PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA
DO RIO DE JANEIRO

**Veronica Fenocchio Azzi**

**Law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) and the militarization of public space in Rio de Janeiro: considerations on limits, territoriality, pacification and sovereign practices**

**Tese de Doutorado**

Thesis presented to the Programa de Pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais of PUC-Rio in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doutor em Relações Internacionais.

Advisor: Prof. Kai Michael Kenkel

Rio de Janeiro
May 2020

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*To my family*

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# Abstract

Azzi, Veronica Fenocchio; Kenkel, Kai Michael (Advisor). **Law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) and the militarization of public space in Rio de Janeiro: considerations on limits, territoriality, pacification and sovereign practices.** Rio de Janeiro, 2020, 275p. Tese de Doutorado – Departamento de Relações Internacionais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

This thesis argues that law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) in Brazil are internal sovereign practices based on a convergence of domestic and national security which enables the deployment of the Armed Forces for public security. This study sustains that these operations reinforce sovereign authority in violent ways as the military exercises its constitutional prerogative of guaranteeing order within the public space by performing policing roles or engaging in domestic pacification. Pacification in Rio de Janeiro is aimed at certain marginalized areas of the city located within the national territory, yet that the Brazilian state considers to be outside of its control and subject to the rule of parallel authorities, mainly organized crime. Since the state regards these 'outsides' as threats to effective governance and to national integrity, it aims to forcefully reintegrate them by deploying violence. By assuming Michel Foucault's notion that the state cannot be understood apart from the practices that constitute it, a conception of borders as excluding procedures that represent power thresholds of sovereign violence will be adopted to understand how sovereignty as a practice is reinforced when the Armed Forces are deployed domestically to pacify the inside/outsides of the state and tackle a certain "enemy within". The thesis theoretical framework will draw from the practice theory and from Foucault's concept of biopolitics as a methodology.

## Keywords

# Resumo

Azzi, Veronica Fenocchio; Kenkel, Kai Michael (Advisor). **Operações de Garantia da Lei e da Ordem (Op GLO) e a militarização do espaço público no Rio de Janeiro: considerações sobre limites, territorialidade, pacificação e práticas soberanas.** Rio de Janeiro, 2020, 275p. Tese de Doutorado – Departamento de Relações Internacionais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

Esta tese argumenta que as operações de garantia da lei e da ordem (Op GLO) no Brasil são práticas soberanas internas que se baseiam em uma convergência entre segurança doméstica e segurança nacional que permitem o emprego das Forças Armadas na segurança pública. Ela sustenta que tais operações reforçam a autoridade soberana de formas violentas conforme os militares exercem sua prerrogativa constitucional de garantia da ordem no espaço público quando atuam em funções de polícia ou quando se engajam em esforços de pacificação doméstica. A pacificação no Rio de Janeiro é voltada para certas áreas marginalizadas da cidade que se encontram em território nacional, mas que o Estado considera como áreas fora de seu controle pelo fato das mesmas estarem sujeitas a autoridades paralelas, como o crime organizado. Como o Estado considera esses espaços 'fora' de seu controle e como ameaças à governança efetiva e à integridade nacional, ele busca reintegrá-las forçadamente através meios violentos. Partindo do pressuposto de Michel Foucault de que o Estado não pode ser entendido de forma dissociada das práticas que o constituem, a análise adotará uma concepção de fronteiras como procedimentos excludentes que representam limites violentos do poder soberano para entender como a soberania enquanto prática é reforçada quando as Forças Armadas são empregadas na pacificação dos dentro/fora do Estado para combater um certo "inimigo interno". O arcabouço teórico da tese será construído com base na teoria de práticas e no conceito de biopolítica de Foucault como metodologia.

## Palavras-chave

Segurança; Práticas Soberanas; Operações de Garantia da Lei e da Ordem (Op GLO); Militarização; Pacificação; Territorialidade.

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There is no more pure foundation or pure position of law, and so a pure founding violence, then there is a purely preserving violence.

Jacques Derrida, *Force of Law*, 1992

# 1.
# Introduction

This thesis is about the use of force. It is also about power. State power. It aims to contribute to the International Relations literature from the point of view of the Global South by analyzing security developments in Rio de Janeiro as a case of the exercise of sovereign authority in its essential prerogative to deploy force domestically. In addition to my personal interest in the subjects of sovereignty, state power, violence and the military, the specific choice for the subject of militarization of public space stemmed from an empirical observation of security policies in Rio de Janeiro in 2016. That year, due to the Rio Summer Olympic Games, there were many members of the military patrolling the streets, particularly in neighborhoods close to Olympic sites. Yet the presence of the military continued to be observed in the everyday lives of cariocas even following the end of the mega sports event. This was a curious circumstance, to say the least, for a country that went through a military regime so recently and for so long. Some were excited about the presence of the military, feeling more secure; others were wary about it. Either way, a new normalcy unseen before had been set, and this puzzled me.

In Brazil, the term militarization is commonly used to refer to issues such as the demilitarizing of the police. Yet the motivation for this thesis did not come from talks of the police being more or less militarized. Instead, it came from the opposite observation, namely seeing members of the Armed Forces patrolling the streets of Rio de Janeiro, exercising police-like functions *in practice*. Acknowledging the continuous presence of soldiers in my neighborhood affected my daily routine, albeit indirectly, as I walked past them on my way to and from home. Possibly due to the dissuasive show of power associated to military force, and to the performative aspect of the state, reinforced by the mere presence of soldiers in public space.

The norms that enabled Armed Forces personnel to be deployed for public security in the particular exercise of law enforcement police-like functions, such as patrolling and surveilling the streets, are a prerogative of the sovereign state enabled by the Brazilian federal legal framework referred to as law and order enforcement

operations[1] (Op GLO, as initials for law and order assurance operations – in Portuguese, *Operações de Garantia da Lei e da Ordem)*[2]. In a way, this object of study found me. It was simply there, taking place. But what is, indeed, the concept of Op GLO? The obvious answer is that GLO is a legal device and mechanism that enables domestic deployment of the military for law and order activities. Yet what I observed was neither simply a concept, legal mechanism nor a prerogative. It was happening indeed *as a practice*. Thus, in light of the existing body of knowledge on security, in the case of GLO operations as an object of study[3], I believe my research problem informs theory significantly more than the other way around.

At first sight, GLOs are a legal framework and a prerogative that allows for the domestic involvement of the military in public security in a systematic specified way; not in an *ad hoc* fashion, as was the case to be observed many times in the past. As part of a legal framework, GLOs work as a device that can be activated whenever the Executive power judges necessary, namely in cases it deems the traditional body of public security forces as unable to act effectively, calling for the military to step in to enforce law and order on behalf of the sovereign state.

Be it a legal framework, device or a practice, law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) systematize a prerogative that is far from new in Brazil: that of the domestic involvement of the military. This prerogative has been ingrained in the country's state formation history, and clear in official definitions of the Armed Forces themselves throughout the Brazilian Constitutions since the birth of the nation state. Therefore, the quest becomes to understand in what ways that deployment became enabled by law, was able to be institutionalized, and what it was justified by. The idea is that this quest can be an attempt to understand what possible future patterns of GLO applicability may be observed in that regard and to comprehend the conditions of possibility in which GLO decrees may be enacted by the Executive in the future.

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[1] Henceforth, law and order enforcement operations will also be referred to as Op GLO or GLO(s).

[2] The Portuguese term "*Operações de Garantia da Lei e da Ordem*" (Op GLO), albeit possibly literally translated to operations for the guarantee of law and order, will be hereafter translated to law and order enforcement operations, given the law enforcing nature of the activities involved, which closely relates to the notion of law and order assurance as in enforcing the law.

[3] As will be seen next, law and order enforcement operations are classified by type by the Ministry of Defense. Even though we will use the term GLO in the text with no further specification, our case study refers specifically to urban violence-type law and order enforcement (Op GLO) operations.

One could say the notion of GLOs 'began' in 1999, or in particular in 2001 with Decree number 3.897, as the government envisioned the possibility of the military to acquire policing roles when and if state security forces proved unavailable, inexistent or insufficient to regularly perform their constitutional mission at a specific point in time –as in cases of military police strikes or disturbance of public order. These same prerogatives were revisited and expanded in 2004 by Complementary Law number 117, consolidating what later was commonly referred to simply as GLO operations, by allowing the military to act in conjunction with the appropriate local public security bodies, such as the military police, in their field. Since then, GLO as a mechanism to engage the Armed Forces in the provision of public security has been repeatedly activated.

According to the Ministry of Defense, GLO operations have been deployed 55 times by the Executive power in Brazil over the past decade, from 2010 to 2020. There were five GLO operations in 2010, nine in 2011 and six in 2012, including the security of the Rio United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20. Three occurred in 2013 for the Confederations Cup, the visit of Pope Francis for the Catholic Church World Youth Days, and eight in 2014, including the provision of security for the FIFA World Cup in the country's main cities. Additionally, there were two in 2015 and four in 2016, including the Rio Summer Olympic Games, then eight in 2017, and five in 2018. Operation Rio de Janeiro, that lasted from July 2017 to December 2018 in that state, coincided for six months with the Federal Intervention to enforce security in Rio until December that same year. Although the Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro ended in December 2018, the mechanism for further applicability of GLO enactments remains in effect, with three GLO operations in 2019 and two by April 2020.

By granting the military the prerogative to acquire police-like functions in the exercise of law and order, GLO operations came as a response from the Brazilian state and as a last resort to force when the Executive perceived the military police as unable to tackle major public security challenges posed against the state. Yet, what makes GLOs so different from previous forms of Armed Forces domestic engagement? What is so peculiar about this particular justification to deploy the military to enforce public security by the Executive? This investigation will depart from the underlying assumption that GLOs are security practices that reinforce sovereignty, for they are a form of preserving violence that sustains the most basic

prerogative of any sovereign state: that of deploying violence internally within its territory. In that sense, this thesis aims to answer the following research question: In what ways law and order enforcement operations (Op GLOs) differ from other forms of previous military engagements in public security in Brazil and what is their meaning and signification to Brazilian sovereignty and its territorial limits?

This focus is borne out in the structure of this thesis. Chapter Two will begin by approaching how militarization fits in the International Relations literature with regard to the territorial limits of sovereign violence and by presenting the argument and central definitions that will be used in the analysis. The military is an institution intrinsically related to the state security apparatus and to sovereign power. Thus, a literature review will retrace the European state formation trajectory, genealogically addressing central IR conceptions as security, wars, sovereignty and statebuilding that developed from that experience, as well as the ontological and epistemological implications thereof. The purpose of that literature review to this case study is to clarify why these concepts, and militarization, are studied in the way that they are.

I argue that in the case of Brazil, law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) constitute domestic pacification sovereign practices promoted by the Brazilian government in which domestic and national security were merged to enable a deployment of the military for public security. As such, GLO operations occur by allowing the Armed Forces to take on policing roles and engage in an internal pacification process with policing activities that, albeit not exclusively, target mainly certain areas considered to be 'outside' the state's effective control.

International Relations as a discipline reinforced an inside/outside divide on the thresholds of sovereign violence regarding the state apparatus that established that while the military focused on the exterior of the state, the domestic space became a responsibility of the police. The chapter will also recover security in developing countries as a concept mainly turned inwards in contrast to the European experience due to these states' consolidation process and approach the reasoning that sustains why sovereign violence is more likely to occur in the Global South. By doing so, the particularities of the Armed Forces in developing countries and their relationship with domestic security concerning the process of state formation will be addressed, particularly in Latin America.

This thesis assumes that this body of literature is still very much attached to the nation states borders as the limits of sovereign violence and hence fails to fully

explore precisely the mechanisms through which security and violence as essential sovereign prerogatives to deploy force are exercised inside states. In this vein, Chapter Three proposes we conceive borders domestically as sites where internal sovereignty is exercised through violent practices. By understanding borders as thresholds of state violence and domestic limits of sovereign power, it becomes possible to see how that power can be exercised at many levels, even domestically. A deconstruction of the traditional understanding of borders in the IR literature will hence be conducted to conceive borders in a way in which sovereignty as a mechanism occurs not solely at the external territorial borders of the nation, where the military is traditionally allocated, but also within the territorial limits of the state itself. In order to conceive GLOs as sovereign coercive practices enacted by the Brazilian state, practice theory and Foucault's concept of biopolitics will account for this analysis methodologically by adopting an alternative conception of borders. The ways in which law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) intrinsically relate to the elements of violence, pacification and territoriality will be considered.

The purpose of Chapter Four is to analyze the relationship of the Brazilian Armed Forces with internal and national security to see how these two were able to converge. The structural aspects and mechanisms of Brazil's security apparatus that enabled the increasing militarization we have been observing in the ongoing deployment of the military in public security in recent years will be analyzed. The historical relationship of the Brazilian Armed Forces with the domestic realm, in the sense of how notions of national and internal security have been forged up to the democratization period will likewise be considered. Finally, the legal framework that created the law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO), as well as their specifications such as the prerogative to act like the police (contained in the first 2013 version of the Ministry of Defense GLO Manual) and the definition of the GLO rules of engagement (ROE), will be introduced.

Chapter Five will describe the territorial dimension of domestic pacification in Rio de Janeiro regarding how some territories were deemed as "ungoverned" by the Brazilian state and in how that relates to GLOs. It is essential to stress that since GLOs are understood here as sovereign violent practices, for the purposes of this thesis, domestic pacification does not entail solely the UPPs program, but instead, an entire governmental security enterprise of a coercive reordering of society in which GLOs play an important role. As such, 'pacification' may have come into

existence with the UPPs installment in 2008, as shall be seen in that chapter, but I argue that domestic pacification is not restricted to it. The focus will be on how the Armed Forces relate to that process, be it by being called upon to act in GLOs that aimed at assisting the implementation of the Police Pacifying Units (UPPs), or by engaging in GLO operations unrelated to UPPs in recent years.

To this end, the chapter will begin by recounting the excluding marginalizing urbanization process in the city of Rio de Janeiro that caused some neglected territories to become spaces outside the *de facto* state control where organized crime developed, mostly some slums deemed as ungoverned and perceived as threats. It will then analyze the securitization of organized crime targeting these spaces as the Brazilian state proposed a militarized forceful reintegration of these territories to pacify them. The purpose is to show how the state has engaged in coercive sovereign practices to handle territories it considered to be 'outside' its control even though they are territorially located within its territorial limits. This dynamic is explained by an inside and outside mechanism of inclusion/exclusion observed in the logic of borders as practices. At this point, we shall be able to see that the areas the state is protecting itself from are within its own territory, not outside its borders in geographical terms, but also not 'inside' in terms of effective sovereign control.

Lastly, Chapter Six will account specifically for the practical dimension and activities of law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) in Rio de Janeiro to sustain they constitute sovereign coercive practices that take place through militarized pacification. The first half of the chapter will begin by an overview of urban security GLOs in Rio, then focus on the role of the military in the pacification process and its socially coercive dimension, as well as some of the consequences of the 'war' over Rio de Janeiro. The second half will consider the alleged implications for International Relations theory and for Security Studies that I believe could be drawn from this case study.

# 2.
# States, Violence and the Limits of the (Inter)national

> As a body of knowledge, international political theory was structured by emphasizing certain concepts in certain ways, based mainly not on natural nor given concepts, and therefore, must always be placed into their historical contexts to avoid risking a reproduction of European historiography inherited assumptions in an almost unconscious way.
>
> Edward Keene, 2005

## 2.1
## Introduction

The involvement of the military in public security represents a case in which a state institution destined to handle international security is being deployed domestically. This differentiation is based on an underlying assumption that security (and the use of force) is tied to the limits of the (inter)national. This conception of security, in turn, stems from a particular experience of state formation that gave birth to specific conceptions of authority and sovereign power. Usually, the prerogative of international security is attributed to the military, while domestic security is responsibility of the police. In that sense, the case study of this thesis does not seem to fit the mainstream theories on the meaning(s) of domestic and international security in terms of the limits of state violence.

Since this case study analyzes militarization, the point of departure will be to provide an overview of the ways this subject has been able to be studied in the discipline of International Relations so far. This overview will be followed by an exposure of the argument of this thesis, as well as the central concepts that will be mobilized in it, to facilitate an understanding of its overall narrative and vocabulary. Next, a literature review will attempt to answer a few questions. Firstly, how was a specific conception of security established and what are the implications of an epistemology and ontology in International Relations that only allow issues such as authority, power, militarization and territory to be conceived the way they are? Moreover, how were the thresholds of inside/outside sovereign violence stabilized

and in what ways is that especially problematic for developing countries? The answers to these questions stem from the fact that major understandings on security are structured in terms of the aforementioned logic that projects this conception as an outward element to the state. To this end, this thesis intends to demonstrate that the traditional territorial and epistemological limits of international security –and by implication, of domestic security –are closely related to the experience of European state formation.

This particular experience that took place in a context fraught with interstate wars, followed by the Peace of Westphalia, reveals specific accounts of sovereignty, authority and territory that are constantly reproduced in the security literature today. Through these historical lenses, we will see how the limits of state violence on the domestic and international spheres have been delineated the way they were in the discipline. The purpose is to show how a particular experience has shaped the current understanding of the dimensions of security and of the limits of violence. An overview of the European history of state formation as a body of knowledge and a theorical tool can reveal how practice has influenced theory in terms of security concepts that are so deeply embedded in the literature. At the same time, this can represent a hindrance to the theorization of the military exercising security in the internal dimension of the state, since this body of literature attaches the limits of sovereign violence to state borders as a threshold.

In this vein, the chapter will discuss the internal dimension of security in terms of particular accounts on sovereignty, authority and on security that emerged in the context of the European state formation process. The state security apparatuses that developed thereafter reveal understandings of domestic and international violence that were likewise constrained to these limits: police responsibilities were in the inside realm, while exterior security was attributed to the military. Accounts on the consolidation of sovereign authority and of the state security apparatus that developed in the literature will be discussed to see how these reinforced the notion of sovereignty and security in its outward relational aspect.

The counterfactual consequence to this development, namely the displacement of violence to the 'outside' of the state, will be exposed with special focus on anarchy. Perhaps the greatest assumption of that understanding to IR's security literature, that is, the projection of an insecure international environment as opposed to a domestic peaceful ordering, will be analyzed. The aim of the

proposed chapter structure is to take a reverse route to see how theory evolved in order to have a better comprehension of how epistemological limits were established, how they work, and what the consequences for literature are. The underlying motivation is to show how this represents a limitation to the theory of International Relations regarding how we can conceive security and violence.

The chapter will also consider the implications of this particular notion to mainstream concepts of security and sovereignty from the birth of International Relations as a discipline to discuss where the specific subject of militarization fits in that literature. Lastly, it will be argued that these assumptions and their underlying implications are particularly problematic for developing countries such as Brazil, where notions of inside/outside differ from the European experience to a great extent. To this end, to comprehend the security particularities of Global South states, it is necessary to account for the limits of the domestic and international security apparatus in ways that inherently relate to their state formation process as colonies. The aim is to recover the argument that, for these countries, state security was mainly turned inwards, not outwards, and located, many times, within the territorial limits of the state.

By the end of this chapter, the goal is to have reached an overall sense of what is claimed to be a body of knowledge on crucial concepts that represent an essential groundwork and a starting point for this thesis. In addition, the intent is to show how these conceptualizations represent limitations to understandings of security and sovereignty, specifically to comprehend GLOs as a case of domestic pacification in Rio de Janeiro.

## 2.2
## The Place of Militarization within Security Studies

During the Cold War, militarization and militarism were central topics in the security agenda, yet they were analyzed and thought of either through the lenses of Strategic Studies or of Peace Studies (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 13). Aimed mainly on power relations, the mainstream Realist understanding of the 'billiard ball model' regarded states as isolated, self-contained units that moved over the table to possibly collide with each other, mostly due to military and security matters (Burton et al., 1973). This implied that the focus of security would rest on potential interstate conflictual relations and reveals how the underlying logic of conceiving security in

an externally oriented way can reinforce and limit the study of military engagements mostly to the international scope of the state.

As the Cold War ended, many historical watersheds that had been taking place within political units themselves, such as the nuclear deténte, as well as the manner in which Cold War bipolarism ceased to exist could not be explained nor foreseen by the Realist paradigm (Fierke, 2007, p. 55). Up to that point, security had been understood mainly in terms of the international system composed of sovereign independent states, and defined by the relations among them. Yet in that context, a new epistemological concern over what the locus of security should be, emerged. In spite of the preeminence of the Realist paradigm, whose focus remained on interstate wars, the issue of an alleged renaissance in Security Studies was brought to the discussion (Walt, 1983, p. 133).

Some claimed the inability to explain new phenomena in a satisfying manner stemmed from the fact that theories such as neorealism limited the object of study to the entity of the state (Kolodziej, 1992, p. 421). By assuming the centrality of the state as an actor, the conception of the meaning of security itself was thought of as a function of that entity, becoming irreducible as such, and consequently causing the subunits at the domestic level to be irrelevant (McSweeney, 1999, p. 15). This statecentrism implied in an ontology that rendered the state the reference of security; in turn, threats were likewise conceived as a function of it.

Critical Security Studies (CSS) within IR originated as a response to that demand, by advocating for a change in the focus of security, as well as its subject and objects, in an effort to transcend the statecentric model (Stavrianakis & Selby, 2013, p. 10). The idea was to include securitizing actors and theoretical frameworks to allow for a more discursive conception of security and include themes beyond those such as arms influence, institutions and military ideologies (Stavrianakis & Selby, 2013, p. 10). It then became possible to think of human security as the security of people as opposed to conceiving security exclusively in terms of the security of states.

For critical security scholars, the pretension of an objective reality, as well as the separation between subject and object that is implied by this observation, needed to be transcended since it affected knowledge production as well as subsequent conceptions of change (Krause, 1996, p. 9). This investigation resonates with this purpose of including interpretative forms of analysis with elements such as identity,

the role of ideas, norms, values, meanings, and historical contexts, as well as human beings in the analysis of security (Krause & Williams, 1997, p. 49).

Following the end of the Cold War, most conflicts were of domestic rather than of inter-state nature, differing from the strategic military traditional issues, so the academic community began to discuss whether internal perils should be a subject to be studied, in addition to external threats (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 11). In addition, there was a shift from a focus on war and militarism to that of security in the rise of securitization theory "to approach questions on where security starts and stops, what it does and does not; however, the question of militarism and its relation to security, has not been at the forefront of academic discussions" (Stavrianakis & Stern, 2018, 4).

Particularly in the aftermath of September 11th, borders became somewhat blurred, given that the terrorist threat was attributed to weak governance. To a great extent, the consensus was that world peace depended on strong states, defined as "*states that were capable of keeping order in their territories, assuring the social contract and human security*" (OECD, 2008, p. 7). Central to that notion was the assumption that threats to international security could rise from a weakening of the legitimate monopoly over violence in Weberian terms – be it internally, in the form of violent civil strife and population displacement – or in ungoverned territories in the international realm, where drug cartels and terrorists could act (Stavrianakis & Selby, 2013, p. 7).

The incorporation of the concept of state fragility into the political agenda also opened doors in the epistemological sense, allowing the literature to encompass cases where states not only could be incapable of providing security within their territories, but could also constitute, in and of themselves, a source of insecurity towards their citizens, as in the case of the Rwandan genocide. In addition to threatening to the local population, there was a concern over the fact that states with such levels of domestic violence could represent "*a potential source of insecurities for the core states of international society since they threatened to undermine the modern project of achieving political order*" (Milliken & Krause, 2002, p. 764).

The more the focus of security was drawn onto the domestic realm, the more scholars argued that the problem of weak 'state capacity' could facilitate civil wars and internal disorder, as well as enable threats like terrorism and drug trafficking, of 'international' nature, to emerge (Fearon & Laitin, 2004a, p. 13). Concurrently,

the global development agenda began to comprise questions such as small arms violence in countries like Brazil, which albeit formally at peace, presented high levels of domestic and criminal violence (Batchelor & Kenkel, 2014, p. 2). The consensus revolved around the notion that in case the political instability of a country resided in its inability to extend the rule of law within its territory, the support to the development of legitimate security structures and justice should be a major goal (OECD, 2008, p. 8).

Nonetheless, despite the inclusion of internal dimension subjects into the academic debate, in practice these topics differed more and more from traditional security issues (Stavrianakis & Selby, 2013, p. 6). The incorporation of new themes, forms of agencies and objects of security, such as new wars, failed states, SSR and small arms represented a breakthrough from the rationalist analytical framework. However, the expansion of the security agenda occurred at the expense of a distancing from the subject of militarization and militarism –even within the Critical Security Studies literature (Stavrianakis & Selby, 2013, p. 6). As a result, by 2003, it had been made the case that militarism, militarization and the military had not been studied much as security themes outside of the logic of wars and much remained yet to be done in that aspect (Stavrianakis & Selby, 2013, p. 10).

This gap in the literature represents a limitation of the meaning of security that directly impacts militarization as a subject. In a way, this may be partly explained by the fact that the Armed Forces as an institution continues to be strongly associated with external threats and to the political imaginary of a potentially hostile 'international' outside environment *vis-à-vis* a stable peaceful domestic order. By assuming that the inclusion of these issues was not enough to transcend the dichotomist logic of sovereignty and security, the ontological and epistemological attachments to the 'territorial' limits of nation states come to the forefront of analysis. This could help explain why the military was put aside from the research agenda as the domestic realm gained greater attention and can reveal epistemological limitations on security upon which this work will develop.

As a subject of study, militarization has traditionally been treated as a function of the sovereign states since the birth of IR and became estranged from the literature as new themes, such as violence taking place at the domestic level of states, have joined the expanded security agenda. Even in light of the violence that began to be perceived at the domestic level of states, sometimes despite an

increasing domestic deployment of the military in the post-Cold War, militarization and militarism are less frequently studied in the discipline.

On the other hand, this epistemological limitation reveals an inability to conceive and study the military as an institution apart from its 'outwards' historical 'signification' of strategic and war studies. This hinders the theorization of the military in terms of how this institution relates to, and deals with, threats that are believed to originate and take place in the domestic realm. It seems that in order to study violence in contemporary liberal states, we are tied onto these boundaries, in which the prerogative of the military continues to be international security. In the words of Stavrianakis and Stern,

> While violence, war and the state persistently stuck to our reflections of militarism, they nonetheless repeatedly slipped away from centre stage in our reflections. This combination of adherence and elusiveness alerts us to the need to pay more attention to these concepts/practices and their interrelationships –not to definitely settle them, but to open them up as promising avenues of exploration. (Stavrianakis & Stern, 2018, 15)

This limitation, tied to territorial conceptions over modern sovereignty, obfuscates a proper recognition of all the ways in which violence and force take place within national borders by the military. Despite these limitations –yet at the same time precisely due to them –this investigation becomes a genuine and necessary effort. Years later, the academic debate continues to stress the fact that the military dynamics tend to reveal an absence or undertheorization of militarism (Eastwood, 2018, p. 51).

For reasons as such, it is important at this point to ask how we understand the relationship between security and militarism, both as analytical tools and as objects of analysis. As objects of analysis, war and militarism have been largely subsumed under the rubric of security both in policy and in efforts to understand even that which has been traditionally clearly presented as 'war' and 'military force'. Yet to reflect on this is important because

> the question of security has been reframed in both international relations and global policy to address political, economic and social processes, practices and materialities that blur, for instance, boundaries between the domestic and the foreign, the civilian and the military, the public and the private, and war and peace. It has made us think more carefully about the operation of power in its variety of forms, and about the scale of analysis from the local to the international, transnational or global. (Stavrianakis & Stern, 2018, p. 4)

According to Stavrianakis and Stern, if we shift our focus to seriously engage war and militarism by transgressing the constraining imaginaries of global order, we might then are able to conceive these concepts beyond dominant accounts that portray war only as "over there", as in Aleppo or Goma, and begin to conceive them in additional warscapes in which military power also emerges and operates. (Stavrianakis & Stern, 2018, p. 7). By acknowledging this, as Stavrianakis and Stern have pointed out,

> "War zones might not be located only in the theatre of traditional combat, but instead can be found in the seemingly safe place of our homes, our streets, our borders, and inscribed on our bodies." (Stavrianakis & Stern, 2018, p. 10)

Needless to say, although this thesis will refer to the 'war' on organized criminality, this does not mean that a case is being made for an actual conflict in Brazil. Instead, it is simply to look at GLO operations in the context of pacification in Brazil to highlight a situation in which military power is being exercised. This will also allow us to consider other equally important key areas and interrelationships *"such as the connection between practices of militarization, securitization and mundane security practices in the name of counterinsurgency and public safety."* (Stavrianakis & Stern, 2018, p. 4).

This is why to the authors it is now commonplace to find research projects that, for instance, use ethnographic methods, pay attention to practices and materiality, as well as discourse, and focus on the corporeal, emotions and the everyday, articulating the concepts of security, militarism, violence, war and the state with social coercive practices (Stavrianakis & Stern, 2018, p. 9).

The next section will attempt to retrace the origins and some of the major meanings and significations of the concepts of sovereignty, state security and development of the state security apparatus within International Relations that will be useful for this analysis. This is part of an effort to make sense of the reasons why militarization is studied the way that it is, and how we can, from then on, approach this subject in this case study.

**2.3**
**Argument and Definitions**

This thesis aims to answer the following research question: In what ways law and order enforcement operations (Op GLOs) differ from other forms of previous military engagements in public security in Brazil and what is their meaning and signification to Brazilian sovereignty and its territorial limits?

To this end, it argues that law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) in Brazil are domestic pacification sovereign practices promoted by the Brazilian government in which domestic and national security were merged to enable the deployment of the Armed Forces for public security. In this vein, GLO operations occur by allowing the Armed Forces to assume policing roles and engage in an internal pacification process, mainly, albeit not exclusively, towards certain areas considered to be 'outside' the state's effective control. As such, GLOs reinforce sovereign authority in violent ways as the military exercises its constitutional prerogative of guaranteeing order within the public space by performing policing roles that speak directly to the reordering of social life. GLOs operations are not exclusive to the state of Rio de Janeiro, but this thesis will mainly focus on the urban security GLOs that took place in that state.

As violent sovereign practices, GLOs are enabled by an articulation between national and domestic security through a legal mechanism that can be repeatedly activated by the Executive power to allow for military use for public security that articulates notions and perceptions of what can be interpreted as internal threats in a vast range of situations. It does so by allowing the domestic engagement of the military through a particular relation in which national and public security are blurred and in which internal sovereignty violent practices in its biopolitical forms are able to be exercised with extremely higher prerogatives to the use of force that can normalize instances of pacification as a form of violence.

Pacification through GLO in Rio de Janeiro is aimed at enforcing law and order in potentially any territory located in the national territory. Given that in Rio de Janeiro a Police Pacifying Units (UPPs) process occurred in 2008 following a process of securitization of organized crime, there will be a significant overlap of military engagement in the process of UPPs instalment in that context, mainly in the Operation Archangel and Operation Saint Francis GLOs. These targeted certain marginalized areas of the city, located within the national territory but that the state considers to be outside of its control and subject to the rule of parallel authorities, mainly organized crime. In that context, the Brazilian state framed organized crime

in Rio de Janeiro as a threat that disturbs order and poses risks to the cohesiveness of its territorial integrity that should therefore be tackled. This refers mainly to territories deemed as ungoverned 'outside' effective state control, mostly slums, that have been classified and 'placed' in specific locations on a map to which pacifying violence should be directed. Since the state regards these 'outsides' as threats to effective governance and to national integrity, it aims to forcefully reintegrate them.

In that sense, the exercise of enforcing law and order by members of the Armed Forces in the city of Rio de Janeiro engaged in deploying violence to pacify and reintegrate these territories considered outside the state but located within it. Since these outside borders are located inside the state, a problematization and deconstruction of borders becomes necessary to account for how these practices are deployed to these sites. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, contrary to Robert B. J. Walker's argument that violence is the condition to a life with no violence inside, to a great extent, the violence targeted toward and in these sites to reintegrate them to the state could be the condition for an ordered peaceful 'outside' in remaining areas of the state, and to the maintenance of state's monopoly over the coercive means domestically.

This is how the bordering practices of the inside / outsides will be analyzed in this case study. Both as a violent protection mechanism manifested as members of the military aim at tackling territories to pacify them as they protect the state's patrimony and/or its citizens, but also to assure that law and order are observed within the state. By adopting practice theory as a methodology, a conception of borders as excluding practices and procedures that represent sovereign thresholds of violence will highlight how sovereignty as a practice is reinforced when the Armed Forces are deployed domestically to pacify the inside/outside margins of the state to tackle an "enemy within". Consequently, the population within these sites becomes subject to coercive practices and to technologies of control. Since sovereign coercive practices carried out by the Armed Forces are analyzed, the state will be conceived not merely as an abstraction, but rather, as defined by the set of practices that constitute it. To echo Foucault,

> We cannot speak of the state-thing as if it was a being developing on the basis of itself and imposing itself on individuals as if by a spontaneous, automatic

mechanism. The state is a practice. The state is inseparable from the set of practices by which the state actually becomes a way of governing, a way of doing things, and a way too of relating to government. (Foucault, 2007)

Militarization is defined as the process of adopting and employing military models, methods, concepts, doctrine, procedures and personnel in activities of police nature, hence granting a military feature to questions of public security (Nazareth Cerqueira, 1998). Carlos Magno Nazareth Cerqueira's definition was originally thought of, and conceived, to characterize militarization of the police in Brazil. However, by assuming that the purpose of GLO operations is to enforce law and order in public security, we will use the adoption of the aforementioned military features by members of the military to exercise public security, according to how they are requested to act in GLOs performing policing roles. The understanding of militarism also resonates with the sociological definition of the term that sees it not as a phenomenon in terms of strong war ideals, but as a function of the intense ways through which military interactions affect practices and social relations altogether (Shaw, 2013). By affecting social relations, questions such as the mere placement of armed military personnel in the streets in their interactions with society will be regarded as activities and practices that can affect social relations in a society.

Security is understood in terms of *"a complex, diffused expression of political, social, and economic powers of knowledge, representations, practices, and institutional forms that conceive, direct, and act over bodies and spaces, that is, as a political technology"* (Burke, 2007, p. 28). Burke's definition of security as a political technology dialogues with Michel Foucault's understanding of the actual practical exercise of sovereign authority in its power dimension.

The definition of pacification used in this thesis is that the concept is a type of violence that is phenomenological and includes threats, coercion, intimidation and surveillance to restructure and sustain social and political relations to promote a coercive reordering of society (Baron et al., 2019). Exercised by liberal states, when pacification operates effectively, it could seem that there is no violence, since its violence is diffuse, difficult to observe and embedded in the structuring of the prevailing order (Baron et al., 2019). Since it could suggest an absence of direct and even indirect violence, in fact perhaps even reducing instances of direct violence, pacification could at best be described as a negative peace that operates through violent means to reorder and restructure society (Baron et al., 2019).

As a third form of violence, pacification provides a conceptual framework with which we can analyze the domestic pacification process in Brazil as a means of the sovereign power to violently reorder and restructure social relations in a quite similar fashion to the ways Foucault has attributed to the roles traditionally exercised by, and a prerogative of, the police, yet that in this thesis will be presented as roles performed by the Armed Forces. That will allow us to see not only GLO operations on the ground as pacification practices that violently reorder social relations, but to see UPPs as part of this overall process as well.

Urban security-type GLO operations will be understood as internal sovereign practices that entail coercive power and violently reorder social relations within the spaces over which they act –hence a form of pacification. Those forms of coercive power will be interpreted as an expression of state power exercised by the military as an essential security apparatus institution that acts in the public space in Brazil, and, as such, has an effect in society. The effect will vary, depending on where citizens live, as GLOs can take on more spatially determined forms that can target pacified spaces or potentially any other public space as requested by the Executive. By analyzing GLOs as mechanisms of violent social inclusion of internal sovereign power exercise, we can then reflect on the possibility of pacification as a means for achieving domestic peace and stability, while also reinforcing sovereign authority.

In this vein, even though the referent object of security will be the state that promotes pacification, the analysis of that pacification in its practical dimension will draw from Foucault's concept of biopolitics. Biopolitics is defined by a technology of power of implanting power mechanisms aimed not at modifying life, but at controlling, regulating and managing human life in its capacity to make live possible on the one hand, and let die on the other (Foucault, 1999, p. 293-4). As a technology of power, biopolitics entails the control of bodies, which according to Foucault, stems from the state's need to administer a population, and the demand to study it emerged as a result of the fact that it becomes a scientific, political, biological as well as a problem of power (Foucault, 1999, p. 292-3). In that sense, biopolitics is variable, and has evolved, from the control over fertility and mortality rates to hygiene promotion efforts at the end of the 18th century (Foucault, 1999, p. 288-92). For this case study, it refers mainly to policing roles identified by Foucault as a function of the police for the maintenance of public order. Most specifically, the biopolitical instances of pacifying violent practices towards local residents

along and within "enacted" borders highlighted in the analysis will include surveilling, conducting searches, restricting the right to come and go, and the establishment of checkpoints.

Territory will be defined as what is controlled by a certain type of power (Foucault, 1980) and this concept will be crucial to add a spatial dimension of the workings of GLOs as practices. A flexible understanding of the territorial element will allow us to conceive territory, and territorialization, as a logic surrounding practices that allows for a rescaling of the lenses that regard the city as a unit of analysis within IR. This stems from the acknowledgement that cities characterize a new frontier for contexts of endemic violence, even in 'non-war situations' since they have become increasingly violent spaces (Nogueira, 2017, p. 1438). In that sense, borders will be conceived as thresholds of sovereign power and as sites, moments and practices of contradiction that can be politicized and/or depoliticized beyond the physical limits of the state, establishing a clear demarcation between the inside and outside of a central political community (Walker, 1993 and 2009).

Conversely, before we begin, specifying what is not meant to be approached by this analysis becomes relevant at this point. Even though public security is constantly referred to throughout this thesis and relates to the subjects of GLOs in many forms –for instance, in the denomination of urban security GLOs and its meanings to law and order enforcement – an analysis of the issue from the point of view of public security *per se* has not been pursued. The main reason therefor is the fact that this thesis is focused on the exercise of sovereign state power and attempts to fit in the sovereign authority realm of intersections between domestic and national security. Public security here, thus, is understood as an internal security dimension. Even references to the state security apparatuses are made in terms of the sovereign authority to which these institutions are subject. This is why even the UPPs, implemented at a local level, are analyzed as part of national security policies as well as the GLOs that will be dealt with in the ways that the Ministry of Defense has handled them: as an internal operation aimed at defending and protecting the state in its domestic dimension from possible threats to order located within its territorial borders. Hence, it is possible to assert that in this thesis, public security will be approached as a function of the notion of a domestic pacification project and of a particular articulation between national and domestic security.

Moreover, the approach of this thesis focuses on GLOs as violent practices in terms of an understanding of pacification that differs from the main historical association of the term in Brazil, namely the experience of the Police Pacifying Units (UPPs). It is essential to clarify that pacification as a concept in this case study denotes a type of violence and hence differs from a notion of pacification that is restricted to a synonym of the UPPs. Through this interpretation of the meaning of pacification, this concept in fact encompasses the UPPs policy as one of the traces and policies that fit into a greater domestic pacification enterprise.

On that note, although pacification in Brazil is commonly associated with the Police Pacifying Units (UPPs) and with the military police in Rio de Janeiro, this thesis sees the UPPs as only part of the Brazilian domestic pacification effort, and not as a synonym thereof. The focus of the thesis will hence be on pacification through GLOs performed by members of the military before, during and following the context of the UPPs. Moreover, given that this thesis is based on the fact that members of the military are exercising roles that are traditionally a prerogative of the police, such as patrolling and surveilling, albeit the military is the focus of this work, there will be constant references to the military police of Rio de Janeiro throughout the text. This is solely for the purposes of providing a better understanding of what the regular functioning of the military police is, and to provide a comparative counterfactual to allow for a better understanding of the Armed Forces exercising these roles. This contraposition between police and the military also serves to better clarify the militarized structure of the state security apparatus in Brazil concerning the police-like functions attributed to these two institutions over time.

That said, the military police in Rio definitely played a crucial role in pacification with the UPPs. Nevertheless, it is important to clarify that the police will be merely addressed to be analyzed in contraposition to the military in the exercise of law and order based on the assumption that the in GLOs, the military is exercising policing prerogatives. In addition, with regard to police violence, the Brazilian military police and police special forces such as BOPE in Rio de Janeiro are notorious for heavily resorting to force causing many killings, for instance, by recently using snipers (Mello, 2019). Throughout this analysis of GLOs as violent practices, there will be an overall assumption that the military *can* be more violent than the police. However, this assumption is simply due to the inherently higher

prerogative to use force that is attributed to the military as an institution of the state security apparatus whose function is to protect from outside threats. It is crucial to clarify that this acknowledgement that the Armed Forces have an inherent greater prerogative to use force, and potentially, act in more violent ways when and if necessary, does not in any way intend to say that the military *is* more violent than the police while acting in the exercise of GLOs.

By utilizing the notion of a potential enemy (in reality or in discourse), the lens of practice theory allows us to expand an understanding of pacification that enables us to approach GLOs as security practices that are nevertheless violent. That is the case even in instances that do not constitute a war, yet in a scenario in which militarization for public security is an expression of sovereign power and in which violence is integral to its primary prerogative to deploy force to ensure the social contract. As a legal mechanism that allows the Executive to interpret possible disruptions to law and order and to hence justify this prerogative to deploy Armed Forces personnel for public security even in non-war situations, due to their inherent relation to the prerogative to the use of force, GLOs reinforce sovereign authority.

In that sense, it is important to mention that two terms will be constantly referred to throughout the text: the war on crime and organized criminality. The appearance of these terms, as well as the choice to highlight them, is a result of textual and narrative analysis. Even though it is important to clarify that this thesis does not aim to state that Brazil is formally at war, nor that organized criminality constitutes the sole enemy and threat that GLOs would be tackling, the choice to account for this particular semantics was firstly, to keep the discourse intact and true to source in terms of the choices made by the sampled interlocuters. Secondly, to best explore the meaning of these terms in the overall context of Op GLO.

Next, a literature review will follow to retrace mainstream processes of state formation and sovereign authority in order to see how the Armed Forces and the police relate to it as essential institutions of the state security apparatus to begin to see the ways these concepts relate to the case study of this thesis.

## 2.4
## Sovereign authority, state formation and the sovereign state's security apparatus

In modern politics, the observance of the resort to violence is inevitable. This leads to the question of in what ways it shall be justified, and who is to use it. For Max Weber, "*if there existed only societies in which violence was unknown as a means, then the concept of the 'state' would disappear; in that event, what would have emerged is what, in this specific meaning of the word, we might call anarchy*", given violence is inherent to the state (2004, p. 33). That said, it is only through politics that good can be achieved, through which the decisive means is the use of force (Weber, 2004, p. 84). Thus, politicians in charge should abide to the following commitment: "*You shall use force to resist evil, for otherwise you will be responsible for its running amok*" (Weber, 2004, p. 82). Weber made that remark in the context of the *Machtstaat*, in a time human life had reached the highest form of structured political organization to this day: the nation state.

With regard to established independent nations states, it is particularly hard to question concepts such as authority, territory and sovereignty, long embedded in the literature and in practice and becoming naturalized over time. Nonetheless, the allegedly current understanding of these concepts and of security, commonly taken for granted, were drawn from the European experience of state formation. In that particular historiography, certain concepts were emphasized in certain ways, so it is "*imperative to look at them with historical lenses to understand that they are far from natural or given*" (Keene, 2005, p. 202). This contextual tracing may be especially relevant to the way the state's security apparatus has been conceived and studied, and what the implications of that to theory are.

The way political scientists, law experts and sociologists historically analyzed the process of state formation has intrinsically linked security, violence and territory to the consolidation of sovereign authority. An internal dimension of sovereignty can be observed in the very first definitions of state in history, in which violence and space are articulated as statebuilding elements. In early classical Legal Studies, a state was defined as a political body in which there was a differentiation between those who govern from those who are governed, strictly as a "*human group fixed in a certain territory, where the strongest impose their will to the weakest*" (Duguit, 1923, p. 14-5). Others have argued that a state was

> "a geographical zone that serves to designate and circumscribe the population […] over which only the state has the right to organize and put into function the several

> public services, as a place for public power to be exercised, or even as a perimeter in which the state has the right to exercise the right to command people." (Villeneuve, 1929, p. 245)

There were many explanations about the appearance of sovereign territorial states as forms of political organization. For some, the emergence of states was, to a certain extent, a combination of factors that created forms of political organization that were able to survive more competitively and successfully than others (Spruyt, 1994, p. 549). These included attempts to "*solve the discrepancy between emerging transnational markets and existing political arrangements, as well as increasing demands of rulers' preferences and ambitions to expand their revenues and resources elsewhere*" (Spruyt, 1994, p. 529).

Thereupon, certain forms of political organized authority have been able to substantially endure across the ages due to the consolidation of power in delimited spaces. That refers to sovereignty in an endogenous way, in terms of the capacity of entities that were to become states to *de facto* rule in certain spaces. An internal dimension of sovereignty refers to the emergence of sovereign authorities within circumscribed territories, which evolved to political units as a result of power struggles between groups that have managed to suppress and dominate others.

In addition to the administrative apparatus and to its legitimizing right, let us not forget that, for Weber, violence is the necessary means for the exercise of state power (1956, p. 17). Hence his famous definition of a state as "*a community circumscribed to a certain territory which holds the legitimate monopoly of the coercive means and an exclusive claim to violence*" (Weber, 1956, p. 27). By inscribing that exclusive right to violence to a territory, Weber's definition and notion of political responsibility presents a dichotomy in relation to anarchy that lays a normative foundation for political orientation regarding the sovereign decision to use violence (See Walker, 1993b and Weber, 1956).

The birth of domestic authority is justified on the founding myth of the social contract, central to the understanding of how political life has been historically organized. Thomas Hobbes laid this notion clearly as he stated that the generation of a commonwealth comes into place as men

> confer all their power and strength upon one Man, or on one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say […] to bear their Person, and everyone to own, and acknowledge himself

to be the *Author* of whatsoever he […] shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concern the Common Peace and Safety, and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgement to his Judgement […] as if every man should say to every man, *I Authorize and give up my right of governing my self to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorize all his Actions in like manner*. (Hobbes, 1997, p. 95) [emphasis by the author]

According to the social contract foundational myth, domestic authority is generated as a result of individuals granting their full liberties to form a commonwealth and put an end to a constant state of war of all against all between men to achieve stability and security. For Hobbes, "*every subject is author to delegating his powers, so the liberty of the subjects is in fact consistent with the sovereign's unlimited power*" (1997, p. 117).

However, since the purpose of sacrificing their liberties is to achieve security, the obligations to a sovereign authority can be absolved should the sovereign be unable to protect them. The sacrifice of liberty takes place as a function of the security provided. Thus, there is only one case in which the governed would cease to obey the sovereign: that is, if the latter is unable to provide the first with protection. In Hobbes' words, "*The end of Obedience is Protection*" (1997, p. 121). Domestically, within the borders of the state, a sovereign entity is responsible for providing security to its subjects/citizens, backed by enforcement capabilities and by a founding right to use violence.

The question of the founding sovereign authority and its relationship to violence to provide protection has been addressed by Jacques Derrida. As he dwelt on the question of the inherent arbitrariness of authority, Derrida argued that the translation of the German word *Gewalt* into simply violence is a translation that "*is unfair because it does not do justice to the fact that in German this word can also mean violence and legitimate power, justified authority*" (1992, p.6). In that sense, justified legitimate authority cannot be conceived in a way that is dissociated from violence. Derrida also saw many aspects of force in the expression to 'enforce the law', which, according to him, when translated into French, would

lose this direct or literal allusion to the force that comes from within to remind us that law is always an authorized force, a force that justifies itself or is justified in applying itself, even if this justification may be judged from elsewhere to be unjust or unjustifiable [...] The word 'enforceability' reminds us that there is no such thing

as law that doesn't imply *in itself, a priori, in the analytic structure of its concept*, the possibility of being 'enforced', applied by force. There are, to be sure, laws that are not enforced, but there is no law without enforceability, and no applicability or enforceability of the law without force, whether this force be it direct or indirect, physical or symbolic, exterior or interior, brutal or subtly discursive or hermeneutic, coercive or regulative, and so forth. (Derrida, 1992, p. 5-6)

In this vein, whether directly or indirectly, violence is inherent to the exercise of sovereign power and of law enforcement, since there can be no applicability of the law without force. This relation constitutes a kind of preserving violence that is purely founding and relates directly to the exercise and to the maintenance of sovereign power essentially in a non-questionable way. In order to be conceived, sovereign authority coexists with force in an inherent way, as it originates from the force of law. Thus, we see how the use of force and violence intrinsically relate to the domestic exercise of sovereign authority in the exercise of law and order.

Violent or not, the sources for the legitimation of sovereignty have been justified philosophically by a vast array of arguments. For the purposes of this thesis, the ways in which the right to sovereignty relates to the question of authority will be emphasized. For Saint Thomas Aquinas, the right to sovereign authority to exercise force came from the responsibility it held toward the commonwealth, including the defense against internal disturbances and external enemies (Johnson, 2004, p. 31). The element of protection is central to the state formation narrative. It could refer to the protection of the people within the commonwealth against external enemies, suggesting an outside element against which the commonwealth shall offer protection. It could also signify the maintenance of integrity against internal disturbances within the space that would constitute the domestic realm in the future. In any case, according to that interpretation, responsibility is constitutive to an authority: as long as an authority provided protection, this provision would conversely grant it the right to sovereignty.

Other authors in the International Relations literature have emphasized the material aspects of sovereignty over its moral imperatives in which *de facto* determinants of sovereignty would outweigh claims to legitimacy. For John Herz, what ultimately accounted for the nation-state's unity, coherence, independence and sovereignty from other units was

to be found neither in the sphere of law nor in that of politics, but rather in that substratum of statehood where the state unit confronts us [...] as an expanse of

territory encircled for its identification and its defense by a "hard shell" of fortifications. (Herz, 1976, p. 100-1)

The idea of protecting from an exterior threat, clear in the reference to defense and fortifications, contributed to forge a conception of security projected to the outside, alluring to something that needs to be protected against. This is "*precisely what constituted the impenetrability or territoriality of the modern state as the basic political unit*" (Herz, 1976, p. 100-1). Defined as a political unit in terms of its material capacity to protect its territory from the outside, the state exists in relation to a realm located outside itself. Internal references to security are somehow dichotomous, since they have always been accompanied by an external dimension.

Conversely, an external dimension to sovereignty becomes clear with the relationship between violence and state formation in the European experience, in a context of interstate wars that partially ended with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This dimension closely relates to an understanding of security that stems from the need to protect against external elements to the state, reinforcing the role of the sovereign authority as protecting a population within. This acknowledgement aims to highlight an external dimension to sovereignty that complements internal violent struggles processes.

The external dimension of sovereignty inherently relates to security and is clear in the works of Charles Tilly on the crucial role rivalries and interstate wars played in the process of European state formation (1985, p. 10). According to Tilly, wars enabled strong centralized state authorities to emerge and expand by extracting and accumulating resources, and by exercising the monopoly of the means of coercion and the control over the population circumscribed within certain territories (1985, p. 170). European states seized and centralized the monopoly of violence and the use of force by building fearsome coercive means of their own as they deprived civilian populations of access to those means (Tilly, 1990, p. 68-69). In light of a context of war, these entities have developed by centralizing power, constituting the sovereign authorities known as nation-states to this day.

Over the years, sovereignty worked in such an effective way that these "*coercion wielding organizations reduced cooperation and coordination problems, transaction and information costs, and social and economic life became regularized*" (Spruyt, 1994, p. 139). Acknowledging the role of outside factors is not the same as saying that entities would not have had the capacity to constitute *de*

*facto* authorities in Europe were it not for the wars. It is merely to acknowledge that wars played a significant role in this particular account of sovereignty, without which this concept could not be conceived as it was in the literature.

As a matter of fact, war making came to be universally recognized as an attribute of sovereignty. It is possible to assert that violence as an element was somehow embedded in the then emerging political order in at least two moments. The first moment was during the context of the Thirty Years War, from 1618 to 1648, period in which European states were established by the 'constitutive' wars (Ruggie, 1993, p. 162). The Thirty Years War revolved over the sovereign right of each independent political community to rule over its own territory to express religious national self-determination given "*future national values were prioritized over claims of transcendental religiously-based conceptions of truth from outsiders*" (Johnson, 2004, p. 93). In that sense, wars about religion played a role in the actual constitution of sovereign authorities that ruled over people and over their right to express a belief or not.

The second moment may be attributed to the period that followed the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The provisions of the Treaty that settled that war acquired a new meaning on the concept of sovereignty, one that emphasized independence and territorial integrity (Johnson, 2004, p. 93-4). Westphalia was the beginning of the consolidation among sovereign authorities regarding the ruling over independent territories. It is possible to assert that the wars that followed had a "configurative" nature in that their "*conflicts revolved around the principles of territorial contiguity that gave shape to political units that closely relate to the way we know states today*" (Ruggie, 1993, p. 163). In this vein, that moment was mostly about where to draw the territorial lines between the already constituted entities.

From 1500 on, future wars shaped the territories of the political units that would become the nation-states in Europe. Either the pressures of large-scale war making or the negotiations of large-scale peacemaking drove European states toward a new organizational form: the national state (Tilly, 1990, p. 195). This is how wars and violence played a crucial role in the establishment of sovereign authority in the European case. It is also the reason why international relations scholars widely share the assumption that sovereignty was conceived as a regulating principle among the new political units with the Treaty of Westphalia, giving birth to modern states and to the international system as we know it (Herz, 1957, p. 477).

The constitution of sovereign authorities in the state formation process significantly influenced the development of the state security apparatus, as well as the notions of domestic and international security. Michel Foucault notes that in the 18th and 19th centuries, the development of a legal code over sovereignty masked procedures of domination techniques and of disciplining coercion that sovereign authorities expressed through the exercise of state power (1999, p. 44). Hence, the exercise of power by the sovereign took place between the limits of a right to sovereignty and of a mechanics of discipline (Foucault, 1999, p. 44-5).

Sovereign power exercised in disciplinary ways is recovered by Foucault's *Security, Territory, Population* in his analysis of the development of the state security apparatus in Europe in a setting of force dynamics which eventually lead to governmental rationality (2007, p. 384). Foucault's read on the end of the Thirty Years War in Europe is that the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia established an equilibrium based on the balance of power mechanism that enabled rivalries, power expansion and the development of states, while avoiding their mutual destruction or weakening (2007, p. 385-7).

This mechanism relied on three instruments, the first of which was war. Religiously motivated wars shifted to rational ones, maintained by the state according to a juridical diplomatic reasoning that followed a logic of power equilibrium (Foucault, 2007, p. 388). The second instrument following the Treaty of Westphalia was the implementation of a permanent diplomatic-military system, through which decisions began to be based on a juridical basis (Foucault, 2007, p. 389). The creation of a military-diplomatic assemblage enabled state authority to be exercised by a diplomatic body sustained by permanent state relations that relied on a conflict resolution device (Foucault, 2007, p. 391).

The third instrument Foucault identified was a process of professionalization of the military through the constitution of a military career and of permanent armed structure within the peace system (2007, p. 391-2). This was partly the result of a process on the eve of modernity in which war practices and institutions were firstly "*concentrated in a central power authority so that little by little, only state powers could initiate wars and manipulate its instruments*" (Foucault, 1999, p. 55). The statization that took place as a consequence thereof meant that more and more wars, its practices and institutions, tended no longer to exist in a way, except within the

borders as outside limits of the political units, later circumscribed to the territorial limits of the states (Foucault, 1999, p. 55-6).

These conceptions have had a crucial impact in defining, and subsequently in attributing, an outwards conceptualization role to the military as an institution of the state security apparatus. Except in cases of civil strife, the mainstream notion is that whenever Armed Forces are employed, the idea of combat must be present (Braga, 2015, p. 55). Yet for Foucault, military institutions, the practices that surround them and all the procedures employed to wage war in an overall way, upon closer or further observation, represent the nucleus of political institutions, either directly or indirectly (1999, p. 54).

Therefore, we can see how the essence and essential mechanisms of civilian order can be a form of uninterrupted battle (Foucault, 1999, p. 54). This understanding would allow us to invert Clausewitz's principle that war is politics by other means to notice how politics itself can be war carried out by other means (Foucault, 1999, p. 54). Later, by focusing on the means of carrying out politics more than on the idea of war as a politics, Foucault shifts the focus to the practical aspect of the exercise of power, allowing it to be conceived in ways other than war.

Along with the diplomatic-military system developed in the newly formed states, a police apparatus emerged as forces to control population and govern communities under public authority (Foucault, 2007, p. 384;408). Therefore, from the 17th century on, the word police started to be understood as a set of means associated with the development of state forces and the maintenance of a proper order at the domestic level (Foucault, 2007, p. 408). This is why Foucault's definition of the police is "*an essentially urban institution that enables men to assemble, communicate and circulate regulating their cohabitation, circulation and exchange*" (2007, p. 438). This intervention in people's lives and occupation highlights a biopolitical role of power, originally exclusively attributed by Foucault to the institution of the police:

> [Police is] the set of interventions and means that ensure that living, better than just living, coexisting will be effectively useful to the constitution and development of state's forces. So with police there is a circle that starts from the state as a power of rational and calculated intervention on individuals and comes back to the state as a growing set of forces, or forces to be developed, passing through the life of individuals, which will now be precious to the state simply as life. (2007, p. 421)

Thus, police as an institution emerged historically as states began to exercise power over their respective population as it became crucial to ensure that the way people were governed was useful to the development of states as entities. Likewise, the organization of societies in the domestic realm by public authority speaks to the maintenance and coexistence of a certain order in a certain way. The establishment of the prerogatives of the police differs from the ones attributed to the Armed Forces precisely because they are aimed at the domestic level, in an organizing fashion. While the military apparatus was responsible for maintaining the 'jurisdictions' among the political units (inter)nationally, police acted within the limits of these states, addressing matters defined as 'national'.

A clear example of the attribution of police prerogatives as domestic – as opposed to military action as international – relates to the concept of posse comitatus in the United States. The origins of posse comitatus are traced to US domestic law, being defined as "the power or force of the country". Posse comitatus referred to "*the entire population of a county above the age of fifteen, which a sheriff may summon to his assistance in certain cases as to aid him in keeping the peace, in pursuing and arresting felons, etc*." (Larson & Peters, 2001, p. 243-4). In 1878, after the end of the American Civil War, President Rutherford B. Hayes signed the Posse Comitatus Act, which became part of the United States Code Section 1385. Its purpose was to limit the powers of the federal government to cease the use of federal troops in the enforcement of domestic policies in former Confederate states within the country. The original text of the Posse Comitatus Act read that

> Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both. (Larson & Peters, 2001, p. 243-4)

Curiously enough, however, one of the key exceptions of the Posse Comitatus Act referred to the possibility of the Armed Forces to be called upon by Presidential power to quell domestic violence (Larson & Peters, 2001, p. 244). With regard to the exercise of violence, Posse Comitatus sets the precedence of clear delimitation for the Armed Forces to act exclusively internationally, whereas the police were granted the prerogative of internal violent exercise. The concern about deploying the military only to tackle cases of domestic violence that could lead to civil strife

is a clear reference to avoiding the disintegration of the political unit and to maintaining its integrity. Needless to say, the establishment of limits of the use of force for the military and the police as state institutions stems from the fact that it takes much more force to maintain territorial integrity than to govern a population domestically. If the military prerogative to violence were to be used to perform police functions, force could become disproportionally high.

This is crucial, since it classifies the institutions of the military and the police in terms of its respective functions. The military is responsible for international border protection and for keeping the state as a political unit in terms of protecting against its disintegration. The police, on the other hand, is responsible for keeping an established order within the spatial borders of the state. By placing these institutions as a function of sovereign power but also as a function of one another in a complementary manner, from that, it follows that the military is responsible for maintaining national borders, while the police is to act within them.

In modern criminology, the general understanding on the prerogative of the legitimate use of force is that

> while the army intervenes only after order has been disrupted by 'asymmetrical conflict' to the point that '[territorial] lines [between groups of people] are being drawn' to produce order, it is the role of the public police to reproduce it once it has been established in the narrow context of particular incidents and in a 'generally peaceful public space' to produce order, to reproduce it once it has been established. (Arnez, 2016, p. 26-7)

Therefore, the act of policing, guaranteed by means of the use of force, cannot be understood separately from its purpose of preserving order (Arnez, 2016, p. 26). Nevertheless, the recent police militarization in the United States indicates an undermining of separation assumption in the Posse Comitatus Act as it reveals military intervention in civilian law enforcement in subtle fashions, as in situations in which the military assists police "*until it reaches the far outer limit of active intervention*" (Bolduc, 2016, p.278). It is no coincidence that the difficulty in persisting in that distinction has been observed with a particular articulation between law enforcement (as a public security issue) and defense. In the case of the United States, the failure to observe that distinction became particularly clearer with the National Defense Authorization Act, as it erased any residual effect the Posse Comitatus Act might still have had (Bolduc, 2016, p.279).

For this analysis, perhaps the most relevant aspect of this understanding is the fact that this dichotomist conception excludes possibilities of theorizing all of the ways in which the military can engage with violence within the limits of national borders – even in non-exceptional cases. It also poses a hindrance both to conceptions of security and to theorizing on the state security apparatus. This is important to the case study of this thesis, in which the military is being deployed domestically for law and order. To conduct the analysis, mainstream theoretical tools will need to be deconstructed to account for ways in which sovereignty can be deployed domestically, ways which differ from the mainstream understanding of attributions to police and the military across the territorial limits of the state.

In order to see how security relates to the state within and without it, and to put both dimensions of sovereignty in perspective, the relationship between inside and outside violence, as well as the way sovereignty works as a regulating principle, need to be considered. This would enable a conception of the domestic deployment of the military and its relation to internal security, especially in cases violence was justified and deployed in terms of sovereignty and used to reinforce it. The next section will reflect on the consequences of this particular understanding to International Relations as a discipline.

## 2.5
## Consequences for International Relations

The process of European state formation has had many implications for the International Relations literature. Among the major ones for the purposes of this thesis are a certain displacement of violence to the international realm outside the state. Another is the establishment of sovereignty as a regulating principle, observed and reinforced in the way that states reciprocally relate to one another.

Post-colonialists have argued that, as the newly formed states in Europe were regarded as sovereign entities, hierarchy was established domestically within their borders by means of the "*eradication, assimilation or expulsion among the alleged tolerance, where the 'other' was placed outside of that state and contained at the border, either by military defeat and/or colonized if necessary*" (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004, p. 6). The consolidation within the newly established exclusive territorial jurisdictions and sovereign authority entailed all sorts of coercive power

exercises, a process in which difference was translated into uniformity along their territorial limits.

The Westphalian context that followed the end of the Thirty Years War contributed to conceive the international in International Relations as a potentially permanently dangerous space of possible confrontations among units (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004). Within the states that would come to existence, there was more of a deference of difference, in what has been called 'the problem of difference' (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004, p. 20). On the one hand, within what would become the 'domestic' realm, there were attempts to eliminate alternative practices and beliefs by conquering, persecutions and purifying processes (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004, p. 25) to turn the domestic realm of future states into a uniform space that needed to be subject to hierarchy and to sovereign authority. Conversely, guided by the logic that difference was a problem that should be faced and solved by means of an empire of uniformity, difference as a prerogative was 'placed' in the outside realm (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004, p. 29).

Assuming that the differences inside the various political communities should be contained within the state, demarcation and policing of the border to separate the inside from the outside of the political community were carried out. The problem of difference became an issue *between* and *among* political units so that difference was identified, and contained, as international (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004, p. 39). The political community was also constructed by additional 'insides/outsides' within its borders. Whatever came from the outside was associated with the notion of perpetual threat, whereas the domestic 'others' were managed and governed by a combination of hierarchy, eradication by assimilation or expulsion, and/or tolerance (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004, p. 39). This organization of political power within circumscribed territories had an internal tangible dimension; however, territory combined with the principle of sovereignty allowed for the external co-constitutive dimension of states.

There is, hence, a representation of difference projected towards the outside of the state. In a way, it may be precisely because the 'other' is imagined, and perhaps (mis)placed to an imaginary universe beyond the limits of the political community, that it becomes possible to see how tolerance among states is enabled. This is how the problem of difference was solved: through the negotiation of a way of life among political communities governed by a few rules that contributed to

constitute international society as we know it – the most important of which being sovereignty and non-intervention, based on borders as a threshold.

In fact, what could not become uniform was portrayed as foreign, international, and as possibly threatening; thus, violence was also displaced to the outside of the state by a process of elimination. Seen from this 'internal dimension' of inside/outside exclusions, the sovereign discourse took place within different logical spaces and different historical episodes, with varying attributes and changing locations of power within political discourse (Bartelson, 1993, p. 83).4 This is why it has been argued that "*without a proper mode of knowledge to render it intelligible, sovereignty cannot exist and loses its capacity to organize political reality through a demarcation of inside from outside, of Same from Other*" (Bartelson, 1993, p. 83). According to that logic, the domestic sphere was constituted as a 'part' in a bigger 'whole', whose identity must be carefully monitored and safeguarded from outside intrusions.5

Therefore, existing notions of sovereignty are very much aligned with the European experience of state formation and founded in the context of interstate wars that drew the borders of newly independent units while sovereign *de facto* authorities developed and consolidated their power internally over established territories (See Tilly, 1985 and Keene, 2005). Moreover, the entire security apparatus that developed as those states were being formed deployed the military outward for protection, while the police began to organize societies domestically.

It is precisely this European state formation experience that informed the ways sovereignty and security are conceived, as well as the meanings and limits of the (inter)national in the sense of what constitutes as domestic, and what, by implication, does not. In particular, the external understanding of security shaped by the European interstate wars context has influenced IR theory in terms of definitions of the state itself and on the concept of anarchy. In addition, it had implications on what the discipline should mean, as will be seen next.

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4 Jens Bartelson has noted that difference was to be regarded as alien to the state not primarily in its own prehistory, yet as temporally simultaneous yet spatially distinct from it. In his words, "by emerging out of a dialectic of historical forces, the modern state also transposes otherness to a place not only outside itself, but to a sphere ontologically over and above itself." (Bartelson, 1993, p. 244)

5 For Bartelson, this is the reason foreign policy can be a mechanism to domesticate what initially was 'foreign' to domestic politics: without a 'foreign policy' there can be nothing domestic buried in the depths of its violent prehistory and inserted as a state of nature in its contractual justification. As such, to classical analysts of interest and sovereignty, foreign policy deals with a traumatic past, as well as it is a policy for dealing with a spatial outside (Bartelson, 1993, p. 180).

Crystallized by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the European experience guided mainstream notions of sovereignty, somehow contributing to "push" the borders of violence to the outside dimension of the state. It did so by two ways. Firstly, by contributing to the relational aspect of sovereignty, since each unit was only independent to the extent that the remaining units were likewise so. In other words, units were only sovereign in relation to one another. Secondly, by creating an understanding that states were peaceful as they respected each other's right to act violently domestically, each within their own established borders.

Yet by concealing all of the violence taking place at the domestic level to produce an image of cohesiveness and unity, this particular experience created a notion that security is a concern exclusive to the outside of the state, taking the inside dimension of security, and violence, for granted. Conversely, this lead the mainstream understanding of sovereignty to be likewise taken for granted, projected outwards, towards security internationally.

Consequently, this double movement Innayatullah and Blaney have denominated the "displacement of security to the outside of the state" has had enormous consequences for Security Studies in International Relations. Since the birth of IR as a discipline, even in face of a genuine concern with the problem of security to avoid wars, key realists like Kenneth Waltz have reinforced the idea that the 'international' realm was chaotic and worrisome, whereas the inside of the state was supposedly peaceful. As such, the potential 'inside' exercise of violence within the borders of the state was frequently overlooked, drawing epistemological limits of security as something to be found and studied "on the outside", and as a problem from which the state should protect itself.

The norms, rules and institutions established by Westphalia have been built upon "*an orthodox theory of order in which different political systems coexisted based on, and were regulated by, sovereignty as a principle of reciprocal recognition*" (Keene, 2002, p. 12). The notion that sovereignty should be understood in terms of its function, as a regulating principle for political practices in a historical context, has been recovered in recent literature by Friedrich Kratochwil, as he stated that

> The concept of sovereignty originated in domestic politics, but it was soon predominantly used to demarcate the outside of a political order. In the last two

decades sovereignty has become again largely a problem of "internal" politics. (Kratochwil, 2018, p. 85)

As it draws the limits over which sovereign authorities are able to act, this acknowledgement adds yet another dimension to sovereignty as a concept. Each unit acts within its own authority, as long as it recognizes the authority of the other; that is, the limits of one entity end where the limits of the other begin. Thus, sovereignty establishes prerogatives as well as responsibilities conditioned upon the other: as externally mutually constitutive.

This constitutive dimension of sovereignty as statehood implies that each state recognizes the independence of others within their territorially defined spheres of domestic jurisdiction. From that assumption, it follows that no state is allowed to interfere in the internal affairs of another, and each has the space to develop its own way of life, constituting an international society of states (Keene, 2002, p. 12-3). The fact that recognition is constitutive of statehood fulfills the sovereign mechanism that continues to be reproduced today, in which "*an entity has the status of a 'state' internationally not only because it asserts so internally, but also because it is acknowledged as such externally*" (Fabry, 2013, p. 165).

In that sense, sovereignty works both as a limit and as a regulating and defining principle among states. With regard to boundaries and state jurisdictions, it is the ultimate threshold of the exercise of state power expressed within a territory. In turn, sovereignty is also the foundation of the conventional separation of modern politics between the domestic and international spheres, given that the point at which it ceases to exist is precisely where anarchy begins. In the discourse of international politics,

> sovereignty is both a defining property of the state and an explanatory function of the international system: the essence of statehood works as a necessary condition to the existence of the whole – the international system – and the state is considered [to be] historically and ontologically prior to that system. (Bartelson, 1993, p. 23)

Hence, the idea of the state entails three different determinations, each necessary and sufficient in their own fashion. Firstly, internally, it is related to itself as a self-contained organic being (Bartelson, 1993). Secondly, at the external dimension, the state stands in a relationship of mutual exclusion to other states,

taking on actual existence through an outward differentiation of itself; thirdly, it takes on active existence historically as a subject in world history, expressed in a temporally indeterminate fashion whose time frame historical trajectory is not stressed nor questioned in sovereign discourse (Bartelson, 1993, p. 216).

As a regulating principle, sovereignty is understood not only as an internal aspect inherent to state formation, but rather exercised through a reciprocal acknowledgement and as a condition for conceiving states in and of themselves, as these are defined in relation to one another. Walker made the same remark in different words, by noting that neither the sovereign state nor the system of sovereign states can exist without the other:

> modern political life works through a constitutive choice as to whether the ultimate source of political authority lies with the sovereign claims of any particular state or with what might be called the sovereignty of the system that makes the sovereign authority of such a state possible. (2006, p. 68)

It is from this central assumption that the English School has put forth its core historical proposition on modern international society of states as a system "*characterized by the principle of internal freedom and established by agreements between states that reflect their common interest in mutual independence, whose defining feature is mutual acknowledgement*" (Keene, 2002, p. 22). Therefore, for the English School, an international society exists when states conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations and in their dealings with one another (Bull, 1977, p. 13). Likewise, the fact that international society is in and of itself dependent on the will or volition of states to submit themselves to a set of rules constitutes a condition for its own existence (Keene, 2002, p. 35). States can only exist as such as long as they have this acknowledged recognition element for each other's sovereignty.

Sovereign authority is justified and legitimized by domestic law, yet also reinforced internationally as independent coexisting units by means of international law and recognizing each other. Mutual recognition became the basis of the new international order (Ruggie, 1993, p. 162). Conversely, the defining line that separates the inside and outside limits of the state is where many tensions take place. It remains a challenge to decide on issues that qualify as domestic and should hence

solely be addressed by the sovereign states within their territories, *versus* international issues that are subject to international scrutiny.

As opposed to the internal dimension of states, where the sovereign is the ultimate authority, there is no such official authority in the international system. In modern times, the closest official form of organization within the international community became clear first with the League of Nations, then with the United Nations, which understood itself as having a role of being the maintainer of international peace and security since its inception in 1945. The concept of 'collective security' set the maxim for ultimate peaceful coexistence. Security was to be provided collectively in cooperation among states, and if a nation shall pose a threat to another nation or to the system itself, the group shall enforce security and reprehend the threat collectively; the only justification for the use of force otherwise being self-defense (See United Nations Charter, 1945). The concern to regulate violence was observed at the international level, whereas authority and force remained an essential prerogative of sovereign nation states domestically.

Sovereignty as a regulating founding principle constitutes a central assumption in international relations, from which many underlying assumptions derive. For one, Westphalia as a myth implied that a universal Christian order marked a transition from a network of underlying authorities to a system of independent states, based in the demarcation of exclusive territorial jurisdictions (Innayatullah & Blaney, 2004, p. 2). Therefore, territory was a demarcation, a limit that defined the exclusivity of such units. As it differentiated the units, territory also homogenized them because where one ended is where the other started, along with the entity's sovereign political limits.

These historical developments led to a process of 'unbundling' territoriality that enabled the formation of a society of states so that by the end of the 20th century, strong centralized administration had significantly transformed the political life of Western and West-central Europe (Ruggie, 1993, p. 160-1). Internally, power became fused with the provision of public order; externally, with statecraft, helping to account for the geographical pattern of successful centralizing efforts upon which current specific conceptions of political space are conceived (Ruggie, 1993, p. 161). Political space is about rule and its distinctive feature is the "*differentiation of subject collectivity into territorially defined, fixed, and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate dominion*" (Ruggie, 1993, p. 151).

The drift from 'internal' to 'external' state formation that prevailed and was reproduced in Europe imposed a common definition of state to diverse parts of the world (Tilly, 1990, p. 195). Nonetheless, in addition, the dichotomist way of conceiving this concept, and the attribution of security inwards and outwards that was inherited from it, resulted in substantial consequences to IR as a discipline. Epistemologically, this conception has limited the ways questions tied to the security problematic in general, over sovereignty, institutional effectiveness and statehood, were allowed to be asked. In addition, it speaks to how these were understood and theorized in the literature, and further reflected in practice.

The focus on security and conflict have been International Relations' utmost theoretical concern from its genesis, posing enormous implications for theory, and subsequently, to the kind of knowledge the discipline produced. Since 1648, as the Treaty of Westphalia, normally regarded as the benchmark of the discipline's birth was signed, war as a subject has been a central concern within IR, becoming a crucial motivation to scholars and considered a major driving force and mechanism of change in the international system (Gilpin, 1981, p. 2-3).

To a great extent, this concern stems from the way sovereignty was conceived in the process of European state formation, as seen in the previous section. The fact that the foundations of IR as a field of knowledge stemmed from this 'outward' sovereignty logic allegedly 'created' by Westphalia has implied in a few aspects. The first is that a definition of sovereignty that classifies and defines a sovereign state *in relation to* while also *in terms of* an outside dimension referred to as an international system, meant placing great weight on the external aspect of security. From that assumption, additional sets of assumptions developed in the literature, some of which will be analyzed here.

However, this concern over security also stems from the fact that IR was born out of a context of modern generalized conflict. As a discipline that emerged in the post-First World War, security was a central motivation for scholars, influencing the ways theory was conceived and formulated. Likewise, this clearly affected the relationship between practice and theory in Security Studies. Edward Carr's classic "The Twenty Years Crisis" made the case for the need to engage theoretically over war as an issue, keeping in mind that "*it is practice that should inform theory precisely because politics are amoral and not a function of ethics, but of power instead*" (Carr, 1946, p. 28-9). By doing so, Carr acknowledges just how much the

warlike context has influenced the making of his own theory. In that sense, to understand Westphalia historically is to acknowledge that practice (embedded in a particular understanding of sovereignty) shaped theory production in International Relations.

Needless to say, theory reflected practice accordingly. As he made the case for an independent theory of international relations, Stanley Hoffman partially agreed with Carr in that existing morals are a product of power, yet he argued that "*theory can also conversely help to create practice since the formulation of concepts precedes the observation of the facts*" (1977, p. 51-3). This statement implied that theory was able to influence practice, which in turn translated into hopes of a greater possibility of promoting impact. What these scholars did not anticipate was how much impact there would be once they began to produce one specific kind of knowledge – and what the implications therefor would turn out to be. In fact, the theories that were to follow shaped an entire body of knowledge that took some concepts for granted at the expense of practically disregarding others.

At the time of its creation, there was a shared understanding that International Relations as a discipline would have to dissociate and differentiate itself from similar areas of study. Firstly, it was necessary to find a differentiating element to justify the existence of an independent discipline, which turned out to be the 'international' element. Unlike Political Science, which focused mainly on the "*checks and balances of the internal institutions of political ordered structures domestically within states, IR put greater weight on the international sphere, namely on the interactions between political structures*" (Hoffman, 1977, p. 46-7). The choice to focus on the *interaction* between the units of the system – which in a way accounted for the own conditions of possibility for the establishment of an independent IR – presented enormous epistemological and methodological implications to the theory that would follow.

For one, in subsequent years, mainstream scholars aimed to systematize and frame IR as a unique discipline in the United States by placing its focus on the international scope and on conflicts between states (Hoffman, 1977, p. 42-3). By implication, this particular lens shifted the focus towards the outside of these states as political units. In practice, theory was informing us to look onto the outside. As a result, the 'international', lately more commonly referred to as simply "the international system", became the main element of analysis within IR. The way the

international element was conceived, which in the absence of a central government meant regarding the 'system' as anarchical, somehow crystalized understandings of security as being of an outward nature, whereas taking the internal dimension for granted. Consequently, this deepened the divide in the limits attributed to violence in the domestic and international realms. As the internal dimension of a state was taken for granted, the external allegedly threatening environment demanded its attention. In turn, the focus of security shifted further outwards, prioritizing the need for wars and protection from the exterior at the expense of its internal dimension, aimed at the dominion of society domestically.

Yet the way the structure of the international order of sovereign states was conceived lacked a central authority that could enforce law internationally, maintain peace and security or compel individual members to act in certain ways, implying in extreme decentralization, even anarchy (Keene, 2002, p. 12).[6] That meant that, in addition to establishing mutually recognized borders, the acknowledgement of sovereignty did not automatically translate into an enhanced sense of security. On the contrary, sometimes 'anarchy' was mostly referred to as a limit and a threshold of what could possibly rest beyond sovereign authority, usually conceived as a potentially conflictual interaction between these units.

This portrays an association of the international system with an externally dangerous anarchic environment. When Kenneth Waltz asserted in his book "Man, the State and War" that states were concerned "*externally with security and internally with justice*", he implied that the problem of domestic order was easier to solve than authors such as Thomas Hobbes, to whom war in international relations was an analogy to the state in domestic politics, would have thought so (1970, p. 96). In a way, by projecting insecurities to the outside dimension of the state, it could be inferred that Waltz implied that the domestic order was easier to handle when compared to the challenges posed by the international realm.

Another clear example of how the understanding of security has been shaped in the discipline can be observed in Waltz later work, in his 1979 "Theory of International Politics". As part of an effort to unify and systematize a theory of

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[6] Conversely, the only foundation for legally binding rules in international society is the volition of states, and the scope of international law is therefore restricted to rules to which states have given their consent (Keene 2002, p.12).

international politics and subsequently shape how security is understood and conceived, he put great emphasis on the element of anarchy.[7]

Waltz claimed the international political system was composed of subunits that interact with each other: the nation states. He defined the international system as a set of interacting units that were distinct and differed from one another by their capabilities but with some level of homogeneity (Waltz, 1979, p. 40). Yet for him, the system was not simply the sum of the parts, but rather a structure that allowed us to think of its subcomponents as being ordered in a specific manner (Waltz, 1979, p. 43-6). Waltz hence uses the international system as a level of analysis, which granted him high explanatory capability at the expense of generalization, and where prediction became easier than description and explanation (Singer, 1961, p. 80).

From Waltz's perspective, the point of departure of his analysis became the whole instead of the individual parts, the latter being characterized by the states. Yet in addition to using the international system as a level of analysis by understanding structure as an organizational concept, Waltz was able to see the system as an arrangement of such units, providing an understanding of the way they interacted with one another as a property of the system itself (1979, p. 80-89).[8] The weight allocated to anarchy as an organizing principle reinforces the element of the international that exists as something beyond the control of the sovereign authority but that still influences it, given he assumes that the subunits behave rationally within that system as to look for self-preservation in a self-interested way (Waltz, 1979, p. 91-3). If we accept Waltz's assumption that anarchy provides an outside realm full of uncertainty, it is easy to see how sovereign authorities will act to assume a worst-case scenario most of the times. In addition to producing a conceptual binary of anarchy outside and hierarchy within states, Waltz's assumption that anarchy is a structure that shapes the behavior of states and determines how they will act and interact in a self-help way is a key feature of his

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[7] In that book, Waltz is interested in defining the international and international politics from a normative standpoint. For him, to produce a coherent theory of international politics, it would be necessary to reach a level of abstraction based on a coherent scientific theory of premises to allow for greater predictability of future occurrences (Waltz, 1979, p. 69-2). In what was later referred to as the level-of-analysis debate as pointed out by David Singer, Waltz's analytical model stemmed from the assumption that the primary purpose of theory was to explain; thus, when descriptive and explanatory requirements were in conflict, the latter ought to be given priority, even at the cost of some representational accuracy, whose promise was reliable prediction (Singer, 1961, p. 79).

[8] As a result, the anarchic structure of the system constituted an *organizing principle* which constraint the actions of states, affecting their behavior, albeit indirectly (Waltz, 1979, p. 74).

theory of order in world politics, painting a security dilemma scenario (Havercroft & Prichard, 2017, p. 257).

These assumptions, which shaped most of IR's scholarly debates, result that the problem of anarchy cannot be dissociated from how we understand the problem of epistemology, ontology, politics, and conceptions so that the relative merits of internal hierarchy and external anarchy rest on the definition of both so that "*if anarchy is the international and if what international scholars do is to study the international, it becomes hard to dissociate oneself from that logic*" (Havercroft & Prichard, 2017).

This is true to the point that it is hard to conceive issues that relate to international order without taking into account anarchy as a foundational claim of a dichotomist relation. Richard Ashley has denominated this as the anarchy problematique (Ashley, 1988, p. 227-8), according to which

> anarchy is understood in a hierarchical opposition, framed as opposed to sovereignty where the latter is privileged as a higher reality and a regulative ideal, whereas the former is understood only in a derivative and negative way and as a failure to live up to this ideal and as something that endangers it. (Ashley, 1988, p. 230)

In that dichotomist relation of a particular understanding of security, sovereignty and anarchy are portrayed as opposites in a way that sovereignty is associated to hierarchy and defined as a regulative ideal, while anarchy threatens it. Nevertheless, since anarchy is located in an imaginary outside the sovereign state, it is possible to infer that, by implication, security concerns are placed in the anarchical outside realm, onto the international.

## 2.6
## Particularities of security and state formation in the Global South

As seen above, the European experience of state formation serves to reproduce a very specific conception of society, cultural, religious, moral values and underlying assumptions (Keene, 2005, p. 200-2). Therefore, to engage in the analysis of a developing country, understanding the sovereign problematique applied to issues of state formation, security and sovereignty in terms of the particularities these countries may present becomes essential.

In many regions of the Global South, formerly referred to as the Third World[9], such as Latin America, the deployment of violence within sovereign borders for public security, for instance, has become increasingly common. As a matter of fact, the way Global South states emerged differs substantially when compared to the Western European experience, particularly with regard to state formation processes. In the 80s and 90s, scholars stressed a fundamental difference between the European experience and that of Third World states as one that

> relates to the existence of the system of states with its rules regarding sovereignty, territorial integrity and nonintervention, as a constraining factor in relation to the process of state making. (Job, 1992, p. 77)

This fundamental difference stems from the fact that sovereignty and territorial integrity many times had to be conquered by the Global South during independence. As a result, nonintervention became extremely important to developing countries as former colonies, to the point that this principle could represent a constraining factor to state making itself. Interstate wars were an instrument of change for European states, yet this was hardly the case for developing countries, to which non-intervention "*prevented the unrestrained interplay of the internal dynamics of particular states in the making and, with limited exceptions, ruled out war as an instrument of change in the boundaries of states*" (Job, 1992, p. 77). Hence, whereas in the European experience there were, according to Ruggie, the so-called constitutive and configurative wars as seen above, these were absent in the territorial constitution of developing countries.

For Mohammed Ayoob, the foundations of an intellectual tradition based on the European experience of state formation resulted in security "*becoming synonym with the protection of a state's vital interests and core values from external threats, further aggravated by the bipolar alliance security dynamics of the Cold War*"

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[9] The choice for using the concept "Third World" is mainly to respect the terminology that authors mentioned in this work such as Mohammed Ayoob, Roland Dannreuther, Edward Azar and Chung Moon, have chosen to use in their original works. Although I acknowledge this terminology may be embedded in its own set of Cold War biases to define developing countries, some scholars still engage with the concept to this day (See Keith R Legg, Arif Dirlik and Christopher Dowswell). In order not to alter original citations, at times I have chosen to maintain "Third World" but also used the terms Global South, developing countries, "new states" or "new nations" (as cited by Morris Janowitz in this chapter) interchangeably throughout this thesis.

(Ayoob, 1991, p. 262).10 As a result, a great deal of the international relations literature on the Third World during the Cold War reflected the perspective of superpower competition for influence in strategic regions of the developing world (Ayoob, 1991). He argues this is also the reason why little had been written in a systematic fashion about the interaction of Third World states with the international system and on how they relate to security within the traditional conceptual security framework. Systemic security was mainly a concern of the great powers, in which the Third World took part as zones of influence to be 'conquered' by these, participating in a marginal, if not passive way.

This traditional understanding of security engages with a concept based on two major assumptions. The first is that threats to a state's security mainly rise from outside its borders; the second, that these threats are primarily, if not exclusively military in nature and hence usually demand a military response to them (Ayoob, 1991, p. 261). In this vein, the dominant strands of security thinking in international relations defined the concept of security in external or outward-directed terms, that is, as external to the commonly accepted unit of analysis in international relations: the state (Ayoob, 1991, p. 262). In other words, this is the same acknowledgement from earlier sections, yet Ayoob analyzes the implications thereof specifically for developing countries.

The historically conditioned definition of security presented three major characteristics in the literature during the Cold War, namely the external orientation, the strong linkage with systemic security, and diluted binding ties with the security of the two major alliance blocs (Ayoob, 1991, p. 263). Yet the application of this concept of security to the analysis of security situations in developing countries has created major conceptual problems, since its explanatory power, as traditionally defined, is vastly reduced when applied to Third World contexts (Ayoob, 1991, p. 263).

In particular, the concept of national security itself has been conceived and formulated throughout modern European history and during Cold War decades to express a set of problems raised by threats that were usually, although not

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10 From that acknowledgement, in 1991 Ayoob argued that the security exercised in practice and in theory was a particularly Eurocentric version of the concept, working only as a function of great powers; likewise, the security of Third World states and regions was primarily analyzed from the point of view of American or Soviet interests and concerns (Ayoob, 1991, p. 258).

exclusively, external to the state (Job, 1992, p. 50). Indeed, the concept of national security in Western Third World states was also influenced by United States' concerns over the possibility of the threat of communism penetrating inside influence zones as something that the states should protect themselves against. National security is a Western, largely American concept that emerged in the post-World War II period and as a result,

> as an analytical tool and a management formulation, in addition to the scarce body of literature on the Third World, national security appears to suffer from relying on the Western experience to understand and apply national policy and security, whose body of literature has underestimated security resources and capabilities that affect Third World states. (Azar & Moon, 1988, Chapter 1 apud Ayoob, 1991)

The placement of security outside the state, and its association with the military, following the outside anarchic security logic, reveals a Eurocentric conception of security that is particularly unfit for the Third World. This territorial dimension of sovereignty – and of security that follows from it – can be explained to the extent that the uniqueness of the state as a unit of analysis in IR occurred in how territory relates to rule. Yet, this discriminatory definition came at the cost of reducing a state's domestic security aspects to its international dimension, which Ayoob framed in the following words:

> Even scholars who have differed from this starkly state-centered realist perspective and focused on *international* rather than *national* security have been primarily concerned with reconciling national security (in terms of reducing external threats to the security of a state, especially of a major power) with systemic security concerns. (1991, p. 261)

It is there to be noticed that since Third World states have different notions on the domestic and the international, they also have different perceptions in terms of what configures as domestic and international threats. Conversely, notions of domestic and international security are important because they inform conceptions on security. At the time Ayoob was writing, he identified a mainstream conception of security that proved flawed to the understanding of that concept to developing countries. In a way, the outward agenda this conception creates cannot be absorbed by developing states, since they have structural differences on the meaning of security and on where the limits of violence rest.

Ayoob also dwelt on the question of why these differences existed, and if there were any factors that could help explain the particularity in the Third World security problematic as compared to the dominant paradigm of security in international relations and strategic studies literature at the time of his writing (1991, p. 265). He partially answers his own rhetorical question by pointing out that the main problem that seemed to distort the security analysis was the tendency to compare developing states to industrialized ones, especially in relation to the crucial variable of state making, since the only commonality between these two types of states is simply that both possess formal juridical statehood (Ayoob, 1991, p. 265).

According to him, a timeframe problematic could provide the primary explanation for the sharp internal challenges to the centralizing state structures in the developing countries. Time as a variable could also account for the high level of violence endemic in stages of state making in the Third World, where challenges such as ethnicity or class formed the core of the security problems facing these states and their regimes (Ayoob, 1991, p. 270). A closer look into the constitution of the state and on state formation brings to light the nature of security problems in the Third World and helps explain the levels of violence that these sovereign entities experience.

Within the modern political imaginary, where borders are commonly taken for granted, the possibility of problematizing sovereignty and its 'reach' is likewise difficult. Given that the European historical trajectory of state formation described by Tilly is a reflection of a particular context, it is crucial to bear in mind that developing countries have had a completely different historical trajectory from the European case that inspired traditional literature. By assuming that a comparison with the European state formation paradigm is unattainable considering these states' distinct historical trajectories, it becomes necessary to comprehend the inherent factors of the Third World that explain its particularities in terms of security. In particular, the colonizing process made these states differ substantially from the European experience of state formation that inspired IR's mainstream understandings of security, possibly posing hindrances to Weberian conceptions regarding territory and legitimacy.

For one, borders were established somewhat differently in colonized states. The majority of these states did not originate 'organically' out of interstate wars, and even independence wars were not comparable to the European context.

Colonization was an arbitrarily defined process that obstructed the consolidation of centralized institutions and resulted in a series of problems of governance and institutional capacity (Dannreuther, 2007, p. 310). The historical and political developments that resulted from decolonization represented, in a way, an external international law imposition towards newly formed states (Dannreuther, 2007).

A demand emerged to reconcile the newly granted *status* of formal independence with the Weberian pre-requisite of empirical sovereignty expected of former colonies. This is why it has been argued that in the Third World, there has been an inversion of the traditional trajectory, in that states' independence was granted primarily based on the external universal right to sovereignty instead of on a particular internal reality, even in the absence of institutions to assure its effective exercise (Jackson, 1987, p. 532). In fact, the distinction between *de facto* and *de jure* sovereignty came precisely from the challenge of Third World states to conciliate formal independence with institutions that would guarantee, in practice, the sovereign state's exercise (Jackson, 1987, p. 532).

Whereas for developed countries the concept of security is a corollary of the doctrine of state sovereignty in its pure form of external directedness, in the Third World, despite the rhetoric of many leaders, the sense of insecurity from which states suffer emanates, to a substantial degree, from within their boundaries rather from outside (Ayoob, 1991, p. 263). This is why some have claimed that security challenges of Third World states may be basically unresolvable as long as the various factions within society are able to compete effectively as security providers, meaning that the concept of "national security" for these countries is ephemeral and almost inapplicable (Job, 1992, p. 22).

For the most part, to post-colonial states, even the notion of modern nation-state is an imported value, so state-building as a process became a crucial concern (Thomas, 1987, Chapter 1). Like all other states, "*Third World states are conscious of the need to make themselves secure, although this task is qualitatively different for them, as the quest for internal security takes place through nation-building*" (Thomas, 1987, p. 4). The fact that these states are artificial constructs means that the process of forging loyalty to them is in many cases still at an early stage, in weak and inflexible political, economic and social structures (Thomas, 1987, p. 4). From that point of view, the absence of strong institutions capable of imposing cohesion in national territory and of guaranteeing the physical integrity of the state

would help explain the fragility, vulnerability and security challenges of so-called Third World states (Dannreuther, 2007, p. 308).

In the absence of strong institutions "*to effectively enforce sovereignty, clientelist politicized relations flourish at the expense of a structuring of the political system by institutions*" (Carment, 2003, p. 412). Besides, the lack of internal homogeneity causes these states to be insecure domestically, since the existence of different centers of authority within a single state can generate social conflict and spill over state boundaries (Thomas, 1987, p. 10-11). Sometimes these authorities are "*commonly weaker than the state in terms of its coercive capacity, but in terms of political legitimacy and to wide segments of the population, are superior to it and compete amongst themselves*" (Ayoob, 1995, p. 4). This is why in these countries, security is defined mostly in terms of internal threats than of outside ones, and the coercive apparatus of the state is structured accordingly, since political fears originate, at times, within society itself (Ayoob, 1995, p. 319).

In practice, it has been argued that the subject of state resilience entails an ideal of modern sovereign territoriality of centralized rationalized monopoly over organized violence in Weberian terms that even some Western European states do not always reach (Milliken & Krause, 2002, p. 755). The notion of 'failed' or 'collapsed' states must be understood in terms of two implicit benchmarks: an institutional dimension over 'stateness', and a functional dimension over the normative implications of such a failure (Milliken & Krause, 2002, p. 753). 'Failed states' challenges over the monopoly of violence include countries whose "*international juridical authority over a given territory is acknowledged in an apparent centralized authority, but in which leaders lack the capacity to exercise authority meaningfully, sometimes in chunks of the national territory*" (Gros, 1996, p. 458). In these cases, these territories may operate with separate constitutions, police forces, judges and economics; in essence becoming states within states (Gros, 1996, p. 458).

In the case of this thesis, the Brazilian 'stateness' has not been questioned; however, as will be seen, the state has securitized the issue of organized criminality based on the assumption that there were some 'ungoverned territories' in which parallel authorities were acting and defying its monopoly and effective governance. It has done so by making the recovery and reintegration of these spaces to its effective rule an absolute priority. The underlying assumption for this research is

that there is a perception by the government that these are ungoverned spaces, and that, in the context of that representing a threat to the state, violence is justified and directed to them, which could represent a form of state weakness. The fact that the state is resorting to violence in that sense could be interpreted as an exercise of state making in terms of the essential sovereign prerogative to deploy force.

Ayoob highlights that before statehood was assured in most European political entities associated with the developed world, for centuries state makers were devoted to consolidating power and control *within* the territories they aspired to dominate (1991, p. 266). The nature of the relationship between violence and statehood is crucial for this thesis, given that it investigates the engagement of the Armed Forces in the domestic security of Brazil as a developing country. The fact that "the Armed Forces *are destined to provide external security, while some other institutional form with considerably less 'force' in terms of overt uses of violence secures domestic order*" continues to be taken for granted and is often legally sanctioned (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005, p. 452). To this day, this analogy is problematic since it continues to be based upon processes of domestic order and security creation that took decades, sometimes centuries, and were not completed without a great deal of violent struggle (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005, p. 451).

The element of time, when articulated to state formation and seen in light of the European historical experience, would help clarify the magnitude of the internal security problems faced by the newly formed states, in that

> not enough time has been made available to state makers in Third World countries to develop the intangible ingredients of security, including the identification of the people with the state (legitimacy) and of people with each other (integration) [...] In the absence of these intangibles, the state elites in the Third World are bound to take frequent recourse to the 'hardware' instruments of security, namely, military force, to meet what are essentially political challenges from disaffected groups within their populations. (Ayoob, 1991, p. 267-8)

Since many threats are internal rather than external, an agreement as to what constitutes the political unit whose security is being protected is not always existent in the Global South (Job, 1992, p. 51). Ayoob argues that the traditional way of conceiving security fails to include aspects that constitute central explanatory features of these states' overriding concern with security: the concern with the vulnerabilities of their structures, institutions and regimes (1991, p. 258). It may be

the case that a Third World regime wants to remain in power and hence engages in escalating repression, commonly causing the elites to adopt security strategies such as militarization, repression and state terror attempting to destroy the enemy within (Job, 1992, p. 28).

For Ayoob, it is preferable to define Third World security in relation to the "*vulnerabilities that threaten, or have the potential, to bring down or significantly weaken territorial and institutional state structures as well as the regimes that preside over these structures and profess to represent them internationally*" (1992, p. 259). This definition could accommodate security concerns such as debt burdens, or even famines, should they threaten to have political outcomes that affect the survivability of states in terms of their territory, institutions or governing elites (Ayoob, 1991, p. 259). The nature of the questions that could mean a threat to the state at the domestic level can hence vary, according to the structural features in each of these countries.

This is also why it has been argued that a significant amount of the political violence in new states is a function of conflicts inherent to the process of primitive central state power accumulation (Cohen et al., 1981, p. 902). At times, political cleavages may reflect competitive conflicts for control over power resources of the respective territories and populations, whereas in the European case, conflict, resistance and violence were the result of such processes (Cohen et al., 1981, p. 902). It is commonly the case in newly established states that the repressive apparatus necessary to back up an administrative structure – and the violent processes it entails – not only perpetuate old conflicts but also generate new ones (Cohen et al., 1981, p. 902-3). As equally argued by others, this poses a "*paradox in which the more the regime needs to exercise the coercive machinery of the state in the repression against its competitors domestically, the more obvious is its 'weakness'*" (Job, 1992, p. 20).

For Youssef Cohen et al., it is only if and when control over the resources necessary for effective territorial domination takes place that the level of violent interactions between the state and its opponents will significantly decline; only at this point (if the state ever reaches it) will anti-state mobilization become extremely costly and ineffective (Cohen et al., 1981, p. 904). Yet "*this point cannot be reached without the state and its opponents passing through the violent phase of primitive accumulation of power*" (Cohen et al., 1981, p. 904). In the European case, there

has been enough time (and wars) for these states to impose their control on opponent forces. This is clearly not the case in the Global South.

In other words, and with all else constant, the lower the initial level of state power, the stronger the relationship between the rate of state expansion and collective violence. Generally speaking,

> this hypothesis implies that new states attempting to increase the power resources of the state are likely to display a higher level of collective violence than old ones because they tend to be at much lower initial levels of state power. (Cohen et al., 1981, p. 905)

This is why for Cohen, instead of indicating political decay, violence in these states is an integral part of the process of the accumulation of power by the national state apparatus (Cohen et al., 1981, p. 909). In addition, to the degree that this power accumulation is necessary for the imposition or maintenance of order, collective violence is also indicative of a political order on a new scale (Cohen et al., 1981, p. 909). In that sense, it is as if the deployment of violence in developing countries were part of the statebuilding process. Although it may be possible to argue that Cohen's theory is a rereading of Tilly's theory applied to developing countries over a longer time frame, it is impossible to deny that the perceptions of threats as national security, and the use of force domestically, closely relate to questions of sovereign authority, violence, and the exercise of power as social control.

In addition, "*as far as the interface between issues of state making and those of internal and external security are concerned, no other institution is more important than the military to developing nations*" (Ayoob, 1991, p. 280). In light of the security predicament during the early modern European state making phase, the role of the coercive apparatuses of the state represented primarily by military and paramilitary institutions was crucial so that it would be a waste not to consider the role of the military in the process of statebuilding and nation building of developing countries, to say the least (Ayoob, 1991, p. 280). Moreover, Third World state making and the violence that accompanies it *"makes no distinction between military-dominated and civilian-ruled polities, enabling the discussion of endemic violence regardless of regime type and of the civilian-military relations that sustain it*" (Ayoob, 1991, p. 281).

The inward nature of security inherent to the Global South can be mainly attributed to its trajectory of state formation of colonization that hindered the

consolidation of legitimate and robust sovereign authority. For this thesis, it is crucial to keep in mind the ways in which the state's coercive apparatus is deployed by the state and in which the military relates to domestic security. The next section will do so by looking specifically at the Latin and South American statebuilding experience concerning regional understandings of security.

## 2.7
## Security, statebuilding and the military in Latin and South America

Latin America is a particularly state centric region concerning security.[11] It developed a distinctive juridical tradition of embedded principles of national sovereignty, nonintervention, and peaceful settlement of disputes, avoiding the involvement of extra-regional powers backed by legal mechanisms (Kacowicz, 2005 apud Mares & Kacowicz, 2015, pp.18-9).[12] Unlike Europe,

> where the main threat to Westphalian sovereignty came from the same European states and the resulting solution was to modify the relationship among them, in Latin America, the principle of nonintervention has traditionally been enshrined as a legal antidote against foreign intervention. Therefore, the norms of sovereignty and equality of states have been deeply rooted in the tradition of Latin American and inter-American international law […] even among the Latin American countries themselves. As a corollary, the principle of nonintervention has received special attention, reflecting the Latin American resistance to unilateral acts of intervention by the European powers and the United States. (Mares & Kacowicz, 2015, pp.18-9)

The explanation therefor may stem from the process of colonization of these states. For Monica Herz, South American countries were extremely wary against foreign intervention upon independence; hence, the concept of security has been historically centered on the state both as object and actor and on the concept of autonomy (2010, p. 602). The lack of externally-oriented violence is a puzzling aspect to Latin America as a region that has enjoyed relative peace; with the

[11] In past decades, formal incorporations of the concept of human security into the regional security agenda fostered by the Organization of American States and confidence building measures aimed at facilitating communication, transparency and predictability to avoid confrontation among the countries of the region (Aravena, 1998, p. 131). Yet even the concept of confidence building measures was stressed and linked to sovereignty as to not generate conflict, and as such, reaffirms the focus of security on the state (Herz, 2010, p. 605-6). To this end, in spite of regional collective initiatives, states remain the main actors and the *locus* of security in the region.

[12] The region holds a strong diplomatic legalist tradition of peaceful resolution of conflicts and non-intervention largely supported by the academic, military and diplomatic establishments (Herz, 2010, p. 608).

exception of few interstate wars in almost two centuries of independence and since the early 19th century, the continent has been relatively free of major international conflict, as well as civil wars (Centeno, 2002, p. 9). In fact, with the end of the Cold War and the resolution of conflicts in Central America, Latin and South America have become progressively one of the world's most peaceful regions in international relations (Mares & Kacowicz, 2015, p. 23).

The non-interference tradition became a constitutive element of the region's interpretation of international security. By stressing the division between domestic and international as a basic tenet of the Westphalian system as fundamental to the reproduction of the idea of a peaceful and stable region, non-interference conversely caused most security challenges to be regarded as domestic issues (Herz, 2010). The reinforcement of the boundaries that distinguish an (inter)national from a domestic autonomous environment created a distinction in which whereas the first is portrayed as collaborative, the latter entails in and of itself, by implication, the violent exercise of sovereign practices. The domestic realm may be marked by intra-state war and transnational criminality, "*yet this reality is insulated from the peaceful international realm where peace prevails, rendering the region allegedly peaceful as an international space*" (Herz, 2010, p. 603).

By stressing non-intervention, Latin American states in fact reinforce their prerogative to promote violence at the domestic level. This has led to what some have defined a striking contrast between frequently high levels of *domestic* disorder and social violence (even in democratic governments) and a relative degree of inter-state peace (Hurrell, 1998, p. 537). In other words, the relative peace in the region takes place at the expense of high levels of violence internally. The extreme violence in Latin American civil wars is also relevant to explain international relations, because it raises the question of "how is it that Latin American countries can be that bloody against domestic opponents yet willing to follow international rules against foreign rivals?" (Mares & Kacowicz, 2015, p. 16).

At the same time, "*states in the region have experienced a lesser concentration of power when compared to European states, being characterized as limited states whose power has been shallow and contested, even in light of high*

*levels of political violence*" (Centeno, 2002, 10-15).[13] Miguel Angel Centeno has associated the fragility of state formation in Latin America to the relative absence of wars, as he notes that political violence has occurred largely within rather than between states in the region (Centeno, 16-7).

The presence of external powers that helped ensure peace in the new postcolonial states prevented bloodsheds yet may also have "*locked regions into political equilibriums unsuited for further institutional developments, contributing to the institutional failure of these states*" (Centeno, 2002, p. 17). By resonating with Tilly's assumption that wars played a crucial role in the modern nation-state building process in that wars increased state capacity to extract resources – to centralize power in national capitals and to foster stronger emotional links between the population and state institutions – Centeno argues that the experience of limited wars in Latin America have failed to offer the historical legacy observed in what he defines as the "European total wars" (2002, pp.21-2).

Conversely, the domestic social context in which Latin American republics arose, shared with most states in the postcolonial world, was one in which states mainly preceded nations, lacking a sense of nationhood as state boundaries developed, in which "*wars of independence produced fragments of an empire, but not new states*" (Centeno, 2002, pp.24-5). As a result, the limited wars and long stretches of peace in Latin America have contributed for states to be deprived of a potentially important impetus for development that resulted in an underdeveloped administrative capacity of the Latin American state (Centeno, 2002, p.26).

This inherent fragility has had impacts in the structuring of the Latin American state security apparatus. It is no coincidence that sociologists such as Morris Janowitz have assumed that military force is one of the several means that a nation state has at its disposal for influencing international relations, making the case for the need to focus on the internal structure of the military establishment as a social system and as a reflection of society as a whole (1969, p. 130).[14] On that

[13] If we understand the state "as the permanent institutional core of political authority on which regimes rest and depend whose general contours and capacities remain constant despite changes in governments and that on the most basic level, whose functions include the provision and administration of public goods and the control of both internal and external violence", Latin American states have regularly failed to establish their institutional autonomy (Centeno, 2002, p.2).

[14] With regard to the prerogatives concerning the state security apparatus, Morris Janowitz stresses that although sociological analysis tended to view violence as a form of disorganization or as deviant behavior of a social system in the past, warfare has been a major source of social change among social systems (1969, p. 131-2).

note, there is an entanglement of social aspects within the military profession, even if it should be observed with certain care in democratic settings:

> By custom, law and political necessity, the professional soldier must be nonpartisan in domestic political affairs. Yet it is clear that the professional officer requires considerable sensitivity to the political and social consequences of military operations. At each step in the graduated application of force, threatened or actual, to the control of international relations, political and social factors are completely intertwined with what has been called military considerations. In varying degrees, this has always been the case. (Janowitz, 1969, p. 128)

Moreover, all armies have internal roles or missions that engage them in civilian sociocultural change or that confront them with the lack thereof, a relationship that can range from being narrowly defined as 'civic action' to 'nation-building', or the like (Nunn, 2001, p. 16). Yet in Latin America in particular, armies have claimed the social role of a civilizing actor within the domestic sphere to a smaller or greater extent. For Centeno, this stems from the statebuilding process in Latin America, which created divisions within the dominant classes and with the military as an institution that appears to have identified the critical nation enemy as internal, since "*given the absence of an external enemy, wars were superfluous*" (Centeno, 2002, p. 26). During the period of border disputes and state formation conflicts at the regional level, sometimes a result of expansionists such as the *bandeirantes* mercenaries in Brazil, there was relative isolation from external influence, leaving room for the military to mostly act in inwardly oriented ways.

For Janowitz, the inward orientation of the military was particularly true in what he refers to as "new nations". In these countries, the basic assumption that civilian supremacy within the democratic model of civilian-military relations depends upon a sharp organizational separation of external and internal violent forces was particularly not widespread; one reason therefor is the involvement of the army, to a great extent, in domestic constabulary duties to maintain the legitimate authority in new nations (Janowitz, 1977, p. 114).

Another aspect of the inward role of the military is the fact that in these nations, the military was successful as an institution crucial to social cohesion, especially as it acted to suppress internal insurrections and other domestic duties historically; as a result, it developed an orientation that rose above partisan politics and embodied national ideals (Janowitz, 1977, p. 112). This relation, which he

denominates a successful operational experience, has made militaries more professional. After being performed repeatedly, this led to further military professionalism over time, constituting a firmer basis for intervention in domestic politics (Janowitz, 1977, p. 112).

Latin American military forces have integrated into the social system as a whole in a considerably more advanced and intensive manner since the beginning of the 19th century, presenting a high degree of homogeneity in development, maturity, character, and function when compared to other regions such as Africa and Asia (Kossok, 1971, p. 410). South American armies adopted and retained a continental European military heritage reminiscent of France and Germany in the 19th and early 20th century (Nunn, 2001, p. 17-8). However, European influence was also present in terms of a rationale that linked the idea of good countries with the notion of good armies, hence advocating for the synergy between the two and calling for a social organic role of the military in society (Nunn, 2001, p. 19).

The trait of undertaking a social role has encouraged Army officers to pay attention to domestic affairs to assure national defense, which over time commonly came to signify 'national security'; as a result, the separation between defense and security from such roles or constabularies proved hard to be conceived (Nunn, 2001, p. 16). Since in many new nations the institutions of law and order are fragile, it is also common for the military to be usually concerned with the alternative function of internal security, sometimes even leading to the development of special mobile units, including airborne troops trained to fight insurrectionist forces and carry out police-type work (Janowitz, 1977, p. 112-3).

In practice, such inward orientation of the military in the region meant that they found themselves to be armies of occupation within their own countries, so that the traditional external role of the military soon became inseparable from their internal role, that ranged from civilizing, educating, uplifting, and to modernizing functions (Nunn, 2001, p. 16;20). In that sense, the political role of the military is closely linked to the organization of the police and the "management of violence" in new nations, and may include large and extensive police forces, organized on a national basis and on a European gendarmerie model (Janowitz, 1977, p. 113-4).

The fact that during many years no South American country could boast a national police organization capable of controlling large-scale, politically driven civil disturbances contributed for the further professionalization of officer corps in

Latin America to play important internal roles in nations with serious economic and social problems under intense political disruption (Nunn, 2001, p. 21). Police forces, conversely, are generally administered under a Ministry of Interior and constitute auxiliary units of the army (Janowitz, 1977, p. 114).

In the 20th century, the military leadership remained largely isolated from the influence of civilian political and social forces, and military professionalism and the military role in nation building became a growing aspect of that institution within a number of countries in Latin America (Fagen, 1992, p. 43). By 1930, military leaders from the Southern Cone already had a taste in nation building and expanded their internal roles despite a decrease in war threats and the increase of political activity by the populace. This conjuncture often demanded intense army participation in a variety of internal roles that ranged from strike-breaking, riot dispersal, controlling political protests, frontier and hinterland colonization, road building, and the overthrowing of governments (Nunn, 2001, p. 21).

Particularly with regard to security, by the outbreak of World War II in 1939, Latin American Europeanized armies expressed an orientation toward internal politics that some have argued to be a result of their professionalism that conflicted with their civilian political practices and socioeconomic realities (Nunn, 2001). In a time where national defense was carried out as an internal imperative, in addition to simply keeping the populace in its place, the Armed Forces were also occasionally assigned police-like functions (Nunn, 2001, p. 17).

After the end of the Second World War, the political conjuncture that followed particularly facilitated the installment of military regimes in the Southern Cone in the 60s and the 70s. It has been made the case that the historical US military influence by no means initiated South American Armies' interest in internal social roles – at least not in Argentina, Chile and Brazil, where militaries were traditionally committed to a civilizing mission (Fagen, 1992). During the Cold War, leftist revolutionary groups throughout the hemisphere thought of themselves as the vanguard of a popular struggle against domestic exploitation and foreign imperialism and as a vector of social transformation (Fagen, 1992, p. 46). The action of these revolutionary groups resulted in strong reactions by the Armed Forces; hence, instead of merely a product of the United States' interests in the region, the Southern Cone military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s were largely the

products of a technical and ideological preparation that had characterized military training for more than a century (Fagen, 1992, p. 60).

In fact, "*the militaries in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay made war with the left as if it were a foreign enemy and claimed to be waging a third world war against subversion*" (Fagen, 1992, p. 46). In face of the imminent communist threat, the association of social demands with subversion, as well as the use of the expression 'revolution' to describe such threats accounted for a particular articulation of national security with a demand for counterinsurgency efforts that advanced the notion of a total war against revolutionaries and social reformers (Fagen, 1992, p. 44). Put in place in the name of national security during the Cold War, the war against guerrillas and the counterinsurgency practices it entailed played a significant role in the hemisphere, enabling military leaders not only to seize power but also to be able "*to establish a security apparatus that maintained absolute power even in light of resistance, which served to justify future deployment of repressive practices*" (Fagen, 1992, p. 46-7).[15]

Nonetheless, particularly during the Cold War, nearly every country in Latin America participated in US assistance and training programs featuring counterinsurgency doctrines and regional intelligence-sharing arrangements that included the provision of arms and organizational advice (Fagen, 1992, p. 43;55).[16] The technical and ideological support provided by the United States and Western Europe in a series of organizational and counter-insurgency orientations entailed anti-crime and anti-guerrilla trainings, among others (Fagen, 1992, p. 60). This configured the following paradox: while the Armed Forces acquired a police role by means of localizing, capturing and interrogating suspects of subversion, militarized functions were applied to the police (Fagen, 1992). It is possible to assert that this contributed to further consolidate the specialization and capacitation of the armed forces to act within the domestic realm. Over time, a reorganization of

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[15] For Morris Janowitz, the increased capacity of military regimes to rule developing nations has been a function of a process of institution building, and especially of the increased growth and effectiveness of police agencies as instruments of repressive control, such as the control of the police and the paramilitary by the central national military establishment (Janowitz, 1977, p. 6-7).

[16] For Patricia Weiss Fagen, it would be naïve to deny the motivations of the United States, since it heavily influenced the specialization in capacitating South American militaries to act within their respective domestic realms. Until 1973, three parallel training programs were operated and funded by the US government, namely one to train police forces in crime control, anti-subversive actions and interrogation techniques, one for non-commissioned officers to train police to conduct anti-guerrilla operations, and a third aimed at higher ranking military leadership to advance their theoretical understandings of geopolitics, economics, and ideology (Fagen, 1992, p. 60).

security forces to accommodate torture and other forms of intimidation became widely perceived as professionally accepted techniques and as essential to the military's domestic operations (Fagen, 1992, p. 55).

During that period, the United States assured Latin American militaries had "nothing to worry about regarding external security", since the region was within their zone of influence; in turn, the US incentivized the armed forces of these countries to act to tackle communism domestically within their own territories (Fagen, 1992). This characterized a clear double standard from the Posse Comitatus adopted by the US in terms of how to act within their own national borders, that advocated against the non-allocation of members of the military within law and order enforcement activities domestically.

The double standard in US security policies towards Latin America contributed to crystallize notions of the military to act within the national security apparatus aiming to handle internal questions in their respective countries, and to continue to be an active actor in domestic politics. This may be able to explain the continuing involvement of the military within social initiatives and programs that could easily be associated with the role of the police and that refer to population management and the handling of social life.

Some understand professional militarism as willingness and propensity to provide solutions to the country's problems – economic, political, social – based on a military ethos, which, sometimes is a result of professionalism in conflict with civilian sociocultural tendencies (Nunn, 2001, p. 15). Despite recruited to protect the nation against outside threats of invasion, both the armed forces and police took on functions well beyond their traditional roles and were ordered to wage war against citizens within the country itself, be it for ideological and/or political reasons (Fagen, 1992, p. 55). Within that context, the military took on police functions, locating, capturing, interrogating and torturing suspects of subversion; conversely, militarized functions were applied to the police. In that context, there was a paradox, that of the military taking over the function of the police – the institution precisely incumbent of domestic law enforcement and charged with the responsibility of ensuring civilian rights and security (Fagen, 1992, p. 55).

It has been made the case that even though at first US counterinsurgency military assistance contributed to this professionalization, particularly in a later period, the chiefs of many Latin American military establishments continued to

believe that professional military expertise was required in a broader range of fields (Stepan, 1976, p. 247). This called for developing expertise in internal security matters that embraced all aspects of social, economic and political life, resulting in high politicization (Stepan, 1976, p. 247). Although armies were not specifically assigned police functions, civil disorder – meaning a number of things – could bring them to action against internal enemies (Nunn, 2001, p. 21).

In any case, the provision of training offered to members of the military and the police formed an entire generation of military officers and police who were armed, trained and 'professionalized' (Fagen, 1992, p. 43). The phenomenon of professional militarism was probably most discernible in the political sphere of Southern cone countries, a practice with which Brazil in particular has had a longer sustained experience (Nunn, 2001, p. 15). For some, the professionalism trend outlasted the decline of military governments in the region, since the potential of professional military roles were built into Latin America's constitutional systems and national budgets; as a result, both the monitoring of activities in the civilian sphere and internal disorder of any nature remained under the ultimate jurisdiction of the armed forces (Nunn, 2001, p. 33).

 This implied in future consequences for security in the region even in the period after democratization. Security studies began to entail not only the traditional issues confronting states in their international relations, but also domestic challenges to regime stability that could include contestation of the state's monopoly of force in physical spaces of the country, cultural survival of minority groups within the nation, and the ability of individual citizens to live and work without fear of either criminals or an overbearing government (Mares & Kacowicz, 2015, p. 11).

In past decades, the nature of violence in the region underwent significant changes yet organized crime continued to gain political influence due to its multiple and sophisticated abilities to weaken state institutions and to become a parallel power in marginalized areas – even in the absence of political motivations (Ortiz, 2015, p. 217). Transnational issues such as criminality and drug trafficking related-violence demanded that states developed new cooperative strategies to tackle them at the international level. Nonetheless, denser military exchange, exercises and bilateral discussions of increasing cooperation within Mercosur did not eliminate the classical geopolitical national security discourse (Hurrell, 1998, p. 533; 541).

Concurrently, in addition to themes such as state strength, military power and geopolitical ambition, new security threats that referred to the absence of political legitimacy, the failure of states to provide minimal conditions of public order within their borders, and to domestic instability and violence that could spill into the international arena all stemmed from state weaknesses (Hurrell, 1998, p. 541-2). In turn, these weaknesses were originated by structural domestic causes that ranged from high levels of social violence with deep historical roots and were exacerbated by drug trafficking and drug-related criminality, social inequality and marginalization; concurrently, state security apparatuses became extremely turned inwards, in a way in which the reference of security continued to be the state (Hurrell, 1998).

In particular over the past two decades, the armed forces have increasingly been asked to take an active role in the fight against rampant crime in Latin America (Pion-Berlin & Carreras, 2017). Besides the classical mission of deterrence, militaries have been asked to assist in public security since "*police are often poorly equipped, trained, and paid, while judicial systems lack resources and are easily intimidated and corrupted*" (Marcella, 2015, pp.168-9).

Yet the drawing of Latin America militaries into the task of internal security, as in the case of the "war on drugs" or into the provision of public order, helps explain how that exercise carried a very high risk of repeating past human rights abuses and brutality, since members of the military are much more likely to think in terms of enemies than police forces (Hurrell, 1998, p. 545). This challenge stems from the fact that

> there is a critical distinction between police and military approaches to the use of force: The police are trained and equipped to deter crime, use minimum force, and gather evidence, the military to use overwhelming force and not be concerned about evidence. (Marcella, 2015, p. 169)

In response to a crime epidemic since the early 1990s, several Latin American countries in the region have resorted to using military units or heavy-force police to physically retake and regain the state's power over territories *de facto* controlled by non-state entities – such as criminal gangs or drug trafficking organizations – that over time stepped into the stateless void and began to deliver public goods as they were sponsored by illicit economies (Felbab-Brown, 2011, p. 5; 11)

Deployments of the Armed Forces for law enforcement have hindered a clear distinction between the military and the police even more problematic and unrealistic in practice (Ortiz, 2015). This is also why most contemporary patterns of conflict in the region revolve, among other factors, around threats of the use of force, high levels of domestic violence, political instability, and long periods of authoritarian rule (Hurrell, 1998, p. 532).

## 2.8
## Conclusion

Reflecting on the limits of the domestic and of the international is essential not only because these limits inform the subjects and issues that can be studied within a theoretical framework and a body of knowledge. It is also crucial to do so in order to inform *in what ways* issues can be studied, directly impacting our perceptions of reality, theory, practice, and change. The idea of this chapter was to show what is the place of militarization in the IR literature and expose the argument and the main definitions that will be used in this thesis. It was also to reflect on the origins of many terms in the existing literature regarding questions of sovereignty, territory, and security in the context of the drawing of limits of the inter(national) and of security that took place in the European state formation experience. The chapter began by looking at the links between violence and state formation within the political units that were to become states in periods of interstate regional wars. It considered implications of a conceptualization of sovereignty that the international relations literature on security inherited to better comprehend the epistemological and ontological limitations created by that particular experience.

For this thesis, perhaps the two most crucial of these implications were an outward conception of security on the one hand (conceived as projected to the outside of the state), and a displacement of violence to the outside of the borders of the national territory on the other. The two implied that since the consolidation of the discipline, it became impossible to conceptually admit threats in the inside realm. In the European experience of state formation, inside threats were suppressed with violence and 'projected' to the outside, beyond the national territory. This process was consolidated by a myth created over Westphalia in which the outside was continually perceived as a threatening environment, whereas the domestic realm was associated with peace and security.

The emergence and consolidation of International Relations as a discipline only served to reinforce that perception. As an effort to dissociate from similar disciplines like Political Science focused on the domestic political structuring of the state, IR was based on the international system and came to exist following a context of generalized war. Likewise, conceptions of sovereignty based on mutual recognition demonstrate how the international relational aspect has always been present in modern political life. Nevertheless, factors that intrinsically relate to the functions of the concept of sovereignty need to be taken into account to reveal that much of the focus of security has been on the 'international system'.

By implication, potential insecurities that are inherent to the state – and the domestic violence that stemmed from it – were rendered unable to be accounted for, at least until post-structuralists and post-colonialists scholars began making an effort to engage with that problematique. By assuming that the mainstream outward dimension of sovereignty is not enough, it may be possible to recover its inside dimension – that which directly relates to the exercise of sovereign authority. In addition, an articulation between military power and the exercise of sovereignty domestically should then be enabled.

The outward conception of security is above all problematic for the Global South in that its process of state formation differs from the experience of developed states of the Global North. In developing countries, threats acquire an inherently domestic nature that stems from the state building process itself – an insight first developed by scholars like Mohammed Ayoob. In light of the way security was conceived in the IR literature, by accepting that threats take on a different nature in the Global South, the inside/outside theoretical framework for violence becomes insufficient to account for their domestic challenges. Likewise, an inward aspect of security is revealed, one that is crucial to this analysis. Special attention was also directed to state formation, security and militaries in Latin America.

By recovering this commonly understated inside dimension of sovereignty that relates to the exercise of sovereign authority and to the use of force domestically, it becomes possible to conceive the security threats of developing countries that take place at the domestic level of states. If for International Relations' theory the international outside is regarded as chaotic whereas the inside is taken for granted as peaceful, for developing countries, security concerns are mostly of domestic rather than international nature, and not perceived as peaceful.

This leaves a few unanswered questions in terms of how to advance in theory from there. The first that comes to mind is: How, then, is security exercised within the borders of developing countries to tackle domestic threats? What does that mean to sovereign power? And how does that relate, if at all, with the outward dimension of sovereignty? In spite of the contribution made by authors such as Ayoob cited in this chapter, there is still much to be said regarding the mechanisms through which sovereign powers in the Global South handle security threats that are perceived at the domestic level.

The next chapter will attempt to answer these questions by exposing the argument in detail and by bringing to light the theoretical framework to conduct the analysis. It will entail an effort to recover the sovereign exercise of the use of force, not only to assess how that relates to the process of state making in developing countries, but also to recover Ayoob's original argument that security is turned inwards in the Global South. Yet, it will be shown that despite threats being in the inside of the territorial limits of the state, the domestic exercise of sovereignty in fact reinforces the same logic of protecting against an 'other' – only, in that case, the other is within the state's territory. Therefore, in a way, while for Realists the state protects the inside against an outside, within the Global South, states reinforce that same logic, and deploy significant violence, to protect themselves against an 'other' located within its own national territory.

With all these particularities considered, resorting to other ways of studying sovereignty that are dissociated from borders as the limits of the (inter)national becomes necessary. In that sense, conceptions of the use of force as a prerogative of the sovereign state can help tackle the research problem in the heart of the matter and allow an engagement with concepts such as the use of force, and to violence as a practice. In order to do so, it is necessary to adopt an understanding of borders that differs from that which regards them as the thresholds of violence as a function of the international realm and that can likewise represent the expression of sovereign coercive practices within such limits. In that sense, the acknowledgement that in developing countries threats are mainly within the territorial limits of the nation state made by authors such as Ayoob and Cohen will be recovered. Yet, the inside/outsides within the state with a focus on borders as violent practices and as a mechanism that protects the state from what it perceives to be a threat will be approached to recover the notion of internal sovereignty.

This is particularly strong in Latin America, due to factors seen in this chapter. For one, fewer interstate wars at a regional level upon independence made their militaries turn even more to the domestic realm of these countries, based on the belief that the police was unable to handle domestic security threats. In addition, countries of the region actively supported the observance of the concept of non-intervention, which resulted in a fierce demarcation of what constituted internal domestic issues, normalizing violent practices that took place within the domestic realm, under the protection of the principle of non-intervention.

In addition, the trend of drawing Latin American militaries into the war on drugs instead of police forces stems from an assumption that the military will be able to solve the problem of security in light of an inability of the police to do so. In that sense, this trace of militarism continues to echo throughout the region. As a result, higher levels of the use of force can cause collateral effects, highlighting a paradox of human security being compromised at the expense of state security. If state security is to be assured by internal sovereignty, the question becomes what the state interprets as something against which it needs to be secured. This question will be addressed in the next chapter.

# 3.
# Internal sovereignty and pacification as violence

> "Not only can the exercise of power only be performed in a certain space, but it is the presence of power that defines a territory – territory is what is controlled by a certain type of power."

> Foucault, Michel. '*Questions on Geography',* 1980

## 3.1
## Introduction

The last chapter provided an overview of how violence and territory have been intrinsically linked to the outside territorial borders of the state as the limits of sovereign violence. This chapter will begin by highlighting the complications of this articulation of situating violence within the limits of the international in terms of which theoretical conceptualizations it allows. The purpose is to recover the internal aspect of sovereignty through an alternative conceptualization of borders, according to which sovereign violence can take place also within national territory, in order to approach this particular case study in the most effective manner.

To this end, analysis will derive from an alternative understanding of borders and from practice theory and Foucault's biopolitics as a methodology. The mainstream conception of borders as territorial limits of sovereign violence will be deconstructed and replaced by a conception of borders as sites where violent sovereign practices take place within the limits of the nation state, sometimes as forms of social control. The idea is to see how law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) entail bordering mechanisms reproduced by members of the Armed Forces in their exercise as agents of the state security apparatus, and to conceive GLOs more than simply a legal framework.

After addressing the methodology elected for this analysis, some of the concepts that define law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) will be elucidated to properly account for the object of study, namely militarization, pacification as a particular form of violence, and territoriality. The latter refers

specifically to the perceived 'outsides' of the state within its territorial limits as domestic thresholds of violence.

## 3.2
## The complications of placing sovereign violence within the limits of the inter(national) for the inside/outside thresholds of sovereign power

To this day, the concepts of territory and sovereignty have structured the international political system based on three principles: the notion that sovereignty is equal to all states, that it relates to the territorial preservation of existing borders, and that the internal realm is a competence of internal jurisdiction (Elden, 2007, p. 825). Territorial sovereignty and political independence assume sovereignty as both internal and exclusive, and at the same time, as equally externally (Elden, 2007, p. 825).17 The case has been made that this articulation between sovereignty, territory and how these two concepts relate to each other in the imaginary of the modern state is highly problematic. Some have referred to this relationship as a 'territorial trap', given that it is based in three problematic assumptions: 1) that states have exclusive power over their territory through the exercise of sovereignty, 2) that the domestic and international spheres are distinct from one another, and 3) that the borders of the state define society by constraining it (Agnew, 1994, p. 76-7). Consequently, the understanding is that the exercise of sovereign power becomes constrained to its territorial limits.

It is no coincidence that, as the concept of state sovereignty expanded to become associated with the concept of national sovereignty, the use of mercenaries in warfare declined and was subsequently eliminated, contributing to the idea of the Armed Forces as an expression of the nation (Ruggie, 1993, p. 163). The concept of the state border has an epistemological and ontological role in terms of shaping the thought over territory, sovereignty, power and authority. Over time, the concept of the border became crystallized, and was taken for granted and treated as a given. This resulted in a series of deficiencies in the kind of theorization on borders enabled by the discipline, to the extent that

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17 The prohibition of the use of force against the territorial integrity or independence of a state articulated by Article 2.4 of the United Nations Charter reify a particular take on sovereignty mainly understood in terms of the territorial element, implying that territorial integrity is equivalent to territorial preservation (Elden, 2007, p. 825).

it is remarkable that state borders are usually taken for granted by international relations. They are a point of departure but they are not a subject of inquiry. (Jackson, 2000, p. 316)

For some, over the years, despite academic efforts to trace alternative connections between violence, sovereignty, power and borders, these concepts continue to be conceived relatively scarcely (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 65). By being 'trapped' by and 'in' these territorial limits, conceptually recognizing hybridized forms of violence that take place within them becomes extremely difficult for International Relations (Krause, 2009). This division is highly problematic, since it renders the classification of particular 'blurry' types of violence, that may not fall into one category or another, more difficult. In the case of Brazil, pacification as a type of state violence could fit in this blurry category.

Therefore, traditionally political scientists and IR scholars have mainly focused on the violence associated with armed conflict, while internal violence has been studied by sociologists and criminologists (Krause, 2009, p. 339). For instance, even in cases where high levels of violence are observed, state violence does not seem to easily fit in the category of armed conflict (Krause, 2009, p. 339). This is why Krause argues that sometimes states defined as fragile or failed may, in fact, be states that did not fully assert the Weberian monopoly on the legal use of violence – usually the international community's standard for statehood (2009, p. 347). In his words,

Such a binary vision of the place of violence in modern life, even if seldom fully respected in practice, does not easily admit hybrid forms since it rests upon the liberal idea that the practical monopoly over the use of force should be aligned as closely as possible with the state, as part of the grand bargain in which state institutions provide security and public order in return for their monopoly of the use of force. (Krause, 2012, p. 40)

This difficulty to identify forms of violence domestically stems from the underlying assumption that violence in the liberal state should be centralized, tightly bounded and regulated by particular institutions like the armed forces and the police, whose primary function is to evacuate the threat of violence from social, political, and economic life (Krause, 2012, p. 40). This also becomes a hindrance regarding the relationship between practice, theory and observation, since

comprehension should be enabled even when these crystalized inherited assumptions on violence do not match the empirical reality in some cases. This becomes essentially problematic to states of the Global South such as Brazil. Albeit not formally at war, in a situation of armed conflict nor in a scenario of state failure, the country nevertheless still experiences large-scale violent killings that could be characterized by, and explained by, an imperfect assertion of the Weberian monopoly (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005).

Furthermore, the liberal understanding that drew historical boundaries around violent practices established that the violence to secure the state and its citizens against external threats was to be represented by the development of modern armed forces, while the use of force to maintain internal security and public order was the responsibility of the police, gendarme and other internal security forces (Krause, 2012, p. 41).[18] [19] This case study does not fit in the usual attribution of the limits of sovereign violence to armed forces externally and to police domestically, since the military is performing policing roles inside the territorial limits of the state. Thus, the risk of failing to account for that phenomenon as an exercise of sovereign violence simply because it may not fit the inherited assumptions of this classification, becomes a particularly relevant question.

Nonetheless, the classification of different forms of violence within the borders of states needs to be done carefully to avoid broad and inaccurate generalizations. According to Krause,

> Whereas large-scale violence can have profound political implications domestically, once one abandons the somewhat legalistic fiction that war can only take places between two states or two highly organized and structured armed groups internationally, then what is usually defined as 'armed conflicts' can be found in all corners of the world. (Krause, 2009, p. 346)

For the reasons stated above, by assuming that the engagement of the military in public security is a pattern of domestic violence, it would not be wise to tweak existing categories of classification of violence in which to 'fit' the Brazilian case.

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[18] For Krause, such understanding would also include a highly restrictive use of force by private actors in public space, as well as the use of violence in the private sphere through the prohibition or sanctioning of certain forms of interpersonal violence (Krause, 2012, p. 41).

[19] For Krause, such understanding would also include a highly restrictive use of force by private actors in public space, as well as the use of violence in the private sphere through the prohibition or sanctioning of certain forms of interpersonal violence (Krause, 2012, p. 41).

Instead, it would be wiser to explore a conceptual framework focused on the sovereign use of force that enables an understanding of the exercise of violence within the territorial limits of the nation-state and, in a way, 'beyond' them.

This should be part of an epistemological effort to speak of security by not forgetting its central element: that of violence manifested through the use of force (Valença, 2016). In a way, this is also an effort to link theory and practice to produce knowledge in ways that recover violence as an object to be studied (Valença, 2010, p. 206). Thus, this thesis will recover the centrality of violence as an object of study by regarding it as embedded in the essential prerogative of sovereign authority to use force that is claimed and exercised internally within the limits of the state.

## 3.3
## Sovereignty at its edge: borders as sites of violence

In the 1960s, there were significant changes in the literature regarding borders. Boundary studies became border studies, enabling a reflexive shift that encompassed a change in the focus of research, *"in the sense of no longer studying the border itself, but instead how it is socially constructed and reproduced in terms of symbols, signs, identifications, representations, performances and stories"* (Van Houtum, 2005, p. 675). Scholars began to theorize on the signification of boundaries as concepts of demarcation that entailed meanings of limits, thresholds and edges, that is, as objects to be conquered or assimilated.

Years later, major reflections on territoriality within IR emerged as part of an effort to understand what was becoming an unbundled territoriality in postmodern international politics, not necessarily as a phenomenon located outside the state border, but rather as one that was becoming "another place" (Ruggie, 1993, p. 174). This constituted an effort to understand how state borders were established, in which conditions, and what meanings were attributed to them. This is an essential effort, because not only borders, but also all the conceptions attached to them, were being taken for granted. Some have even suggested that

> there is a wealth of hitherto underexploited resources for problematizing the concept of the border of the state, as well as the concept of the border itself more generally, within what is often referred to as 'post-structuralist' thought. (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 65)

This theoretical effort does not aim to advocate that state borders are obsolete. It proposes additional ways of problematizing this concept. Therefore, to conceptualize and think of borders as a central security concept in non-traditional ways does not, in any way, represent a claim nor an attempt to question the geographical limits of nation states. The goal of this reconsideration is not to defend the end of the concept as we know it by advocating for a narrative of the 'end of borders', which, for some, would only serve to reinforce the *status quo* (Walker, 2002). It is simply an attempt to transcend the mainstream crystallized meanings on borders to conceive other ways in which their logic can work.

For Walker, it is important to objectify the international due to the fact that "*one specific account on borders, margins and limits was taken as given in the modern political life by overlooking the fact that the way such borders were drawn was, in and of itself, a violent process*" (2002). The failure to acknowledge that the constitution of the state is not natural but rather a violent process keeps us from theoretically identifying and conceiving much of the violence taking place 'at the border', and within it (Walker, 2002).

This effort can enable an awareness of existing challenges in terms of the discriminations, distinctions, geographical frontiers, and legal and conceptual limits that permeate the modern political imaginary (Walker apud Bigo & Walker, 2016, p. 20-1). Instead, realizing that the constitution of borders is in and of itself arbitrary, yet nevertheless treated as a given, can highlight all the remaining ways power can be exercised and in which sovereignty as a practice is reinforced within the established territorial limits of nation states (Walker, 2002).

In terms of its spatial aspect, sovereignty as a principle establishes a clear demarcation between the life inside and the life outside a certain central political community, in a mechanism through which borders are conceptually conceived as excluding practices and procedures (Walker, 1993a, p. 62). Upon acknowledging the constitution of borders as arbitrary instead of natural and given, it becomes possible to conceive sovereignty as inherently violent, namely as a violent practice that needs constant reinforcement to be sustained.

Before culminating in the current political cartography and international law codes as an accomplishment, borders were represented as a result of a series of conflicts and as *sites of struggle* (Walker, 2002, p. 22). Thus, it is crucial to

politicize borders as socially constructed phenomena in the sense that they represent the outcome of violent encounters (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 70).

As seen previously, the relationship between the concepts of violence, borders and limits can be attributed to Max Weber's articulation of violence as the necessary means to the exercise of sovereign power (See Weber, 1956 and Walker, 1993b in Chapter 2). According to Walker, as Weber defines a state as a community circumscribed to a certain territory which holds the legitimate monopoly of the coercive means and the exclusive claim to violence, the delimitation of borders becomes the starting point of his analysis. By positing the state as an entity that exists in relation to space as an element, "*its constitutive nature inhabits a political imaginary within the domestic level whose deconstruction needs to start with the analysis of two of its central components: territory and monopoly*" (Walker, 1993b, p. 141).

> Taken by itself, Weber's definition of the state falls neatly into two parts: territory and monopoly. By quickly insisting that territory be treated as merely 'one of the characteristics of the state', however, these two parts are immediately conflated, and conflated in relation to a specific claim about the spatial location of the violence over which the state claims monopoly. (Walker, 1993b, p. 141)

The articulation of the two concepts highlight a new conception of the political, characterized by the nature of the exercise of power within the territorial space over which the state held the monopoly of coercion during the transition from feudalism to capitalist, then to modernity (Walker, 1993b, p. 145). Moreover, this conception is an attempt to conciliate universality and plurality. The state is defined pre-eminently in terms of a monopoly, which by itself represents a claim to universal legitimacy; yet, that monopoly is exercised in a contained way, within the limits of a specific territory (Walker, 1993b, p. 142).

For Walker, one of the consequences of borders being taken for granted is the fact that the analytical developments within IR never bothered to examine the construction of state borders or even the complexities and relations embedded in such ontology (1993b, p. 157). The fact that violence within the state's domestic political space was likewise taken for granted helped reify its *inside* dimension, instead of questioning if such conception even existed (Walker, 1993b, p. 145).

Hence, the need to deconstruct the notion of a state as a function of territory and monopoly stems from the fact that this particular definition carries an inherent contradiction, inserted and articulated in a discourse that refers more to claims over violence than to definitions of it *per se*. Likewise, for the purposes of this case study, the claims over violence embedded in the exercise of Op GLO, and present in the official governmental discourse that justifies deploying them, is more important for the analysis than an assessment of the definitions and nature of that violence *per se*.

Conversely, if the borders of the modern state cannot be questioned and are taken for granted, if follows that violence and perils are clearly located outside the state (Walker, 1993b, p. 157). By refuting the notion that the inside of the state is peaceful and without violence, Walker is skeptical about the possibility of eradicating this same violence, arguing that current challenges on it bring up questions that are fundamental to the character, the aspect and the *locus* of political life at the end of the 20th century (1993b, p. 138). Following that logic, the resort to violence becomes the condition of possibility to our continuous existence: "*violence itself becomes the outside condition to a life with no violence inside*" (Walker, 1993b, p. 139). In addition, the failure to perceive the arbitrariness of borders represents a hindrance in terms of conceiving violence as intrinsically related to sovereign authority, as in the preserving violence noted by Derrida (See Chapter 2).

This Janus-faced character of national borders is highlighted by William Connolly as he claims that "*borders represent indispensable protections against violations and violence, but the divisions they sustain also carry cruelty and violence*" (1995, p. 163 apud Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 66). Conversely, according to that logic, territory can be thought of as "*land occupied and bounded by violence*", so that to territorialize would be "*to establish boundaries by warning other people off*" (Connolly, 1995 apud Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 66). That entails a perception that it is necessary to contain some territories while protecting an outside against them, and consequently, their population within.

Barry Hindess also stresses the relation between the concept of terror and territory as he analyzes the etymology of the two words:

> While it is usually seen as relating to terra, meaning earth or land, it might also be derived from *terrere*, to frighten, via *territor*, frightener. This, the OED [Oxford English Dictionary] suggests, would give us *territorium*, "a place from which people are warned off." Although the Latin root of a term is not always a reliable guide to

its later meanings, the disputed etymology in this case provides a useful introduction to its political significance. While terror may sometimes pose a threat to the territorial order of states, the possibility that territory and terror derive from the same Latin root suggests that it might also be an integral part of this order's functioning. […] Territory is associated with the threat of violence toward those who do belong, as much as to those who do not. The point in this case is not to warn them off but to regulate their conduct. They are to be frightened without being frightened off. Like the threat to outsiders, the internal threat is often seen as a means of attaining security. (Hindess, 2006, p. 244)

Thus, to territorialize a space would mean to establish 'borders' in a territory by deploying terror, controlling those within it against *outsiders*, while also trying to regulate the behavior of those who find themselves in this territory through fear. As such, borders work as a mechanism of the exercise of sovereign power that takes place through violent practices, even in spaces within national territory.

Such mechanism works both ways, depending on who, or what, is constituted as a threat by the sovereign authority at a specific point in time. In a way, the inclusion/exclusion mechanism that takes place at the border relates to Carl Schmitt's notion of exception in that the 'normal' territory of a political-juridical order is defined in terms of a certain notion of an exceptional territory (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 73). According to this inside/outside logic, the exceptional territory is understood as precisely a site located geographically *at* the external margin of the sovereign state (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 73).

Paradoxically, borders between states can be seen to be simultaneously exceptional territory, a zone of anomie devoid of law and excluded from the normal juridical–political territory of the state, but nevertheless an integral part of that juridical–political territory (in fact, the very condition of its possibility). This characterisation also resonates with images of state borders as sites of exceptional measures, practices and rules, […] a threshold between the inside and the outside, the normal situation and the exceptional situation. (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 73)

These are some notions on the concept of borders that allow the exploration and problematization of the relationship between borders and violence, by transcending the conventional inside/outside logic of static state borders (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 65-6). Such effort is crucial to our analysis, since it sheds light upon additional limits and workings of sovereign power that are not visible according to the conventional logic of borders.

This conception refers to Foucault's statement that the presence of power is what defines a certain territory (1980), and enables a conception of it that

fundamentally differs from the mere concept of space, given that it encompasses the element of *power*:

> while the concept of 'space' places the focus on the character of coexistence of phenomenon in time and in space (without reducing itself to it), the concept of 'territory' discusses the problematic of power in its indissociable relationship to the production of space. (Haesbaert, 2014, p. 29)

This conceptualization allows traditional articulations of space and territory to be transcended to possibly "*understand territory as a political technology, which in turn enables the incorporation of questions such as the reformulation of state technologies that allow society to be controlled by space*" (Haesbaert, 2014, p. 29). These technologies of control include turning certain spaces subject to coercive practices that are not applied to other spaces within the territorial limits of the state, treating them as exceptional to some extent.

On the one hand, understanding how the claim to sovereign authority works even beyond conventional state borders allows us to identify the various ways through which power and limits can be expressed. This also sheds light upon political possibilities that are "*much more perplexing than we might expect from all those discourses that insist that boundaries are only marginal, merely thin lines of separation, and that they must be either here to stay or about to disappear*" (Walker, 2009, p. 34-5). In Walker's words:

> Our political futures, and the most interesting forms of political analysis, will necessarily become more and more obsessed with boundaries, borders and limits, though not only of the kind we recognize from our experience of the modern state and states system, nor of the kind that can be reduced to a descriptive geography, an explanatory sociology or a deterministic economy; and certainly not of the kind that can be erased through a historical shift from a fragmented politics of international relations to a universalizing politics of the world. (Walker, 2009, p. 34-5)

To think of boundaries and borders in terms of limits of sovereign violence allows an analysis that differs from the ways through which they condition international practice from the very foundations of IR as a discipline. It has been argued in the past by key scholars that "*the discipline's inability to relax its statist assumptions hinders it from 'bridging' the gap between external and internal*", rendering it unable to account for how more intense interactions across borders in complex interdependencies take place (Keohane, 2002 apud Huysman & Nogueira,

2016, p. 303). Furthermore, it becomes possible to conceive borders as sites, moments and practices of contradiction that can be politicized and/or depoliticized beyond the physical limits of the state (Walker, 2009, p. 2).

As a theoretical concept, territorialization as a logic surrounding practices allows for a rescaling of the lenses that regard the city as a unit of analysis within IR. This stems from the acknowledgement that cities characterize a new frontier for contexts of endemic violence, even in "non-war situations" since they have become increasingly violent spaces (Nogueira, 2017, p. 1438). By looking at practices in the context of International Political Sociology,

> we can take into account sociological concepts, procedures and observations in a way as to understand war by placing it in a broad ecological interconnectedness of things, humans, and various spheres of life; such work seeks to engage in distinct and less sociological ways the contemporary dissolution of the line between everyday, banal life and 'the battlefield' and 'war-fighting strategies' in the politics of war. (Huysmans & Nogueira, 2016, p. 301)

To some extent, this allows a problematization of the international that occurs by connecting instead of by fragmenting, mobilizing various bits of instances, theories, philosophies and political engagements to bring out how power is dispersed and how warring and militarizing modes of relation are enacted (Huysmans & Nogueira, 2016, p. 308). In that sense, fracturing contributes to concerns about power, authority and politics as an alternative view of the decentering of the state and the diffusion of social practices of authority (Huysmans & Nogueira, 2016, p. 302).

Sometimes referred to as "new urban" conflicts, boundaries have shifted, becoming the object of intense and violent political struggles (Nogueira, 2017, p. 1448). This understanding allows a conceptual rescaling in military and security forces that differs from their usual global aspect and leans toward a preoccupation with their exercise in spaces such as streets, slums and neighborhoods, that is, with the micro-geographies of the cities within the state (Graham, 2011, p. 55).

This understanding also resonates with Foucault's assertion that power is not owned, rather *exercised,* exerting pressure on individuals not only as an obligation or prohibition towards them (Foucault, 2014a). In this vein, the choice for the methodology is precisely to analyze how practices and biopolitics, in their exercise, can reveal certain dynamics of sovereign power – in this case study, pacification.

## 3.4
## Methodology

It is possible to assert that all law and order enforcement operations that deploy the military (Op GLO) are sovereign practices. However, for this case study, in particular the urban violence-type Op GLO in Rio de Janeiro will be analyzed. GLO operations entail aspects of pacification, territoriality and militarization whose purpose is mainly to pacify certain territories considered outside the effective rule of the state or to perform policing roles in public space. Yet in both these cases, the agents enforcing law and order to pacify public space, in the case of Op GLOs, are members of the military.

Conducting an analysis of engagements of the military within national borders whose focus is within the national territorial jurisdiction of the state – when this topic is usually thought of precisely across such limits – is challenging, to say the least. However, this case study sets an example in which urban violence GLO operations as a practice can help inform theory in novel ways rather than necessarily the other way around, that is, of theory informing practice. Thus, by assuming that sovereignty is a practice, this case study relates to forms of authority and social control towards certain citizens and spaces, and of security as a governing and political technology.

Moreover, the assumption that the state is a practice relates to the fact that as an institution, it exercises its sovereign right to claim the monopoly of the coercive means through actions and activities embedded in the exercise of the social contract. This includes all areas, but security above all, for it inflicts a direct effect in social life. Much of the material of this thesis will be drawn from official discourses, to the extent that they serve to justify and orient practical guidelines, policies, doctrines and political decisions that inform action. In addition, part of this investigation was drawn from documented pictures published by the media that depict certain actions and activities as they were taking place in practice.

Thus, the practice approach will be applied to this case study to relate to what is being empirically observed in the social world. All International Relations scholars seem to agree that in order to be useful, theory should be meaningful (Weber, 2000, p. 303). This is especially important due to the nature of the argument of this project, that resonates with the idea that in order to count as legitimate knowledge, IR theories need to relate to practice, explicitly or implicitly (Weber,

2000, p. 298). Exploring this relationship between theory and practice is a critical move scholars should take to avoid limitations on possibilities of inquiry to the risky extent of being crystallized by existing concepts that can stifle future theorizing of what may be conversely observed in the 'empirical world'.

That resonates with the purpose of critical theory of not taking institutions and social and power relations for granted, but rather of calling these and their origins into question to understand how and whether they might be in the process of changing (Cox, 1986, p. 208-9). Critical Security Studies (CSS) scholars argue that theories in the social sciences do not occur in a vacuum, but instead are tied to, and develop in relation to, specific socio-historical (external) and intellectual (internal) contexts in which they emerge and/or to which they are applied (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006, p. 445). Critical International Relations scholars recurrently stress that science is neither detached nor free from value choices; therefore, what guarantees the quality of political science is precisely a reflection on the relation between the latter and politics (Berling & Bueger, 2013, p. 116).

This project benefits from the critical approach of the Welsh and Copenhagen Schools in the fields of *international and internal* security by emphasizing the overlaps between strategic studies and peace research, whose interdisciplinary nature lies within the fields of political sociology, law, IR and criminology, as well as areas broadly covered by domestic security (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006, p. 449). This theoretical framework allows for a combination of critical approaches to enable research focused on conceptual explorations of state, modern politics and exception, as well as empirical investigations of a variety of actors, including the police and the military (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006, p. 451).

In that sense, this study will adopt a critical standpoint on security that goes beyond the traditional understanding of modern international relations that frames violence and peace as antonyms, and as a dichotomy. For Christian Bueger and Frank Gadinger, the traditional dichotomies within IR such as micro/macro, individual/society, ideational/material represent more of a hindrance than an aid to better understand the world (2014, p. 3). Practice theory is based on the central assumption or the set of shared assumptions that drew from the cultural and interpretative linguistic turn in IR (Reckwitz, 2002).

For Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, the first scholars who drew attention to practices in the field of International Relations were, in fact, poststructuralists

such as James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro, who built on the works of Michel Foucault and revisited world politics through lenses that would entail textual practices (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b, p. 2). In that sense, poststructuralist scholars came to realize

> precisely that the complex pictures of world politics are made up of a myriad of everyday practices that too often get overlooked in scholarly research. (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b, p. 2)

The result is an increased interest in concepts such as 'deeds' and 'practical reasoning', as brought up by scholars like Nicholas Onuf and Friedrich Kratochwil (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b, p. 2). This also contributed to the process of establishing international practices as valid objects of analysis in the discipline, which culminated in a recent turn to practice at the turn of the millennium; as Iver Neumann advocated for 'returning practice to the linguistic turn' when building on a similar intellectual movement in social theory (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b, p. 2).

For the purposes of this project, practices are seen as a concept that structures social realities and everyday actions as a core vehicle for ontological discussions within the social science universe, namely in a debate sometimes described by some as a 'practice turn' (see Bueger, 2019). Hereby, practices will be defined as "*patterned actions embedded in particular organized contexts and, as such, articulated into specific types of action and socially developed through learning and training*" (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b, p. 6-7). Theodore Schatzki's understanding of practice is an "*open-ended, spatially-temporally dispersed nexus of doings and sayings*", hence emphasizing the *locus* of the social in practical activities (2012 apud Bueger & Gadinger, 2015, p. 451). Likewise, by these definitions, practices entail notions of social action and forms of expression also embedded in language, in addition to doings. Hence, law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) are justified in the context of a domestic pacification motivated by notions of an enemy of the state within its borders. It also relates closely to official interpretations of the meaning of security threats to the patrimony and the state, and on the understanding that the Brazilian military has a role to play in terms of handling these threats.

Adler and Pouliot's understanding on practices define them as competent performances, in the sense that

> practices are socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world. Practices, such as marking a linear territorial boundary, deterring with nuclear weapons, or finance trading, are not merely descriptive 'arrows' that connect structure to agency and back, but rather the dynamic material and ideational processes that enable structures to be stable or to evolve, and agents to reproduce or transform structures. (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b, p. 6)

From that definition, practices acquire an epistemic or discursive dimension that relates them to the material world, yet whose ontology is broadened as to not limit their scope to text and meaning (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b, p. 2). To adopt practice theory as a methodology means embracing a distinctive way of studying the world when compared to the traditional ways of the discipline to do so. In this case study, what informs analysis is what is happening on the ground between security agents and the people who are subject to security practices within the territories deemed as problematic by the state. As a result, the way the official governmental discourse of building an enemy within resonates with the effective exercise of security activities on the ground becomes visible. The reason therefore stems from the fact that daily activities, like patrolling and policing performed by members of the military to act within police prerogatives, have much to reveal about biopower techniques. Residents from pacified areas become subject to coercion in ways that people in remaining areas of the city would otherwise not be.

By taking practices as the core unit of analysis, a different understanding of the "international" that differs from models of action focused on the calculation of interests or the evaluation of norms, such as rationalist and norm-oriented theories, as well as common culturalist approaches, becomes possible (Bueger & Gadinger, 2015, p. 449). In a sense, instead of dwelling on the meaning of the legal framework of law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) or on the mere acknowledgement that the state security apparatus in Brazil is embedded in a militarized structure, how GLO guidelines are being interpreted and carried out *in practice* will be analyzed.

Therefore, the practice approach transcends the dichotomy between political practices as representations of the material balance of resources and ideas, in the sense that one dimension complements the other. Hence, practice weave together the discursive and material worlds. One reason therefore is the fact that the

constitution of competent performance is fundamentally epistemic, insofar as accounts of lived practices are textually constituted so that discursive practices are socially meaningful speech acts, according to which saying is doing. Besides,

> although practices still rely on knowledge and embody material objects, in a discursive strong sense, the competence of routinely doing something socially meaningful often relies on discourse. It is thus relevant to conceive of discourse as practice and to understand practice as discourse. (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b, p. 15-6)

In that sense, when political or military practices such as counterinsurgency may not conform to human rights collective ideals of practicing states, the former cannot acquire their patterned existence and be skillfully enacted without learned 'congealed' knowledge, and without discourses that give meaning to material and institutional resources and social technologies (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b, p. 3). In addition, this is the case since without language, communication, and discourse, people could not tell the difference between behavior and practice:

> Not only is language the conduit of meaning, which turns practices into the location and engine of social action, but it is itself an enactment or doing in the form of 'discursive practices.' (Foucault, 1980 apud Adler & Pouliot, 2011b, p. 6)

Therefore, everyday practices could also help explain some inconsistencies, since they are responsible for that ambiguous aspect of objects of study by becoming the object of investigation, by allowing us to better understand dynamics of order and change (Bueger & Gadinger, 2015, p. 449). For Adler and Pouliot, practices encompass both aspects because they force an engagement with the relationship between agency and the social and natural environments "*with both material and discursive factors, and with the simultaneous processes of stability and change, helping explain and understand how world politics actually work*" (2011b, p. 2-3).

Thus, it is possible to say that practice theory owes much to poststructuralists because it inherited from them the acknowledgement of the importance of language to social processes. Conversely, it also dissociates itself from poststructuralists since instead of typically exposing the contingency, openness and instability of discourse, practice theory is preoccupied with explaining how most political dynamics come to rest on the fixation of meanings *on the ground* – a hard work in which practices play a prominent role (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b, p. 3). As such,

practice theory implies emphasizing process, developing an account of knowledge as action, recognizing the materiality of practice and working with a performative understanding of the world (Bueger & Gadinger, 2015, p. 449-0).

In addition, it has been argued that the practice approach can serve as the basis for a research program around which debates in IR theory can be structured in terms of a "unit of analysis" that transcends traditional understandings of "level of analysis". In the words of Adler and Pouliot, the reason therefor is the fact that

> the notion of practice supplies a particularly fertile 'focal point' making interparadigmatic conversations possible. An IR practice-oriented theoretical approach comprises a fairly vast array of analytical frameworks that privilege practice as the key entry point to the study of social and political life. We claim that as soon as one looks into practices, it becomes difficult, and even impossible, to ignore structures (or agency), ideas (or matter), rationality (or practicality), and stability (or change): one becomes ontologically compelled to reach beyond traditional levels and units of analysis. By implication, there is no such thing as the theory of practice but a variety of theories focused on practices. (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b, p. 3)

As a methodology, the practice approach enables a broadening of the discipline's ontological and interparadigmatic debates between realists, liberals and constructivists (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b, p. 5). As it primarily draws on trajectories in social theory, the practice turn emphasizes reproduction and hierarchies since this approach constitutes a new paradigm for the study of IR capable of accommodating all of the wide range of ontological and epistemological stances found in the field (Bueger & Gadinger, 2015, p. 449) and allowing a move beyond traditional debates on methodology (Stern, 2003, p. 187).

Conversely, by privileging the everyday, practice theory also enables "*an accommodation between the local and the global through the connection between local events, practices or phenomena that order the world unequally towards broader political meanings that extend beyond their contingencies*" (Austin, 2019, p. 11). By paying attention to the actual doings that give social forms a shape in order to understand them, the fundamental building blocks of social life can be conceived not as units such as individuals or structures, but as *social interactions* instead (Adler-Nissen, 2018, p. 4). Therefore, the concept of the everyday becomes crucial for practice theory. In other words, a practice approach brings practices to the forefront of what is being analyzed, so that

by telling social scientists where to start from – practices –, practice theory moves beyond the usual social theoretical dichotomies that have hitherto led to a metaphysical dead end. This means revisiting such things as system and unit, micro and macro, and local and global. Instead of working with philosophical or theoretical abstractions which create in our imagination 'social structures', 'social relations', or indeed a realm of 'social reality', we should begin by observing social interaction, relations and networks. (Adler-Nissen, 2018, p. 3)

This enables an analysis of concepts such as 'local' and 'everyday' that acquires a richer meaning. It allows a resignification of the everyday as a concept to conceive it as a 'tactics' that constitute the world and its problems instead of the universalist 'strategies' of liberal regimes of power shaped by an external viewpoint, somehow believed to be 'outside' this problematic itself (Chandler, 2015, p. 43). This resonates with Foucault's acknowledgement to shift away from the disciplinary power of law to focus on all of the ways in which the real lives of 'everyday' individuals, communities and their environment is affected by power:

> The 'local', or the 'everyday' is understood neither as a product of social and economic structures or fixed ideological and cultural values nor as a barrier or limit but rather as a set of fluid micro-processes of practices in a constant interaction driven by the agency of ordinary people in concrete circumstances. In this way, 'everyday' life operates across or outside of the structural spatial orderings of critical sociological theory and the homogenising assumptions of top-down understandings of science, law, and politics. (Chandler, 2015, p.43)

Practice theory approach represents an account of practices as a fundamental social phenomenon, *not only [as] pivotal objects of analysis in an account of contemporary Western society, but also [as] the central phenomenon by reference to which other social entities such as actions, institutions, and structures are understood* (Schatzki, 1996, p. 11). To this thesis, that means the actions performed in urban violence law and order enforcement operations have much to offer in terms of how the military as a state security institution, and of how sovereignty as a mechanism of biopolitical power, can be understood.

There is, therefore, a shared interest in terms of what happens 'on the ground' as something that holds critical potential in that albeit trivial at first sight, is crucial to analysis (Adler-Nissen, 2018, p. 2). In this case, it becomes possible to ask: How do the interactions between security agents and the local population of the territories subject to security policies in Rio de Janeiro shape the actual limits of violence as part of their daily exercise of the use of force? What do these social interactions mean for internal sovereignty, and what can they reveal about it?

From an ethical point of view, practice theory allows us to reveal how theories and practices relate to one another so that discourses, representations and practical activities of social scientists constitute the social world and, as such, take part in defining reality. As an object of study, practices are embedded in discourses in the sense that they enable particular meanings to be signified (Kratochwil, 2011, p. 55-6) while keeping in mind social science practices are not just one text alongside other (Bueger & Villumsen, 2007, p. 440). Militarization practices happening today in Brazil are constantly justified by the federal government, whose rhetoric ties into the discourse of the exercise and reinforcement of sovereign power itself.

Viewed from that angle, it may be relevant to conceive discourse as practice and to understand practice as discourse (Adler & Pouliot, 2011a, p. 14). Likewise, the case has been made that one key post-critical stake lies in "going theoretical" (Huysmans & Nogueira, 2018 apud Austin, 2019, p. 11). In that sense, even 'practical' problems in critical IR are theoretical, since they revolve around the connection between a specific event and its broader meanings, so the solution would be to recover the concept of 'structure' as a non-totalizing means of understanding how meaning is produced beyond immediate events (Huysmans & Nogueira, 2018 apud Austin, 2019, p. 11).

In that sense, this method aims to reveal what is behind discourse not to take it necessarily as a truth, but rather to treat it as discontinued practices that constitute a violence and practices imposed to things (Foucault, 2014, p. 49-1). Thus, the idea is to take discourse not necessarily to look for the meaning expressed in it, but instead as a starting point to think of its external conditions of possibility (Foucault, 2014, p. 49-1). By following these assumptions, it is possible to interpret discourse not as a given, but as an element that can acquire meanings that are re-signified over time – precisely to the extent that it interacts with practices.

This approach reveals the mutable character of such practices and discourse whose essence is not fixed neither predetermined, but that instead operates in a relational approach in which practices are not simply a set of interactions but rather allow for the analysis of relations (Foucault, 2014, p. 235). By allowing changes and transformations in context and specific processes to be noted, there is an estrangement from the notion of a structure that invokes or conditions great causalities that attempt to offer an explanation of the entire history of humanity (Foucault, 2014, p. 327). Instead, the ambition is to understand a particular context.

Changes become possible through practices because they can be conceived as the vehicle of social reproduction in which intersubjectivity lives on in and through (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b, p. 18). Practice tends to be patterned, generally exhibiting certain regularities over time and space. In a way reminiscent of routine, practices are repeated, or at least reproduce similar behaviors with regular meanings; these patterns are part of a socially organized context, which not only gives them meaning, but also structures interaction (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b, p. 6).

Their performance in socially recognizable ways is the source of ontological stability in social life, yet conversely, practices can also originate social change (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b, p. 18). Thus, practices properly address the debates and theoretical concerns over continuity and change because they can be both the source of ontological stability in social life and the stem from which social change originates (Adler & Pouliot, 2011a, p. 16). By looking at practices in the way they are exercised, the origin from which the immanent practices in security policies have emerged, and the ways through which violence is working as a norm within a context, becomes clear (Foucault, 2014, p. 235).

With regard to agency itself, Bueger and Gadinger argue that what is truly new about practice theory is its interest in concrete situations of life in which actors perform a common practice and thus create and maintain social orderliness (Bueger & Gadinger, 2015, p. 451). Consequently, "*the intentions and motivations of actors are less relevant than their actual activities and practical enactments in concrete situations, so that situations become more significant than the actors themselves*" (Bueger & Gadinger, 2015, p. 451).

This is also why Vivienne Jabri recovers Paul Veyne to point out Foucault's use of the term as he states that "*practice is not an agency or a prime mover – there is no agency nor any prime mover*" (2006, p. 50). Jabri stresses that aspect of practice to make the point that security practices (e.g. of violence, intimidation, control) "*become structurated in the routines of institutions as well as in lived experience*" (Jabri, 1996 apud Jabri, 2006, p. 50) to the point in which saying who is 'to blame' in terms of agency loses relevance.

When the focus is mainly to figure out the dynamics and significations of social relations, existing relationships become more important than agency and structure. This solves much of the agency-structure conundrum in terms of theory conceptions. It is also precisely for that reason that questions relating to practice

theory cannot be answered through theoretical debates alone; instead, they must be worked out in the context of empirical investigation (Bueger & Gadinger, 2015, p. 458). Practice reveals the content of that interaction *in the interaction*, as it develops

> while performed by individual human beings, practices are possessions of collectives insofar as their meanings belong to communities of practice. 'Suspended' between structures and agency, practices are simultaneously enacted (agency) and inserted within a social context or political order (structure). The advantage of taking practices as the main site of the social thus lies in enabling a superior formulation of the agent-structure conundrum, where agency and structure jointly constitute and enable practices. (Adler & Pouliot, 2011, p. 16)

As for the methods deployed in this thesis, according to Bueger and Gadinger's "*New Perspectives of International Practice Theory*", narratives will be used as an instrument, given that

> narratives […] are a form of configuration devices by which actors seek to make sense of the world and order it in a specific way. They order a heterogeneous world into more of less coherent configurations. (Bueger & Gadinger, 2014, p. 36)

This comes from the understanding that 'enacted narratives' point to the performative dimension of narration in which narratives require to be acted out and hence always relate to practical activities (Bueger & Gadinger, 2014, p. 37). It is important to look at the narratives since they are "*also a political device that generates legitimacy and mutual agreements, providing a glue to practices, but they are not static and thus change over time*" (Bueger & Gadinger, 2014, p. 38). Therefore, searching for a common understanding through narrative is a fragile process of retelling stories, because narratives need to be seen as conditional and joint activities, in that narrators and their audiences adjust stories should they lose their credibility and their legitimizing function (Bueger & Gadinger, 2014, p. 38).

> Narratives are organized in particular configurations, or 'plots'. These plots are rooted in a range of practical choices of actors: strategic purposes, moral judgements, aesthetic preferences, or claims of power and authority. This means that there is always a close connection between the moral meaning of a story and its plot as well as its ending. (Bueger & Gadinger, 2014, p. 38)

Hence, it is critical to take a close look at the narrative enacted by the Brazilian government when it comes to recent deployments in security policies and

militarization, to see what kind of story is being told. The purpose of deploying such method is not to create another dualism between narrative and practice similar to the one between structure and agency, since that would contradict the core ideas of practice theory (Bueger & Gadinger, 2014, p. 43). On the contrary, narrative approaches foreground the linguistic dimension of practice, adding to it by focusing on sayings rather than doings (Bueger & Gadinger, 2014, p. 43).

That said, it may be relevant to highlight an essential limitation in the preparation of this thesis, that is, the fact that there has been no personal direct field observation of military involvement in GLO operations by the author. Military involvement in GLOs will be covered throughout a relatively vast time frame of ten years, namely from 2008 up to the period of the Federal Intervention in 2018 in Rio de Janeiro. It is crucial to acknowledge that this research entailed a hindrance in the sense that it was unfeasible to visit GLO sites in person. Most GLO operations that will be analyzed here took place as early as 2014. It was physically impossible to be there to observe what exactly was taking place on the ground, as this period preceded the beginning of this study. With regard to recent GLO operations, although attempts to access the field would have been technically possible, the current political environment of insecurity in Brazil has rendered this access particularly difficult. This was understood as a risk I was not willing to take.

The analysis will undertake two dimensions that refer to the practice theory techniques that will be used in this thesis, namely text analysis and indirect observation of practices from secondary sources. Text analysis refers to the linguistic dimension, accounted for through the textual analysis of the legal framework of Op GLO, as well as official accounts that highlight its practical guidelines, doctrines and procedures. The second is the dimension of action as lived experience, based on indirect observation of the security practices of urban security GLOs in Rio de Janeiro, consisting of pacifying efforts and biopolitical forms of social control. Text analysis of the legal framework of law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) such as decrees, laws and the GLO Manual by the Ministry of Defense, will be useful since they provide practical guidelines that orient military engagement in public security. Albeit far from being practices, these texts define, signify and classify the activities that will orient doctrines and procedures in the field once mandates are established. Clear examples are the Police-like Operations

guidelines in the 2013 version of the GLO Manual and the Rules of Engagement for the GLO Operation Saint Francis.

Interviews and official declarations by relevant authorities on the activities and their effectiveness will also be a source that will allow access to the narrative and the discourse on security that justify and sustain these practices. This may be especially useful in the case of Brazil, since it has been argued that policy outcomes are more likely to be determined by prevalent discourses of security than by institutional arrangements (Kenkel, 2006b, p. 212-3). This will also serve to reinforce the idea that the outcomes and feedback regarding security practices as policy outcomes on the ground could likewise inform theory.

It is crucial to mention the reasons why direct source interviews have not been conducted in the preparation process of this thesis. The main reason therefor was the fact that at the time this thesis was being written, Brazil's social-political context was one of polarization. Deeming militarization as an extremely sensitive topic to be discussed by both academics and civilians, especially in light of the Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, only added to my perception that public security has increasingly been handled as a national security concern to be discussed mainly by, or restricted to, specialized bureaucrats. Had the context been more favorable and had a greater exchange between the military and civil society, and between the government and the military been possible, interviews would have been my preferred choice. There were few well-known and respected academics in Brazil who have accessed military sources in that context, who have been working in the field for decades and established a reputation of maintaining open communication channels with the military. Due to my personal difficulty of accessing the primary subjects directly involved on the ground in GLO activities, the choice has been made to address it indirectly by using only secondary and official sources.

Another crucial limitation that needs to be addressed is that of the bias embedded in the process of looking at the state as a self-referenced source. Since the state is the one conducting these practices, it is also writing its own narrative. The fact that I am going to have access to many official governmental sources by analyzing the exercise of violence as a sovereign prerogative could mean that I am looking at the state as possibly the oppressing actor at the expense of looking for sources among those possibly oppressed by the state in that exercise and, thus, unable to capture the point of view of the latter.

This is a limitation embedded in a difficult trade-off I chose to make: one point of view that draws from the state as a potential oppressor; the other, that draws from the individuals who are the targets of that oppression. I truly believe both points of view are completely legitimate and valid as points from which to draw an analysis that addresses violence. However, a decision had to be made in terms of what narrative I was choosing to highlight, and because the purpose of this thesis was to analyze GLOs as practices carried out and justified by the sovereign Brazilian state, I chose the official governmental narrative as my train of thought. That said, one may argue it is just as valid to look into the oppressor as an actor to reveal patterns of violent practices in general. Yet I truly believe that the same phenomenon of power exercise can still be highlighted by analyzing it through the lens of the state as the actor that justifies and promotes sovereign violence as it chooses to deploy the Armed Forces in that exercise.

Indirect observation from secondary sources will entail the description of practices by analyzing press pictures and official accounts that document the activities of the military in pacification missions and policing activities in the city. As shall be observed in future chapters, GLO militarized practices on the ground as a consequence of the war on organized criminality may very well change future security practices and limits of what is acceptable in that exercise. Needless to say, the pictures I have had access to are a product of the media, and, as such, are inherently biased as well. Just the fact that these pictures were chosen to be published to the public carries a bias in terms of GLO practices as something chosen and selected be shown in their most performatic aspect. Despite that bias that is inherent to these sources in terms of what a photographer has chosen to portray, I believe the 'pictures' depicted do not lose their possible meaning for militarization as practices nor for this thesis. In other words, eventually the policing and surveilling activities portrayed in the pictures that will be analyzed in this thesis do not disregard the fact that these actions were being exercised, even before someone decided to take a snapshot of it and publish it. Even upon assuming the worst case scenario that these pictures represent solely an instrument of propaganda on behalf of the state, in order for the picture to be taken, these practices still occurred in the first place and still inflicted the social and political impacts that this thesis aims to analyze. Next, the mechanisms through which this particular exercise of sovereign power, and violence as a pacification practice in Rio de Janeiro, will be exposed.

## 3.5
## Violence, pacification and militarization

In international relations, violence functions as a structural feature of the world even in alleged times of peace, although the case has been made that the field of IR has not yet scrutinized its concepts of violence, and the term is rarely used (Baron et al., 2019). For scholars such as Zvi Baron, Jonathan Havercroft, Isaac Kamola et al., violence is not simply the absence of peace; rather, as the Romans acknowledged, it is the ordering feature that structures social relations and the political world in modern society (Baron et al., 2019).

Johan Galtung's notion of structural violence is that it is embedded in the structure that appears as unequal power and unequal life chances (Galtung, 1969, p. 170-1). Unlike direct violence, indirect violence is mediated though the aggregate actions of social groups and institutions that cause physical harm on other social groups, and its effects are not immediate (Galtung, 1969). From that point of view, violence is portrayed as central to the contemporary world, and moments of violent rupture are not aberrations of such world order; instead, violent outbreaks are breakdowns of what they call pacification (Baron et al., 2019).

Some authors have termed pacification a type of violence that is phenomenological and includes threats, coercion, intimidation and surveillance to coercively restructure and sustain social and political relations (Baron et al., 2019). When this type of violence operates effectively, it may seem that there is no violence, since the violence is in the structuring of the prevailing order (Baron et al., 2019). While pacification may appear peaceful in the sense of an absence of direct and even indirect violence that may in fact reduce direct violence, added to the fact that it is difficult to observe and diffuse, it is, at best, a negative peace that operates through a violent and coercive reordering of society (Baron et al., 2019).

As an approach, this transcends the debate of direct and indirect violence by introducing pacification as a third form of violence, central to the development of the liberal world order, especially conspicuous now that warfare between nations is declining (Baron et al., 2019). International Relations scholarship's strict distinction between peace and violence reinforces the obfuscation that violence is usually not associated with peace (Baron et al., 2019). As such, pacification allows us to conceive violence even in light of allegedly 'peaceful' settings.

In the past, pacification practices were justified by narratives of war against barbarian 'others' such as indigenous peoples' or slaves, either to bring about civilization, or for their mere policing character (Gomes, 2014, p. 129-0). The use of the *pax* term refers back to its Roman connotation of a colonizing process or military operation designated to ensure the pacific cooperation of a specifically designed area where enemies were allegedly acting (Neocleous, 2014, p. 33). As such, the term to pacify is *per se,* an allusion to war. Military involvement in Brazil, with regard to the construction of the nation's identity, has been permeated with historical narratives of 'pacification' that have portrayed the military as an embodiment of the imaginary of the nation's *self* as opposed to the *other* that is colonized by it (Gomes, 2014, p. 112).

This framework allows the shifting of geographical perceptions (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006, p. 451) since it examines the broadening of internal security activities as a consequence of the routinization of military operations in the national arena, characterized by a merging of internal and external security (see C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006, p. 449). Hence, it is possible to theoretically conceive territory in a way that transcends the logic of inside/outside borders of the state towards a more comprehensive understanding of limits in how sovereignty is exercised to explore the territoriality aspect that surrounds militarization as a practice.

Moreover, analyzing coercive practices within national borders allows us to conceive militarized security policies in which the exercise of policing and law enforcement is organized in a series of (para)military 'security forces' which some have called a '*policization of the military'* along with a *'militarization of the police*' (Graham, 2011, p. 96). The military's involvement in such forms of social control exercise brings to light the 'militarization of law enforcement' that can occur even in the absence of ideological motivations (Stavrianakis & Selby, 2013, p. 18).

This is clear, for instance, when members of the military insist on borders as zones of demarcation and place themselves as their protectors, occupying them and pushing 'others' against which they are exercising protection, to the 'bottom' (Bigo & Walker, 2007, p. 734). This border dynamics is understood in terms of a specific topology, strongly attributed to the notion of state sovereignty which makes the inclusion/exclusion dynamics harder to notice; it also hinders the perception of a border as what it actually consists of: a differentiating, discriminating and

demarcating practice of structural exclusion and systematic marginalization (Bigo & Walker, 2007, p. 737).

Similarly, Roberto Yamato reflects over Carl Schmitt's notion of exception that can take place within the state by discriminating some human lives from others (2019). For Yamato, Schmitt was concerned with "*humanity becoming an assymetric counter concept, thus legitimizing a negative discrimination that would turn the 'negatively valued person' into 'an unperson' whose worthless life must be destroyed*" (2019, p. 218). That could easily be applied to the imaginary of pirates as outsiders, as is the case analyzed by Yamato (2019), but following the logic of borders we are adopting, this discrimination does not have to necessarily occur outside the territorial limits of the state. It also does not have to be necessarily deployed to signify classifying someone as unworthy of living, yet could signify subjecting certain people to different rules, as if their lives were less worthy of being lived, at least in comparison to how others normally live.

Albeit not the focus of this project, it is absolutely worth mentioning that in the case of Brazil and Rio de Janeiro, race plays a crucial role in the way processes of dehumanization have been identified to take place, even within the limits of the law when it comes to security practices. Essential literature contributions in that sense have been made by Thula Pires, who argues the modern/colonial project mobilized the category of race to draw a line that unequivocally separates a zone of the human (*worth of being*) from a zone of the nonhuman (worth *of non-being*), in which marginalized social groups are deprived of material and symbolic goods (Pires, 2018, p. 66-7). Berenice Bento is another author to highlight this structural violence when thinking about the relation between the State and the human groups that inhabit it. By pointing that out to show how risk assumptions are heavily embedded with racial elements in Brazil, Bento identifies this relation as being embedded in risk assumptions based on racial elements that she conceptualizes as Brazilian necro-politics (2018).

Not coincidently for the practices we are analyzing here, most people who are particularly targets of state violence in security policies in Brazil are part of the black population who inhabit many of the slums, occupied or not. Hence, it is impossible to discuss state targeted violence in Brazil without taking the racial element into account, since race is crucial to justifying the discretions and decisions over deploying violence that are being made by security agents on the ground. By

looking at it that way, this would mean that perhaps the state violence exercised by the state's security apparatus altogether (including police and military operations) would not be regarded as exceptional to the state. In a sense, they could not even be considered as human rights violations, since this dehumanization process questions people's humanity, and with it, their own entitlement to have their human rights respected – as if they were non-persons (Bento, 2018).

Contemporary concerns over liberty in which declarations of exceptions allow the construction of an *other* as an enemy, as absolutely alien or threatening open the way to affirm the suspension of liberties and absolute authority (Walker, 2006, p. 76). Inside the state, women, children, minorities, aboriginals and deviants could also fulfill the role of internal outsiders, either as the enemy within or as the object of domestication of subjectification (Walker, 2019).

For Walker, exceptions take place at the 'horizontal' limit, at the border of a territorial jurisdiction, where liberal democracy gives way to invocations of sovereign necessity, to the privileging of national security over all other values (2006, p. 76). Such conception of power and authority acknowledges the juridical-territorial dimension of state power but entails power relations that may transcend the spatial and territorial limits designated by state borders. Similar to the conception of borders adopted for this thesis, this conception of power relations also extends beyond the territorial limits of the nation state (Foucault, 1980, p. 122) – also in the sense that they take place domestically. Such a stance can help us transcend IR's limitations of a discipline which describes a world fragmented by borders, be it physically or in terms of jurisdictions and principles whose divisions are obsolete (Bigo & Walker, 2007, p. 730).

By transcending the limits of the nation state, militarization can be understood as a phenomenon that derives from the way that borders are conceived as a result of a crucial change in the nature of such states (Graham, 2011, p. 89). On the one hand, more and more often within the territorial borders of the state, international and urban/local borders are blurred (Graham, 2011, p. 89). This resonates with Henri Lefebvre's reflections on territory in how it articulates with state power 'beyond' the scope of sovereign borders, and with international political sociology notions on territoriality in its historical and geographical specificity both as a practice and as a politicospatial form (Brenner & Elden, 2009, p. 355).

On the other hand, it is possible to see how, in addition to guaranteeing a community of citizens inside a territorial unit marked by the policing of the inside/outside links, states become likewise organized systems that seek to distinguish individuals and circulations regarded as risky or malignant from those worthy of protection and who do not pose risks (Graham, 2011, p. 89). Such discriminatory acts highlight the interstices of security and citizenship as a constant struggle to make the former outweigh the latter (Kopper, 2013, p. 119).

In practice, such inside/outside blur shifts in the role of nation states toward a biopolitical nature in the exercise of repressive state power that affirm a form of biopolitics that Carl Schmitt had envisaged as an exercise that entails the production, reproduction and disciplining of populations in the world of nationalisms and mass societies (Walker, 2009, p. 117). According to Walker, claims to sovereignty are grounded on the reproduction of such inside/outside(s):

> Just be prepared to make an exception when necessities arise, and remember that exceptions are both necessary to legitimize the rule, and will require the suspension of what is taken to be the norm. Complex zones of inclusion and exclusion, and of understandings and negotiations across the divide, can be reduced to no less complex but very thin lines and decision moments at the drop of a sovereign declaration. Be prepared for violence; and not only at the territorial edges of the modern state. (Walker, 2009, p. 147)

This accounts for a dimension of political power that Michel Foucault associates to a substantial change in sovereign power during the 18th and 19th centuries. Traditionally, the sovereign held the right over the life and death of subjects by "making die" or "letting live" so that life and death were not understood as original immediate phenomena located outside the realm of political power; in fact, the two only became rights as they were exercised as an effect of the sovereign will (Foucault, 1999, p. 286). Precisely due to the prerogative to kill, the sovereign exercised a right over life; having the right to make die or let live instead (Foucault, 1999, p. 286-7). Yet one of the most massive transformations in the 19th century has consisted of not exactly substituting, but rather complementing this old sovereignty right of making die or letting live with another new right. This did not erase the first; instead, it penetrated and modified it, constituting precisely the inverse power: that of "making live" and "letting die" (Foucault, 1999, p. 287).

Following a power takeover over individual bodies as the population became a political subject, another expression of the technology of power over society in general emerged as a form of governance: the biopolitics of the human species (Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 79). At first, this entailed the control over fertility and mortality rates; later, biopolitics evolved to hygiene promotion efforts at the end of the 18th century (Foucault, 1999, p. 288-92). Such biopolitical control of bodies as a collective introduced the notion of a "population", and the demand to study it emerged as a result of the fact that it became a scientific, political, biological as well as a problem of power (Foucault, 1999, p. 292-3).

From that moment on, this technology of power implanted power mechanisms with a certain number of functions very different from the purely disciplinary mechanisms. The purpose of biopolitics was not to modify life, but to control, regulate and manage human life in its capacity to make live possible on the one hand, and let die on the other (Foucault, 1999, p. 293-4). In fact, this mode of power transcends the essentially protectionist territorial logic of fixing and demarcating territory, to be instead centrifugally oriented to regulate circulation and movement to take place in a way of "*sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement [...] but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out*" (Foucault, 2007).

As such, Foucault stressed that sovereignty and discipline, legislation, right to sovereignty and disciplinary mechanics are absolutely constitutive pieces of the general power mechanisms in our society (Foucault, 1999, p. 47). This introduces a juridical system of power analysis in which political power is analyzed in terms of war and repression and repression is no longer an abuse of the contract, but instead the simple effect that follows from such a relation of domination (Foucault, 1999, p. 24). Seen in that light, repression is nothing but the deployment, within a *pseudo* peace uncovered by a continuous war, of a perpetual force relationship (Foucault, 1999, p. 24).

At first, disciplinary power institutions such as hospital and schools were developed to discipline bodies; later, biopolitical regulatory mechanisms were put in place by states to control the population (Foucault, 1999, p. 298). For Foucault, institutions such as the police act at the same time as disciplinary and state apparatuses, representing a perfect example of how body disciplinary and population regulatory mechanisms are non-exclusive and do not operate on the

same level; as such, they are able to coexist and work with one another in an articulate way (1999, p. 298-9).

Jabri draws upon Foucault's analytics of war and power to summarize it as: i) the direct use of violence and hence the power to kill, ii) disciplinary power directed at individuals and communities and iii) biopower directed at the life and welfare of populations involving, thus, not only war in its traditional battlefield sense, but war in the sense that it can incorporate practices from torture and incarceration to the reframing of social relations (2007, p. 50). Another author to relate biopolitics to the core of sovereign power is Giorgio Agamben. For him, this relationship constitutes a hidden point of an intersection between the juridical-institutional and the biopolitical models of power:

> What this work has had to record among its likely conclusions is precisely that the two analyses cannot be separated and that the inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original – if concealed – nucleus of sovereign power. *It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power.* In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception. Placing biological life at the center of its calculations, the modern State therefore does nothing other than bring to light the secret tie uniting power and bare life, thereby reaffirming the bond (derived from a tenacious correspondence between the modern and the archaic which one encounters in the most diverse spheres) between modern power and the most immemorial of the *arcana imperii.* (Agamben, 1998, p. 11)

Biopolitics configures a way to understand life in that it is problematized in the field of political thought and in the analysis of political power not at the level of political theory but at the level of the mechanisms, techniques, and of the technologies of power (Foucault, 1999, p. 288).

Hence, there is also a social element to pacifying coercive practices, to the extent that members of the military engage in roles traditionally understood in terms of, and attributed to, the police. As such, pacifying, although associated to the maintenance of peace and security, is aimed at a certain population whose goal is to control social life to attain a productive social ordering (See Neocleous, 2014 and Foucault, 2007). Within the context of social control technologies and surveillance as key attributes of the modern state, the "pacification" of internal society is enabled:

> In that sense, the success of the modern state comes historically to rely on key developments in military organization, innovations that can be exploited in military technology, and effectiveness in techniques of surveillance of internal societies, all of which contribute to the near marginalisation of violence within them, so that the military comes historically to be replaced by the police in maintaining civic order. (Jabri, 2007, p. 16)

Seen in that light, pacification constitutes a social practice applied to targeted spaces so that violence is not exclusively territorial in nature in the sense of a technology of social control; war is also transformative of such relations so that it is not always problematic to claim distinctions between the inside and the outside, the domestic and the international, the zone of civic peace and the zone of war, the sovereign state and the anarchic outside (Jabri, 2007, p. 2).

In addition, the emergence of a disciplinary society highlights in what ways a "*continuation of war in society and not, as in Hobbes and elsewhere in the history of thought, the idea that war happens in the outskirts of society and its civil order*" can be observed (Jabri, 2006, p. 55). This resonates with Foucault's notion that power is prolonged war by other means and that the exercise of power and the use of force engaged in GLO operations provide a tool to comprehend the Brazilian war on organized crime as territorialized pacification practices.

The conditions of possibility revealed by critical scholarly in relation to how we got here aims to unravel the enabling dynamics that lead to the disappearance of distinctions between war and criminality, war and peace, war and security (Jabri, 2006). In Jabri's words, "*When such distinctions disappear, impunity is the result, accountability shifts beyond sight, and violence comes to form the linchpin of control*" (2006, p. 48). It then becomes possible to reveal the operations of violence; in a far more critical way, it becomes possible to reveal power and how it operates.

This exploration raises fundamental questions regarding the relationship of power and violence, and their mutual interconnection in the complex interstices of disrupted time and space locations. Power and violence become connected in ways that work on populations and bodies – with violence often targeted against the latter as a condition for the former to be reigned and governed (Jabri, 2006, p. 48).

## 3.6
## Conclusion

This chapter has aimed to point out some of the theoretical issues that the domestic/international security framework poses in terms of its tools of analysis to approach the literature on the state security apparatus that associates the Armed Forces with the outside realm and international threats, and the police with the domestic realm and internal threats. In light of this acknowledgement, it has been sustained that this framework falls short from properly accounting for Op GLO as a case study, since such operations deploy the military domestically in public security. The case has also been made of why it is problematic to place violence only within the limits of the international and what some of these implications for theory and epistemology are.

Among them is a limitation to the study of fragility, domestic security and challenges that exclude the theoretical conception of violence at the domestic realm in and of itself in cases that do not constitute civil conflicts and war – precisely the case in Brazil. The outward turned mainstream conception of sovereignty and security crystallized onto the territorial element in fact reinforce the notion that violence is placed on the outside limits of the state. That goes in conjunction with the notion that borders can be thresholds of sovereign power that differentiate domestic violence from international violence.

Hence, the problem may be the mainstream conception of border in and of itself, in terms of how it is conceived and how it contributes to crystallize particular understandings of security. However, as has been shown, borders are not given, and their delimitation processes actually entail much violence. By undertaking a practice approach, borders can be conceived as a unit of analysis, practices in the inside of the state, and as a mechanism that highlights internal aspects of sovereignty, namely coercive sovereign security practices. As practices, pacification and militarization 'create' and reinforce borders and reveal everyday coercive security practices of sovereign exercise performed by members of the Armed Forces in Op GLOs in Rio de Janeiro.

Violence and peace will hence not be treated as antonyms. Practice theory will guide our analysis to begin looking at what is actually taking place on the ground in Rio de Janeiro to understand GLO as security practices that become part of lived experience, systematized in the routine of the Armed Forces as a crucial institution of the state security apparatus. The discursive aspect of militarization will be considered to reveal how GLO decrees and complimentary laws, as a legal

framework, justify the domestic deployment of the military to tackle potential threats and enemies 'within' the state.

Through the practice theory framework, territoriality will be adopted to rethink borders not in terms of the demarcation of lines on a map, but as thresholds of violence. So instead of looking at borders as given and fixed limits of sovereign power within a territory, their functionality will be considered, regarding them as practices that are constantly reinforced and deployed by that power. They will be seen as thresholds of the sovereign exercise that can draw and redraw territorialities and violent practices, in particular within the domestic realm of the state, backed by significations of security that portray an enemy within it, hence justifying violent practices to address it.

Instead of then talking simply about war or peace, militarization in Brazil as domestic pacification precisely associates violence with peace. By articulating the military with protecting the nation state domestically, the Armed Forces can be conceived as security forces that act internally to pacify certain spaces while protecting some citizens from 'others' and coercively restructuring social relations in violent ways. Therefore, these practices allow us to conceive security as an expression of power and as a political technology that acts on bodies and spaces. Foucault's expression of biopolitical power will allow an analysis of what the "war against criminality" is doing at the level of violent practices through the exercise of GLOs as domestic pacification. One of the main aspects to be observed is the greater prerogative to use force by the military while enforcing law and order domestically by conducting activities normally attributed to the police. Another aspect refers to a concern to socially control the lives of residents of certain spaces in areas that need to be pacified, mostly slums. These include exceptional measures justified by security policies, such as the restriction of the right to come and go and others forms of coercive social control.

The practice theory framework has been chosen to properly account for this case study and address the challenge to conciliate the inside and outside limits of violence. Now that the understanding of the concepts of security and borders for this thesis have been established, an analysis of the country's security apparatus, and of how the Armed Forces have related to it historically and structurally in the domestic realm, will follow.

# 4.
# Armed Forces, notions of domestic and national security and law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) in Brazil

> If power is in and of itself the activation and unraveling of a relation of force, instead of analyzing it in terms of cession, contract, alienation or in functional terms of production relations, should we not analyze it, above all, in terms of combat, confrontation and war? We would thus have, in face of the first hypothesis which claims the mechanism of power is fundamentally repressive, a second hypothesis, which claims that power is war, a prolonged war by other means.
>
> Michel Foucault, *Microphysics of Power*, 2014

## 4.1
## Introduction

This chapter will highlight the aspects and mechanisms in Brazil's security apparatus that have enabled increasing militarization and the ongoing deployment of the Armed Forces in public security in recent years from a historical perspective. The idea is to answer the following question: What is the relationship of the Brazilian Armed Forces with the domestic realm of the country and in what ways the structuring of the Brazilian security apparatus contributes to enable these forces to act in public security and other internal roles?

Firstly, the militarized structural aspects of Brazil's state security apparatus will be considered, as well as some of the ways in which the Brazilian Armed Forces inherently relate to 'national' security throughout the entire statebuilding process, which translated into a perceived inability of the police to enforce law and order. Special emphasis will be given to the prerogative of law and order given that it builds on a strong "domestic" component of security that facilitates understandings for the deployment of the Armed Forces for public security, reinforced by Constitutions, decrees and specific laws that enabled that exercise to evolve to law and order enforcement operations over the years.

Following a detailed assessment of the relation of the Brazilian military with the domestic realm by analyzing the Brazilian Constitutions, in particular regarding

references to domestic security, law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) as an object of study will be considered through a detailed overview of the laws, decrees and manuals that regulate them. Thirdly, domestic pacification in terms of portraying a threat and the changes in vocabulary and legal frameworks created to provide the Armed Forces with legal support to act within such operations will be analyzed. Finally, police-like prerogatives within the 2013 GLO Manual will be considered to reflect on the meaning of GLO to public security from a perspective of national defense, as well as the practical implications of taking law and order to another level when the ones doing the police work are the military. Narratives over notions of security and the Armed Forces that allowed the military to acquire police-like functions and its established rules of engagement will be considered.

## 4.2
## The role of the military in internal security in Brazil

In their book "Brasil: A Biography", Lilia Moritz Schwarcz and Heloisa Murgel Starling deconstruct historical accounts of the country as peaceful by showing that despite several rebellions and attempts to establish a republic in the colony, these were treated as domestic issues, reinforcing the notion of a non-violent colony (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 30). Accounts as early as the ones from the Portuguese explorer Pero Vaz de Caminha on the new colony to describe it highlight a particular understanding of domestic security, characterized by a myth that over time crystallized the notion of Brazil as peaceful:

> Evidently dazzled, the account of Caminha would also inaugurate another recurrent myth. One of the peaceful nature, of a conquer without violence, a communion that has unified everyone onto a same heart and religion. Weird process that would define Brazil as a country with absence of conflict, as if the tropics – for some miracle or gift – had the power to alleviate tensions and inhibit wars. In Europe the fights divided nations and made them bleed; yet in the New World, if wars existed, they were, according to European accounts, only internal. The encounter had to be one of a kind and among equal, in spite of time showing the opposite: genocide on one side, conquer on the other. (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 30)

As seen in Caminha's account, whereas notions of sovereignty in Europe were strongly related to conflictual and bellicose processes of state formation as differences were assimilated (as seen in Chapter 2), in Brazil, conflicts of domestic nature were treated as 'internal' from its onset as a colony. The fact that they were

treated as such contributes to a notion that these conflicts were rendered 'invisible'. At the expense of this invisibility, the cohesiveness of the state – and its peacefulness – was taken for granted long before it came to exist as a political unit.

It is no coincidence that the wars of conquering that wiped innumerous indigenous tribes and that the slavery violent practices that lasted for centuries following independence are not remembered as particularly conflictual aspects of national history (TV Brasil, 2019). If the 'outside' cannot be seen, it cannot be accounted for. By rendering the otherness 'invisible', history denies it. Likewise, if in Europe the otherness was assimilated in a violent manner, in Brazil the same practices continued to be handled as an outside within. To this day, it may be the case that the otherness has not disappeared, but rather has been confined to spaces where traces of conflict can be observed. In the case of the indigenous tribes, one may say that conflict is visible in the struggle for indigenous land rights in the Amazon and other rural regions. In Rio de Janeiro, social, economic and racial tensions are mainly manifested in spaces such as *favelas*, the so-called slums.

For Benedict Anderson, memory and forgetting are a crucial part of the nation building process and can be accessed in biographies, by imaginings of fraternity emerging 'naturally' in fractured by racial, class and regional antagonisms that are reproduced as homogenous narratives (Anderson, 2006, p. 203-5). The peaceful image Brazil has chosen to account for itself has nevertheless concealed many wars and rebellions as early as 1789, the case of the *Conjuração Mineira*. Also known as the *Inconfidência Mineira*, the most relevant anti-colonial movement in all Portuguese America, that preceded the French Revolution itself, exemplifies this:

> Contrary to the official image that the country likes to portray, inwards and outwards, "[the *Conjuração Mineira* is an example of how] Brazilian history is far from the "fairy tale" of a narrative deprived of wars, conflicts or of the daily practice of violence". (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 129)

Independence movements and rebellions as those were heavily suppressed by internal security forces during the regency period. Until independence in 1822, troops were insufficient and, at first, made up by organizations of paramilitary character, such as the *Guarda Cívica* in São Paulo, that would later originate the Army (Ferreira, 2004, p. 126).

At the time, discussions revolved over the possibility of granting the Army a permanent character as an institution. On the one hand, some argued that by having

permanent forces, Brazil would be trying to mimic bellicose Europe, portraying itself as a constant threat to neighboring nations. On the other, some sustained an acknowledgement that the Army and the *Armada* were indispensable forces to safeguard the Constitution of the Republic (Ferreira, 2004, p. 188). The latter perspective proved dominant, and in the 1824 Constitution, the Armed Forces were defined as a permanent national institution, deployed by the Executive power to ensure the safety and defense of the Empire (Ferreira, 2004, p. 96).

In the first Brazilian Constitution of 1824 following independence, in which the country was still officially part of the United Kingdom with Portugal[20], the Armed Forces are referenced in its VIII Chapter, that states:

> The Executive power is responsible, in a private way, for the deployment of the Armed Force of Sea and Land as it judges convenient to the Security and the Defense of the Empire. (Brazilian Constitution of 1824, Art. 148)

Evidently, the 1824 Constitution puts the military institution under the prerogative of the Executive power to serve the security and defense of the Empire in a private way. The reference to the domestic is not explicit but appears as a function of the convenience of the realm that could be activated as judged necessary by the Emperor. That would entail the interests of the Empire as a whole, and not just Brazil. In any case, the Armed Force should be deployed in the security and defense of the Portuguese Empire, so it is possible to argue that such competence entails the provision of internal security, as well as of external defense.

By 1831, the security forces that later evolved to form the Brazilian military consisted mainly of three sustaining forces of the ruling elite: the Navy, a mercenary troop, and the National Guard, which worked especially to support its interests (Ferreira, 2004, p. 68-9). Originally, the general understanding concerning security forces at the disposal of the Empire was that they consisted of a National Guard, police forces, and the line army. The National Guard was the nation's greatest force for protection; it could assist other forces in the domestic and external security of the state, safeguarding the Constitution, repressing crimes, rebellions and potential

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[20] Even though Brazil was independent in 1822, the United Kingdom between Portugal, Brazil and Algarves was officially dissolved only in 1825, as representatives from Portugal and Brazil ratified the Rio de Janeiro Agreement, conferring formal independence to the country.

civil wars (Ferreira, 2004, p. 148).[21] It has been made the case that the National Guard also focused on guaranteeing the state's responsibility for the defense of property and social order, in accordance to the interests of the elite members of society and in maintaining the social *status quo* (Holloway, 1997).

Until the outbreak of the Paraguayan War in 1864 that would last to 1870, the Portuguese Empire security forces were poorly equipped. The "*Guarda Nacional was the state´s main basis of support, basically commanded by powerful land owners, created in 1831 and reorganized in 1850*" (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 295). While the line army was a special force to keep the external security of the state, to repel the enemy and to assure the state's rights in international relations, civilian and military police forces aimed at handling domestic security to prevent crime and threats to public tranquility (Ferreira, 2004, p. 149).

In that sense, since its creation in 1809, the military police worked as an instrument to enforce the state's authority in a slave-based economy whose elite united around a common fear against a perceived threat of physical domination of the minority by the majority (Holloway, 1997). The militarization of the Rio police was a way for the state to guarantee a certain level of efficiency and discipline among the inferior classes of society in that they could be the targets of repression while at the same time, they could possibly constitute newcomers that would join the institution and become part of the same police forces responsible for that same repression (Holloway, 1997).

As such, for Thomas Holloway, Rio as Brazil's capital was an institutional experimental laboratory whose police reflected the ideas and goals of its dominant social class; the city was also the stage of the national political discourse, be it in its meeting rooms, streets and squares, so that policing in Rio was at the same time a social and a political task for the state (Holloway, 1997). Over the years, the role of disciplinary agent initially performed by the police left a persistent legacy of police techniques of mutually hostile attitudes between the police and the lower

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[21] The structure of the security apparatus also had important implications regarding the current institution of the police, namely the *Polícia Militar*, whose origins date to 1809. Following the arrival of the Portuguese Royal family in Brazil. The Military Division of the Royal Guard of the Court Police, created in Rio de Janeiro as the city became the capital of the United Kingdom with Portugal, was similar to the one in Lisbon and used its legislation as a model (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 237). Such forces were regulated separately by each federal state unit, and were denominated by different names, ranging from Police Body, Public Force, Military Police Body, Military Police Guard (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 237).

sectors of society that felt their impacts (Holloway, 1997). It also left a legacy of creating mechanisms of popular domination of the majority by the minority that were responsible for suppressing revolutionary changes in society by means through which skin color acted in parallel ways to the country's social, economic and political hierarchy (Holloway, 1997).

By 1864, with the outbreak of the Paraguayan War, the Brazilian state had to engage in the effort of mobilizing and organizing forces at the national level. Despite many compulsory attempts at conscription, there was still an initial patriotic optimism that motivated voluntary enlistments (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 295). By 1866, a new phase of reorganization of the Army began to take place. As soldiers were unprepared and discouraged after the initial years upon realizing the protracted nature of the conflict and with few voluntaries willing to join, the government decided to establish mandatory recruitment (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 295-6). For the first time, the official Armed Forces began to develop, with an Imperial Navy that grew from 45 to 94 armored ships from 1865 to the end of the conflict, by 1870, respectively (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 295).

Since the initial years of the Paraguayan War, the National Guard slowly disappeared as a significant military force, giving room to the development of a more robust force that Brazilian engagement in the war demanded, which would later be characterized by the Army (Ferreira, 2004, p. 69). By 1908, military enrollment and conscription was regulated, the Army was reorganized and state security bodies became militarily organized and put on duty by federal government, presidents or governors of a specific state when required, to constitute "third line" forces within the Armed Forces (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 237). From that moment on, the police became attached to them, as alluded by the name military police.

The long war with Paraguay proved of utmost importance for the consolidation of the Army as an institution of national character, in contrast to the "elite force" that the *Guarda Nacional* proved to be (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 296-8). The Army grew from a contingent of 18 thousand men in 1865 to 38 and 78 thousand soldiers a year later, and by the end of the war, homecoming combatants were to find in the military a form of social ascension and a social representativeness up to then unknown (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 296-8). This created a socially and intellectually elite dissatisfied with the power hierarchy structures in the country, whose antagonism to the civilian elites would soon

become conspicuous. Used to fighting side by side with soldiers who were former slaves, homecoming members of the military began to refuse to perform one of its original roles: that of persecuting fleeing slaves, which motivated many Republican and abolition sympathizers (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 298).

The conflict with Paraguay provided the circumstances for an awareness by many tenants of the Army as a social class inspired by Republican ideals who began to oppose what they judged to be backwards notions that hindered the progress of the country, such as the slavery system (TV Brasil, 2019). Motivated by the scientific and republican spirit, these military youngsters were active participants in major political watersheds in the country's history, such as the Republican conspiracy that led to the end of the monarchy in Brazil (Castro, 2001, p. 65).

In the 1891 Constitution, the Armed Forces acquired a character of permanent national institution. This introduced a change in comparison to previous versions and may have happened as a function of a concern in terms of ensuring their subordination to the limits of the law:

> The forces of land and sea are permanent national institutions, destined to the defense of the Motherland in the exterior and to the maintenance of the laws in the interior. The armed force is essentially obedient, within the limits of the law, to its hierarchical superiors and obliged to sustain the constitutional institutions.
> (Brazilian Constitution of 1891, Article 14)

A reference to the Motherland also introduced a patriotic element, alluding to a national institution to serve the nation, and that, as such, should continue to exist to guarantee the maintenance and integrity of the state in a permanent fashion. The constitutional character of the Armed Forces was stressed in two ways. Firstly, the fact that such forces had to be subject to the limits of the law, but they also were responsible for the maintenance of such laws of the interior. The reference to "laws of the interior" itself may be interpreted as a reference to law and order – at least in the legal sense of the terms. Moreover, the Constitution established not only the defense of the exterior but also the law in the interior competencies as spaces where the Armed Forces should act. Although the reference to the interior took shape not specifically mentioning security, it is possible to identify a reference to law and order embedded in the referred state as a political organizational form.[22]

[22] The 1891 Constitution did not make any specific reference to the Military Police, but a vast subsequent legislation started to relate state security forces to the Armed Forces from the 20th

Key scholars noted that from the end of the Paraguayan War in 1870 until the 1930 Revolution, the Army was the most active social agent of the modernization process of Brazil (Castro, 2001, p. 53). In the final years of the Empire, the so-called military youngsters of the Brazilian Military Academy embodied a consciousness of political action and an understanding that advocated for the values of "*merit versus privileges, science and progress versus metaphysics and backwardness, and the future versus the past*" (Castro, 2001, p. 64). This awareness would soon begin to be expressed in political movements within society. By 1910, the Navy, up to then absent from the political scene, organized the *Revolta da Chibata,* which proved how politicized that institution was.[23]

The political consciousness of the Armed Forces, added to traces of military professionalism, contributed for members of the Forces to consider themselves as integral to the evolvement of society and motivated young military officers to take part in politics. A series of movements and rebellions, initiated with the 18 of the Copacabana Fort Revolt in 1922 as part of the lieutenants movement (*movimento tenentista*), would inspire many other engagements in politics, increasing tensions within society in advocating for change (TV Brasil, 2019). These social movements within the military revealed the dissatisfaction of its members with the power structures of the Republic but also highlighted important aspects of military behavior in Brazil:

> The first [being] that part of the political action takes place outside the republican institutions and of political parties. The second [aspect], that the nature of military interventions [in politics] was many times reformist. Participants saw themselves acting as instruments of popular will and were, in a way, very close to the idea of what could be called a soldier-citizen. (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 331).

The Armed Forces' politicization trend was aggravated by a resentment towards civil society in general, backed by a conviction that the latter was to blame for the countries' shortcomings, as well as a common resentment and a shared perception that the police was unable to maintain order (Castro, 2001, p. 65). At the same time, however, motivated by the belief that a professionalized police could

century on, fundamentally when it came to being oriented by the principles of discipline and hierarchy (See D'Araujo, 2010, p. 237).

[23] The 1891 Constitution did not make any specific reference to the Military Police, but a vast subsequent legislation started to relate state security forces to the Armed Forces from the 20th century on, fundamentally when it came to being oriented by the principles of discipline and hierarchy (See D'Araujo, 2010, p. 237).

translate into potential competition over scarce resources and over the allure of power, armies did not overwhelmingly support the modernization of police forces, since an army's internal role could easily become one that overlapped and duplicated police functions in exceptional circumstances (Nunn, 2001, p. 26). For reasons as such, major historians have noticed that members of the military would act motivated by their convictions on a civilizing and modernizing role for the next forty years to come, increasingly engaged with politics (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 387;397).

Despite efforts at centralizing security forces through a militarized structure, in the years leading to the 1930 Revolution, while lower rankings of the Army tended to support Getulio Vargas in the so-called Liberal Alliance,

> the greatest support basis of the rebel opposition came from the then powerful state military police forces, little autonomous, well-equipped armies that responded only to the command of state presidents, accompanied by voluntary battalions composed of armed civilians. (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 359)

Either way, following the Revolution in 1930, the centralizing state granted the Armed Forces with a prominent role until then unseen in Brazilian history (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 240). At the time, questions of "domestic order" were re-dimensioned and communism was framed as the main threat domestically, one to be tackled with the targeting of the Brazilian Communist Party and the strikers' movements (D'Araujo, 2010: 240). For some, this was a political move that combined a national security interpretation with an expansion of the state's actions enabling for an enactment that linked military and national security by endorsing the ties between military and public security affairs (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 240).

According to the 1934 Constitution, the reference to the exterior disappeared in the constitutional text, giving way to military roles as the defense of the motherland and the guarantee of constitutional power, law and order (Ferreira, 2004, p. 97-8). The fact that the 1934 Constitution kept the hierarchical organization and the defense of the motherland as roles of the military, while also adding some more competences to its definition, is no coincidence:

> The armed forces are permanent national institutions, and, within the limits of the law, essentially obedient to their hierarchical superiors. They are destined to defend

the Motherland and guarantee the constitutional Powers, and, law and order. (Brazilian Constitution of 1934, Article 162)

The term "maintenance of laws in the interior" was replaced by an allusion to the guarantee of constitutional powers, as well as to the guarantee of law and order. For the first time, an explicit reference to law and order in a Brazilian Constitution in the linguistic framework pattern as seen today was made.

It is there to be noticed that such legal disposition was placed under Title VI of the Constitution, entitled "Of National Security". The choice to place the definition of the Armed Forces in the session destined to national security reveals, in and of itself, the high degree of association of that institution with notions of national security was – or, at least, how much policy makers at the time would like this to be the case.

To some, such articulation was a strategic political act that combined an interpretation of national security with the expansion of the state's action that enabled an association between national security and defense as it explored ties between military and public security questions (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 240). In particular in the year of 1934, the reference to the exterior and to defense against international threats disappeared from the constitutional text. This change in focus to a more domestic dimension has opened way to establishing the role of the Armed Forces of defending the motherland and of guaranteeing constitutional powers, of law and order in the domestic realm of the country (Ferreira, 2004, p. 97-8).

One of the consequences of such change in language was the fact that the 1934 Constitution conferred the Union (Federal Government) with the competence to legislate over the organization of the military police in situations of war and peace as it defined, within the scope of the section "Of Federal Organization" in Article V, that the sole prerogative of the Union was to privately "*organize external defense, the police and the security of the borders and of the Armed Forces*". In that sense, the military police was placed in the section of Title VI in the category "Of National Security", defined as reserve forces of the military and hence enjoying the same prerogatives granted to military officers when deployed in the service of the Union (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 241).[24]

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[24] In 1936, a law reinforced that the Military Police of the Union would be considered as Army reserve and that, as such, should be called upon in case of wars, under the command of an official Army officer in charge or under the command of an officer of the corporation itself, subject to the norms of the Military Criminal Code (See D'Araújo 2010, p. 241).

Such intertwining between domestic security (normally a prerogative of the police) and the external realm of defense (traditionally attributed to the Armed Forces) intensified further in the following years of the Vargas rule, verified in the excessive focus it gave to the interior dimension of security. It is no coincidence that despite its title, the expression national security is only mentioned once in the 1935 'Law of National Security' (Law number 38), enacted to tackle established "*crimes against the social and political order*" which visibly targeted unions, strikes, political organizations and private militias (See Acervo CPDOC, 2019 and D'Araujo, 2010, p. 212).

For some, the analysis of the text of the 1935 Law of National Security reveals that its main purpose was to transfer crimes against the security of the state to a special legislation, subjecting them to a more rigorous regime by means of an abandonment of the usual processual guarantees (Acervo CPDOC, 2019). Curiously, however, the terms 'security' and 'domestic' do not show in the piece of legislation in and of itself (Law number 38/1935). Hence, it is possible to argue that the focus on the internal realm of security is made clear only upon careful analysis regarding the content of the law and the significations it establishes around the understandings of security that can apply to the domestic level.

In 1936, a National Security Court was also installed to judge and convict individuals accused of acts interpreted as committed against the state, but since 1933 Vargas had already created its political police in Rio, the capital of the Republic at the time, by decree (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 375). The *Delegacia Especial de Segurança Política e Social (Desp)* acted particularly in political repression, handling denouncements, investigations, detentions and incarcerations of any person whose activity was considered as suspicious, even in the absence of a verification of effective proof of a crime and headed by an Army Captain (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 375).

The subsequent 1937 Constitution mentioned the Armed Forces in several different sections. These forces were defined, and subsequently allocated, in the section "Of National Security", maintaining the focus on the domestic competence. In Article 161, however, such definition is subject to the President of the Republic:

> The armed forces are permanent national institutions, organized under the basis of hierarchical discipline and of faithful obedience to the authority of the President of the Republic (Brazilian Constitution of 1937, Article 161).

However, the Armed Forces are likewise mentioned in another section, entitled "Of the Defense of the State", where its competence is further detailed in the text under Article 166, only to encompass the provision of the defense of the motherland:

> In case of an external threat or the imminence of internal disturbances, or in the event of a concertation, plan or conspiracy that tends to disturb public order or put in danger the structure of the institutions, the security of the State or its citizens, the President of the Republic will be able to declare in the entire territory of the Country, or in the portion of the territory particularly threatened, the state of emergency […] As long as necessary the deployment of the armed forces to the defense of the State, the President of the Republic will declare in the entire national territory or in part of it the state of war.
>
> Single paragraph – To none of these acts authorization by the national Parliament will be required, nor could this [Parliament] be able to suspend the state of emergency or the state of war declared by the President of the Republic.
> (Brazilian Constitution of 1937, Article 166)

In fact, the 1937 Getulio Vargas Constitution does not make an explicit reference to law and order. The reasons therefore are outside the scope of this investigation. Nevertheless, the text still allows for the possibility of interpretation to identify possible allusions to the concepts of law and order. For the first time, the terms "state of emergency" and "state of war" were added to the text. In a way, both do refer to the domestic realm of the state, at least to the extent that it is possible to see how notions of threats or the imminence of "internal disturbances" or conspiracies that may subvert domestic order can be interpreted in many ways, subject to the discretion of the President of the Republic.

The text still mentions the term *defense* but in terms of the defense of the State, representing a change in the wording that shifts the focus from the outside in that the clear reference to the *exterior* disappears. Needless to say, the term defense of the state can mean the self-preservation of the political unit also regarding domestic threats, but the specific mention to outside or exterior threats is gone in this version of the Constitution. For reasons as such, it may be possible to assert that even though there is no specific mention to the expression "law and order", the 1937 Constitution is still very much inward oriented. It is so in the sense that it enables the President of the Republic to interpret acts and define them as disturbances, plans, concertations and conspiracies, and qualify them as threats.

During the 1945 elections, a presidential electoral race between two rival candidates, an Air Force Brigadier and an Army General was proof that

> […] the Armed Forces, in particular the Army, were no longer playing a supporting but rather a central role, becoming the most reliable Vargas ally, as well as its main instrument of control. […] By 1945, the Army worked as a kind of executive force that did not see itself neither as subordinate to civilian power nor as an instrument of popular will. From that year on, the Army was not only a modern institution with guns, equipment and appropriate troops; it had turned into a qualitatively different institution, an autonomous force certain to be the only one in conditions to form a well-trained elite, with a national vision and prepared to act in the public sphere. (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 375)

In the Constitution of 1946, the attributions of the Armed Forces became significantly reduced and objectively defined when compared to the former 1937 version. In it, these forces were defined in a section entitled "Of the Armed Forces", in which the term "defense of the state" was replaced by the term "defense of the motherland", and the specific mention to law and order returned:

> Article 176 – The Armed Forces, constituted essentially by the Army, Navy and Air Force, are permanent national institutions, organized in a hierarchical and disciplinary basis, under the supreme authority of the President of the Republic and within the limits of the law.
>
> Article 177 – The Armed Forces are destined to defend the Motherland and to guarantee the constitutional powers, law and order.
> (Brazilian Constitution of 1946)

The inward orientation of the Armed Forces was intensified from the 50s on. As seen above, well before the Southern Cone coups, the military leaders who eventually seized power had begun to reorganize and redirect military and police structures so that counterinsurgency methods provided the rationale and the techniques for military involvement in social control (Fagen, 1992, p. 55). The role of being a basis of support for the Empire is just one example of a signification that conceived the Army in an image of a *Poder Moderador*, responsible for solving political crises and for partially maintaining the social adjustment of specific social groups to reproduce social order (Ferreira, 2004, p. 72).

Since in Brazil the military was highly institutionalized, the perception of a communist threat during Cold War years further aggravated the Army's 'professionalization' approach to internal security in terms of preventing insurgent movements and becoming much more concerned with political problems (Stepan,

1976, p. 247). From 1955 on, both right-wing and left-wing leaderships had projected the Armed Forces into politics, accepting its interference in a regime legitimated by democratic rules.

This only aggravated the protagonist role of the Armed Forces in the public scene, the consequences of which were only to be fully felt in March 1964, with the installation of a military regime in the country (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 414). Changes in military ideology contributed to the events that led up to the military seizure of power in 1964 as well as the emergence of the military-bureaucratic components of a model of authoritarian development in Brazil (Stepan, 1976, p. 244). Alfred Stepan attributed this development, to a significant extent, to what he called a "*new professionalism of internal security and national development*" that contributed to the expansion of the military role in politics (1976, p. 244).

Following the installment of the military regime in 1964, the Brazilian government enacted a series of Institutional Acts and decrees that banished individuals from political participation, curtailed political activities, ended direct elections, reduced Congressional powers and outlawed political parties, student organizations and trade unions (Fagen, 1992, p. 47). The first institutional act (AI-1) allowed the execution of mass detention policing military maneuvers that entailed street blockages, house and individual searches throughout 1964 in major cities in states like Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul and Pernambuco, during which more than fifty thousand people were detained (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 456).

Special Investigation Commissions of administrative nature (*Comissões Especiais de Inquérito*) were established in all levels of government: Ministries as well as state organs and companies; conversely, Military Police Investigations (*Inquéritos Policiais Militares*, *IMPs*) were established and headed mainly by Army Colonels invested in a new kind of police-like function: to investigate the activities of public servants (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 456).

In addition to engaging in collective and individual disorder movements, the organ had the prerogative to "*act in a preventive dissuasion force in specific sites or areas where it is assumed that alleged order disturbances are taking place*" as well as "*in a repressive way, in case of disturbance of order, preceding the eventual deployment of the Armed Forces*" (D'Araujo ,2010, p. 243). Military police should

also be ruled in accordance with the Army's Disciplinary Regulation and adapted to the conditions of each corporation (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 243).

For some experts, from this point on, a relationship of evolving subordination of the military police to the Armed Forces was established, and not surprisingly, from 1964 to 1985, throughout the entire military regime, public security state secretaries and the general-commanders of the military police were Colonels and Generals nominated by governors upon contingent approval of the Army's Ministry (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 243).

From 1964 on, the Brazilian Superior War School (*Escola Superior de Guerra* – ESG) began to deploy special attention to the question of internal security. This is evident upon a closer look to ESG's Manuals with regard to the notion of national security. That year, the concept was mentioned in a lecture by Colonel Mário D. Andreazza, who by then, kept his definition close to the one used by the School of the *Estado-Maior Conjunto das Forças Armadas* (EMFA), the Brazilian Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, as he stated that:

> Internal Security is the degree of guarantee provided to the national collectivity, in what [it] relates with the maintenance of constitutional powers, of law and order. (Cel. Mário Andreazza apud Arruda, 1980, p. 24)

Another major development in terms of deepening militarization in the security structure was enabled by Decree number 57.131 in October 1965, also known as the Second Institutional Act, the AI-2. The General Inspection of the Military Polices (IGPM) was created as an organ of the Ministry of the Army with the purpose to centralize, coordinate, and inspect activities, budgets, personnel, training and the weaponry of the military polices (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 242-3). The AI-2 granted jurisdiction to military tribunals in all crimes classified as crimes against national security or against the state, enabling further repressive actions to be deployed. In practice, this meant that thereafter, nearly all offenses deemed political in character were tried in military courts and the number of people arrested, tortured, and exiled grew (Fagen, 1992, p. 50).

In 1965, the concept of internal security changed a little as to integrate internal security with national security, in the sense that it began to be articulated with the

pressures that would manifest or produce effects in the domestic realm. With this change, the text resulted in a greater focus to the domestic dimension:

> Internal security is the set of aspects of National Security that refer to the pressures of any origin, form or nature that manifest themselves or produce effects in the domestic realm. (Arruda, 1980, p. 24)

For some, this conceptualizing would have inspired, two years later, the Law Decree number 314 of March 13th 1967, which defined crimes against national security, social and political order as well as other competencies. It not only approached internal security as a set of aspects of national security as the former definition did. This time, internal security was defined as integrated to national security. Little by little, it is possible to observe the increasing articulation between internal and national security, so that one began to signify the other to a great extent:

> § 1º Internal security, integrated into national security, refers to threats of antagonist pressures, of any origin, form or nature, that manifest themselves or produce effects in the domestic realm of the country. (Law Decree 314/1967)

Such signification took shape in the sense that both terms referred to threats or antagonistic pressures that manifested themselves (or produced effects) in the domestic realm. This connotation allowed for a particular understanding of threats to national security that would emanate from internal problems, which in Brazil, was expressed in conjunction with specific theoretical formulations of the national security state (Fagen, 1992, p. 43-5). Associations of that kind were repeatedly reified, linking communism as a political problem to socially motivated challenges. According to the Manual of the Brazilian Escola Superior de Guerra, "*the Communist aggression capitalizes on social discontent, on frustrations of misery and hunger as well as national anxieties*" (Fagen, 1992, p. 44-5).

The 1967 Constitution mentioned that the Armed Forces were subject to the authority of the President in its own section, entitled "Of the Armed Forces" and not in the "National Security" section, as was the case in its previous version. They remained a function of the defense of the motherland, as well as to law and order:

> The armed forces, constituted by the Navy of War, the Army and the Military Air force, are permanent and regular national institutions, organized based in the

hierarchy and discipline, under the supreme authority of the President of the Republic and within the limits of the law.

Paragraph 1: The armed forces are destined to defend the Motherland and to guarantee the constituted Powers, law and order.
(Brazilian Constitution of 1967, Article 92)

For Patricia Weiss Fagen, the 1968 Fifth Institutional Act (AI-5) removed the *habeas corpus* prerogative for all cases deemed to raise issues of national security, characterizing a denial of recourse to civilian assistance or legal defense (1992, p. 50). Yet for historians Lilia Moritz Schwarcz and Heloisa Murgel Starling,

> the AI-5 was a tool of intimidation by fear with an ongoing deadline to be deployed against opposition and disagreement, although it was not the only instrument of exception created by the regime nor did it mean a "coup within a coup" applied by intramilitary radical factions to guarantee arbitrary expansion and political repression. The AI-5 was part of a set of instruments and discretionary norms embedded in legal value, adapted or self-conferred by members of the military. (2018, p. 455-6)

The AI-5 also effectively terminated both the autonomy of the judicial branch and civilian oversight of security-force practices (Fagen, 1992, p. 50). Until May 1967, the dictatorship used the already existing structure of repression available at the [federal] states: the Departments of Political and Social Order (*Dops*), subject to the Public Security Secretaries, as well as the civilian police officers based in the theft and robbery police stations (*Delegacias de Furtos e Roubos*) (Schwarcz and Starling, 2018, p. 459). As noted by Fagen on the repressive acts,

> Each new restrictive act was met with greater repression and harsher measures. In the course of events, the broad political opposition was left without legal outlets for protest. Many turned to clandestine or armed actions (or both). These armed actions – ranging from the kidnapping of ambassadors to the mounting of rural campaigns – brought the so-called hardliners in the military to dominance in the government. In 1969 the hardliners removed the remaining vestiges of constitutional protections for suspected political opponents. By 1973 the guerrillas were defeated and, despite a gradual détente up to the end of the regime in 1985, the security apparatus was not significantly dismantled until 1978 (Fagen, 1992, p. 47).

From a strategic point of view, the rapid defeat of the guerrillas in Brazil left an elaborate repressive force still intact (Fagen, 1992, p. 50). Since 1964, the Brazilian military had created a nationwide intelligence system, the *Sistema*

*Nacional de Informações (SNI)*.25 Years later, Law Decree number 898 of September 29th 1969, inspired in the former national security law, defined crimes against the political and social order just as the former 1935 National Security Law, but added the term national security to the text:

> § 1° Internal security, integrated in national security, refers to threats or antagonist pressures of any origin, form or nature, that manifest themselves or produce effect in the country. (Law Decree 898/1969)

In fact, the relationship between internal and national security became so crystallized that, by definition, the mention to the 'domestic' disappeared from the text over the years, perhaps because it was already embedded, implicitly, in the relationship between both concepts of security. The mention to the defense of the motherland and the terms law and order have remained in the 1969 Constitution, even with the removal of the explicit expression "in the domestic realm":

> Article 90. The Armed Forces, constituted by the Navy, Army and Air Force, are national, permanent and regular institutions, organized based on hierarchy and discipline, under the supreme authority of the President of the Republic and within the limits of the law.
>
> Article 91. The Armed Forces, essential to the execution of the national security policy, are destined to the defense of the Motherland and to the guarantee of constituted powers, of law and order.
> (Brazilian Constitution of 1969)

For the first time after the 1824 Empire Constitution and the 1937 Getulio Vargas Constitution, the term security was reinserted into the text as a function of the term "national security policy" – a clear reference to the threat of communism interpreted by the military regime. In 1969, there was special emphasis to the role of the Armed Forces as essential to the execution of the national security policy as an essential institution to the exercise of that policy. Such definition naturally articulates the military institution to the domestic realm of the state in the sense of

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25 The *SNI* was responsible for coordinating and supervising all intelligence activities pertinent to national security in all the ministries, as well as armed forces and police. Its director had a ministerial rank and was directly tied to the Executive through the National Security Council (Fagen, 1992, p. 57). In addition, the organs *Centro de Operações de Defesa Interna (CODI)* and the *Centro de Informações da Marinha* merged to form the *Departamento de Ordem Política e Social* (Fagen, 1992, p. 58).

protection of the motherland against outside threats yet acting domestically to do so. Even in cases in which such threats, albeit originating in the external transnational communist threat, acted ultimately in the domestic realm. For that reason, in addition to the competence of guaranteeing law and order, the Armed Forces were also designated the function of acting domestically specifically within the national security policy.[26]

In fact, by 1968-69, the Brazilian military claimed success in attaining its goals, but did not indicate any clear intent to create a civilian regime. For some, the institution ruled with repressive techniques and with much more coercion than appeared necessary to the outside observer (Janowitz, 1977, p. 67). On the one hand, this resulted in a structuring of the state security apparatus that was militarized and more than prepared to handle questions of domestic nature. On the other, over time, it contributed to a conception of security intrinsically related to national security.

In the 1975 ESG's Manual, the term internal security recovered the inward sense of the word in its definition, even though it kept most of the text in its essence:

> Internal security, integrated in national security, refers to the antagonisms or pressures of any origin, form or nature, that manifest themselves or produce effects in the internal realm of the country. (*Manual Básico da Escola Superior de Guerra*, 1975, p. 246).

The National Security Law of 1983 defines crimes against national security and the social and political order, reinforcing the notion that the state remained the referent object of security to be protected (Planalto, Law number 7.170/1983). Upon transition to democracy and following the end of the Cold War, the military prerogative to act domestically within internal security has been kept, as well as the consequences thereof for the understanding of security in Brazil. By implication, the 'place' and attributions of the military police were likewise extremely militarized.

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[26] Over time, further resistance and repression from government authorities also served to strengthen the repressive security apparatus, which in 1967 began to take on a new form with the creation of the Center of Information of the Army (*Centro de Informações do Exército, CIE*), a central institution whose activities ranged from data collection to direct repression, along with the Center of Information of the Navy (Cenimar) and the Center of Information of the Air Force (Cisa), created in 1957 and 1970, respectively (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 460). In 1993, the CIE was renamed to Center of Army Intelligence. Cisa was extinct in 1988 and replaced by the Secretary of Air Force Intelligence (SECINT), which in August 2004 became part of the Air Force Command structure, under the name Intelligence Center of the Army (CIAER).

**4.3**
**Inherited militarism upon transition to democracy**

In 1985, the political opening that led to a democratic government after roughly twenty years of military dictatorship in Brazil occurred in a way in which military leadership had to avoid any sort of chasm within the three Armed Forces during the transition. In the new institutional context, disputes for prestige and influence and concerns over which of the three Forces would prevail within it, were common (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 119). Because the Army was the most active among the three forces, the Navy and the Air Force worried that it could overly influence practical decisions to be made from then on (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 119).

Despite internal tensions within the Armed Forces themselves throughout the period of the dictatorship, the military had remained a cohesive institution of society since 1964. Over time, the Brazilian Army "*managed to deepen its bureaucratic character, which helped keep dissidence between hard-liner and soft-liner elements within the organization at bay*", and "*contributed decisively to the relatively smooth exit of the military from power to maintain an impressive degree of unity*" (Hunter, 1997, p. 27).

The fear of political vindictiveness motivated military leaders to shield themselves with immunity prerogatives against the political acts committed during the regime, such as the Law of Amnesty. Immunity over torture was a way to protect the institution against a perception of weakness and also against apparent political cleavages between the three Forces and against the internal tensions among and within them (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 107). Thus, upon transition to democracy under the rule of President José Sarney, the military emphasized the demand that the new Constitution should not alter previous agreements over the issue of amnesty (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 116). As such, vetoes to avoid sensitive issues were kept throughout subsequent negotiations. Yet, some experts argue that these did not indeed alter the democratic agenda built by society in a substantive way, nor modified the commitment of the military to return political power to civilians (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 116).

Upon transition to democracy, the military's constitutionally mandated role to maintain internal security was a crucial concession the Army demanded to be preserved (Hunter, 1997, p. 39). This proved to be one of the most inflammatory issues of the constitutional debates, since all previous constitutions had given legal

foundations to military interventionism in domestic issues by holding the Armed Forces responsible for guaranteeing law and order in the country (Hunter, 1997, p. 47). Whereas in early 1987, at the beginning of constitutional debates, surveys suggested that members of large conservative parties at the time strongly favored a continuing role for the Armed Forces in internal security, "*virtually the entire membership of the left-leaning parties sought to confine military functions to external defense, with the centrist PMDB being divided between both positions*" (Hunter, 1997, p. 47).

The military lobby at the time defended the internal aspect of the institution's competence, arguing that an internal mission for the military "*rested on the ground that political chaos could erupt and tear apart the social and economic fabric of the country*" while reminding their audience that the military had effectively put down previous challenges to social order (Hunter, 1997, p. 48). It also touched upon crucial questions of maintaining social cohesion that had been, up to that point, clearly articulated in history as a function of the Armed Forces in Brazil. There was also an overall shared fear that the creation of a Ministry of Defense would represent a loss of prestige to the military as an institution, which, for some, reflected a United States imposition onto the regional agenda to transform the Armed Forces in Brazil in auxiliary forces to help the police in the fight against drug trafficking (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 119).

In any case, military participation in the maintenance of internal order, and by extension, intervention in politics, was justified by the traditional role of the institution to guard against the possibility of social convulsion. In turn, those who opposed it argued that the "*clause allowed the military to seize power or, more frequently, to intimidate civilians engaged in protest behaviors, which should not be acceptable in a democracy*" (Hunter, 1997, p. 47-8).

In any case, a series of military prerogatives followed the transition to democracy. For one, there was no question that the three traditional forces' ministries would remain in place and headed by officers, and the positions of the *Estado Maior das Forças Armadas* (Armed Forces General Staff) and the Military House (*casa / gabinete militar*) were equally kept (Hunter, 1997, p. 32). In fact, the effective implementation of the Ministry of Defense in 1999 also meant the extinction of the Ministries of the Army, Navy and Air Force as well as the direct access of their Commanders' to the President. This represented a substantial change

in the nature of military institutions in that they were incorporated into a civilian Ministry of Defense (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 121-2).

The change took place immediately and in a definite way, contrary to what former military ministers had proposed; from then on, there were no more instances in the sphere of the Executive of military nature with ministerial status (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 121-2). Some have argued that the 1988 Constitution concentrated significant power in the hands of the Executive branch, to the detriment of the legislative. The corollary to this imbalance is that the Brazilian Parliament's impact on military matters borders on insignificance (Brigagão & Proença, 2002, p. 137 apud Kenkel, 2006b, p. 216). Consequently, in the Brazilian case, that meant "*granting Presidents with extensive power to legislate by decree, rendering parliamentary oversight legally unnecessary*". Yet a large majority of legislation regarding the Armed Forces to be made in this fashion, including, ironically, the establishment of the Ministry of Defense (Kenkel, 2006b, p. 216).

Following the end of the Cold War, there was also a change in the overall perception of what constituted threats to defense and security, a context in which the threat of communism gave place to concerns over borders tensions with neighboring countries, especially Argentina, motivating negotiations that would later give birth to the creation of the Mercosur (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 117). For some, the creation of the Ministry of Defense in 1999 constituted a political decision taken by the then civilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso to stress a differentiation between military and civilian powers (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 117). Upon its implementation, the military's mandate to maintain internal order was upheld albeit conditional upon civilian command and within the limits of the law (Hunter, 1997, p. 49-0). The mandate regarding internal order not only was maintained grounded on the legal basis for such domestic deployment. It was also refined and further specified over time, with the creation of a legal framework to regulate law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO).

Even though the newly civilian instituted *Council of National Security* was occupied by additional cabinet members, the military continued to exercise a preponderant role, that of a secretary-general, traditionally a member of the military responsible for the crucial link between the civilian and military bureaucracy in covering the following areas: domestic and foreign politics, economic and social development, external defense and regionally related problems of significance to

national security (Hunter, 1997, p. 33). This change in structure reflected the military's demand upon transition of not altering its role regarding internal and external security (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 116).

At first sight, Army control over the military state police was reduced at the institutional level (Hunter, 1997, p. 44). Discussions over the military character of the military police in light of the transition called for a demilitarization in the structure of such security forces since this aspect of the corporation would cause officers to be excessively prone to violence and not act in conformity with democratic ideals (Hunter, 1997, p. 50-1). After much debate, although the federal government retained significant power over the military police, the new constitution still defined such police as "auxiliary and reserve forces of the army"; however, it remained under the control of state governors (Article 144), thus hindering the army command to directly interfere and supervise the operations of such police, now subject to the discretion of state governors (Hunter, 1997, p. 52).

In that sense, the military lost authority over the military police as a coercive force, particularly that which was most naturally summoned in matters of internal security; for some, that would make it difficult for the military to override the decisions of state governors in assuming direct responsibility for the maintenance of law and order (Hunter, 1997, p. 52).

Nevertheless, the estrangement from a direct exercise of internal security did not take place, since in practice state decisions caused military jurisdiction to expand otherwise. Yet in spite of the consolidated civilian control over the military upon transition to democracy, the security apparatuses, as well as the structure of security forces themselves, continued to be permeated with, and influenced by, military instances. Besides, the fact that the institutional structure of public security agencies in Brazil was shaped by military rules and models has caused many to question if this inheritance could be the reason why the Brazilian military police is so violent (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 235).

The case has been made that, in contrast to other countries whose police forces have a military structure – such as in France, Italy, Spain and Canada – in Brazil, as indicated by the term, "*there is a military structure playing the role of the police*" (Zaverucha, 1999, p. 5). In addition, the political opening did not alter the centralizing aspect of the competences of the military police. Following such changes, the Union lost the competence to legislate exclusively over the instruction

of the state military polices. In practice, it kept the prerogatives of instituting general organizational norms, personnel, warranties, weaponry, appointments and mobilization (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 244).[27]

Conversely, the lack of separation between the domestic and international spheres regarding security that resulted from the lack of differentiation between the police and the military in terms of their competences opened space in terms of rendering yet additional consequences and possibilities of military prerogatives to act in the domestic security sphere. From then on, a unique institutional pattern to ostensive policing aimed at enforcing public security in a period where legal devices were responsible for an understanding that military polices had a role to play in public security was observed and understood as national security (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 243-4). For some, this was another factor that turned the military police into what some have called a process of nationalization, even in the presence of the

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[27] In 1917, a law that regulated terrestrial forces of defense and security established that the Police and Fire Brigades of the Federal District - as well as the state polices that had enough organization capabilities according to the judgement of the *Estado-Maior do Exército* - would be considered permanently organized forces. As such, they could be incorporated to the National Army should a mobilization take place. In 1918, additional changes in legislation regarding conscription enhanced ties between the military police and the Armed Forces, as the Federal District Police and Fire Brigades, as well as the state militarized police forces, would constitute auxiliary forces of the active Army. Ties between the military police and Armed Forces were further strengthened in the 1920s, as the military corporation intensified its professionalization and became institutionalized within public power in a more articulate way. In 1920, the statute of the Military Police of the Federal District stipulated that the Military Police, in terms of the laws in force, constituted an auxiliary force of the active Army. Additional ties at the institutional level were links to the Army in terms of the occupation of the officials in charge. It was established by law that the post of Commandant of the Military Police should be occupied by a Major General or Colonel from the Army's effective personnel, nominated by decree by the President of the Republic; likewise, lower positions should be exercised by active Army officials, such as Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels. Accordingly, members of such police should be judged by ordinary Justice or by the then Military Supreme Court. In 1922, a new decree demanded that the military police became subject, and accountable to, the Military Criminal Code, and that as such, it should be accordingly judged by an investigation and discipline council in the first instance, and by a Military Supreme Court in the event of the demand of a second instance. That same year, a subsequent law emphasized that military police would be considered Army reservations and that, as such, could be called upon at times of war under the command of an Army officer in charge or an officer from the corporation itself, subject to enforcement of a Military Criminal Code. Since 1934, the Union had the competence to legislate on the organization and on the roles of the military polices, be it in situations of war and/or peace, according to Article 5. The military police came to be listed under the Title VI, namely the category "Of National Security" and defined as "Army reserves", enjoying the same prerogatives of military officials when deployed in the service of the Union. In 1946, the Brazilian Constitution listed the military police under Title VII, this time under the category "Armed Forces", establishing that their roles aimed substantially at "public security" and to the "maintenance of order" in addition to continuing to be auxiliary and reserve forces of the Army, keeping the prerogatives granted to it should they be called to serve in an external or civil war. In 1969, another law accentuated military control over both the military police and the fire brigade by establishing exclusivity to military police in the execution of ostensive uniformed policing for the first time. As a result, additional state security agencies such as the Civilian Guard and the São Paulo Public Force were extinct and replaced by the then military police of that state (See D'Araujo, 2010).

remaining state security public agencies (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 243-4). Yet patterns of militarism outlasted the period of military rule and continued to be observed in the following years.28

After the transition, military officials from reserve forces or in active duty were assigned to occupy key security office positions in national security, such as offices at the National Secretariat of Public Security, at the Department of Public Security Affairs, or the then recently created National Antidrug Secretariat (Zaverucha, 2000, p. 29).29 It is hence no coincidence that in the 90s, there has been continued militarism at the institutional level in the sense of Executive appointments by military officials even in light of the creation of the allegedly civilian Ministry of Defense, hence perpetuating the presence of the military in matters of public security, curiously among left or right-wing politicians alike (Zaverucha, 1999, p. 9).

Room for interpretation in the applicability of security does not seem to have been reduced over the years; on the contrary, despite the transition to democracy, the Brazilian military has continued to set the vocabulary of security in the country (Kenkel, 2006a, p. 4). It has been argued that there was no effective civilian control established within the Ministry of Defense and that the Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Force continue to hold *de facto* power in defense (Zaverucha, 2006, p. 174). The fact that since 2018 the past two Ministers of Defense are Army Generals could also point to further militarism.

Besides, the fact that following the transition to democracy, members of the military continue to occupy institutional roles in public security organs is an example that reveals an inheritance of militarism in terms of the way security was interpreted and conceived during the military regime. It is common upon transitions that the new civilian leaders aim at removing the police from the scope of the control of the Armed Forces to stress the differentiation between the two, as to

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28 Ties with the Army were also kept with the continuity of the General Inspection of Military Polices (IGPM), nowadays linked to the Terrestrial Operations Command of the Army (Coter) and no longer to the Ministry of Army itself (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 244).

29 Army General Alberto Cardoso, in charge from 1995-2002, took over an institutional security position whose competencies were similar to the ones of the former extinguished *Casa Militar* (Military House) yet went beyond it. As a member of the government security council, his duties comprised running the Undersecretary of Intelligence (SSI), intermediating government relations with civilian and military polices, coordinating works on the elaboration of a new National Defense Policy, and studying the creation of the new Ministry of Defense, encompassing activities relative to civilian intel, external defense, public security and drug trafficking fighting policies (Zaverucha, 2000, p. 51).

attribute internal order and public security issues to the police and external problems, such as war, to the military (Zaverucha, 2000, p. 42).30

Due to the intrinsic nature between the concepts of domestic and national security, Jorge Zaverucha has argued that in spite of the installment of a democratic government in Brazil, there is no civilian supremacy over the militaries nor the other way around; what is observed is an intermediate situation that has lingered since the transition in which there is no solid democracy established whereas at the same time, there is also no return to a military government (2000, p. 24). This configuration of power has been denominated by Zaverucha as an "*equilibrium point of the civilian-military game where neither civilians nor members of the military seem to be interested in changing, and even if they are, they do not possess enough political strength to abandon this hybrid position, despite the contingent disputes that occur within the limits of that grey zone*" (2000, p. 24).

Nevertheless, even in light of potential tensions, the Brazilian military has not sponsored any political crisis since the transition to democracy in 1985, nor has it enacted public statements in that sense. Over time, tensions revolved mainly around accountability, and the fact that the institution vehemently opposed a revision of the Law of Amnesty (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 109). The prerogative to act domestically has remained and the Armed Forces have collaborated in public security in recent years, as requested by the Executive. This practice has been further systematized with the GLO decrees, as will be seen next.

## 4.4
## The legal basis for the domestic deployment of the Brazilian Armed Forces: the creation of law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO)

The provision for Armed Forces deployment for law and order enforcement operations needs to be understood in the context of the relationship of that institution to the domestic realm of the country. Different significations have been denoted over the years, and these refer to the definition of the Armed Forces itself.

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30 However, such effort to separate the two in the Brazilian case not only did not occur in the 1988 Constitution. In fact, it was actually hindered by it in that, for the first time in Republican history, it conceded a status of public servant to members of the military police and to Fire Department officers identical to the status enjoyed by Armed Forces personnel (See Zaverucha, 2000, p. 42).

In fact, all Brazilian Constitutions reference the internal realm of the state in a greater or smaller degree – even when they vary regarding law and order in terms of the authority judging and determining the Armed Forces deployment.

Upon democratization, in the 1988 Constitution, the Armed Forces are defined as permanent institutions of the state, listed in the same section V, entitled "Of the Defense of the State and of Democratic Institutions":

> The Armed Forces, constituted by the Navy, the Army and the Air Force, are permanent and regular national institutions, organized based on hierarchy and discipline, under the supreme authority of the President of the Republic, and are destined to the defense of the Motherland, the guarantee of constitutional powers, and by initiative of any of the two, of law and order.
> (Brazilian Constitution of 1988, Chapter II, Article 142).

According to Article 142, concerning the terms security and order, similar convoluted interpretations are possible to occur when it comes to law and order, attributed to the Armed Forces along with the guarantee of constitutional powers (the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary). Moreover, it is there to be noticed that this Constitution allows for members of the Armed Forces to act in matters of domestic order, if requested by one of the Republican powers. [31]

Yet the notion of law and order is so vague that it allows for broad interpretations of what this could mean. For some, the reference to "law and order" in the text is subject to stereotypes and biased interpretations over what constitutes *"threats to social order and does not specify if the law is constitutional or ordinary, if the order is political, social or moral nor who is supposed to define when law and order have been violated"* (Zaverucha, 2000, p. 38). Thus, the mere interpretation by the Executive that law and order have been offended would be sufficient, in theory, to justify military intervention in the past (Zaverucha, 2000, p. 38). Moreover, the possibility for such broad interpretation of the term opens space for the military to act domestically as an independent force in internal intervention in practice and to act in public security operations, as opposed to acting as an armed branch of political power (Zaverucha, 2000, p. 39).

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[31] Conversely, the military police is listed in the following section, under "Public Security", namely Chapter III, whose role is defined as ostensive policing and the preservation of public order, but remain auxiliary military forces and Army reserves (Article 144, §5º and §6º).

In addition to the ambiguity that surrounds the term law and order, the vagueness and overlap in the use of the terms "public security" and "internal order" have been a recurrent matter throughout Brazilian history. In the current version of the Constitution, the term national security policy was removed and the term security itself re-signified to denote the defense the motherland, hence reacquiring its meaning of mentioning the exterior. On a normative instance, for some experts, while the term public security should refer to the security to be provided by the state to its citizens, the expression "internal order" refers to the protection against threats to democracy or to national sovereignty, hence referencing defense of the state (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 239).32 According to Maria Celina D'Araujo, our legislation has allowed for an undifferentiated use of the two expressions, aggravated during the military regime, period in which the expression "national security" was used as a resort to political intimidation and when military police engaged directly in political repression (2010, p. 239-0).

In spite of an alleged *de jure* replacement of the term *security* by *defense* to denote a removal of internal security issues from the armed forces purview, this shift – in addition to the new institutional arrangements that accompanied it – is not *de facto* verifiable (Kenkel, 2006a, p. 24). For some, current public security policies indeed pose a threat to democracy and to the rule of law due to their predominantly authoritarian orientation in which security laws are characterized by elements such as the policies of 'combat', the creation of 'public enemies', the criminalization of black and poor individuals, and the appeal to constant Armed Forces deployment (De Souza Neto, 2009, p. 61).

Since then, revisions to the National Defense Policy have defined and interpreted national security as the condition that regards the obtaining and maintenance of the goals and interests of the Nation, by means of integrated and coordinated deployment of the various expressions of National Power, and in which it has been argued that the Army has naturally a role to play (Martins Filho, 2006, p. 14). In recent years, official reports continued to stress the social role of the

32 The current national Constitution allows for the decree of a state of defense by the incumbent President to preserve or reestablish public order or *social peace* in local and specific sites should these be threatened by grave and imminent institutional instability or by great nature threats. Conversely, a state of siege can be declared by the President of the Republic in the event of a great national commotion or facts that may prove that measures taken during a state of defense were ineffective, or in the event of a declaration of state of war or response to foreign armed aggression.

Brazilian Armed Forces through the linking between security and development, and among other roles, of being responsible for understanding, foreseeing and managing potential or implicit conflicts of internal or external nature that may threaten national cohesion and the inviolability of national borders with intel acts – a role that, according to the Ministry of Defense, is a highly complex task that affects defense (Pinto et al., 2005, p. 20).

At the institutional level, the National Public Security Secretariat of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (SENASP/MJSP) was created in 1996. In 2001, a National Fund for Public Security was created with the intent to fight violence to enable greater access to budget resources, from then on processed at the national level. Along with this institutional change, in the 2000s a National Public Security Plan was launched nationwide, advocating for more active federal government involvement in the issue of public security and allowing for the deployment of Armed Forces personnel in that field (Cano, 2006, p. 138).

For some, instead of enhancing the security of citizens, this initiative denoted, in practice, an estrangement of this concept, and a continuous reference to the metaphor of war with regard to public security operations, permeated by militarized strategy, doctrine and tactics (Cano, 2006, p. 141). Later, in 2007, the Ministry of Justice launched the National Public Security Plan (*Pronasci*), an attempt to integrate Union, states and cities over the issue of public security. Yet, rising violence levels in some Brazilian cities demanded more active military deployment in public security by the Executive over the years (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 253).

In addition, recent conceptions of the Brazilian national strategy have been particularly linked to challenges in the domestic realm, allowing notions of security to be equivalent to defense itself as in the National Security Policy, based on an understanding that some forces that threaten and weaken the state need to be fought (Ferreira, 2003, p. 37). In that sense, many regard organized crime, due to its frequency and extension, as a security threat, even though criminal gangs lack a direct aim to take over the state's apparatus in terms of taking *de facto* control over the state (Ferreira, 2003, p. 42). Within that context, members of the military have been called upon to take on roles traditionally defined as police roles, including engaging in peace operations and in statebuilding measures which, to a great extent, constitute law and order enforcement activities (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 255).

Not surprisingly, the 2014 version of the Brazilian Superior War College´s (ESG) Basic Manual, defines national security in the following way:

> Albeit a competence of the state, National Security entails the application of National Power as a whole. National Security is the sensation of guaranteeing the conquer and maintenance of the fundamental goals of the Nation, provided by the application of its national power. (ESG - Brazilian Superior War School Manual, 2014, p. 81)

When it comes to framing organized crime as a national security issue, there needs to be a legal framework that allows the military to act within domestic security. Along with talks on the need to pacify the Brazilian public space – as shall be seen in the next chapter, there were also adaptations to the legislation to ensure domestic Armed Forces deployment to be enabled and regulated by law. To this end, a series of decrees and complementary laws developed from the existing prerogatives between the Armed Forces and built on their existing relationship to the notions of domestic security, law and order to expand and crystallize that idea of enabling the military to systematically act on public security.

The first of these laws could be pointed out as the 1999 the Complementary Law number 97. This law established that, in addition to their constitutional competencies, the Armed Forces were also supposed to fulfil, among additional action explained in the law, a specified role to act domestically in the form of guaranteeing the constitutional power and in law and order operations, under the following subsidiary attributions:

> The deployment of the Armed Forces in the defense of the Motherland and in the enforcement of the constitutional power, of law and order, and in the participation of peace operations, is of the responsibility of the President of the Republic, who shall determine to the Minister of State of Defense the activation of operational bodies. (Chapter V, Article 15)

The text further specifies the kind of subordination that the Armed Forces are subject to regarding specific forms of action within law and order operations in Paragraph 2:

> The acting of the Armed Forces in the guarantee of law and order, by initiative of any of the constitutional powers, shall occur according to the guidelines set by the President of the Republic, following an exhaustion of the instruments destined to the preservation of public order and of the safety of the people and of patrimony related to Article 144 of the Federal Constitution. (Chapter V, Article 15, Paragraph II)

Likewise, Article 144 of the 1988 Federal Constitution establishes the competent bodies for public security, namely: the federal police, the federal highway police, the federal railway police, civilian police, military police and military firefighters. Yet, the paragraph below presents the possibility that in case of exhaustion of the referred instruments listed above, the Armed Forces could step in to ensure the safety of the people and of the patrimony.

Two years later, in 2001, the Presidency of the Republic enacted the Decree number 3.897, which later came to be known as the GLO decree, whose purpose was to establish guidelines to orient the planning, coordination and execution of the actions of the Armed Forces and of federal governmental bodies specifically in such activities aimed to enforce law and order. The decision to deploy them continues to be a prerogative of the President of the Republic that may occur by his/her own initiative, by the request of a governor of any federal state, or by other constitutional power – represented by the Federal Supreme Court, the President of the Senate or by the President of the House (Article 2). Article 3 of the decree established that:

> In the event of Armed Forces deployment for the enforcement of law and order aiming at the preservation of public order and the safety of the people and of the patrimony due to an exhaustion of the instruments destined to this in Article 144 of the Constitution, [the Armed Forces] will be assigned, whenever necessary, with the development of ostensive police action of preventive or repressive nature that are included in the competency, constitutional and legal, of the military police, observed in the terms and limits imposed, to the latter, by the juridical framework (Decree number 3.897, Article 3).

The decree specifies that, as judged necessary by the authorities, if deployed to enforce law and order, in that exercise, the military shall take on the competences of the military police – namely ostensive policing of preventive or repressive nature. For one, the means "*the action of the military police need to be unavailable, inexistent or insufficient to the regular performance of their constitutional mission*". In that case, Article 4 of Decree 3.897 also places the military police subject to, and coordinated by, a military command to perform these functions:

> In the event of the deployment of Armed Forces object of Article 3 […] the military police in question shall, under approval of the governor of the state, act partially or totally under the operational control of the military command in charge for the operations, whenever demanded or recommended by the situations to be faced (Article 4).

As for the criteria for such deployment, the decree states that GLO operations need to meet certain conditions that further describe their nature:

> The deployment of the Armed Forces in law and order enforcement shall be episodic, in a previously established area and must have the minimum duration possible, entailing, in addition to the hypothesis of Articles 3 and 4, other situations in which it is possible to assume an alleged disturbance of order, such as the hypothesis relative to official or public events, particularly those that account for the participation of a Head of State, or from a foreign government, and to the accomplishment of electoral voting, in this case when requested (Article 5).

The text aims to ensure that GLO military engagement does not become systematic but instead remains temporary by stressing the terms "*shall be episodic*" and by having "*the minimum duration possible*". Regarding the demand for GLO, it shall be applied to situations in which the competent authority assumes "*an alleged disturbance of order*" – hence leaving the possibility to interpret disturbances of order open. As seen above, according to the Brazilian Constitution, many events could be identified as disturbances of order by competent authorities.

Yet this is not the only possibility for GLO to be activated as a legal device. It can also be so in case of official or public events that entail the participation of a head of state, as well as the accomplishment of electoral voting processes. By assuming that military police forces may prove insufficient, providing the enforcement of security of public events and elections not only relates to preventive policing functions. In terms of the sovereign exercise of power, it also relates to coercion at the level of the everyday, of acting on the streets and in how this affects the lives of people and their duties and rights as citizens. Either when they vote in an election or as they come home to face the military patrolling the streets, this allows for the possibility to enforce law and order with a greater prerogative to use force when it comes to the military. In particular because despite alleged policing practices *in practice*, GLO were still provided for, and regarded as, military activities by law.

In 2004, Complementary Law number 117 added further details regarding GLO competencies in terms of the meanings of deploying the military in such activities. This piece of legislation entailed the "*planning, organization and articulation, instruction and training, doctrine development and specific research, intelligence and structuring of the Armed Forces, its logistic and mobilization*"

(Article 1). This law, added to the previous Complementary Law number 97, prescribes additional attributions to the nature of GLO operations in Article 17A, specifying that

> The Army is incumbent, in addition to other appropriate actions, specific subsidiary attributions such as:
>
> I – contributing to the formulation and conduction of national policies that refer to the Military Land Power;
>
> II – cooperate with federal, state and municipal state bodies and, exceptionally, with private companies, in the conduction of construction works and engineering services, when resources derive from the soliciting body;
>
> III – cooperate with federal bodies, when necessary, in the repression of felonies of national and international repercussion, within national territory, in the form of logistical, intel, communication and instruction support;
>
> IV – act, by means of preventive and repressive action, within the land border area, against cross-border and environmental felonies, in an isolated way or in coordination with other Executive Power bodies, to carry out, among other, the actions of:
>
> a)      patrolling;
> b)      personal, land vehicles, ships and aircraft searches, and
> c)      arrests upon offenses committed in the act.
>
> (Complementary Law number 117/2004)

Paragraph II provides for the cooperation in the conduction of construction works and engineering services that relate to providing critical infrastructure enterprises. Paragraph III include the repression of felonies within national territory by providing "*logistical, intel, communication and instruction support*". This suggests coordinated action with additional public security forces to help capacitate them by providing them with specialized military training. Paragraph IV mentions particularly repressive but also preventive actions within national territory not only in cases of coordination, but also acting independently to patrol, search and arrest.[33]

[33] This piece of legislation also authorized the Armed Forces to engage in 'internal affairs' of social, political and economic nature, and to act domestically in the repression of crimes of national and international repercussion by offering logistical, intel, communications and instructive support (See Complementary Law #117, 2004). It also clearly granted the Armed Forces with police competences in exceptional situations and foresaw that the military engaged in such actions may be authorized to use their guns outside working hours (See D'Araujo, 2010, p. 253).

At this point, the description comes closer to competencies normally attributed to the police that include, according to Foucault's definition, the regulation of social life in that they relate to liberties such as freedom of movement.

## 4.5
## The prerogative to act like police and the definition of rules of engagement (ROE)

In addition to the legal basis, there were institutional changes within the organizational structure of the military. Deploying military troops for assisting the police in law and order, however reluctant they may be to perform this mission, has demanded military institutions to establish training programs such as the Brazilian Army's Center of Instruction for Operations in Law Enforcement and Order located in Campinas, state of São Paulo (CIOpGLO) (Marcella, 2015, pp. 168-9). This specific Battalion is responsible for the development of the land military doctrine at a tactical level, specifically for law and order enforcement operations.

As such, the instruction center offers a series of trainings to capacitate approximately 1,000 officials a year in professional military ethics with an emphasis on human rights, crisis management and negotiation, area control, non-lethal technology, combat in confined facilities and first aid (Exército Brasileiro, 2016). The training is standardized and open to officials from all states to enable troops from the entire country to be capacitated to engage in law and order.

In terms of strategic competences, GLO operations are a responsibility of the Ministry of Defense, which shall conduct their planning, coordination and execution while keeping permanent ties to the governmental bodies that shall execute them, such as the Cabinet of Institutional Security of the Presidency of the Republic, the Ministries of Justice (MJ)[34], Ministry of Planning and Budget and Administration (MPOG), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), the Federal Public Ministry and the Union General-Lawyers Agency (AGU), in addition to governmental agencies (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 21).

In fact, operations of law and order enforcement are specifically mentioned in the White Paper of National Defense published in 2012. According to Executive

[34] As shall be seen next, since 2019 the Ministry of Justice has been merged with the Ministry of Public Security, culminating in the Ministry of Justice and Public Security.

authorities, "*GLO operations would demand special training and preparation since the deployment in that operation is fundamentally different, in principle and doctrine, to the Forces' traditional deployment*" (*Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional*, 2012, p. 159). In traditional missions that relate to external defense, the focus is to act in missions whose focus is on perfectly identifiable enemy forces on the terrain – normally characterized by an armed and uniformed military force (*Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional*, 2012, p. 159). Yet, with the GLOs, the Ministry of Defense adds another prerogative to the mission of the military that differs from its traditional outward oriented mission.

In 2013, the GLO Manual of Law Enforcement Operations35 was published by the Ministry of Defense. The purpose of the manual was to establish guidelines to the planning and deployment of the military in GLO operations. The definition of GLO as a military operation in the Manual is the same used in previous enactments. The military nature of the operation is acknowledged, but just as in the White Paper of National Defense, once again there is a preoccupation to differentiate GLO operations from traditional military functions. In strategic terms, the first version of the document stresses that GLO are not regarded as actions "*that aim at combating guerrilla and armed groups that may compromise the internal order of the country*" (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 17), placing these groups as threats outside the competence of GLOs. This shows that GLO activities come closer to policing practices, since political motivation is not the driving force of the (at first sight, at least) economically oriented organized crime in Brazil.

As for the military character of GLO operations, they are characterized as

> "non-war" situations because even though the military is being deployed domestically, such operations do not entail combat in and of itself, they can, under special circumstances, entail the use of force in a limited way, and are able to occur in an urban as well as rural environment (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 17).

The wording expresses a preoccupation to define GLOs firstly by what they are not: a combat situation. This explanation clarifies that *even though* the military can be deployed at the domestic level in both urban and rural environments, GLO operations do not entail combat, although they may entail limited use of force. This

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35 Henceforth, GLO Manual.

removes the political factor from the nature of the operations and reveals an effort to differentiate GLOs from previous military repressive activities exercised in Brazil during the Cold War and the military regime.

By definition, GLOs do not entail combat operations. Yet they act, in practice, to combat some kind of threat. It is crucial, then, to understand that the manual has its own vocabulary to specify threats. This kind of operation does not characterize an 'enemy' in the classical form of combat military operations; consequently, what needs to be secured is public order and the safety of people and of the patrimony. In that sense, the first GLO 2013 manual classifies *threats* as

> acts or attempts potentially capable of compromising the preservation of public order or the safety of the people and the patrimony, practiced by previously identified opponent forces or identified by the population in general (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 15).

In the following version of the manual, issued in 2014, the part of the sentence that says "*practiced by previously identified opponent forces or identified by the population in general*" disappears. By eliminating possible agents, this reduction in the wording allows for a wider interpretation in the sense that any one person or group could be considered a threat. The 2013 first version of the manual contains the term opponent forces, defined as

> people, groups of people or organizations whose acting compromises the preservation of public order or the safety of the people and of patrimony (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 15).

The manual specifies the agents that may constitute *opponent forces*, that among others, are listed as follows:

> a)      movements or organizations;
> b)      criminal organizations, drug trafficking gangs, arms and ammunition smugglers, armed groups, etc;
> c)      people, groups of people or organizations acting in the form of autonomous segments or infiltrated in movements, entities, institutions, organizations or public security bodies, provoking or instigating violent and radical actions; and
> d)      individuals or group that use violent methods to impose their own will due to the absence of police public security forces.
>
> (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 29)

The 2014 Manual changed the wording from *opponent forces* to the term *public order disturbing agent (APOP)*; however, that change did not include a section to specifically define an APOP. In lack of this specification, the manual acquires broader possibilities of interpretation in that fairly any group or agents could qualify as an APOP, depending on how governmental agents interpret their actions as actions that disturb order. At the same time, it may be possible to argue that the choice for the term 'agent' shifts the focus from the actors to agency itself, meaning that agents will be defined by their *actions*. In effect, regarding the guidelines for the military to respond to such actions, much of the focus is on acts that are considered disturbances of order. In the Rules of Engagement guidelines designed for specific operations, the mention to threats themselves comes as 'threatening acts', reinforcing the focus on *acts* as the main defining category interpreted as disturbance to order.

Another clear change from the 2013 to the 2014 version of the Manual is that neither the definition of opponent forces nor the definition of APOP has a specific mention to groups that are politically motivated. Instead, the focus for the defining criteria of opponent forces seems to be on violent actions and repercussions that may very well disturb public order, but that apparently do not aim to revert it or take control of the state, nor its integrity in terms of reverting the existing political order. Even upon the mention that such groups could take advantage of the absence of police as public security forces, the statement that GLO operations do not entail the fighting of guerrilla disappears altogether in the 2014 version of the manual.

The 2013 reference to opponent forces "*previously identified by the population*" (or the implicit previous identification, by the state) of opponent forces alludes to a notion that agents who disturb public order are somehow identifiable and hence still acting on an existing precedent. Besides, *threats* are further exemplified throughout the 2013 manual as acts such as

a)      actions taken against elections affecting the voting process and the verification (vote counting process) of an election;
b)      actions of criminal organizations against people or against the patrimony including ships that carry the Brazilian flag and in oil and gas platforms in the Brazilian continental platform;
c)      blockage of public circulation routes;
d)      pillage of public and private patrimony;
e)      urban disturbances;
f)      invasion of rural or urban property and facilities, public or private;

g)          paralyzing of the productive activities;
h)          paralyzing of critical or essential services to the population or to productive sectors of the country;
i)          sabotage in great events sites; and
j)          looting of commercial establishments.

(Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 29)

It seems that most of the threats refer to perils that would disturb public patrimony and property do not seem to target the territorial integrity of the state but rather the 'proper' functioning of goods, services and persons in national territory. One example was a GLO that deployed the military to act to protect public patrimony that took place in the federal district of Brasília on May 24th 2017, after protesters committed acts of vandalism, setting fire to the facilities of the Ministries of National Integration, the Ministry of Labor and of Agriculture (Planalto Notícias, 2017).

Another example of GLO activation was an operation to unblock circulation routes on May 25th 2018, five days after truck drivers organized a national paralysis that led to a national crisis in terms of food supply (G1 Notícias, 2018c). The official purpose of the decree was to deploy the Armed Forces to clear national highways and resupply the country with the products being retained by truck drivers obstructing the roads. The Minister of the Cabinet of Institutional Security argued that this was an instrument the government would make use of until normality was recovered (G1 Notícias, 2018c).

From 2013 to 2014, threats and APOPs became more and more general, meaning that many actors and acts could qualify as someone, or something, that could pose risks to public order. It seems, then, that even a previous definition of who these agents are, as well as what they do, is open to interpretation given that the focus of framing security shifted from previously established categories toward possible carried out actions or practices *per se*. This definition could perfectly apply to organized crime, mainly in urban spaces.

Integrated action, intelligence, counterintelligence and dissuasion are some of the law and order enforcement guidelines that will be analyzed here. There should be integrated action among different appropriate governmental bodies that may be of interest to the operation in question, acting on a case-by-case basis:

4.2.1 Integrated Action
4.2.1.1 The planning and execution [of GLOs] allow for the possibility of participation of the Armed Forces, public security and Judiciary bodies related and of interest to the operation.
4.2.1.2 During the planning, the knowledge and experience of the several bodies in the development of public security shall be explored, and during the actions, the bodies whose vocation is the activity in question shall have priority of deployment, being up to the Armed Forces, primarily, to complement the actions. Nevertheless, the deployment of the Armed Forces in the operations shall take place regardless and independently of the additional public bodies destined to public security in case they are exhausted by protest movements.

(Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 25) [author's translation]

The articulation of integration between security forces was further reinforced with the resignification of organized crime as terrorist acts in 2015. That year, the Brazilian Senate approved the first antiterrorism law in the country, defining acts of terrorism as '*any act which seriously attempts to disrupt the stability of the democratic state, aiming to subvert the functioning of its institutions*' (Folha de São Paulo, 2015). This piece of legislation is a clear sign of how public security issues became part of the Brazilian 'national security agenda' so to speak (Azzi, 2017, p. 596). Despite the reference to an alleged political goal to "s*ubvert the functioning of its institutions",* this definition also allowed for many acts committed by agents of the organized crime to be considered as terrorist acts.

Regarding guidelines, the manual classifies GLO actions as actions of preventive and of repressive nature. Preventive actions shall be "*permanent in character, entailing the preparing of the troop and the intel, psychological and social communication activities, as well as dissuasion*" deployed in light of a possible threat detected by intelligence (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 26). In turn, repressive actions are "*developed to fight a concrete threat whose goal is to reestablish the free democratic state, social peace and public order*". Repressive actions target the acts of actors in case they are considered as concrete threats.

In the 2013 first version of the manual, among the basic guidelines of the GLO operations as a non-war military action, specifies a subsection on operations that are designated as "Police-like Operations". Although this specific section was removed from the 2014 version of the GLO manual, it will be considered since the prerogatives set in this section may have shaped an entire understanding on the

nature of GLOs for the practices being analyzed in this thesis. This additional operational prerogative is described under Section 4.5.2 of the manual as

> 4.5.2.1.1 The State, with the goal of protecting the interests of society, may act in a coercive way and use the necessary means to curb individual or collective actions contrary to the juridical framework, whose preservation is the responsibility of the bodies stated in Article 144 of the Federal Constitution.
>
> 4.5.2.1.2 The Armed Forces may be deployed in substitution to these bodies, according to legal precepts, exercising in these occasions the power of police.
>
> 4.5.2.1.3 The police-like operations, as repressive actions, will be conducted in an urban or rural environment and carried out in all GLO operations.
>
> 4.5.2.1.4 The troops must restrain their acting strictly to the fulfilment of the mission assigned and to use adequate equipment, through the moderate use of the means and proportionally to the infraction in order to minimize damage to the people and to the patrimony.
>
> (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 30)

It is possible to argue that the definition and denomination of these capacities as "police-like operations" speak directly to the capacity of the military to effectively act with police power.[36] One subsection, on employment, specifically mentions that the Armed Forces are prepared to carry out police-like operations and to act in a coordinated way with additional security forces:

> 4.5.2.3.1 All operational units of the Armed Forces, particularly the combat ones, are apt to the execution of police-like operations, especially the units of (Armed Forces) police, infantry and marines.
> 4.5.2.3.2 The units of military police of the states and of the federal district are especially prepared to conduct police-like operations. The additional bodies of public security can be employed, in a coordinated way, according to their own specificities and competencies.
> 4.5.2.3.3 Civilian-type bodies, such as municipal guards, traffic control elements and other bodies, if judged necessary, may remain in specific activities and have their actions coordinated by the legal force in the execution of the GLO operation. This coordination shall take place within the principles of the Inter-agencies Operations.
>
> (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 30)

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[36] A more exact description on what specific actions and prerogatives are described as part of police-like operations will be analyzed in Chapter 6.

Cooperation in GLOs shall take place using the intelligence for data gathering on the areas that the operation will entail as well as the characteristics on the population of such areas in order to neutralize or suppress the acting capacity of the opponent forces causing the least damage to the people involved (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 25-6). This provision of essential knowledge is regarded as imperative to inform the decision-making process in all phases of the operations. Previous knowledge obtained by external intelligence bodies other than the Armed Forces shall be part of an intel planning to effectively integrate these bodies to account for the facts that preceded and motivated military engagement (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 25). Likewise, counterintelligence shall also be deployed during GLO operations to safeguard the information and the people and facilities involved.

Dissuasion is mentioned as a strategy to tackle opponent forces, ideally to deter them and avoid engaging in direct combat. A peaceful resolution to avoid the resort to repressive means shall be prioritized, and if and only if dissuasion fails, the troop shall engage in force progressively as necessary (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 26). This stance is based on the assumption that the vast superiority in the military *means* of the troops deployed in GLO operations when compared to the means available to opponent forces, their superior combat power and force demonstrations and their deployment of ostensive policing will discourage the actions of opponent forces (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 27). The assumption that, if necessary, the Armed Forces will deploy force works as a dissuasive strategy towards the opponent that becomes clear in the strategic positioning of soldiers and weaponry in GLOs, even for policing purposes.

In order to tackle the GLO-type threats, the manual establishes a set of rules of conduct that demand specific Rules of Engagement to be followed by the Forces. Such rules are supposed to be designed by superior ranks for each specific operation, depending on the kind of action, and should bear in mind procedures for the protection of the citizens and patrimony for each mission (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 20). Albeit tailored for each mission, operations have a general set of rules to be followed, based on three main basic principles: proportionality, reasonability and legality, defined in Chapter IV of the manual as

> Proportionality shall be maintained in accordance with the compatibility between means and ends of the measure to be taken. Actions shall be restrained and moderate.

Proportionality is the correspondence between the action and the reaction of the opponent, so that there shall not be an excess by the part of the troop member deployed in the operation in order to preserve or reestablish local security.

Legality refers to the necessity that the actions must be practiced in accordance with the commandments of the law and not deviate from it, under the penalty of practicing an invalid act, hence exposing oneself to disciplinary, civilian and criminal responsibility, depending on the case.

(Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 25)

Following these three principles, the manual establishes that the intensity and the scope of the deployment must limit itself to the shortest time possible to avoid the exhaustion of troops and use dissuasion to convince APOPs to opt out before the troop has to resort to force. To this end, whenever possible, GLO operations shall also be guided by a progressive use of force and the use of weaponry, ammunition and special equipment that are non-lethal and of reduced power of destruction shall be prioritized (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 26).

All in all, the whole planning and execution of the actions must aim for the least intervention possible in the daily routines of the population to avoid affecting and restricting people, and to avoid possible collateral damage to the patrimony and to the physical, mental and moral integrity of civilians (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 26). Yet, as shall be seen, to carry out these practices without affecting the social life of local residents is challenging, since the presence of the military entails, in and of itself, a substantial resort to force in terms of sovereign practices.

## 4.6
## Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to show that, contrary to official narratives, Brazil indeed has a violent history in which state forces have been deployed for domestic security in many instances. From early periods in the history of nation building, deployed in the exercise of the state security apparatus, the military developed a political consciousness, casting itself as a modernizing class, attached to an ideal of "soldiers as citizens" and as an agent of change. The fact that the Armed Forces have been used many times as a force to act in domestic issues that are precisely treated as 'internal' has contributed to reinforce a trace of domestic sovereignty that obfuscates an 'other' that the state does not wish to display. The modernizing

project pursued by the Brazilian state has promoted diverse forms of assimilation, eradication or exclusion as part of maintaining a domestic order from certain marginalized 'outsides' of the state that are nevertheless located within it.

In addition, it has been made the case that the militarization of police forces in Brazil cannot be attributed solely to the heritage of military dictatorship, since it can be traced far back in the country's history (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 236). As a matter of fact, the way the public security apparatus has developed in Brazil followed a model in which the military police have been historically attached to the Armed Forces (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 240). Others have argued that police violence in Brazil occurs due to such intertwined nature in the militarized structure that would condition police officers to be prepared to fight and destroy the "enemy" within a repressive logic in a conception of public security (D'Araujo, 2010, p. 249).

For the purposes of this thesis, militarization needs to be understood not only in terms of the military influencing the police or the other way around. In turn, it needs to be understood in terms of how the structure of the internal security apparatus allows for the military to engage domestically in public security. In the case of Brazil, this has rendered a separation between external and internal violence problematic, as the Armed Forces have historically acquired an inward role of domestic duties and of an active actor for social cohesion. Besides, the professionalization of the military contributed for further propensity for that institution to engage in the domestic realm.

Particularly during the Cold War, the anticommunist policy of the United States towards the region has further contributed to the militarization of the security apparatuses of the Latin American countries. By offering professionalization techniques to fight the communist threat, the United States contributed for security forces to act domestically by developing and specializing in intelligence against subversive forces and leftist guerrillas. Particularly with the installment of the military regime in 1964 in Brazil, the military has used the resort to national security to conduct repressive Cold War practices. This strengthened the security apparatus to an extent that even upon transition to democracy in 1985, the prerogative for the Armed Forces to act on the domestic realm has been kept, and the institution has continued to have a significant say in security matters.

This chapter provided a contextualization of how in the past decades, a legal framework for military engagement in law and order enforcement operations that

includes a series of practical guidelines and rules of engagement have been created and refined. Based on the assumption that the Armed Forces are more effective than the police, precisely due to their inherent prerogative to resort to higher levels of force due to their traditional role of external defense, the Brazilian government has been increasingly requesting these forces to act in public security in law and order enforcement operations. The following chapter will consider the spaces in Rio de Janeiro to which this exercise is mainly applied.

# 5.
# The Territorial Dimension of Pacification in Rio de Janeiro

> O urbano reúne. O urbano, enquanto forma, trans-forma aquilo que reúne (concentra). Ele faz diferir de uma maneira refletida o que diferia sem o saber: o que só era distinto, o que estava ligado às particularidades no terreno. Ele reúne tudo, inclusive os determinismos, as matérias e os conteúdos heterogêneos, a ordem e a desordem anteriores. Aí compreendidos os conflitos, as comunicações e as formas de comunicação pré-existentes.
>
> Henri LEFEBVRE, *A revolução urbana, 2002*

## 5.1
## Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to address the territorial dimension of pacification in the city of Rio de Janeiro and its relation to the military and GLO operations. The case of deploying the Armed Forces to law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) in the city highlights a problem of chaos *versus* order in which the sovereign state handles the outsides within its national territory. Throughout the urbanization process, marginalized areas became spaces where parallel authorities have developed to exercise *de facto* control, challenging the state's authority. Over time, this territorially based challenge, mainly with the consolidation of control by organized crime, became Rio's – and possibly Brazil's – greatest security threat.

The governmental solution to this was to pacify these spaces to then reintegrate them into the state. Yet this process was to take place in a violent manner, since these parallel authorities would not leave willingly. The fact that these sites became spaces outside the actual control of the state very well resembles the literature on the security of developing states as an element aimed mainly inwards rather than outwards. Yet in this particular case, security efforts are observed in internal aspects of sovereignty to target territories *within* the state itself, as a response to face them as essential threats to governance. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, there is a discursive dimension regarding the way the threat is constructed, whose narrative allows the Armed Forces to act upon public security. Moreover, in

addition to the territorial aspect of describing the slums to become target spaces as unruly territories that needed to be forcefully reintegrated by the state, there was also an aspect of conceiving what was considered as a threat to conceptually subject it to law and order enforcement operations guidelines.

Security challenges in the city are, to a great extent, determined by a territorial component, due to the geographical factors and the ways an unequal urbanization process took place in marginalized areas of the city. The chapter will firstly analyze how these marginalized neglected territories, mostly slums, became spaces where organized criminality developed and established itself as a parallel authority. It will also show how this development later evolved to pose a public security challenge to the state to the point of becoming a national security concern. It will also mention the process of securitization of organized criminality in Rio de Janeiro in 2008, through which the issue was framed as a threat to national security that called for coordinated action between the federal and state governments with the implementation of the Police Pacifying Units (UPPs).

Although the UPPs were meant to be a program carried out mainly by the military police, the focus will be on the participation of the Armed Forces in the program and in military deployments that preceded and followed it. Furthermore, to account for the involvement of the military in the pacification process in Rio, the UPPs will not be analyzed here as simply a public security program for pacifying police, but instead as a step in the domestic pacification process in which the military played a significant role.

The last part will approach the social dimension the UPPs as part of Brazil's domestic pacification process in terms of its tactics of control and rule, as well as some of its inherent challenges. The tenet of proximity policing, regarded as the major challenge of the UPPs from a strategic point of view, will be especially discussed in that section. Finally, the territorial particularity in Rio de Janeiro will be connected with the literature aimed at explaining security challenges in developing countries (see Chapter 2) to reflect on the nature of insides / outsides of the state perceived as ungoverned spaces by the federal state.

The focus will be on military action reinforcing coercive practices within those occupied and pacified spaces. However, there is an additional aspect of the territorialization that is enabled by GLO operations, one that encompasses the entire territory of the nation. Law and order operations began to systematically be

activated at the national level as an existing legal mechanism that was repeatedly and frequently activated and enacted by the Executive power in many states in addition to Rio. In the case of the UPPs, as we shall see, there was a clear demarcation of territories regarded as problematic in which the state aimed to target, and to which GLO Operations Archangel and Saint Francis were designed to act. However, GLOs can potentially apply to any federal unit, as was the case in 2020 in light of a public security violence crisis in the state of Ceará and military actions along the border of the state of Roraima in the context of *Operação Acolhida*.

In that sense, the idea of potentially being applied to the entire federation reveals how, by deploying the military to law and order enforcement, GLOs as a mechanism converges domestic and national security. The justification to deploy the military domestically and to treat public security as a matter comparable to a defense issue portrays a conception of an "enemy within" that threatens the domestic order and that cannot be tackled solely by police forces, hence the need for military deployment. Although the definition of this enemy within is currently vaguely referred to as APOPs (public order disturbance agents) – embedded in notions of threats that can be interpreted accordingly by the Executive – for the purposes of this thesis, this enemy within has been associated with organized crime.

As such, domestic pacification is depicted by an abstraction in which the threshold of national security becomes potentially circumscribed to the entire federation, merged with the "territory", and realm, of domestic security. It represents an abstraction in the sense that any territory within the territorial limits of the state could be subject to that sovereign prerogative in its exercise of preserving violence, and a case where state security turns inwards. It is crucial to mention that even though, as seen in Chapter 4, the domestic prerogative of the military has consistently been observed in past Constitutions, domestic involvement in the past in terms of national security has taken the form of fight again communism as a diffuse enemy, which could act within national territory but that even then, does not call for using the military domestically specifically for law and order as an essential function of the police.

By acknowledging this, it becomes possible to see pacification, defined by territoriality, as a process not only circumscribed to the demarcated territories of the UPPs, but also potentially to the entire realm of the federation. In that sense, UPPs are able to be understood not just as a public security policy, but rather in a

broader context of domestic pacification in Brazil, specifically in Rio, that may very well represent the main security challenge of the country. To this end, UPPs will be analyzed as part of that pacification process that justifies the deployment of the military in light of these crucial challenges.

## 5.2
## The marginalization of favelas as 'outsides' of the state

In order to understand the nature of territoriality in the security challenges in the city of Rio de Janeiro, it is necessary to account for the historical and social aspects regarding the urban structuring of the city. It has been argued that the interaction between social, economic and spatial elements can reveal how urban space developed in a historically determined society (Abreu, 1987, p. 16). Assuming that space can highlight social characteristics of a society's organization at different stages, the structuring of a city should accompany the processes of evolution of a particular society (Abreu, 1987, p. 31).

In 1808, Brazil was a Portuguese colony. That year, however, facing an imminent invasion from Napoleon's France, the Portuguese royal family fled to Brazil, transferring the capital of the United Kingdom of Portugal to Rio de Janeiro. In a way, the city's urban development in and of itself was a result of that context. The arrival of the Portuguese Royal court introduced a new social class to Brazilian society. Rio was suddenly supposed to attend to the Royal family's needs and facilitate new economic, political and ideological activities that it lacked as a city yet needed to perform from then on as the Empire's capital (Abreu 1987, p. 139). As Rio de Janeiro became the administrative capital of Brazil, a role which would last for approximately two centuries, the city experienced profound effects in its social development (Holloway, 1997).

From the onset of its establishment as a city and especially upon the arrival of the Portuguese court, Rio was structured as a function of the elite that had come to occupy it. Goods and services provided by the state were concentrated around privileged areas to serve the accordingly privileged social classes. Before 1870, mobility through space was a privilege accessible to few, designed to support the interests and privileges of the elites through the adoption of highly discriminating regulating policies and social control mechanisms (Abreu, 1987, p. 15; 37).

Discriminating regulating policies were performed by the Royal Guard Police, which around the year of 1809 was responsible for maintaining acceptable levels of order and tranquility to allow the city to function according to the interest of the elite social class; coincidently, most police persecutions regarding alleged suspects were based on assumptions over skin color, and incoming slaves from Africa were commonly perceived as a threat, being subject to higher surveilling levels when compared to native Brazilians (Holloway, 1997).

During the shift from a colonial to a capitalist city over the course of the 19th century, Rio de Janeiro underwent substantial changes that affected its appearance, form and content as it began to become structured in spatially socially stratified forms, clear in the first public project for the development of mobility infrastructure networks, responsible for segregating social classes that had been formerly grouped together in the city (Abreu 1987, p. 139-0). As Rio de Janeiro became a magnet for the international capital, the governmental administration granted concessions in the area of public services sectors, such as transportation, sewage, gas, and so on, to promote urban enhancements (Abreu, 1987, p. 35).[37]

By the end of the 19th century, the city of Rio de Janeiro experienced its first industrial developments. Following the abolishment of slavery, the subsequent decline of the coffee activity as an export country and the high volume of immigrants to the city accelerated a rise in population rates. The Brazilian population increased by 2,5% a year; the population of urban areas of 50 thousand residents or more increased by 6,8% whereas the population of rural areas decreased by 2,2% (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 326).

The social changes that derived from population growth were especially conspicuous in the countryside, where workers, allured by the possibility of jobs in the growing industry, moved to the capital and became an available workforce (Abreu, 1987, p. 96). Upon arriving in Rio, people settled in the areas around the city center or by its outskirts to be in proximity to the industrial region, where work

[37] A clear example thereof is the development of the city's mobility infrastructure. Since 1870, transportation plans for developing donkey trams and steam trains allowed the city to expand physically, but selectively. Fancier trams were set up to serve the noble areas of the city and neighborhoods that could afford this type of mobility, whereas steam trains were structured to head from the suburbs to the city and vice-versa to dislocate the less privileged social classes (Abreu, 1987, p. 140). The main concern of the state regarding poorer areas was simply to ensure that the labor force had a means to commute to work sites.

opportunities were mainly located. The lack of collective means of transportation caused residents to live relatively close to one another; therefore, at first, the local elite would differentiate from the rest of the society mostly due to better type-residences rather than their location itself (Abreu, 1987, p. 139).

Historically, the city center was the site of residence of the city's poorest residents, who lacked power of mobility and relied on living in or close to central or peripheral (suburban) locations. This considerably aggravated the habitational problem in the province, culminating in the proliferation of *cortiços* and other forms of collective unhealthy housing sites that would periodically spread diseases such as the yellow fever epidemics (Abreu, 1987, p. 140). In that context, particularly from 1850 on, the so called *cortiços* – collective housing sites with poor health conditions – emerged as the main housing choice for workers and vagabonds alike (Valladares, 2005, p. 24).

A non-planned urbanization process that lacked security and other basic services marked some metropolitan areas (Abreu, 1987, p. 15). These sites' poor health and sanitation infrastructure contributed for the government to consider them a *locus* of poverty and idleness and crime that was prone to vices and sicknesses, being regarded as a threat to the social and moral order (Valladares, 2005, p. 24).[38] The belief that such environments constituted a direct physical and moral threat to the city was thoroughly advocated by engineers and doctors at the time, who proposed a series of techniques to 'treat' these urban evils (Valladares, 2005, p. 41).

For some, this represented a footprint of state direct intervention in Rio's central area that only exacerbated and aggravated the stratification of the social space in the city (Abreu, 1987, p. 50). The governmental choice to face the problem was eradication; however, this did not make the residents within those spaces go away. The plan to 'clean the city' from *cortiços* backfired, as these policies did not solve the causes of such stratification and resulted in a spatial rearrangement that reproduced the same dynamics. The consequences that followed only reinforced the social and economic inequalities expressed in the city's geography.

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[38] The proliferation of cortiços was so intense that in 1893 that the mayor Barata Ribeiro declared 'war' on the *cortiços,* to the extent of planning to deploy police and military means to curb them - as was in the case with the one infamously known as *Cabeça de Porco* (Pig's Head). More than simply an urban problem, the *cortiços* represented a threat to the idea of the city that the government was attempting to project. In fact, they were addressed as a sanitary threat.

In the beginning of the 20th century, under the Presidency of Rodrigues Alves between 1902 and 1906, the so-called Passos Reform named after the mayor Pereira Passos represented a period of civilizing intentions characterized by *"efforts to embellish major cities by taking public buildings, moving poverty to the newly formed suburbs, implementing collective transportation"* with the intention of turning Rio de Janeiro an attractive city to foreign interests (Schwarcz & Starling, 2018, p. 327). Remodeling efforts consisting of the removal of many *cortiços* caused the evicted populations to move to nearby mounts located in the city center.

Such spaces, until then scarcely inhabited, were rapidly occupied by the evicted population and became sites that originated a new form of popular housing that would profoundly mark the shape of the city in that century: the *favelas* (slums) (Abreu, 1987, p. 66). Curiously, one of them, the *Morro da Providência,* was already known as the Favela Mount since 1897, and was first occupied by low-ranking military officers as they returned to the capital after serving in the Northeastern *Canudos* military separatist revolt (Abreu, 1987, p. 66). Over time, slums arose near the city center, for they enabled residents who were previously on the outskirts of town to be in close proximity from work and conveniently live in the cheaper central areas of the city. Seen by that light, slums are sites that highlight the contradictions of industrial capitalism as socially constructed spaces in which cities materialize societal demands and conflicts (Fleury, 2012, p. 204).

During the 20th century, developing countries underwent significant urbanization characterized by an intense migration that accelerated the process of the rising metropolis.[39] On the one hand, the dismantling of the agrarian structures as a result of the industrialization process that was about to develop occasioned significant migration flows into urban cities that received significant population contingencies, reinforcing existing national and regional disparities (Da Silva & Campos, 2008, p. 18). Yet the problem of structural inequalities went beyond the aggravation of regional disparities within the country.

On the other hand, the fact that such cities in developing countries were unable to absorb these demographic demands translated into a debilitation of the national urban network, a phenomenon particularly conspicuous in Latin America

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[39] Between 1950 and 1960, there was a 4.8% increase in the rate of urban growth in such countries compared to a growth rate of 2.3% in the so-called developed countries (Da Silva & Campos, 2008, p. 18).

(Da Silva & Campos, 2008, p. 18). The lack of adequate housing structures and collective goods and an expansion of the job market that was unable to keep up with the rate of migration and demographic growth contributed to significant unemployment and informal jobs, feeding a vicious cycle of poverty (Da Silva & Campos, 2008, p. 18). In Rio de Janeiro, existing contradictions only aggravated as the city experienced intense urbanization from 1906 to 1930.

It is no coincidence that in that period, governmental efforts were aimed at remodeling the growing city center and embellishing areas such as *Zona Sul*, built to house the elite (Abreu, 1987, p. 72). Plans of modernization entailed urbanization reforms to transform Rio into the symbol of a "new Brazil" (Abreu 1987, p. 141). Yet this urbanization development project reinforced existing political-economical contradictions. Displacements in the poorest areas of the city took place at the expense of the embellishing modernizing project aimed at sustaining a rising consumption and industrial production to satisfy the dominant classes in society (Abreu 1987, p. 72).

During the presidency of Washington Luís from 1926 on, the mayor of Rio Prado Júnior engaged in developing further means for the state to control the process of the city's expansion (Abreu, 1987, p. 86). In the following years, government official documents stressed the need to plan and control the occupation spatial challenge of the working class, which tended to revolve in central areas of the city, and framed slums as a mode of urban inhabitance that represented a "social and aesthetic problem" (Abreu, 1987, p. 87-8). The government reported that the relatively 'nomad' residents of the *favelas* were becoming more and more "*sedentary and taking effective possession of the city's mounts, to the extent of reproducing social and economic patterns of neighboring relations, such as habits and establishing small vending spaces*". There was rising concern over the acknowledgement that social life was developing in these spaces where the state had not yet been actively present.

It was becoming clear to the state the kind of social challenge that would develop from this acknowledgement, and it became necessary to respond to it. This meant eradicating these stable and definite building processes, since "*the longer it took for measures to be taken, the harder their total expropriation for public utility would be*" (Abreu, 1987, p. 88-9). Over the years, governmental efforts failed to consider that attempts of eradication would probably be useless unless adequate

housing structures, in terms of hygiene and pricing, were offered to shelter the residents as an alternative (Abreu, 1987, p. 90). In light of an absence of alternative housing options, there was a risk that after being evicted, residents could choose to return to the former housing, back to the same conditions (Abreu 1987, p. 90). Indeed, the state was unable to coercively avoid that people returned to these spaces even following evictions.

In the 1930s, this 'problem' remained and urban planning was aggravated as plans to foster industrialization in certain areas became a governmental policy to define an industrial zone for the establishment of factories in the city (Abreu, 1987, p. 99). The difficulties that revolved around importing manufactured goods during the Second World War motivated the municipality of Rio to allow for the settlement of industries in suburban areas. The decision was partially due to the geographical conditions of the city center, initially structured around swamps and mounts, factors that hindered the physical installment of factories in the main areas of the city (Abreu, 1987, p. 103).[40] That same geographical difficulty caused workers to opt to settle in the outskirts of the city or suburban areas.

Conversely, a whole logistics infrastructure of industries, factories yet also warehouses, offices and garages developed around the suburban areas and into the city center along the *Avenida Brasil* highway, where most *favelas* and suburban areas developed over the course of the 1950s (Abreu, 1987, p. 103). Close to the industrial sites and convenient for many workers, these areas became densely populated in the form of irregular and affordable types of housing.

Until the 1920s, *favelas* had not yet been framed as a consistent governance problem with regard to its marginalized nature due to the fact that these spaces represented a nuisance, a hindering to the city's official urbanizing project (Burgos, 1999, p. 27).[41] Thus, slums and the socially constructed representations of them refer to Rio de Janeiro's modernization and embellishment project, gaining increasing importance in the Brazilian social imaginary over time (Valladares 2005,

[40] This may also help explain how the famous *Avenida Brasil* was built in the 1946 as a state strategy to dislocate part of the existing *Rio-Petrópolis* and the *Rio-São Paulo* interstate highways to areas of the city with less traffic-jams, reduce circulation costs and at the same time incorporate new terrains to the urban areas by means of the industrial occupation (See Abreu 1987: 103).

[41] Rio's 1937 Code of Works (*Código de Obras*) was the first formal governmental policy whose administrative measures targeted slums to embellish and effectively turn Rio de Janeiro into the Marvelous City (Leeds and Leeds, 1978, p. 191-2 apud Valladares, 2005, p. 54).

p. 22). In the 40s, the government put in place a project of population relocation called *parques proletários*

> whose goal was mainly to solve the 'slum problem' by removing residents from outskirts areas surrounding the city center, clearing these spaces classified as unsanitary, and allowing for a modernizing expansion of urban space. (Burgos 1999, p. 27)

Up until the 60s, the state was still not present in slums.[42] The Catholic Church was active in providing social assistance to the residents of these territories, whose goals were mainly beneficiary and did not envision ensuring forms of control comparable to the ones exercised by the state. The presence of the Church naturally did not stop residents from organizing themselves politically by means of Workers' Organizations (Burgos, 1999, p. 30-1). Once these politically mobilized forms began to make official demands to the state as social agents, *favelas* became a governmental concern that the state interpreted as a political problem. From the 1960s on, there were greater governmental efforts to exercise effective social control in slums, such as attempts to regulate, for instance, residents' associations and other forms of social organizations (Burgos, 1999, p. 31). By 1962, the government had registered 75 residents' associations and granted them some political representation in exchange to greater regulation and political control (Burgos, 1999, p. 31-2).[43]

Particularly in the post-1964 period, the case has been made that a centralizing anti-distributive political practice, in addition to attempts to control slum areas, contributed to a worsening of intra-metropolitan disparities (Abreu,

[42] In fact, the first time the government specifically aimed at conducting a census in slums was in 1941 for the First Brazilian Urbanism Congress, when it requested a complete study of these territories, acknowledging them as a social problem (Valladares, 2005, p. 55). The next slum census in Rio de Janeiro to recount facts and figures regarding these spaces was only requested by the government in 1947 and published two years later, in 1949 (Valladares, 2005, p. 64). Interestingly enough, the census referred not only to the housing structure of slums in and of themselves, but also their population. Demographics included gender, age, nationality, place of birth, level of schooling, professional occupation, marital status, and skin color (Valladares, 2005, p. 65). As a tool of social control, the census indicated that the government - which by then had clearly failed to avoid the development of slums - now attempted to 'manage' them by assessing how many people actually lived in these spaces and to understand how to govern them.

[43] These conditionalities entailed a formal commitment to report to, and cooperate with, governmental authorities on social services to stop unregulated constructions from taking place, cooperate with the police, and contribute to law and order enforcement, and so forth (Burgos 1999: 31-2).

1987, p. 15). A state policy to invest and embellish central urban spaces was followed by a subsequent peripheralization of low-income classes who could no longer afford to live in the city center (Abreu, 1987, p. 15). As the city developed, the goods and services supplied and offered by the state became concentrated only within the most privileged areas of the metropolis and consequently, benefited mainly the elite who resided in these spaces (Abreu, 1987, p. 15). There were no efforts to ensure that the provision of services would reach slums, areas that had never been a priority in terms of state public policies – except when faced as a problem. Yet, they continued to proliferate.

Slums were further marginalized until they joined the agenda during the military regime, as governmental policies aimed at eradicating them and relocating their residents. In the late 60s and early 70s, in light of the rising proliferation in the number of slums, a policy of forced removal and relocation onto government housing complexes built in remote areas of the metropolitan region was carried out by the government (Burgos, 1999, p. 37-8). Furthermore, the state conducted large scale urbanization policies, intensifying construction and remodeling efforts and making huge public investments to modernize and integrate the city.[44]

Nonetheless, the re-articulation of urban space was enabled by removing existing forms of social organization and expelling their residents. All in all, it is estimated that between 1968 and 1975, approximately 60 slums were destroyed, leaving 100.000 people displaced (Burgos, 1999, p. 38). Some argued that the policy of forced eradication backfired. Most residents, who preferred to live closer to the city and their worksite, sometimes sold the housing awarded by the government to then return to the sites they had originally been removed from. While representing 13.2% of the city's population in the 1970s, despite eradication efforts under military rule, slums residents continued to account for 12.3% of the city's demographics in the following decade (Valladares and Ribeiro 1995, p. 62).

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[44] Modernizing construction works entailed the broadening of the Copacabana bayside area as well as the construction of avenues, highways and bridges over the sea such as the *Ponte Rio-Niterói*. Newer areas were also built as a result of a real estate speculation process that enabled an expansion of the city into neighborhoods such as *São Conrado* and *Barra da Tijuca*. At the time, the state sponsored this expansion by providing the infrastructure to enable access to the ongoing built spaces with the construction of the *Auto-Estrada Lagoa Barra* highway, particularly in the expensive neighborhood of the *Zona Sul*, so that luxury habitations could be built or that mounts could be kept free to be marketed as attractive real state "green areas" (See Abreu 1987:145).

## 5.3
## Organized crime and the escalation of violence in the city

The establishment of organized criminality factions in a relatively organized fashion has been attributed to links between ordinary and political prisoners in the 1970s at the Ilha Grande prison that evolved to the Red Falange, and later to the group that would denominate itself as the Red Command (Comando Vermelho) (Leeds, 2006, p. 239 apud Mourão et al., 2016, p. 17). These groups, originally confined to the worst cells and complexes within prison facilities, were able to organize themselves while imprisoned, and years later, upon leaving Ilha Grande, many members settled their businesses in slums (TV Brasil, 2019).

By that time, slums had turned into "*no go zones*" of limited state presence and little, or absent authority (Williams, 2003, p. 167). The fact that neglected areas were mountainous is a crucial factor in and of itself (See Fearon & Laitin, 2004b, p. 283) that rendered access to these spaces difficult, granting an isolation that allowed entities to mobilize and organize themselves as authorities. Within years, hundreds of areas in the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro, in poor or rich regions, were controlled by gangs, and these spaces had turned into drug selling and gun trafficking sites (Mourão et al., 2016, p. 37-8).

Violence in the slums originated with, and was facilitated by, a number of often interlinked factors that developed substantially following the introduction of cocaine trade (Oosterbaan & Van Wijk, 2015, p. 181):

> Ever since their emergence, favelas and their residents have been stigmatized and marginalized by residents of the formal city. […] Cocaine trade entered the favelas in the mid-1980s and is still active in most favelas in Rio de Janeiro. The state failed to frustrate the drugs trade when it first started and thus indirectly helped to set the scene for violent turf wars later on. (Arias, 2006 Perlman, 2010 & Zaluar, 1995 apud Oosterbaan & Van Wijk, 2015, p.181)

The establishment of a criminal order was clear in the 90s, when a number of criminal groups used drug money and bought weapons to establish parallel 'governments' in the peripheries of large cities (Ortiz, 2015, p. 214). In contrast to mafias or cartels, Rio drug dealers did not possess a great capacity to articulate with the Judiciary and Legislative powers; however, criminal factions frequently became monopolized providers of public services (Mourão et al., 2016, p. 38). This posed challenges to governmental control, since groups of drug dealers established

themselves on slums territorial domains and began to impose laws, regulate the functioning of collective live, and face the police and rival groups with high lethal power (Mourão et al., 2016, p. 19;38).

Up to the 70s, crime had been conceived as a matter of police, limited to the Rio de Janeiro state jurisdiction. Yet, in the 80s and 90s, due to rising criminal records amidst crisis, public security became a concern of the federal state (Cano, 2006, p. 137). Slum violence rose to the point of affecting social life in the city as a whole. Constant confrontations between the different drug factions surpassed the physical barriers of the slums, becoming threats to the physical integrity, social cohesion, and sovereign power which resulted in coercive practices such as military incursions into the favelas, and competition for the economic control over informal markets that developed thereby (Fleury, 2012, p. 197).

As Leonel Brizola took office as Rio's state governor in 1983, he publicly committed to carrying out a different approach toward slums, as opposed to former policies. His discourse acknowledged the need for the state to better engage with those areas by providing access to basic services and revealed an estrangement from authoritarian policies and police violence. Brizola also leaned towards the promotion of rights and "respect to *favelados*", hence not looking at slum residents as a problem *per se* (Mourão et al., 2016, p. 25). Instead of naming an Army general to command the police forces, as was the tradition, he named a military police officer, Colonel Carlo Magno Nazareth Cerqueira, who not only was not in the Armed Forces, but was also black (Mourão et al., 2016, p. 25). Along with these changes came the promise to promote social improvements and engage in infrastructure efforts of water supply and distribution, sewer services and trash collection, and to advocate for the observance the human and civil rights of slums residents (Burgos, 1999, p. 41-2).[45]

If on the one hand, the democratization process in 1985 translated into less fear of removals of the *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro by their residents, the subsequent years coincided with the intensified articulation of organized crime, armed groups

[45] For some, this doctrine of relative withdrawal and non-interference in neglected areas represented a clear rupture in state governmental policy towards slums, especially when compared to the previous authoritarian presence under military rule. For others, this was precisely what enabled the development and structuring of clientelist networks that filled the gap of public power over time since the state conferred a vacuum of power to these spaces that would later be consolidated by parallel authorities (Burgos, 1999, p. 43).

and the emergence of parallel authorities. It also facilitated greater power consolidation by drug dealers and drug lords in marginalized territories, allowing them to consolidate a *de facto* domain in those spaces (Fleury, 2012, p. 197). The government of Moreira Franco (1987-1991), whose promise was to "end violence and drug trafficking in Rio in six months" actually increased violence, presenting one of the highest rates by police killings and reaching a record of 56 homicides per 100,000 residents in 1990 (Mourão et al., 2016, p. 26).

Violence can be expressed in many dimensions, be it in physical actions or through coercive threats of physical action, so both violent acts and coercion can be considered elements of violence when it comes to social control (North, 2009, p. 13). Cities may be expressions of the incapacity of cohesion in excluding societies and the emergence of urban violence can be interpreted as a symptom of social disaggregation (Fleury, 2012, p. 206).

Overall, the 80s and 90s in Latin America were characterized by a neoliberal economic detachment of the state's involvement in politics, but the consequent pauperization and informalization this policy created in society enhanced political and social violence which did not cease even following the consolidation of a formal democracy (Koonings & Krujit, 2004, p. 6). Urban violence escalated, violent episodes in Rio became of national concern and the Brazilian elite began to support the implementation of a policy of punitive contention to complement the deregulation of economy, marking a change onto what was defined, by some, as the militarization of urban marginality (Wacquant, 2008, p. 56).

Over time, existing tensions required state intervention to remediate the ailments of the market and to protect citizenship and society (Fleury, 2012, p. 203). By encompassing the everyday policing of the racialized poor and/or managing protests (Kienscherf 2016, p. 1180), the highly selective coercion within militarized practices in Rio urban spaces reveals long-term strategies of liberal social control that target populations, individuals, and spaces. In metropolitan Rio, homicide rates tripled in the 80s, going from twenty-three in 1982 to sixty-three deaths per 100,000 residents in 1990, then to seventy-four in 1994, to only decrease to forty-one per 100,000 residents in 1999 (Zaluar, 2004, p. 141).[46]

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[46] These changes took place as the city's population stabilized demographically and were conspicuous mainly in peripheral and poor municipalities (Zaluar 2004: 141).

In that period, slums residents were treated as virtual enemies of the nation, trust in public institutions was scarce, and the spiral of violence accelerated; culminating in an example of a society marked by social and physical insecurity (Wacquant, 2008, p. 56). This trend represented a paradox: the demand to bring "more state" into criminal areas regarding arrests and police action was in turn caused by the neoliberal doctrine of "less state" itself" (Wacquant, 2008, p. 56). Not surprisingly, in the 90s, a series of massive coordinated rebellions among prisoners throughout many cities in the country was a clear example of state weakness in light of a clear demonstration of the power of organized crime (TV Brasil, 2019).

By 1993, Rio had reached high levels of killings by the police and a further increase in levels of violence (Mourão et al., 2016, p. 27). Therefore, it is no coincidence that since the 90s, military deployments in public security occurred in isolated episodes, becoming increasingly recurrent years later. Occasional military engagement in public security was for the first time endorsed by the federal government, particularly under Itamar Franco in 1994, only to continue to rise in the following years. The request by public authorities that the military engaged in exercising governance – should drug trafficking, organized crime and gang violence in Rio slums reach alarming proportions – made the Army became deeply involved in internal security in practice (Hunter, 1997, p. 67).

In 1994, the federal government, by default of the state government of Rio de Janeiro, put in place *Operação Rio*, a joint operation commanded by the Army to occupy slums on the eve of the governmental and presidential elections (Mourão et al., 2016, p. 27-8). Composed by members of the Army soldiers, federal police and military police officers, for some Operation Rio served to reinforce common perceptions associating the military with social order (Hunter, 1997, p. 67).

The period that encompassed the years of 1995 to 1999 marked a turning point of rising violence in the city. During that period, there was an escalation of the use of force by the police; this meant more resistance from drug dealers who, in turn, invested heavily in arms, escalating confrontations to a logic of combat and a spiral of violence  (Mourão et al., 2016, p. 27-8).[47] This, added to the ongoing

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[47] In the 90s, when *favelas* first became a serious subject of inquiry in Brazil, efforts to promote sanitation, urbanization and social services by the newly carried out *Favela Bairro* program were seen with optimism by Brazilian scholars, who noted improvements in terms of acquired social services. In addition, the fact that eradication was not in the political agenda represented to some an

criticism of Rio police being charged with abuse of power, especially towards young men of lower classes, opened space for new public security proposals to join the agenda in the 2000s (Couttolene & Cano, 2000, p. 74).

By the end of the 2000s, the city of Rio de Janeiro faced a dilemma regarding how to handle the question of violence. If the police did not interfere in the slums, drug trafficking would extend its power to areas beyond its territorial reach and threaten even the Brazilian air space; conversely, if the police acted, further damage due to school closures, shootings and deaths of drug dealers, residents and police officers could be inflicted (Mourão et al., 2016, p. 39). The situation of the city became a unique case in Brazil, in which shootings with war machinery were a daily reality and public security became a national drama (Mourão et al., 2016, p. 29).

## 5.4
## The Police Pacifying Units (UPPs): the paradox of promoting inclusion by forceful (re)integration

The fact that Brazil would host the World Cup in 2014 and that the city of Rio de Janeiro would host the 2016 Olympics put into question the government's ability to reduce violence and exercise effective control over its territory. The crisis in public security aggravated to the extent that organized crime in Rio was securitized and classified as a terrorist act that posed an existential threat to the state, relative to survival and hence of high priority[48] (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 33-4) (Bravo & Drumond, 2014, p. 218). In 2008, the federal government and the Rio state administration announced a new program aimed at public policy in Rio de Janeiro: the Police Pacifying Units (aka the *UPPs*). This coordinated policy enabled an articulation between the police and the military in some instances and levels.

acknowledgement of these territories from the part of the government and despite police repression against drug trafficking, they could see signs of *favelas* becoming actual neighborhoods (*bairros*) in the near future (Zaluar & Alvito 1999: 21). Sadly, almost two decades later, although the government started to refer to *favelas* as *comunidades,* in reality, latest state policies towards slums have, in some cases, included building walls around such spaces to hinder further expansion; this ended up reinforcing the discrimination and exclusion of such areas (Ferreira 2009, p. 8-9).

[48] The concept and theory of securitization in International Relations were elaborated by the so-called School of Copenhagen and were first exposed in the 1998 book *Security: A New Framework of Analysis* by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. Even though this thesis acquires the term cited in the argument by the authors Barbara Bravo and Paula Drumond, the theory of securitization itself will not be discussed in this thesis since it is not part of its theoretical framework. In that sense, the term securitization utilized in this thesis is in accordance to the argument of the referred authors, which argues that during the UPPs, organized crime was posed as an existential threat to the Brazilian state and hence of high priority (Bravo & Drumond, 2014).

In the case of Brazil, as an attempt by the sovereign state to reinforce that the preponderance of physical power and monopoly of violence lies within its authority and law enforcement apparatus, Rio's favelas were territories to be 'retaken' by it, since they had been up to then physically controlled by violent non-state entities (Felbab-Brown, 2011, p. 10). These efforts usually involved the insertion of "special forces" to supplement or at least temporarily replace regular police forces unable to address levels of violent criminality in these spaces (Felbab-Brown, 2011, p. 12).

The official UPPs' purpose was to recover the Brazilian state sovereignty by removing parallel authorities and physically occupying territories taken over by organized criminality since "*former policies had allowed for the development of alternative authorities in these areas that were opposing the state*" (Rio de Janeiro ISP). The program aimed at recovering territories under the control of illegal armed groups, restoring the legitimate monopoly of force by the state and reducing criminality of high lethality.

With the implementation of the first UPP unit in Santa Marta in 2008, the deployment of the Armed Forces was justified under the rhetoric that highly militarized coercion was necessary to confront and remove the organized crime entities in Rio. The official mandate for the implementation and structuring of the UPPs was based on the goal to consolidate

> state control over communities which were previously under strong influence of highly armed criminality in order to give back local population the public peace and tranquility necessary to the exercise of full citizenship that allows for their social and economic development. (ISP, 2015)

Thus, the idea of the UPP as a public security policy was, in a way, an attempt to bring back the state rule to marginalized territories. The map below shows the official planning targeting the slums in which 39 UPP units were to be implemented since the beginning of the program in 2008. These areas and their perimeters were defined and marked as areas to be 'recovered' and occupied by the state. Hence, the reference to the occupying element is clear. By 2015, there were 38 UPPs in the state of Rio de Janeiro, 37 of which were located within the capital city, encompassing 196 slums that entailed circa 700 thousand residents (ISP, 2015). That total excluded the UPP planned to occur in the Maré slum complex, which was never implemented.

**Mapa das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora do Rio**
Conjunto de Favelas da Maré, ocupado neste domingo (30), receberá mais uma UPP

Duque de Caxias
Linha Vermelha
Galeão
Av/ Brasil
Bangu
Realengo
38ª Vila Kennedy
Linha Amarela
Centro
1ª UPP inaugurada
Copacabana
Ipanema
Barra da Tijuca
Mapa: Google Maps

**Legenda**

| Nº | | Data | Nº | | Data |
|----|----|------|----|----|------|
| 1ª | Santa Marta | 19/12/2008 | 20ª | Fazendinha | 18/04/2012 |
| 2ª | Cidade de Deus | 16/02/2009 | 21ª | Nova Brasília | 18/04/2012 |
| 3ª | Batan | 18/02/2009 | 22ª | Adeus/Baiana | 11/05/2012 |
| 4ª | Chapéu-Mangueira/Babilônia | 10/06/2009 | 23ª | Alemão | 30/05/2012 |
| 5ª | Pavão-Pavãozinho/Cantagalo | 23/12/2009 | 24ª | Fé/Sereno | 27/06/2012 |
| 6ª | Tabajaras/Cabritos | 14/01/2010 | 25ª | Chatuba | 27/06/2012 |
| 7ª | Providência | 26/04/2010 | 26ª | Parque Proletário | 28/08/2012 |
| 8ª | Borel | 07/06/2010 | 27ª | Vila Cruzeiro | 28/08/2012 |
| 9ª | Formiga | 01/07/2010 | 28ª | Rocinha | 20/09/2012 |
| 10ª | Andaraí | 28/07/2010 | 29ª | Manguinhos | 16/01/2013 |
| 11ª | Salgueiro | 17/09/2010 | 30ª | Jacarezinho | 16/01/2013 |
| 12ª | Turano | 30/10/2010 | 31ª | Complexo do Caju | 12/04/2013 |
| 13ª | Macacos | 30/11/2010 | 32ª | Barreira do Vasco/Tuiuti | 12/04/2013 |
| 14ª | São João/ Matriz/ Quieto | 31/01/2011 | 33ª | Cerro-Corá | 03/06/2013 |
| 15ª | Coroa/ Fallet/ Fogueteiro | 25/02/2011 | 34ª | Arará e Mandela | 06/09/2013 |
| 16ª | Prazeres/Escondidinho | 25/02/2011 | 35ª | Lins de Vasconcelos | 02/12/2013 |
| 17ª | São Carlos | 17/05/2011 | 36ª | Camarista Méier | 02/12/2013 |
| 18ª | Mangueira | 03/11/2011 | 37ª | Complexo da Mangueirinha | 07/02/2014 |
| 19ª | Vidigal | 18/01/2012 | 38ª | Vila Kennedy | A definir |
| | | | 39ª | Maré | A definir |

G1 /com/br

Infográfico atualizado em 28/3/2014

Figure 1 – Map of Police Pacifying Units (UPPs) in Rio de Janeiro by 2014.
Source: G1 Notícias.

The integration logic that motivated the UPPs as a security program worked by establishing borders around these spaces and classifying them into specifically demarcated territories to be recovered. Thus, it is possible to argue that the UPPs represent, on the one hand, a territorialization process regarding specific areas located within the borders of the state. Within these delimited borders, the state deployed a pacifying project of reintegration that entailed coercive social control practices of biopolitical power. Some of the aspects of that program conducted by

the military police as the main security forces responsible for acting within UPPs will be taken into account in this chapter, as they informed future security practices in Brazil that are similar to the ones conducted by the military in GLOs.

The delimitation of the territories chosen to be targeted in the UPP program is an abstraction, a discrimination on a map of Rio de Janeiro. This delimitation did not include all the slums that faced violent issues and the motivation behind that public security policy choice is outside the scope of this project. Yet the selection and delimitation of territories on a map are arbitrary abstractions of imaginary lines that define specific spaces. In the case of the UPPs, the discourse of protection embedded in the logic of any borders that are set to protect a territory holds; however, the threat comes from within delimitations that are, in turn, located within national territory itself, not outside it. This has implications regarding the object and the subjects of protection and represents a paradox in terms of how the state needs to face that threat and at the same time protect the population of the slums.

Lastly, the delimitation of these territories as unruly or ungoverned took place by means of incorporating them 'to the state' for being marginalized and outside its control in the first place, so that the process of territorial demarcation is justified by a discourse of bringing these spaces located within national borders 'back in'. This deviates from the regular logic of borders, since incorporation refers not only to the physical incorporation of these territories to protect the state once they are declared pacified and conquered. It also speaks to a promise of social inclusion whose result should bring about more citizenship through increased control by the end of the pacifying process. In that sense, the protection is likewise aimed at the people within these borders. However, it is as if that inclusive process designed to remediate exclusion ended up only reinforcing exclusion. The acknowledgement of the exclusion is, in and of itself, a discrimination yet at the same time, the condition of possibilities that allow inclusion to occur in that way. To be included, there needs to be a prior perception of exclusion in the first place. This process creates a series of consequences derived from these practices, in that the same logic which aims at including also continues to exclude.

As a public policy program, the UPPs were designed to be implemented in four phases. Involvement of the military was specifically planned to occur in the first phase in conjunction with the BOPE military police special forces to provide them with ostensive support (Oosterbaan & Van Wijk, 2015, p. 182). In the second

phase, police forces should systematically sweep the favela to clear it of any remaining criminals or contraband. Once the favela was secured, control would be handed over to a UPP unit in a third phase and community policing would ensure a more participative model of police exercise where residents and police would cooperate (Oosterbaan & Van Wijk, 2015, p. 182). The fourth and final phase would allow the pacified territories to enjoy social and public services within the scope of the so called "UPP Social" to fully integrate local residents into society (Oosterbaan & Van Wijk, 2015, p. 182).

In addition to the main purpose of the state to recover unruly territories controlled by criminal organizations and aim at ending armed confrontations, other aspects of the UPP entailed 1) the idea of a fixed troop, inspired in the strategy of communitarian proximity policing or of a problem-solving policing to occupy these territories, 2) the logic of saturation policing, where the ratio of the number of police officers in relation to the number of slum residents was approximately 4 times greater than the average of the rest of the city, and up to 8 times greater than the average of the state, 3) the permanent presence of a captain or tenant responsible for the police officers in the community to serve as a troop supervisor, facilitating the filing of possible complaints on misconduct e.g. of soldiers, sergeants to establish a dialogue with the local population, 4) the decision that in the first 5 years, the fixed troops would be composed predominantly of freshly graduated police officers with no existing ties to the community to avoid risks of corruption, and 6) the support of the media to sustain the idea that the UPPs were about a governmental and not simply a police program (Mourão et al., 2016, p. 33).

The idea of a "proximity police" in and of itself acquires a new meaning that has been argued to represent a state force that handles not only citizen protection, but also mediates conflicts among citizens and plays a role historically associated to the Judiciary (Ribeiro & Vilarouca, 2014, p. 258). It allures to a "*concept and strategy based in the partnership between the population and the institutions of public security*": unlike combat police officers, members of the UPP should aim at strengthening ties with the community in which they act, prioritizing preventive assistance and conflict mediation (Mourão et al., 2016, p. 90).

The purpose of proximity police was to guarantee the closeness between the state and the local population by advocating for a concept beyond the idea of community policing itself (ISP, 2015). Some of the assumptions of community

policing are pro-active action, integrating public and social defense, transparency, citizenship and education action (Mourão et al., 2016, p. 90).

The map below shows the proportion of police officers to the local population for some of the areas that received UPP instalments. The underlying idea was also to ensure that the police would really come to be accounted for in substantial ways, in terms of significantly high numbers compared to the number of residents. In a way, proximity policing in Rio almost represented an attempt by the state to remediate its past absence towards these areas. By 'overcompensating' these marginalized spaces with a governmental presence, the state would effectively enforce law and order in these spaces. It seems that this was the motivation behind proximity policing, even though, as shall be seen, this strategy may not have been really enough to fully remediate the effects of long-term exclusion.



Figure 2 – Map of Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) in Rio de Janeiro specifying the ratio of police to residents and the date of inauguration.
Source: Infográficos IG.

As a public security strategy, the UPPs entailed permanent police occupation of these areas through coercive integration to secure the state's sovereign monopoly. Military occupation, with or without confrontation with ruling groups – to be followed by the permanent instalment of a police unit – was considered as a necessary condition to allow for the integration of these territories into the formal city, which should take place with the expansion of local residents' citizenship (Fleury, 212, p. 195-6). Thus, one may argue that the degrees of violent deployment

in the installation process, and the subsequent occupation of slums by the military police, were enabled by a great extent due to the support of the Armed Forces. Furthermore, although the Police Pacifying Units (UPPs) program in Rio was supposed to be mainly a police project, coordinated efforts with the military became a permanent condition over time, at least in cases in which military support was observed, such as in Maré. Added to this was the fact that, following pacification, as UPP units were handed over to military police, sometimes such regular police forces were unable to maintain control over the territories of occupied slums and hence organized criminality managed to regain control over these spaces once again (Felbab-Brown, 2011, p. 19). At times, this trend demanded further militarization.

The narrative of pacification, for the purposes of this thesis institutionalized for the first time with the UPPs, is embedded in a protection discourse in which the state claims the responsibility to 'recover' certain marginalized spaces, handling the security threat they represent while also granting citizenship to the slums residents. Thus, just as slums residents need to be protected and absorbed as citizens, the state also needs to protect itself from the threat that organized criminality's parallel authorities that act within them represent. Since organized criminality authorities will not go peacefully nor willingly, they needed to be confronted and coerced in a violent way. Therefore, the idea that in order for that protection by the state to occur, violent practices would be a necessary means for attaining that goal is, in and of itself, a contradiction concerning the need for protection in the first place.

Some have referred to proximity policing as a "super police" which, in addition to surveilling, can punish proximity conflicts under the justification of preventing its escalation – a practice that has been argued to cause local residents to live under the impression of a constant siege (Ribeiro & Vilarouca, 2014, p. 258). For them, these public security policies reveal the permanence of authoritarianism and of a military discourse – only instead of being exercised by former drug dealers, this is performed by state military police through practices such as allegedly abusive random approaches and searches enabled by the narrative of pacification (Leite, 2012 apud Ribeiro & Vilarouca, 2014, p. 258).

On the other hand, this also implies in a particular form of occupation that, to enforce 'peace', demands greater state control in these territories in terms of the nature of social life control when compared to areas outside them. This occupation implies these spaces be submitted to forms of control to which remaining areas of

the city would never be. In that sense, UPP occupied areas represent a zone of relative exception, (or that at least call for exceptional measures) where coercion and repression towards residents are superior to remaining areas, and the freedoms, reduced. All in the name of security, as if (at the expense of freedom) (in)security were the inevitable price to pay for this provision by the state at this point.

In any case, the fact that this enterprise had to be done forcefully creates a paradox in terms of the need to resort to violence to be able to pacify these territories. In an interview, former Secretary of Security of Rio de Janeiro, José Mariano Beltrame, stressed the difficulty of having to carry out an enterprise that was supposed to be a pacifying project while having to deploy force, arguing that this was extremely problematic (TV Brasil, 2019). Beltrame noticed he made a public announcement to the media one day before the inauguration of the UPPs for "*he would rather risk the element of surprise to avoid more violence, in case some drug dealers would choose to flee*" (TV Brasil, 2019). This highlights the paradox of a pacification strategy that appeals to less coercive ways of promoting peace – even if that means avoiding using force in that process.

All in all, the UPPs had positive impacts from 2008 to 2016, contributing to a significant reduction in homicide rates by 26,5%, shootings within occupied communities and in its surroundings, as well as effectively controlling crimes against patrimony such as cargo and vehicle thefts (Mourão et al., 2016, p. 39). Yet in 2018, a decade after the implementation of the first UPP, violence had not precisely improved. It deteriorated, and the Armed Forces' participation in public security became institutionalized and increasingly necessary for security policies to be carried out in effect. Coercive military deployment practices have been sustained by a series of legal frameworks that developed and evolved alongside governmental security policies throughout that period.

Furthermore, there was much criticism of the UPPs as a program, mainly on the question of proximity policing, which, to some, turned out to be more of a challenge than a solution in and of itself. Conflicting interpretations on the meaning of proximity policing as a mechanism highlighted problems with the notion that more proximity would necessarily mean less conflict, revealing that an assumption that combined repression and approximation seemed incompatible, in practice, within pacified areas (Mourão et al., 2016, p. 105).

It may be argued that the assumption that more proximity would translate into less conflict became a hindrance to the effectiveness of the program itself. The promise of proximity policing to include these areas and bring about citizenship becomes a rather difficult enterprise if police and members of the military have to resort to force to do so. Perhaps the whole structuring of this project was undermined in the way that it was designed: to ask for results that could only be achieved through coercion to be handled without it. In that sense, there is no way the program could be assessed as successful (Mourão et al., 2016). One of the indicators thereof could be an alleged shared perception among UPP military police officers of feeling unable to act in an effective way in that they associated the tenets of proximity police to an actual limitation to the program's effectiveness.

Among specific complaints of UPPs military police officers were demands for greater institutional backing, more autonomy and the liberty to act like 'actual' or 'real' police (Mourão et al., 2016, p. 119-0). In fact, sometimes to avoid frequent shootings in a particular UPP site not to harm the reputation and evaluation of the program, police officers ended up losing strategic areas to drug trafficking, since confrontations could be pointed out as an indicator of failure of the program (Soares, 2015). In fact, the number of GLO operations since 2001 (36 in Rio alone) may be an indicator that further and intensified resort to prerogatives of the use of force seems to have been a common response in light of the problems that continued to be faced by UPP sites.

The pacification 'promise' of the UPPs was to play a fundamental role in the social economic development of communities to facilitate the entry of public services, infrastructure, social, cultural and sports projects, private investments and opportunities (ISP, 2015). The social dimension of the program, entitled *UPP Social*, was originally based on the coordination and articulation of constructive social policies in occupied territories initially at the state level. However, it was interrupted before the completion of its first six months and transferred to the municipal sphere; as a result, the program began to face difficulties and discontinuities that further undermined its social aspect (Mourão et al., 2016, p. 37).

Although my purpose is not to evaluate the effectiveness of the UPPs as a public policy program, but rather to contextualize it into the overall context of domestic pacification, I believe this particular delimitation and understanding of space and social control marks an important re-articulation of the role and purpose

of the Brazilian military in how it relates to enforcement within domestic order. The close relationship between the territorialization of violence in certain spaces, and the way some territories have been administered in terms of an alleged promise of social and urban integration (Leite, 2012, p. 374) articulated in the sovereign narrative, can offer us clear examples of militarizing social control practices. The referred areas include former and/or active UPP occupied areas, although sovereign coercive practices, as will be seen next chapter, are not exclusively limited to them.

In addition to the purely military aspect of the coercive actions observed in UPPs designated spaces, a series of biopolitical procedures were applied to local residents in terms of the control of their social lives. These included all procedures that "*allowed the bodies to be spatially distributed, segregated, surveilled and made more productive to the state*" (Foucault, 1999, p. 288-9). Along with the territorial spatial occupation, a genuine interest in the *occupation* of life of slums residents in terms of their daily activities was observed, as to assure that what they *do* is productive to the state. Social control practices of militarized action – in a way, not any less coercive than the use of force as a result of military occupation – were put in place in those spaces by the government. They ranged from efforts to counter informality – for instance, with the legalization of rents and services for taxation purposes and the provision of official documentation to register workers in the social security system – to more aggressive acts that affect social mobility, such as constant systematic identity checks.

Some argue that the entry of TV and phone services upon occupation have transformed slums, resulting in real estate speculation effects in these spaces and raised living standards; yet this abrupt marked dynamics occurred in the absence of the protection of special citizenship rights, arguing that such coercive apparatus installment did not in effect translate into greater citizenship at the institutional level (Fleury, 2012, p. 218-9). Others argue such policies have offered a particularistic reading of citizenship, embedded in a dimension of sociospatial segregation which materialized into a violent solution to the problem of violence in the field of public security policies (Leite, 2012, p. 379).

In fact, the physical occupation of UPP designated spaces represents an intervention in the sociability and in people's behaviors and an attempt to build a new social ordering (Fleury, 2012, p. 213). The application of restrictive control measures and new procedures, subject to the discretion of security officials, refers

to the regulation of social life and included restrictions on circulation and on the right to come and go. Moreover, local residents reported the imposition of rules such as curfew, the installment of a "law of silence", the prohibition of *bailes funks* and local parties, and regulation over mototaxis (De Oliveira, 2014, p. 155-6). Gathering events that were perceived by police authorities as events that could generate disorder or 'turmoil' were either prohibited or restrained by physical repression as part of a disciplinary project; similarly, all events that took place in public areas needed to be authorized by police officers, according to their discretion (Fleury, 2012, p. 213).

UPP officials justified prohibition and control measures on the provision of security, hence revealing disciplinary power methods:

> "First, I check for ids, see what time the event will end, how many people will come, the location, who is organizing the party, and from there, we evaluate to see if security is guaranteed or not, because if there isn't a minimum of security, if it is going to last throughout the night, then there is no way we can authorize it. And even they are learning it. This is interesting, because they are learning how to make a point. Because at first [...] they didn't apply with a social security number, you couldn't even tell who was applying. Then we used to tell them, this is not how it goes, you need to identify yourself, all that you want, these are some of the things we demand, so we can evaluate it [...] Depending on the situation, we may not authorize it, to guarantee the security of residents themselves" (De Oliveira, 2014, p. 160)

These practices are likewise arbitrary: they take place at the discretion of agents who define which citizens are allowed to live and integrate society by means of that occupation, and those who are not, and in what ways. The harder the process of occupation, the higher the number of confrontations with the police (De Oliveira, 2014, p. 121). These social control practices constitute wider forms of social control that entail regulating the habits, the circulation and the behavior of local residents. Interviews with locals also have shown that in the first stages of UPP implementation, practices such as personal and home searches and forced document inspections, in addition to reported threats, aggressions and arrests, were commonly put in place (De Oliveira, 2014, p. 155-6). Local slums residents have reported physical, verbal aggression and threats during searches, as well as extortion to a lesser degree (Ribeiro & Vilarouca, 2014, p. 270).

These are some examples of territorialization control practices that took place in UPP sites. Not surprisingly, only 1 to 2% of 1.220 residents interviewed, when

asked about what were the most positive aspects brought by the UPPs to the communities, considered the right to come and go (*ir e vir*) to be an improvement (De Oliveira, 2014, p. 164). These instances of sovereign control can now be traced and observed in more and more public spaces due to the increasing militarized engagement in law and order enforcement operations. That particular imposition of biopolitical power creates borders whose perimeter is created and reinforced as sovereign practices restrict mobility and circulation, and consequently, the liberties of residents within these pacified public sites.

## 5.5
## Territoriality, 'Outsides' and Notions of Order

The relationship with territoriality is clear in the mechanism reproduced in GLO operations of reinforcing bordering practices in which some 'inside' territories are deemed as unruly by the state, considered as outside its *de facto* control, and as spaces to be forcefully reintegrated into it due to the threat they pose. To this end, territoriality is crucial to the understanding of Brazil's security challenges, since the use of force by the state targets specific territories domestically. In Latin America, it is commonly observed that

> the armed forces provide state presence and critical services in vast ungoverned spaces and borders that are often exploited by an assortment of delinquents who compete with the state over the monopoly of force or control of territory. (Marcella, 2015, p.167)

In the case of Rio, the security threats related to organized crime are perceived to be mainly 'located' on a map. These territories, historically neglected during the urbanization, experienced a spatial organization along socioeconomic cleavage. With regard to the argument of this thesis, the territoriality bordering processes around space takes on two dimensions. The first is the domestic large-scale one, characterized by a merging of the discourses of national defense and national security at the domestic level, enabled by the GLO framework that authorizes the military to engage in public security, exercise which is specified and defined by a series of decrees and laws. This dimension enables the possibility of deploying GLOs to the entire national territory to enforce law and order in the country when the public institutions aimed at that exercise prove insufficient or ineffective – so long as the Executive interprets it as so. That grants greater resort to force in the

exercise of internal security, since members of the military are trained to engage in combat to tackle threats that demand superior deployment of force when compared to the police's attribution to handle law and order.

Another dimension is the pacification that takes place at a micro level of the state, namely the level of the city of Rio de Janeiro. Over time, organized crime took over neglected marginalized areas, acting as a parallel authority and exercising *de facto* control in such spaces. Eventually, violence in those areas escalated to a point at which they were interpreted as serious threats to the power of sovereign authority. At this point, the issue of organized crime was securitized and these territories were regarded as unruly that hence needed be recovered and reintegrated onto the Brazilian state. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, these areas are mostly represented by slums delimited on a map and marked to be reintegrated into the state by a pacification process to promote social inclusion and as a form of regaining state control. In that sense, the contention towards the territories considered as unruly entailed subjecting them to specific control techniques and violent practices.

It should be noted that although the focus of this project is the city of Rio de Janeiro, the national and the local dimensions of pacification cannot be dissociated from each other here, since they go hand in hand with one another. GLO laws and decrees were added to the national legal framework and, therefore, could potentially apply to any state of the union. This enabled GLO operations to be deployed to the city of Rio in what has been referred to by official authorities as the war against organized crime. Therefore, in order to successfully account for our case study of Rio de Janeiro, the national dimension of the territoriality created by the GLO as pacification – in terms of the creation of the conditions of possibility for the deployment of the military in public security – will likewise be analyzed.

The militarization of public space in Brazil carried out in the form of GLO operations constitutes sovereign practices aimed at pacifying targeted spaces and/or individuals who live in them. This enables the conception of an all-pervasive presence of an enemy within and without, against which defenses come to form a legitimizing tool of war (Jabri, 2006, p. 48). Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri referenced how the regulation of extremely unequal populations by an Empire creates a situation of *"permanent social danger and requires the powerful apparatuses of the society of control to ensure separation and guarantee the new*

*management of social space*" (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 336-7 apud Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 88).

This is the case with the militarization of public security, particularly in the areas of Brazilian slums, in terms of how their populations are handled by the state. Hence, "*boundaries are conceived in a way in which they do not disappear, but rather become manifest in every instance of violence, every instance of control, every instance of practices targeted against a constructed other*" (See Jabri, 2006). By looking at such modes of control of direct and indirect violence that the state is capable of implementing, the boundary shifts: it becomes associated not with legal boundaries of the state, but instead inscribed upon the body of the other (Jabri, 2006, p. 60). By highlighting these instances of power associated with the sovereign prerogative to use force to target its own population as part of claims to sovereignty, the biopolitical aspect of GLOs is highlighted.

Militarization deployed to public security does not take place exclusively in slums, but mainly targets these spaces regarded as a threat to the domestic sphere of the country, whose population is forcefully governed and subject to biopower forms of control. In terms of regulation and circulation, these include higher levels of violence and the use of force deployed as a natural prerogative of the military. In addition to the coercive effects *per se* that such areas and their corresponding residents are subject to, this process constitutes a higher exposure to violence when compared to remaining areas of the city that were not being pacified. Pacification and disciplinary power with higher prerogatives of the use of force, as well as coercive measures of social control, become clearly applied to the population of such spaces. In that sense, biopolitical power in the exercise of exceptional measures is applied to such areas, as in the case of suspension of rights. All justified in the name of security by the sovereign authority.

Either way, we are looking specifically at violence as a practice that reinforces claims to sovereignty by 'activating' borders of inside/outsides within the state. These 'pacified' areas were spaces in which violence was somehow expected to occur in many ways, and where it became a practice. In fact, domestic pacification in Brazil may constitute what Charles Tilly denominates violent practices that engage specialists of a highly coordinated group in certain areas through the monitoring and vigilance of certified agents (Tilly, 2003, p. 84-8). This process culminates in the polarization of such political space with recurrent contentious

episodes whose social interaction usually reveals and reinforces systems of social inequality (Tilly, 2003, p. 84-8). Domestic pacification gained shape in programs and interventions such as the UPP and later, GLO operations *per se* entailing the participation of the military police and members of the Armed Forces. Naturally, in terms of agency, this thesis will focus on the latter.

Pacification in Brazil entails the conduction of contentious episodes that reproduce violent rituals as a systematic practice of sovereign violence. The violence that follows from that ritual, whose purpose is to inflict damage, is not generalized, but instead contained within the limits of such intersections of socially activated borders (Tilly, 2003, p. 82). These are known to all parties involved, and entail a logic of border mobilization that follows a logic of 'us' *versus* 'them' within such delimitations and intersections, where the inflicted damage is expected to occur in a somewhat coordinated way – like contained versions of a war (Tilly, 2003, p. 86-7). In other words, such practices of violence are expected to occur in those spaces in a systematic way. Exceptional measures also apply to them, as if the security situation justified a distinct juridical-political ordering.

With regard to theory, GLO operations in Rio de Janeiro portray a case of peaceful order inside the state and chaos outside, in which ungoverned territories located inside the state is chaotic whereas the outside is stable. Yet, in this case, the "outside is within", showing an inversion of the assumption that the outside is chaotic while the inside of the state is taken for granted as peaceful. It builds on the existing literature, as pointed out by authors like Ayoob, that insecurities and concerns over security threats in the Global South lie within the territory of the state itself, rather than outside of it.

The case study will expand on this reasoning, by explaining the violent mechanism through which developing states handle these territorial threats "within" their political unit. In this case, while the inside is regarded as chaotic, the outside, where order is supposed to be mainly kept, remains perceived as stable. By looking at what takes place on the ground rather than simply the official discourse that justifies it, the security practices deployed towards these spaces represent instances of internal sovereignty. Due to the nature of the object of study, these internal aspects of sovereignty take place within the territorial borders of the nation state by means of that inside/outside mechanism.

Yet the definition of threats for law and order enforcement operations is quite broad and flexible in the sense of what could be interpreted as a threat. It is also extremely focused on the notion of order. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the GLO Manuals elaborated, respectively, by the EMCFA and by the Ministry of Defense, are not focused on one sole definition of threat. The GLO Manual describes threats as "*acts or attempts potentially capable of compromising the preservation of public order or the safety of the people and the patrimony*", hence placing the focus more on what is to be secured – namely, the safety of the people and the patrimony – than on whatever could potentially constitute and pose an objective threat to people and the state.

It is there to be noticed that the term order is not only an allusion to order as a reference to law and order. It could also be an allusion to order as in keeping social structures as they are. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, it almost seems like the ordered 'outside' – that is, the rest of the city – needs to be safeguarded from these unruly or ungoverned spaces. Even regarding domestic pacification in Brazil, notions of an existing order are strongly observed, sometimes at the expense of the notion of peace itself, as noted by Maíra Siman and Victória Santos:

> Stabilization/pacification practices shed light on how (public and international) engagements have followed a tendency in which the horizons of peace are lowered, favoring instead the maintenance of a controlled environment over any expectation of emancipation or profound social change. Order, control and institutions are emphasized, while more expansive definitions of peace – including social processes associated with development – are condensed, postponed, or even neglected. (Siman & Santos, 2019, p. 67)

Pacification efforts in terms of law and order enforcement operations in Brazil seem to have emphasized pacification in its coercive dimension as an effort to tackle organized crime in specific territories to integrate them. The fact that they are regarded as 'outsides' contributes to a notion of tackling this threat and possibly including these spaces while also maintaining a peaceful order elsewhere in the state. However, it seems this pacification has not entailed, as noted by Siman and Santos, a goal to actually promote inclusive long-term social policies.

With regard to GLOs, although the conception of threats can change from opponent forces to agent that disturbs public order (APOPs), the existing legal framework sets the terms for mainly protecting the people and the patrimony,

according to the GLO Manuals.[49] Yet the only mention in that sense was firstly to opponent forces as criminal armed groups, then to the broader term APOP as agents who compromise public order. That also creates a difficulty in terms of the objects and subjects of security since, in the end, the idea of GLO is to protect the Brazilian population (people) and state (patrimony). There is no distinction of the category of civilians as in the case of an armed conflict. According to Luiz Eduardo Ramos Baptista Pereira,

> Here, it is Brazilians, so we have a legal framework, people protection. You go into a slum, a 14 or 15-year old boy that was holding a rifle, as he sees you come in, he hides the rifle behind the door or under the bed and goes on to play marbles. You can't… who is the adverse force? (Ramos apud Castro & Marques, 2019, p. 172)

The question of the lack of definition of a "clear adverse force" reveals an additional problem when analyzing GLOs as part of the war on organized crime and pacification in Rio de Janeiro. Even though Op GLO do not qualify as combat operations, they are embedded in a definition of threat that justifies and calls for military, not police, action. There is, then, an incongruence between what is supposed to constitute the threat – which is not handled as a war, since the nature of the operation is of non-combat – and the level of the use of force naturally deployed once sovereign power calls upon the military to take on the mission. In the case of urban violence-type GLOs, that incongruence may very well be grounded in an assumption that the police is uncapable of handling the issue of public security. This also lies on the assumption that the military is simply a more effective security force than the police, but it is so *precisely* because it holds greater prerogative to the use of force, due to the inherent nature of the institution.

In Brazil, the assumption of higher effectiveness of the military for public security may stem from the country's history of militarism, in which governmental

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[49] As opposed to the "*restoring a secure and stable environment*" as stated by the United Nations Security Council (UN MINUSTAH Fact Sheet, 2019). Except for broad references to human rights, the words protection or protect do not show up in the document in terms of people's protection in general, but of civilians specifically. Mentions to the word protection in Resolution 1524 include 1) the observance of the Resolution on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts, 2) the assurance of the continued promotion and protection of human rights, particularly of women and children, and the establishment of a State based on the rule of law and an independent judiciary, 3) the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, and 4) the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel.

authorities may have taken advantage of deploying the military as they realized police was unable to maintain order. The fact that the appeal to the concept of order remains in the Constitution as a natural prerogative of the Armed Forces is a factor that contributes to that assumption. The MINUSTAH involvement in Haiti may be another factor to enable parallels to be established over time, comparing military engagements in peacekeeping abroad with GLO operations in Rio de Janeiro.

However, this comparison creates a set of difficulties. The relative consensus that the Brazilian situation is characterized by the absence of a formal, defined enemy when it comes to facing the threat of organized crime makes it difficult to define the type of 'conflict' dynamics that GLOs could possibly entail, as described by General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira:

> In the case of Brazil, it is organized crime. In a lot of places crime is disorganized, but little by little, it organizes itself. Very well armed, very well equipped. With one difference: they defend points […] If you went into a community by force [in Haiti], they were not going to resist the way these guys do here for a drug selling spot. (Heleno apud Castro & Marques, 2019, p. 41)

As seen above, military participation has been crucial in the process of pacification in Brazil in cases the forces integrated the effort of UPPs installment. Ongoing comparisons to a war on drugs in Rio de Janeiro, and the reference to terrorist acts performed by organized criminality have rendered allusions to a war increasingly common. However, the notion of fighting a war on organized crime over territories to the point of justifying military deployment in Rio while at the same time sustaining that officially GLOs are a non-combat operation is extremely problematic.[50] This reveals an inherent tension that speaks to the military doctrine as a whole, their purpose and mission, as opposed to GLO roles that refer to the maintenance of order and should, therefore, be attributed to the police.

This tension has been pointed out by Christoph Harig as he highlights that the relationship between lessons learnt in the MINUSTAH and their application in

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[50] There has been considerable debate since the September 11th attacks in the United States as to the classification of the use of force by the US Armed Forces against Al-Qaeda and other non-state armed groups in situations similar to an "armed conflict" within states with regard to International Law. In that sense, international opinion has considered some operations against terrorists as part of an armed conflict context, international or domestic, in which the so-called "War on Terror" would be best comprehended as a complex and transnational matter, in which human rights should prevail (Conor, 2013, p. 42).

Brazil "*most clearly shows that soldiers' mindset remains focused on defeating enemies, even when deployed in police roles*" despite the effort of authorities "*to depict GLO operations in Rio de Janeiro as a type of peacekeeping at home*" (2019, p. 13). Clearly, the doctrine of the military to naturally resort to higher levels of force is an issue that speaks to the primal purpose of the Armed Forces and to their identity as the nation's institution for external protection against enemies.

Harig perceives the tension created by GLO operations as a trade-off between the rule of law and military effectiveness, in which troops clearly placed greater emphasis on the latter, sometimes feeling the need for a more permissive legal framework (2018, p. 145-6). One could say that compromising rule of law over military effectiveness or the other way around touches on the problem regarding the justification of bringing members of the Armed Forces to enforce law and order. If members of the military are to be called upon to GLOs precisely due to their higher effectiveness when compared to the police in terms of enforcing law and order, then why could they not resort to more force if necessary in order to guarantee the effectiveness they were called upon to enforce in the first place?

That kind of violence speaks to the primary prerogative of the sovereign to deploy violence in order to ensure the social contract. Yet with pacification, we arrive at the reordering of social relations that takes place in that exercise. It is unclear as to exactly which understanding of order the state is aiming to achieve other than maintaining its own territorial integrity, but what can be said is that this kind of order ends up by reinforcing these 'outsides' since the state has not yet been successful in effectively handling this marginalization in ways that are less violent and that could, perhaps, effectively promote sustainable peace and development.

This seems to be an inherent tension to GLOs operations that needs to be taken into account when thinking of their effectiveness to law and order – especially considering the results the government expects to see upon deploying the military. One example thereof was a 2017 law that ruled that cases of crimes against civilians, when practiced in the context of GLO operations, were a competence of military justice to be judged by a military court. As seen in the exact text of the law below, this became an added prerogative in terms of the rules to the use of force by members of the Armed Forces, one in which the government seems to have prioritized effectiveness:

Homicide crimes against life committed by Armed Force members of the military against civilians will be a competence of Military Justice of the Union, when practiced in the context of I) the fulfillment of the attributions established by the President of the Republic or by the Ministry of State of Defense; II) an action that entails the security of a military institution or military mission, even if non-belligerent or III) an activity of military nature, peace operation, law enforcement or subsidiary attribution carried out in conformity with the dispositions of Article 142 of the Federal Constitution.
(Law 13.491/2017)

The idea that there needs to be juridical protection to establish boundaries and to define how the members of the military should act to effectively face certain situations, as well as what is expected of them in terms of legal support, is clear in the experience of former Force Commander Elito Siqueira of pacifying the Alemão:

A few years ago in Rio de Janeiro, a soldier in a slum could not climb onto the roof of a house. What is the only place you can observe something in a slum? From the roofs. The soldier could not, but the criminal could. So how can you possibly want to solve, even being with the police, how could you help them in deployment if you are not juridically backed to do so? When we went into the Alemão, there was a police station in there, the Public Ministry.[51] I designed 52 clear rules of engagement, of what we could do down there, approved by the state and by the Public Ministry, because there needs to be legal backing to act. (Elito Siqueira apud Castro & Marques, 2019, p. 67)

Additional prerogatives for this particular security deployment pose additional tensions to the question of individual rights. In February 2018, there were also talks about the state granting the military the prerogative to carry out collective warrants during the Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, which the Minister of Defense Raul Jungmann claimed as necessary to tackle crime (Bianchi & Amaral, 2018). According to Jungmann,

"Suppose the following situation occurs: the police have information about a kidnapping. They find out there is a hostage, a kid. They know the kid is in a building at *Rua Jardim*, number 13. But there is no information on the apartment where the kidnappers are hiding the child. You need a judicial warrant. What are you going to do? Cross your arms? No, the solution is to request a collective search warrant that authorizes the state agents to inspect all units of the building". (Jungmann apud Bianchi & Amaral, 2018)

[51] The Brazilian Public Ministry is a governmental body that holds autonomy, working independently from the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary, whose role is to act to protect citizens and the patrimony against potential abuses or omission by Public power, assuring the observance of democratic social and individual rights in federal cases as far as public interest is concerned.

That same year, the Minister of Justice Jardim Torquato supported this idea, stating that these mandates would target names and addresses, following the procedures of the Constitution but possibly containing more information due to the singularities of these areas, described by him as conflict zones:

"The conflict zones in Rio de Janeiro are precariously urbanized, the addresses are not easily located. Hence, it is possible that the requests be based on GPS positioning describing the areas within the communities". (Bianchi & Amaral, 2018)

The fact that these territories in Rio are constantly referred to as conflict zones shows the rhetoric of the need to fight a war, and the justified means over the actions that are taken in accordance with that need. Still, much of the territorial aspect is still clearly tied into the narrative; in pacified spaces, the law is supported by exceptional measures and local residents do not have their rights observed, even following the UPPs period. The justification continues to be in the name of security, namely that of the state, although by principle, if pacification efforts are successful, the narrative enacted should refer to the security of society in general.

This can cause us to realize that the security provided by the state in the pacification project can inflict collateral damages that include the insecurity of local residents of pacified sites. The security practices which they are consequently subject to constitute Foucault's biopower techniques that directly infer in their social life – as in their right to come and go as citizens, arriving home to find military tanks by their house, for instance. So even if these measures are justified in the name of security, they can cause a sense of enhanced insecurity among the people they directly affect. That raises questions over whose security the state is pursuing, and at the expense of what. It seems that the human security of some is compromised at the expense of keeping Brazil's territorial national integrity, as well as for the security of the remaining order, and society, to be maintained.

If on the one hand GLOs can remedy a scenario of pre-existing violence (observed before the enactment of the operation) by increasing security and order for the state, on the other, they can also promote insecurity as they change the ways in which violence is promoted, and hence in which this violence is manifested. By possibly promoting the insecurity of the residents in spaces they target, GLOs reinforce the exercise of that same sovereign violence evoked to enforce law and order. This problematique raises questions of effectiveness that shall be seen in the

following paragraphs, in particular with regard to urban violence-type GLOs that act within public security activities that relate directly to traditional policing roles. The official description of the function of the previously enacted urban security-type missions in Rio de Janeiro is mainly to protect the patrimony and the people. However, to be activated, GLOs need to be based on the justification that the public security organs are, for some reason, unable or uncapable of performing their function – assumingly, law and order.

At least Operation Archangel and *Entorno* were justified in the context of the UPPs of securitization of organized crime in official governmental discourses, but this particular articulation in the UPP installment experience is not enough to enable a conclusion that the purpose of GLOs is to tackle organized crime. Yet, this mechanism is by no means exclusive to it as an issue. Be it organized crime, violent crime or any other issues or actors (potential APOPs) that the Executive deems worthy of enacting a GLO for – so long as it understands that public order could be seriously threatened by that issue – then this mechanism could be activated by that power. In other words, there may be crime but if there is no perception of 'disorder' by the Executive, then this is not a necessary condition for the applicability of a GLO. Eventually, the decision is an Executive judgement call. In turn, there may not be exactly a concrete criminality scenario and even then, the Executive deem it as such. This is why it is essential to look at the official governmental narrative. Assuming we are following legal procedures, the mandates will supposedly contain the official justification, and demand for, GLO enactment in their language and text.

The trend for increasing military involvement in public security highlights limitations in terms of the state's mainly repressive strategy towards organized crime, that of focusing on the law enforcement suppression of crime while disregarding multi-faceted state-building strategies that seek to address this marginalization by strengthening the bonds between the state and the communities of such urban spaces (Felbab-Brown, 2011, p. 27).

By conceiving pacification sites as 'outsides' of the state, it is possible to see how an ordered and stable outside protects itself from these territories within it. These spaces are considered as chaotic sites, comparable to conflict zones, that need to be integrated into the state by means of pacification in a violent way, since this (re)integration process could never take place in a peaceful manner. The threat also comes from the perception that these parallel authorities will not be removed

willingly, and that therefore the state will need to resort to higher force in order to maintain its territorial integrity, and consequently, exercise its internal sovereignty.

Besides, that protection entails sovereign practices that almost turn these spaces into spaces of exception, where the levels of the use of force are higher than any other remaining areas, and where its population is equally subject to security measures that entail biopower techniques of control such as checkpoints and constant heavily armed surveillance. Thus, pacifying to integrate contributes to a further exclusion of these spaces, since marginalization is precisely what enables their inclusion in the first place. The fact that these places are marked as places that need to be reintegrated back into the state renders them even more marginalized.

## 5.6
## Conclusion

In this chapter, the territorial aspect of the security challenges in Brazil from the perspective of a sociospatial distribution that occurred along the urbanization process in Rio de Janeiro has been shown. By assuming that urban factors reflect the way social classes are spatially organized, and that the development of Rio has occurred along the lines of social and economic cleavages reflected in its urban distribution, it becomes possible to see how slums turned into marginalized spaces in the city. Modernization also took place at the margins and, to a certain extent, at the expense of, this sociospatial distribution. During the urbanization process, certain territories, mainly excluded from major advances and the service provision system and located in peripheral areas of the city or around the city center itself, became marginalized spaces later to be known as *favelas* (slums).

The state negligence towards the slums and the vacuum of power created in these spaces turned them into an urban challenge. Organized crime developed mainly within prisons and detention centers as an articulation between political prisoners, establishing itself decades later in many slums of the city. These spaces became safe havens that allowed for the further articulation of organized crime. Hence, the issue of public security in the city of Rio de Janeiro needs to account for its territorial aspect. Over time, slums became spaces of state absence where organized criminality exercised *de facto* control as a parallel power. In these spaces, violence among different factions over the drug trafficking illicit market and confrontations with the police lead to an escalation of violence that rendered this

issue a national security concern that local state authorities were unable to handle. In the 90s, the federal government has requested isolated military incursions to some of these territories. Yet the further escalation of violence in the following decade caused the Brazilian state to securitize the issue of organized crime, turning it into a question of utmost priority to its integrity and survival as a political entity.

To justify for the instalment of UPPs in 2008, organized crime was regarded as an essential threat to the state by the federal government, compared to terrorist acts. The rhetoric of framing a domestic enemy began with a consistent discourse of a need to fight parallel activities that had emerged to defy the state and acted in these territories located on a map. The planning and promise of the UPPs as a pacification public policy project is embedded in its territorial aspect, since it touches on the issue of pacifying sites as discriminated areas outside the rule of the state. This domestic pacification process, albeit designed to be carried out mainly by military police officers, frequently demanded participation of the Armed Forces.

The Police Pacifying Units (UPPs) aimed at recovering territories that were considered to be outside the control of the state. This case relates to the literature of the nature of security in developing states, expanding it in terms of the mechanisms of how exactly domestic sovereignty works. Therefore, it is not simply the case that security is inward oriented in these states, as argued by Ayoob. There is also an inside / outside dynamics, similar to the one that takes place in reference to the international system, yet in this case, there are 'insides' of the territorial limits of the state that are nevertheless treated as 'outsides' for they represent spaces that may not have been completely integrated, yet are marginalized and pose problems.

If according to the classic Realist International Relations theory the inside of the state protects from the outside, in the case of Brazil, the state protects its overall territory and cohesiveness from certain areas located inside it but that are outside its control and perceived, and handled, as threats. As seen in Chapter 2, if for Cohen et al. the least developed states are in their level of statebuilding, the more violence they will tend to engage domestically in order to consolidate their power, it is possible to begin to wonder if in Rio this violence was supposed to be aimed at these territories to protect the rest of the state from this outside located 'within'.

As the Brazilian state aimed at incorporating these areas into the state, the pacifying process occurs in an intrinsically violent manner. As such, the nature of this mechanism implies that these become spaces of relative exception that are

treated under rules that normally do not apply to remaining areas of the city, under higher levels of the use of force, and to which sovereignty aimed at the inside is exercised by the state. Justified by security, pacified areas become subject to various forms of violence – not only as a result of the pacification process itself but also for the coercive social policies consistently carried out in these spaces that, all in all, represent greater control of residents' lives by the state – as if this were the price to pay for the security provided. The ways this dynamic works in practice in law and order enforcement operations will be analyzed in the following chapter.

# 6.
# Law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) as sovereign coercive practices

> I am concerned with the constant deployment of the Army in GLO 'interventions' in the states [federative units in Brazil]. In Rio Grande do Norte (RN) alone, the Armed Forces have been used three times in 18 months. Public security needs to be treated by the states with 'zero' priority. The numbers of violence corroborate my words.
>
> General Eduardo Villas Bôas, Commander of the Brazilian Army, 2017

## 6.1
## Introduction

As seen previously, law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) enable the deployment of the Brazilian Armed Forces to tackle domestic security threats. In most cases, urban violence GLO operations in Rio have targeted organized crime; however, GLOs can potentially apply to anything classified as a threat that can qualify as a disturbance of internal order. Therefore, the GLO framework enables the creation (or interpretation) of any 'threats' that can be regarded as such by the Executive. Hence, it enables an interpretation that works on a case-by-case basis. This thesis argues that GLO operations constitute sovereign coercive practices that deploy violence to targeted spaces regarded as threats through a domestic pacification process.

As a legal framework, GLOs provide the conditions of possibility for the deployment of the military domestically, justified by the Executive in terms of a need to protect the state as an entity against various types of threats. Although the focus of this thesis is on urban violence GLO operations in the city of Rio, since these operations are applicable countrywide, the data published by the Ministry of

Defense on GLOs at the national scale will be briefly considered in the first section to offer a perspective on the issue.[52]

At the national level, GLOs refer to the defense of the state – normally a prerogative of the Armed Forces – yet they shift these forces' focus to the domestic realm, becoming part of the national security agenda. In effect, GLO operations are enacted by the Executive but closely accompanied by the Ministry of Defense. Sovereign power is expressed through the basic prerogative to deploy force for the enforcement of law and order and to guarantee the integrity and functioning of the state if Executive authorities judge the police is unable to do so effectively. Yet, pacification also takes place at a micro level of the state, specifically in Rio de Janeiro. Many of the GLO operations deployed to Rio were specified as urban violence-type GLOs deployed to pacify marginalized territories deemed as 'outside' the state. Pacification was meant to forcefully reintegrate these spaces regarded as areas outside its effective control, and their populations, to the state.

This chapter will show how GLO operations enforce law and order as sovereign practices whose mission is to protect the rest of the state from 'outside' spaces located within national borders, or to deploy pacification practices such as policing and surveilling in public spaces that, albeit aimed at protecting social life, nevertheless constitute pacification as violence. It will also account for the consequences of the 'war' over criminality in Rio de Janeiro, considering some of the recent militarization trends in public developments, as well as the implications of this case study for International Relations and for Security Studies.

## 6.2
## The deployment of the Armed Forces to urban security

Before analyzing urban security GLO operations in Rio de Janeiro in practice, a few considerations on the methodology and criteria for considering these operations will be made. The first refers to the official time frame that accounts for them. Even though the first official mentions to GLOs did not occur up to around 1999, the data gathered and officially published by the Ministry of Defense

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52 In terms of the analysis, whenever possible, GLOs in the state/city of Rio de Janeiro were isolated from the rest of the statistics nationwide, but sometimes graphs and tables published by the Ministry of Defense, do not differentiate between GLOs deployed to states and cities as opposed to GLOs deployed at the national level. Therefore, in cases with no specific mention to a geographical location, graphs and tables comprise unspecified data regarding GLO operations countrywide.

considers GLO operations from 1992 on. This means that even before being formally called a GLO, Armed Forces' deployment to public security has been accounted as such since 1992. Since this thesis covered a crisis in public security in a context that preceded the GLO decrees, I chose to consider the time frame provided by the Ministry of Defense that includes the period from 1992 to 2019. As can be seen in Figure 3 below, the period which accounts for most GLOs is the 2000s, probably due to the several GLO operations deployed nationwide that year.



Figure 3 – Law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) countrywide (1992-2019).
Source: Ministry of Defense, 2019.

Secondly, the data uses information provided by the three Armed Forces and sometimes does not discriminate by force. Most of the operations were based on data gathered by the Brazilian Army, but for the purposes of this thesis, there will be no differentiation between the three forces, since all military deployment is accounted for in a combined way. The reason therefor stems from the fact that even though most GLOs are effectively carried out by the Army, differentiating between the three Forces does not significantly impact the findings of this case study.

Thirdly, in terms of their nature, GLO operations are divided by type, namely urban violence, military police (PM) strikes, GVA, events, and others. Although urban violence and military police strikes may be deployed in similar situations – in cases in which the situation of regular public security bodies proves insufficient or unable to handle public security – these two categories were regarded as distinct by the Ministry of Defense. As a category, 'GVA' refers to guaranteeing voting

processes and vote counting (in Portuguese, *garantia da votação e apuração*). This operation takes places every two years in federal (Legislative and Executive) elections as well as local elections countrywide. The 'events' category stands for providing security for official events such as mega sports events and international conferences. 'Others' is a category that applies to operations that refer to acting on "indigenous questions" and on the security of facilities of national interest, among other unspecified activities.

GLOs that entail the securing of events and votes may take on a more preventive form. In GVA operations, dissuasion may be deployed as a preventive strategy to ensure that 'all goes well'. The 'others' category may include the securing of facilities of national interest or direct confrontation in a reactive manner, demanding higher prerogatives to the use of force in cases of invasion of property to assure the defense of the state patrimony.

Despite the division into five categories by the MD, the nature of all GLOs is very similar to the roles normally attributed to the police. The reasons for the Ministry of Defense to decide to classify GLO operations in that fashion is outside the scope of this thesis. However, in terms of actual practices taking place on the ground, all of them fit into the definitions of security as exposed in earlier chapters.

All five categories include, to a smaller or greater extent, practices such as policing, securing, patrolling that entail repressive and dissuasive techniques that vary only in terms of the degree of the use of force that each of them demands and in terms of their different official denominations. "Urban violence" and "military police strikes" type-GLO operations refer directly to the local security apparatus being unable or insufficient to secure the population and/or the public patrimony. In these GLOs, higher levels of actively repressive security practices can be expected in the form of police-like operations in activities that entail a policing nature. These can control and secure certain areas, enforce a judicial mandate, and provide support to federal bodies in security operations by offering intel, logistics, communication and instruction. Figures 4 and 5 below show a classification and a distribution of GLO operations by type from 1992 to 2019.

Figure 4 – Law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) by type (1992-2019).
Source: Brazilian Ministry of Defense, 2019.

| LEGENDA | |
|---------|---|
| S PUB | Segurança Pública |
| GVA | Garantia da Votação e Apuração |
| EVENTO | Grandes Eventos |

| RESUMO | | |
|--------|-------|-------------|
| TIPO | QUANT | PORCENTAGEM |
| VIOLÊNCIA URBANA | 23 | 16,9% |
| GREVE PM | 25 | 18,4% |
| GVA | 22 | 16,2% |
| EVENTOS | 38 | 27,9% |
| OUTROS | 28 | 20,6% |
| | 136 | 100% |

Figure 5 – Percentage distribution of GLO operations.
Source: Brazilian Ministry of Defense, 2019.

In fact, the Ministry of Defense not only lists what it considers to be GLOs. It also lists operations that are outside the scope of GLOs and are, therefore, not regarded as such. Some of these include defense operations in the traditional

understanding of the word, namely exercises to engage in the possibility of a conflict (*prontidão*), border zones preventive and/or repressive military exercises (*faixa de fronteira*), and regular military training exercises. These are the military operations within the Ministry of Defense that refer to external security.

By looking at the operations for Rio de Janeiro by type and quantity, the GLOs considered will be public security ones, namely urban violence-type GLOs. GVAs will not be considered, given that securing elections and pre-election processes are a constant that will accordingly be displayed in all other states of the federation. In order to look at Rio state to account for this case, GLO operations deployed to the entire national territory will likewise not be considered. For the same reasons, GLOs deployed for the security of sports, academic or official governmental events will likewise not be considered.

Upon analyzing the GLOs deployed exclusively to Rio state and/or city, not surprisingly, all these operations since 1994 were classified as urban violence-type GLOs. As can be seen in the official governmental description of the operation's missions in table below, the idea of cooperating with public security bodies has always been present since the first GLO in the list, although there are variations in the exact wording in each case.

In Operation Rio, for instance, the exact phrase "to cooperate with public security" is not reproduced in the mission's description. However, one could say that the choice for the wording 'to collaborate' as a verb, and the specific mention to organized crime, still reference and allude to security.

Figure 6, the table in the following page, specifies the urban violence-type GLO operations that took place in Rio de Janeiro from 1994 to the end of 2018. The operations in the table are specified by their period, duration, type(s) of Force to compose the mission among the three Armed Forces, as well as the operation's name and a description of the missions' official mandate.

| PERIOD | | DURATION in months[53] | FORCE | OPERATION NAME | MISSION |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| nov/94 | nov/94 | 1 | Army | RIO | Cooperate with public security bodies to reduce the actions of organized crime. |
| nov/94 | jan/95 | 2 | Navy | ALVORADA | Contribute to the public security of the State of Rio de Janeiro. |
| jan/01 | jan/01 | 1 | Army | CRIME ORGANIZADO | Contribute with the public security bodies in the state of Rio de Janeiro. |
| feb/03 | mar/03 | 1 | Navy/Army | GUANABARA | Contribute to the public security bodies in Rio de Janeiro – RJ. |
| jan/07 | jan/07 | 1 | Army | ENTORNO | Contribute to the preservation of public order and of the protection of people and of patrimony in the city of Rio de Janeiro and in neighboring municipalities. |
| nov/10 | jul/12 | 20 | Navy/Army | ARCANJO (ARCHANGEL) | Contribute to the public security of the State of Rio de Janeiro. |
| apr/14 | jun/15 | 14 | FFAA[54] | SÃO FRANCISCO (SAINT FRANCIS) | Contribute to the preservation of public order and the protection of people and of patrimony. |
| feb/17 | feb/17 | 1 | FFAA | CARIOCA | Contribute to the preservation of public order, to the protection of people and of patrimony in the metropolitan region of the municipality of Rio de Janeiro-RJ. |
| jul/17 | dec/18 | 17 | FFAA | RIO DE JANEIRO | Contribute to the preservation of public order, to the protection of people and of patrimony in the State of Rio de Janeiro, in support to the National Public Security Plan, Rio de Janeiro phase. |

Figure 6 – Law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) in Rio de Janeiro classified as urban violence-type GLOs.
Source of original data: Brazilian Ministry of Defense, 2019 (table elaborated by the author)

[53] For clarifying purposes, for cases in which duration could include up to one month of operation or less, one has been input in the table to avoid zeros.

[54] FFAA stands for Brazilian Armed Forces, hence unspecified. Although it is not crucial for us to differentiate between the three forces engaging in these activities, I have kept the classification done by the MD in the table to highlight that albeit mainly conducted designation by the Army and/or the Navy from 1994 throughout 2012, from 2014 on, the MD has left the of the Forces unspecified. This could indicate greater participation of the Air Force on the one hand, as well as deeper integration between the three forces, perhaps causing the MD to choose not to discriminate them.

In most GLOs since 2007, the notion of "contributing to public security" defined in the missions expanded to acquire the specific GLO vocabulary and added to it the terms "preservation of public order" as well as the "protection of people and of patrimony". Therefore, in a way, the operations began to transcend the concern of law and order and public security *per se* to entail other aspects of what the nature of the protection was to become, in particular with regard to the notions of order, the people and the patrimony. This change resonates with a sense of pacification in maintaining a certain social reordering, while also focusing on the people and the patrimony as elements to be secured.

With regard to periods and duration of GLOs, it is conspicuous that since 2010, GLOs have become increasingly common, and lasted longer over the years. Both Archangel (2010-2012) and Saint Francis (2014-2015) GLO operations took place in Rio de Janeiro. By 2010, domestic pacification had already begun with the UPPs since 2008. By 2013, when the first GLO Manual was published, an entire legal framework supported by UPPs pacification practices had already developed. Among those are Complementary Law number 97 and Decree number 3.897, valid since 1999 and 2001, respectively. Both of them allow the Armed Forces to engage in law and order, albeit not in the specified manner done so by the GLO Manuals, that is, specifically aimed at regulating, systematizing and orienting that exercise.

Particularly from 2014 to 2015, for the Saint Francis Operation, military troop substitution took place every two months and entailed a total of 23,5 thousand members of the Armed Forces deployed to the Maré slums complex. This Pacification Force accounted for 85% of the contingent that had been sent to act in the Haiti's MINUSTAH UN mission from 2004 to 2015 (Bacelar, 2015).[55]

The Rio Olympic security deployment was officially accounted for from July to September 2016. Nonetheless, actual military deployment following the Rio Olympic Games may have outlasted the events, even if not officially – and not accounted for – as a GLO operation [Refer to Figure 6 above]. The only official record at the time was Operation Carioca in the month of February 2017. It is also easy to see how it is plausible, to say the least, to argue that by 2019, the Ministry

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[55] Despite its humanitarian inclination, Operação Acolhida in the state of Roraima since 2018 and recent 2020 military operations to fight the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil have been carried out by members of the Armed Forces; however, these are not regarded as GLOs by the Ministry of Defense.

of Defense accounted for GLOs with data since July 2017 without discriminating the weight of the Federal Intervention from February to December 2018.

That means GLO troops from the Operation Rio de Janeiro could have easily been under the command of the Federal Intervenor, the *Eastern Military Command* (CML) in charge of the Federal Intervention in Rio from at least July to December 2018. This could have caused many joint operations for that intermittent period to possibly be designated under GLO operations in and of themselves, when they could, in fact, be part of a combined militarized effort under the umbrella of the Federal Intervention. This integrated aspect of security activities is extremely important because these practices in the exercise of the functions, as well as in shared learning processes that may easily have outlasted the intervention and the GLO themselves, set a new standard for centralization and for guidelines of the use of force within public security.

In any case, Rio de Janeiro has been under GLO operations roughly every year continuously at least since 2010.[56] In addition to that number, the duration of GLOs are also significant, especially when compared to other GLOs at the federal level. Of a total of 136 GLO operations deployed to all federal units in Brazil, 58 of all GLOs, that is, 42,6%, roughly half of them were classified as urban violence-type operations. Likewise, of all of the 23 GLOs for urban violence countrywide, at least 9 were in Rio. By another angle, it becomes clear that for the past 8 years at least (since 2010), Rio de Janeiro has been under urban violence-type GLOs for a period of 52 months. That number is equivalent to 4 years and 4 months of continuous military deployment to handle the issue of urban violence – that is, not considering the security of official events, which have not been accounted for here.

## 6.3
## On the Edge: Pacification and everyday practices of the use of force

This section will focus specifically on military participation in the Brazilian pacification effort to Rio de Janeiro in the framework of law and order enforcement operations to demonstrate this deployment as sovereign violent practices. Although

[56] If we take into account GLOs for military the security of events, that number acquires even greater magnitude since there were GLOs for Operation *Jornada da Juventude* in July 2013 and Operation Libra in October 2013, the World Cup from May to July 2014, then the Rio Olympics Games from July to September 2016.

military involvement in the context of the first UPP in 2008 has been requested as seen in the previous chapter, precisely two years later, in 2010, the security situation in Rio de Janeiro deteriorated, causing the government to appeal to increased participation by the Armed Forces.

On November 21st 2010, armed individuals affiliated to organized crime stopped three vehicles that were at the Red Line highway, told the drivers to leave them and set fire on the vehicles. That same day, there were coordinated attacks in the North Zone and in entire neighborhoods, taken over by shootouts and causing stores to close and schools to cancel classes. This was the beginning of a series of robberies and attacks to vehicles, buses and vans that put the city of Rio de Janeiro in a chaotic situation of generalized violence (Opera Mundi, 2010).

On November 25th 2010, the city underwent a series of additional coordinated attacks by organized criminality. Molotov cocktails and dynamite were used to set fire on cars; buses were burnt in several areas of the city, sometimes with people inside them, who had to leave through the windows. Police units and stations were also being attacked, but the violence targeted not only the police, but also civilians in an indiscriminate way. At the time, foreign newspapers were alarmed with the fact that violence in the city was taking on proportions that raised serious inquiries in terms of the actual capacity of the city to host the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics in a secure way (Opera Mundi, 2010).

In fact, an occupation plan to enable the installment of a UPP in the areas of Vila Cruzeiro and Alemão had already been scheduled, but the development of these events anticipated military action. On November 26th, the Ministry of Defense charged the Commander of the Army's Eastern Military Command (CML) to lead the mission to surround and invade the Alemão slum complex. The invasion was justified on the basis that organized criminality conducted 'terrorist' acts such as burning public buses and cars in protest against the government; this built a narrative around the notion of an enemy of the state, since "terrorists are usually military domain" (Savell, 2016, p. 66).

The so-called Operation Archangel was followed by a request by the state governor Sérgio Cabral to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, soliciting the deployment of military troops to contain the security situation in Rio. The occupation's mission was to

collaborate with the maintenance of public order of the state of Rio and pacify these regions by conducting police-like operations, psychological operations and intel and social communication activities. (Ministério da Defesa, 2012)

Operation Archangel was comprised of 8,764 members of the military whose average effective was of 1,300 members of the Armed Forces from December 2010 to June 2012 – period during which 63,489 patrols by foot and 48,142 motorized patrols were carried out. Activities included patrolling by foot, car and even by armored vehicles, in addition to the establishment of 180 strong points and 153 street blockages. The military command also reported 606 terrain recognition activities (of which 32 were flights) in access ways to the communities, the establishment of 4,172 checkpoints, 18 search and apprehension operations and 14 area isolations (Ministério da Defesa, 2012).

At the time, more than 2.700 members of the military, including special police forces, the three Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force), federal, military, civilian and traffic police were deployed to the operation and initiated an invasion of the Alemão slum complex – the main safe haven of the most dangerous criminal faction at the time, the Red Command. A few days later, the Eastern Military Command (CML) announced a second phase of occupation that would expand from that perimeter into inward areas of the Alemão slums complex to prepare it for the installment of a UPP (Gaier, 2010). The plan to advance inwards, scheduled to last up to October 2011, meant occupying an area that encompassed 400,000 residents.

The CML announced the engagement of 2,000 men requested by the governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, and regarded the takeover of Alemão as successful, with significant arms apprehensions and arrests (Gaier, 2010). Military action in the Alemão complex was endorsed by the then President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, according to whom "*federal forces would remain in the state as long as necessary to ensure peace in Rio de Janeiro*" (Gaier, 2010). This initiative reinforced the idea of using force to preserve order, only the agents responsible for this were not the police, but the military.

These areas were occupied by members of the military and its perimeter became subject to security practices such as patrols, strong points, street blockages and checkpoints. Whereas practices like the establishment of checkpoints and patrolling are comparable to regular policing practices, they take on a different format when performed by members of the Armed Forces, since these agents are

traditionally prepared for combat at any given time and are heavily armed while in missions. Besides, the pacification effort entailed sovereign practices such as terrain recognition, the establishment of strong points in access areas and checkpoints that represent extreme measures, in which sovereign authority exerts its primary function: that of deciding how citizens are allowed to live by the regulation of social life and the bodies of the individuals governed.

These practices resonate closely with the goals of police-like operations described in the 2013 version of the GLO Manual:

> a) to control the population;
> b) to provide security to troops, authorities, facilities, essential services, the population and transportations routes;
> c) to diminish the capacity of acting of F Opn [opponent forces] and restrict their liberty of action, and
> d) to apprehend material and supplies
>
> (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p .30).

These directly relate to the circulation and liberty of movement of actors to move in a secure (or not so secure) way, depending on where they live, and who they are. They also refer to the regulation of people's lives and population control as in Foucault's surveillance and policing strategies. The idea of population control in particular also speaks to a notion of pacification as a violent means for a social reordering, and, as such, as a tool for law and order.

To Michel Foucault, police is in effect an essentially regulatory security institution when it comes to the organization of social life (2007, p. 442). That aspect of policing is closely related to notions of law and order, assuming that the sovereign state conceives a certain type of social ordering that it envisions for the sake of its own perpetuation. According to this understanding, police is a function of the state that represents administrative modernity par excellence, "*not so much in terms of the distinction between nobility and the common people as differences in status but in terms of the occupation of social life*" (Foucault, 2007, p. 416-7).

As an instrument, the police shall also ensure that social life is productive to the state. In this vein, it should effectively "*integrate men's activities into the state, and its forces, and into the development of these forces, to ensure the creation of public utility on the basis of men's occupation and activity, on the basis of what they do*" (Foucault, 2007, p. 416-7).

In the 2013 GLO manual, police-like operations are supposed to be activated originating from a set of demands. These actions, albeit attributed to the military, have an intrinsically policing nature. The following actions can be listed as actions to be carried out during these operations:

a)      assure the functioning of essential services under the responsibility of the paralyzed governmental body;
b)      combat criminality;
c)      control urban and rural circulation routes;
d)      control disturbances;
e)      control the movement of the population;
f)      unblock circulation routes;
g)      evacuate or protect critical infrastructure facilities, guaranteeing their functioning;
h)      evacuate areas or facilities;
i)      guarantee the security of authorities and of convoys;
j)      guarantee the right of the population to come and go;
k)      prevent the occupation of essential services facilities;
l)      prevent the blockage of vital routes for the circulation of people and cargos;
m)      interdict areas or facilities at risk of being occupied;
n)      keep or reestablish public order in situations of vandalism, disorder or turmoil;
o)      allow the realization of the electoral voting within the constitutional order;
p)      offer logistical support to the OSP [public security bodies] or other agencies;
q)      protect voting sites;
r)      provide the security of the facilities, material and people involved or participating in great events;
s)      conduct the search and apprehension of illicit materials;
t)      conduct ostensive patrolling, establishing patrolling by foot and motorized;
u)      reestablish the law and order in rural areas; and
v)      search areas.

(Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 31)

It is no coincidence that to Foucault, circulation was one of the main objects of police, namely the circulation of goods and of the products of men's activity (Foucault, 2007, p. 441-2). Yet circulation here does not refer exclusively to a material network that allows the circulation of goods, and possibly, of men. It also refers to circulation itself understood as a "*set of regulations, constraints, and limits, or the facilities and encouragements that will allow the circulation of men and things [...] and possibly beyond its borders*" (Foucault, 2007, p. 442). This regulation occurs to the point that the population itself becomes the object of the police by existing in a space of circulation, to a kind of sociality even (Foucault,

2007, p. 442). As seen in the picture below, a boy wearing a school uniform crosses the street at a road crossing occupied by military officers in what resembles a trench. The establishment of trenches guarded by heavily armored men was a pacification protective and dissuasive practice that clearly affected the way circulation took place in these spaces.



Figure 7 – One year since the arrival of the Army in the Maré slum Complex in the North Zone of Rio de Janeiro. March 2015.
Source: UOL Notícias.

In 2011, the government announced a police reform and promised a renovation in police forces whose goal should be, more than simply winning the hard "war against drugs", to end the drug-related violence and protect the population; by then, military involvement in public security was further intensified (Amar, 2013, p. 8). In January 2012, the Brazilian Minister of Defense declared that the federal military action in Rio constituted "*the biggest law and order operation ever carried out in the history of the Armed Forces"*, extended by means of the request of the entire federation to promote human security (Amar, 2013, p. 11).

The security of the slum complexes of Alemão and Penha occupied by the Pacification Force of GLO Operation Archangel was to be transferred to military and civilian police by June 2012 to allow for the installment of eight UPPs in these areas (Ministério da Defesa, 2012). At the occasion, the Minister of Defense Celso Amorim congratulated the Army in Operation Archangel, reaffirming that the pacification task

"demanded not only military virtues, but also common sense and the capacity to know how to exercise human rights in their plenitude, with the distinction of the use of force to know when it is necessary and the civility in the treatment of the population" (Defesa Net, 2012) [author's translation]

Months later that year, Amorim also complimented the Army's work in the pacification process of Operation Archangel. For him, "*the work of the Army has filled the Brazilian population with joy, who was able to watch an example of dedication, devotion to the public cause",* especially given that the action took place outside of the main competency of an Armed Force – the defense of the motherland in the face of external threats (Defesa Net, 2012). Uses of the Brazilian flag as a national symbol in official ceremonies commonly resonated with that discourse.

By highlighting the professionalism and competence of the military engaged in these actions, Amorim stated that the experience demonstrated the *"extraordinary capacity of the military to be firm in the defense of order and in the dialogue with the local community, reaffirming the symbol of the state's presence in that community"* (Defesa Net, 2012).

This highlights the pacification discourse in terms of recovering territories by the Brazilian state to (re)establish order that "*makes sense of the world to order a heterogeneous world into more or less coherent configurations*" (See Bueger and Gadinger 2014 in Chapter 3). It acknowledges military occupation by portraying the state presence as a means of making amends that would pacify and bring social peace towards these neglected territories. Peace and order are articulated in a narrative in which the military is articulated to what Foucault would describe as precisely policing roles "*associated with the development of state forces and with the maintenance of a proper order at the domestic level*" (See Foucault, 2007).

In 2015, there was another pacification mission. Organized and deployed to the Maré slum complex. *Operação São Francisco*, whose goal was to prepare that territory for the installment of UPPs in the area and prepare the city to host the World Cup in 2014, cost more than R$ 555,6 million to the federal government since its inauguration (Bacelar, 2015). However, the plan to implement UPPs in the Maré was never fulfilled.

Operation Saint Francis was first enacted in April 2014, a few months before the World Cup in Brazil as a result of a joint decision per request of the then governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, Sérgio Cabral and the Ministers of Justice

and Defense, deploying, at first, 2,5 thousand members of the three Armed Forces, including operational grouping of the Marines and paratroopers brigade (UOL Notícias, 2015).

The GLO operation, headed by the Eastern Military Command, was named Operation Saint Francis as an allusion to pacification, in that the goal was to "*bring peace to that area of the city*" and since *"that Saint was a messenger of peace"* (Bianchi, 2015). The official mandate for Operation São Francisco described a law and order guarantee operation that aimed to deploy the necessary means to provide security and services in benefit of the population in the 16 communities of the Maré complex. In addition, the operation was supposed to

> preserve public order and the safety of the people and of the patrimony in the communities in the Maré complex, contributing to the reestablishment of social peace in that region" (Defesa Net, 2015).

Peace was meant to be assured through the targeting of the so-called APOPs (public order disturbing agents) in a selective way to avoid inconveniences among the majority of the Maré local population, composed of workers and their families, that "*for decades suffer from the actions of organized criminal factions*" (Defesa Net, 2015). The mission also specifically accounted for a selection of security agents that had been trained and acquired experiences in Haiti as well as in the Pacification Operation in Alemão and Penha. These were to act according to the observance of the principles of minimum use of force necessary, progressivity and proportionality, always keeping in mind the preservation of security and the physical integrity of the local population (Defesa Net, 2015).

The activities deployed included ostensive patrolling and personal and vehicle searches, the establishment of blockage points and the fulfillment of search and apprehension warrants in the areas of the operation. The definition of a threat in GLO Manuals intrinsically relates to a conception of order. It is no coincidence that the reference to the disturbance of order is clear in the definition of the APOP itself, as an agent that disturbs it. That means that the APOP is a category that can apply to many different agents, as it is also defined in terms of the threat itself, which, in turn, is defined in terms of a perceived disturbance of order.

In the case of Operations Saint Francis, the notion of threats was clear as threatening acts were described as

a)	persons or vehicles that impose obstacles to the operations;

b)	persons or vehicles exercising acts that are prejudicial to the integrity of the people and the patrimony;

c)	person carrying a long barrel firearm or a shotgun in an ostensive manner when the troop is in an area within its reach;

d)	more than one individual carrying firearms or an explosive artifact when the troop is in an area within its reach;

e)	persons using a firearm or explosive artifact when the troop is in an area within the reach of this weaponry or artifact;

f)	pointing a firearm within its reach;

g)	to fire, even if it aims up to the sky;

h)	to launch objects (stones, pieces of wood, etc);

i)	to set a "Molotov cocktail";

j)	to raise cutting, piercing or offensive objects in a threatening manner and at short distance;

k)	to advance against the troop and the authorities, direct threats, defiance, verbal enticements with imminent possibility of physical aggression;

l)	set, fire or launch explosives;

m)	launch, deliberately, a vehicle toward or against people or facilities; and

n)	depredate, invade and/or destroy private and public facilities and public sites.

(Estado-Maior Conjunto das Forças Armadas, 2014)

In addition to acts that directly threaten the people engaged in the mission, carrying firearms in an ostensive way within the reach of the troop is considered a clear threat to the integrity of members of the mission, for self-defense purposes. In addition to these, there are two actions also described as threatening acts that albeit not directly demanding the immediate use of force (for not being interpreted as direct threats), are still illicit and, as such, shall be curbed. These are "*to direct threats, defiance, provocations and/or verbal aggressions that characterize a disrespect to authorities and to carry a firearm in a non-ostensive way without legal authorization*" (EMCFA, 2014).

This is important since it not only establishes clear guidelines of how to act in face of the imminent presence of a firearm. It also instructs members of the troop to respond to these threats accordingly. When it comes to deploying force, the rules of engagement (ROE) for the Maré specified that, in case it became inevitable to curb aggressions or to the fulfillment of the mission, the deployment of low lethal weaponry shall be prioritized (EMCFA, 2014). Likewise, the use of lethal ammunition by the troop can only be done "*as a last resource when facing a threatening act that represents a serious threat to the one's own physical integrity,*

*of others, of facilities and/or material goods essential to the fulfillment of the mission*" (EMCFA, 2014).

In the event that it became inevitable to deploy lethal or low lethal weaponry, the troop member should bear in mind the protection and preservation of all people in their integrity, except in cases in which there is an intention to protect the life of the own troop member or someone else's (EMCFA, 2014). This extract makes allusion to the self-defense of a member of the troop. In addition to the self-defense prerogative, the procedure should follow the steps of only opening 'fire' upon the order of the Commander. Firing should entail a warning shot in a site visible to the APOP and in his direction (if the APOP is clearly identifiable) as an attempt to try to discourage him to proceed with the threatening act against the troop and to avoid presenting risk to third parties (EMCFA, 2014). The idea should be not to kill the APOP, but to hurt him instead. There should be a concern to "*take all reasonable precautions not to hurt anyone else other than the APOP*" and fire only when necessary, ceasing fire as the APOP has stopped with the threat (EMCFA, 2014). Among the listed actions, certain ones are clearly considered as threatening acts, hence rendering certain subjects as APOPs on the one hand, whereas constituting threats on the other.

In addition, the social dimension of the Operation Saint Francis as a pacification project to bring more citizenship to local residents of the occupied areas meant, in this case, more access to basic services. By taking into account an acknowledgement that public security was only one of the items to be pursued in the restauration of social peace, there was a need to also include the presence of the state in education, sanitation, urbanism, leisure and job creation (Defesa Net, 2015). In that sense, the operation adopted several inclusive measures of juridical and infrastructure nature that relate to forms of social control and organization. Some of the juridical inclusive measures were the organization of marriages and the issuing of identity cards and birth certificates. These constitute clear forms of social control, since they refer directly to the management of social life by the state in terms of the government securing access to and controlling its population.

Infrastructure initiatives included the regularization of trash collection, the removal of abandoned parts of vehicles by the Army, cleaning canals, building schools, improvements to system sewage and energy distribution (Defesa Net, 2015). Additional activities of a social nature were periodical meetings with

community leaderships and non-governmental organizations that developed activities to identify the main demands among the population and make sure these reached the authorities (Defesa Net, 2015). These are pacifying efforts that aimed at securing basic services to ensure greater forms of social inclusion and citizenship.

Pacification practices also bring about a reordering of social relations (See Baron et al., 2019). In the case of these territories, this reordering has been exercised in terms of the provision of services by the state backed by dissuasive and preventive security practices. Practices were dissuasive because heavily armed members of the military were supposed to discourage organized criminality to incur attacks against them and the local population, and to assure the freedom of locals to come and go in a more secure environment. Yet, in spite of in practice causing more insecurity than security to residents that came across them, these practices were also preventive since they were there to provide security to locals, as well as to assure the self-defense of members of the mission themselves.

Initiatives had to ensure not only the self-defense of the GLO officers, but also paradoxically, to provide for the security of the residents who lived in these spaces. In that case, as can be seen in Figure 8 below (in which a young man bypasses a military tank wearing a school uniform), locals had to get used to high levels of militarized displays of force in terms of weaponry and armed personnel as part of their daily routines. The difference between these areas from remaining areas of the city where patrols could be occurring was that, in pacified areas, the Armed Forces had to be ready to engage in a conflictual situation of disturbance of order at any time. At least the chances of possible confrontations were significantly higher in pacified sites. Hence, due to the security nature of inherent conflict in these spaces, a possible attack, and likewise, the resort to force, were imminent.

Figure 8 – One year since the arrival of the Army in the Maré slum Complex in the North Zone of Rio de Janeiro. March 2015.
Source: UOL Notícias.

Since the deployment of Operation Saint Francis, the Executive signed decrees renewing the GLO mandate in the area that was supposed to end in July 2014 and authorized the permanence of the Armed Forces to act in the combat of organized crime in the area until October that year, then until June 2015 (Bianchi, 2015). The decree not only authorized, but also prescribed members of the military to perform police responsibilities – that is, to conduct searches and arrests and patrol the streets in conjunction with military and civilian police officers. These became regular practices in the daily lives of the residents of these areas.

Operation Saint Francis in 2014 in the Maré was endorsed by specific rules of engagement (ROE) that offered the following guidelines to resort to force progressively and in proportion to an alleged aggression:

o)      [employ] self-defense against direct attacks or concrete threats that target [his/her] own physical integrity and the integrity of others;
p)      avoid being disarmed;
q)      avoid the capture of any member [of the troop];
r)      preserve the safety of the patrimony;
s)      keep important positioning for the execution of the mission;
t)      avoid threatening acts that may compromise the execution of the mission.

 (Estado-Maior Conjunto das Forças Armadas, 2014)

These rules were meant to ensure the mission was carried out effectively. In that sense, they are also instructions, modes of conduct that shall guide the troops

while they are in a GLO, so that the mission's purpose and the safety of its members is not compromised. In that sense, these are not only guidelines to ensure the mission is conducted, but to ensure that it is so by taking into account elements of self-defense to ensure the integrity of the members of the troop. The resort to force shall occur in response to a threat and in a proportionate manner.

Due to the nature of the military forces, usually prepared to engage in combat and with a naturally higher prerogative to the use of force due to their institutional nature, it was very common in the Maré to see soldiers heavily armed, as can be seen in the pictures in this chapter. This made the setting resemble, at many times, a warzone, given that soldiers had to be prepared for an imminent attack at any moment. This was problematic in the sense that the scenes portrayed soldiers with their guns ready to respond to an imminent threat and to ensure their own security, which nonetheless caused a feeling of enhanced insecurity among the residents of these spaces. As can be seen in the following Figures below, guns were pointed out, checkpoints were established, and trenches were set up for the protection of the troops and for surveilling purposes. Yet the population of these pacified sites were equally subject to these security practices that entail technologies of control and that seriously limit their liberties and circulation within this social space.



Figure 9 – With the support of federal forces, military police occupies the slum Complex of the Maré in the North zone of Rio de Janeiro. Fourteen Navy armored vehicles and an armored vehicle of the Shock Police Battalion are being used in the operation. March 2014.
Source: UOL Notícias.

After a year and three months occupying the Maré, about 23,5 thousand members of the Armed Forces left the complex of slums on June 30th 2015. As the

Pacification Force has left the site, handing control over to the military police (Bacelar, 2015). During that period, R$ 560 million BRL were invested after Rio state requested federal military support to act on the Maré, an area inhabited by more than 130 thousand people along its 16 slums (Agência Brasil, 2015). Upon its conclusion, Operação São Francisco was positively evaluated by the Ministry of Defense, that issued an official note stating that the process was partially enabled by the deployment of military and police forces but extended beyond it (Defesa Net, 2015). The note read that the GLO operation was

> "successful in restricting the freedom of action of criminal factions, removing from them the sense of impunity, reducing its economic power and contributing to a recovery from the local population throughout the pacification of the communities in Rio de Janeiro […] as seen by the support of local residents, […], it opened the way for joint action between the state and the city of Rio de Janeiro aiming at disarticulating criminal factions and enhancing the governmental social spheres to foster citizenship and the welfare of the population" (Defesa Net, 2015)

The wording of "*removing criminal factions from their sense of impunity*" makes a clear reference to a recovery of the rule of law in these spaces. Hence, this pacification, both in practice and in discourse, comes not only in the form of greater control, but also as providing citizenship as a result of that coercive exercise. Yet this coercive inclusion occurred at the expense of security practices that subjected local residents to a feeling of constant siege, similar to a military occupation deployed to territories of exception. The pacification restrictions of liberties to come and go, to move freely without having to go through a military checkpoint represent extreme control measures over the social life of these residents. Even if these practices were carried out for the residents' own protection, they nevertheless represented strict control over their basic right to free movement. In addition, they could collaterally expose residents to an imminent risk of confrontation between the troops and alleged APOPs, since pacification 'brings' the conflict to the insides of these spaces.

In addition, as the pacification effort is in place, in a way, it is precisely these practices that create the borders of sovereign power. As highlighted by Figure 10 below, the setting up of trenches over main roads that allow access to the insides of the slums (demarcated as the frontier) are a clear example of bordering practices that discriminate the insides from the outsides. This discrimination also occurs in

the representation of a threshold of what kind of security practices are acceptable in those spaces as opposed to those which apply to remaining areas of the city.

Pacification efforts seem to be protecting an outside order from chaotic territories literally inside (but technically outside) of it. Thus, these security practices create a horizontal border within the state in the same format that Walker mentioned in terms of "*being prepared to make an exception*" not only at the territorial edges of the modern state (See Walker, 2009, Chapter 3). Within these trenches, internal sovereignty prioritizes state security over individual liberties.



Figure 10 – It has been one year since the arrival of the Army in the Maré slum Complex in the North Zone of Rio de Janeiro. March 2015.
Source: UOL Notícias.

The Military Eastern Command (CML), responsible for GLO Operation Saint Francis, accounted for 674 arrests, 255 apprehensions of minors involved in organized crime, and more than one thousand apprehensions on drugs, guns, ammunition, vehicles and motorcycles (Agência Brasil, 2015). In spite of violent incidents in the operations, according to the Pacification Force, military leadership relied on the help of the local population, responsible for around 2,3 thousand denouncements against organized criminality through the *Disque Pacificação* operation hotline (Ministério da Defesa, 2015). Circa 3,000 military personnel from different Brazilian regions – that is, not only from jurisdiction of the Eastern Military Command – were being replaced every two months. 2,430 officers from the Army and 575 from the Navy who were still at Maré received 212 military police officers who began to act jointly with the Armed Forces in the operation (Bianchi, 2015). Complete military withdrawal took place by June 2015 (O Globo,

2015). Figure 11 below shows the strategic placement of military tanks and officers in a particular street in a dissuasive show of force while local residents regularly walk through the streets or stand outside their houses and / or businesses.



Figure 11 – It has been one year since the arrival of the Army in the Maré slum Complex in the North Zone of Rio de Janeiro. March 2015.
Source: UOL Notícias.

In fact, the internal pacification adopted by Brazil had yet an external appeal to its discourse. The first UPPs in the Santa Marta slum gained meaning in a context of shared learning from international territorial occupation and integration experiences such as the one in Medellín, Colombia (Fleury, 2012, p.199). UPP military police and the members of the Armed Forces assisting them would serve as domestic peacekeepers in communities targeted for Olympic redevelopment, drawing from their experience leading the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (Amar, 2013, pp. 10-2). According to the Pacification Force, the selection of military members to participate in the occupation took into consideration their professional capacity and experience acquired in MINUSTAH.

Years later, the case has been made that the pacification in Brazil was influencing Haiti, for knowledge that was also coming from Rio de Janeiro pacified areas to the field in MINUSTAH. In an interview, former MINUSTAH Force Commander Ajax Porto Pinheiro highlighted similarities:

In the eleven years of the mission, up to 2015, [all acting] was in an urban area, in depredated areas, as are the most precarious in Brazil: slums, communities, however you name it. It is very similar, the environment was similar. Not so much Cité Soleil,

which was very degraded. But there were other areas in which Brazil has acted in the past – such as Bel Air and Cité Militaire – that are like the ones in Brazil. The procedures, approach and entry tactics practiced in Haiti are very similar to the ones applied here. So there was a time I did not know if the knowledge was going from here to there or if it was coming the other way around. (Ajax apud Castro & Marques, 2019, p. 242)

Further engagement of the Armed Forces, by appealing to more force, was requested on the eve of the 2016 Summer Olympic Games in Rio. At the time, Brazil continued to be considered one of the most dangerous countries in the world, with weak judiciary and security systems that lack resources, and which help sustain a culture of impunity to an extent that authorities appeal to military deployment to face social and economic problems such as increased rates in organized crime, occasionally resulting in serious human rights violations (Anistia Internacional, 2016).

That same year, at least two thousand homicides had occurred in the city alone, many caused by shootouts between the police and the organized crime and / or during extrajudicial police attacks (Davies, 2016). Police strikes and protests over insecurity and the death of several police officers created additional tension. Many residents of occupied areas such as the Complexo do Alemão and Maré worried that after the Olympics the government would stop the pacification programs and the police would cease to occupy and leave (Davies, 2016). This concern aggravated especially due to the return of drug trafficking and organized crime to sites where the pacifying project, formerly considered a success, had been undergoing frequent shootings and attacks on UPP units. In spite of this, the government aimed to contain the violence that originated from confrontations within slums from spilling over to neighboring areas, of which many were fancy neighborhoods where the games were scheduled to take place (Davies, 2016).

In preparation for the Olympics in July 2016, the military also acted in conjunction with the *Força Nacional* special police force (composed of military police personnel from across the country) as well as civilian, military and federal police in a contingent that accounted for more than a 1,000 men and members of the intel engaged in antiterrorist exercises (G1 Notícias, 2016). Yet militarization did not cease following the end of the events. Since July 24th 2016, 500 members of the Air Force alone were patrolling and policing the streets and these activities were scheduled to continue throughout the Paralympic games until mid-September

(FAB Notícias, 2016). This was the first time the Air Force deployed a battalion to patrol the streets in a GLO operation, and that practice contributed to the Force in terms of organizational, logistical and operationally learning (FAB Notícias, 2016). The responsibility to patrol the international Galeão airport (GIG) terminals and its surroundings and main access ways was delegated to the Brazilian Air Force (FAB). The exercise of these functions is illustrated in Figure 12 below.



Figure 12 – Air Force Law and Order Battalion patrols the International Galeão Airport. September 2016.
Source: FAB Notícias.

On August 2016, as determined by interim President Michel Temer upon a request by the Rio state governor, who claimed police forces were insufficiency to enforce security in neighborhoods, GLO deployment expanded into the city (Folha de São Paulo, 2016a). At first limited to strategic areas for the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games in major highways and railways such as Avenida Brasil, the *Transolímpica* highway and the Yellow Line (*Linha Amarela*), the operation also covered the neighborhoods of Copacabana and the city center and its outskirts, including the domestic Santos Dumont airport (SDU), with a contingent of 22 thousand men of the Navy, Army and Air Force (Ministério da Defesa, 2016).

During the Games, the picture below became common in the everyday lives of Brazilians in many neighborhoods of Rio: members of the military patrolling and policing the streets. One may say that this was supposed to bring about a greater

sense of security to citizens, who would see soldiers prepared to act to enforce law and order and deploy force if necessary for the provision of security. On the other hand, however, the apprehension of a population not used to seeing members of the Armed Forces heavily armed patrolling the streets becomes clear, especially in touristy neighborhoods. An example thereof can be seen in Figure 13 below, taken in Copacabana. In contrast, Figure 14 highlights that same policing exercise in the Rocinha slum.



Figure 13 – Marines conduct security patrolling in Copacabana, South zone of Rio de Janeiro. July 2016.
Source: Folha de São Paulo.



Figure 14 – Armed Forces members of military patrol the Rocinha slum in the South zone of Rio de Janeiro (original picture title, translated by author). September 2017.
Source: Veja Abril

As Vanda Felbab-Brown noted for Latin America years ago, "*the removal of the criminal gangs often resulted in a rise of street crime that could become a critical nuisance to the community and a discredit of the presence of the state and its law enforcement*" (Felbab-Brown, 2011, p. 24). In Rio, GLO operations meant not only deploying military members to promote incursions and operations in high-risk areas such as the favelas. It also meant placing soldiers and marines strategically in fancier neighborhoods to dissuade crime from occurring in these spaces. This may also help explain why while some members of the Armed Forces were acting in operations in slum areas during a GLO, other were placed in the streets of fancier neighborhoods to ensure that the residents of these sites felt safer.

Needless to say, there is a dimension in terms of the perception of each subject in which the interaction between the soldiers and the population will vary, depending on the neighborhood. In fact, slums have been militarized with the presence of military police long before that military presence existed; for Savell, "*the police already treat favela residents as enemies in the war on drugs, and many residents view the military as doing the same*" (2014). If we understand GLOs as a mechanism in place that enables violent practices to potentially take place along the lines of the interactions between members of the Armed Forces as security agents and the population who is subject to these security practices since they interact with them on a daily basis, they become part of their social life to a certain extent. By following the practice theory logic that developments are determined by and in the interaction itself, we acknowledge that this interaction can take on different forms depending on where it is taking place. So even if, as we can see in the pictures, the logistic show of force – that is, guns, machinery, armored vehicles – is present in both situations, we can infer that law and order acquires two distinct significations, due to the location of the security agents and the citizens they interact with.

When placed in a fancier neighborhood, members of the military are mainly there for ensuring law and order and to mostly prevent street crime from taking place, so that the resident from that neighborhood tends to feel safer. Activities mainly involve patrolling and surveilling, but the military does not seem to feel much threatened in the sense of a great perception of the threat that these spaces represent. Rather, it is as if the state were there to protect these spaces, mostly where members of the elite live, from possibly threatening individuals that may pose a risk to them. This is the way in which 'order' is to be maintained in those spaces.

By contrast, when strategically placed in (maybe formerly pacified) allegedly violent slums, military personnel may also be there to promote law and order enforcement (as officially stated in the GLO specific mandate/mission for that particular operation), yet the kind of law enforcement to be promoted here is one that focuses on handling these spaces as threats from which the state aims to protect itself, and its desired order, against. On the one hand, it has been argued that slums residents may feel an affinity towards the presence of the Armed Forces, at least initially, due to the symbolism of the Forces to appeal to the nation as a whole and to the perception, by residents, that the military is more moral and orderly than the police (Savell, 2014). That, added to the fact that "*the military strategy to flood the favela with soldiers and heavy weaponry, 'suffocating' traffickers through sheer presence*" rendered the military fearsome, reveals the credibility of the Armed Forces in terms of performing in a more effective way in that their "*ability to generate fear means it is the army, and not the police, who can match traffickers at their power plays*", impressing an idea that the military were capable of ensuring local order due to their high show of power (Savell, 2014).

Thus, if on the one hand, slums residents may perceive the Armed Forces as more effective for public security, as these spaces are seen as threatening, local residents are likely to experience increased insecurity. While at first the military seemed a more welcome alternative than the police to local residents, following the initial years of their presence, problems with the occupation began to arise. In some cases, residents declared they had "*lost respect for the military for they argued that the soldiers' show of physical force was an empty threat as they explained they overheard soldiers over the possibility of not being allowed to fire on anyone*" (Savell, 2016). This situation may have been the result of soldiers just following the protocol of the rules of engagement (ROE); however, if residents feel like the military may not be able to enforce security if necessary, this may become a source of insecurity to them.

Nonetheless, if soldiers are placed in a pacified slum site, as in the case of Figure 14 depicting members of the Army police (*polícia do Exército*), the local population will most likely feel at ease. Since those sites are understood as problematic sites, the possibilities for violent practices and confrontations to occur there are perceived as higher. For instance, the people who live in the Maré are more likely to be possibly perceived as potentially threating subjects who may have

links to organized crime in soldiers' perceptions and may be hence exposed to violence should confrontations between the Armed Forces and drug traffickers occur. The act of exercising discretion is defined by the security agent at the moment of the interaction, but we may assume that the agent will be inclined to act more or less suspiciously depending on where they physically stand and on the overall perceptions of a place being regarded as dangerous. As a result, as the Brazilian state continues to be the referent object of security, in particular the black population is the main victim and easy target of state violence in the process of that exercise of security policies in the country. As Bento affirms, "*while some lives are born to live, others become lives that can be killed by the state*" by means of a repeated policy of making to die with planned and systematic techniques, in which "*suspicious attitudes have become sufficient for police to arrest and kill, and these can be a body, a skin, a region*" (Bento, 2018).

Figures 15 and 16 below portray a practice that became common in the city: the strategic systematic placement of soldiers in the Copacabana's boardwalk for policing purposes. Performed routinely, this alluded to an enhancement of security. Although sometimes placed by armored vehicles, the fact that soldiers were mostly standing required them to carry and display their guns for self-protection purposes. These practices demonstrate enhanced security in terms of a higher capacity and possibility by the military to enforce law and order in these sites.



Figure 15 – Army soldier greets child during patrol at Copacabana beach. February 2017.
Source: UOL Notícias.

Figure 16 – Military troops reinforce security along Copacabana beach. August 2017.
Source: Agência O Globo.

The August 2016 Olympic Games were successfully carried out, but security was guaranteed, to a great extent, by the Armed Forces. Yet upon conclusion of the mega sports event in February 2017, there were still members of the military patrolling the streets; not only in marginalized areas but also in fancier neighborhoods (UOL Notícias, 2017). Amidst continuing generalized insecurity in Rio, that same month the GLO Operation Carioca was in place in the state of Rio, officially only during February 2017. Throughout that period, around 9,000 military personnel of all three forces – including the special infantry of the Air Force – were deployed to patrol maritime areas of the Niterói region as well as to ostensibly police areas by foot and by vehicle to enforce the security of the population (FAB Notícias, 2017a).

In July 2017, the interim president Michel Temer signed a decree authorizing the permanence of military personnel in Rio at least until December 31st 2017 to support the actions of the National Public Security Plan (Jornal do Comércio, 2017). The goal was to engage the Armed Forces in public security "*in cases of grave disturbance in public order and/or if the deployment of conventional security forces were burnt out and unable to enforce law and order*" (Jornal do Comércio, 2017).

Following the decree, the Ministry of Defense Raul Jungmann announced that Rio state would receive 8,500 members of the Armed Forces to act on GLO

operations in conjunction with federal, state and municipal public security agents. The effective accounted for more than 10,000 personnel, would be comprised of 620 from the Força Nacional, 380 from the Federal Highway Police and 740 local officers (Ministério da Defesa, 2017). According to Jungmann, this operation was aimed at "*applying intel to organized crime, its command chains and means to reduce it operationally and tackle it*" through the integration of public security agents at the three levels of government to obtain as much synergy as possible (Ministério da Defesa, 2017).[57]

To Jungmann, instead of focusing on the occupational aspect – as was the case in the Maré – the new GLO operation could include eventual patrolling but was supposed to entail diverse type of operations, using the surprise element. Additionally, the Minister of Defense included a civil society project onto the security agenda as a means to promote human development, which reinforced the social aspect of the operation. In a formal ceremony, he met the Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro and the city's association of enterprises (FIRJAN) to discuss social action and civil society's role in an effort to promote a "pact for peace and security" that the city demanded (Ministério da Defesa, 2017). He reinforced that along with the role of the Armed Forces, there should be social assistance projects in the communities in partnership with the Ministry of Social Development. Thus, the operation was named "Security and Peace" (Ministério da Defesa, 2017).

There were a series of military operations acting under GLO Operation Rio de Janeiro since it began in July 2017. One of them took place in August, comprised of the Air Force and the Army in Rocinha, one of the biggest slums next to the fancy Zona Sul neighborhood. The forces patrolled main access roads and shared strategic information on the densely vegetated hills area with troops on the ground, and after constant shooting overnight, members of the military apprehended arms, loading equipment, ammunition and arrested four suspects (FAB Notícias, 2017b).

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[57] With the integration of security forces in all levels of government, the involvement of civilian police in drug trafficking incursions has become more and more common. By July 2017, the civilian police had already began to conduct drug trafficking operations, such as the Operation War on Drug Trafficking that month. Civilian police traditionally resorted to less force than the military police and the Armed Forces, hence this may be another indicator of rising militarization even along security forces, implying in a redefinition of police roles (Azzi, 2017: 601).

Figure 17 – Members of the military conduct operation in the Rocinha slum during the Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro. November 2018.
Source: El País.

All in all, some have argued that the combined activities between the federal and state governments to combat crime did not reduce violence in the city, assessing that there was an increase in some major crime indicators, namely homicides, cargo and vehicle thefts a month following the beginning of the GLO operation (O Globo, 2017). The data, which comprised information from all registered crimes of all police stations in the city, showed that apparently only theft by foot was reduced since the beginning of Operação Rio de Janeiro (O Globo, 2017). Naturally, as seen before, military presence can be an essential factor of dissuasion for that type of crime, due to its credible threat and higher possibility to resort to force if necessary.

In September 2017, a combined Armed Forces and police intelligence investigation pointed out that in 850 of the 1,025 slums in the capital city, heavily armed drug traffickers or members of militia were exercising territorial control (Veja Abril, 2017). 9 out of 12 of these slums were particularly problematic since they were areas under UPP occupation in central neighborhood areas of the city, such as the communities of Rocinha, Turano, Jacarezinho, Santa Marta, Alemão and Maré (Veja Abril, 2017). Intel reports indicated that drug trafficking continued to be the main source of funding to those groups, although they also profit from charging local residents and business owners taxes for transportation and for providing goods such as gas and mineral water in places that lacked sanitation

systems (Veja Abril, 2017). Once again, despite UPP sites, many of these areas continued to be subject to the effective control of organized criminality.

Along with the increased militarization in the public space of Rio following the Olympic Games, the UPPs began to be dismantled since August 2017. That month, while the Operation Rio de Janeiro was in place, the then Secretary of Security of Rio de Janeiro Roberto Sá had already announced restructuring changes in the program, including a 33% reduction in the effective as well as a subordination of UPP officers to the Military Police Battalions (Lemos & Bianchi, 2017). This represented a major shift from the original idea of the pacifying program in terms of the tenet of proximity policing, since by being subject to regular military police battalions, the idea of proximity would lose its meaning.

In February 2018, a decree justified in the name of law and order to fight crime was enacted authorizing a Federal Intervention in the security of the state of Rio, placing both civilian and military police forces under the control of the military until December that year (G1 Notícias, 2018a). Michel Temer argued that organized criminality "*had almost taken over the state of Rio de Janeiro*" and assured the government would take all necessary measures to eradicate this threat as he appointed Army General Walter Souza Braga Netto, head of the Rio based Eastern Military Command (Comando Militar do Leste), to oversee police and other security services in the state (BBC News, 2018). The Army, which by then was already regularly patrolling some of the most dangerous areas of Rio de Janeiro, had its presence felt all over the city's metropolitan area, comprised of 12 million people (BBC News, 2018).

Curiously, the Federal Intervention in the Area of Public Security of Rio de Janeiro (*Plano Estratégico da Intervenção Federal na Área de Segurança Pública do Rio de Janeiro*) is described as an unprecedented and extraordinary activity since 1988, to which "*there are no legal and normative mechanisms applicable to the circumstances that characterize it*" and therefore no "*references to best practices nor to any historical series*" (Cabinet of the Federal Intervention 2018, p. 9-10). Nonetheless, the Federal Intervention Plan went on to stress that

> whenever necessary, [the implementers of the Federal Intervention] will count with the cooperation of troops of the Armed Forces … assigned to the [Joint Military Command of the East, in Rio de Janeiro], deployed since the year of 2017 in law and order enforcement actions (GLO), endorsed by Presidential Decree of July 28th 2017

(altered by Federal Decree of December 29th 2017), authorizing the deployment of the Armed Forces for law and order enforcement in the state of Rio de Janeiro. (Cabinet of the Federal Intervention 2018, p.13)

Experts highlighted that since the beginning of the Federal Intervention in 2018, violent casualties rose due to a significant increase in shootings from 1,299 to 1,502 as a result of at least 70 operations commanded by the military that involved more than 40 thousand agents, during which 25 killings occurred and 140 arms were apprehended (Boeckel, 2018). During a particular operation in the North Zone of Rio in June 28th 2018, a military police officer was killed in the Morro dos Macacos, neighborhood of Vila Isabel, accounting for the 58th police officer killed in operations that year (Boeckel, 2018).

The fact that more killings were occurring could mean that more resort to force was being deployed, in contrast to the approach to avoid conflict that had been commonly pursued in proximity policing in UPP sites. The paradox of pacifying coercively whilst avoiding higher levels of confrontation turned out to be one of the main problems of the UPPs as a public police program, but it was not repeated during the Federal Intervention. Be it by GLO operations alone or under the coordination of the Cabinet of the Federal Intervention, confrontation was taking place in a more effective way, due to the military's natural proneness to combat and its willingness to enforce security and fulfill the intervention's mandate.

By April 2018, the Cabinet of the Federal Intervention decided to extinguish 12 UPP sites and to merge another 7 to neighboring units, since many of these sites were under constant confrontation given that security forces had lost control over the situation (Soares, 2018). Proximity would only be considered in areas where the program was regarded as effective; otherwise, the shock battalion and BOPE special police forces would engage to recover remaining areas (Soares, 2018).

During the course of the Federal Intervention, control measures were carried out in some slums. An operation in Vila Kennedy, Coreia and Vila Aliança in the West Zone of Rio conducted by members of the Armed Forces, civilian and military police apprehended arms and stolen goods. On February 23rd, the military set up checkpoints in several access locations to these slums; as residents approached to come in or out of these spaces, they found their right to come and go and move freely from and to their homes to be restricted. By then, these practices of biopolitical control in the governing of bodies through space had been commonly

deployed. Residents were approached by members of the military to have a picture of their ID and faces taken. The goal of the procedure was to help with the cross checking of this information on residents with the Secretary of Security database; after being sent to an intel sector and to the civilian police system for a background check, pictures would be deleted (Satriano, 2018).



Figure 18 – Army soldiers take pictures and 'file' slum residents in Rio. February 2018. Source: Folha de São Paulo.

The Order of Brazilian Lawyers (OAB-RJ) claimed the practice was an infringement of the constitutional guarantees to come and go and of the liberty of expression and advocated against practices like this one in the future. Likewise, the Public Defense of Rio de Janeiro also disagreed at the time, arguing that

"approaches and personal searches by any security agent are only allowed when there are concrete and objective reasons for the suspicion that the individual is either committing a felony or carrying an illicit good". (Satriano, 2018)

Civil society members criticized the measure, saying that this would never take place in fancier neighborhoods of the town, only within slums. According to the CML, the procedure was legal and aimed at enhancing efficiency in the communication between the different sectors of security (Satriano, 2018). Others, like residents submitted to the practice, perceived the measure as necessary since "*they perceived themselves to be caught up in the middle of a war between members*

*of militia and drug dealers*" (Satriano, 2018). Once again, a rhetoric of war is used to justify exceptional measures in areas to which different juridical frameworks apply when compared to remaining 'ordered' areas of the city.

In terms of control measures, this practice represents a change in the coercive nature when compared to the checkpoints and random searches that restricted the right to come and go in UPPs. In this case, measures were more coercive since people were not allowed to leave the site without having their documents checked and their picture taken by members of the military (Satriano, 2018). Nobody was able to leave without undergoing these procedures in these specific checkpoints, and some people without the ID had to go back home to get their document before being able to leave the community (Satriano, 2018). As earlier noted by Foucault in this thesis, these measures affect circulation, as well as sociality in these spaces, and constitute indeed policing roles (See Foucault, 2007).

In addition, even if the pictures are to be deleted after shared with the responsible authorities, this also constitutes the sovereign power and the means to conduct the profiling of local slum residents in a coercive way, to assure its prerogative of the use of force and of control of its population. The profiling of these citizens, added to a coordinated intel effort, is a biopolitical security measure that controls not only the background of individuals. It also allows future access to this data, since the profiles become part of a state security database. The role of 'internal outsiders' attributed to those residents justifies that they become objects of these extreme security control measures. In the case of picture profiling of local residents, it becomes clear "*how every instance of violence and every instance of control no longer associates boundaries with the legal territory of the state, but instead, with an inscription upon the body of the other*" (Jabri, 2006, p. 60).

During the course of the Federal Intervention, in the interim period between the end of GLO Carioca in the month of February 2018 and the GLO Rio de Janeiro that followed it and lasted from July to December 2018, the military was still patrolling the streets from March to June 2018. (G1 Notícias, 2018b). This policing exercise, performed by members of the Armed Forces, can be seen in Figure 19 below.

Figure 19 – Army soldier in Copacabana. March 2018.
Source: G1 Notícias.

The biggest military action since the beginning of the federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro was put in place in June 2018, as 5,400 members of the military, 80 PMs and 100 civilian police were deployed to occupy the slums Chapadão and Pedreira in the North Zone (Veja Abril, 2018). Military police blocked access roads, civilian police ran background checks and executed judicial mandates, while the military sieged certain designated areas and conducted personal and vehicles searches (Veja Abril, 2018). Equipped with armored vehicles and helicopters, the military asked for the support of the residents to remove eight barricades that members of the organized crime had set up (Veja Abril, 2018). The occupation accounted for six arrests, the killing of an alleged suspect, and the apprehension of guns loading equipment, stolen cars and drugs in the area and its surroundings, where more than 1,2 million people reside or work (Veja Abril, 2018).

Shortly thereafter, by July, the state decided to dismantle the UPP in the slum Cidade de Deus (City of God) based on the official justification that it was deemed to be "asfixiated by crime" and due to the high violence that organized criminality was able to target police officers with (G1 Rio, 2018). More military action was deployed that same month, as members of the military were called to act in the area as part of the Federal Intervention, which points to further militarization.

**6.4**
**Consequences of the "war" over Rio de Janeiro**

In light of rising criminality indexes, a shared sense of insecurity has turned security the utmost policy priority in the country. Many politicians have deemed this a propitious opportunity on which to mobilize and lean their political campaign for the 2018 elections. Following the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016, security became a predominant subject among political platforms, leading the way for new policy proposals at the federal and state levels.

In June 2018, during Michel Temer's interim mandate and under the Federal Intervention, a new law created a Unique System of Public Security (SUSP) to integrate public security organs including federal and state police to state secretariats and apparatus to harmonize information sharing, statistics and procedures (Calgaro, 2018). Along with this institutional change, the National Public Security and Social Defense Policy (PNSPDS) was approved by the Senate's Commission of Constitution, Justice and Citizenship to plan collective action strategies in public security in articulation with society in the areas of security and "social defense" between the Union, its federal units and cities (Senado Notícias, 2018).

Upon taking office in January 2019, following the end of the Federal Intervention in December 31st 2018, elected president Jair Bolsonaro merged the Ministry of Public Security with the Ministry of Justice, inviting federal judge Sérgio Moro to become the Minister of Justice and Public Security (Alessa & Saboya, 2018). From then on, Moro advocated for a political agenda focused on fighting organized crime by promoting a series of legislation structural changes to the Brazilian Penal Code, including the right to self-defense to police officers, which he denominated an "anticrime package" (Barbosa, 2019). The question of granting members of security forces self-defense rights reveals a concern about the prerogative to allow them to act to combat criminality in ways that can assure their self-defense. This speaks to an underlying assumption that security agents need to have legal backing in their exercise of enforcing law and order under conditions of extreme violence. By 2020, this restructuring was under the consideration by federal legislators, but Sergio Moro left the post in April that year.

In February 2019, state representatives pre-approved a project bill that aimed to end the UPP program altogether in the entire state of Rio de Janeiro, based on the argument that the 8,000 of the effective of 15 UPP military police officers were "*confined in containers inside communities without actual power to act like real police*" (Resende, 2019). The perception is that police may be unable to handle the security situation for not being granted the power to act like 'real police' – in the sense of a greater prerogative to the use of force, which the military definitely holds. This understanding could be pointing to an increasing militarization of the security apparatus in Brazil. Concurrently, an entire re-articulation of the security forces, and the institutional measures created to handle such current security challenges in the country, also seem to be indicators of that trend.

General Sérgio Etchegoyen, chief of the Cabinet of Institutional Security in 2018, endorsed this legal protection in terms of a need to clarify the consequences of military performance in security tasks. When referring to the Federal Intervention, he stated that

> "There are two critical factors to the success [of the intervention]: the adherence of society in Rio de Janeiro to it and the understanding that the media will have of what will be done. This is fundamental because we shall have miscarriages, we will have incidents. We are in a war. This will happen, it is predictable that undesirable things will happen, including injustices. But either society wants it or not." (El País, 2018)

The clear rhetoric of war justifies the means facing the need to conceive and allows for exceptional measures backing the acting of the military during GLO operations in order for the Armed Forces to be able to act effectively in that sense. As we can see, the notion that there is a price to be paid regarding security has been systematically brought up in official governmental discourses in Brazil. Since during conflicts different rules apply, making the case for exceptional measures in exceptional cases is an important element. If means justify the ends, the support of society seems a small price to pay, according to this state narrative.

However, even within the military as an institution, some people are greatly concerned with the increasing engagement of the Armed Forces in GLO operations. In a meeting of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Commission, former Commander of the Army General Eduardo Villas Bôas stated that "*A military officer is not a police officer, and when it [the occupation] ends, everything gets*

*back in any way. To this end, I do not believe that today I would do the [occupation of the] Maré*" (El País, 2018). Similarly, he expressed his criticism regarding how the deployment of the military in public security changes the character of the organization of the Armed Forces:

> "I want to make very clear that we do not enjoy participating in this kind of operation, so the fact that the government is reconsidering this kind of deployment of the Armed Forces is a positive thing, because it is innocuous and, to us, it is embarrassing." (El País, 2018)

In December 2016, the then Minister of Defense Raul Jungmann had already stated that a banalization of the Armed Forces to solve eventual public security crisis in Brazilian states had been occurring, expressed in 36 GLO operations since 2010 (Folha de São Paulo, 2016b). He alarmed that a banalization was not good for the Armed Forces for these Forces were responsible for other roles, and affirmed this was not good for security itself (Folha de São Paulo, 2016b). According to him,

> "Simply placing soldiers in the streets, gives you a sense of comfort, a momentary one, but it does not solve the problem, because the Armed Forces will pull out. If it is just Armed Forces [acting], albeit they may have a significant contribution, you are actually giving vacation to criminals". (Folha de São Paulo, 2016b)

By looking at this statement, it becomes clear that the Armed Forces alone are not enough to solve the security problem, and that the moment they pull out, the 'bad guys' return. Coming from key authorities within the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces, these statements reveal a need to conceive better solutions to this challenge. There are many dimensions to the problem of organized crime, and although presented as a solution by the federal government, GLOs do not seem to be effectively handling the problem once their mandate ends. And yet, more mandates are continuously being enacted. Placed expectations on the Armed Forces is being renewed, and the chance of causalities is naturally greater since that institution, as opposed to the police, is trained and conceived in an entirely different way, traditionally prepared for war.

Following the GLO decree of July 2017, in an interview, Villas Bôas once again alerted about the cost of using soldiers as police officers:

"The possibility of collateral damage involving innocent civilians itself needs to be evaluated with attention by society. It is there to be noticed that the Army is devoted to a situation of armed conflict. The Force is equipped with weapons and ammunition with degrees of high lethality, high reach and mutation, and has been deployed in urban civilian areas, densely populated". (El País, 2018)

He continued to stress that "an exclusively military solution" would not solve the crisis of security in Rio (O Globo, 2018b).[58] Albeit providing all the requested support to the Federal Intervention in the city, he said that "*the frequency with which law and order enforcement operations have been occurring is worrisome, given that the Army is devoted to the external defense of the nation*" (O Globo, 2018b). His concern with regard to the frequency and the times that GLOs have been activated as a federal prerogative is based on an acknowledgement that the constant appeal to military solutions fails to solve the problem in an effective way. In his words, since "*upon withdrawal of troops, organized crime returns to its regular activities and recovers local tacit control*" (O Globo, 2018b).

That difficulty also creates a problem in the sense of the reach of the mission, of how much the military is actually able to put in practice in a sustainable fashion after the mission is over. Upon military withdrawal and no further continuity, there seems to be a consensus that this would also be leaving behind the promise of the entire pacification process unfulfilled. According to a Rio de Janeiro state public defender who investigates human rights violations,

> Once the Army goes into the territory and does not solve the problem of violence, the population starts to see it as more of the same. This has been ascertained by many residents in the Maré. People used to see the Army as a hope. And it is one of the impressions we are seeing with regard to the [Federal] Intervention in Rio de Janeiro. (El País, 2018)

Many GLOs have been, in practice, renewed and postponed to outlast their original mandates. The fact that the mission's mandate is planned and pre-established gives an idea, on the one hand, that military action is supposed to have

[58] This is why effective governmental action in the psychosocial and economical spheres as well as other measures that can fully address such challenges, such as a penitentiary reform, are fundamental to Villas Bôas. In addition, he stated that the federal intervention "*came with the symbolism of highlighting the trust placed in the Armed Forces as an institution that holds the ethical values and morals that are so important for Brazilian society*", and hence the support of the population would be important. To him, the Federal Intervention was positive in that it did bring forward the issues of corruption and the need to value police, so on the one hand, police corruption needed to be tackled and there was also a need for a penal legislation and a greater engagement of the Judiciary with the question (O Globo, 2018b).

an emergency nature. The comparison to act like the police amidst a crisis in public security poses challenges in terms of the lack of concrete solutions in the long term. Yet the deployment to respond to a crisis in public security also reveals conflicting versions of the signification of the Armed Forces as an institution with regard to its mission and purpose. In the words of MINUSTAH's former Force Commander Ajax Porto Pinheiro:

> This crisis in public security, that is a symptom that something is going wrong, it is a failure. But it is not our job. The ideal is that we were never activated to do that. If we are called upon, it is because something is wrong. And it is not our role. I did not leave as a Colonel, General, to take part in public security. If I liked this, I would have entered the Police Academy. It is not my role. (Ajax apud Castro & Marques, 2019, p. 242-3)

General Carlos Alberto Santos Cruz, along with the acknowledgement of the basic differentiation that echoes the traditional boundaries of the established limits of violence when it comes to the state's security apparatus and its forces, also noted:

> Public security is a matter of police, it is not a military matter. Here, everything is wrong […] Public security is not just confrontation. I do think that confrontation is needed to tackle the audacity of the bandits, and this is a function of the armed force, since that level of conflict is not for the police. The police are not meant for combat. It solves small conflicts with a gang here, something there. Police is supposed to do the policing, not meant to combat. The military is made for combat, so the military has to enter that level of conflict for combat and end the audacity of criminality. So the police can continue to do their work. (Santos Cruz apud Castro & Marques, 2019, p. 110-2)

These accounts by key members of the Armed Forces who have had direct involvement in the context of the MINUSTAH as a peacekeeping mission resonate with the notion that public security is, indeed, a responsibility of the police – as described by actions such as policing, *as opposed to* combat. In that sense, pacification, in the form of GLO deployment, seems to be a hybrid to the Armed Forces as a security institution of sovereign power, whose nature brings to light several tensions regarding the doctrine, mission and purpose of the Forces, as well as their prerogative to force and Rules of Engagement, to name a few.

Despite the criticism toward the GLO performed by the Armed Forces, it may be possible to say that the skills developed by these operations and the expertise that results from them are becoming an 'export' asset to other countries as a strategy for low-intensity type-conflicts, fairly common in modern warfare. In February

2019, a 5-year agreement was signed between the Brazilian Navy and the Marine Corps Forces South (MARFORSOUTH) to cooperate in the planning, combat support, aviation and armored vehicles deployment or any other activity that may enable the exchange of capacities and expertise (Ommati, 2019). According to the Brazilian Navy Rear Admiral Nélio de Almeida, US officers demonstrated much interest in the Navy's engagement in GLO activities – something that the US does not have (Ommati, 2019). In a scale of the levels of the prerogative to use force, a GLO is classified as an operation of low intensity, placed between the operations of naval war of high level of attrition and the so-called benign operations such as humanitarian assistance (Ommati, 2019).

Nonetheless, still much remains to be thought of with regard to law and order enforcement operations as security practices that the sovereign state has chosen to deploy in order to tackle its domestic security threats. The challenge of safeguarding state security while enhancing human security remains unanswered, especially when faced with the conundrum of enforcing law and order to protect the patrimony and the integrity of state. The acknowledgement that the pacifying and occupation discourse was accompanied by the rhetoric of a war in recurring allusions to conflict, added to a crisis in public security, took justifications for the need to deploy force to another level.

This preoccupation, and the acknowledgement it creates, were noticed even by key members of the military. In particular, General Villas Bôas expressed his discontent with a scene he claimed to have witnessed in 2015 during the occupation of the slum complex of Maré. As he was accompanying the troops that were patrolling a street full of women and children, he realized each soldier was extremely attentive, tense and armed and hence noted: "*We are a sick society. The Army is pointing guns at Brazilians. This is terrible*" (El País, 2018).

## 6.5
## Implications for International Relations and Security Studies

This case study can mean a few things to International Relations theory and to Security Studies. It could be an example that shows instances of a peaceful order that the sovereign authority does not have to worry about, as opposed to potentially dangerous outsides of the state that are chaotic. In the case of Brazil, the territories

analyzed in Rio de Janeiro are quite chaotic and represent spaces to which the sovereign state deploys much violence in the way it routinely deals with them as part of a pacification process. This relation is violent because these spaces are considered to be outside of the state, so that these 'insides within' are chaotic because there is an ordered outside, the 'rest' of the state, to be protected.

The fact that these chaotic spaces underwent a neglected process of urbanization, excluded from basic services and where the state was absent for a long time, helps explain how parallel authorities, mainly organized crime, took *de facto* control of them over time. In Chapter two, authors such as Cohen et al. argued that levels of violence tend to be higher in the Global South, especially, that these levels were relative to the level of statebuilding that these countries found themselves in. For IR theory, albeit not applicable to the entire territory of the country, this case study of domestic pacification through GLOs may constitute an example of a statebuilding challenge for a country of the Global South. These spaces could pose such a challenge because the state did not fully 'reach' them, rendering these spaces as 'outsides' within to which violent practices are targeted.

The particularity in this case study shows how territoriality can help highlight internal sovereign practices in the name of state security, showing exactly in which ways security takes on an inward character in Brazil as a country from the Global South. It also helps provide a better understanding of conceptions of territories that were excluded from a certain social order, marginalized to the point where the vacuum of power allowed them to be deemed as threats by the state. This way, the state could no longer ignore them, but continues to handle them as extremely problematic, and so far, has been unable to look for effective solutions to handle marginalization. Albeit territorially 'within' the state, these are seen as sites that need to be tackled with coercion.

This also speaks to the idea defended by Walker in Chapter 3 that insecurities outside are a condition for a life without violence on the inside of a political community. Yet in the Rio case, the occupation of these 'outsides' within the state seems to be a condition for the maintenance of state integrity, and for life on the ordered rest of the state to continue with less insecurity. In a way, enhanced (in)security in occupied spaces promotes a general reordering of society in remaining areas of the city, where residents may feel safer by implication.

Therefore, perhaps the argument sustained by Cohen et al. may be applicable not necessarily to the entirety of the territorial limits, but precisely to these 'outside' spaces. This means the causality between violence and statebuilding in their theory is correct, but that this may not be sufficient to help explain how precisely these mechanisms of domestic violence would work in practice. This could be an opportunity to reflect some more about the mechanisms of violence in countries of the Global South, and how they may relate to statebuilding in terms of deploying violence to integrate these spaces and maintain the territorial integrity of the state.

Ayoob's acknowledgement can be recovered to provide reflection on yet additional questions. If violent practices represent a way of statebuilding in the Global South, what if they are simply part of the historical trajectory of these states' consolidation? If yes, are these violent practices based on a time frame horizon that should be effective and diminish over time, or this particular relationship with the internal threats 'outside' and within the state should continue without a deadline of when to end? There may not be an answer to that at all, yet the question of the duration for theory when looking at this object of study should definitely be kept in mind – especially to shed some light upon where we want to be as we reach 'the end of the road', should there be one. It also entails questions such as sovereign authority and the essential right to the use of force in exercising preserving violence.

Likewise, this case study also shows internal aspects of sovereignty on resorting to violence, commonly taken for granted in IR theory and that may render studying the military within national borders so difficult. That also speaks to aspects of human security and everyday practices of pacification that are nevertheless violent and that affect the lives of many people on a daily basis. The fact that the Federal Intervention has ended and that there has been no GLOs in Rio de Janeiro in 2020, as this thesis is being written, does not necessarily mean that the relationship between slums and the state will change in the future, or that it may become less of a concern to sovereign power in Brazil.

Marginalized spaces physically do exist and may always exist in the history of modernity. Yet by linking borders and internal aspects of sovereignty, it is possible to see how security practices in Rio are precisely what create and reinforce these borders as thresholds of sovereign power. This acknowledgement is extremely important to inform future research in the sense that in International Relations

today, to study security, it may be increasingly necessary to look inwards, to the insides of the state and analyze the actual violent practices carried out within them.

Albeit located within the state, that violence is exercised by the sovereign power within its inside/outside thresholds of the prerogative to use force; in that sense, this is a genuine international relations subject to be studied. This case study on Rio connects the local and the international as sites that express aspects of sovereign power but that, at the same time, help transcend clear-cut differentiations between these two dimensions. That means much for IR theory, given that the analysis of social and political phenomena shall not be limited – especially when it comes to practices – to either the local or international spheres, yet instead, should attempt to see how the two connect and relate to each other.

The contradiction of using force to handle a security challenge by resorting to even more force through pacification as a form of violence was likewise illustrated. Even if the goal of pacification is to reintegrate, this is still a violent process in and of itself. In the Brazilian case, the inherent militarism within the security sector acts as a structural factor, but a crisis in public security and the apparent inability of the police to handle the question of urban violence translated into increasing deployment of the Armed Forces and of militarized means to security. The resort to pacification as a higher prerogative to force, in turn, was responsible for causing more insecurity to some people, precisely due to the mechanisms of violent practices it entails.

In an increasingly globalized world, this case study is an example of how bordering practices of security determine much of what may be left to be studied in terms of security and of the meaning it has acquired with current technologies of power in increasingly militarized societies. In that sense, hopefully this thesis is an invitation to face the issue of militarization through its practical dimension and by engaging in ways of looking at GLOs with the intent to find meaning and significations between pictures, 'lines' and demarcations.

Acknowledging an analysis of cases of domestic patterns of sovereign violence is the first step in the process of attempting to identify the processes, procedures and mechanisms through which that same violence is being – or potentially can be – justified and exercised by legal authorities in future instances. This should be part of an effort along the path of security scholars in terms of their quest and commitment to understand social and political phenomena by attempting

to grasp and make sense of particular meanings, semantic associations and significations that may shed some light onto potential developments to enable future predictions in that regard.

I remember entering an immigration line in the United States and reading the sign: "You are your ID". This oddly reminded me of Rio. We (not all Brazilians, at least) may not exactly 'be' our IDs in this city of Rio de Janeiro when compared to the immigration control systems of the Global North. However, some people may have to show their identification to the authorities on a regular basis while others may never need to do so. And a lot of that has to do with spaces as (hopefully not so) invisible borders that become visible if you know what to look for; in terms of identifying what it is that indeed could 'turn' them into borders.

In addition, this thesis portrays a case in which internal security is being treated as a matter of defense. This has some implications for International Relations even if – but precisely because – violence to enforce law and order and the social contract within a state's territory is being exercised within it by its internal sovereign prerogative. The fact that sovereign violence continues to be treated as a domestic issue signals and reveals that by keeping a distinctive line of classification that labels it as a domestic issue, we may fail to ignore the problems inherent to it, such as possible human rights abuses that become immune to international scrutiny so long as this violence is defined as domestic. In that sense, internal sovereign practices may have something to say in terms of what kind of violence is currently taking place in a world with very few interstate wars and which is allegedly increasingly less violent at the international level.

The sovereign state may be the referent object of these violent exercise processes, but eventually by accessing the sovereign prerogative of carrying out internal violent practices, much of that violence may be currently taken for granted and being normalized simply for not qualifying as a domestic conflict nor a war. In other words, if these practices enhance state security at the expense of the insecurity of some of its citizens, then it may come the time in which we need to reflect on these consequences and on the capacity of the state to enforce security while at the same time being observant of its obligations regarding enforcing the social contract.

To the Armed Forces as an essential institution of the sovereign state apparatus, this case could raise the question of a redefinition in the identity, professionalization and even of the defining functions of the forces. In light of this

trend of possible future in which an increasing policization of the military continues to be clearly observed even in peaceful countries of the so-called Global North, we may begin to ask ourselves what mechanisms are being deployed to handle security as an issue, and the implications thereof – beginning by asking ourselves in which ways that affects violence, and to what extent it effectively promotes security and insecurities in that process.

## 6.6
## Conclusion

Over the years, Rio de Janeiro and the Brazilian state have been consistently relying on military deployments in public space to solve security challenges. In practice, security in Brazil has become increasingly militarized, especially in light of a relative disbelief in the UPPs as a security program and in a context in which law and order enforcement operations have become a recurrent practice.

The aim of this chapter was to take a closer look at what GLO operations as violent sovereign pacification practices mean in practice. By looking at Brazilian Constitutions over the years, it was possible to analyze how the prerogative to deploy the military domestically has evolved over time to reflect on the meanings and significations between defense and security, as well as GLO decrees, complimentary laws and manuals enacted by the Ministry of Defense.

The GLO vocabulary set by the Ministry of Defense to allow for the military to be deployed domestically includes the definition of practices and procedures, as well as conceptions of threats and opponent forces or agents of public disturbance. These terms can be fairly flexible depending on each GLO, its mission and specific Rules of Engagement. Regarding Rio de Janeiro, most GLOs as pacification and militarization processes have been urban violence-type operations in which the prerogative to act like the police is commonly observed. In terms of the domestic pacification process, existing parallels with MINUSTAH have been exposed to reflect on GLO limitations in terms of constituting a device to handle domestic security threats that are treated as a matter of defense.

The idea was to sustain the argument that GLO operations constitute violent practices that enable the pacification of a domestic threat to be faced by the sovereign power with the Armed Forces as the state's most fundamentally coercive

actor in terms of its prerogative to use force. As the military engages in the use of force for pacification purposes, sovereign authority is being reinforced representing its sovereign claim to the legitimate monopoly of the coercive means – the most basic prerogative of the nation state. These claims to violence, allowed by GLOs as a legal framework, are (potentially) carried out and reinforced at the national level.

It has been demonstrated how some spaces within national territory have specifically been considered as spaces 'outside' the effective control of the state that needed to be pacified. These areas have been considered somewhat unruly that the state could not reach, and pacifying them was a means for it to recover them by bringing them back in. Another aspect of sovereign power refers to territorialization as a practice as has been shown in terms of how residents of these spaces live on the edge of sovereignty, subject to higher levels of the use of force when compared to remaining areas of the city. Some pacification militarized practices, such as street patrolling, also extended to fancier neighborhoods with lower levels of actual resort to force and proved to be effective for the dissuasive show of power of the Forces.

Recent changes in the Brazilian security apparatus that reveal a centralization of security forces that enable increasing militarization have been mentioned to demonstrate how security actions are becoming increasingly coordinated at the federal level. On that note, concerns from key relevant authorities such as Defense Ministers over the excessive deployment of the Armed Forces in GLO operations, as well as the implications it presents for notions of national security, for defense and for the reputation of the institution altogether, have been presented. It is there to be noticed that the constant deployment of the military to perform policing roles may pose many problems to the credibility and to the institution's mission of protecting the nation from outside threats, as well as to its nation-building character.

# 7.
# Concluding Remarks

> Brother Ray: *Violence is a disease. You don't cure a disease by spreading it to more people.*
> Sandor 'The Hound' Clegane: *You don't cure it by dying, either.*
>
> Game of Thrones, Season 6, Episode 7

This thesis has analyzed law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) as internal sovereign coercive practices that reinforce notions of inside/outsides within the state. To this end, an understanding of borders not simply as the outer limits of the territory of the nation state, but rather as thresholds of sovereign power, as well as a practice theory approach, were adopted. These military operations mainly aim at reintegrating marginalized 'outside' spaces within national territory, which are, however, considered to be outside the state rule. As part of this forceful pacification process, local residents are subject to coercive practices of biopolitical social control that characterize state security as a technology.

At first, key International Relations and theories on security, sovereignty and militarization/militarism in the literature were explored to see in which ways these concepts were conceived epistemologically, as well as the limits they posed to the understanding of this particular case study. Particularities of security in the Global South were considered to show that, in these countries, security is turned inwards. Arguments related to sovereign domestic violence were mentioned in an attempt to make sense of how this mechanism works and to show what could be a case of insides/outsides within the state.

Borders were conceived as thresholds of sovereign power not to deny their traditional meaning in the IR literature, but to explore the dynamics they represent with regard to sovereign power in the domestic dimensions of the state. Chapter Three explored alternative ways to mainstream IR in which borders can perform that function. In that same chapter, the case has been made for why practices are the best methodology to analyze this issue, given that through law and order

enforcement operations (Op GLO), sovereign violent instances become clear in this bordering process of pacificating the 'outsides' of the state.

The first part of the case study was aimed at overlooking the state security apparatus in Brazil, taking into account its militarizing aspects and with special emphasis to the historical relation of the Armed Forces to the prerogative of maintaining order and security domestically. That chapter served as a basis for how it became structurally possible for the Executive to deploy the military for public security. The development of organized crime in Rio de Janeiro was covered to understand the conditions that enabled further militarization of public space. At first considered as a matter exclusive to the police and, hence, limited to the jurisdiction of federative units until the 1970s, organized crime became part of the Brazilian national security agenda given the high levels of criminality in the 80s and 90s.

Since the 2000s, violent confrontations were observed between organized crime factions, both among themselves and against state agents. Record levels of violence seemed to point out to an inability of traditional security organs to cope with these security challenges, inflicting recurrent crisis in public security. As a result, the Brazilian state, namely the Executive branch, decided to tackle challenges by resorting more and more to militarized action, increasingly relying on Armed Forces deployment to fight an internal war against organized crime. It was shown that this has taken the form of a domestic pacification process that was supposed to promote human security and enhance citizenship to particularly problematic territories considered as ungoverned and outside state rule.

The demand for the deployment of the Armed Forces in this pacification project has been increasingly observed, first in a sporadic fashion; subsequently, in institutionalized public security policies to tackle the enemies of the state. Over the past decades, a set of legal arrangements have re-signified meanings of defense and security and amplified interpretations of internal security threats by posing organized crime as an essential threat and a security challenge to the cohesion of the state itself. This set of arrangements, aimed at foreseeing and regulating military engagement in public security to act mostly in law enforcement operations and perform police-like functions, have been referred to Op GLO.

According to the Ministry of Defense, the activities of the Armed Forces are divided in military exercises, combined operations, law and order enforcement and border protection. GLOs were originally aimed at simply allowing the military to

offer support to public security organs. What is now commonly known as law and order enforcement operations (Op GLO) were established by a series of decrees and complementary laws, the first of which was Complimentary Law number 97 of 1999, that regulated the deployment of members of the Armed Forces in the defense of the motherland, in the guarantee of constitutional powers (law and order), and in the participation in peace operations.

In 2001, Decree number 3.897 (later known as the GLO Decree) temporarily conceded the military the faculty to act with policing power until the reestablishment of normality in case the traditional public security organs (OSP) had proved "*unavailable, inexistent or insufficient to regularly perform their constitutional mission*". These guidelines were further detailed in 2004 by Complementary Law number and systematized by a GLO Manual published in 2013 and revised in 2014 by the Ministry of Defense which classified the GLOs as non-war operations.

By working as a legal mechanism to institutionalize practices of a national defense policy aimed at tackling the domestic security challenge of organized crime, GLOs evolved to more elaborate forms of deployment over the past decades. They ranged from isolated military incursions to longer mandates in operations headed by Armed Forces personnel performing police-like functions such as policing and surveillance. Official governmental data indicates that between 1992 and 2017, 136 operations took place within national territory under the rubric of "law and order", that is, as GLOs; approximately 18% of those were aimed at urban violence, many of which in the state of Rio de Janeiro alone. Hence, it is no surprise that a GLO operation has coincided even with the federal intervention in the state of Rio de Janeiro in 2018. These numbers point to a trend of increasing militarization that should continue in years to come.

The narrative of an ongoing war against criminality and of a need for pacifying Brazil has allowed the Ministry of Defense to accommodate, justify, and regulate the use of the military within national borders. To a lesser extent to enforce law and order, pacification targeted touristy areas of the city with policing and surveilling activities in a show of power for dissuasive purposes. Yet pacification was aimed mainly at urban territories that were marginalized over the urbanization process and deemed as unruly decades later due to the development of organized crime. In these territories, mainly composed of favelas, parallel authorities, like

drug trafficking factions, would exercise *de facto* control, threatening governance and challenging the capacity of the state to rule them effectively.

The idea of the domestic pacification project that began with the UPPs was to coercively remove parallel authorities from these territories restoring public order and pacifying them incorporating them back into the state. Thus, pacification was meant to bring about forms of inclusion and greater citizenship to the residents of these spaces. This process of inclusion entails the targeting of territories that the state considers as being 'outside' of its control, yet spatially within it, demanding a resort to violence to handle them. Law and order enforcement operations have embodied sovereign power in ways that, albeit aimed at enhancing the state's security and contributing to recover its territorial integrity, represent coercive sovereign practices of social control that rendered these spaces subject to exceptional technologies of security when compared to remaining areas of the city.

By analyzing the daily practices of deploying the military to perform roles such as policing and surveilling, normally attributed exclusively to the police, I have supported my argument that domestic pacification in Rio de Janeiro against organized crime constitutes a process that creates a notion of 'outsides' within the state separated by borders that, as incorporated, were also in a way further excluded. It also becomes clear how biopower is exercised within these territories towards local populations, through the regulation of social life, circulation, the right to come and go and when to do so, as well as the greater prerogative to use force to deploy exceptional security measures.

From a theoretical and analytical standpoint, GLO operations can represent an essential contribution to the literature and to academic debate. For the reasons demonstrated along this thesis, this type of operation changes the entire dynamics on the limits of the use of force applied to military personnel when deploying law and order roles domestically. For one, GLOs are an example of how conceptions of defense, security, and consequently, sovereignty, are mostly turned inward in the case of developing countries like Brazil, whose main state security challenges are of domestic rather than international nature. The case of organized crime in Brazil can be an example that corroborates my thesis in the sense of how conceptions of defense, state integrity, and of the claims to sovereignty to sustain it are systematically expressed and reinforced domestically.

This also contrasts with the historical role of the military as an institution, which, according to the traditional state apparatus literature, is defined exclusively by international security. In that sense, this case study suggests that defense, security and sovereignty do not have to be exclusively conceived in the outside dimension of the state. Instead, it reminds us of the need to conceive violence domestically as an object of study. In that sense, this theoretical effort situates itself within an interface of defense and security in terms of legal and institutional mechanisms that albeit not much studied, should be so due to the effects that they cause to the Forces themselves, to the civilian populations, and to the state security apparatus altogether. Conversely, this was also an effort to look at the question of public security from an International Relations point of view, and at the same time, from a point of view of understanding security as an element that intrinsically relates to the nation state and to the sovereign state practices that sustain it.

As a mechanism, the possibility of the deployment of GLOs as pacification violent practices can be interpreted as a means to achieve notions of order, peace and stability. In terms of the official sovereign justifications for 'activating' this mechanism and enacting a GLO decree for a particular operation, there needs to be an interpretation by the Executive that the public security bodies are unable to perform their exercise – interpreted here as enforcing law and order – according to the traditional attributes of the police to be concerned with the state's domestic realm and internal security.

Nevertheless, it is crucially important to clarify that, at the end of the day, the only decisive factor and sufficient condition that can explain the activation of this constitutionally prescribed mechanism to allow for military engagement in public security is the discretionary power inherent to the Executive. In other words, regardless of the degree of a potentially actual concrete threat and regardless of the situation of perceived or felt insecurity by society, even in contexts of crime and 'disorder', in order for a GLO to be enacted, the state needs to interpret this issue as a threat that could, or is, potentially disrupting order. Even though this thesis only assessed enacted GLO decrees that originated GLO operations that actually took place and hence could be observed and analyzed in this investigation, the possibility of future enactments within the workings of that legal mechanism potentially remains open for activation in future conjunctures and, as such, is something worth being studied in the literature.

By analyzing this issue from the point of view of practices, it becomes possible to highlight the different dimensions and nuances of this complex and interdisciplinary research problem, perhaps to invite more comprehensive forms of debate on this crucial issue and attempt to promote dialogue among the different sectors of society altogether, especially between civilians and the military, which I deem of utmost importance if we are to engage in knowledge that truly enables shared learning. Hopefully this could also highlight a professionalization and specialization of the Armed Forces which transcends their traditional attributions of external defense, signifying their role in ways not much explored in the literature yet. As an object of study, the focus has been mainly on the Force's external deployment in peace operations. However, perhaps ways of studying the military that looks at their recent performances at the domestic level can likewise allow for the establishment of parallels between Brazil's highly esteemed pacification experience in Haiti *vis-à-vis* bridges and challenges of pacifying the country domestically regarding the provision of protection and the prerogative to use force for preserving violence.

The increasing militarization of public security in Brazil has taken many forms, but since 2018, the year of the federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro, the Ministry of Defense has advocated for the implementation of greater integration in the public security system, its organs and intel systems. As part of a strategy of national defense, the integration was to be led by military authorities, as was the case in the Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro when all public security organs were placed under the command of the Armed Forces. Since then, the Ministry of Defense has supported initiatives like the Army training regular police, another aspect that seems to confirm that militarization within public security is to continue.

Violence is an essential prerogative for any sovereign authority. This becomes clear in countries like Brazil, with so many structural and territorial domestic security challenges. However, if human security is to be truly achieved, academic efforts towards understanding the dynamics of current practices such as pacification, militarization and bordering mechanisms that are being carried out in and *as* public security become of crucial importance. In that sense, security policies and practices such as law and order enforcement operations (Op GLOs) need to be studied for they directly impact not only society in general but also the Armed Forces themselves, traditionally trained and prepared for combat.

The inherent prerogative of greater use of force by the military needs to be taken into account carefully in military training and procedures to preserve the credibility and the character of the Armed Forces as a crucial institution of the state security apparatus in the exercise of sovereign power. In addition, the observance of fundamental liberties and rights in GLO security operations need to be cultivated, including the right to protection. The main challenge remains in how the state can achieve security while avoiding the risk of waging a war against (some of) its own citizens and of compromising fundamental liberties in that process.

# 8.
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