Bethell, as he removes the State when he says: "The stronger sovereign was Emperor Slavery, and his dominion commanded sugar, tobacco, rice and coffee – in a phrase, the chief 'alimentary products' of the entire Western world." (Karp: 2016, 141). Even though Karp's book is essentially on the intersection between foreign and domestic politics in the US, this sentence works as way of offering another read on slavery, less centred on the State and more loosely spatially situated. However, in order to do so, he falls in an abstraction of the idea of slavery: "Emperor Slavery" is a good play on words, but with little explanatory power. It shows how committed Karp is to the idea of State, for the notion of Empire is nothing but a punctual metaphor.

The other side of these efforts of classifying Empire solely as an economic feature is the use of Empire as a concept whose meaning is exclusively political. The best example thereof is Daniel Nexon's (2009) use of the term. In a historical approach to the formation of the early modern Europe, Nexon defines empires as follows: "Ideal-typical empires are characterized by *heterogeneous contracting*: the terms of incorporation between the center and each periphery involve different rights and responsibilities." (Nexon, 2009, 72, emphasis on the original). On the following page, Nexon goes on to elaborate upon his dual ideal types of polities that other than Empire include federations. He then states: "This distinction – which generates a continuum between imperial and federative composite states – does not exhaust the differences between early modern European polities" (Nexon, 2009, 73). This is to say that Empire and federation are only different forms through which the State organizes itself within its boundaries. They are not, it seems, different conceptions on the use of the space. Following this passage, he goes on to employ "empire" as an adjective to city-states. "City-Empire" would be defined as follows: "The ascendant city-states of late medieval and early modern Europe, however, might better be described as 'city-empires': they,

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occurring within the politics of 19th Century Europe and its expansion overseas, hence, taking for granted much of what Arrighi is dwelling to stablish.

at a minimum, controlled a *contado* composed of adjacent rural regions" (Nexon, 2009, 77).

There is, thus, a loose sense of the term, something between this political entity that encapsulates different forms of suzerainty and the use of force to enforce rule. This ambiguity gives the grounds to question if the substitution of the word "Empire" for "dominion" would suffice for Nexon, since it seems to be a concept with no clear developed meaning. The same critique can be extended to William Wohlforth (2001) and his use of the concept of Empire when analysing Russia and the Soviet Union as the same entity with nominal change after 1917. For Wohlforth, Empire would incorporate the idea of expansion to that of dominion, but no more complex than that.

The debate on Empire should account for the contributions of Andreas Osiander, who engages seriously with the imperial institution that haunts State-centric analyses: the Holy Roman Empire. In doing so, he historically and materially situates the disputes between emperor, pope, kings and whoever challenged the views of the Empire which he traces back to Hobbes and the absolutist wave in Europe (Osiander, 2001, 144). His notion of Empire is present in the following passage:

> As with any other Christian crown, it [Holly Roman Empire] owed its [Empire] status largely to metaphysical considerations, based in this instance on theology and the Christian interpretation of history, rather than to its power. Other medieval kings generally granted to the emperor (when there was one) a kind of primacy of honour, but this was a courtesy that reflected essentially, widely shared assumptions concerning theological role of the empire (Osiander, 2001, 143).

Osiander is proposing an Empire that was not historically absolute once the legitimacy of their rulers was put to the validation of the people, a take reinstated two pages later with the following passage: "In a nutshell, the crucial difference is this: we see society as existing within states. By contrast, the *ancient régime* saw rulers as existing within society" (Osiander, 2001, 145). However, the history about this Empire was one of absolute power and inescapable glory. The 19th Century and its invention of traditions is the point of contact between the creation of history/tradition of grandeur and the imaginary of the empire as the space that is in itself sufficient.

Pierre Manent (1990) is another author thinking through the meaning of Empire. As a matter of fact, he argues on the impossibility of Empire in latter moments of European History, given that the universality it stood for would always clash with

Catholicism and would not be enforced in a space with such a challenging geography (Manent, 1990, 18). Later experiences with the noun "Empire" in European History should not be confused with the Roman experience, for it became an idea that "each king intended to be Emperor in his own kingdom" (Manent, 1990, 13). Osiander (2001, 135-136) says that by the late 13th Century, the formula *rex imperator in regno suo*[106] had already been coined by Italian jurists. This is a legal predicament that enforces the argument of the imperial power as being hierarchically superior to other nobles in Europe, but this did not mean that their power was not needed for an articulation with subjects.

Manent (1990) is duelling with the History of Liberalism and conducts his analyses of European modern History in 10 pages arguing, basically, that there is no space for politics in an Empire, since it claims to be a unique power, therefore the struggle for projects and theorization would take place between States and cities. The idea of the Universal as apolitical would have been appropriated by the Church, hence the unique figure of the Pope who played a dual role in politics, for in the Peninsula he was no more than a prince, having bigger influence in England or Germany – prior to the reforms – than in Italy (Manent, 1990, 17).

There is another perspective on the idea of how to deal with Empire and Imperialism that entails the concepts being used interchangeably. This perspective is one that allows for Robert Vitallis (2015) and Adom Getachew (2019) to be accounted for together. These two authors ought to be differentiated from the others because they focus specifically on the meaning of the concept of Empire at the turn of the 20th Century: race relations. Anievas, Machanda and Shilliam (2015) present how the Foreign Affairs, "The discipline's 'founding journal" (Anievas, Machanda, Shilliam, 2015, 2), was called Journal of Race and Development in its inaugural years. This points to the intentions behind the creation of the discipline and its driving force during its first years: an understanding of the world through the colour line. This sensitivity is what distinguishes these two authors from the others, even though the contributions offered by them are also very different from one another. Vitallis, focuses more on the US and how racial dynamics operated within the country. He does so by making an

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[106] Roughly translated as "each king is an Emperor in his own kingdom".

exercise of understanding the dynamics of humanities, at large, but focusing on IR specifically in order to see how both were constituted within racial parameters fit not only to understand "the international", but also what happened within the States. His proposition of the "Howard School" is his way of accounting for how this movement was perceived at the time and how it was challenged by non-white intellectuals that kept on doing research that was also resistance. This resistance would point to the precision in du Bois' concept of colour line as the marker of belonging.

Adom Getachew (2019), in turn, is looking to the period of decolonization from the early 20th Century League of Nations' context. She works with the divide between contexts of "democratic nation-state" in Europe while overseas "unequal integration and racial hierarchy" (Getachew, 2019, 2-3) prevailed. In her analysis, despite the ways in which race is considered, it always ends up working as a structure that gives meaning and sense to the hierarchies invented within the borders. For instance, in challenging the idea that after independence the expected result would be nation-states, she argues that other forms of politics, in the shape of pan-Africanism for example, emerged.

The last author to be included in this section is Michael Doyle's 1986 book, namely "Empires". Doyle made an effort of synthetising the meaning of Empire in its many connotations without distinguishing between analytical categories – for instance, to categorize the expansionist drive of European states in the 19th Century – and adopting "Empire" as the name of the polity that it represents – and applying it to Roman, Ottoman, Spanish and English Empires within 40 pages. Doyle attempts to account for the political and economic movements that marked the history of the West within those terms, from Rome to decolonization in the 20th Century. He offers a definition of Empire in the first paragraph of the first chapter that reads:

> Empires are relationships of political control imposed by some political societies over the effective sovereignty of other political societies. They include more than just formally annexed territories, but they encompass less than the sum of all forms of international inequality. Imperialism is the process of establishing and maintaining an empire (Doyle, 1986, 19).

From this passage, three aspects jump to the eyes. The first is the reductionist role attributed to Imperialism, pretty much portrayed as equivalent to "acts of Empire". Such framing works in the way of domesticating Marxist interpretations to a supposedly more encompassing political reading. That way, he is able to quote Lenin

and the Gallagher and Robinson's 1953 text, along with Hobson, as a way of understanding Empire that focuses on its consequences on the periphery. This perspective, just as much as the one focusing on the metropoles, he argues, are somewhat reductionist and should be substituted by an interpretation that gives a broader view by encompassing the whole picture. This proposition to this broadening of the scope relies on Waltz's (1979) concept of International Relations (Doyle, 1986, 26-28).

The second tricky aspect with which he has to deal in his definition is the role of the State. "Political societies", "territories", perhaps even "all forms of international inequality" can work as place holders for State(s). Thus, the "State" is a sound absence in this definition. Still on the first chapter, in the subsection "Defining Empire", he also restrains himself of using the term State in the first paragraph. He only applies this term as the text flows. Actually, not only does he do that to this term, but also the notion of sovereignty – one which also poses a challenge to him (Doyle, 1986, 30). Imperialism as acts of Empire and a definition of Empire which dodges unescapable concepts of its definition to some extent leads back to Wohlforth (2001) and Nexon's (2009) definition that are both very close to the notion of dominion.

The third and last aspect is Doyle's characterization of Empire as an imposition of a "political society" over other(s). I will not engage in observing this interpretation through the lenses of Vitallis (2015) nor Getachew (2019) since it is clear that, although he constrains himself in using the term, Doyle is proposing a State-centred approach to the subject, not sharing with these other two authors the premise that the State may represent a menace to those within its own borders. Rather, it is useful to recall Hobsbawm's (1992) equation to represent nationalism that I employed in chapter 2 "nation = state = people". Thus, in categorizing Empire in terms of political societies acting upon other political societies, Doyle is playing with nationalistic sentiments. In doing so, the interests of Empire – or of Imperialism – are not accounted for; they are hidden under the cloth of pretentious national interests.

The option for closing this section with Doyle aimed at presenting precisely the insufficient attention that the term Empire has received disciplinarily. Doyle's book, in 1986, was the last study on the matter and yet, it was so filled with gaps while trying

to diminish the Marxist contribution to the discussion. It is upon this lack of discussion that I want to engage in the debate, since I understand that the uses that followed did not accomplished in making the meaning of the term more understandable. Vitallis (2015) and Getachew (2019), the ones who challenge the boundaries of the State as the limit to the imperial action, did not go as far as challenging the State as the *locus* of these actions. Wohlforth (2001) and Nexon (2009) did not actually elaborate on the meaning of the concept, just used it as a substitute to the use of force, whereas Osiander (2001) dealt more with the name of European *polities* than with the concept itself.

Finally, of all of these authors, it is interesting to bring to light the importance of the 19th Century in the transformation of European politics. And yet, the silence on slavery as a constitutive part of the Atlantic remains. The 19th Century as a period prone to the emergence of crown heads reclaiming imperiality is only a symptom of a system in which the notion of sovereignty was interchangeable with the idea of Empire. They key point is not, then, that there were many Emperors in Europe; rather that only few European States were open in stating their ambition of Empire in the title of sovereign. Despite Nexon's (2009) argument, the institutional race in European politics did not end with the victory of State; instead, it did so with the Imperial rationale as the winner, regardless of the multiplicity of claims.

It is within these cracks on the idea of Empire that I want to build another concept to Empire, one that accounts for it as a concept detached from the tradition of Imperialism. The concept of Empire that I want to present is one that, recognizes States as political spaces and is therefore also able to account for phenomena that takes place in spatialities that are not constrained by State borders, albeit being manifested within these borders nonetheless. These phenomena cannot be reduced as solely economic or social. They are happening at the same time economically and socially in different ways throughout the vast and imprecisely defined space that can be understood as the Empire.

This is what I propose as Empire, which works as a culmination of what I have presented throughout the chapters: the limits of the discipline; the disciplinary difficulty of dealing properly with the notion of enslavement: and the importance of the elites in enacting and promoting slavery through the 19th Century. In the next two

sections, I will close this argument of slavery as an Empire. But it is important for me to stress the following point: to the extent that I argue that slavery in the 19th Century Atlantic was an Empire, I do not wish to argue that it was the sole existing Empire. Nor do I wish it to be understood as only being able to happen within the Atlantic. As I see it, other Empires may have existed in the Atlantic or elsewhere. If they existed or not is a matter for other research(r)s and outside the scope of this thesis.

6.4.
Slavery as Empire

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri developed an important contribution to critically think about the modern International departing from the concept of "Empire". The all-encompassing network of connections that challenge sovereignty itself – albeit not the State – is characterized by the lack of boundaries and has no territorial centre (Hardt, Negri, 2000, xii). This structure, rising on the shadow of the demise of the USSR, knows no limits:

> First and foremost, then, the concept of Empire posits a regime that effectively encompasses the spatial totality, or really that rules over the entire 'civilized' world. No territorial boundaries limit its reign. Second, the concept of Empire presents itself not as a historical regime originating in conquest, but rather as an order that effectively suspends history and thereby fixes the existing state of affairs for eternity (Hardt, Negri, 2000, xiv).

At the risk of stating the obvious, not only Hardt and Negri are using Empire to think a very specific moment in time, but also the absoluteness they attribute to the concept ends up reducing it to exactly that: the definition of a moment in time, rather than a concept in itself. Not to mention that one could argue that the point of departure to this notion of Empire seems to be a historic miss-concept since the idea of Empire as "the absolute" resonates more with the vision denounced by Osiander (2001) – born out of 19th century disputes – than with the political history of the concept.

This notion of Empire developed by Hard and Negri seems to be the conceptual influence for R. B. J. Walker (2016b) in his "International, Imperial, Exceptional". Originally from 2005, Walker writes in a moment after September 11 and the Wars in Iraq and Afeganistan, thus necessarily having to account more explicitly to the effective

use of force, not only the building of strength. To Walker, the empire, also mixed with imperialism, lies in a different space than the international:

> To suggest that we ought to be thinking about contemporary political life in terms that invoke claims about new forms of empire/ imperialism or new forms of exceptionalism in addition to or even instead of claims about internationalism, as many recent literature suggest we should, is to confront a need to re-engage much more seriously with the politics of modern politics; the politics of a politics, that is, that has been produced in relation to two distinct yet interdependent discourses (Walker, 2016b, 238).

The absoluteness of the Empire; the undistinguished relation between Empire and Imperialism; the feature of violence: Walker synthesizes a great deal of what I presented in the last section as the insufficiency on the definition of Empire. There is one point, however, that this text helps illuminate on the argument I am building, and this is the idea of the exceptional that he develops.

Walker relies on a Schmittian reading of exceptionality denouncing it as essential to the liberal State. Schmitt defines the sovereign as the one who can decide on what is normalcy and what is exceptional. The issue here is that the premise of normalcy rests on the idea of citizenship as the definer of belonging: citizens belong; non-citizens do not belong. Walker's use of exceptional in the text is a form of denouncing the nemesis of States that were no longer States. Terrorist groups, radical cells and other forms of non-conventional types were exceptional and treated exceptionally by the US. But to this vision is not useful to think the role of the exception and how, even in light of the critique of the liberal State, the forms of invisibilisation of enslavement operate.

The State can operate in normal – non-exceptional – terms with a constitutive other from within. Slavery, as much as citizenship, was constitutive of normalcy within 19th Century US and Brazil. Violence and segregation were the norm, not the exception. This does not mean that these States had no sovereign power to decide on the exception. They had and the debate presented by Chalhoub (2006) shows precisely the State deciding if children would be free or freed. That which the 19th Century Atlantic Slave system demonstrated is the limit in the production of exception. Because, to the extent that the State could decide on the definition of the categorization of black people, white people were above the sovereign will of defining them as enslavable. This points to a limit to the State sovereignty and points towards the doubt if sovereignty lies in the State or in the system of States (Walker, 2016b, 244). Walker argues that at times the

legitimation of acts of violence from the State originated not in a *Raison d'État*, rather as the understood necessity of the State operationalizing ways of defending the sovereignty of the system. This is the understanding of slavery that I have been addressing: a way of organizing politics pervasive to States, generating consequences to the States but not originating in them.

Slavery did not claim to stretch away from the Atlantic, so it would be overreaching to equate it with that which Walker calls the International System. However, slavery is a dimension of politics that stays above the States and is, therefore, international in both meanings of the word: as a collection of national States and as a political structure capable of handling multiple national identities as a consequence of its overreach. These two meanings do not relate to Hardt and Negri's (2000) concept of Empire, consequently, for this reason, I went back to Norberto Bobbio et al's. *Dictonary of Politics*[107] to see how it is defined. Hereby I present what I found:

> (...) Empire has been the instrument to conciliate ever more conflicting and divergent political realities in the life of a State; a way to define a superior form of cohesion and unity in relation to regal and princely conflicting entities; absolute power organization in a social agglomerate for the conquest of territorial spaces (Colliva, 2004, 622) [author's translation].[108]

Empire, thus, would have the meaning of a political structure that could be seen as able to articulate the conflicts which would take place between other political institutions that are under its authority. From this capacity of articulation would derive the idea of absolute power, understanding power as the authority to mediate conflict. Empire is able to provide meaning to events that happen across the borders of its

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[107] I was not able to find a translation to English of this dictionary that is a recognizable reference in Brazilian circles of Political Science and International Relations.

[108] I understand that this is not a conventional reference in the discipline; however, the option for it expresses the difficulty in finding actual definitions of Empire. I looked in go-to references of the discipline in order to find a definition of this sort. In Max Weber (1991), I found a discussion on "The Prestige and Power of Great-Powers" and "The Economic Foundations of 'Imperialism'", but not directly addressing the issue of Empire. Morgenthau (1961), the second disciplinary reference I consulted, offered a more complex reading of the term. Nevertheless, it did not actually conceptually treat Empire as anything different than the collection of imperialist policies: "Since the 1870's, British 'imperialism' – that is, British foreign policy with regard to Britain's overseas possessions (…)." (Morgenthau, 1961, 60). Further on the book, he presents a section entitled "Three Goals of Imperialism" (Morgenthau, 1961, 69-71) in which World Empire, Continental Empire and Local Preponderance say little more than a State-centric approach to the use of military capabilities. The insufficient conceptual development in the texts with arguments that were presented by contemporary authors led me to look for the definition elsewhere and opt for not including them in the bibliographical overview of the last section, as to extend it in an unnecessary way.

vassals' polities at the same time that it relies on them to further develop its capabilities. The politics of Empire would be different than the framework that State-centrism proposes. Politics were not defined by State borders; instead, as taught by the Roman experience, events articulated in broader territories were loosely defined in their borders. By reading Anthony Bogues (2010), I find in the original – Roman – definition of Empire two contributions to the concept proposed here. The first is the acknowledgement that the root word of *Empire* is *Imperium* which means rule and command, and the second is the suggestion "that imperial power is also about establishing ways of life that rest on a single truth determined by power as common to human nature." (Bogues, 2010, 11), a concept that he draws from the classical statement by Cícero: "*civis Romanus sum*" – I am a Roman citizen.

Cícero's definition of Empire gives a new perspective to the idea of boundaries, an idea that the limits of the politics of that entity are defined by those who are able to say that they are citizens not by any geographical delimitation. To take Cícero seriously is not to ignore geographical boundaries and, consequently, the politics that takes place within these boundaries. Instead, it is to notice that there is also some politics that is more pervasive, one which is defined by belonging to the Empire, by having a citizenship that is recognized throughout specific borders and that, in itself, has no limits– since the limitation of the Empire is the existence of citizenship itself.

Bogues differentiates this original notion of Empire from the experiences mentioned in the last section. His intention is to frame the idea of Empire and Imperialism as used to categorize the United States politics as an independent State. Bogues develops his idea of Empire of Liberty as the power of constructing subjectivities (Bogues, 2010, 12). His point is not to situate a historical moment in the US (as did Hardt and Negri), rather to see how the idea of freedom is a continuity in the US discourse overtime, in spite of the contradictions it experienced since 1776.

Bogues discussion of "Empire of Liberty" leads me to think about the diametrically different concept: the Empire of slavery. My idea is the subversion of the Roman idea of Empire. Instead of having an Empire that is defined in terms of those who claim rights, it is pressing to think of a system that is dependent on the marginalized and whose politics is pervasive to the spaces that are caught beneath its

geographic extension. The limits of this Empire were not defined in terms of the last citizen, but in terms of the labour of the last enslaved person, and in another difference from the classical proposition, this Empire was not named after the seat of the crown. This is the chance of engaging with the issue of exception, not only in the terms put by Walker (2016), but also in Agamben's (1998) take on the matter. In the Introduction as well as in chapter 4, I have come back to Agamben's (1998, 11) quote: "Bare life remains included in politics in the form of exception, that is, as something that is included solely through an exclusion". Now, however, the critique on exception of Schimittian tradition made it clear that it is possible to point to its insufficiency on the subject at hand: if one is to categorize slavery as bare life, the argument made is not far off from the idea of "social death" (Patterson, 1982), meaning that it works as a way of making invisible the labour employed in building the world. Having said that, the Empire of slavery can be understood as an inclusion through exclusion, however not as exception, but as one of the norms. The norm that gives meaning to the Empire.

To think slavery as an Empire in the 19th Century Atlantic is to offer a cohesive interpretation for this phenomenon that manifested in different shores of the ocean long before 1800. On the second half of chapter 3, by thinking slavery in the US through its manifestations in Brazil, I mentioned a fluvial geography emerging from Mauray's proposal of the Mississippi colonizing the Amazon River. It ended up with a handful of Dixies establishing themselves in the Paraíba Valley to fight for the maintenance of slavery in Brazil. What makes the idea of this fluvial geography is the territorial imagination and the effective possibility of translating the image of space on the part of the elites. On the part of the enslaved populations, the image that connects the spaces of enslavement is the practice, as presented by Robert Slenes (2006), of the rivers banks as the place of burial of those who had tormented deaths in order to facilitate the access to *kalunga*.

There is a reason for this imaginary not incorporating the Potomac or the Hudson: it is not about them. It is not about the idea of politics or economy they were proposing. There is a common imaginary connecting the Mississippi and the Paraíba. This imaginary is mediated by the States in which they are situated, no doubt – and Gerald Horne and Matthew Karp had already elaborated on how they interact. However, there

is another dimension to this connection. One that is not mediated by the State and that ended up being responsible for the migration of the Southeners. This dimension is slavery, and the only way to articulate it is through the Atlantic: "a River Called Atlantic" to use Alberto da Costa e Silva (2003) metaphor.

Costa e Silva (2003) does not actually develop this metaphor that is present in his book title. It rests as a form of pointing to the proximity that the Atlantic allowed for, instead of signaling the distance, it represents the way in which the transit through the Atlantic was constant and flowing in the two directions, not only with enslaved people and their life experience constituting an utmost important part of Brazilian culture, but also in terms of how the South American coast influenced the African Atlantic coast through return journeys made by freed people who experienced the return to African ports. Costa e Silva's (2003) proposal in this book is to argue on the proximity of Brazil to Africa, a proximity that is most frequently overlooked as a consequence of predominant readings of Brazil in relation to Latin America or to Europe. Understanding the links connecting the shores of the South Atlantic as a river, the author not only articulates an interesting metaphor; he also dodges from the problem that oceans represent disciplinarily.

Considering that Europe's Imperial enemies were the Russians and the Ottomans, the ones who shared borders with the continent not only physically but also as a consequence of sharing some of the European values and history, while inscribing them in a profound process of differentiation that reflected the constitutive multinationalism of these Empires that reached far beyond Europe: worldings that could be understood through European lenses and concepts. However, the contacts made overseas fell in another category of understanding, which was outside the realm of hierarchical dialogue and comprehension to be in the domain of domination, of colonialism. The sole case in which the ocean in between posed a problem to the understanding of closeness is the relation, at large, was between Europe and the US whose proximity in terms of project allowed for the understanding of West as a political entity. Disciplinarily, this problem was solved by the development of two perspectives

responsible for two narratives of IR: the historical approach, nodding to the European experience, and the theoretical debates centered on readings of US context.[109]

With all that, the oceans remained unbounded territories, as void spaces of politics. Consequently, when calling the Atlantic a river, Costa e Silva (2003) is offering the conceptual tool to treat the ties that connected Brazil and Africa, yet at the expense of pushing forward an understanding of the seas/oceans as politically imagined on its own right. imagined as a space of contact with potential to be understood without the mediation of a metaphor of another sort of body of water. After all, the rivers run to the ocean, consequently, the ocean has the potential to be understood as the space of contact between the difference more than the homogeneity of the river constrained by its margins. It is to account for the potential of representing a melting-pot and for being less defined in terms of borders, rather considered in its whole mass, that the idea of ocean relates to the proposition of Empire that I am formulating.

The image of Empire is a useful one because it does not challenge States as political *loci*, yet proposes another dimension to politics. One that stands above the States intervening politically in the spatial imaginary, trade issues, war, belonging, alliances, wealth, nationality, citizenship, humanity and labour.

On that note, Paolo Colliva states:

[The] Empire was an institution that was able to sustain itself only in periods with certain cultural and social conditions; in fact, when outlived the limits of time to which it was proper, it lost its essence and purpose. It remained only as the pure 'imperialism' of power, strongly rooted in our time, despite of its formal matrix no longer existing (Colliva, 1997, 623).

This 'imperialism' would be racism and the forms of hierarchizing social relations in Brazil and the US after the abolitions, since it was racism that structured the imaginary of these countries following the abolition. No longer connected by slavery, the two spaces shared racism as an important feature in thinking politics. With black people being considered citizens, racism was the guidance in establishing new legal structures that enforced the discrimination. Colliva's passage is a more institutional reading of the concept, but it still relates with Bogues' notion that "imperial power is also about establishing ways of life that rest on a single truth

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[109] In between these two traditions is the United Kingdom, torn between the two and trying to articulate a compromise in the form of the English School approach.

determined by power as common to human nature." (Bogues, 2010, 11). In the case in question, the truth is that racial hierarchy is a structuring factor that organizes labour and wealth in the Empire.

For Manent (1990), the difficulty of Empire as a political possibility in modern Europe is the difficulty of having another absolute universal (as Christianity was to pre-modern Europe). However, by flipping this idea of inclusive universality – just like proposed by the Kantian idea that liberty comes to fruition in the State (discussed in chapter 2) – it is possible to argue that in the 19th Century Atlantic, one can see the category of the universal exclusion. The reason therefore is that the thing about the enslaved person is not the claim for citizenship: rather, it is a prior demand, one for the recognition of humanity. It is important to highlight that I do not say "absolute exclusion" deliberately because it is not absolute, since the exclusion does not apply to labour, if nothing else. It is through labour that the enslaved people prove themselves socially alive within their captivity. However, this exclusion is "universal" in the Atlantic space to the extent that is a dynamic shared by the spaces produced by slavery. Thus, it is not a demand for a recognition within boundaries; it is a demand for universal recognition.

The last feature on the Empire is its positionality as being above politics. This characteristic is present in Colliva's text in Bobbio et al's dictionary, just as in Hardt and Negri (2001), in Mannet (1990) and Nexon (2009) – in the case of the latter to the point that one understands that dominium is the failure of politics. Being the element which arbitrates politics between the constitutive parts of this totality, the mantle of neutrality is attributed to the Empire. Such neutrality is what contributes to the naturalization with which slavery is understood in Atlantic history instead of constant surprise following the appalling picture that is portrayed. The naturalization of the Empire generates a pervasive silence as to the relevance of slavery to the Atlantic. This silence is what allows for the mingling of history and fate. The way in which the Civil War marks a new start to the United States, or the way in which the abolition led to the fall of Brazilian monarchy fits this confusion. For as markers of the end of slavery, these two events mark a new way in which the exclusion of the "part with no part" was enforced, consequently changing the terms in which the eruption of politics would

occur. For once, at least formally, all were citizens then. With that, the predicament of the Empire as a space of politics that bends time and space once it becomes the marker for both emerges.

6.5.
"Uneasy Lies the Head that Wears the Crown"

The third act of William Shakespeare's Henry IV, Part II begins with a monologue by the king Henry IV:

> Who take the ruffian (billows) by the top,
> Curling their monstrous heads and hanging them
> With deafing clamour in the slippery clouds
> That with the hurly death itself awakes?
> Canst thou, O partial sleep, give (thy) respose
> To the wet (sea-boy) in an hour so rude,
> And, in the calmest and most stillest night,
> With all appliances and means to boot,
> Deny it to a king? Then, happy low, lie down.
> Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown. (Shakespeare, s/d, 111)

This scene takes place in the king's chambers. Nevertheless, the imaginary of sea is present as a comparison to the king's state of mind when war feels imminent. The anguish he feels, comparable to that of the sea-boy who posted in the higher mast, to see in the distance, but who, during a storm, is more vulnerable. Even this terrified character, in the highest pole, with rushing waves and the spray of the ocean, at times can close his eyes and sleep, and yet, the king is left sleepless. It is his royal responsibility that lays heavy on him and deprives him of his sleep and of the possibility of rest.

I find this passage pressing because it articulates the sea with instability and violence. The anguish of war is communicated in a sea-like imagery that makes the burden of the crown to be worst than a ragging sea. Much of that burden comes from the king's responsibility to organise the country and the impact his choices would have in the lives of men and women within the country[110].

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[110] It is evident that Shakespeare is writing about a king while the discussion on this chapter revolves around the concept of Empire. However, since I already discussed that the free use of the term emperor (ress) held no meaning other than presenting a larger State than its neighbours, the quote proves to be a pertinent one.

The 19th Century and the imaginary of history and Empire it brought with it leads us to think the latter has to do with the crowned heads. From Jacques-Louis David's "The Coronation of Napoleon" to the picture of Queen Victoria with a small crown on her head and to the image of D. Pedro II at the opening of the 1872 General Assembly with the State paraphernalia depicted in Pedro Americo's painting, the imaginary of Empire brings the idea of a crowned head. This is not the imaginary that the quote by Cicero evokes. "*Civis romanus sum*" points in the direction of citizenship as the defining issue, and it is upon this idea that I put forward the parallelism of thinking the people who constitute the Slave Empire in the 19th Century. After all, the burden of the crown fades comparing to the work in the plantations.

It is important to notice that in the Atlantic experience, differently from the Mediterranean one, there is a substantial difference between the people who stand as markers of the borders and those who are recognized as politically active. Both sets of people belong to the enslaver States and are constitutive of it, but they manifest completely different worldings (Spivack, 1999). Arguing that the 19th Century Atlantic is the inversion of the Roman idea of empire means that the people who constitute that space are deprived of rights in the face of that political institution. Other than the people who were the manifestation of the borders of the empire, there were also the people recognized as citizens who were empowered to decide on the directions of the Empire. They not rarely, occupied key State positions and sometimes their allegiance was torn between Empire and State in the sense that the logic of this dimension of politics that stood above the State could, at times, be contradictory with the goals of the States. The reason therefor is that as I have been arguing, to acknowledge the Empire is not equivalent to affirming that the State was an empty vessel. On the contrary, it remained the realm of political disputes that could be handled domestically between the nationals of that State. The claim I make of Empire is that concomitantly to national identities, slavery mobilized a set of identities of its own which could be communicated in Brazil just as much as in the US, States that had made slavery legal within their borders. In this scenario, the pledge of allegiance by states-men such as Henry Wise, as US minister to Brazil, who was torn between the interests of the State he represented and the rationale of Empire he endorsed and on which he was inserted, speaks on the multi-

layered politics taking place in the Atlantic. This politics, when reduced to diplomatic relations, falls short in properly offering a portrait of politics in the 19th Century.

This difference between those who commanded the space and those who enacted it is a way of saying that the spatial imagination of the Atlantic was operated by the mobility of the bodies of black people. It is important to highlight that this mobility did not relate to their will to move. Consider, for once, Linebaugh and Rediker's proposition of the mirage of freedom and mobility represented in the notion of Hidrarchy. They are also portraying the Atlantic as a space that connects, but with an emphasis on its positive side: the potential of connecting different spaces and peoples in search of, and fighting for, freedom. The mobility of the black bodies that constituted the loose frontiers of this Empire, however, was more akin to kidnapping. The bodies that constructed the spaces point to Maury's fluvial cartography – that proposed the colonization of the Amazon Valley by the Mississippi Valley – and to father Antonio Vieira's articulation of Newspeak that thought Portuguese domination over spaces and hierarchization of people as a political space of experiencing liberty in the 17th century.

The coexistence of these two possibilities of understanding the Atlantic offers the opportunity to look back to Henri Lefebvre's (1991) intake on the production of space as he points to a triad that helps the understanding of it. The three verbs "perceived – conceived – lived" (Lefebvre, 1991, 40) talk of space being mediated by the body in its manifestation. Lefebvre supposes that the experience with the three verbs is to be held individually by the members of a group. The triad of verbs relate to a triad of categories he proposes that are useful to argue onhow the divide between the two populations that inhabited this Empire was manifested.

"Spatial practice" is defined as "From the analytic standpoint, the spatial practice of a society is revealed through the deciphering of its space" (Lefebvre, 1991, 38). And here lies the main point of the thesis, for there is no way in which the deciphering of the 19th Century Atlantic can be accomplished without looking at the enslaved people whose labour produced the Atlantic space. Thinking in terms of Hydrarchy, Linebaugh and Rediker did just that and looked to the society that was articulating that space: sailors crossing the Atlantic. Yet, disciplinarily, we have not taken the challenge of understanding the Atlantic space seriously since we have been silent on the issue of

slavery and the enslaved people. What is central to a better understanding of the space dealt here is the articulation between two other Lefebvrian concepts. On the one hand, there are "representations of space" that consist of "Conceptualized space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers" (Lefebvre, 1991, 38); on the other, there are "representational spaces" (Lefebvre, 1991, 39) which refer to "this is the dominated – and hence passively experienced – space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate" The link between these two spaces – the one of projects and the other of execution; one of citizens, the other executed by enslaved people as well – is the Empire: a larger dimension of politics with loose borders. The moment in which the defining trope of space is no longer its borders, then the potential of reading space in ways that can account for marginalized people becomes more tangible.

The barriers of the Empire are not built as walls in a border. They are built in the way of defining which spaces one can inhabit and with whom one would be able to exchange experiences on the spatial practices. Spaces of command and decision would be impregnable to enslaved people. Access to representations of space, for instance, would not be possible for these people. The perception of labour, on the other hand, would fall exclusively to them living within the plantation. This represents a completely different worlding (Spivack, 1999) than that of property owners, or even free employed people that would live in the plantation. The abyss that differentiates these two experiences is represented in words. The lexicon that belongs to enslaved people is not the same that is adopted by plantation owners, and in order to understand it, one needs only to consider what it takes to make sense of concepts such as "violence" and "boredom" in the 19th Century Atlantic. They are exemplary of experiences within the world of the plantation and rationalized as a consequence of the experience of their bodies.

Getachew (2019) has a concept that works to characterize this divide between the two worlds created by slavery: postcolonial cosmopolitanism. Of course, she is dealing with the 20th Century and the efforts of proposing something other than the European nation-state, but the concept speaks volumes to the Atlantic in the century prior.

> The persistence of unequal integration and hierarchy calls for a post-colonial cosmopolitanism that recenters the problem of empire. Drawing on the critique of

international hierarchy and the anticolonial efforts to build a world after empire, which are reconstructed in the following pages, this model of cosmopolitanism is less aimed at the limits of the nation-state and more concerned with the ways that relations of hierarchy continue to create differentiated modes of sovereignty and reproduce domination in the international sphere (Getachew, 2019, 32).

Her idea of Empire is simpler than the one adopted by me here. She is referring to overseas territories. But the idea of hierarchies enacting ways of differentiation of peoples and sovereignties is central to the argument I am building. The dimension in which this distinction is more potent is on the divide between white and black people, Du Bois' "color line" which is also a divide between humanity and bestiality. However, it does not stop there: gender and wealth are also hierarchies that are at play at the same time in the construction of a spatiality more representative of social complexities. Divides and hierarchies that are coexistent with State borders and that are marked in/by the bodies of the people who experienced this multiple-layers divide.

The divides are the operative category here. From the beginning onwards, the debate on ways of categorizing the divides have been central to this thesis. From the disciplinary difficulty of dealing with it – presented in chapter 2 – which tends to equate divide with border. This is made clear from insisting in projecting the challenges of dealing with hierarchy to the international, to the proposal of incorporating difference to the political construct that is central to the research and rendering the definition of borders the less important element in the text. The pervasiveness of the issue of division points me back to Georg Simmel's text in which he discusses the framing of the picture. In it, he argues that the importance of the frame is that it guides the glance to the picture, thus talking about the picture, but with an inescapable nod to the wall in which the painting hangs (Simmel, 1994). It is about presence and enhancing beauty just as much as it is an erasure of the wall that rests behind and without which the painting would not have where to sustain itself. Simmel's text uses the imagery of the frame as a way of presenting a definition of wholeness that the painting, which is framed in its four sides, represent. An imaginary of references that point to geometry, just like Lefebvre did in his discussion of space and like Rancière in the following passage:

> Politics begins with a major wrong: the gap created by the empty freedom of the people between the arithmetical order and the geometric order. It is not common usefulness that founds the political community any more than confrontation or the forming of interests. The wrong by which politics occurs is not some flaw calling for reparation. It is the

introduction of an incommensurable at the heart of the distribution of speaking bodies (Rancière, 1999, 19).

"The empty freedom of the people" is Rancière's way of accounting to the fact that democracy is the form of government that rests in a tautological truth: it is based solely on the existence of people. There lies a difference in comparison to the other two forms of government that the author brings up from Aristotle. To the extent that an oligarchy would be based on the wealth of the few and an aristocracy would be legitimized by the virtue of excellence, democracy would manifest out of thin air. It would only depend on the manifestation of the people (Rancière, 1999, 6). Rancière's powerful interpretation of politics is that democracy lies in the capacity of relating to a group's experience of marginalization, a consequence of not being among the few rich nor among the few that exceed their qualities. This sort of politics allows, consequently, for the recentring of the problem of empire as a consequence of the persistence of unequal integration that follows colonization, to apply Rancière (1999) in interpreting Getachew (2019). The political democracy, just like the spatial definition discussed previously, would be defined in terms of social experience, specifically in the case of the political democracy, out of the social experience of marginalization which would build the latent potency of democracy.

Rancière's quote also offers a distinction between the arithmetical order and the geometric one is between the order of the many – thus horizontal – and of the few – hierarchical. To work with this metaphor, the idea of Empire I am proposing does not compete with this distinction between arithmetical or geometric. It just says that there is another dimension to this politics that is silenced. Almost as if there were two geometric orders: say two equilateral triangles sharing the faces opposed to their vertex. The geometric order from bellow sustains the police-based order from above with their labour. They are a "part with no part" no doubt, but they are also considered as not having part in the partake of other parties with no part. To many, it would remain yet to transcend the frontier of nature with civilization to be accounted for, and such is the case of the enslaved people. There is a difficulty in accounting for enslaved people as people, and this difficulty reverberates disciplinarily with the tendency of characterizing the different as being outside. I want to take the next paragraphs to present how limited this idea of otherness is, partly as a consequence of relying still on

the premise of citizenship, in part as a consequence of still relying on the State as the legitimate dimension of politics. In other words, as a consequence of operating, even critically, within the terms of the Liberal political thought.

This disciplinary critique that I propose relies in an effort of pushing forward with some critiques presented by Rob Walker. The first thing to notice is the presence of the notion of system in Walker's critiques. The tension and articulation between the State and the International (be it as system, or as modern international) are pervasive to Walker's work. The way in which the ground is always changing in the analyses produced in the field entices Walker to point the limits and insufficiencies of the discipline that, at times, is focused on States when it actually is dealing with a subject that concerns the international and that, at times, looks to the international when the States should be the main focus of concern. These concerns are present in texts that, sometimes even articulate with it the question of Empire. However, before going to this discussion of Empire, it is pertinent to discuss Walker's understanding of dynamics of exclusion and, to do so, the best point of departure is his 2005 text, "The Doubled Outsides of the International". In it, he proposes to see cases in which people are considered as pariahs not only of the State but also of the International. The radicality of this proposition resides in contesting the underlying construct built on the hype of Globalization that the world had a place for everyone. Consequently, even if one would be ostracized within the constraints of a State, the opportunities opened by the liberal international order would help one find his/hers place in the world.

This text, originally from the early 2000s like his other text "International, Imperial, Exceptional", seems to be a way of analysing the context of the war against terrorism, and the implication it created to certain people that would find themselves excluded from their own countries just as much as from the protections envisioned by the modern international towards people. The figure of the double outside of the international with which Walker arrives as a way of portraying the degree of marginalization to which these people are subjected is a powerful one, since it is a way of saying that one finds him or herself excluded from the international which is, by definition, the encompassing of everything. The point that I find important to discuss is if this reading of the double outside would not fall into a deterministic and absolute

reading of the people marginalized. The absoluteness I identify in this conceptual construal points me back to Achille Mbembe's Necropolitics which portrays a condition of complete despair and lack of control. For Walker, those who are left out in a double way are those who are not included in modern political life, neither on its State version nor in its international dimension (Walker, 2016a, 69). He leaves a space to the articulation of a critique on the modernity of coloniality open, inscribed in the recognition that there is the possibility of a spatiotemporal rearticulation of the modern political life. However, it seems that the critique posed by Walker presupposes the homogeneity within the State, the conventional wisdom of within the borders existing citizenship and homogeneity, and everything different would be coming from the outside. The presupposition of the outside to the State (perhaps the first outside) implies not a neatly divide, as the author himself denounces, rather a constitutive other whose otherness comes from some place different from, and other than, the State.

The necessity of the constitutive other to the State as well as to the modern international points to a scale in which, not belonging to the modern State, chances are that one will not belong to the modern international as well. The question is: what happens when one belongs to a State inscribed in the modern international (I will recuse myself at this moment to engage in a discussion on the modernity of the 19th Century Brazilian State) in a category other than citizen? Can one be outside the international even though s/he is inscribed to the State? To engage with Walker's proposition, there is no possibility of a double outside when, inside the State there is inclusion, even if it happens through exclusion (Agamben, 1999). Enslaved people would thus be outside of the modern international while belonging to the State.

It is a conundrum, that we are hence left with. I began this thesis arguing that slavery is an international phenomenon by definition as a consequence of always being framed as the constitutive other. Through the chapters, I built the argument of another spatiality centred in the figure of the enslaved person that articulated national spaces from Brazil and from the US. Within this international defined in terms of Empire, slavery is central to understanding the dynamics. However, when the international is framed in liberal terms – as the modern international and the international system that Walker is criticizing – slavery is invisible, and consequently, enslaved people do not

appear in the frame. As a consequence, this predominantly international phenomenon is made invisible internationally.

Walker's proposition of the double outside calls for another differentiation: that between the idea of the international and the concept of Empire, as proposed here. Throughout the thesis, I articulated it as a concept that stands above the State in its capability of articulating the sense of belonging of citizens and enslaved people in the US and Brazil. However, I do not claim that this Empire equates the international in a claim to totality. The idea of Empire that I am developing does not ask for the identification of universality, but for the idea of self-sustainability in the sense that everything that is beyond its limits is unimportant. Politically, economically and in the dynamics of hierarchization, the Atlantic Space in the 19th Century was self-sufficient.

Walker kept with the analyses of the modern international and the modern State as an entangled pair even on the second decade of the 2000s. In a 2018 text, Walker put forward the concept of scalar politics as follows:

> Paradoxically, the modern international also affirms an hierarchical structure within which this reconciliation has been affirmed: a scalar order that goes from high to low and from big to small, although, and crucially, this is an articulation of a scalar order that partly resembles and partly refuses the form of order against which the modern international is conventionally counter-posed: empire (Walker, 2018, 14).

This quote from Walker is helpful in synthesising the challenge of IR that is constantly dwelling with the challenges of articulating politics from different scales in a single narrative. Most frequently, one can find analyses on the field that depart from personal experience to make a broad argument, or that goes on the other direction, explaining how a major political event reverberated in the daily life of a group of people. This scale runs seemingly uninterrupted from the modern subject to the system of States in a harmonious dialogue.

Such a structure encompasses much of the discipline, be it as a way of arguing on the interaction between the different levels, be it as a way of denouncing the leaps that must be faced in order to make sense of it.

That which I am arguing in these pages aims at developing another engagement with such scale: to make it discontinuous, at least in one of its sections. Consider chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis, in which I am articulating at the same time the idea of State and its inhabitants with which I am working. It has in itself a divide between

citizens and enslaved people, both belonging to the State, but each with their own scale. On one side, there is the hierarchy that culminates – in the case of Brazil in the 19th Century – in the crown. This higher point organizes the positions that derive from it, everyone looking up to him as the point from which the scale is ordered. This scale ends in the social space that is on the threshold of citizenship, the courtroom that, as Hebe Castro (1995) has pointed out, is the social place where white poor men met enslaved people.

The second scale was organized from the bottom up: it was structured having as reference point not the person everyone aspired; rather, the representation of the utmost excluded person: the enslaved African woman who recently arrived to the plantation. This scale was organized in terms of repulsion: the further away one was from this category, the better it was.

It is important to highlight that this is not a continuum that goes from the crown all the way to the image of the enslaved woman, because there is the racial line operating a divide between these two realities, and this line ensures that someone's expectation on the divide of slavery never aimed at being close to the emperor, while on the other side, no matter how profound the fall from grace one might experience from the emperor, s/he would never expect to reach enslavement.

Taking seriously the effort of understanding labour as the organizing category of social life and as the condition of possibility for the social space, and considering that the bulk of the labour force in Brazil was enslaved, leads to the proposition that, in order to have a proper understanding of the 19th Century Atlantic, one must dislocate the analyses to the enslaved person. It is by acknowledging that the society was structured around enslaved labour, not around those who exploited their work, that it is possible to have a more precise portrait of the period. And it is from this acknowledgement that I named this sub-section: the uneasy life belonged to those who were productive to the society, not to the crowned heads who were dealing with human life as abstract figures.

I am using as reference the Brazilian case here but in a way that this can be translatable to the US experience as well. Considering the subject at hand, the distinction between a hereditary Monarchy and a male slave-centric democracy is not

pressing, and, as already discussed in chapter 4, the connections between the pro-slavery movement in the US and in Brazil were close and saw ways of supporting one another. The proximity between these two slave societies that led me to articulate that the possibility of thinking these two experiences together could result in an insightful understanding of this 19th Century phenomena. And it paid off, to the extent that it led me to the proposition of Empire. Thus, to the extent that nationalism was developing in Brazil just as it was in the US, the sense of belonging to the Empire was also taking place as well both in the mutual identification of those who made plans on how to exploit forced labour from racialized populations and in the acceptance that black people were, by default, enslaved people. This dual belonging (to the State that defined citizenry and slavery and to the Empire that legitimized the terms legalized within the State) is what differentiates and characterises the concept of Empire I am proposing: a political dimension that incorporates the "constitutive other" to its own conceptual development.

IR has its quota of "constitutive others" well developed. "Migrant", "refugee", "terrorist", "alien", "foreigner" are just some of the terms the discipline uses to translate the condition of a citizen from another country who, for one reason or another, had to come to the country where they are. As such, they are within, but they are not from within. As a consequence, these terms, deployed to characterized citizens from elsewhere is a strategy of translating the motive that made her/him move. No matter the naming, the central idea is to communicate that they do not belong. They are, to some extent, always "outside" from the enunciator State, but – in their majority – they are within the modern international (to articulate Walker's idea of the double outside). To the extent that they challenge the internal homogeneity of the State, their condition of othering in the perspective of the enunciator State is translatable in this lexicon of international law/politics that define the conditions in which the person left their country and which are the rights s/he is expected to access, consequently differentiating a migrant, a refugee, a foreigner, a terrorist and so on. People from the State in which these "others" arrive can – though not necessarily will – relate to the idea that if one is to cross a frontier, s/he would have his/her status of citizen translated to one of those categories characterizing a communicability to their situation. Consequently, these

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constitutive others are translations from citizenry with which "true citizens" are eventually faced with. Recovering Todorov's (1984) intake on the alterity – discussed in chapter 2 in light of Inayatullah and Blaney (2004) – it is possible that his identification of the encounter of the absolute "I"s would suffice in such situations since, though belonging to different States, they still met within the broader frame of modern citizenry.

The case I built throughout this thesis, though, is that the 19th Century Slavery followed a different trope. For starters, "slave" as a qualifier stood not as a way of addressing a citizen from another nation that arrived in Brazil or in the US. It was a way of identifying a *Kibundo*, a *Mina*, a *Bantu, a Huça* or a variety of other populations that were kidnaped in territories not recognized as States and brought to these shores against their will under intensive torture. It is only upon arriving that these people were in contact with the modern State – or the colonial form of a modern state – and in this contact, they were not qualified as citizens, but instead, as slaves. Outside the States that recognized them as slaves, they posed challenges to national authorities[111]. This is why I claim that their condition is different, for they represent a different otherness: one created within the State that did not mean the translation of a similar category proposed by another State. Thus, to the same extent that the State created the citizen, the States also created the enslaved person.

This constitutive other from within would not mean that there was not a constitutive other in the more traditional sense. In fact, there was – and this role was played by indigenous people. The indigenous people are present in Todorov's metaphor of the encounter between Europe and America, they are also present in Rousseau as "the noble savage" as well as in the romantic novels by José de Alencar as the holder of virtues lost to modern society. They are also protected by the Jesuit against enslavement while African labour was constantly exploited in the colony. There are even traces of indigenous people in John Locke's Second treatise, although not properly articulated in the text (Armitage, 2004, 603-605). The attachment of

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[111] The frontiers of slave States with non-slave States were constantly posing challenges to national governments. The Brazilian southern frontier – shared with Argentina and Uruguay – is recurrently demanding attention of the monarchy that had to negotiate the status of fleeing slaves (Cervo, Bueno, 2008).

indigenous to the land colonized by European powers was a presence that could compete with the production of space structured in a mode of production that developed in these shores. This is a different role than that attributed to the enslaved person. Both could find themselves in a marginalized place in society, yet the enslaved person was erased, while the indigenous was idealized. The role played by these two constitutive others is better summarized by anecdotal history behind the composition of the Opera *O Escravo* (The Slave).

As a form of celebrating the abolition of slavery in Brazil, André Rebouças, the black engineer and one of the more recognizable names of the social movement that pressured for the end of slavery in Brazil, asked Carlos Gomes, the conductor protegée of D. Pedro II to write an opera celebrating the abolition of slavery in the province of Ceará, in 1884. The music was developed by Gomes and the Viscont of Taunay, a supporter of the cause, drafted the first plot whose main character was an African freed man living in Brazil in 1801. This draft was sent to the Italian who Gomes commissioned to write the opera libretto. To the surprise of some, when the correspondence arrived with the final version of the Opera, the history was now situated in 1567 having as main character Iberê, a Tamoio indigenous (Alonso, 2015, 367-369). Black people were erased from the celebratory art work envisioned to celebrate their own liberty, and worst yet: this erasure was accepted by all and the libretto was never corrected.

This discussion of scalar politics remits me back to Walker's [2005] 2016 "International, Imperial, Exceptional". To the extent that I find his understanding of Empire insufficient, as discussed previously, he raises an interesting point in the discussion of sovereignty. Written on the shadow of US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, Walker questions the absoluteness of State sovereignty:

> […] modern political life works, in part, through a constitutive choice as to whether the ultimate source of political authority lies with the sovereign claims of any particular state or with the sovereignty of the system that makes the supreme authority of the state possible (Walker, 2016a, 244).

Walker is discussing the system of states as a whole, but this idea of sovereignty of the system reflects my proposal of understanding slavery as a dimension of politics that articulated the Atlantic and the spatial production in Brazil and the US. The

discussion of slavery as the other from within allows for the broadening of the sense of belonging for those whose identities as citizens are intertwined with the process of building the identity of enslaved of so many others. This particularity in the production of identity is what approximates the experience of citizenship in US and in Brazil. This identification in sharing the experience of a society that creates otherness within an abject otherness which allows for the communication between member of the elites in the US and in Brazil who, in sharing plans and experiences, identify themselves with one another in a dynamic that, at times, trumped their allegiance to their own State. This is what I have called Empire: this loose sense of belonging of these two elites. And this is also the reason I called it the Empire of Slavery, because the enslavement of Africans and of people of African descendance was the condition of possibility to its existence. The enslaved people were, consequently, more important to this system than the citizens themselves, since the Empire was entirely organized around slavery. And this is why I believe Orlando Patterson (1982) offers an insufficient take on slavery: it was not social death. Slavery actually defined the condition of social life in the 19th Century Atlantic.

6.6.
Conclusion

A few paragraphs back, I proposed the image of two triangles united by one of their bases as a representation of this concept of Empire. If we were to imagine the suppression of this common base, we would have a diamond with a straight line representing the hierarchy within this Empire: with the white male emperor representing the apex of citizenship on one extreme to the black enslaved African woman on the other. The supressed base would perhaps communicate that this continuum is representative of a social mobility within this hierarchy. So, it is better to retain the image of the two triangles with two distinct hierarchies. One represents the Police, the other Politics; one represents death, the other life; one stands for accumulation, the other labour; one imagines spaces; the other produces them.

These dualities are the ones that I articulated throughout the chapters by thinking through the scale of slavery during the 1800s as a way of proposing an interpretation that would make sense of the Atlantic as a unified political space. Relying, conceptually, mainly in Mbembe's "Necropolitics"; Rancière's "the part with no part"; Lefebvre's "Production of space"; Patterson's "Social Death"; and Spivack "Worlding", I try to argue that the image of the two triangles is useful to the extent that it establishes the mutual dependency: they only make sense combined. Not only that, this image also brings with it an ambiguous relation on the interpretation of the hierarchy. It can be intuitive to identify those who enjoy citizenship from any State for that matter; who enjoy the ability of being in the world freely, even with the option of manifesting against the State – perhaps to make a stand against slavery itself, as the higher place in the hierarchy. However, being an inverted Empire, this one is structured on the oppression and violence against enslaved populations. With that, the lower point on the hierarchy seen from the perspective of citizenship is actually that which grants meaning to the Atlantic as a whole. The fluvial imaginary that connected different sections of the continent was only possible by having as subject the body of the enslaved people working and producing the spaces, and the body of the enslaved women, understood as more vulnerable to violence, which would make them the opposite of the white male citizen.

At this point, it is important to highlight that the enslaved person, in this narrative that I am proposing, does not represent the "constitutive other" in this Empire in the traditional sense. Firstly, because s/he was not an outsider, s/he was from within: just like it took a State to constitute citizenship, it took a State to constitute slavery. Clearly, the condition of the enslaved people could not be compared with that of citizens, they were treated violently and marginalized within the same State that created them. This is why I argue that slaves were the constitutive other from within, because they were others, in relation to the citizens, and it was with their labour that society was constituted. Thus, their role as the constitutive other was literal, differently from the romanticized figure of the indigenous person whose imagery was mobilized as a way of establishing civilizational hierarchy.

I understand articulating a complex reading of the politics and identities inscribed in the States to be a valid exercise. To the extent that I confront State-centrism, the idea that the State must be understood through the lenses of Liberalism is reductionist. My goal was never to substitute Locke's liberal narrative, rather situate this reading as a political project effective in effacing slavery from the Atlantic political thought while displacing its centrality by offering other perspectives. This is my way of saying that the world should not be reduced to 17th Century England. Our political imaginary cannot be constrained by Locke's political battles and life experiences. In order to develop a discipline able to seriously engage with "the problem of difference" (Inayatullah, Blaney, 2004), it is necessary to articulate histories dealing with difference. Such histories will not be able to offer the same space to all the characters because, sometimes the testimonies are no longer available. Sometimes all that is left is the silence, and it demands looking through the traces to see reminiscences of presence that would have "world" (Spivack, 1999) in other ways.

Dale Tomich's (2004) Second Slavery is the proposition of thinking slavery as a cohesive system in the 19th Century Atlantic. I agree with him and it is precisely because of that that I am proposing the concept of Empire of Slavery, because framing slavery within the constraints of the State is not enough to understand it, especially in the dynamics of exclusion and on the perspective of future that it imposed to the enslaved people. The States around the Atlantic were relevant in the process of building slavery and maintaining it since the authority to do so lied in them. However, the imaginaries that produced the Atlantic space were not constrained by the borders. These imaginaries recognized the States, if, because of nothing else, many of them worked for the States (as diplomats, military men, nobles and so forth), but they were also committed to slavery as a broader project.

This is an aspect which is important to highlight: the effort of characterizing slavery as an Empire, more than an economic option taken by members of the elite and more than a conservative position of antiquated politicians is an effort to situate it in its contemporary disputes. Slavery, as Karp (2017) argues, was aligned to a broader 19th Century project that was able to articulate white supremacism with an idea of modernity which, albeit not recognized as modern by 21st Century patterns, resonated

in the 1800s. To reduce slavery as solely economic or political project is a way to understand the kidnaping and violent exploitation of the labour of more than two million people within 50 years in Brazil as a process of concentration of wealth. This is the reason why I, throughout the thesis, tried to articulate the economic aspect of slavery with its identity side as well, in order not to reduce the complexity – and the multi-layered violence – that was constitutive of slavery to only one its side.

On the matter of violence, I find a passage by Mary Karasch telling:

> In addition to convicted slave criminals, the prisons, such as one on the Ilha das Cobras and another on Santa Barbara, held slaves sent for 'correction' by their owners for a fault committed against them, such as running away or contracting an incurable disease. If their owners never signed the releases, they were, in effect, abandoned for life. In 1835, for example José Benguela and José Rebolo, who had chronic ulcers, and Joaquim Angola, who was paralyzed, were imprisoned by their owners in the Aljube to be cared for in its infirmary at state expense. These slaves were then trapped, because they could not leave prison without their owners' consent, and the government could not pardon them because they had not been convicted of a crime. Therefore, they remained in jail (Karasch, 1987, 120-121).

The amount of violence in this passage is overwhelming, and yet it was not at all exceptional at the time. This is central to the thesis, and an aspect that poses the following serious question for the discipline: what happens to a field of research constituted in the premise of the exceptionality of violence when faced with the prospect that, in fact, violence can be inscribed in the everyday lives of people? Worse yet: a legal form of violence that is enforced out of the will and volution of citizens that, in enforcing their will, do so at the expense of public resources. The relation between State and slaveholders was so profound that enslaved people could die in jail out of judgement/negligence/will of the holder even in light of having committed no crime. This sort of figment of history is no rarity. It is most common to find such histories in this research and when they rise, for a moment, other layers of the violence are effaced. But when the moment ends, in adding injury to the offense, the fact that the legitimation of these practices lied in wealth production and accumulation, adds another layer of violence.

The last aspect to which I want to point to is the effort of having clarity on what slavery meant. Slavery is a condition inflicted on a group of people by another group of people. There is no reason why it should be inferred that the sole group of being considered when working with slavery should be the enslaved people. Slaveholders

and their "police" activities are part of it just as much and must be remembered as such. To address slavery only memorializing the lives of those who suffered violences is to leave grounds for slaveholders to pose as philanthropes who conducted charity and, liberate all enslaved people a few moments before the abolition of slavery against which they articulated in parliament. It is from there that stemmed the preoccupation with dedicating a whole chapter to better understand the elites. This is not a thesis on the enslaved populations, rather a thesis on slavery as a whole and, consequently, it shall account for all the violences that slavery enacted and entailed.

Multiple silences marked slavery in the Atlantic. It was the condition of possibility to the political organization of this space in the form of an Empire that encompassed States and hydrarchies. These silences are conniving in connecting bodies to spaces and in violently detaching value from labour.

7. Epilogue

> But, it will be said, it also marks and retains his having-been present in a past now, which will remain a future now, and therefore in a now in general, in the transcendental form of nowness.

> Jacques Derrida

The reading of "Signature, Event, Context" by Jacques Derrida made an impression on me for a number of reasons – the main one being his elaboration on the event of signature and how it plays with the idea of presence in the text. I think that it points to something else: the difficulty of ending a text: the moment/space in which the presence/absence tension is resolved in favour of absence to the extent that the writer and the text part ways, each with their own independent life. How are we to jump into the abyss of the end of the text? How to choose the last words? How to make the sentences and ideas out-leave the pages and chapters of a thesis?

I surely constructed the argument the best way I could, worked with some punch lines, tried to mix some bibliography and incorporated some documents in the discussion. But, at the end of the day – or at the end of the five years, precisely – there is only so much one can do. In any case, this thesis is out there and, as far as I go, the text reaches an end, along with my efforts of playing with words. Putting the thesis out there is to sacrament the nowness referred by Derrida. And this is what I am faced with now, after having articulated the argument up until last chapter. Thus, this epilogue is me deferring the moment of the signature.

This movement of deferral is to some extent contra-sensical with the title of the thesis itself: A Sea of Silence, and yet I keep on writing. The last contradiction of a text that transited through so many. However, the silence is – I can only hope – broken with this text. Consequently, deferring this text is filling that void, is acknowledging some lifes that we do not account for frequently, in a space we do not consider politically. A Sea of Silence is thus a play with words that open so many possibilities of metathors through these pages.

Derrida's last deferral before the void of the last page stated: "(*Remark*: the – written – text of this -oral – communication was to have been addressed to the *Association of French Speaking Socieites of Philosophy* before the meeting. Such a missive therefore had to be signed. Which I did, and counterfeit here. Where? There. J.D.)" (Derrida, 1982, 330). That remark is what inspired me to, in the last minute, offer the synthesis of that which I hope I have (or soon to have had) comunicated. The argument I wanted to push forward is that slavery is a dimension of the Atlantic in the 19th Century which cares little for the State boundaries and is constantly interfering within States' "polices". I called this dimension "Empire". This concept, disciplinarily overseen be useful in discussing dynamics in which difference has to be articulated with dependency in such a way that the geographical boundaries are not central. I understand that this definition of slavery and the proposition thereof as a socially divided Empire works as the closure of the narrative that begins in the first chapter with the incapacity of the Theory of International Relations to deal with the figure of the enslaved person. It did so after going through the experience of Brazilian slavery and what it says about the limits of understanding the enslaved person through the frame of the State to the extent that what s/he lacks is the recognition of a characteristic that would be unrelated to the State: humanity. The State knows what to do with citizens and foreigners, concepts in which humanity is already inscribed and that operate as the opposite of one another. The framing of slavery in terms of State automatically leads to understanding it as the opposite of citizenship when, in reality, s/he is deprived of more. But how to account for one's humanity disconnected from his/her citizenship? Put differently: 19th Century slavery is an opportunity to see that one's humanity is not a tautological-universal truth, it is mediated by politics to the extent that it demands a State to recognize one's citizenship prior to his/her humanity being accounted for. However, when the day came that – after many quilombos, rebellions, Zumbis, Dandaras, homicides, suicides and every other form of fight – enslaved people were recognized as citizens – thus human beings – the lingering effects of slavery were still present in 20th Century Atlantic in the form of racism. These racisms showed that enslaved labour was responsible for physically producing the Atlantic space just as much as slavery produced the social interactions that inhabits these shores and it would

take more than institutional changes in the countries to transform the social legacy of slavery. Jim Crow laws in the US and intricate legal constructions in Brazil articulated forms of ostracizing former enslaved people and their descendants as second-class citizens in the two largest democracies of the Atlantic.

The third and fourth chapters show how the transition from slave to racist States operated both in Brazil and the US articulating the narrative of the abolition of slavery as a history of the strength of slavery instead of one of the advancements of freedom. This history is told along with a narrative of the intermingled experience of slavery and the imaginary of Brazil in the US during the last decades of slavery in the latter. The fifth chapter builds the argument in situating Locke's Liberalism in the Atlantic context: the same one that favoured the rise of slavery to the proportions it came to have in the 19th Century. This Empire, thus, is a political structure manifested in the bodies and imaginaries of the people who inhabit it, be it as enslaved or as members of the ruling class. Two universes that communicate with one another by means of violence.

"Communicate with one another by means of violence". Is an interesting way of closing the synthesis of a thesis that emphasizes silence in its title. I tried to refer to this intention of silence now and again when it related to the argument. Sometimes, for instance in quoting Sidney Chalhoub's text "The Politics of Silence: race and citizenship in nineteenth-century Brazil" (2006), this sort of relation was already presented to me by the texts themselves. Other times, as in Robbie Shilliam's "The Atlantic as a Vector of Uneven and Combined Development" (2009), the metaphor of "racism as a syntax" offered me the possibility of articulating metaphors to then make a play with words. My pen cannot stop before acknowledging a sentence in Randolph Persaud's and R. B. J. Walker's (2001) "Race in International Relations": "The primary problem that must be addressed is not that race has been ignored in IR, but that race has been given the epistemological status of silence" (Persaud, Walker, 2001, 374). This is a reference present since my PhD project, to which I have more than once referred to and that helped me not only to construct the metaphor, but also to navigate it through the text. How to engage with silences? Now, the question that imposes itself is perhaps even harder: how to know when to stop talking about silence?

"Signature, Event, Context" has yet another dialogue with this Epilogue: it is, in itself, an absent presence to the extent that it is a version, in writing, of an oral presentation of Derrida. It is already a figment of presence, a version of itself. And I can relate to that by the end of the thesis. This thesis is a version of itself too in that it elaborates upon generational silencing. People silenced in enslavement, disciplinary silence about enslavement, and multiple silences on the possibility of a political thinking that would conceive it politically not relying on the State.

But that to which I mostly relate this thesis to Derrida's text is the idea of how he understands the text "as a disseminating operation *separated* from presence (of Being)" (Derrida, 1982, 330). The dissemination, the labour, the existence, the personal separated from the presence is a potent idea, one which, in absence, was constantly present, articulated, if nothing else, in my critique to Patterson's "social death" because it fails to account for the absolutely necessary and yet, ever denied presence.

The possibility of accounting for it goes only thus far and, where it ends, begins the acknowledgement of the incompleteness of this thesis. The incapacity of accounting for the lives of those whose bodies produced this Empire, through their work or through the abandonment they suffered in rottenning places. The incapacity of speaking about the violences that constituted this empire is present all along. Koselleck's quote in the Introduction arguing that: "According to a well-known saying of Epictetus, it is not deeds that shock humanity, but the words describing them" (Koselleck, 1985, 73). This sentence makes more sense now, especially when the words to describe the deeds seem insufficient. Eventually, there is something of the order of the unreachable regarding slavery as an Empire. Something specific of this kind of totality that, despite being extremely difficult to pin-point, is absolutely necessary to consider.

This Epilogue is the hardest part of this thesis precisely because it is the end, where I intended to account for the voids of the thesis. But upon arriving here, in the end of the end, the defining moment of nowness, only made me notice that the voids are still empty and that they will probably remain so, because anonymity and silence were the rule in the lower decks of the ships crossing the Atlantic.

In the beginning of the 20th Century, during troubling times in Brazil, low-ranks Navy personnel took control of the most powerful ship in the Brazilian armada, turn its guns to Rio de Janeiro and threatened to open fire against the city if slave-like treatment applied to these black low-rank sailors were not suppressed. The man who led this revolt was João Candido Felisberto, later referred to as "The Black Admiral". Celebrating his deeds, Aldir Blanc and João Bosco wrote "*Mestre Sala dos Mares*". The last verses of the music are the following:

> *Glória aos piratas, às mulatas, às sereias* / Glory to the pirates, to the *mulatas*, to the mermaids
> *Glória à farofa, à cahaça, às baleias* / Glory to the *farofa*, to the *cachaça*, to the whales
> *Glória a todas as lutas inglórias* / Glory to all inglorious fights
> *Que através da nossa história* / That through our history
> *Não esquecemos jamais* / We never forget
> *Salve o Navegante Negro* / Hail the black saillor
> *Que tem por monumento* / Who has for his monument
> *As pedras pisadas do cais* / The stepped stones of the quay (Aldir, Bosco, 1974).

This is a song about the lack of presence. It is a song that acknowledges that the making of the world is, perhaps, all that there is for some, and that the immortalization in statues hence would be more fitting to the socially dead citizens.

At some point in the 2000s, a monument was built to João Candido. It is the statue of a tall man holding a ship's stirring wheel and facing the horizon. The statue stands over a pedestal that puts it, perhaps, two meters over the soil. With some help, one can see that the sculptor of the statue incorporated, under Felisberto's feet, "the stepped stones of the quay". As such, he incorporated, in his work of art, the absence that the statue aimed to correct.

Has he?

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
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