

10.Appendix

Table 1 - Municipalities with Dynastic Candidates in 2004 Election by Region

	Municipalities with a Dynastic Candidate	Number of Municipalities	% of Municipalities with a Dynastic Candidate
Region	(1)	(2)	(3)
South	172	1189	14.47
Center-West	138	465	29.68
North	134	449	29.84
Southeast	505	1668	30.28
Northeast	889	1791	49.63
Total	1838	5562	30.78

Notes: The first column presents the number of municipalities with a dynastic candidate and the last column presents the proportion of municipalities with candidates that had previous relatives in office.

Table 2 - Brazilian Municipalities Characteristics

	Brazilian Average	Municipal. With Dynastic Cand.	Municipal. W/o Dynastic Cand.	Difference
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Illiteracy Rate	0.267 (0.00204)	0.314 (0.00346)	0.243 (0.00244)	0.0773*** (0.00397)
Years of Schooling	4.039 (0.0174)	3.7 (0.0289)	4.207 (0.0211)	-0.516*** (0.0341)
Inequality	0.521 (0.00147)	0.524 (0.00246)	0.52 (0.00183)	0.00571* (0.00294)
Distance to State Capital	253.2 (2.206)	245.2 (3.816)	257.2 (2.702)	-21.93*** (4.411)
Proportion of Poor Hous.	0.465 (0.00308)	0.538 (0.00505)	0.428 (0.00372)	0.115*** (0.00597)
AM Radio Station	0.206 (0.00542)	0.179 (0.00894)	0.219 (0.00678)	-0.0304*** (0.0108)
Urbanization	0.607 (0.00330)	0.586 (0.00546)	0.618 (0.00413)	-0.0265*** (0.00658)
Population Density	96.11 (7.104)	82.95 (11.37)	102.6 (9.020)	-16.95 (14.07)
Number of Candidates	8.313 (0.0394)	8.503 (0.0640)	8.219 (0.0496)	0.408*** (0.0789)
Population	30,164 (2,427)	25,211 (1,831)	32,113 (3,485)	2,714 (4,992)
Income Per Capita	170.8 (1.299)	142.1 (2.017)	185 (1.611)	-44.77*** (2.510)
Observations	5562	1838	3724	

Notes: Inequality is measured by the Theil Index of income. The number of candidates refers to the sum of the number of candidates in the 1996, 2000 and 2004 elections. Distance to State Capital is measured in Km. Income per capita, population and distance to capital were transformed to their logarithms.

Table 3 - Determinants of Municipalities with Dynastic Candidates

	Municipalities with Dynastic Candidates									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
AM Radio Station	-0.055*** (0.0152)									-0.0308 (0.0194)
Income Per Capita		-0.184*** (0.0107)								-0.201*** (0.0263)
Years of Schooling			-0.068*** (0.00486)							-0.0139 (0.0134)
Electoral Concentration				-0.22*** (0.0691)						-0.321*** (0.0811)
Urbanization					-0.11*** (0.0267)					0.162*** (0.0350)
Inequality						0.0753 (0.0573)				0.0328 (0.0598)
Population Density							-1.59e-05 (1.19e-05)			-1.52e-05 (1.25e-05)
Population								0.0131** (0.00558)		0.0190** (0.00833)
Distance to State Capital									-9.95e-05** (3.90e-05)	-8.47e-05** (4.01e-05)
Observations	5,555	5,503	5,503	5,562	5,502	5,503	5,503	5,503	5,503	5,501
R-squared	0.002	0.051	0.035	0.002	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.064

Notes: Inequality is measured by the Theil Index of income. Electoral Concentration is measured by the Herfindahl Index of votes for mayors. Distance to Capital is measured in Km. Income per capita, population and distance to capital were transformed to their logarithms.

Table 4 - Pre-determined Discontinuity with Dynastic Candidates Margin Vote in 1996

Dependent Variables	IK BW (1)	50% IK (2)	200% IK (3)
Candidate's Gender	-0.0904 (0.0631)	-0.105 (0.0930)	-0.0930* (0.0475)
Candidate with College Degree	-0.0285 (0.0857)	-0.0440 (0.122)	-0.0231 (0.0641)
Distance to State Capital	28.89 (23.86)	16.36 (30.70)	29.07 (18.34)
Population	-0.166 (0.155)	-0.186 (0.222)	-0.0939 (0.114)
Population Density	-7.776 (13.63)	-13.84 (20.32)	-3.558 (9.975)
Proportion of Illiterate Adults	0.0314 (0.0249)	0.0195 (0.0362)	0.0242 (0.0180)
Years of Schooling	-0.389* (0.216)	-0.461 (0.306)	-0.275* (0.155)
Theil Index	0.00750 (0.0119)	0.00551 (0.0149)	0.0133 (0.00992)
Proportion of Poor Households	0.0384 (0.0337)	0.0225 (0.0486)	0.0296 (0.0246)
Income Per Capita	-0.114 (0.0895)	-0.120 (0.127)	-0.0825 (0.0655)
AM radio station	-0.0315 (0.0471)	-0.0422 (0.0625)	-0.00821 (0.0372)
Urbanization	-0.0653 (0.0400)	-0.0985* (0.0573)	-0.0315 (0.0290)
Number of candidates in the election	-0.362 (0.342)	0.0281 (0.452)	-0.197 (0.262)
Observations	1,084	1,084	1,084

Note: Robust Standard Deviations in parentheses. Sample includes only candidates with a vote margin smaller than 0.6. Candidate's gender = 1 if the candidate is male. Inequality is measured by the Theil Index of income. Distance to Capital is measured in Km. Income per capita, population and distance to capital were transformed to their logarithms. The number of candidates refers to the sum of the number of candidates in the 1996, 2000 and 2004 elections.

Table 5 - Pre-determined Discontinuity with Dynastic Candidates Margin Vote in 2000

Dependent Variables	IK BW (1)	50% IK (2)	200% IK (3)
Candidate's Gender	-0.0189 (0.0482)	-0.0347 (0.0676)	0.0147 (0.0366)
Candidate with College Degree	-0.0740 (0.0751)	-0.205* (0.109)	-0.0840 (0.0567)
Distance to State Capital	1.592 (19.75)	-0.120 (27.26)	3.892 (14.98)
Population	0.0575 (0.146)	0.0712 (0.209)	-0.0121 (0.112)
Population Density	-8.554 (13.00)	-17.05 (15.77)	-13.20 (14.68)
Proportion of Illiterate Adults	0.0333* (0.0182)	0.0345 (0.0245)	0.0354** (0.0141)
Years of Schooling	-0.357** (0.144)	-0.423** (0.200)	-0.328*** (0.111)
Inequality	-0.00195 (0.0182)	-0.000194 (0.0261)	-0.000374 (0.0133)
Proportion of Poor Households	0.0506* (0.0275)	0.0554 (0.0373)	0.0556*** (0.0211)
Income Per capita	-0.140** (0.0626)	-0.115 (0.0823)	-0.121** (0.0489)
AM radio station	0.0616 (0.0597)	0.113 (0.0889)	0.0179 (0.0443)
Urbanization	-0.0563* (0.0300)	-0.0814* (0.0418)	-0.0450** (0.0226)
Number of candidates in the election	0.607* (0.351)	0.638 (0.526)	0.288 (0.266)
Observations	1450	1450	1450

Note: Robust Standard Deviations in parentheses. Sample includes only candidates with a vote margin smaller than 0.6. Candidate's gender = 1 if the candidate is male. Inequality is measured by the Theil Index of income. Distance to Capital is measured in Km. Income per capita, population and distance to capital were transformed to their logarithms. The number of candidates refers to the sum of the number of candidates in the 1996, 2000 and 2004 elections.

Table 6 - Pre-determined Discontinuity with Dynastic Candidates Margin Vote in 2004

Dependent Variables	IK BW (1)	50% IK (2)	200% IK (3)
Candidate's Gender	0.00516 (0.0464)	-0.0505 (0.0614)	0.0305 (0.0366)
Candidate with College Degree	-0.0231 (0.0550)	0.0163 (0.0749)	0.0175 (0.0424)
Distance to State Capital	-19.01 (20.54)	-17.23 (27.69)	-16.70 (15.73)
Population	0.00627 (0.0945)	0.0382 (0.122)	0.0363 (0.0740)
Population Density	-17.01 (13.43)	-5.386 (12.33)	-13.33 (11.60)
Proportion of Illiterate Adults	0.0301* (0.0179)	0.0205 (0.0247)	0.0190 (0.0136)
Years of Schooling	-0.147 (0.125)	-0.106 (0.170)	-0.0856 (0.0959)
Inequality	-0.00871 (0.0123)	-0.0182 (0.0169)	-0.00878 (0.00958)
Proportion of Poor Households	0.0368 (0.0263)	0.0170 (0.0360)	0.0217 (0.0203)
Income Per Capita	-0.113* (0.0684)	-0.0780 (0.0935)	-0.0692 (0.0523)
AM radio station	0.0565 (0.0459)	0.0620 (0.0635)	0.0321 (0.0351)
Urbanization	-0.00850 (0.0263)	0.00225 (0.0359)	0.00342 (0.0203)
Number of Candidates	0.0907 (0.270)	-0.264 (0.370)	0.226 (0.204)
Observations	1,853	1,853	1,853

Note: Robust Standard Deviations in parentheses. Sample includes only candidates with a vote margin smaller than 0.6. Candidate's gender = 1 if the candidate is male. Inequality is measured by the Theil Index of income. Distance to Capital is measured in Km. Income per capita, population and distance to capital were transformed to their logarithms. The number of candidates refers to the sum of the number of candidates in the 1996, 2000 and 2004 elections.

Table 7 - Effect of Political Dynasties on Mayors' Identity

	Female Mayors (1)	Age of Mayor (2)	Mayor w. Coll. Deg. (3)	Prop. Leg. May. Coal. (4)
Average	0.112 (0.00736) 1,843	47.3 (0.231) 1,854	0.419 (0.0115) 1,856	0.313 (0.00458) 1,856
OLS	0.0760*** (0.0155) 1,827	-2.579*** (0.465) 1,838	0.0491** (0.0225) 1,840	0.175*** (0.00759) 1,840
Observations	1,827	1,838	1,840	1,840
R-squared	0.019	0.031	0.080	0.343
Linear	0.0745*** (0.0243) 1,827	-1.851** (0.759) 1,838	0.00666 (0.0352) 1,840	1.15e-05 (0.0105) 1,840
Specification	(0.0243)	(0.759)	(0.0352)	(0.0105)
Observations	1,827	1,838	1,840	1,840
R-squared	0.019	0.032	0.082	0.503
Quadratic	0.0616* (0.0338) 1,827	-2.819*** (1.067) 1,838	0.0272 (0.0491) 1,840	0.00334 (0.0147) 1,840
Specification	(0.0338)	(1.067)	(0.0491)	(0.0147)
Observations	1,827	1,838	1,840	1,840
R-squared	0.019	0.033	0.083	0.504
Cubic	0.0923** (0.0419) 1,827	-2.993** (1.370) 1,838	0.0114 (0.0628) 1,840	0.0220 (0.0186) 1,840
Specification	(0.0419)	(1.370)	(0.0628)	(0.0186)
Observations	1,827	1,838	1,840	1,840
R-squared	0.021	0.036	0.084	0.506
IK Optimal	0.0890** (0.0381) 1,843	-3.299** (1.513) 1,854	0.00688 (0.0482) 1,856	0.0405* (0.0213) 1,856
Bandwidth	(0.0381)	(1.513)	(0.0482)	(0.0213)
Observations	1,843	1,854	1,856	1,856
50% IK	0.110** (0.0506) 1,843	-3.140 (2.046) 1,854	0.0468 (0.0630) 1,856	0.0614** (0.0292) 1,856
Bandwidth	(0.0506)	(2.046)	(0.0630)	(0.0292)
Observations	1,843	1,854	1,856	1,856
200% IK	0.0734** (0.0304) 1,843	-2.644** (1.127) 1,854	0.00944 (0.0381) 1,856	0.0157 (0.0160) 1,856
Bandwidth	(0.0304)	(1.127)	(0.0381)	(0.0160)
Observations	1,843	1,854	1,856	1,856

Notes: Robust standard deviations in parentheses. Controls in the parametric specifications include Theil Index, distance to the state capital, population, income and radio station existence in the municipalities, Herfindahl index for votes and dummies for candidates running for reelection. All the variables measured in reais are in per capita units and were, along with the population, transformed to their logarithm. Female Mayor = 1 if the mayor was a woman. Mayor w. Coll. Deg. = 1 if the mayor had a college degree. Prop. Leg. May. Coa. is the proportion of municipal legislator in the mayor's coalition.

Table 8 - Effect of Political Dynasties on Policy Choices and Political Competition

	Prop. Bills Appr.	Discret. Transfer	Work on Zon. La.	Employ. in Dir. Adm.	Person. Expen.	Prop. Empl. Coll. Deg.	Direct Inv.	Num. of Cand.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Average	0.886 (0.00518)	- (0.0116)	0.53 (0.0116)	- (0.0127)	- (0.0130)	0.178 (0.00222)	- (0.0299)	2.788 (0.0244)
Observations	1,539	-	1,855	-	-	1,855	-	1,855
OLS	0.00796 (0.0106)	0.0418 (0.0591)	-0.00569 (0.0218)	-0.00220 (0.0127)	0.00455 (0.0130)	0.0107** (0.00430)	0.0146 (0.0299)	-0.13*** (0.0441)
Observations	1,530	1,773	1,840	1,840	1,837	1,840	1,835	1,840
R-squared	0.006	0.054	0.161	0.890	0.475	0.090	0.227	0.205
Linear Specification	-0.00943 (0.0172)	-0.127 (0.0932)	-0.0199 (0.0341)	0.00366 (0.0199)	-0.042** (0.0201)	0.00180 (0.00675)	-0.0889* (0.0465)	-0.0383 (0.0693)
Observations	1,530	1,773	1,840	1,840	1,837	1,840	1,835	1,840
R-squared	0.011	0.057	0.161	0.890	0.478	0.092	0.230	0.206
Quadratic Specification	-0.0244 (0.0238)	-0.119 (0.131)	0.0258 (0.0478)	0.0164 (0.0279)	-0.0162 (0.0282)	0.00647 (0.00958)	0.0199 (0.0638)	0.0297 (0.0979)
Observations	1,530	1,773	1,840	1,840	1,837	1,840	1,835	1,840
R-squared	0.012	0.057	0.163	0.890	0.479	0.092	0.233	0.207
Cubic Specification	-0.0256 (0.0311)	-0.0318 (0.165)	0.0304 (0.0607)	0.00890 (0.0359)	-0.0191 (0.0373)	-0.000557 (0.0124)	0.0759 (0.0824)	-0.0584 (0.127)
Observations	1,530	1,773	1,840	1,840	1,837	1,840	1,835	1,840
R-squared	0.012	0.057	0.163	0.890	0.479	0.093	0.233	0.208
IK Optimal Bandwidth	- (0.0368)	-0.129 (0.116)	0.0284 (0.0765)	0.0313 (0.0818)	-0.0622 (0.0478)	-0.000799 (0.0115)	0.00739 (0.0960)	-0.00866 (0.126)
Observations	1,539	1,781	1,855	1,855	1,840	1,855	1,838	1,855
50% IK Bandwidth	0.0295 (0.0581)	-0.0518 (0.148)	0.0655 (0.109)	0.0474 (0.109)	-0.0533 (0.0645)	-0.00730 (0.0159)	-0.0173 (0.137)	-0.109 (0.176)
Observations	1,539	1,781	1,855	1,855	1,840	1,855	1,838	1,855
200% IK Bandwidth	-0.0161 (0.0268)	-0.160 (0.0981)	0.0149 (0.0560)	0.0362 (0.0630)	-0.0436 (0.0367)	0.00134 (0.00874)	-0.0376 (0.0714)	0.0214 (0.0937)
Observations	1,539	1,781	1,855	1,855	1,840	1,855	1,838	1,855

Notes: Robust standard deviations in parentheses. Controls in the parametric specifications include Theil Index, distance to the state capital, population, income and radio station existence in the municipalities, Herfindahl index for votes and dummies for candidates running for reelection. All the variables measured in reais are in per capita units and were, along with the population and the number of employees in the direct administration, transformed to their logarithm. Prop. Bills Appr. = Number of bills approved which were submitted by the mayor/ Number of bills which were submitted by the mayor. Discret. Transfers refers to the total value of these block grants, which were approved during the 2005-2008 mandate. Work on Zon. La. = 1 if the municipal government was working on Zoning Laws either in 2005 or in 2008. Employ. in the Dir. Adm. is the average number of employees which were working in the Direct Administration in the years 2005, 2006 and 2008. Prop. Empl. w. Coll. Deg. is the average proportion of employees working on the Direct Administration in the same years. Pers. Exp. and Dir. Inv. Person. Expend. and Direct Inv. are the average of the annual value of personnel expenditure and of the direct investment in the 2005-2008 mandate. Num. of Cand. is the number of candidates in the 2008 elections.

Table 9 - Effect of Political Dynasties on Welfare

	Income Per Capita Growth	2008 Camp. Spending	Reelec. Mayors
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Average	0.167 (0.00682)	- -	0.486 (0.0133)
Observations	1,855	-	1,407
OLS	-0.00829 (0.0138)	0.197 (0.122)	0.0261 (0.0270)
Observations	1,840	408	1,394
R-squared	0.014	0.040	0.007
Linear	-0.0247 (0.0242)	0.427** (0.200)	0.0382 (0.0422)
Observations	1,840	408	1,394
R-squared	0.016	0.049	0.008
Quadratic	-0.00351 (0.0313)	0.471* (0.281)	-0.00202 (0.0584)
Observations	1,840	408	1,394
R-squared	0.017	0.054	0.012
Cubic	0.00658 (0.0347)	0.514 (0.356)	0.0873 (0.0736)
Observations	1,840	408	1,394
R-squared	0.017	0.055	0.019
IK Optimal	0.0451 (0.0405)	0.406 (0.365)	0.0648 (0.0678)
Observations	1,855	410	1,407
50% IK	0.0318 (0.0508)	0.426 (0.434)	0.112 (0.0926)
Observations	1,855	410	1,407
200% IK	0.00365 (0.0293)	0.488* (0.276)	0.0444 (0.0522)
Observations	1,855	410	1,407

Notes: Robust standard deviations in parentheses. Controls in the parametric specifications include Theil Index, distance to the state capital, population, income and radio station existence in the municipalities, Herfindahl index for votes and dummies for candidates running for reelection. All the variables measured in reais are in per capita units and the population variable were transformed to their logarithm. Income Per Capita Growth is the growth rate of income per capita in the entire 2005-2008 mandate. 2008 Camp. Spending is the total value spent by the mayor in his reelection campaign. Reelec. Mayor = 1 if the mayor was reelected in the 2008 elections and = 0 if the mayor was eligible but was not reelected.

Table 10 - Common Names

Rank	Name	Number of Occurrences
1	da Silva	3493
2	de Oliveira	2083
3	Pereira	1881
4	dos Santos	1761
5	Ferreira	1625
6	Alves	1622
7	de Souza	1547
8	Rodrigues	1328
9	Gomes	1064
10	Ribeiro	1010

Notes: The number of occurrences was calculated based on name of the mayors in the 1989-1992 and in the 1993-1996 mandates, as well as of the candidates in the 1996, 2000 and 2004 elections.

Table 11 - Effect of Political Dynasties with Uncommon Names on Mayors' Identity

	Female Mayors (1)	Age of the Mayor (2)	Mayor w. Coll. Deg. (3)	Prop. Leg. May. Coal. (4)
Average	0.129 (0.00949) 1,252	46.9 (0.285) 1,260	0.443 (0.0140) 1,261	0.319 (0.00532) 1,365
OLS	0.0813*** (0.0193)	-2.480*** (0.567)	0.0477* (0.0273)	0.171*** (0.00882)
Observations	1,243	1,251	1,252	1,354
R-squared	0.019	0.032	0.077	0.347
Linear	0.0894*** (0.0295)	-1.850** (0.912)	0.0182 (0.0418)	-0.00695 (0.0121)
Specification				
Observations	1,243	1,251	1,252	1,354
R-squared	0.019	0.033	0.078	0.510
Quadratic	0.0774* (0.0412)	-3.156** (1.286)	0.0422 (0.0582)	0.00193 (0.0166)
Specification				
Observations	1,243	1,251	1,252	1,354
R-squared	0.019	0.035	0.079	0.510
Cubic	0.112** (0.0504)	-3.310** (1.662)	0.0312 (0.0737)	0.0346 (0.0213)
Specification				
Observations	1,243	1,251	1,252	1,354
R-squared	0.021	0.036	0.079	0.512
IK Optimal	0.0907* (0.0488)	-2.695 (1.693)	0.0894 (0.0729)	0.0481* (0.0256)
Bandwidth				
Observations	1,252	1,260	1,261	1,365
50% IK	0.123** (0.0610)	-2.221 (2.234)	0.0922 (0.101)	0.0577* (0.0344)
Bandwidth				
Observations	1,252	1,260	1,261	1,365
200% IK	0.102*** (0.0394)	-2.753** (1.284)	0.0403 (0.0562)	0.0179 (0.0189)
Bandwidth				
Observations	1,252	1,260	1,261	1,365

Notes: Robust standard deviations in parentheses. Controls in the parametric specifications include Theil Index, distance to the state capital, population, income and radio station existence in the municipalities, Herfindahl index for votes and dummies for candidates running for reelection. All the variables measured in reais are in per capita units and were, along with the population variable, transformed to their logarithm. Female Mayor = 1 if the mayor was a woman. Mayor w. Coll. Deg. = 1 if the mayor had a college degree. Prop. Leg. May. Coa. is the proportion of municipal legislator in the mayor's coalition.

Table 12 - Effect of Dynasties with Uncommon Names on Policy Choices and Political Competition


	Prop.Bills Appr. (1)	Discret. Transfer (2)	Work Zon. La. (3)	Employ. Dir. Ad. (4)	Person. Expen. (5)	Prop. Emp. Coll. Deg. (6)	Direct Inv. (7)	Num. of Cand. (8)
Average	0.888 (0.00605)	- (0.00605)	0.532 (0.0135)	- (0.0135)	- (0.0135)	0.182 (0.00257)	- (0.00257)	2.766 (0.0278)
Observations	1,138	-	1,365	-	-	1,365	-	1,365
OLS	0.0117 (0.0125)	0.0986 (0.0665)	0.0198 (0.0253)	-0.00259 (0.0151)	0.000398 (0.0152)	0.00628 (0.00495)	0.0283 (0.0344)	-0.128** (0.0494)
Observations	1,132	1,306	1,354	1,354	1,351	1,354	1,350	1,354
R-squared	0.007	0.061	0.164	0.887	0.473	0.078	0.232	0.215
Linear Specification	-0.00292 (0.0198)	-0.0174 (0.103)	-0.0131 (0.0394)	0.0210 (0.0232)	-0.0386* (0.0233)	0.000533 (0.00764)	-0.0731 (0.0528)	-0.0201 (0.0747)
Observations	1,132	1,306	1,354	1,354	1,351	1,354	1,350	1,354
R-squared	0.012	0.063	0.166	0.888	0.475	0.078	0.236	0.217
Quadratic Specification	-0.0374 (0.0271)	0.0154 (0.149)	0.0361 (0.0556)	0.0282 (0.0325)	-0.0170 (0.0332)	0.0125 (0.0109)	0.0684 (0.0729)	0.0424 (0.104)
Observations	1,132	1,306	1,354	1,354	1,351	1,354	1,350	1,354
R-squared	0.016	0.063	0.167	0.888	0.477	0.080	0.240	0.218
Cubic Specification	-0.0481 (0.0355)	0.0683 (0.189)	0.118* (0.0710)	0.0203 (0.0422)	-0.0303 (0.0441)	0.00880 (0.0143)	0.0772 (0.0948)	-0.0651 (0.136)
Observations	1,132	1,306	1,354	1,354	1,351	1,354	1,350	1,354
R-squared	0.016	0.063	0.169	0.888	0.477	0.080	0.240	0.219
IK Optimal Bandwidth	-0.0256 (0.0388)	-0.0140 (0.196)	0.0766 (0.0587)	0.177 (0.112)	-0.105* (0.0590)	0.00450 (0.0146)	-0.0424 (0.113)	0.0140 (0.160)
Observations	1,138	1,314	1,365	1,365	1,354	1,365	1,353	1,365
50% IK Bandwidth	-0.0285 (0.0612)	0.164 (0.266)	0.144* (0.0780)	0.172 (0.154)	-0.0895 (0.0807)	0.00161 (0.0207)	-0.0997 (0.168)	-0.0649 (0.247)
Observations	1,138	1,314	1,365	1,365	1,354	1,365	1,353	1,365
200% IK Bandwidth	-0.0385 (0.0288)	0.00102 (0.149)	0.0298 (0.0455)	0.132 (0.0855)	-0.0693 (0.0449)	0.00704 (0.0109)	-0.0316 (0.0825)	0.0521 (0.115)
Observations	1,138	1,314	1,365	1,365	1,354	1,365	1,353	1,365

Notes: Robust standard deviations in parentheses. Controls in the parametric specifications include Theil Index, distance to the state capital, population, income and radio station existence in the municipalities, Herfindahl index for votes and dummies for candidates running for reelection. All the variables measured in reais are in per capita units and were, along with the population and the number of employees in the direct administration, transformed to their logarithm. Prop. Bills Appr. = Number of bills approved which were submitted by the mayor/ Number of bills which were submitted by the mayor. Discret. Transfers refers to the total value of these block grants, which were approved during the 2005-2008 mandate. Work on Zon. La. = 1 if the municipal government was working on Zoning Laws either in 2005 or in 2008. Employ. in the Dir. Adm. is the average number of employees which were working in the Direct Administration in the years 2005, 2006 and 2008. Prop. Emp. w. Coll. Deg. is the average proportion of employees working on the Direct Administration in the same years which had a College Degree. Pers. Exp. and Dir. Inv. Person. Expend. and Direct Inv. are the average of the annual value of personnel expenditure and of the direct investment in the 2005-2008 mandate. Num. of Cand. is the number of candidates in the 2008 elections.


Table 13 - Effect of Political Dynasties with Uncommon Names on Welfare

	Income Per Capita Growth Rate (1)	2008 Campaign Spending (2)	Relected Mayors (3)
Average	0.169 (0.00808)	- -	0.484 (0.0156)
Observations	1,365	-	1,032
OLS	-0.00142 (0.0159)	0.238* (0.141)	-0.0112 (0.0315)
Observations	1,354	308	1,023
R-squared	0.013	0.051	0.011
Linear Specification	-0.00878 (0.0292)	0.473** (0.223)	0.00117 (0.0486)
Observations	1,354	308	1,023
R-squared	0.015	0.065	0.012
Quadratic Specification	0.0116 (0.0370)	0.582* (0.312)	-0.0169 (0.0676)
Observations	1,354	308	1,023
R-squared	0.018	0.066	0.015
Cubic Specification	0.00269 (0.0413)	0.953** (0.407)	0.101 (0.0853)
Observations	1,354	308	1,023
R-squared	0.018	0.075	0.023
IK Optimal Bandwidth	0.0382 (0.0441)	0.781* (0.446)	0.0405 (0.0807)
Observations	1,365	310	1,032
50% IK Bandwidth	0.0276 (0.0587)	0.884* (0.519)	0.0695 (0.110)
Observations	1,365	310	1,032
200% IK Bandwidth	0.00212 (0.0344)	0.651** (0.327)	0.0297 (0.0623)
Observations	1,365	310	1,032


Notes: Robust standard deviations in parentheses. Controls in the parametric specifications include Theil Index, distance to the state capital, population, income and radio station existence in the municipalities, Herfindahl index for votes and dummies for candidates running for reelection. All the variables measured in reais are in per capita units and were, along with the population variable, transformed to their logarithm. Income Per Capita Growth is the growth rate of income per capita in the entire 2005-2008 mandate. 2008 Camp. Spending is the total value spent by the mayor in his reelection campaign. Reelected Mayor = 1 if the mayor was reelected in the 2008 elections and = 0 if the mayor was eligible but was not reelected.

Figure 1 Timeline


Notes: The names presented in each period of the timeline refer to the mayors of *Bom Jardim de Minas* in the respective mandates.

Figure 2 The Effect of Political Dynasties on Mayor's Identity

Notes: Fitted values are from a quadratic polynomial fit, the dashed lines represent a 95% confidence interval, there are 60 bins in each graph, and the sample is restricted to Candidates with a vote margin below 10%. The legislative support is measured by the proportion of municipal legislators in the mayor's coalition.

Figure 3 The Effect of Political Dynasties on Policy Choices and Political Competition

Notes: Fitted values are from a quadratic polynomial fit, the dashed lines represent a 95% confidence interval, there are 60 bins in each graph, and the sample is restricted to Candidates with a vote margin below 10%. Approved over Submit. is the proportion of the bills submitted by the mayor that was approved. Zoning Law = 1 if the municipal government was working on this legislation either in 2005 or 2008. Employ. in Dir. Adm. is the average number of employees which were working in the Direct Administration in the years 2005, 2006 and 2008. Prop. Empl. w. C.D. is the average proportion of employees working on the Direct Administration in the same years which had a College Degree. Pers. Exp. and Dir. Inv. Personnel Expenditure and the Direct Investment are the average of the annual value of this spendings in the 2005-2008 mandate. Number of Candidates is the number of candidates in the 2008 elections.

Figure 4 The Effect of Political Dynasties on Welfare

Notes: Fitted values are from a quadratic polynomial fit, the dashed lines represent a 95% confidence interval, there are 60 bins in each graph, and the sample is restricted to Candidates with a vote margin below 10%. Income Per Capita Growth is the growth rate of income per capita in the entire 2005-2008 mandate. 2008 Campaign Spending is the total value spent by the mayor in his reelection campaign. Reelected Mayor = 1 if the mayor was reelected in the 2008 elections and = 0 if the mayor was eligible but was not reelected.

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