



Isa Lima Mendes

**Unveiling inclusion in peace negotiations through the
concept of political representation:
Women and the Havana Dialogues between the Colombian
government and the FARC-EP (2012-2016)**

PhD Dissertation

Dissertation presented to the Institute of International Relations, PUC-Rio as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor in International Relations.

Supervisor: Prof. Monica Herz

Rio de Janeiro
February 2021



Isa Lima Mendes

**Unveiling inclusion in peace negotiations through the
concept of political representation:
Women and the Havana Dialogues between the Colombian
government and the FARC-EP (2012-2016)**

Dissertation presented to the Institute of International Relations, PUC-Rio as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor in International Relations.

Prof. Monica Herz

Supervisor

Institute of International Relations – PUC-Rio

Prof. Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann

Institute of International Relations – PUC-Rio

Prof. Bernardo Medeiros Ferreira da Silva

Institute of Social Sciences – Uerj

Prof. Josefina Echavarría Alvarez

Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies – University of Notre
Dame

Prof. Marie-Joëlle Zahar

Department of Political Science – University of Montreal

Prof. Monica Herz

Associate Dean of the Center for Social Sciences – PUC-Rio

Rio de Janeiro, February 9th, 2021.

To my parents, Keka and Milton,
and the fierce Colombian women who refuse to give up on peace.

All rights reserved. Total or partial reproduction of the work is prohibited without authorization from the university, the author and the supervisor.

Isa Lima Mendes

Graduated in Political Science from the University of Houston (Texas) in 2007 and holds a master's degree in International Politics from the Institute of International Relations at PUC-Rio (2016).

Bibliographic data

Mendes, Isa Lima

Unveiling inclusion in peace negotiations through the concept of political representation : women and the Havana Dialogues between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP (2012-2016) / Isa Lima Mendes ; advisor: Monica Herz. – 2021.

305 f. : il. ; 30 cm

Tese (doutorado)–Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Relações Internacionais, 2021.

Inclui bibliografia

1. Relações Internacionais - Teses. 2. Colômbia. 3. Diálogos de Havana. 4. Inclusão. 5. Representação política. 6. Negociações de paz. I. Herz, Monica. II. Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro. Instituto de Relações Internacionais. III. Título.

CDD: 327

Acknowledgments

If someone had told me just a year ago that this journey would end amidst an unprecedented pandemic, I would have laughed in disbelief. This scenario added to what was already an immense challenge, and to be wrapping up this stage at this precise moment is humbling and puts a lot of things into perspective, the main one being my own privilege in life. It also reinforces my belief in education and validates my vocational choice to be a student for the rest of my life.

Thanking my parents Keka and Milton properly for their relentless support in this journey would require inventing new words, words that do not yet exist in any language. I can only try, and it falls short. Thank you for so much love, understanding and for measuring no efforts. You certainly know it has all been for you, above all things. To my sister Marina, for seeing me like no other, and to Marina and Daniel, for my niece, a beautiful surprise and something I keep looking forward to for long months of exhaustion. To my partner Raphael, for the loving encouragement, for all the thought-provoking conversations and for without fail making me laugh every single day of this journey. Silly, but alongside my family I also need to thank my cats Jolie and Virgulino – they have kept me company, forced me to take breaks and tolerated my hugs and kisses for far too long now not to get acknowledged as well.

To Monica Herz, for being the kind of supervisor that pushes you towards new flights but never without a safety net to catch you before you hit the ground. As we quickly learn in academia, this is a rare kind of supervisor and I am truly grateful that mine was just that one. I have not felt alone for a second. Thank you for your trust, your support, your reassurance and for being an inspiration when things get rough – which lately, let's face it, has pretty much been all the time.

To my dear friends Camila dos Santos and Mariana Caldas, for the sharing and mutual care that kept all of us going. Camila, thank you for taking turns with me rowing for so long. I am in awe of just how much we have learned and grown together in the last seven years. Mari, thank you for the affectionate and attentive dialogue – sometimes all a person needs is five minutes of Mari's "the Greeks used to say..." kind of talk. To Luísa Lobato, Camila Amorim and Luísa Giannini, for the friendship and shared laughter.

To the Global South Unit for Mediation (GSUM) – especially Maira, Paula, Lia, Vic, Claudia and Jana –, the roof over my head for so long and no doubt the most significant decision I made at IRI. I need to thank Maira in particular for her

vibrant and infectious enthusiasm for discovery, which has shaped my joy of doing research in so many ways.

To my most recent roof, the Center for Ibero-American Studies (Ei) – Marco, Monica, Maria Elena, Arthur, Andrea, Marcia Nina and Luiz Leo –, for the collective love of Latin America and the honor of being able to learn from so many incredible people at once. I am grateful for the stimulating debates on citizenship and democracy in the various activities of the Center, which helped me structure my discussion on political representation and will keep reverberating in my plans and hopes for future research. A special “thank you” to the Dean’s Office of the Center for Social Sciences (CCS) for its indispensable support to my work at Ei, and to Luciana Varanda in particular for her always thoughtful presence and support.

I also have to thank the wonderful Professors I got the opportunity to cross paths with throughout the years, at IRI and elsewhere – I have immense gratitude in particular to Claudia Fuentes, Marta Fernández, Jimmy Klausen, José María Gómez, and Bernardo Ferreira. To Claudia, for encouraging me and cheering me on for years, and teaching me so much in so many ways, especially during my time as her TA. To Marta, for her wonderful classes that also inspire and teach so much about teaching. To Jimmy, for the valuable lessons from the dissertation seminar course, which were so important for the writing process. To Gómez, for the surgically precise advice that I have taken to heart the whole way here. To Bernardo, for all the years of patiently teaching me about political representation. To IRI and BPC, for seven years of intense learning and personal transformation, with a special appreciation of Lia González, for always being there for us desperate PhD candidates when we need her.

The fieldwork in Bogotá has been the soul of this research, so I want to express my appreciation to every person who took the time to talk to me while I was there. Colombian women’s work for peace, in all its complexity and diversity, is awe-inspiring and admirable. Moreover, I want to thank everyone, in Rio and in Bogotá, who have helped me make this fieldwork possible. Thank you to Maria Elena Rodríguez and Manuela Trindade for helping me prepare for the trip. In Bogotá, I am especially indebted to Pedro Valenzuela, Fernando Sarmiento and Esperanza Hernández.

I am thankful to Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann, Bernardo Ferreira, Josefina Echavarría and Marie-Joëlle Zahar, for kindly accepting the invitation to participate in the Examining Committee.

Finally, to CAPES, for the financial support that made this research possible.
This study was financed in part by the *Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - Brasil* (CAPES) - Finance Code 001.

Resumo

Mendes, Isa Lima; Herz, Monica (Orientadora). **Desvelando a inclusão em negociações de paz por meio da representação política: as mulheres e os Diálogos de Havana entre o governo da Colômbia e as FARC-EP (2012-2016)**. Rio de Janeiro, 2021. 305 p. Tese de doutorado – Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

Esta pesquisa aborda a questão da inclusão nas negociações de paz de um ângulo diferente daquele normalmente empregado pela literatura de Estudos sobre Paz e Conflitos (PCS). Este tema vem ganhando cada vez mais atenção nas últimas décadas: embora por muito tempo tenha sido visto apenas como uma fonte de perturbação no caminho de acordos políticos, a inclusão da sociedade está lentamente sendo aceita como uma “perturbação necessária” à construção de acordos legítimos e de uma paz duradoura. O desconforto que motiva esta investigação decorre da frequente despolitização e instrumentalização da inclusão no contexto da negociação e mediação da paz. A inclusão é muitas vezes tratada como uma entidade benigna que visa cultivar a legitimidade de um novo sistema político, enquanto sua natureza política inerente – as articulações políticas, disputas e exclusões que envolve – recebem pouca atenção. A literatura tende, portanto, a tratar tanto o processo de paz como o sistema político em negociação como um dado, neutralizando as disputas e exclusões que se renovam ou se criam pela reinvenção política envolvida em um processo de paz. Essa discussão não é de forma alguma dispensável se se quiser refletir sobre a construção da paz e a prevenção de conflitos em longo prazo, ou mesmo sobre a inclusão política em geral e a atual crise vivida pela democracia representativa.

No esforço de politizar essa discussão, a tese dissecou a ideia de inclusão nos processos de paz, analisando-a pelas lentes conceituais da representação política. Ao contrário de nossa tendência contemporânea de considerar a representação apenas o produto pontual de eleições periódicas, aqui o conceito é tomado em uma interpretação crítica e ampliada, considerada no contexto de seus dilemas atuais e sua relação complexa com a participação política, particularmente à luz da teoria democrática feminista. Além das eleições e da autorização formal, a pesquisa considera a representação política possível e presente em situações diferentes dos ambientes institucionalizados usuais, tais como as negociações de paz. Uma dupla estratégia é buscada para enfrentar esse desconforto: uma, uma discussão teórica da literatura existente sobre inclusão,

que é “relida” por meio de sua interpretação como questão de representação política; e a segunda, uma observação empírica desse debate no contexto do caso colombiano, mais especificamente o papel das mulheres nos diálogos de Havana entre o governo e as FARC-EP (2012-2016). Esta parte se baseia na documentação disponível (declarações e relatórios oficiais, acordos de paz, material da mídia, relatórios da sociedade civil) e em um trabalho de campo realizado em Bogotá em novembro de 2018.

Palavras-chave

Relações Internacionais; Colômbia; Diálogos de Havana; Inclusão; Representação política; Negociações de paz.

Abstract

Mendes, Isa Lima; Herz, Monica (Supervisor). **Unveiling inclusion in peace negotiations through the concept of political representation: Women and the Havana Dialogues between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP (2012-2016)**. Rio de Janeiro, 2021. 305 p. PhD Dissertation – Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

This research approaches the issue of inclusion in peace negotiations from a different angle than the one(s) usually employed by the Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS) literature. This topic has been gaining increasing attention over the last few decades: while, for a long time, it was seen solely as a source of disturbance in the way of achieving political settlement, including societies is slowly becoming accepted as a “necessary disturbance” in the construction of legitimate agreements and durable peace. The discomfort that motivates this investigation stems from the frequent depoliticization and instrumentalization of inclusion in the context of peace negotiation and mediation. Inclusion is often treated as a benign entity aimed at cultivating legitimacy for a new political system, while its inherent political nature – the political articulations, disputes and exclusions it involves – receive little attention. It tends, therefore, to treat both the peace process and the political system under negotiation as a given, neutralizing the disputes and exclusions that are renewed or created by the political reinvention involved in a peace process. This discussion is by no means dispensable if one wants to reflect on long-term peacebuilding and conflict prevention, or even on political inclusion in general and the current crisis experienced by representative democracy.

In an effort to politicize this discussion, the dissertation dissects the idea of inclusion in peace processes by analyzing it through the conceptual lens of political representation. As opposed to our contemporary tendency of considering representation merely the punctual product of periodic elections, here the concept is taken in a critical and expanded interpretation, considered in the context of its current dilemmas and its complex relationship with political participation, particularly in light of feminist democratic theory. Beyond elections and formal authorization, the research considers political representation to be possible and present in situations other than usual institutionalized settings, such as peace negotiations. A twofold strategy is thus pursued in order to address this discomfort: one, a theoretical discussion of the existing literature on inclusion, which is “re-read” through its interpretation as a matter of political representation; and two, an

empirical observation of this debate in the context of the Colombian case, more specifically the role of women in the Havana dialogues between the government and the FARC-EP (2012-2016). This part is based both on available documentation (official declarations and reports, the peace agreements, media material, civil society reports) and fieldwork conducted in Bogotá in November 2018.

Keywords

International Relations; Colombia; Havana talks; Inclusion; Political representation; Peace negotiations.

Table of contents

1 Introduction	12
2 The politics of inclusion in peace negotiations.....	26
2.1 The theoretical locus of peace negotiations	27
2.2 The debate on inclusion	39
2.2.1 Inclusion as unnecessary disturbance.....	44
2.2.2 Inclusion as necessary disturbance.....	50
2.3 A critical word: the politics of “necessity” and “disturbance”.....	58
2.4 Final thoughts	69
3 A conceptual history of political representation	72
3.1 The concept and practice of political representation	73
3.2 Representation as foundation	81
3.3 Representation as state politics	92
3.3.1 The emergence and consolidation of representative democracy.....	93
3.3.2 Inclusion, conflict and crisis in representative democracy.....	105
3.4 Representation beyond the state	119
3.5 Final thoughts	125
4. Unveiling inclusion in peace negotiations through women’s political representation.....	127
4.1 Feminist critiques of political representation.....	128
4.1.1 Feminisms, political theory and representation as foundation	130
4.1.2 Feminisms, democratic theory and representation as state politics	138
4.2 A critical view of inclusion and representation beyond the state.....	148
4.3 Unveiling inclusion in peace negotiations through political representation ..	158
4.3.1 The inclusion of women in peace processes.....	158
4.3.2 A proposed framework of analysis.....	168
4.4 Final thoughts	178
5 The narratives of inclusion and representation in the Havana Dialogues.....	180
5.1 A brief conflict history	182
5.2 Inclusion discourse and political representation in the Havana Dialogues	193
5.2.1 The place of society in the Havana Dialogues	194

5.2.2 The missing link of political representation	205
5.3 Final thoughts	217
6 Women’s representation in the Havana Dialogues	219
6.1 Women, politics and conflict in Colombia	221
6.2 “ <i>La paz sin las mujeres ¿no va!</i> ”: women’s discursive articulation and representative claims.....	230
6.3 “ <i>No queremos ser pactadas sino pactantes</i> ”: the gender perspective and representation as foundation.....	246
6.3.1 Women’s representation in the peace agreement.....	246
6.3.2 The gender perspective, women and the Colombian social contract	255
6.4 Final thoughts	263
7 Final remarks	265
8 References	270

List of Tables

Table 1 – Paffenholz's nine inclusion modalities

56

List of Figures

Figure 1 – Johan Galtung’s Conflict, Violence and Peace models	29
Figure 2 – John Paul Lederach’s peacebuilding model	36
Figure 3 – Fisas’ “Habitual levels of participation”	48

List of Acronyms

ANAPO – *Alianza Nacional Popular*

ANMUCIC – *Asociación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas, Negras e Indígenas de Colombia*

AUC – *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*

Bacrim – *bandas criminales*

CEDAW – Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women

CHCV – *Comisión Histórica del Conflicto Armado y sus Víctimas*

CIASE – *Corporación de Investigación y Acción Social y Económica*

Cinep – *Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular*

CMPVI – Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement

CNOA – *Conferencia Nacional de Organizaciones Afrocolombianas*

CRR – Comprehensive Rural Reform

CSO – civil society organizations

CSW - Commission on the Status of Women

DDR – Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

ECOSOC – United Nations Economic and Social Council

ELN – *Ejército de Liberación Nacional*

EPL – *Ejército Popular de Liberación*

EU – European Union

FARC – *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*

FARC-EP – *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo*

FIP – *Fundación Ideas para la Paz*

GSUM – Global South Unit for Mediation

IACHR – Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

IGO – intergovernmental organization

IMP – *Iniciativa de Mujeres por la Paz*

JEP – *Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz*

LGBTI – Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex

M-19 – *Movimiento 19 de abril*

MAQL – *Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame*

MHS – mutually hurting stalemate

NCPS – National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Crops Used for Illicit Purposes

NGO – nongovernmental organization

OFP – *Organización Femenina Popular*

PCS – Peace and Conflict Studies

PDETs – Development Programs with a Territorial Focus

PMI – *Plan Marco de Implementación*

PRIO – International Peace Research Institute Oslo

PRT – *Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores*

RNM – *Red Nacional de Mujeres*

SSR – Security Sector Reform

UN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

UP – *Unión Patriótica*

US – United States

WIDF – Women's International Democratic Federation

WILPF – Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

WOLA – Washington Office on Latin America

WPS – Women, Peace and Security

1

Introduction

On September 26, 2016, in a ceremony held in Cartagena de las Índias, the Colombian government and the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionárias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo* (FARC-EP)¹ signed a hard-won peace agreement to bring their 52-year-old armed conflict to an end. It was the culmination of four years of intense bilateral negotiations in La Habana, Cuba addressing a six-point agenda – integrated agricultural development policy; political participation; end of the conflict; the solution to the problem of illicit drugs; victims; and implementation, verification and endorsement. The event was wrapped up in a celebratory atmosphere and was visibly planned in detail to go into history as a symbolic moment for Colombia. The signing of the agreement took place in front of an audience of around 2,500 people, made up by several heads of state, representatives of international and regional organizations, victims of the conflict, members of civil society and journalists. Up on stage and down in the audience, everyone wore white; the decoration was also all white, with symmetrical images of doves on the upper part of both sides of the stage.

The speeches delivered by President Juan Manuel Santos and FARC's leader Rodrigo "Timochenko" Londoño at the occasion reflected the solid work developed between the parties in the process of going from enemies to adversaries. They seemed almost choreographed in their complementarity – even making the exact same reference to Gabriel García Márquez's yellow butterflies² – and their willingness to "agree to disagree" on matters of political and economic nature while still standing united in their mutually acquired respect and their intention to build peace together. To sign the agreement, Santos and Timochenko used a pen made out of a rifle bullet dubbed a *balígrafo* – a play between the words "bullet" (*bala*) and "pen" (*balígrafo*) in Spanish and a symbol of the silencing of the guns between them. After both had signed the agreement, before they finally shook hands, Santos took out a dove-shaped pin from his shirt and placed it in Timochenko's hands, who in turn put it on his *guayabera*³. The audience burst in applause and tears.

¹ The guerrilla emerged as "FARC" in the 1960s, adding the "EP" in the 80s. For matters of simplicity, most of the time I refer to it only as "FARC".

² The yellow butterflies they mention are a reference to Mauricio Babilonia, a character from Gabo's classic novel *A Hundred Years of Solitude*.

³ A *guayabera* is a typical Latin American summer shirt.

The Colombian conflict, often underlined as the last one remaining in the Western hemisphere, stemmed from and lingered on due to a series of reasons, among which political exclusion and socio-economic inequality, especially in the countryside, might be mentioned as the most important ones. The emotional accent of the Cartagena ceremony was not misplaced – it was the end of a long and painful conflict that killed over 200,000 Colombians and victimized millions. Internal conflicts such as this are known to cut across societies, which more often than not become trapped in between the crossfire, making people other than the armed actors important elements in reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts – suffice it to say, the conflict’s victims represent 18% of the Colombian population.

The Cartagena ceremony helps in elucidating the place that Colombian society had occupied in the Havana Dialogues and, in a more theoretical key, in exemplifying the importance gained by the discussion on inclusion in peace negotiations within the field of Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS) over the last few decades. In his speech, Santos stated: “What we are signing today is a *declaration by the Colombian people* to the world that we are tired of war, that we do not accept violence as a means to defend ideas, that we say loud and clear: ‘No more war!’” (Alto Comisionado 2018d: 62, added emphasis). Timochenko, in turn, highlighted that “[t]his peace treaty is also a victory for Colombian society as a whole and for the international community”, adding that “[w]ithout that broad social and popular support that grew throughout the country during these last few years, we would not be faced with this magnificent event in the political history of the country” (p. 75). Both also spoke directly to the conflict’s victims – some of which were sitting right there watching them –, recognizing the importance of their role in the process and, in Timochenko’s case, apologizing for the harm caused by the conflict.

For a long time, whether to include society in peace negotiations or not was a non-issue across practice and theory; negotiating tables are traditionally taken as secretive, fragile instances that deal with matters of life and death, and thus being inclusive of social actors has not been exactly a priority for actors committed to resolving conflict and scholars dedicated to studying it. As the nature of conflict and how it is handled starts to fundamentally change especially from the 1990s onwards, however, the role of society in peacebuilding went from a *non-issue* to *issue* – a controverted and contested issue, but an issue nonetheless. This has to do with international normative and practical transformations in dealing with intrastate conflict in the post-Cold War, in particular the growing acceptance that building peace was about more than achieving ceasefires, involving the reshaping of political institutions and the addressing of conflicts’ root causes. Turning the

construction of peace into transformative, deep, long-term projects also meant that societies from those states torn apart by conflict also need to accept and participate in such projects in order for them to endure. In this sense, the debate on inclusion in PCS in large measure revolves around the need for social actors to *feel part of peace processes* through the fostering of *national ownership*, to make peace *legitimate* in order for it to be *durable* and *sustainable*.

My own summary of this shift, as I elaborate ahead, is that inclusion in peace processes, especially in peace negotiations, went from being deemed an *unnecessary disturbance* to a *necessary* one. Inclusion is seen as hurtful to the objective of reaching peace agreements due to the simple fact that the more people have a say in making a decision, the more complicated it gets to reach one – in short, it disturbs the *effectiveness* of negotiations. On the other hand, while for long it was generally accepted that inclusion was not necessary for peace processes, the need to have people on board and, more recently, empirical findings that show inclusive peace processes indeed last longer (Wanis-St. John & Kew 2008, Nilsson 2012), have significantly changed that. This posed a challenge to conflict parties, practitioners and scholars alike – if inclusion “disturbs” peace negotiations, agreements may never be reached; if agreements are reached without involving the people, conflicts are expected to recur.

This is a tightrope that came across very clearly in the Havana Dialogues, and one that the parties are considered to have walked well and survived, balancing the inclusion of social actors – especially victims, women and the LGBTI community and ethnic groups – and the shielding of the talks from the echo of “too many voices”. The passages from Santos’s and Timochenko’s speeches illustrate their concern with showcasing the peace agreement not strictly as a deal between them, but as “a declaration by the Colombian people to the world” and only having become possible because of a “broad social and popular support” – both claims of legitimacy for their work, based on the people’s engagement with the process. On the one hand, the intention of having the talks unfold as bilateral negotiations that happened outside Colombia was a nod to effectiveness – in the government’s own words, “it would not be an open mic negotiation” (Alto Comisionado 2018a: 224). On the other hand, the recognition of the importance of the people’s input from the beginning, as well as the gradual expansion of the space granted to society as talks advanced, were an admission that effectiveness by itself would not cut it.

While civil society actors were not given seats at the negotiating table, the parties set out three inclusive mechanisms for society to participate in the talks – first, the submission of proposals through the internet or mail; second, the holding

in Colombia of regional and national thematic forums with civil society actors; and third, direct consultations with experts and civil society as seen fit by the table. The first and second mechanisms demonstrate the table's effort to keep society away from decision-making instances but still being able to participate from afar; the third one exemplifies how the direct inclusion welcomed by the table was in large measure stressed as *consultative* or as relying on the input of *experts*. Social actors, however, were not satisfied with the level of openness shown at first by the parties and struggled for – and ultimately got – more inclusion than they had planned to allow. While Colombian civil society mobilized and articulated itself around the negotiations as a whole, the activism and involvement of victims' and women's organizations in particular received a lot of praise and are said to have exercised significant influence over the talks.

The victims were at the center of one of the most celebrated inclusive initiatives of the peace process – the selection of five delegations, each made up by twelve victims of the conflict, to fly to Havana and participate in sessions with the parties as they discussed the topic of victims and transitional justice in 2014. The victims' delegations took their proposals to the table, and each had the chance to narrate their personal stories of victimization and urge the parties not to leave the table until they reached a final agreement. Whereas their participation did not entail binding commitments for the parties, the visits are said to have exercised a powerful effect over the negotiating table and seem to represent an inflection in terms of its openness to receiving social actors in person as opposed to remaining completely hermetic to their presence.

Colombian feminist and women's movements – whose level of organization and decades-long work in favor of negotiated peace is well known – were also at the forefront of civil society's advocacy for inclusion in the Havana Dialogues. Initially absent from both the negotiating teams⁴ and the agenda, women articulated themselves and pressured the table in order for women to be present and for their grievances to be taken into consideration in the peace agreement through the inclusion of a gender perspective across its stipulations. The level of inclusiveness achieved by women is seen as a breakthrough and a result of their collective work, and the format chosen for the transversalization of gender into the accord – the creation of a Gender Sub-commission – is celebrated as unprecedented and innovative.

⁴ While the occupied technical positions from the start, they were absent from the teams of negotiators.

Despite the ups and downs naturally experienced by the talks – especially considering that the parties did not enact a ceasefire for the negotiations to happen – and the fact that they took a lot longer than envisioned by the parties, the Havana Dialogues earned a certain “benchmark status” at the international arena for the way it was conducted. The delegations were seen as qualified and willing to do serious work together until they reached an agreement, and the agenda drawn by them was seen as addressing fundamental aspects of the conflict without sacrificing feasibility. While the parties opted for not having official mediators at the table, their welcoming of international support – especially from the guarantors, Cuba and Norway, the accompanying countries, Venezuela and Chile, and the UN – was important in critical moments, and the process received overwhelming support and encouragement from key international actors such as the US and the EU. Lastly, of course, they also became an example to learn from in the sense that there was an effort to include society without letting it get in the way of the major objective, which was signing an agreement.

Despite its incorporation into hegemonic discourses on peace negotiations, it should be noted that the issue of inclusion is still met with cautiousness and spatially, temporally and thematically controlled, i.e., it tends to happen in instances, stages and regarding topics that are viewed as non-threatening to the continuation of negotiations in the way the parties believe best. Its attachment to the fostering of legitimacy for peace processes, which in turn works as a proxy for peace durability, instrumentalizes and depoliticizes the role of society in peace negotiations. At the same time that “inclusion” can often seem benign and unquestionably desirable in its vagueness, its attachment to the political legitimization of a negotiated peace presupposes that it is only desirable and worthy of debate when it has something to offer. It also takes inclusion as unidirectional, running from conflict parties to society but not the other way around, and often frames society as passive and stripped of agency – which the Colombian case demonstrates quite well not to be true. As a result, it is frequently approached as a technical matter – civil society actors get included in the same measure that they are perceived to aggregate knowledge and expertise. Framed as something that can be learned and replicated, without taking into consideration the political character it carries, society’s role in peace processes is domesticated and instrumentalized.

Behind the Colombian benchmark narrative, then, lies political contestation and disputing discourses – less than a week after the heartfelt ceremony in Cartagena, the Colombian electorate rejected the peace agreement in a close and

surprising vote. The legitimacy-anchored inclusion discourse maintained until that moment was put in check. Apart from forcing the parties back to the table to renegotiate parts of the agreement with the political opposition responsible for its defeat in the referendum, such turn of events brought to the surface the inevitably *political* role of society in the peace process. In other words, a process that was celebrated in the international arena as a newly established benchmark on how to conduct negotiations in a simultaneously effective and inclusive manner was rejected by its own population due to political disputes from which the process had been shielded. As widely known, the opposition to the agreement came not only from the rejection of FARC and the feeling that it was granted impunity but also a religious and conservative argument against the gender perspective. Following the renegotiation forced by the result of the referendum, the final agreement was approved through a congressional vote.

The positioning of the rightwing sectors that opposed the agreement brings a new perspective to the inclusion/exclusion debate in at least two ways. First, it makes it clear that despite the perception of the peace negotiations as “realistically inclusive”, there was a significant portion of society that was neither included nor wanted to be, due to their fundamental differences with the process. Second, it also evidences that even when inclusion is controlled and toned down as technical, it does not cease being political and up to contestation. Even the pondered and cautious inclusion that went on throughout the process provoked resistance and reactions that are political to the core.

Such tension is perhaps clearest in the case of women, and this is the main reason why their case will be privileged and studied here in further detail. On the one hand, there is no denying that women succeeded in entering the process through its established participatory channels and in expanding the limited place reserved for them in order to get their ideas inserted into the letter of the agreement. The worldwide celebration of their collective work is justified – they managed to get included both in presence and ideas (Phillips 1995), and the gender perspective is reflected throughout the agreement, whose chapters are all crosscut by measures specifically related to gender. However, as the plebiscite conundrum and the “gender ideology” controversy demonstrate, there is more to the issue of inclusion in peace negotiations than just its reduction to technical roles and political legitimation. If we look closer, we can see that the inclusion of women was the result of a specific collective articulation whose discourse had to be levelled with the actors at the table, leading towards a minimal consensus regarding women’s rights. The Cartagena ceremony is also illustrative of such

minimal consensus around women's role in the process – despite the advance identified in the negotiations, in the more closely framed pictures of the exact moment in which Santos and Timochenko shake hands, not one woman is in sight; in wider frames, one could count in just one hand the number of women standing on the stage. Having said that, even such “minimal consensus” – which in itself entailed political tension, internal negotiations and back and forth dynamics – was considered “too much” for the conservative sector that came together to reject the agreement.

Given all of the above, the starting point for this dissertation is a discomfort with the usual depoliticization of society's role in peace negotiations in both theory and practice, as well as the certainty that depoliticized views of such contexts are unable to problematize and critically explain what goes on behind this “political veil” of inclusion. The questions that inspired this research were simultaneously of theoretical and empirical nature; they arose while reading works of the PCS canon and contemporary literature, but they also came up while following the Colombian peace process from 2015 to 2017, a period in which I produced bi-weekly reports (“Radars”) about it for the Global South Unit for Mediation (GSUM)⁵. Theoretical and empirical questions informed and fed off from each other.

In a theoretical key, this dissertation proposes to reframe the inclusion debate through the concept of political representation. By itself, inclusion is an imprecise notion that collapses the process of struggling for something and the results of such process, ignoring the dispute, the conflict and the inadvertent exclusion that might stand behind the final product of “society's inclusion in peace negotiations”. It also frames the debate in benign terms, since “inclusion” often carries an inherent positive spin and ends up working to silence critical views of it – since it is so hard to achieve in contexts like these, we run a risk of accepting any inclusion without questions, under the impression that *some inclusion* is better than *no inclusion*. Furthermore, as it is currently mobilized to describe peace efforts, the inclusion lexicon does not promote a conceptual differentiation between political participation and representation, which is another problem with the vagueness entailed by its employment. This is indicative of the lack of integration between theory, practice and research in the field; as pointed out by Louis Kriesberg, “[r]esearch has rarely sought to specify or assess major theoretical

⁵ The Global South Unit for Mediation (GSUM) is a research, teaching and learning platform devoted to the production, debate and diffusion of knowledge and expertise on the broad spectrum of peace-related activities and conflict transformation mechanisms, including international peace negotiations, mediation and peace operations. It is an initiative of the Institute of International Relations of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) through the BRICS Policy Center.

premises or propositions. Often, it is largely descriptive of patterns of actions” (Kriesberg 2009: 29). More specifically, it reflects the lack of dialogue between PCS and democratic theory (Ron 2009, 2010).

To conceptually clarify this discussion, I call attention to the fact that peace negotiations involve, at all levels, both participatory and representative relationships which in turn are deemed inclusive or not from diverse political standpoints. A person may participate on her own behalf; speak on behalf of more people than just herself, i.e., in representation of others; and, why not, do both at the same time. Participation and representation, therefore, are what serve as vehicles for inclusion. Having said that, I choose to focus on political representation here for a few reasons, the most important of which is the limited and hermetic nature of negotiating tables, which makes them representative instances by definition – whether they intend or not to be inclusive, it is under a representative logic that negotiating tables work. Thus, despite the usual association of civil society organizations and social movements with political participation, rarely do peace processes allow for massive and formal participation of social actors, which ultimately find themselves competing or allying and articulating through the leadership of a few in order to echo their voices. This is especially true for the Colombian process with the FARC, which, as mentioned, was designed not to allow too many people into the table.

My option for political representation as an analytical lens also stems from the fact that it constitutes a common thread between the before, the during and the after of peace negotiations. Armed conflict usually has to do with varied types of exclusion, which in turn often has to do with how inclusive political representation is in a political system. People often resort to violence when they see no possibility of being represented in established political institutions. During peace negotiations, as mentioned, political representation provides conflict parties with a tool for organizing presence and decision-making. Such decision-making, finally, reshapes and reinvents political representation as an organizing tool of state politics. In its most automatic interpretation, i.e., the representative democracy model, representation may be viewed as a conflict resolution mechanism that constantly keeps (or tries to keep) politics from turning violent.

As a reflection of this interpretation, and given the informal character of the representation that goes on in non-institutional contexts such as peace negotiations, I choose to see representation beyond its usual electoral format, recognizing its existence in (nonstate) situations in which it is not formally established. I also interpret its role as a condition of possibility for the emergence

of the modern state in a more abstract level, based on the conception of representation developed by Thomas Hobbes, for whom it was an indispensable element of the social contract and the emergence of the state. Such wider perspective of the concept allows me to see representation in the collective action of social movements in search of inclusion in peace talks. It also outlines a deeper understanding of the peace process as a refoundational enterprise that reviews a state's social contract, making inclusion not only about being present and influencing negotiations but also about the intention by different collectivities of becoming contractarians in such renewal, hence reshaping the fiction of the state according to their own political principles.

The theoretical framework herein proposed arises from a dialogue between theories of political representation, feminist democratic theory and critical PCS literature. Such dialogue is informed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's work on democracy and discourse theory and guided by Michael Saward's representative claim analytical framework. Having Laclau & Mouffe's theoretical framework inform my analysis will mean stressing the openness of the social, which translates as a lack of social essence and multiple possibilities of signification which are always contingent (Mendonça 2009: 156). In this context, political dynamics are understood as constantly oscillating between relationships of antagonism and hegemonic accommodations achieved by consensus. Following agonistic approaches of politics, therefore, I see in "any form of consensus the result of a hegemonic articulation" (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: xviii). Such accommodation emerges through the articulation of and interaction between contesting discourses.

On top of that, adopting Saward's framework will mean that my privileged conception of political representation across these literatures share a common *constitutedness* at their very core – i.e., I take representative and represented alike to be *constituted* by political representation instead of having it simply translate a static reality that is out there to be grasped. This is important if one wants to understand inclusion in peace negotiations as a contested and political issue. For Saward, any type of political representation can be read as a back-and-forth making and acceptance or rejection of representative *claims*. In his own words, a representative claim is "a claim to represent or to know what represents the interests of someone or something. It is a *claim*; it may or may not be a well-founded claim" (Saward 2010: 3). To the extent that in this view collective subjects emerge *through* political representation, it is also through the grouping and re-grouping of society that we may understand political inclusion and exclusion.

The theoretical reflections raised in the first few chapters will later be carried over to an empirical analysis of the Colombian case. In grasping how representative dynamics developed in the context of the Havana talks, in particular in relation to feminist and women's movements, I conducted fieldwork in Bogotá in November 2018. In this period, I did fifteen semi-structured interviews⁶ with government officials, FARC members, academics, and civil society and international organizations' actors⁷, fourteen of whom were women. My objective with the interviews was to get as close as possible to firsthand internal dynamics of the negotiating table, seen from different perspectives. I also tried to understand internal Colombian dynamics regarding the process and the role of inclusion in it by interviewing academics and civil society actors who were not directly engaged but were able to provide me with a view of the process I had not had the chance to encounter through academic journals or the media.

Thus, seven of my interviewees were in Havana for the negotiations or visited the table in at least one occasion; four were engaged with the process and had contact with those at the table but did so mostly from Colombia; and another four, finally, accompanied the process without maintaining direct contact with it. I have chosen to keep all interviewees anonymous, mentioning only their affiliation for purposes of analysis. Apart from my own fieldwork, I have collected and analyzed additional interviews from the media, books and documentaries with different actors engaged with the process. I have also gathered the most official documentation possible, including official statements, agreements and reports from a wide gamut of actors. As it pertains the negotiating table itself, the official record maintained by the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace in the *Biblioteca del Proceso de Paz con las FARC-EP* has been valuable.

The mix of different roles and perspectives, as well as the different degrees of contact with the process, allowed me to reconstruct diverse discourses on inclusion and political representation in the Havana talks. What I asked and what I sought for in the material collected, therefore, had this specific goal in mind. Besides enquiring each interviewee's perspective of and role in the negotiations, I concentrated on grasping what inclusion and political representation meant for

⁶ One of these interviews were actually conducted in Rio de Janeiro in October 2018, prior to my trip to Bogotá. All interviews were conducted personally, recorded and transcribed with the authorization of interviewees, with the exception of one, which was done through an email exchange. All interviews were conducted in Spanish and have been translated to English.

⁷ Among those interviewed are 4 government officials, 3 members of FARC, 5 civil society actors, 1 UN Women official and 2 academics. No interviews were conducted with guarantor or accompanying countries, which I tried to compensate by resorting to official documents and their members' own words in published reports (for example Salvesen & Nylander 2017 and Nylander et al 2018).

each of them in the context of the Havana talks. I have found that, while talking about political representation pushes sensitive buttons and raises particular rejection due to the forthright decision by the parties that societal representation was out of the table in the process, a discourse analysis of the collected material helps in seeing how a representative logic sneaked into the process regardless of its rejection. Thus, in analyzing the words of my interviewees and other participants of the negotiations, I must highlight that I take political representation both as discourse and analytical lens, and the two will not always coincide. As times, this will mean that I identify representation in situations in which it is rejected as a label. I take this to be a sign of the complexity of making representative claims in delicate scenarios such as a peace process.

As it concerns Colombian women, I argue that representative relationships were most obvious when they involved the ties between social movements or civil society organizations and their social bases. The existence of representation was rejected when it came to the relationship between female negotiators and individual members of the Gender Sub-commission; however, a collectivized and disembodied logic of representation did emerge between the sub-commission and women's movements, in such a way that it became a key link in a diffuse chain of representative claims running from the regions all the way up to Havana. I also look at women's representation from a foundational standpoint, i.e., Colombian women's resolute intention of being "*pactantes, no pactadas*" in the text of the agreement. To do so, I add to my interviewees' voices the text of the agreement itself, analyzing the gender perspective employed as a site of political contestation and control in terms of how transformative gender stipulations could be. Ultimately, I argue that the insistence on calling the sub-commission a technical entity and its spatial separation from the main negotiating table, reducing its work to inserting the gender perspective into previously elaborated and closed measures, placed a political ceiling over women's role in the process and was symptomatic of the hegemonic accommodation behind the consensus achieved in the process.

Aside from the Introduction and the Final Remarks, this dissertation develops its discussion throughout six chapters, which are organized as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the politics of inclusion in peace negotiations. It starts by pointing out the theoretical locus of peace negotiations within the larger umbrella of Peace and Conflict Studies, going over important concepts such as peace process, peacebuilding, peace negotiations and mediation, as well as the work of inescapable thinkers such as Johan Galtung and John Paul Lederach. It introduces and maps the debate on inclusion in the field, calling attention to the uncertainties

it raises and maintaining that it needs to be seen as an object of continuous political dispute. It argues that inclusion has gone from being considered an *unnecessary disturbance* to a *necessary* one in peace processes, especially due to its increasing association with the fostering of political legitimacy and peace sustainability in the last few decades. Even past its reconceptualization into a useful tool for the construction of peace, however, it is hierarchized and spatially, temporally and thematically controlled so as not to jeopardize peace efforts or extrapolate what conflict parties feel is acceptable inclusion-wise. The chapter concludes by resorting to agonistic peace debates within PCS and contending that attaching inclusion to its usefulness and disturbance potential reduces the debate to a specifically political enclosure by ignoring its “implicit normativity” (O’Rourke 2017). Aiming to reframe this debate through a critical, politicized perspective, it proposes to look at inclusion from a lens of analysis based on the concept of political representation.

With this objective in mind, Chapters 3 and 4 are dedicated to making such movement. Chapter 3 provides a conceptual history of political representation, aiming above all to look at the concept from a standpoint that is not limited to its usual association with electoral representative democracy and is enlightening to contexts of peace processes, especially when it comes to thinking about the relationship between representation, political inclusion and conflict. The chapter then provides three accounts of political representation, based on but not exhaustive of some of its main historical inflections – representation as *foundation*, as *state politics* and *beyond the state*. The first interprets representation as an essential pillar of the fiction of the state and its social contract. It does so by going back to Thomas Hobbes’s conception of political representation, which was central for him to turn the multiplicity of his gloomy state of nature into the orderly unity of the state. This will be important to look at peace processes as a reconstruction (or at the very least a renewal) of states’ social contracts, and to contextualize the debate of inclusion against this background. The second account, representation as state politics, discusses the transformation of representation into the main organizing political tool of modern states, its encounter and intersections with democracy and its so-called proneness to crises. Discussing the “crises of representation” is also relevant for thinking about the limits between politics and violent conflict. The third account, finally, tracks recent debates on political representation, especially what became known as the “representative turn” in recent democratic theory and its emphasis on representative expressions outside the state realm – for instance, local, regional and international arenas, including

peace negotiations, which escape the electoral format, but in which one can also identify the emergence of representative relationships. Such recent debates also invite different approaches to the relationship between participation and representation, which likewise proves relevant for reflections about inclusion in peace negotiations.

Informed by and with the intention of critically re-reading the conceptual analysis of Chapter 3, the following chapter has two goals – first, to promote a critical discussion of women’s representation, which will help me in clarifying the specific concept of political representation that is adopted in this dissertation, and second, to close the theoretical circle of this research by proposing an analytical framework that looks at the inclusion of women in peace negotiations *through* that concept of political representation. The chapter is crosscut by critical and feminist approaches of the concept, which are important for identifying fundamental issues and exclusions that are embedded within dominating views of representation. Against such views, critically approaching political representation entails recognizing it as a *constitutive* and at all times *disputed* dynamic between collective subjects. In other words, representation does not translate a reality that is out there to be grasped; it constitutes and constantly re-creates it.

In my own view of representation, then, I echo Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s work on democracy and discourse theory as well as Michael Saward’s representative claim analytical framework. Based on this reading of political representation, I move the discussion back to PCS, outlining how the role of women in peace processes is addressed by its literature and laying out how I suggest reframing this discussion. My analytical framework thus consists of two building blocks. The first looks at the political articulation of discourses and subject positions into representative relationships, holding political representation as constitutive and contested. The second building block considers the “below the surface” unfolding of such representative dynamics by considering the place occupied by societal and women’s inclusion in the refoundational role of political representation in peace agreements’ discourses. In doing so, I will consider gender mainstreaming a strategy of inclusion in this deeper sense of representation.

Chapters 5 and 6 undertake an empirical analysis of the theoretical discussion on inclusion and representation in the context of the Havana Dialogues. Chapter 5 tackles the subject in a more general way, starting with a brief overview of the Colombian conflict and the history of peace attempts before the Havana talks. It then moves on to analyze the different discourses on inclusion and political representation in the negotiations, explaining the place officially reserved by

society through the participatory mechanisms stipulated by the negotiating table, and the struggle of civil society in obtaining more space than originally opened by the parties. It analyzes the discourses of different actors from the government, FARC and civil society while looking for the missing link of representation in this debate. Chapter 6 builds from this analysis to look into the representation of women in the Havana Dialogues. It starts by equally providing historical background on women's presence and activism both in the political scenario and in the conflict, underlining the diverse subject positions occupied by them. Next, it interprets the inclusion of women in the negotiations through the two analytical building blocks proposed in Chapter 4 – first, it goes over women's articulation and representative claims beyond the state realm; then, it looks at the gender perspective employed in the making of the peace agreement in light of my account of representation as state (re)foundation and social contract renewal.

2

The politics of inclusion in peace negotiations

“Creo en los milagros, cómo voy a decirte que no creo en la paz.”
(Gabriel García Márquez)

Inclusion has become a buzzword in the Peace and Conflict Studies field (Hellmüller 2019). Especially from the 2000s onwards, the role of society in peace processes started to earn increasing attention in debates relating to theory, practice, policy and norm. Post-Cold War global transformations, which reached so many aspects of international relations, had a reflex over the way conflict is seen to take place and how it is handled by armed parties and international actors. The ambitious peacebuilding projects of the 1990s left such actors with no choice but to address the role of society in the goal of constructing solid and sustainable peace in post-conflict scenarios. In this process, the context of peace negotiations, be they mediated or not, remain as a sort of “last frontier” – while the need for including society in implementation stages of peacebuilding has become relatively uncontroversial across different discourses on peace, for many, including society at the negotiation stage is still considered tricky and secondary.

The objective of this chapter is to track the discussion on societal inclusion in the specific context of peace negotiations, in particular those aiming to put an end to armed conflicts of internal character, which need to address and mediate among the grievances of the different sectors of a single society and often involve an overhaul and a reinvention of a political system. I will locate the inclusion debate within the wider field of PCS in order to get a good grasp of the “language” it speaks and the concepts it mobilizes, its main challenges and dilemmas. Then I will move on to enquire what critical, politicized outlooks of inclusion have to add to this discussion. In short, I want to place a magnifying glass over the notion of inclusion as elaborated and exercised by specialists and practitioners, dissecting it towards later *unveiling* some crucial issues that are seldom problematized in the literature. In such critical and politicizing movement, I will dialogue with critical PCS approaches, in particular those working around the notion of agonistic peace.

With the above in mind, section 2.1 will do a brief overview of Peace and Conflict Studies to elucidate the theoretical locus of peace negotiations. Apart from

presenting the field, it will go over important concepts such as peace process, peacebuilding, peace negotiations and mediation; unavoidable thinkers such as Johan Galtung and John Paul Lederach; and crucial aspects to be considered in peace processes as a whole, in particular timing issues and the actors involved. The following section will map the discussion on societal inclusion in peace negotiations, arguing that it went from being deemed an unnecessary disturbance to a necessary one. In other words, in a first moment, one could see that inclusion was overwhelmingly approached as a disturbance that was also seen as unnecessary – civil society actors were mainly associated with matters of technical skill, and inclusion is conditioned by clear spatial, temporal and thematic control. Recently, however, due to normative moves that made inclusivity a norm to be taken into account and empirical findings that associate inclusive peace processes with durable peace, the treatment received by inclusion in PCS has changed considerably. Still, as I shall argue, this does not take away from the cautiousness or the control that usually surrounds the role of society in peace negotiations; what it does is indeed give it a paradoxical character, and being deemed simultaneously necessary and disturbing creates some contradictory moves towards accepting and promoting inclusion all the while maintaining its limited reach and impact.

Buzzwords by definition are “concepts that are regularly referred to, but whose real value is diluted the more they are used” (Hellmüller 2019: 47). The lack of clarity around the notion of inclusion has a lot to do with the above-described ambivalence. Section 2.3 will thus approach and problematize such ambivalence by looking into the two halves of the expressions used above. First, it will discuss the “unnecessary/necessary” half by questioning the frequent attachment of inclusion and its utility to newly founding political orders and their earning of legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Secondly, it will touch upon the perception that inclusion is a “disturbance”, arguing, from an agonistic peace standpoint, that consensus is a hegemonic accommodation in need of politicization and what is considered a disturbance to a peace process needs to be seen in light of that. Faced with these issues, I will propose to reframe the inclusion debate by resorting to the concept of political representation, a task I will take upon in Chapters 3 and 4.

2.1

The theoretical locus of peace negotiations

The peace process may be seen as a broad project that, throughout its different steps, encompasses initiatives to deal with violent conflict – from peace operations to peace negotiations, mediation and long-term peacebuilding. It is a wide and difficult to delimit object of study, whose problems are approached by a variety of theoretical angles that conform an ever-changing puzzle. John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (2008) note that while the term "peace process" is recent, emerging in the 1970s amid the American attempt to mediate the Middle Eastern conflict, its practice is as old as war itself (pp. 2-3). In this sense, the study of war as a social practice and a collective and organized form of violence, as well as the study of diplomacy, have always been a recurrent concern of those interested in the resolution of conflicts and the reinstatement of so-called "political normality."

As opposed to the longevity of practical concerns on ending wars, the theoretical field of Peace and Conflict Studies (hereafter PCS) emerges and consolidates only in the 20th century, driven by the two World Wars and the bipolar order. It is born, therefore, as the product of a specific historical circumstance, worrying above all about the extrapolation of the tragic limits of war and in finding ways to deal with violence, at a time when it takes on unprecedented and worrying proportions. The multiplicity of approaches and the convention of temporal frames/sequencing of armed conflicts in this context are consistent with both the increasing complexity of war and the diverse and multidisciplinary nature that have marked the field since its formation. They also have to do with the evolutionary convention that serves as a foundational framework for the modern state and leads from the typical violence of institutional disruption to the predictability and stability of the institutionalized citizen condition. The use of the label "Peace and Conflict Studies" is not unanimous, but represents, as André Barrinha points out, a "common denominator for research on armed conflict ... [and] it is based on a holistic understanding of the discipline" (2013: 2, translated from Portuguese). PCS thus brings together expertise from fields such as Law, Psychology, International Relations and Diplomacy, also grouping efforts of specific areas of study such as Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies.


Although the first steps of PCS were given after World War I, it was after World War II, and especially throughout the 1950s and 60s, that the topic gained the urgency associated with the ghost of nuclear war and the field began to undergo institutionalization. Two pioneering initiatives, respectively associated with Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies, are often cited to illustrate this process. First, there is the work of Kenneth Boulding who, in partnership with Elise Boulding, Anatol Rapoport, and others, founded the Journal of Conflict Resolution

in 1957 and, two years later, a research center at the University of Michigan. Secondly, there is Johan Galtung's work at the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), created in 1959 in Oslo, Norway.

One could hardly overstate the weight of Galtung's work in outlining the categories and parameters of the field, as well as his anticipation of a broadened debate on peace and security that would only gain centrality decades later. His introduction of the concept of structural violence (versus direct or personal violence) and the differentiation between negative and positive peace have exposed the need to think of peace beyond the simple absence of armed conflict. Less evident than physical and personal violence, structural violence is embedded in the very core of societies, appearing in the form of asymmetrical powers and, consequently, as unequal life opportunities. The need to differentiate between a negative and a positive peace follows from the argument that "the absence of personal violence does not lead to a positively defined condition, whereas the absence of structural violence is what we have referred to as social justice, which is a positively defined condition" (Galtung 1969: 183).

Thus, his argument that violence should be seen as a structural issue of societies, within the less obviously violent aspects of social interaction, was essential for the conception of his well-known triangular model (Figure 1) on types of violence, its channels of expression and their remedies.

Figure 1 – Johan Galtung's Conflict, Violence and Peace models



Source: reproduced from Ramsbotham et al (2011)

For Galtung, violence can be expressed through attitudes, behaviors and contradictions – an attitude involves perceptions and misunderstandings between parts of a conflict; behavior involves actions of cooperation or coercion; and contradictions, finally, refer to the background of a conflict and incompatibility of objectives (Ramsbotham et al 2011: 11). A "full" conflict would combine these three elements in the expression of cultural, direct, and structural violence. The search for negative peace in this language translates into concern for the direct destruction

caused by wars. However, other types of violence – i.e. cultural and structural – are also relevant for building peace that goes beyond the mere cessation of physical strife.

The first two triangles are translated into the solutions presented by the third: direct violence is remedied by peacekeeping; the cultural one, by peacemaking; and the structural one, by peacebuilding. While peacekeeping has as its priority the reestablishment of the status quo ante in situations where violence has already become physical, peacemaking is associated with conflict resolution efforts that deal with incompatibilities between parties and that may be "less or more respectful of the status quo" (Galtung 1976: 291). Peacebuilding, in Galtung's conception, aims exactly at a structural reform in search of a sustainable and preventive solution to contradictions and injustices that represent a latent potential for war. This model serves as both a platform for rejecting purely immediate approaches towards violence and a later condition for the development of critical theoretical and practical frameworks (Fetherston 2000: 202).

Although the temporal compartmentalization of peace processes is a fiction produced by a specific modern narrative, it is possible to identify the centrality of peace negotiations and the reaching of peace agreements in what Galtung calls "peacemaking," which the literature loosely labels "conflict resolution" and, more recently, in long-term peace projects based on the notion of peacebuilding. One may find some effort by experts in the field to understand and systematize the evolution of peacemaking since the emergence of PCS (see, for example, Kriesberg 1997, 2009; Ramsbotham et al 2011; Richmond 2001). They often opt to evaluate peacemaking through the changes perceived in its central objective and the means employed to achieve it. In its early Cold War days, the focus was on *managing* conflicts in the sense that the goal was to achieve ceasefires through geopolitical decisions made by the superpowers – or, in Galtung's terms, the goal was negative peace. This objective would slowly shift towards addressing root causes and *resolving* conflict, and later, in the 1990s, it would move toward an idea of conflict *transformation*, i.e., in this perspective, conflict is inherent to sociopolitical organization, and we should try not to eliminate conflict, but continually work to transform it into reconciliatory and positive relations.

The concepts of conflict management, resolution and transformation are of course not supposed to be neat and precise categories. Authors underline that they overlap and are mere organization strategies to try and understand how peacemaking changed over time. In a similar vein, it is worth calling attention to the multiplicity of meanings attached to the concepts mentioned up to this point.

Precisely because armed conflict seems each day a little bit harder to pinpoint, practical strategies and theoretical categories that deal with it also become more muddled and difficult to tell apart. This is especially true with time horizons: it is difficult to establish when peacebuilding begins or ends. In the 1990s, the belief that peacebuilding refers strictly to the long-term implementation of peace agreements gained strength (Körppen 2011: 79). However, both the original Galtungian conception and current approaches to peacebuilding conceive it as a wider endeavor. This research will adopt Séverine Autesserre's definition of peacebuilding, which, according to this author,

refers to actions aimed at creating, strengthening, and solidifying peace. Peacebuilding can therefore include peacemaking – the process of bringing parties in conflict to an agreement through peaceful means – and peacekeeping, which denotes the 'deployment of international personnel to help maintain peace and security' after a war (Autesserre 2014: 21).

The usual disarticulation of the different “stages” of a peace process, as if they had nothing to do with each other, contributes little towards more critical views of peace. The insistence on not drawing a clear line between peace negotiations and a temporally-limited version of peacebuilding is therefore crucial if one is to look at the issue of inclusion under a new light. This work echoes Jan Selby's (2013) argument that the literature usually ignores the relationship and continuity between the signing of peace agreements and the typical implementation phases of peacebuilding. This generates a “temporal disconnect” in theory and disregards political factors essential for understanding peace processes in a broader sense. Selby argues this is related to a combination of, on the one hand, the non-consideration of the peace process as a political undertaking, and, on the other, the lack of cohesion between studies on peace negotiations and implementation efforts that succeed them.

For the sake of clarity, “peacebuilding” and “peace process” will henceforth be employed in reference to the long-term process of trying to bring about peace to a violent conflict, including preparatory and negotiation phases as well as the posterior implementation of peace agreements. “Peacemaking”, “conflict resolution” (lowercase, as opposed to the subdiscipline of Conflict Resolution, in capital letters), “peace negotiations” and “peace talks/dialogues” will be used to refer to the specific duration of peace agreement negotiation. The study of these different concepts often overlaps, which also means all expressions should surface throughout the next pages; however, its main focus will remain the duration of peace negotiations.

Vicenç Fisas defines negotiation as “the process of approaching a conflict in which the implicated parties seek to reach an agreement that satisfies their interests through dialogue and obtain a non-zero-sum result so that both parties win something and no one loses completely” (2010: 95 – translated from Spanish). As alternative means of resolution to either inter- or intrastate violent conflicts, peace negotiations may involve two or more parties to a conflict, functioning under pre-established rules deemed acceptable by all actors seeking consensus.

The group of actors seen as the natural participants of peace negotiations has also changed over time – if mid-20th century conflict management schemes tended to involve only states and occasionally international organizations (IOs), over the last few decades not only have IOs expanded their role but nonstate actors – armed or not – started claiming, and sometimes getting, peace process representation. As noted by I. W. Zartman (2009), negotiations are inherently ambiguous because even though they imply formal recognition of equality between veto-holding parties, in practice perceived asymmetries of power between them are an issue that cannot be lost from sight.

There is a vast literature concerned with different aspects of peace negotiations, which include, besides the actors that should be involved, timing issues, bargaining and trust-building techniques, power-sharing dynamics, the use of third-party support, DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration), SSR (Security Sector Reform) and the architecture of transitional justice systems. When parties are unable or unwilling to conduct negotiations bilaterally, third-party involvement becomes an option. In the United Nations Charter’s Chapter VI, Article 33, mediation is listed alongside negotiation and a few other tools of peaceful alternative solutions to conflict. It thus determines that parties in dispute avoid endangering international peace by “[seeking] a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice” (United Nations 1945). These can be summed up into three specific conflict resolution techniques: direct negotiation between the parties; the several mediation, good offices and conciliatory resources; and, lastly, legally binding arbitration and similar techniques (Bercovitch 2016: 27).

A mediated process differs from direct negotiation in that another actor comes in, tasked with assisting the parties reach an agreement that seems at least partly advantageous for all⁸. Arbitration and other legal tools differ from mediation

⁸ Although mediation and bilateral negotiation are deemed two separate conflict resolution methods by the UN Charter, the literature is divided on this. Some authors, like Bercovitch, see negotiation

and direct negotiation in that decision power is stripped from the parties – instead, another person receives binding power to decide the terms of the agreement. In direct and mediated negotiations, the final authority to decide lies with the parties, with the difference that, in the second, they rely on external assistance to do so. Mediation thus “turns the dyadic relation between the parties into a triad, in which the third angle serves to facilitate negotiation between the other two by overcoming the obstacles which keep them from negotiating directly” (Zartman 2009: 325). It takes place when “those involved in the conflict seek the support, or accept an offer of support, from an external agent (be that an individual, an organization, a group or a state) to change their perception or their behavior” (Bercovitch 2016: 32 – translated from Portuguese). A mediation process is supposed to be noncoercive, nonviolent, nonbinding and voluntary (p. 29).

Timing and sequencing issues of bilateral and mediated negotiations also receive particular emphasis in the PCS literature. Academics and practitioners investigate if there is a right or optimal moment to initiate negotiations; they also evaluate the steps usually taken throughout the different stages of a peace process. The most discussed concept in terms of timing is most likely Zartman’s idea of ripeness. It consists of a combination of factors that causes a conflict’s parties to perceive nonviolent resolution as a viable and positive option. A conflict is thus ripe for negotiation if two conditions are met: first, that none of the parties has remaining expectations of a military victory and therefore can only anticipate losses from carrying on fighting (i.e. a “mutually hurting stalemate”); second, that on top of that they see the possibility of an acceptable joint solution (i.e. a “way out”) (Zartman 2009: 329). The author does not see ripeness as an automatic shift toward a negotiated settlement – he sees it as a window of opportunity that necessarily needs to exist for negotiation to take place, but one that may or may not be perceived and seized by the parties to a conflict.

A lot of the criticism received by the theory of ripeness has to do with the fact it portrays conflict as less complex than it is. John Paul Lederach suggests ripeness is a rear-view mirror that has retrospective value but is not something easily detectable by those whose passions are deeply entrenched within the conflict. He thus defends the timing for reconciliation should be seen not as “harvest”, but as “cultivation” (2008: 41). In other words, he rejects the somewhat fatalistic viewpoint

and mediation as separate “sister mechanisms” and consider mediation “the continuation of negotiation through other means” (2016: 28). Others regard mediation as a subset of negotiation (e.g. Zartman 2009). It is, however, an important subset that gathers its own literature and practical skills. This research will stick with the latter and refer to the two as “direct negotiations” and “mediated negotiations”.

that negotiation is simply impossible until it is not, arguing instead that mutual trust must be cultivated even at the height of conflicts in order for them to reach a point of ripeness. Dean G. Pruitt proposes a modified version of ripeness theory he calls “readiness theory”, which addresses some of the original theory’s issues – it proposes looking at each side separately and incorporates a multiple causal factor model to complexify variable analyses (Pruitt 2005). Adrian Guelke reminds us that thus separating coercion from negotiation – as two points in time completely set apart by a moment of ripening – conceals the fact “it is possible to present the process of negotiations not as separate from coercion, but as integral to it” (2008: 64).

The sequencing of negotiation stages and their appraisal, in turn, vary in theory and practice (see for example Zartman 2009, Fisas 2010, Guelke 2008), but usually come down to pre-talks stages, secret talks, multilateral/public talks, settlement and endorsement. The first two are referred to as “prenegotiations”, and the following three are often bundled into the term “public negotiations”. If successful, these are then followed by implementation and institutionalization phases (Guelke 2008). It is interesting to note, however, that even after the signing of agreements, negotiations keep on being the tonic of peacebuilding. In short, “what is termed negotiation is in fact (or in concept) three sets of negotiations: negotiations to negotiate, negotiations to end conflict (violent or not), and negotiations to implement the agreement” (Zartman 2009: 335).

Thus, before a period of public dialogues aiming at an agreement, the parties go through exploratory conversations in which they try to align expectations and build enough trust to agree on basic and general points that later guide formal negotiations. Prenegotiations tend to be secretive because they take place when the conflict is still unfolding, and the parties do not officially recognize the legitimacy of each other’s grievances. At this point, communication through third parties tends to be common and preferred (Guelke 2008: 70).

The secrecy of prenegotiations, as well as their informal and delicate nature, may also help explain why they receive far less attention and investigative effort than public phases of negotiations. If parties can agree to a negotiated solution to their conflict, they then inform the general audience and initiate public negotiations. On the other hand, prenegotiations are crucial not only for the success or failure of the peace process as a whole but also for the structure of the process, its location, the selection of participants, the roles attributed to them, the rules of negotiation and the agenda of conversations. Janice Gross Stein observes that negotiating the terms of the negotiation reduces uncertainty and risk, influencing in great measure

what comes next: “Without an analysis of the process of getting to the table, we cannot explain the shape of the table, who gets there and who doesn't, what is on the table and, equally important, what is kept off” (Stein 1989: 257).

Although the temporal organization of peace processes always come with disclaimers of case by case specificities, advances and setbacks, they get even more ruffled with the watershed of post-Cold War transformations brought forth by the 1990s. Peace projects of longer time horizons and transformative intentions take the forefront, and the main theoretical guide behind this shift from “resolution” to “transformation” may be found in the work of John Paul Lederach and other authors of the “first local turn”⁹. Moved by the impetus of transcending the immediate treatment of conflicts, Lederach developed his models and strategies regarding the construction of peace, becoming, with time, as unavoidable for studies of peacebuilding as Galtung a few decades earlier. At the core of his theory is the argument that conflict is an inherent part of human interaction, and more than ambitioning to resolve violent struggles, it is urgent to embrace difference, to reconcile and transform destructive relations into constructive ones. Sanam Anderlini sums it up:

[t]he notion of transformation embraces traditional elements of conflict resolution, dialogue, and negotiation. It also goes beyond tradition to draw attention to issues of rights and justice, promoting inclusive decisionmaking and participation, addressing the welfare and survival needs of people, strengthening civil society, encouraging social and economic reconstruction, and promoting reconciliation (2007: 12).

Lederach's proposal thus involves the establishment of infrastructure for the creation of a multiple “peace constituency”, capable of bringing together high-level leaders, community leaders and grassroots social movements (Lederach 1997; Richmond 2001: 15). This unfolds into an approach that not only relies on top-down solutions but also seeks to contemplate the local dimension of conflict through bottom-up mechanisms. The attempt to construct a comprehensive model of peace is expressed through a pyramid of three interrelated levels, the relationship of which is framed by “middle” sectors integrated by actors such as leaders of social organizations, journalists and religious leaders (Miall 2001: 6; see Figure 2 below). Such actors would act, in other words, as “mediators” between high-ranking decision-makers and local movements. The weight attributed to the local level and the author's bottom-up approach were an important watershed for the notion of peacebuilding (Fetherston 2000: 205).

⁹ Thania Paffenholz explains that “[t]he [first] local turn in peacebuilding began in the early 1990s with the works of John Paul Lederach, and has been revitalised in recent years with critical peacebuilding research” (2015a: 857).

Figure 2 – John Paul Lederach’s peacebuilding model



Source: reproduced from Ramsbotham et al (2011)

Hugh Miall (2001) points out that Lederach’s project is distributed between “different time-periods (short-, mid- and long-term) and [affects] different system levels at different times” (p. 6). It is, therefore, a sequenced structural process that integrates different temporal stages: in the short term, the focus is on intervention in immediate crises (2 to 6 months) and preparation and training (1 to 2 years); in the medium term (5 to 10 years), the focus turns to social transformations; the long term (up to 20 years), finally, is dedicated to a generational vision of the future (Fetherston 2000:205). The overlap between the more immediate phases and Lederach’s long-term vision, in turn, underlines the relevance of planning and the future vision of peacebuilding to the closure of armed conflicts in the short term. In this manner, the links and relationships between different temporalities are an indispensable part of this view, suggesting, above all, “the dependence of crisis intervention ... on systemic understanding, analysis, and action over a generational time frame” (Fetherston 2000: 205).

Eileen Babbitt underlines that despite superpower rivalry having for decades muffled the pleas of peace and disarmament movements, in the 1980s “a new voice for peacemaking emerged as negotiation theory migrated from its origins in the management/labor relations field to international relations” (2009: 540). The 1990s, then, represented a “coming of age” for the field, which saw an expansion of the peacebuilding agenda beyond superpower negotiations, an increase in the role of NGOs, and a shift from traditional security debates towards the notion of human security (p. 540). This shift may be said to fit within the larger global governance framework and agenda, which, as Thomas G. Weiss explains, comes

from a combination of academic and practical developments surfacing in the 90s (Weiss 2011: 9). Global governance may be thought of as “the capacity of the international system to provide government-like services in the absence of a world government”, thus including “both informal and formal values, norms, practices, and institutions” (idem). These unfold into different “cooperative problem-solving arrangements”, which are reflected onto a wide array of topics and policies handled at the global stage.

In this context, moves toward a strengthened governance apparatus are present in both international and regional realms, and these start to cover issue areas such as trade and finance, the environment, development, human rights, and peace and security. This has a lot of influence over the way armed conflicts are faced and dealt with. In the aftermath of the Cold War, as a peaceful alternative to traditional conflict resolution through military victory, there was a rise in the use of negotiated agreements as a way out of war. From the 1960s to the 90s, civil wars ended by negotiated agreements went from 10 to 54% (Fisas 2010: 95). Hampson et al (2007) see the increase in resort to negotiation as part of a context in which globalization shrunk the distance between states and societies, and the multilateral key ingrained within international organizations and regimes helped push it forward as a practical tool for achieving shared interests in the international arena.

At the same time that negotiation supplied superpowers with a graceful resolution to proxy wars that no longer made sense, it also became the best option to approach the unleashing of (mostly internal) conflicts – Mary Kaldor’s “new wars” (2012) – that were earlier prevented by the bipolar system (p. 38). As a (somewhat delayed) result of this growing preference for negotiated settlements, mediation also slowly gained international ground in the last few years. Herz et al (2016) call our attention to the fact mediation has only recently entered the UN agenda as a specific topic (p. 21), which may be illustrated by the General Assembly’s first-ever resolution concerning the topic in 2011 and the launch of the *UN Guidance for Effective Mediation* in 2012 by then-Secretary General Ban Ki-moon (p. 22).

Throughout the 90s, the impact of the theoretical contributions of Galtung, Lederach, and other scholars became clear with the incorporation of peacemaking and peacebuilding vocabularies into post-Cold War international interventions and renewed UN activity. In its institutional guidelines, its own definitions of peacebuilding began to appear¹⁰, and reports such as Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s

¹⁰ For the UN, peacebuilding “refers to efforts to assist countries and regions in their transitions from war to peace and to reduce a country’s risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening

Agenda for Peace, published in 1992, and the Brahimi Report, from 2000, were important in this positioning by the organization. The UN points to three main elements of a peacebuilding process – the national ownership of such efforts; the development of national capacity in conflict settings so that the continuity of the process is guaranteed after the departure of international actors; and the creation of “common strategies” for peace, inclusive in the sense that it involves the maximum variety of actors (UN 2010: 5-6).

While noting that peacebuilding takes place more strategically and on a larger scale in the years immediately following violent conflicts, the UN highlights that efforts in this direction can begin even before arms are put down by the parties and are long-term projects assumed by affected states after contributions from international actors (p. 6-7). Taken together, alongside other concepts such as human security and the security-development nexus, these peacebuilding practices were the basis for a series of humanitarian interventions, such as those conducted in Cambodia, Kosovo, Liberia, and East Timor (Richmond 2008: 22).

Roland Paris has argued that this model of peacebuilding, rooted in liberal internationalism, translated as “an enormous experiment in social engineering – an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict” (Paris 1997: 56, also see Paris 2010). Oliver Richmond identifies a series of contradictions in this model, which begin with the convergence between the agendas of Peace Studies, Conflict Resolution and Conflict Management, and culminate in the elaboration of a “liberal peacebuilding project” (2008: 22). According to the author, a consensus was reached among international actors such as the UN, financial institutions and non-governmental organizations around the need for a liberal peace in response to post-Cold War conflicts. This involved a “liberalizing package” that included political democratization, market reform, the pursuit of development and respect for human rights. In the extreme, such project goes from peacebuilding to statebuilding, in the sense that it becomes a complete and more interventionist effort to fully rebuild “failed states”¹¹ torn apart by conflict (p. 22).

For Richmond and fellow “second local turn” authors such as Roger Mac Ginty, however, such interventions prioritize top-down approaches over the local

national capacities for conflict management, and laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development”. See more of UN’s definitions regarding peace and conflict at <https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/peace-and-security/> (accessed December 7, 2020).

¹¹ This is a problematic notion that constructs failure in relation to a very specific (and intrinsically violent) “successful” state. For a critical analysis of the concept see Fernández 2015.

component and its potential to aggregate to the process through bottom-up initiatives. As a result, there is “a failure to come to terms with the lived experiences of individuals and their needs in everyday life, or vis-à-vis their welfare, culture, or traditions” (2008: 25). In addition, the legitimizing authorization of external intervention, based on the non-negotiable need for a liberal peace, ends up acquiring imperialist outlines and remnants of a “victor’s peace” (Richmond 2004: 88).

Both in the context of such complex versions of peacebuilding and the criticisms they raise, the role of societies affected by these conflicts becomes an unavoidable topic of discussion. If, on the one hand, heads of state may choose to ignore the demands of their populations while merely trying to “manage” armed conflict, on the other, long-term and transformative projects of peace simply cannot preclude the opening of dialogue with affected societies, even if this means reluctant acceptance on the part of the population. The above-described scenario thus places peace negotiations in a spot of growing scrutiny by civil society and social movements such as ethnic groups, victims’ and women’s organizations. The next section will discuss the rise and current state of the debate on inclusion in peace negotiations.

2.2

The debate on inclusion

This section will map the discussion concerning inclusion in peace processes, with special emphasis on contexts of peace negotiation. It will identify two portrayals of inclusion in the PCS literature – inclusion as “unnecessary disturbance” and, more recently, as “necessary disturbance” to peace processes. In short, it will argue inclusion is (still) seen as a source of disturbance for peace processes and even more so for peace negotiations, but will also observe this narrative has not stopped recent movements towards slow acceptance that it is necessary for the construction of what the literature often calls “durable” or “sustainable” peace.

Far from clear-cut and mutually exclusive, these two portrayals aim to clarify recent arguments advanced in this discussion, as well as the one proposed by this dissertation. It is clear, nevertheless, that each peace process has its own background, frames the role of society differently and thus inclusion may be

thought of beyond these two categories shaped here¹². Their objective, in turn, is to clarify how the debate on the issue has advanced, which will prove important to the next steps taken here.

Having said that, one might now ask: *what does “inclusion” mean?* There is no clear answer to this question – nor is my objective to provide one uncontroversial solution for the issue. In fact, it is exactly the uncertainties raised by the use of this expression that this research intends to explore. Trying to determine “the” ultimate definition of inclusion comes from an underlying assumption that there is one out there to be identified and grasped. Instead, this research will consider inclusion an object of continuous political dispute and accept it as multiple things at once, aiming for political reflections that can contemplate its equally political nature. In institutionalized settings, as the study of formal politics goes, inclusion usually means a one-time move of incorporation of certain social sectors into formal and often periodic political procedures (e.g. women suffrage or the law-abiding creation of participatory mechanisms). In peace processes, in turn, the term for the most part loosely refers to the inclusion of diverse social sectors’ perspectives in trying to end a conflict.

This is as far as consensus goes; perceptions regarding the means to do so, the choice of participants, the timing of such inclusion and the use of political conceptual vocabulary to evaluate, analyze and categorize it vary widely across interpretations found in the specialized literature. Some authors will say inclusion means direct involvement in decision-making, i.e. a seat at the table; others argue inclusion may also happen through indirect channels, making issues present in agendas, not people physically present at tables. Some will argue there is a specific ideal timing for inclusion to take place; others will argue it should be present in every step of the way. Some will employ the vocabulary of inclusion to refer only to nonarmed civil society, organized groups of victims, women, LGBTI and indigenous populations; others also employ it to address armed groups who have yet to sit at the table, be it due to their own choice or due to international and/or domestic norms that prohibit negotiation with armed groups, especially those considered to be terrorist or criminal organizations.

Unless signaled otherwise, “inclusion” will be used here in reference to both direct and indirect channels employed, at any stage of a peace process but with special emphasis on the negotiation phase, for the observation of armed and

¹² Peace processes formatted as broad and inclusive National Dialogues, for example, exist at least since the late 1980s and escape the logic of the two versions proposed here. For more on National Dialogues see Berghof Foundation 2017.

nonarmed groups' grievances. It should be stressed that dealing with the inclusion of armed and nonarmed actors is fundamentally different, especially if one believes that holding guns means automatic earning of stakeholder status in negotiations – which is also why part of the literature just assumes the word “inclusion” refers to the choice of either dialoguing or not with armed groups¹³. Only more recently did the invitation of nonarmed actors to the table start to receive more attention. In the present research, the role of nonarmed civil society groups will be crucial, which does not mean, on the other hand, that armed groups will be wholly disregarded. Chapter 6, for example, will deal with the role played by Colombian women's movements in the Havana talks, but also with the work of FARC women in the process. Either way, the lack of clarity in differentiating between the inclusion of armed and nonarmed actors is yet another reason to problematize the use of this vocabulary, which, besides being flawed and imprecise, is too often taken as benign and apolitical.

The first portrayal of inclusion presented next takes it as an *unnecessary disturbance*, which, for a long time, was the overwhelmingly dominant perspective in the field. In this view, inclusion is seen as a source of disturbance for the success of peace processes regardless of being desirable or even (at times) useful. Above all, in this perspective, it is simply not considered necessary for peace. On the contrary, the exclusiveness and even secrecy of peace-related efforts have traditionally been deemed essential for dealing with armed conflict. Then, we will go on to another version of inclusion, a more recent one that captures it as a *necessary disturbance*. While it does not cease to be considered a disturbance that may well jeopardize the achievement of peace agreements and the establishment of new political institutions, in this view, it becomes necessary for peace durability despite the complexity it may add to the path towards peace. This shift is marked both by the changes experienced in the 1990s, which place and allow for normatization of inclusion in peace efforts, and quantitative and qualitative studies that start showing inclusion might in fact not just be useful but *necessary* for peace, bearing a central role in preventing the return of violence.

The present section will see this matter through spatial, temporal and thematic hierarchizations that cut across the two versions of inclusion outlined above. As an unnecessary disturbance, inclusion tends to be cornered into specific spatial instances, restricted to certain stages of the process and contained within certain points of negotiation agendas. In particular, it is often “pushed down” and

¹³ See for example Podder 2013 and Sriram 2008.

“pushed forward” as a move better suited for settings far from high politics arenas, preferably avoided during negotiations and postponed to implementation stages. More recently, in its necessary disturbance version, we are faced with growing acceptance that inclusion is actually also necessary during negotiation stages. Thus, we have lately been seeing less of “push-forward movements”, but still a lot of “push-down” ones. In other words, even when accepted as a necessity for negotiation stages, inclusive initiatives are still achieved through indirect channels away from the table. Direct inclusion during the negotiation stage is generally considered the toughest mountain to climb in this discussion.

On top of spatio-temporal hierarchizations, it is important to highlight inclusive initiatives are also controlled and hierarchized thematically. Agendas such as victims’ rights are seen as more fitting for inclusive approaches, whereas others, such as military-related topics, are more likely to be deemed out of reach for societal participation. The main issue with thematic control of inclusion is that the topics usually making up peace negotiations are not independent of one another in practice. The creation of niche-like spaces that allow for increased participation does not erase the interrelation between the topics under discussion. The inclusion that goes on in certain aspects may be hurt or even reversed by exclusory measures concerning topics “too strategic” for wider debate.

As mentioned, the emergence of the second portrayal of inclusion does not do away with the first one; although it did become an unavoidable issue, the need for inclusion did not become a unanimous argument, much less a unanimous priority. The all-around top priority for practitioners and scholar alike keeps on being brokering political settlements, especially in situations in which violence remains high. From the backseat inclusion still occupies, however, it has been gaining increasing relevance over the years – willingness to combine halting of violence and inclusiveness in peace processes has been consistently rising since the 1990s. The issue thus becomes a contradictory tightrope. On the one hand, it goes without saying that armed actors have the power to block or at least limit inclusion if they want, and too much insistence on it could mean continued violence and loss of lives. On the other hand, it is generally accepted that some form of exclusion is always at the root of armed conflicts and peace processes need to identify and address it if they are to truly interrupt recurring patterns of violence. A highly exclusive agreement may be followed by quick re-escalation of violence and even more bloodshed.

In this context, the uncontroversial prioritization of elite settlements becomes increasingly blurred – among other reasons, because the notion itself of what a

successful political settlement *is* starts to transform. This is also especially true if one considers international and often domestic peace brokers are more and more pressuring conflict parties to allow for at least some inclusion. Precisely because this apparent paradox is difficult to overcome, we tend to forget the relationship between inclusion and exclusion is way more complex than “either ... or” assumptions – a move praised as inclusive for some may still carry exclusive elements which should not be forgotten. The use of the inclusion lexicon encourages a vague, benign and perhaps romanticized view of ad hoc initiatives that are often limited, tentative and highly political. It also embeds positive value into political decisions as they are – no one who is in favor of societal involvement in peacebuilding would argue against inclusion, which makes it harder for it to be seen under critical light.

The “possible” inclusion that survives this tightrope is not free of dispute, and seeing it as neutral is an acceptance of and an insertion within specific political and power configurations. Quite the contrary, inclusion is political by nature and cannot be seen as unidirectional decisions by negotiation tables concerning passive and otherwise silent collectivities; it needs to be seen amidst a complex entanglement of interactions coming from a multitude of directions. Building upon approaches such as Lederach’s, which already see peacebuilding as happening at multiple places throughout society and not only at high-level instances, we may say the issue of inclusion corresponds in essence to additional (and constant) negotiation(s) not only between the parties and those brokering peace, but also between those at the table and society as a whole, and within society itself. These are different but by no means dissociated forms of negotiation. Moving away from the PCS canon, however, it is also pressing to highlight and further explore the fact all these negotiations involve changing power dynamics and diverse forms of political articulation. There is a relation between the dispute over what inclusion means and who should be included, and it should not go unnoticed.

This section will leave us with a few important issues for reflection, in particular the two elements of the expressions just mentioned. First, we need to think about the issue of *necessity*, not only making sense of the reasons why inclusion is now seen as necessary but also, more broadly, discussing the attachment of inclusion to its potential utility in the political refoundation of societies torn apart by violence. One also needs to address this idea that including actors from society in peace processes is a *disturbance*, questioning why and to whom this is so. These two issues are necessarily connected to the fostering of political legitimacy in newly created political systems and to the place of political dispute in

peacebuilding, two fundamental pieces in this puzzle to which we turn further ahead.

2.2.1

Inclusion as unnecessary disturbance

The role of organized social groups other than conflict parties in peace processes has been traditionally treated as secondary. At worst, it was simply deemed unthinkable – a nonissue. It is easy to see how, in Cold War conflict management schemes, there was no room for even beginning to consider social demands for participation at negotiation tables. Even when instances of civil society involvement begin to surface, between the late 1970s and early 80s, in the form of problem-solving workshops and informal high-level civil society forums for debating peace, they were punctual and still very exclusive. Not only was the task of building peace assumed to be exclusive; exclusiveness and secrecy were often seen as salutary for the drafting of peace agreements.

In general, even when considered desirable or “the right thing to do”, Conflict Resolution approaches have represented inclusion as an *unnecessary disturbance* to peacemaking. Peter Wallensteen and Mikael Eriksson express a common concern among these views of inclusion, for example, when they say that “the mediator needs to keep in mind that when too numerous members of civil society, with different and perhaps unclear mandates, are brought into a process, it may danger to fragment negotiating dynamics” (2009: 28).

Such approaches condition their openness to inclusion to its utility for peacebuilding, and this cost-benefit calculation has consistently led to recommendations against societal inclusion at the negotiation stage. Fisas argues “there is no room for third-row players at the negotiation table, so it is always necessary to start from an inclusive approach that gives voice to the actors, even if they are not the desired ones but are *key to resolving the conflict*” (2010: 22-23 – my emphasis). There is thus a well-consolidated discourse that determines that some actors (i.e. those with military power) are necessary and should be at the table, as opposed to unnecessary unarmed or “third-row” actors. Such discourse is grounded in a specific idea not only of what is key for ending conflict but also of what the word conflict stands for. This feeds into a consensus in the specialized literature that the echo of “too many voices” at the table is simply detrimental to the signing of peace agreements and may preclude a peace process from even reaching its implementation stage.

The attachment between inclusion and its potential utility for peace explains and leads to a couple of other important points. First, it inspires an association of civil society inclusion with neutral conceptions of NGO expertise and technical skill, not with citizenship-related issues. Kriesberg notes that, alongside the interactive problem-solving workshops of the 70s and 80s, “NGOs were founded ... [and] conducted training, consultations, and workshops relating to large-scale conflicts” (2009: 22). From the 90s on, when Conflict Resolution starts experiencing what Kriesberg calls diffusion and differentiation, he likewise links nongovernmental action to technical attributions. NGOs are then called upon by government and IGOs “to carry out some of the needed work of humanitarian relief, institution building, protection of human rights, and training in conflict resolution skills” (p. 25). NGOs are thus largely recognized as flexible and potentially more efficient mediators and facilitators in complex peace processes in which state and international actors are either unwilling or unable to reach solutions (Bartoli 2009: 393).

The professional role of NGOs in peace-related activities, in particular facilitation and mediation support, tends to obfuscate alternative views of inclusion as stemming from political action and disputes that aim not at being useful, but at advocating for rights. Most peace processes are not limited to ceasefires and military policy; they involve a negotiated redefinition of people’s fundamental rights. As such, inclusion also needs to be understood as having a say in this redefinition process.

Moreover, this type of nongovernmental involvement in negotiation processes is in tight consonance with the knowledge production expected and practiced in this field, i.e. one that revolves around the gathering of lessons learned and best practices. The expectation that there is such a thing as all-encompassing models and neutral expertise regarding peace and conflict makes it more difficult for anyone to see social inclusion in peace negotiations as an inherently political endeavor. The interaction between international institutions and academic actors in the production and circulation of knowledge, as well as the conformation of normative standards regarding inclusion and inclusivity, are of central importance in this debate and should be kept in mind. Even as political and social demands more recently start being recognized as worthy of inclusion, the placement of civil society as a technical actor that has to bring something to the table remains. This tension is likewise present in the way knowledge is created and disseminated in the field. As Anna Leander and Ole Wæver highlight, the interplay between authoritative expertise and ignorance may help shed light over the fact any

expertise is always exclusive of some people and alternative views. It is therefore essential to keep in mind that

[t]he terms on which it becomes possible to problematize and articulate one issue, the objects and subjects pertaining to it, simultaneously and necessarily lead to the exclusion and ignorance of a wide range of other objects and subjects. Ignorance shapes the assembling of expertise by discarding alternative points of view (Leander & Wæver 2019: 10).

Another consequence of the inclusion-utility attachment is the spatial, temporal and thematic control of inclusion. Even when accepted as useful for peace, it happens under a complex combination of hierarchizations. In their reading of affected populations' role in a peace process, mainstream approaches resort to pyramidal models such as Lederach's (*see Figure 2 above*), which show social movements belonging to a wide base spatially separated from the top. Another (perhaps even more enlightening) example of the spatial insulation of negotiation tables is the concept of Track II diplomacy, as well as resulting notions such as Track one and a half and Multitrack diplomacy, and close synonyms such as Citizen diplomacy. While it exists in practice since the late 1960s (Davies & Kaufman 2002: 3), the term "Track II diplomacy" itself was coined in 1981 by American diplomat Joseph Montville to "denote unofficial conflict resolution dialogues" (Jones, 2015: 9). Therefore, Track II surfaces to provide both an alternative and a complementary space to Track I activity, i.e. official state diplomacy. Even more so in the context of widening and deepening post-Cold War agendas (Buzan & Hansen 2009), PCS theories channeled the concept to discuss multiplicity and inclusion in peacebuilding¹⁴. The idea of having two or more tracks of engagement in conflict resolution works as separation and a division of labor between different sectors of society, as well as a back-channel charged with revamping dialogues when official arenas go sour. More importantly, however, it also opens up the possibility of adding up the work all tracks do separately around the common goal of building peace.

This movement invokes Galtung's notions of structural violence and positive peace, so "it is fitting that citizen diplomacy empowers those most impacted to participate in the search for peace" (Davies & Kaufman 2002: 2). Citizen diplomacy is similarly defined as those activities developed by nongovernmental actors independently of official stances. Such actors may come from NGOs, academia, business, religious or artistic organizations, or any other social movement acting in this regard (Fisas 2010: 115). Fisas draws strict lines, however, between official

¹⁴ There is a wide literature on "Track II", "multitrack" and other related concepts. See, for example, Davies & Kaufman 2002, Jones 2015 and Babbitt 2009.

and unofficial diplomacies, saying: “in no circumstances ... should nongovernmental actors be present at the formal negotiation table, although the parties (all or just one) can consult with them if they have gained their trust” (p.115-116 – translated from Spanish).

Pyramidal models and the train track metaphor are rather illustrative of inclusion’s spatial (de)limitations and a shared sense of cautiousness regarding its effects on peace negotiations. In Lederach’s model, political instances of decision-making are at the narrow tip of the pyramid and their relation to the grassroots is mediated by middle sectors of society, which visually reinforces the idea that the table is not the place for wide social debate. In this view, the exclusion of social demands at the negotiation table and the encouragement of grassroots initiatives at the local level become two sides of the same coin. Tracks, in turn, run parallel, each in its path; parallel lines by definition never meet. If a track tilts towards the other, they may safely cross each other, under certain conditions, but they may also tragically collide. The renderings of social inclusion underlined above adhere and reinforce a spatial hierarchization of politics that does not stand alone; it is socially constructed and discursively maintained.


If we switch this analysis to a temporal key, we likewise see these (de)limitations are present and in accordance with spatial ones. Most authors tend to agree it is best to promote social inclusion once a peace agreement is reached and in process of implementation – or, to a lesser degree and in a more limited, professional way, in preventive and exploratory stages. This solution comes off as natural due to the long-term character of recent peacebuilding endeavors, as discussed in the previous section. It also stems from the fact that an ambitious peace project will never “catch on” if people are not on board, working collectively towards taking those agreed-upon measures from paper to life. In terms of utility, therefore, having inclusion happen after negotiations is often seen as ideal because it holds the promise of a more useful and stable role for it to exercise.

In this sense, Fisas sees three types of peace process engagement – high level/official, parallel diplomacy and citizen diplomacy/civil society –, distributing them as they most often occur across stages. He places the role of civil society in preventive and post-agreement stages, also linking what he calls parallel diplomacy to the prenegotiation stage¹⁵ (see *Figure 3 below*). Again, the belief that

¹⁵ He says: “We call ‘parallel diplomacy’ the citizen diplomacy that acts in accordance and in parallel with official diplomacy, but exercising functions that at certain times states or international or regional bodies cannot meet. (...) Governments or armed groups often ask specialized organizations to act as intermediaries, to probe the disposition of the other party and the demands they would impose if negotiations were initiated” (Fisas 2010: 116 – translated from Spanish). This is therefore not so

inclusion has a right time to take place relies on a specific idea of what inclusion *is*, or *should be*, and on usual ways of organizing and sequencing time in PCS. In particular, considering inclusion a strictly post-agreement move assumes the people should not have a say in the renegotiation of their own rights at the table. In this perspective, society only gets to assist in implementing decisions that, despite concerning it in fundamental ways, were taken in its absence.

Figure 3 – Fisas’ “Habitual levels of participation”



Source: reproduced from Fisas (2010: 54).

Along with spatial and temporal control of inclusion, we may also say inclusion is conditioned by thematic hierarchizations. Some topics, especially those of military character, are deemed strategic priorities and are usually much less permeable to societal demands. While recent peace processes have been dealing with a wider gamut of topics – not only of military but also social, political and economic nature –, the disparate levels of openness to society among negotiation topics can become mechanisms of “exclusion within inclusion”. Although some aspects of the liberal peace toolkit (such as economic development planning) are more inclusion-friendly, these are directly affected by exclusive political decisions that continue happening behind closed doors.

A good example of this is the role of democratization in peace processes. Given that most conflicts tackled by newest peacebuilding models involve either openly authoritarian governments or destroyed democratic institutions, concern with assuring democratic ideals in post-conflict reconstruction increased, and so did the need for further study of the issue. Peace agreements started to feature a checklist of democratizing measures – such as the holding of elections, new

much an inclusive type of engagement for civil society members as collectives, but individual roles seen as better exercised by non-official actors.

regulations for party politics, the approval of a new constitution and the installation of transitional justice mechanisms –, which added further complexity to a list of sensitive peacebuilding staples such as infrastructure rebuilding, demining, SSR and DDR.

Anna K. Jarstad created the term “war-to-democracy transition” to study these “two intertwined processes, from violent conflict to peace on the one hand, and from authoritarian rule to democracy on the other hand”, which are seen as “separate, but related” (2008: 21). As the author underlines in justifying her concept, studies of democratization and peacebuilding did not dialogue until the need to think about the two together became vital. For Jarstad, the relationship between the two is not always one of mutual reinforcement – in fact, at times a series of dilemmas between conflicting goals impose a choice between the two, in which case peace should be prioritized (p. 18). In other words, ending hostilities trumps the democratizing role of peace negotiations.

This is a thematic hierarchization that has a direct impact on inclusive initiatives, not only for the fact this specific example involves the push for democracy in post-conflict societies but also because inclusion usually happens under the umbrella of these very topics that take the backseat when a choice is perceived as necessary. In this point of view, although peace and democracy walk hand in hand in liberal peace recipes, the same cannot be said about the individual processes leading up to their consolidation. The rise of the inclusion debate in PCS is thus permeated by this contradiction – the urge for a democratic ideal whose making is seen as impossible unless undemocratic.

Having said all of the above, it is important to highlight that in large measure this whole discussion is made possible precisely by the transformations brought about by the whirlwind of the 1990s. Besides the emphasis received by the local sphere in this period, debates on post-conflict democratization also helped make the issue of inclusion in peace processes much harder to ignore. The relationship and contrast between a transition towards democracy and a peace process that is perceived as democratic, in this sense, should also be problematized and further explored – in particular if we make an effort not to see peace process stages as disarticulated and unrelated.

In view of all this, over the last few decades, the peacebuilding scenario has made it impossible for the maintenance of exclusion as the norm of the field. The tools developed to deal with armed conflicts, especially intrastate ones of social, ethnic and/or religious nature, generated a growing sense that the peace process can no longer be the exclusive territory of rulers and rebels. More than ever,

decisions taken by parties at the negotiation table are not limited to their grievances and the continuation or termination of physical strife.

More than solving differences and judging war crimes, the plan now involved reconciling and rebuilding societies in the long run. This was clear in UN's ambitious post-Cold War performance, as mentioned above, and in the mainstreaming of positive peace theories and new versions of peacebuilding that advocate the inclusion of civil society actors in peace processes. While the tradeoffs identified in this discussion in essence remain the same, the next subsection will claim it acquired new contours recently, after undergoing some important transformations. These have to do both with recent international normatizing moves and studies that have shown inclusion might reveal not just potentially useful, but *necessary* for peace.

2.2.2

Inclusion as necessary disturbance

This subsection will stress the continuities and discontinuities that make up the transition between unnecessary and necessary inclusion, claiming inclusion has both changed and stayed the same in this process. It is still conditioned and controlled based on its potential utility, and ultimately faced as a disturbance for negotiations. It also has quite paradoxically grown into a necessity due to normative and theoretical developments, explained next, which turned social inclusion into both an unavoidable debate and a demand much harder to ignore. Recent studies have made an effort to analyze normative and practical aspects of this renewed take on inclusion, trying to understand when inclusion usually takes place and how.

The best example of inclusion's normatization¹⁶ into peacebuilding protocol is probably the emergence of the inclusivity norm. In its *Guidance for Effective Mediation*, the UN lists it as a fundamental of mediation¹⁷, defining it as “the extent and manner in which the views and needs of conflict parties and other stakeholders are represented and integrated into the process and outcome of a mediation effort” (2012: 11). For the UN, we cannot assume armed parties represent the wider public, which is why restricting openness to armed actors may send the message

¹⁶ For a discussion on norms and mediation, see Hellmüller et al 2015.

¹⁷ The other fundamentals of mediation presented by the document are preparedness; consent; impartiality; national ownership; international law and normative frameworks; coherence, coordination and complementarity of the mediation effort; and, lastly, quality of peace agreements (p. 3).

that violence pays off. Balancing out inclusion and process efficiency is seen as a challenge for mediators, as well as their role in convincing armed parties that broad participation is preferable to closed dialogues. Inclusivity is considered a settled norm in the sense that its consolidation is hardly ever questioned anymore and exclusionary practices now demand public justification (von Burg 2015: 10, see also Hellmüller 2019). It is important not to confuse the norm of inclusivity and actual measures aimed at inclusion. The normatization of inclusion indeed does not guarantee inclusive processes, whatever they are defined to be – this much must be clear. It does, on the other hand, strengthen the case for inclusion and raises costs for those who insist on exclusion.

Another normatizing movement that will receive attention later on concerns the norms established by UNSC Resolution 1325 (and its resulting resolutions) on the role of women in peace processes. These norms gave way to what is now broadly called Women, Peace and Security Agenda (hereafter WPS Agenda). Such “[i]nternational normative commitments to inclusion [of women] ... are widely accepted and shape the design and implementation of many contemporary peace processes and peacebuilding programmes” (Yousuf 2018: 6). This subject is of major importance to this dissertation, in particular for the discussion of the Colombian case, and will be taken up in Chapter 4.

Bertram I. Spector (2015) believes that, in a context of growing pressure for inclusion, people start to seek ways of communicating their stands beyond mere protest, since “[t]hey not only want their voices heard, but they want to be directly involved in making the change happen through collective action” (p. 91). Social demands for peacebuilding cease to be something that could be ignored without consequences – whether to support or reject greater participation by civil society in peace negotiations, it becomes imperative not only to address the issue but also justify positions regarding this matter. How can it be possible to build peace and promote reconciliation in a society without the commitment of society itself, without convincing it of the validity of the project?

The significance of the problem of exclusion in peace processes, on the other hand, does not eliminate the caution that always pervaded approaches to including third parties at negotiating tables. Wallensteen’s and Eriksson’s previously mentioned concern, in this sense, does not go away; it is simply reshaped when faced with new developments of this debate. In the midst of violent confrontation, the approach to non-violent contact between rival parties is usually surrounded by an aura of fragility. Hence, for example, the concern of experts with issues of timing

and the influence of spoilers¹⁸ on the failure of negotiations. Even with the emergence of the inclusivity norm, there is still an overall consensus in the literature that direct inclusion of voices deemed unnecessary at the negotiation table is a disturbance and even perhaps an impediment to a negotiated solution (Nilsson 2012; Wanis St-John and Kew 2008; Zanker 2014; Lanz 2011).

The inherent contradiction of having inclusion promise both utility and disruption grows even deeper with a few recent transformations that increasingly turn the issue of its potential utility into one of outward necessity. Parallel to the rise of the inclusivity norm, recent studies have shown inclusion might be more than just punctually useful; it might in fact be *necessary* for peace to endure. Here the concept of sustainability in theoretical and global governance discourse is of central importance, permeating discussions on development, environment, as well as peace and conflict. The preoccupation with conflict recidivism is not new in PCS literature – in theorizing what “stable peace” means, for instance, Boulding suggested that “[i]t is a phase of the [war-peace] system in which the strength is sufficiently larger than the strain, so that the inevitably cyclical and random movements within the system never carry us over the boundary into war” (Boulding 1978: xi). In peace global governance, the concept of sustainability received center stage attention recently with the launch of UN’s Sustaining Peace Agenda, which turns attention from traditional peacebuilding models to conflict prevention, i.e., the avoidance of the outbreak, escalation, continuation, and recurrence of conflict (de Coning 2018, Mahmoud 2017).

If, on the one hand, welcoming additional points of view into the elaboration of a peace agreement in theory makes consensus more difficult to come by, specialists have found that it was precisely the peace negotiations deemed inclusive that presented the lowest rates of subsequent return to violence. Two quantitative studies stand out in this sense: one published by Anthony Wanis-St. John and Darren Kew in 2008, and another by Desirée Nilsson, published four years later. The first evaluated more than twenty peace negotiations between 1993 and 2008, in order to verify what kind of influence the participation of civil society exerted on the goal of peace agreement sustainability. The authors observed that among the cases studied, all those with high civil society involvement led to a stable peace throughout the implementation phase (2008: 27). The vast majority

¹⁸ Spoilers are actors that either refuse to negotiate peace and sabotage it from afar or enter negotiations with the purpose of disrupting them. See Newman and Richmond (2006) and Zahar (2008).

of cases with low civil society involvement, in contrast, experienced a return to violence. Their main conclusions, in short, were as follows:

the direct participation of civil society groups in peace negotiations is strongly associated with the sustainability of subsequent peace agreements and their exclusion is associated with failed agreements, except when the Track I negotiators are democratic actors responsive to broad constituencies or when the international community is willing to fund robust peacekeeping and state-building (2008:33).

Nilsson, in turn, expanded the scope of analysis by taking into account 83 peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2004. Much like Wanis-St. John and Kew, the author found results consistent with the expectation that the inclusion of civil society actors increases the chances of peace (2012: 244). In all cases involving the inclusion of civil society actors and members of political parties, together or separately, Nilsson noted that the risk of a negotiated peace failing was significantly reduced. In conclusion, she points out that her research “seems to suggest that it is important for the durability of peace to have different spectra of society included as a way of garnering support and legitimacy for the peace process” (p. 258). Thus, inclusive initiatives are slowly recognized as legitimating factors for the refoundation of war-torn political systems, and linked to a sense of national ownership and public buy-in¹⁹. As the next section shall maintain, there is some reductionism – and, more importantly, a silenced political character – in considering inclusion solely an instrument for the production of legitimacy.

Also important is to look further into what it is these authors label inclusion while reaching the conclusions underlined above. Wanis-St. John and Kew devised three measures for inclusion in the peace processes evaluated in their study: high, moderate and low. High means civil society sat at the table; moderate means no seat but relevant influence over the table; and low means no seat and little influence (p. 25). Nilsson, in turn, considered there was civil society inclusion when identified in the agreement text that it was given a role in the drafting process and/or subsequent participation in the peace process (p. 252). She alerts her reader, however, that the number of actors involved and the extent of their action were not taken into account, given that there was no data available to analyze this in further detail (p. 253).

Ultimately, what these arguments demonstrate is that the issue of inclusion in peace negotiations develops a paradoxical character: the effort for inclusion is seen as simultaneously good and bad, as both necessary and disruptive for the success of peace negotiations. In spite of the recognition of the importance of

¹⁹ For an argument contrary to Nilsson and Wanis-St. John & Kew, and to the wider argument that inclusion helps foster legitimacy, see Kanol (2015).

considering groups normally excluded and particularly affected by armed conflicts, it is usually controlled, conditioned and tentative in comparison to the urgency of ending violence between the parties. Inclusion is only admitted if under control, i.e. if its manifestation is spatially, temporally and thematically managed as to not compromise negotiation efforts. Secondly, these control mechanisms work to establish the conditions under which inclusion may take place. As a consequence, inclusion is most often laid out as a tentative effort by decision-makers, one that may be quickly discarded when more urgent matters surface throughout negotiations.

Of all the tensions observed in this apparent catch-22, none is clearer than that between direct inclusion mechanisms (i.e. those that grant access to the negotiating table) and indirect ones (i.e. those that seek to influence table activities but do not reach it directly). Thus, the sense of stalemate – or pure unfeasibility – is especially neuralgic when demands for inclusion aim at seats at the negotiating table since such inclusion needs the stamp of the armed actors involved and/or international mediators and sponsors. Jarstad categorizes four different types of dilemmas that pervade calls for inclusion in contexts of simultaneous democratization and peacebuilding processes. Two of them are particularly important to address here: the ones she labels horizontal and vertical dilemmas²⁰.

Horizontal dilemmas are about the choice of groups that should be represented in these processes and therefore involve a tradeoff between inclusion and exclusion. The frequent exclusion of civil society from horizontal relations between elites of warring parties and democratic political parties leads to “an uneven start in a democratization process”, which may be remedied by “[including] a broad range of actors in the peace negotiations and also in the future government” (p. 23). The other is a vertical dilemma related to a choice between efficacy and legitimacy concerning the relation between elite and mass politics. She says: “On the one hand, legitimacy is expected to increase when the people are involved in all phases of a peace process... On the other hand, the elites often have an interest in a non-public process” (Jarstad 2008a: 23). Even if meant as a schematic view of real-life problems, this separation between horizontal and vertical dilemmas constitutes yet another hierarchization of society’s role in

²⁰ The remaining two are systemic and temporal dilemmas. Systemic dilemmas concern the issue of ownership and an “international versus local” tradeoff. For a critical stance on the local turn in peacebuilding, see Randazzo 2016 and Paffenholz 2014, 2015. Lastly, temporal dilemmas are tradeoffs between short-term and long-term effects of both democratization and peacebuilding – she sees a timing issue for pressing democratizing measures, which, if done “too soon”, may hurt peacebuilding efforts. These dilemmas are also good examples of what I have been calling spatial and temporal hierarchizations of inclusion.

building peace, also artificially separating instances that are not independent of each other. Precisely because this might work to conceal dynamics that perforate and subvert established categories, we must ask ourselves which narratives do not fit these well-defined boxes, and which alternative approaches may help unveil them.

A few authors have explored these contradictions to try and understand how armed parties and sponsors deal with popular demands and then foresee when and in which situations inclusion will occur. Ultimately, as previously indicated, the discussion usually goes back to questions of utility (or, more recently, one may say *necessity*) and normativity. In this vein, David Lanz (2011) believes that the factors that lead to the inclusion or exclusion of actors at negotiation tables depend fundamentally on the crossing between practical and normative dynamics. The practical argument seeks to understand if the inclusion of a particular participant increases the chances of an agreement being reached; the normative, in turn, questions whether such participation is consistent with the norms and values of the actors who conduct the process. If the inclusion or exclusion of an actor is perceived as necessary in the practical sense and appropriate in the normative sense, there is mutual reinforcement between the two parameters and, consequently, the choice of participants is uncomplicated.

The difficulty for Lanz lies, however, in cases where practical and normative requirements do not coincide – whether an actor is seen as practically necessary, but normatively reprehensible, e.g. groups considered to be terrorists; or the opposite, if it is seen as harmful in the practical sense though "legitimate" in the normative sense, e.g. some civil society actors. David E. Cunningham (2013) takes the practical argument further, arguing that the decision regarding inclusion should be based solely on veto-holding actors, i.e., those who can prevent the evolution of negotiations if they wish. In other words, the author believes that "negotiations are most likely to lead to a comprehensive settlement if they include all of the veto players in the war and exclude everyone else" (p.39).

The feeling of isolation around negotiation tables has led specialists to search for alternative ways of overcoming this perceived paradox between inclusion and effectiveness in peace processes. This was mainly done by expanding the notion of inclusion beyond the granting of seats at the table. A series of indirect modes of social mobilization and vocalization of demands also start "counting" as inclusion. For Wanis-St. John and Kew, because access to the table is controlled by powerful actors that can resort to violence, most often civil society

exerts influence through indirect means such as political lobbying, transfer of expertise and the mobilization of public opinion (2008: 20).

Lanz suggests that “instead of giving actors a direct seat at the negotiation table, mediators can launch public information campaigns as well as engage in regular consultations with important civil society stakeholders in order to provide them with a feedback loop into the negotiations” (2011: 291). In a similar fashion, the *UN Guidance for Effective Mediation* stresses that inclusion “does not imply that all stakeholders participate directly in the formal negotiations, but facilitates interaction between the conflict parties and other stakeholders and creates mechanisms to include all perspectives in the process” (2012: 11). In her study of inclusivity, Corinne Von Burg observes that, while it is most often recognized as a process-related norm (i.e. referring to “the number and diversity of actors involved”), it can also at times be understood as content-related, in which case it would refer to the inclusion of issues at the negotiation table’s agenda (2015: 9). As the author stresses, the two types of inclusion that come out of such norms do not necessarily go hand in hand: an actor can be personally included only not to be able to advance his or her agenda; on the contrary, an issue or specific agenda may be included without the physical presence of the actors behind it (p. 16-17).

After mapping the known ways of inclusion in peace processes and assessing how it is done in practice, Thania Paffenholz (2014) listed nine inclusive modalities²¹, from more direct to more indirect:

Table 1 – Paffenholz’s nine inclusion modalities

Paffenholz's Modalities (2014)	
1)	Direct representation at the negotiation table, in a separate delegation or incorporated into an existing delegation
2)	Observer status at the negotiation table
3)	Consultative forums that run parallel to official negotiations
4)	Less formal consultations with civil society
5)	Inclusive post-agreement mechanisms
6)	High-level civil society initiatives, e.g. problem-solving workshops
7)	Public participation, e.g. public hearings
8)	Public decision making, e.g. referenda
9)	Mass action, e.g. protests

Source: *elaborated by the author from Paffenholz (2014)*

²¹ In later publications, the author reduces her list to seven modalities (see Paffenholz 2015b for example). I am choosing to work with her previous elaboration here.

Paffenholz emphasizes that these are not self-excluding categories, but different inclusive manifestations that can be combined in innumerable ways, depending on the specific conditions and interactions of each peace process. She sees advantages and disadvantages in employing each of these modalities. More direct modalities provide valuable opportunities for civil society to act as advocates, promote their own post-conflict agenda, and obtain information that is unavailable elsewhere; on the other hand, if no decision-making power is attributed to these actors, the proximity to the table runs the risk of becoming empty legitimation, with the parties taking advantage of the credit gained by their "openness" at the same time as they shun these actors in practice. In turn, indirect inclusion modalities such as mass action demand greater volume and adherence in order to make an impact, but they also have the advantage of being less vulnerable to the cooptation and influence of powerful actors.

In the version of inclusion proposed here, the way it is seen and portrayed both changed and stayed the same over time. It stayed the same because it is still viewed as a disturbance. As discussed, the role of society at this stage of peacebuilding is usually read as additional conflict to an already conflicted scenario. The portion of the expression that did change (from unnecessary to necessary), on the other hand, had to do with the normatization of inclusion and the growing endorsement of studies that suggest it bears a central role in fostering sustainable peace. It should be mentioned, however, that even these changes were constructed on top of some unchanged fundamental features, highlighted in the previous subsection.

In this sense, there is permanence within the change observed – even where we can find discourses on inclusion that are grounded on the guarantee of basic rights, most of the time it is valued for its utility and controlled in function of such utility, a trend that may be found across academic and expert production, practitioners' discourses and international institutions' guidelines for inclusion. The above-mentioned hierarchizations still frame what inclusion is and the role it plays in a peace process. Spatial, temporal and thematic control of inclusion is thus decisive for the way it is perceived both in theory and practice today. The next section will place under critical light the issues of "necessity" and "disturbance" when it comes to the inclusion of society in peace negotiations.

2.3 A critical word: the politics of “necessity” and “disturbance”

The two categories outlined in the previous sections have a lot to say about the advances and limitations of current approaches to inclusion in peace negotiations. Despite the growth of concern with this topic, it still calls for deeper critical reflections over what ultimately means for a peace process to be “inclusive”, and whom such inclusion serves. It is also necessary to reflect on the tendency to oppose languages of practicality and normativity, as previously highlighted, and the significance of their adoption to explain inclusion. Reducing inclusion to its usefulness leads to its instrumentalization and potentially misses the point of asking some more fundamental questions about it. Therefore, while investigations on the role of inclusion and the way it unfolds have gained space in PCS debates in the past years, it also seems increasingly necessary to see it as shaping and shaped by political dynamics.

My aim in this section is to critically reflect about each half of the expressions I proposed before. First, I want to look at the “necessary/unnecessary” component and its creation of an attachment between inclusion and legitimacy. Next, and related to the previous discussion, I will evaluate the “disturbance” component, questioning the place of (nonviolent) conflict and dispute within the attempted consensus underlying peace processes. Together, the two will lead to seeing the peace process as a place and time not only of deliberation and consensus but also of political dispute – a debate which should not be avoided despite the general sense that it hurts the larger objective of peace. On the contrary, seeing the dispute behind the consensus might just be what we all need in order to see inclusion from a deeper, more nuanced perspective. In this sense, I follow authors that have recently framed different PCS debates under the notion of *agonistic peace*, in particular views that apply it to the specific issue of societal inclusion in peace processes.

Let’s start with the issue of *necessity*. Behind both practical and normative arguments for inclusion as “necessary”, there is a fairly widespread belief that it benefits peace processes by helping foster legitimacy and thus, as a result, also contributing towards peace durability. Examples establishing a causal relation between sustainability and legitimacy abound. The UN Guidance says “[c]ivil society actors can play a critical role in increasing the legitimacy of a peace process and are potentially important allies” (2012: 11). Roberto Belloni argues inclusion “can increase the legitimacy of a peace agreement and the prospects for its implementation – even when domestic elites expect civil society involvement will

have only a modest impact on the drafting of the peace settlement” (2008: 199). For Paffenholz, “engaging civil society in the various stages of the peace process can promote higher levels of accountability among the conflict parties, and a sense that the negotiations have greater legitimacy, which can lead, in turn, to a shift in public opinion about the process” (2014: 74). Guelke believes “[h]ow inclusive the process is of significant strands of political opinion has a strong bearing on perceptions of its legitimacy, both internally and externally” (2008: 70). The list goes on²².

Conditioning inclusion to its “practical validity” suggests it is only a possibility if useful – taking as given, accepting and omitting power dynamics as they exist, which affects the treatment of inclusive efforts as potential mechanisms of transformation. The normative argument (which may work to justify the inclusion of social groups deemed unnecessary for the signature of an agreement, e.g. conflict victims) ends up attached to the loose objective of legitimation. As an end in and of itself, the goal of political legitimation not only serves instrumentalist purposes and ignores the political character of peace processes, but also suggests that inclusion itself matters less than the *perception* and consequent *acceptance* that it happened.

Andreas Hirblinger & Dana Landau (2020) show how vague calls for societal inclusion and its role in political legitimization run across theory, policy and practice of inclusion in peacemaking, but hold little transformative potential. First, legitimacy-oriented theoretical arguments usually “use open and vague framings of the included, leaving their translation into tangible policy options open”, as a consequence also ignoring the antagonistic dynamics at the core of armed conflicts (p. 4). In policy, this usually translates into references to broad-based inclusion of “stakeholders”, “voices” or “civil society”, which do not facilitate their practical application by parties and mediators (p. 7). Mapping out stakeholders reveals key in this sense, which is not always at the reach of those working in negotiations. As a result, what we see is an inclusion that follows “a ‘standard formula’ of consultations, giving voice predominantly to representatives of urban-based, professionalized civil society organizations” (p. 10-11).

Far from aiming to exhaust the issue of legitimacy, which is subject to vast theoretical debate²³, it is fitting to briefly discuss its significance for peace

²² See also Nilsson 2012: 248, Yousuf 2018: 7-8, Jarstad & Sisk 2008: 11, Wanis & Kew 2008: 16, Lanz 2011: 276.

²³ This wider debate includes for example the dialogue between descriptive and normative conceptions of legitimacy and its relationship with coercion, consent and democracy. Recent

processes and enquire how its connections to inclusion have been forged. What is it, then, that PCS authors are calling legitimacy? Are they referring to the creation of legality in the form of new political institutions? Is it related to literal or tacit ideas of popular consent to such institutions? Or – what seems more likely –, is legitimacy here taken simply as the belief that it actually exists, with little focus on what is the practical anchor of such belief?

More than anything, it is strictly treated as something to aspire to. This is only natural since legitimacy is a key aspect of going from the widespread and undisciplined use of force to the classical Weberian formulation of state monopoly over the legitimate use of force²⁴. On the other hand, since force is not enough to sustain a political order and should not be the state's first resort in dealing with society, a well-accepted sense of authority, that leads people to obey without violence, ranks pretty high in peacebuilding's priorities. As legitimacy is about *the justification of political power*, it cannot be taken as neutral (Bobbio 2017: 113) and it is problematic to see its achievement as merely an end instead of a (contested) process.

Franziska Zanker notes that the approach received by legitimacy in studies of inclusion is circular: "Public buy-in results in legitimacy, and because of legitimacy, there is public buy-in. Therefore, while several of these scholars mention legitimacy, they leave the exact mechanisms of how legitimacy works largely unaddressed" (2018: 7). Based on this, she calls attention to the importance of a closer look at this specific idea of legitimacy, questioning "what would make peace negotiations more legitimate for the population, rather than in what ways civil society can contribute to the legitimacy of peace talks" (p. 9). In a related argument, Anderlini points out that the legitimacy and objectivity of civil society actors demanding inclusion are often questioned; these are questions "rarely, if ever, applied to the political and military leaders who claim to be representative of their societies but often appear to gain their legitimacy through the barrel of a gun" (2007: 60-61). The direction assumed in different views of post-conflict legitimacy is therefore anything but trivial – most of the time it is mentioned in reference of what society can contribute towards enabling new political institutions, not the other way around. Instead of seeing legitimation as one unproblematic feature of a peace process or an easy answer to a yes or no question, it is important to recognize it

discussions on legitimacy have usually revolved around Weber's influential formulation, its developments and critiques (Weber 1964).

²⁴ Weber 2002.

as both a *two-way street* and as an *informal (i.e. noninstitutionalized) and contested process* (Zanker 2018: 10).

In pursuing this, civil society's agency in peace processes should not be muted or underestimated. Paffenholz sums it up:

Most of the current negotiation literature treats civil society primarily as an object of inclusion or exclusion and the decision to include or exclude is attributed to the mediators or the principle negotiators. Inclusion, however, is often the initiative of civil society groups, and powerful mass action is mostly out of the mediators' control. Mediators and negotiators should therefore consider civil society as an actor in its own right rather than a passive object of inclusion or exclusion" (2014: 89).

It is also important to underline that since the production of agreements and their legitimation must be accommodated by consensus, it starts by automatically excluding those who question the basis for consensus itself. This shows that this association between inclusion and legitimacy is problematic because it assumes consensus as a universe, whereas it is possible, in a different interpretation, to see the creation of legitimacy as something that simultaneously includes *and* excludes.

This is directly related to the *disturbance* debate, to which I now move on. Thinking about the disturbance societal inclusion is said to pose necessarily involves bringing up its political significance for peace processes, as well as its place in transforming power dynamics. The consensual universe imagined within the enterprise of peace negotiations is restrictive of disagreement beyond those fundamental ones between conflict parties motivating the peace process. This shapes the very labeling of what constitutes politically relevant actors or agendas in the handling of armed conflicts. Societal actors are either completely stripped of political value, being portrayed as passive bystanders, or, if/when inclusion becomes a controlled and hierarchized possibility, they are recognized as political actors yet also as potential troublemakers. The first option is seen in approaches that contemplate power and politics in peace processes as the exclusive realm of conflict parties and elites; the second, in the more recent inclusion-friendly viewpoints discussed in previous sections.

In consonance with conflict management schemes, the literature that does place power and politics at center stage still limits itself to studying elite bargains, with little or no attention to societal actors and a lack of critical purpose. Two examples of specific literature may be mentioned: the political settlement framework and power-sharing approaches. While political settlements analysis²⁵ is most utilized in development studies, its main features can also be found in applications to contexts of conflict. These include having international peace

²⁵ For more on the political settlement framework, see Bell 2015 and Bell & Pospisil 2017

projects overcome liberal normative directives that are universalizing and “doomed to fail”, addressing conflict instead in a so-called pragmatic manner that tackles the interests of elites which would otherwise upset such efforts (Bell 2015). Bell & Pospisil thus point out that “the concept of political settlement does not require or imply a ‘good’ political order, such as that of the liberal democratic state, but includes a broader range of political arrangements many of which may be normatively unattractive” (2017: 4). In large measure, this way of seeing conflict resolution seems like a realist-pragmatist reaction to the failed liberal peace projects of the 1990s.

Power-sharing approaches, in turn, have a stronger presence as a tool for dealing with conflict. Although it is a contested concept – authors disagree over what power-sharing entails –, it involves reaching an agreement between parties through a consensual distribution of power among conflicting elites, which may be of political, territorial, military or economic nature²⁶. In its political key, the one of most interest here, power-sharing is “a governing system aiming at including multiple political actors in decision-making processes” (Binningsbø: 2013: 107). More specifically, political power-sharing gives former rebels a place in government, for example through the institution of electoral quotas²⁷.

Interestingly, while widely used in conflict management in the present day, the notion of power-sharing actually emerged from studies of democracy back in the 1960s. Power-sharing thus dates back to Arend Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism, which involved the use of political pacts to achieve moderate and functioning democracy in divided societies (Jarstad 2008b: 110). Lijphart defines consociationalism as “*government by elite cartel* designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy” (1969: 216 – my emphasis), which in turn is made possible by tools such as grand coalitions, group autonomy, mutual veto rights and proportional representation. Conflict management and democratic theory thus make up two diverging strands of research which tend to see very different potential effects of elite consensual power-sharing on either benefiting or harming post-conflict peace and democracy²⁸. Regardless, both strands “[freeze] conflict lines” (Jarstad 2008b: 125) and do not factor in societal actors as invested with agency before, during or

²⁶ See Binningsbø 2013, Sriram 2008 for more detail on the types of power-sharing.

²⁷ It is worth noting that in power-sharing literature the word inclusion is used in reference to armed actors and elites; it does not refer to society as well, as I chose to do here.

²⁸ As discussed by Binningsbø (2013), one can find both arguments defending power-sharing as beneficial for peace and democracy and others that claim it is actually harmful to them. For a critique of consociationalism in democratic theory, see Phillips 1995: 14.

even after peace processes. In this point of view, such actors are irrelevant for the achievement of both peace and democracy and do not even get to become a disturbance at all.

In inclusion-friendly literature, on the other hand, the political and contested character of society's involvement in peace processes is usually admitted but cast aside as "too complex to tackle", in favor of more manageable and neutralized viewpoints that set out to study it "as it is", without questioning existent power dynamics. Oftentimes inclusion is seen as penetrating loopholes within specific political configurations that are perceived as naturally exclusory. Once found and seized, these loopholes are evaluated by scholars in an isolated way, losing sight of the configuration that generated them. Taken in isolation, technical categories accept power dynamics as they are and contribute towards turning political aspects of inclusion into a black box.

However, one cannot lose from sight that the agency of any actor is necessarily connected to the structural continuities of the political and social life of conflicting societies – continuities that are made possible and maintained by institutional and discursive developments (Jabri 2006: 2). For Vivienne Jabri, "[t]he problem lies in the extraction of conflict resolution from its social and political context" (2006: 5). In fact, a widening of political and social agency in peace processes is crucial if a deeper reflection on the topic of inclusion is to be undertaken, and this goes through the problematization of the political as the "realm of the possible" and a stage for power dynamics. As Stefano Guzzini explains, thus, "[p]ower" implies an idea of counterfactuals; i.e., it could also have been otherwise. The act of attributing power redefines the borders of what can be done. In the usual way we conceive of the term, this links power inextricably to 'politics' in the sense of the 'art of the possible'" (2005: 511). In the context of peace negotiations and the political refoundation of states in the face of ever less palpable and well-delineated wars (Jabri 2007), the "art of the possible" finds the extreme of reinvention.

The hierarchization and control of inclusion are indissociable from the attribution of what is political and what is not, as well as what is political and deserves attention, and what is political but "too disruptive" to enter analyses. As stressed by Catherine O'Rourke in her critique of the political settlement framework, "[t]he determination to 'do politics' apolitically leaves the discipline blind to its own implicit politics" (2017: 605). Moreover, the idea of achieving "possible" inclusion discloses a "commitment ... to 'work with the grain' (Levy, 2014) of prevailing distributions of power and to focus on securing marginal policy gains",

which inevitably carries an “implicit normativity” (idem). As it so happens, the separation between elites and non-elites, a categorization that appears as central in conflict management schemes and to a certain extent is incorporated by more recent takes on inclusion, is also far from neutral. As O’Rourke argues, “[i]t is unlikely to be clear at all times and in all settings who, in fact, constitute ‘the elites’. Rather, it is a term inherently laden with both ambiguity and values” (p. 600).

This is also true for the spatial and temporal categories we see in PCS – as practical conventions, they are also political choices. Here, to stick with the temporal example for now, the foucauldian inversion of Clausewitz's maxim acquires particular relevance – “politics is the continuation of war by other means” (2005: 22). To think of politics as a continuation of war both awakens us to the complacency of the temporal slicing of peacebuilding and to the fact that the consolidation of new political systems after armed conflicts is also the expression and continuation of *non-neutral* power dynamics sealed around a table. Bell suggests we may better understand these “temporal politics”, if I may, by highlighting the “tension between the peace agreement as providing for an ‘elite pact’ as necessary to short-term stability, and the more ‘constitutional’ ambition of peace agreements to provide a broader, more inclusive social contract, capable of sustaining peace” (2018: 10).

Bell & Pospisil propose looking at political settlements not as punctual and final products of rushed timelines, but as what they call “formalized political unsettlements”. These involve the acknowledgment that conflicts continue under negotiation after peace processes officially end, allowing that “pragmatic approaches to elite inclusion interact in complex ways with more normative arguments for social inclusion and create situations of constant institutional flux” (2017: 11). As opposed to political settlement views, the authors believe accepting peace processes as ever-unfinished tasks and the long-term horizon of conflict negotiation opens up possibilities for social inclusion to be continually reworked (p. 14). Also importantly, they underscore formalized political unsettlement offers new ways of addressing the issue of legitimacy, considering “what might give the state legitimacy is understood to be up for grabs, and itself to be negotiated rather than assumed” (p. 12).

As an example of the spatial aspect, in turn, I may add Amit Ron’s (2009; 2010) suggestion that peace processes need to be seen as places of public decision. In addition to the “horizontal” dialogue of the negotiating table, Ron sees a “vertical” dialogue between the table and society, with the potential to extrapolate “the frames of discussion [the elites] intended to establish” (2009: 3). These two

dialogues take place amidst what he calls an epistemological crisis – a crisis of knowledge and understanding, a redefinition of old certainties. He also calls for interdisciplinary dialogue between peace studies and democratic theory, a dialogue that is still very incipient. For Ron, “the dialogue between democratic theory and peace studies may be useful as a tool for social criticism: to understand how powerful players can abuse claims for democratic legitimacy to derail rather than promote the cause of peace” (2010: 370).

I do agree with seeing peace agreements as the start of something, not the end; I also agree with the need to interpret peace negotiations as loci of public decision and establish interdisciplinary dialogues for social inclusion to be seen under a new light (as is the case of this research). However, I also believe a different framing of politics and power is called for, in order for their expression in peace processes not to be merely acknowledged and accepted but scrutinized and criticized instead. This also means assuming a distinct outlook on consensus, which is not only the main objective behind the idea of peace processes but also their main standard of analysis, traditionally based on rational-actor frameworks and liberal individualistic conceptions of politics. Whereas I am not trying to deny the centrality of decision-making in the handling of violent conflicts, I want to call attention to the conflict contained within achieved consensuses, as well as the social and political context in which it exists and that it transforms – especially if one agrees that the flipside of this coin might just be the exclusions contained within “possible” inclusions.

The concept of agonistic peace recently developed in the PCS literature is illuminating in this regard. Drawing inspiration from authors inside and out of the PCS discipline²⁹, debates on agonistic peace³⁰ have represented “an opportunity to politicise the concept of peace and in so doing to illuminate points where peace slides all too comfortably back into familiarised hegemonic iterations of disciplinary order” (Shinko 2008: 475). They came as a response to what authors call “a technical turn” that advances a depoliticized view of conflict and leads towards “counterproductive” peacebuilding practices (Aggestam et al 2015, Strömbom 2020). In short, agonistic peace presents itself as an alternative to violent antagonisms that does not deny the conflictual nature of politics; instead, it

²⁹ Among authors outside PCS I may highlight for instance William Connolly, Michel Foucault, Bonnie Honig and Chantal Mouffe – the latter will guide my argumentation here. From the PCS field inspiration often comes from critical authors such as Oliver Richmond, Vivienne Jabri and Oliver Ramsbotham.

³⁰ Authors have developed the concept of agonistic peace in relation to peacebuilding (Aggestam et al 2014), human security (Peterson 2013), reconciliation (Schaap 2006, Maddison 2015), dialogue (Ramsbotham 2009, Lehti 2016), narratives (Çelik 2020), etc.

proposes to see peace as a reframing of conflict, from a clash between enemies to a dispute between (peaceful) adversaries (Maddison 2015).

Inserted within the agonistic peace debate, in an attempt to tackle peace processes' political and power dynamics from a critical angle and reframe societal inclusion in a political key, I want to mobilize alternative ways of discussing politics, antagonism and consensus, drawing particularly from Chantal Mouffe's theory³¹. This means briefly discussing her differentiation between "politics" and "the political"; the relationship between antagonism and agonism; and the essential contradictions within liberal ideals of peace, expressed in the form of hegemonic relations. Ultimately, the author's outlook on politics and discourse will inform my proposal to study societal inclusion in peace negotiations through a theoretical dialogue between PCS and the concept of political representation.

For Mouffe, "politics" refers to the practices and institutions making up a specific political order; by "the political", on the other hand, she means a more fundamental and constitutive aspect of societies, which is indissociable from power, conflict and antagonism³². As a "struggle between enemies", antagonism is central for the political because it frames the constitution of collective forms of identification – which always surface through "us" versus "them" dynamics (2013: 184). Antagonism, in this context, is defined as a situation in which "the presence of the 'Other' prevents me from being fully myself". The constant possibility of (violent) antagonism underlying political orders thus "impedes the full totalization of society and forecloses the possibility of a society beyond division and power. This, in turn, requires coming to terms with the lack of a final ground and the undecidability that pervades every order" (p. 158).

Mouffe believes that it is only by recognizing antagonism and the ever-changing character of conflict that *agonistic* democratic politics – i.e. a struggle between mutually recognized (and therefore legitimate) adversaries, not enemies – becomes possible. Armed conflict may thus be viewed as the violent expression of such antagonisms, and peace processes as transitional moments in which both politics and the political are under reconstruction. While a successful peace process can and often does establishes agonistic democratic politics, the existence of antagonism at the root of the political remains the basis for the identification of social groups and their interaction in newly founded political orders.

³¹ This also includes Mouffe's co-authored work with Ernesto Laclau, in particular their book *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (1985).

³² Mouffe bases her argumentation on a dialogue with Carl Schmitt's theory.

According to the author, it is because liberal and rationalistic interpretations of politics completely miss this point that they find it possible to devise technical solutions for conflicts. However, "...political questions are not merely technical issues to be solved by experts. Proper political questions always involve decisions that require making a choice between conflicting alternatives" (Mouffe 2013: 171). As Mouffe points out, modern liberal ideals were built over a paradoxical connection forged between equality and liberty. The tension between these two principles can only be accommodated through political negotiations that establish temporary hegemonic power patterns.

Once it is granted that the tension between equality and liberty cannot be reconciled and that there can only be contingent hegemonic forms of stabilization of their conflict, it becomes clear that, once the very idea of an alternative to the existing configuration of power disappears, what disappears also is the very possibility of a legitimate form of expression for the resistances against the dominant power relations. The status quo has become naturalized and made into the way 'things really are'" (Mouffe 2000: 5).

The idea of hegemonic articulation originally conceived by Mouffe and Laclau necessarily relates to the openness of the social, i.e. to the unfeasibility of conceiving society as a founding totality (p. 95). In this perspective, political orders stem from the sedimentation of hegemonic practices, which are constantly susceptible to counter-hegemonic attempts to substitute them with new ones (Mouffe 2013: 158).

Addressing PCS approaches from this standpoint presupposes not only considering the elimination of conflict an impossibility, as conflict transformation approaches already do but also reframing how antagonism is brought into the analysis, seeing "any form of consensus [as] the result of a hegemonic articulation" (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: xviii). By reconceptualizing classical Marxist discourse³³ and its exclusive focus on the working class as a unified agent, Laclau and Mouffe's theory of hegemonic articulations works to highlight the plurality of (often contradictory) subject positions and struggles that act in society. While it may seem nonsensical to flesh out more conflictual relationships in the context of desperate attempts for armed conflict resolution or transformation, the recognition and embracing of this sort of conflict is also in line with a view of politics as, yes, a realm of conflict, but an agonistic conflict nonetheless.

On the one hand, the belief in the impossibility of "definitive conflict resolution" is already present in the PCS literature, for example in the lasting influence of Galtunian peacebuilding and, more recently, in Lederach's work and

³³ They consider their work post-Marxist, in the sense that they distance themselves from Marxist conceptions of subjectivity, class and antagonism, and also draw from post-structuralist theory, especially Lacan and Derrida.

the notion of conflict transformation. It is clear, on the other hand, that the hegemonic practices behind given political orders are usually a blind spot for PCS, which most often adhere to specific power configurations by trying to grasp reality “as it is”. In contrast, Laclau and Mouffe propose to “privilege the political moment in the structuring of society” (p. xii), which constitutes a first step towards destabilizing the political silences of PCS literature in relation to the role of society in peace negotiations, as well as capturing the plurality and asymmetry of positions involved in peace talks.

Agonistic peace approaches go further than conflict transformation in that they focus not only on relationship-building and identity change but also on institutional arrangements (Strömbom 2019: 5). For Lisa Strömbom, an agonistic peace analytical framework is capable of addressing not only issues related to the mutual recognition of former enemies but also institutional solutions that dismiss standardized peacebuilding formulas. In her view, recognition may be thin or thick, with the first being more superficial – e.g., the formal recognition between negotiation parties – and the second involving deeper engagement with particularities of identities (p. 17). Agonistic approaches to institutions, in turn, should safeguard a plurality of political voices and claims as well as a dialogical process that “is built on the idea of dissensus as a progressive source of social life” (p. 15). Through such parameters, the author argues that we can assess whether a scenario of agonistic peace may be deemed deep, partial or shallow, depending on its reach within different levels of society – if agonistic pluralism only reaches elite-level instances, it is shallow; it is deep when it reaches mid- and local levels; and it is partial if it is high in certain instances but not others (p. 20).

Agonistic approaches to peace thus help to reposition the discussion on inclusion in peace negotiations. For Strömbom, “[a]gonistic practices can help mitigate violent conflict, since they aim towards problematising exclusionary practices, marginalisation, relations of domination and also probe how these could be overthrown, resisted or altered” (p. 9). Moreover, such approaches stress that the role of society in peace processes should be more than “the inclusion of less powerful groups in already existing structures”, since “[a] heterogeneity of voices within a homogenous system cannot alter the status quo” (Peterson 2013: 323).

Agonistic peacebuilding must probe questions regarding the transformation of power relations. Ultimately this means striving towards an inclusive society that values contestation, in which all parties have the possibility to make their claims heard and where all individuals feel that their interests are represented (Aggestam et al 2015: 1740).

In light of politicized approaches, the simplification of inclusion as a source of legitimacy and/or disturbance may be reread and reinterpreted; this places the present research in broader identification with Critical Peace and Conflict Studies scholars, whose critique of the liberal peace and notion of agonistic peace resonate the most with interdisciplinary and political approaches to peace negotiations. The next two chapters will construct a critical approach that considers peace processes a renegotiation of both politics and the political; that sees in consensus a tool for hegemonic accommodation; and that takes inclusion in peace processes as a simultaneously controlled and disputed struggle. In this effort, I will approach political representation as a vehicle for inclusion (and exclusion) in peace negotiations – a choice I will discuss further in the next chapters.

2.4

Final thoughts

This chapter has located and re-politicized the concept of inclusion within the Peace and Conflict Studies umbrella. It has looked at how the idea of welcoming society into peace negotiations transformed through time and how a critical reflection may help further complexify and build upon existing literature on the subject. Section 2.1 addressed the theoretical locus of peace negotiations in a wider sense, briefly underlining the path of the PCS field and some of its main theorists and concepts. It also introduced topics such as participants' selection and timing/sequencing issues behind peace processes, calling attention to the challenges that arise in peacebuilding efforts since the 1990s.

In the following section, I moved on to map how the notion of inclusion in peace processes surfaced and unfolded throughout the last few decades. I have argued that the discussion on inclusion has gone from considering it an *unnecessary disturbance* to portraying it as a *necessary* one, a move that is closely related to its normatization and the empirical verification that it is important for building lasting peace. Exclusion went from the unquestioned norm in peace processes, especially peace negotiations, to a point in which it is received with criticism and activism from both domestic and international actors. The main driver behind this change is the perceived utility of inclusion, despite the fact it remains a "disturbance". I have also observed that, despite the changes from one expression

to the other, there is also permanence in the sense that inclusive initiatives are always controlled and temporally, spatially and thematically hierarchized.

With inclusion increasingly revealing an important component of peace, studies begin to focus on identifying how and when it takes place, as well as the potential benefits it may have in bringing armed conflicts to a closure. Section 2.3, in turn, tried to leave the established political boundary around accepting inclusion as a necessary disturbance for peace, proposing instead to analyze the two parts of the expression under critical light. It questioned, on the one hand, the association between inclusion and its usefulness and legitimizing potential, and, on the other, the idea that it constitutes a disturbance for peace dialogues and the reaching of peace agreements. Ultimately, this chapter proposed a (re)politicized approach for looking at inclusion beyond established liberal and technical conventions.

It is thus necessary to rethink (or rather *unveil* and *dissect*) the idea of inclusion in peace processes. The unquestioned adoption of the notion of societal inclusion as it is now portrayed induces one to think of it as a static and uncontroversial end product. However, a deeper evaluation of the meaning of inclusion cannot refrain from a repoliticizing movement grounded by a dialogue with democratic political theory. Somehow, beyond its vagueness, the repeated use of the term “inclusion” seems to swap a process for its result – inclusion, as a result of a process usually absent from current literature, seems to tell a story in half or even reverse it. Furthermore, the term “inclusion” and its vocabulary are often treated as interchangeable substitutes for the conceptual lexicons of participation and political representation, which also contributes towards this feeling of imprecision.

The next two chapters will defend reframing the inclusion debate through the conceptual lens of political representation. While representation is a word that shows up much less in current literature than either inclusion or participation, I believe it is precisely the one most able to unveil the politics of inclusion in peace negotiations. As I will later discuss in further detail, there is even a feeling of rejection concerning the role of political representation in contexts of conflict-to-peace transitions – a rejection that surfaced both in the theoretical literature and in my fieldwork in Colombia. Still, the concept of political representation can and needs to be seen beyond its usual electoral and democratic manifestations in order for one to grasp how it is actually able to explain peace processes and negotiations from a different standpoint. As an indispensable organizing principle of the modern state, representation can provide a common thread (and language) between the before, the during and the after of peace processes. Even where participation is

the intention, the fact of the matter is that the inclusion that does take place in peace negotiations today is, by nature, mostly representative. Furthermore, the verticality of representation speaks more directly to the temporal, spatial and thematic hierarchizations of inclusion discussed in this chapter. Such hierarchies are placed, questioned and renegotiated by representatives of different sectors of society. Chapter 3 will undertake a conceptual study of political representation, and Chapter 4 will then think about inclusion in a representative key, taking feminist and critical democratic approaches as inspiration.

3

A conceptual history of political representation

"It is through representation that collective political subjects are created; they do not exist beforehand."
(Chantal Mouffe)

Faced with the issues pointed out in Chapter 2, the present chapter and the following one will tackle the concept of political representation as a theoretical lens of analysis capable of illuminating issues that remain obscured by current PCS approaches of inclusion in peace negotiations. Not only is representation a foundational and organizing principle for politics and the political in modern societies, a tool of intermediation for conflict not to escalate into war, it also provides a common thread between the "before", the "during" and the "after" of armed conflicts and peace processes. The concept of representation, in this sense, should be understood far beyond its ordinary electoral (and democratic) interpretation. Taken as a political tool that extrapolates formal and national instances, representation can be attached to a wide array of collective activities taking place in noninstitutional contexts (such as armed conflicts), as well as in local (nonstate) and international settings. Given that violence is often the last resort for those systematically excluded from institutional politics and those who do not feel contemplated by it, armed conflicts are strongly connected to struggles for political representation, be that in democratic regimes or not. In the same vein, peace processes and peacebuilding projects are likewise *ad hoc* representative setups tasked with renegotiating power dynamics that also involve decisions over whom, in new political orders, will get to be represented and acquire political expression.

As theoretical disambiguation, then, I would argue peace negotiations involve, *at all levels*, both representative and participatory relationships which in turn may, from different politically grounded perspectives, be deemed inclusive or not. In short, people participate if they engage in peace negotiations exclusively on their behalf; they may represent others if their engagement is in the name of a certain collectivity; and they can also, why not, both participate and represent, if they speak for themselves but also as representatives of larger collectivities. As a noninstitutionalized instance, peace processes blur the lines between different

types of political engagement, which at times become rather difficult to tell apart – hence the need for theoretical elucidation on the inclusion debate. In the absence of formal authorization, when will political relationships forged in peace processes be of representative nature? And, if they can be called representation, are they good – *inclusive* – representation?

Before exploring such questions in the context of peace processes – which I will do in chapters 4, 5 and 6 –, a conceptual history of representation is needed. The first section introduces and outlines the concept by removing it from its usual political and democratic framings, evaluating the task of defining representation and the complexities and perils involved in trying to do so. The remaining sections “organize” the path of the concept’s history through three accounts of representation – representation as foundation; representation as state politics; and representation beyond the state.

Based mostly on Hobbes’s theory and the context in which he wrote it, section 3.2 looks at representation as a founding pillar of modern state narratives, analyzing it in view of the emergence of the people as a unit, the political agency reserved for it and its right (or not) to resist tyrannical sovereigns. Then, the second account of representation will scrutinize its adoption as an organizing mechanism of state politics, surveying its encounter with democracy and the emergence of contemporary models of representative democracy. It will also pay specific attention to its relationship with political inclusion and social conflict, questioning the centrality of the idea of crisis in representative politics. Lastly, section 3.4 will provide an account of “representation beyond the state”, i.e., it will look at stretched possibilities for the exercise of representative action beyond its traditional electoral format. A rethinking of political representation takes place especially as democratic theory undergoes a “representative turn” starting in the 1990s, with a lot of its internal critique operating within a representative register instead of a participatory one, as it has been more common from the 1960s to the late 80s.

3.1

The concept and practice of political representation

Representation is a multifaceted, complex and tension-permeated concept that precedes and transcends its political application. Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe (1985) note that “every relation of representation is based on a fiction: that of the presence, on a certain level, of something that is strictly absent from it” (p.

195). While not exclusive to political activity – it is a supporting pillar of artistic expression, for example – representation is not limited to its role in modern democracies either. Very importantly for this work, representation can also be mobilized to shed light on extra-institutional political contexts such as peace negotiations. As both a concept and a practical undertaking, it has many facets and may be approached from a variety of different angles. It is, to use Dario Castiglione & Johannes Pollak's words, both a “moving target” and an “overloaded signifier” (Castiglione & Pollak 2019: 5; Pollak 2007: 88).

Thus, not only is representation elusive and in constant metamorphosis; it is always contested and multiple as well. It is not necessarily democratic, in fact, it does not arise as a democratic endeavor, nor does it need to be a state instrument. Beyond the automatism of its current attachment to popular suffrage, the political practice behind the usual formula – one stands for/acts on behalf of another in the exercise of a particular function – is much broader and older than modern representative democracy. As different authors have stressed, winning candidates represent both those who voted for them in an election and those who did not; dictators represent everyone, no ballots cast; nonelected government officials such as diplomats represent the population of their countries; and nonstate actors such as international, transnational or domestic civil society organizations often also represent specific collectivities in the absence of a vote (Pitkin 1967; Rehfeld 2006; Urbinati & Warren 2008). More than an established political relationship that is not strictly dependent upon consent, representation is a social organizing principle and a foundational component of the modern state.

As such, it may be said to serve as a common thread connecting the before, the during and the after of peace processes – as blurry as these stages may be. Exclusion from representative politics or the desire for reshaping representative institutions is, for one reason or another, at the root of armed conflicts. Moreover, peace negotiations take place through the representation of certain sectors of society around a table to redraw state politics and therefore redefine the terms of future political representation. Thus, it is not only at the core of conflicts' root causes (past) and of peace negotiations' goals (future), but it is also a means that shapes the inclusion or exclusion of social groups and agendas in the present, in the pursuit of peace agreements. Monica Brito Vieira and David Runciman thus observe that

...the concept of representation has proved its worth as a mechanism for managing significant change ... in circumstances of political crisis and most often of war (both civil and international). It is at times of crisis that the concept of representation has shown its flexibility as a political tool by providing a conceptual means for the

reordering of politics, transcending the constraints of sectional or local prejudices and reconciling the apparently irreconcilable interests and perspectives of the inhabitants of a single political space” (2008: 183).

One of the most often cited efforts towards defining representation may be found in Hanna Pitkin’s work. Her canonical book *The Concept of Representation* (1967) remains one of the few in-depth studies of the concept in the last decades. Pitkin argues that, despite its complexity, representation does have an “identifiable meaning” whose core has hardly changed since the 17th century (p. 8), which she then tries to apprehend in her investigation. For Pitkin, in a wide sense representation is “the making present *in some sense* of something which is nevertheless *not* present literally or in fact” (p. 8-9). The author sets out to analyze different (and apparently self-excluding) views of representation, claiming that they are in truth distinct “angles of vision”, with differing primary assumptions, contexts and therefore also contrasting results. By putting these views together as complements, Pitkin tries to re-assemble what she perceives as the “puzzle” of representation and gets to her famous typology, made up in general lines by *formalistic*, “*stand for*” and “*act for*” (or *substantive*) perspectives of representation. Formalistic views are concerned above all with the modes of establishing representative relationships, especially authorization; “stand for” views deal with the characteristics of the representative and their relationship with the represented; and “act for” representation concerns the actions s/he takes on behalf of the represented. I will come back to Pitkin’s typology further along.

Pitkin’s search for a “final” definition and typology of political representation, on the other hand, may contribute to some important omissions and for this reason has come under the scrutiny and criticism of several authors³⁴. I want to call attention to two main issues behind the perils of essentializing political representation. The first has to do with the embedded tensions that surface while trying to define it, in particular the ones between presence and absence, individuality and collectivity, similarity and difference, equality and inequality, inclusion and exclusion, and universality and particularity. Although these pairs are known to blur what does not fit them, they are important to understand the conceptual history of representation and, hopefully, afterwards present a more critical stance on it. The second issue refers to the historicity and linguistic specificities of the concept.

³⁴ For a specific argument in favor of multiple forms of defining political representation, see Rehfeld 2017. For additional criticisms of Pitkin see Gurza Lavalle 2015.

First, it must be said the tension between presence and absence in studies of representation – which Pitkin calls its “fundamental dualism” – lies at the heart of this debate and is an object of fierce theoretical controversy, with practical repercussions as well. One crucial issue to keep in mind – and something that will still reemerge countless times in this dissertation – is that representation does not simply reproduce a given, preexistent reality; it helps constitute it as well. It is constitutive in a more abstract key, as a condition of possibility for the existence of the modern state as we know it, but it is also the case for the more palpable (although always confusing) practice of representative politics. This is imperative to discuss how collective organization and social alliances are in constant mutation, how feelings of belonging overlap and intersect each other, how politics is multidirectional, and, most importantly, how representation itself shapes and is shaped by all these factors. It does not mean *denying* representation works as a mechanism of substitution and that the binary presence/absence is central for studying it. It does mean, however, that the “making present again” rendition, as general and self-evident as it might seem, is still ahistorical and confining, because it suggests unidirectionality and preexistence of subjects, fixating representation and concealing its historical, performative, dynamic and disputed character.

From the presence/absence debate, furthermore, one may extract some other tensions. The question of whom is to be represented brings to the surface the relationship between individuals and collectivities, and between these two and the notion of *people* as one single representable unit. Whereas the “one person, one vote” principle triumphed in modern electoral systems, the rights and political influence of collectivities, reaching far beyond party politics, cannot be taken for granted. The notion of people, on the other hand, carries within itself a cleavage between an ideal and the (fruitless) search for its practical verification. For Pierre Rosanvallon, “the difficulty lies in the distance between a political principle ... and a sociological reality” (2004: 10 – translated from Spanish). Thus, “the people do not preexist because they are invoked or sought: they are *constructed*” (p. 15 – my emphasis). The debate over the subject of representation in large measure comes down to a never-ending process of grouping society, as well as who are the ones doing such grouping. There is, for this reason, a huge challenge embedded within “the relationship between the interests of individuals and groups in a society and a hypothetical ‘collective will’, that is, how to allow the free expression of conflicting interests and still maintain a minimum unity, without which no society can exist” (Miguel 2013: 13 – translated from Portuguese).

Another challenge that is closely related to presence/absence and individual/collectivity issues pertains the relation between similarity and difference, as well as the one between equality and inequality. The similarity vs. difference debate goes back to ancient and medieval applications of representation; while some of the first uses of (pictorial and theatrical) representation aimed at similarity and replication, through time the concept also came to denote a symbolic, at first mainly religious, bond between representative and represented that are different from each other (Vieira & Runciman 2008; Mulieri 2016).

In that same tonic of tension between replication and symbolism, current debates about who is best fit for being a political representative revolves in large measure around their degree of similitude to those they represent. Whereas preferences reliant on similarity will observe matters of community, belonging and common interests, differences seen as constructive, in the form of political influence and expertise, are often valued as well. Moreover, although current forms of political representation are based on the formal equality of a state's citizens in their rights and obligations, social reality is also permeated by asymmetries and representation reflects these as well. One must not forget people do not have the same starting point, material and otherwise, for participating in politics.

That is also why political representation has always been strained by the pressures of another binary – inclusion and exclusion. Since the trick of representation by definition is a limitation of space, people and topics surrounding political activity, it will at every moment involve choices of both inclusion and exclusion that have to do with political organization and power struggles. The relationship between representation and the inclusion/exclusion issue also clarifies the choice of conceptual lens made here for looking at the role of society in peace negotiations – because representation is a vehicle for both inclusion and exclusion in politics, it brings the pair into a new perspective. While, as mentioned above, representation must be grasped as constitutive of social reality, groups and interests, the lexicon of inclusion by itself may lead to the assumption of preexistent, fixed constituencies, which omits some crucial political aspects of peace processes.

It is often with the issue of inclusion in mind that so many authors point out the paradoxical nature of the expression “representative democracy” (see for example Manin 1997; Rosanvallon 1998; Mineur 2012; Miguel 2013; Almeida 2015). Since democracy means government by the people and representation puts clear restrictions over such definition in the form of intermediaries between the state and such people, we often see its democratizing potential put in check and

the expression labelled an oxymoron. Such an acknowledgment, especially in the context of the last few decades, allows for renewed attention towards the concept of representation and its relationship with democracy and political inclusion.

This takes me to the second issue with essentializing political representation as a concept – its historicity and linguistic richness. If representation and inclusion are to be discussed, it cannot be done without first coming to terms with the fact representation was and remains a specific historical solution to equally historically located problems. The historical gene of representation is usefully illustrated by yet another tension – the one between the universal and the particular. As underlined by Pietro Costa, “[t]he discourse of representation has a concrete historicity: it is genetically and materially linked to Western societies and cultures (first European, then American)” (2004: 60 – translated from Spanish). The modern practice of representation emerged of the thoughts, image and standards of white, mostly upper-class, European men. In this sense, it is not enough to just realize how limited suffrage was by race, gender and class at the beginning of the representative democracy experience. It is also necessary to acknowledge that these men were the “universal” parameter for the conception of political representation, which for a long time made everything else, all other cross-cutting types of attachment, become out-of-norm – the “particular” –, with consequences that endure even after inclusive moves such as the expansion of suffrage rights in the 19th and 20th century. Since the inclusion of women is crucial for this research, the masculine normativity of political representation is of distinct importance here.

In a linguistic key, in turn, the polysemy and historical constructedness of representation are also manifest. The practice of representation preceded its “official” adoption as a tool of social organization so that it was not “invented” by modern regimes but indeed recognized, labeled and systematized by them. Before the advent of the modern state, although it already existed as a practice, the term “representation” had several meanings that differed from its current applications. On the other hand, as set forth by Hasso Hofmann, “in the beginning was the word, not the concept” (2013: 94 – translated from French). The word, which comes from the Latin *repraesentare*, has no Greek equivalent and was then used in opposition to its modern interpretations – it came closer to what we now call “presentation” i.e. the representation of a person by herself.

The original Latin word unfolded into the wide array of representation’s semantic repertoires now found in European languages. While English and French, for example, each have only one word to denote representation, in German and Italian, different meanings of representation are articulated by different words

(Mulieri 2016: 128). Yves Sintomer remarks that linguistic repertoires on political representation are historically constructed and highly limited by the vocabularies available in Latin-based and influenced languages. In this sense, he observes that “in German or Chinese, for example, there are several non-substitutable terms to translate what we mean in everyday language by ‘representation’” (2013:4).

The German words *Darstellung*, *Stellvertretung/Vertretung* and *Repräsentation* help illustrate this point: they all translate as “representation”, but each carries a specific meaning. *Darstellung* refers to representation as a symbolic act; *Stellvertretung/Vertretung* and *Repräsentation* both mean a form of substitution, but the first is used in reference to mandates or private interests, and the second is attached to “the common good in the public sphere” (Mulieri 2016: 128-9). These semantic contrasts are a very relevant indication of the level of complexity contained within the concept of representation, and this is only to focus on European languages – it does not even start to address its Western bias.

One of the criticisms faced by Pitkin’s theory is therefore its “a-historical conceptual focus” (p. 131), which in this view is precisely what allows for her belief in the existence of an apprehensible and definable essence of representation. Critiquing and building upon Pitkin’s work has been the tonic behind theories of representation since the late 1960s. It is noteworthy that another major conceptual analysis of the concept – Bernard Manin’s *The Principles of Representative Government* – did not surface until three decades after Pitkin’s book. As Vieira points out, from the 1970s to the 90s, theorists had their hands full with debates on participation and deliberation³⁵, which left Pitkin for a long time as the established version regarding representation (2017: 1).

From the 1990s onwards, especially in the context of what was labelled the “representative turn” in studies of democracy, political representation – or, more specifically, a feeling of *crisis* of representation – started earning the attention of authors again. Issues concerning inclusion, social justice and the democratic potential of representative politics resurfaced in the work of authors such as Iris Marion Young, Anne Phillips, Nadia Urbinati and Melissa Williams. Contra Pitkin, in what has been called a “constructivist turn”, theorists such as Michael Saward, Andrew Rehfeld and Lisa Disch rejected any intention of finding an essence of

³⁵ Vieira observes that while participatory democrats saw representation in opposition to participation, deliberative democrats relegated it to a subordinate status.

representation³⁶, experiencing “a shift from a ‘legislative’ to an ‘interpretive’ frame” (Saward 2010: 16).

As representation more and more extrapolates formal and institutional political instances, gaining ground outside state practices, this too becomes a much-needed object of study. In this context, political representation and participation are increasingly going from being considered two opposite poles to being studied as related or even merging phenomena. Therefore, I also want to bring up works that investigate scenarios in which civil society actors step forward as representatives of certain portions of society when the state does not want to or fails to do so (for instance Zarembek et al 2014; Rehfeld 2006; Saward 2010) – a pretty common situation during internal armed conflicts. Such choice also stems from my belief that, in future research, not only current dilemmas and crises of political representation may be valuable to reflect about the construction of peace; peace processes have a lot to add to discussions on political representation as well.

The remainder of this chapter will discuss the concept of political representation to later reflect about its relevance to a repoliticized debate on inclusion in peace negotiations. Far from attempting to exhaust available discussions on the concept – given its complexity and the humbling (and perhaps futile) experience that is trying to fully grasp it –, the objective here is to call attention to a few fundamental features and applications of representation and their relevance for peace negotiations. These features will come in chronological order throughout the three following sections, which are framed through a few crucial historical events and turning points³⁷. This organization is not an indication that each account of representation is overcome by the next; the intention is simply to highlight the features that are most elucidating for my investigation of peace processes. It is also important to clarify that these three accounts of representation are not supposed to constitute a typology – they are merely different perspectives directed at shedding light over the notion of inclusion in peace processes.

The next few sections will thus address three accounts of representation that reveal relevant for unveiling the issue of inclusion in peace negotiations. First, I will discuss representation as a foundational component of the state, which is

³⁶ Such rejection is not new, on the other hand, considering Hasso Hofmann’s historical analysis in his book *Repräsentation: Studien zur Wort- und Begriffsgeschichte von der Antike bis ins 19. Jahrhundert*, published in 1974.

³⁷ An extensive analysis of the history of political representation is outside the scope of this research. For detailed accounts on the history of political representation, see Vieira & Runciman 2008; Mulieri 2016; Podlech 2014; Duso 2016; Costa 2004; Pitkin 1967, 2006; Rosanvallon 1998; Mineur 2012.

particularly illuminating for reflecting about internal conflicts and the new beginning – indeed, the refoundation – involved in negotiating peace in this scenario. Next, I will approach representation in its “state politics” enclosure – which, although limiting of the practice of representation in its wider applications, is still the weightiest channel for voicing of concerns regarding political courses and projects for society. Finally, I will discuss the widened debate of representation as more than voting every few years and the stretching of possibilities for involvement in politics from noninstitutionalized channels.

3.2

Representation as foundation

This section will evaluate the locus of representation as a founding principle of the modern state. It will refer to the brief historical explanation about the concept made above and expand it, engaging mostly with Hobbes’ approach in *Leviathan* and his assertion of representation as a necessary condition for the state to exist. Moving beyond the simplistic argument that links representation to a practical solution allowing for the existence of large political entities, it will argue that representation functions as the glue holding together the fiction of the sovereign state, which is no small element when thinking about the recreation of political communities torn apart by armed conflict.

The path of representation towards its modern conceptions goes back to the Roman period and the Middle Ages, particularly its attachment to pictorial, theatrical, theological and legal metaphors. As suggested by the comment above on the linguistic richness of political representation, tracing it back to its roots implies a dive into a complex web of languages and semantic applications. It stems in large measure from European religious and legal vocabularies that framed both practice and theory of representation in the shift from medieval to modern times. Some expressions that make up such vocabularies thus help tell the story of how “representation” came to mean *what we now know* as representation. As mentioned earlier, the Latin word *repraesentare* did not initially coincide with the attribution of one’s actions and words to another person. From the Roman period to the Middle Ages, the word was either used to express a production of likeness in image or used as “a technical term that referred to two different forms of juridical activity: one is the borrowing of money, anticipated or in the form of payment, and

the second is the production of witnesses in court or during a trial” (Mulieri 2016: 132).

Two groups of expressions may be singled out as crucial for the developments that led to the modern concept of political representation – those connected to the notions of *persona* and *body*. Both may be identified as deeply intertwined with each other and with the path followed by the practice of representation and, consequently, as also having exercised a heavy influence over the manner it was theorized into a political concept. The first group comprises the word *persona* and its related expressions. While originally employed in Rome to denote mask-wearing impersonation in theatre, Cicero eventually extrapolated it from stage to everyday life, suggesting one could also wear someone else’s mask – thus “bearing her person” – for ends other than artistic ones (Vieira & Runciman 2008; Mulieri 2016; Skinner 2005). As Quentin Skinner explains, although Cicero did not use the word *repraesentare* to express such borrowing, through time a natural transference of meaning occurred. For Skinner, “if it makes sense to say that, when I speak or act for you, I am sustaining or bearing your person, then it arguably makes equally good sense to say that I am offering an image or *repraesentatio* of how you might have comported yourself” (2005: 162). In a similar vein, Mulieri observes that representation acquires its substitutive function “when it takes on a particular association with the notion of *persona*, a word that belonged both to the world of theatre and to that of law in the Roman world” (2016: 136). It is largely within Christian thought (and its controversies) that “*persona*” and “representation” cross paths and the latter comes to convey a relation of replication between two distinct entities, as opposed to previous expectations of resemblance (Vieira & Runciman 2008: 8-9; Ankersmit 2002: 108).

The fictional component behind the legal use of *persona* paved the way for innumerable conceptions of agency beyond individuals made from flesh and bone. The human body, in turn, is the object of the second set of expressions I mentioned above – the one connected to body-related metaphors and more specifically the notion of corporation. In essence, both sets of expressions had to do with figuring out the role of individuals and collectivities, how they went about in ordering society, practicing politics and legitimizing power. The notions of *persona* and *body* were also mobilized by diverse thinkers in their diverging projects for political unity, especially when it came to the creation of a single polity capable of enduring the test of time.

The conceptual grammar of the body was long-established by the time it was appropriated by representation theorists; a classical and often-cited example of a

comparison between the government and a living organism is John of Salisbury's *Policraticus* (Kantorowicz 2016: 199). The creative amplification of politics allowed by the metaphor of the body emerged not only in general illustrative terms – for instance when one would say a king's soldiers are his own hands in the battlefield –, but also in overlapping theological and legal theories.

The theological notion of *corpus mysticum* carries a lot of weight in this discussion, also having a huge impact on political theory overall. The use of this expression was initially established by Saint Paul in his description of the Church as the mystical body of Christ, with Christ being its head. Over time, given the different interpretations the expression received, its meaning morphed in different directions. In a second moment, the idea of *corpus mysticum* was associated with the eucharist – the assumption that the bread, more than representing, *becomes* the body of Christ. By figuratively replicating the body of Jesus, the Church “solved” the issue of incarnation and gave continuity to his legacy through a community of salvation that remains capable of renewing itself and attracting members despite the physical absence of its head. The unifying idea of incarnation emerges, in this sense, as an operator of reciprocal inclusion – a leader is only a leader because he *incorporates*, he *is* the community, much the same as the community *is* him. In sum, “the expression ‘mystical body,’ which originally had a liturgical or sacramental meaning, took on a connotation of sociological content” (Kantorowicz 2016: 196). In Sheldon Wolin's words,

Christianity helped father the idea of a community as a non-rational, non-utilitarian body bound by a meta-rational faith, infused by a mysterious spirit taken into the members; a spirit that not only linked each participant with the center of Christ, but radiated holy ties knitting each member to his fellows. The Christian community was not so much an association as a fusion of spirits, a pneumatic being (2004: 119).

The separation between “the two bodies of Christ” – i.e., his individual existence (*corpus verum*) and his collective/communal body (*corpus mysticum*) – served a twofold purpose for the Church. It was an argument that favored both the maintenance of cohesion within its religious community and the consolidation of its authority and power as a political actor (Kantorowicz 2016: 206-7; Wolin 2004: 121). The politicization of the notion of *corpus mysticum* by the Church thus opened the way for its spilling over into other political realms, in particular its apprehension and utilization by nascent secular states.

Legally, therefore, we may say the conceptual use of the notion of body resulted not only from the rediscovery of Roman Law and its adaptation to medieval social and communitarian realities from the 12th century onwards but also from the appropriation of notions initially advanced with religious purposes. Ernst H.

Kantorowicz emphasizes that the notion of *corpus mysticum* acquired legal connotations, starting to correspond to a juridical person or corporation (2016: 209), and was intersected and overlapped with other concepts such as *universitas*³⁸, borrowed from Roman Law, and Aristotelian interpretations of the body politic. While legal uses of the discussed lexicon would reflect about collectivities in a descriptive or operational key, theological applications moved from a standpoint of embodiment and reciprocal inclusion, which becomes the basis for legitimate authority.

This brief conceptual discussion concerning legal and theological vocabularies is crucial for political representation because “it was only when [it] was brought together with another legal idea, that of the corporation, that its political potential began to be realized” (Vieira & Runciman 2008: 10). Political representation thus arose amidst the political struggles of the Middle Ages, especially those between conflicting papal, monarchic and imperial unifying intentions. The idea of authority initially set forth by the Pope and absolutist monarchs presupposed the existence of a given and hierarchically structured order (Costa 2004), and “[i]t took quite a time until the descending or theocratic theory, which saw the ruler fitted with a godly mandate, was replaced by the idea that the ruler depends on the people’s consent” (Pollak 2007: 95). It was “the medieval doctrine of corporations [that], while recognizing the divine origin of all sovereignty, elaborated the idea of an intramundane legitimization from the bottom up” (Podlech 2014: 3). Medieval representative traditions that went against top-down logics may be found, for example, in some early parliamentary experiences.

Acknowledging the discussion outlined above helps in locating the context of representation’s adoption as a modern political pillar and a foundational element of the modern state. More specifically, it is fitting to remember that the use of these legal and theological vocabularies was commonplace amongst the first thinkers of representation, including Thomas Hobbes – who would change the whole game but was, at the same time, very much inserted into this framework. Even though Hobbes’s work went on to constitute (or be studied as) the inauguration of modern representation, a few authors will remind us that he was a product of his own time. Vieira stresses, for example, that “Hobbes’s reflection on the objects, phenomena and actions he recognizes as forms of representation are ... his way of taking part in some of the most important debates of his time” (2009: 9; also see Jaume 1986, Skinner 2004, 2005). In this sense, it should be noted Hobbes was not the first

³⁸ *Universitas* may be defined as “a conjunct or collection in one body of a plurality of persons” (Kantorowicz 2016: 304).

thinker to scrutinize the issue of representation; his creative genius resided precisely on his ability to utilize, rearrange and turn upside down existing political ideas in favor of his watershed state project (Vieira & Runciman 2008; Skinner 2005). This is central for understanding where Hobbes came from in his theory – especially in the *Leviathan*, in which representation takes center stage for the first time in his work –, and for thinking about representation in its foundational key.

The key to the *Leviathan* can be found, in a way, in Thomas Hobbes's long biography. Born in 1588 to a poor family in the city of Westport, in the south of England, Hobbes witnessed, during his 91 years of life, a period of profound political and religious turbulence in his country. Armed with his intellectual training, received at Oxford thanks to the help of an uncle, and still lacking the option of being a professional philosopher at the time, Hobbes became a tutor to the Cavendish family – a position he would hold for much of his life and which allowed him to advance in his studies and publications. The author lived the time of the decline in the divine power of English kings, of power struggles between kings and Parliament, of religious persecution (mainly the oppression of the Puritans and Catholics by the Anglican nobles) and, finally, of the civil war that led Oliver Cromwell's Republican project to power. It is telling that Hobbes most likely started working on his *Leviathan* in exactly the same year that the monarchy was defeated by parliamentary troops (1646). The primary objective of the work – the creation and preservation of the state in the face of conflicts, especially internal ones, which threaten its dissolution – is thus made clearer.

Hobbes's dialogue was therefore mainly with parliamentary writers who preceded him in developing theories of representative government. In this sense, his ideas in *Leviathan* are more of “a critical commentary on a range of existing theories, especially those put forward by the parliamentary opponents of the Stuart monarchy at the beginning of the English civil wars” (Skinner 2005: 155). Parliamentary arguments came from sources of inspiration such as the Monarchomach treatises³⁹, the most notorious of which is probably *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos* (1579), by pseudonym Brutus⁴⁰. *Vindiciae* enquires whether the people have a right to resist tyrannical kings, which it finds to be just and allowed if it happens *through the actions of parliaments*. Thus, the use of representation is

³⁹ Adrien E. Boniteau explains that “the so-called monarchomachs are those Huguenots who reacted to Saint Bartholomew's massacre (1572) and to the royal opposition towards the French Protestants after this event by claiming a right to resist institutionally against tyranny” (2016:4). Other examples of Monarchomach treatises include Hotman's *Francogalia* and Beza's *Du Droit des magistrats*.

⁴⁰ The true authorship of this text has never been confirmed. It is speculated that the author may either be Hubert Languet or Philippe du Plessis-Mornay.

already present here, specifically suggesting magistrates “*take the place of the people assembled as a whole*” (Mornay 1969: 149 – my emphasis). As I shall discuss ahead, Hobbes’s veiled stance in relation to works such as *Vindiciae* – both in what he endorses and what he rejects from them – is revealing not only of his state project as a whole but also of his take on representation and the political role of the people (Skinner 2005).

Although he did not believe in the divine right of kings, Hobbes did see absolutism as the best way to build a stable and secure state. Refusing both the religious top-down logic and the bottom-up proposal of parliamentarians, Hobbes preferred to write a scientific treatise that deductively exposed physical, geometric and mechanical aspects of human existence and its nature, as well as the consequence of such characteristics in the attempt to build the best political model available to man's imperfection. The guiding thread of the book is therefore the metaphor that Hobbes builds from the human body, its stimuli and movements, and the idealization of the state as an artificial person – drawn, as mentioned, from existing legal and theological vocabularies. In this man-state trajectory, in which the idea of the individual is central as a unit of analysis⁴¹, two essential assumptions are made. First, that human nature is perverse and warlike; “a condition of political nothingness” (Wolin 2004: 218) lacking any given idea of order and contrary to our basic purpose of self-preservation. This is mainly due to individuals’ equality both in their freedom to do as they please and their capacity to harm each other. More than just “extreme disorder”, Wolin highlights Hobbes’s imagined state of nature also meant an “anarchy of meanings” that he then tries to address in his work (idem p. 230). The second assumption is that the only way to avoid this war of all against all is the conclusion of a collective social contract giving unlimited power and sovereignty of all individuals to the state – the Leviathan – in exchange for protection. The definition of such a state is thus the task taken up by Hobbes in Part II of *Leviathan*. In the fifteen chapters that compose it, he defines and describes – sometimes in very minute details – the configuration of such state, also prescribing the most favorable paths to its stability⁴².

In this effort, more than a practical organizing mechanism for everyday political activity, representation revealed a constitutive element of social

⁴¹ David Held (2006) clarifies that the conception of a person as “an individual” dates back to the Reformation, which saw individuals as “alone before God”. Taking individual agents as “masters of their own destiny”, apart from a collectivity that precedes them, has powerful political consequences (p. 58).

⁴² It is possible to outline six general topics in his effort – (i) the definition and creation of the state; (ii) its form; (iii) its power (and its relation to the idea of freedom); (iv) its constituent parts; (v) its organization; and (vi) the factors that weaken and destroy it.

experience and political communities. It is in this key sense that Hobbes differs from his medieval predecessors and essentially reinvents the concept – he detaches political representation from any belief in previously existing orders. Which also meant reinterpreting – through a scientific discourse – the relationship between the individual and the collective, as well as the nature of men. With Hobbes, it is a creative construction, *through representation itself*, that allows for the creation of order and the existence of the state.

Hence, Hobbes is considered the great watershed of the concept – although not the first to examine it, the Hobbesian social contract became the background against which modern applications of representation developed. This expression of foundational representation (i.e., representation as the creation of the body politic itself) can be found in Chapter 16 of *Leviathan*, in an often-cited excerpt in which he states:

A multitude of men are made one person, when they are by one man, or one person, represented so that it be done with the consent of every one of that multitude in particular. For it is the unity of the representer, not the unity of the represented, that maketh the person one. And it is the representer that beareth the person, and but one person, and unity cannot otherwise be understood in multitude (1994:103-4).

His proposal for the creation of a state was primarily based on the idea that a sovereign (the Leviathan) would be made into an *artificial person* and authorised by a group of people, in common accord, to act on their behalf in the quest for stability and control of our "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short" state of nature.

Hobbes's main problem is thus finding ground for a political *unity of coexistence*, which is explained by the fragmented reality he experienced in his lifetime and in turn explains his insistence on contrasting and playing with the words "unity" and "multitude" in the passage cited above. Since in his view we do not constitute communities by nature – unlike bees, for example –, his conclusion is we must assemble them artificially. In this sense, "the personality of the state, being not a physical quality, needs representative action to give it shape, that is, express its political unity" (Duso 2016: 23).

The way it is imagined by Hobbes, representation to a large extent becomes a bridge between the rational individual and the modern state. This becomes explicit in the very structure of *Leviathan* – Chapter 16 stands precisely between the first part ("From Man") and the second ("From the State"). The concept of representation, located literally between his theories on man and the state, reveals a fictional component that serves as a unifying gear. In this context, representation is converted into a condition for the exit of man from the state of nature and for the establishment of an agreement in which the state becomes the guarantor of his

life. There is a clear order here: the subject must be rational, grounded in science, so that it can represent and be represented; a group of rational subjects must represent and be represented if they want to create a stable state. Political representation needs the modern subject, and the modern state needs political representation.

Hobbes's foundational act – the definition of a "we" by means of specific foundational myths e.g. wars of independence or the victory of one side in a civil war – makes it possible to refer to a "political community". The body politic is born from conditions of verticality in the sense of order and predictability. Renato Lessa (2016) notes that the use of force as the "last resort" functions as the manufacturing of a civilizing form with which the operator of representation inevitably converges. Therefore, representation in its foundational, more abstract form, has an intention of universality and promotes a transition from the "invisible" to the "visible". It differs from its practical key, which arises as specific forms of government and visible manifestations of the representative operator. The practical component, as a second step, promotes the transition from the "visible" to the "simultaneous", i.e. it addresses the non-ubiquity of modern political life. Both movements signal the unconditionally representative nature of the modern state (Lessa 2016).

Having said all the above, a few interrelated aspects of representation's foundational character are worth further elucidation. I will discuss them in three main points: first, political agency, the authorization and responsibilities of representation; second, the construction of the public sphere and the people under political representation; and third, the possibility of resistance and the place occupied by violence (and possibly civil war) in a representative state.

First, Hobbes's approach to political agency is key to understand the way the representative state is born as viable and necessary. It is necessary, above all, because he sees no alternative for security and even survival other than a collective social contract that unifies and transfers multiple individual sovereignties to one state. In order to enable the fiction of the state as a unified juridical person that acts on behalf of a multitude of people, Hobbes promotes a split in the notion of agency, separating action from responsibility for said action. This is what allows him to unite ruler and people in agency, granting the first with performance while transferring responsibility to the second. In other words, agency is deemed divisible between actor (the ruler) and authors (the ruled), and it is precisely representation that will mediate between the two and allow for the maintenance of unity despite their separation. For Hobbes, the establishment of this bond is only possible through authorization, which implicates a juridical transfer creating faculties to the

actor and obligations to the author. Such authorization presupposes a single transfer of authority, or ownership over action, which may be seen as a parallel to the right to material possession in the notion of property.

Hobbes's split agency translates as an abyss between the private will of the many and the political will of the representative; the latter is not subject nor responsive to the first in any way. For Giuseppe Duso, unity comes from the representative precisely because the will of the multitude is not predetermined and can acquire any content; it is representation itself which produces the unity of the state. Such relation of alterity is ingrained within Hobbes's theoretical presuppositions, especially to his taking of individuals as a starting point and "the new role that the concept of the individual fulfills for the nature of civil society" (Duso 2016: 90).

This discussion leads to another aspect cited above: the role of representation on the creation of the public sphere and the emergence of the people as a unified entity. For Hobbes, the constitution of a represented people is secondary to his goal of constituting state power. As he stresses in chapter 16, cited above, it is the unity of the representative, not the unity of those represented, that makes the state possible. This means the people do not pre-exist the social contract; they are created by it. On closer look, there is a fundamental contradiction behind this – it is after all the multitude that, in the condition of natural persons⁴³, enters the contract, each person with all others. It is not a contract between the people as a whole and the sovereign that brings it into existence; it is individuals who agree among themselves to submit to a ruler. For Hobbes, it is only then, after the original act of representation and the creation of the representative state, that the multitude becomes one represented people. Once again, the Hobbesian formulation may be contrasted with that of Monarchomach writers – the people in *Vindiciae* not only precede the contract as they are also one of its parties. Brutus speaks of a "twofold covenant: the first, between God, the king, and the people that the people will be God's people; the second, between the king and the people that if he is a proper ruler, he will be obeyed accordingly" (Mornay, 1969: 143).

As highlighted before, Rosanvallon calls attention to the elusiveness of the notion of "people", which has many facets and is hard to grasp. By this, he means in particular a contradiction between, on the one hand, the people as a political, juridical and fictitious principle, and, on the other, the less than clear-cut traits of

⁴³ Hobbes defines natural and artificial persons in the following manner: "When [his words and actions] are considered as their own, then he is called a *natural person*; and when they are considered as representing the words and actions of another, then is he a feigned or artificial person" (1994:101).

the people as a social reality. For Rosanvallon, then, the modern enterprise flattens and reshapes the social experience in order to create the ideal of the modern individual subject, taking away from social consistency in the name of an underlying legal fictitious principle (1998: 17). The “concrete people” remains shapeless, exactly because it does not preexist its invoking and is in constant construction (1998: 24). This helps to clarify the fact representation is not merely the translation of a pre-existent reality and a well-defined represented people, ready for apprehension. More than *expressing* a social reality and an existing constituency, representation *constitutes* them, functioning therefore as “the mediation of identity” (1998: 20).

Rosanvallon explains that Hobbes solves the problem of social figuration with the already mentioned fictional transformation of the multitude into unity and the creation of an “ideal political people” borne by the state (p. 19). There is an element of performance involved in this process, which weaves together representation and incarnation. This is a less debated feature of Hobbesian representation, mostly, as some authors suggest and criticize, due to Pitkin’s excessive focus on the issue of authorization in her *The Concept of Representation*, and the maintenance of such an imbalance since then (Vieira 2009). In its foundational key, representation also includes embodying, and Hobbes’s theory may be synthesized in seeing representation as both mandate and embodiment (Sintomer 2013: 28).

The Hobbesian act of authorization demands the concession of unlimited powers to the sovereign state, which cannot be objected. Resistance is ruled out from Hobbes’s world; as he reiterates throughout the book, by entering the contract, citizens become responsible for the actions of the sovereign, and therefore resisting or opposing them, for him, constitutes a contradiction. Hobbes’s position on the right to resistance is often likewise seen as dialoguing with his contemporary Monarchomach writers, whom, amid religious wars, defended the right to institutional resistance against tyranny⁴⁴. *Institutional* resistance, one must emphasize, meant for these authors action through parliamentary representation against tyrants – not popular uprising against any ruler, despite the fact the people are considered part of a covenant with their ruler. Brutus argued it is permissible to resist a prince who violates the Law of God through the action of magistrates and officers – as representatives of the people, they must resist in such situations, even if by force (Mornay 1969).

⁴⁴ Monarchomachs saw kings as *singulis maiores*, but *universis minoris*, which meant they were superior to individuals taken separately, but inferior to their subjects as a collective, a position with which Hobbes emphatically disagreed (see Duso 2016: 91).

Skinner stresses that Hobbes did agree with Monarchomach writers on some issues, such as consented power and their rejection of divine right. However, their main disagreement was also the one with most serious consequences – unlike his fellow theorists, Hobbes argued that “there is simply no such thing ... as the body of the people” (Skinner 2005: 169). If the people did not preexist the covenant and therefore simply could not be one of its parties, as Hobbes defended, it could not resist it either. Thus, “[s]ince the many can only be made one by the very same authority they authorize and do not exist as a people independently of it, the people’s resistance becomes contradictory” (Rustighi 2018: 6). These were the radical (revolutionary) possibilities Hobbes was seeking to discredit in *Leviathan*.

His rejection of resistance is therefore symptomatic of how he sees the (im)possibility of dissolution of the social contract, or worse, the threat of civil war, as a return to the state of nature. Wolin reminds us that this was “an ever-present possibility inherent in any organized political society, a ubiquitous threat which, like some macabre companion, accompanied society in every stage of its journey” (2004: 237). In other words, Hobbes did not conceive of the state of nature as something humanity could place in the past; quite the contrary, it was something we must remain vigilant not to return. A terminable contract would not do, because “peace cannot be the result of a temporary agreement, exposed to the risk of its dissolution, but must give rise to a stable structure, which eliminates the source of conflict” (Duso 2016: 92). In chapter 29, Hobbes touches upon the factors that weaken or cause the dissolution of the state (or, still using the metaphor of the human body, the risks of illness or death of the artificial man). Since the architect of the state is man himself, it is certain that he too is imperfect and is subject to having his structures compromised or even destroyed.

The dynamics between authorization and (the rejection of) resistance in Hobbes’s work, as well as the influence they exercise on political agency, are still to a great extent the frame for debate on the rights of the represented and the autonomy they get to annul a political relationship they no longer want to be in. Representative government underwent several transformations throughout the centuries, including democratizing pressures from the people and the insertion of institutional mechanisms aimed to ensure fairness in representation. Still, the essential nature of the original act of representation, the one that makes it possible for the multitude to become unity in the state, has not changed. It relies on the Weberian monopoly of the legitimate use of force by the state and severely limits the capacity of the people as a political agent. This is a condition for constructing

– *and reconstructing* – the fiction of the state supposed to organize and protect social life.

The Hobbesian political project, as widely known, was not a democratic one. Whereas representative elements are identified even in Athenian direct democracy, the practical use of representation as a modern political standard is associated with aristocratic (and, in Hobbes's case, absolutist) forms of government, so that the intertwining of its trajectory with democracy happens only later, gradually and dubiously (Araújo 2006; Manin 1997). Next section will approach the adoption of representation as the main organizing mechanism of state politics, as well as its relationship with democracy, inclusion and conflict.

3.3

Representation as state politics

Insofar as “every political system can or even should be regarded as the response to a particular type of political challenge” (Ankersmit 2002: 91), we may say Hobbesian political representation was his solution to the problem of pervasive disorder; his expected result, in turn, was the creation of unity and stability. This section will look at how Hobbes's abstract creation was taken up and eventually transformed into the practical backbone of states' political systems. What new political problems inspired the creation of representative democracy from the late 18th century forward?

The aim is to address the use of representation as a method of state government, with an emphasis on its ties with violent conflict and political inclusion. While I will draw from many of its historical and theoretical milestones in doing so, it is impossible to grasp the path of representation as a state mechanism in its entirety, nor is it my objective with this section⁴⁵. What I do want to do here is investigate how representative government deals with conflict, especially the avoidance of armed conflict, and its relationship with democracy and political inclusion. As we shall see shortly, modern narratives build violent conflict and massive direct participation as a combo, the latter constantly risking a return to the former – something that is very much in tune with last chapter's discussion. As democratic ideals take hold and exclusion is equally recognized as a potential source of conflict, we see an effort of accommodation through a range of diverging

⁴⁵ For studies of representative democracy and its main theories see Held 2006, Runciman and Vieira 2008, Miguel 2013 and Almeida 2015.

perspectives on what constitutes “too little” or “too much” inclusion, with the association of representation with elections and a strictly electoralist paradigm becoming dominant as “just enough” inclusion.

If we look at the history of representative democracy, we can attest that the relationship between controlled conflict and political inclusion has always been deemed uneasy. From the 18th century to present day, debates on ideal democratic configurations of political systems have ultimately come down to the relationship between conflict and inclusion, necessarily going through debates on the public/private divide and the antithetical perception of representation and participation. Thus, added to the initial equation of the search for order and stability are now matters such as the control of state power and political majorities, the relationship between public and private spheres of life, citizens’ rights to participation and political inclusion. Thinking about representative government in light of the conflict-inclusion pair, we get closer to seeing it at its very edge – a state of crisis –, being faced both with the state of the art in representation theory and the discussion developed in the previous chapter. The persistent idea that representative democracy undergoes crises – a subject of intense debate among authors – is therefore also very important in promoting this dialogue.

With all this in mind, the first part (section 3.3.1) will focus on the encounter between representation and democracy, from Hobbes to the emergence of liberal models of representative democracy – especially its leading towards a strictly electoralist paradigm. Section 3.3.2 will then turn to issues of political inclusion and exclusion, underlining contestations of the electoralist paradigm; questioning whether representative democracy is, or can be, truly democratic; and examining the recurring feeling of crisis that seems to hover around representation. Building upon the political problems presented earlier, the two parts also prove relevant for the discussion on armed conflict and peace processes.

3.3.1

The emergence and consolidation of representative democracy

Ankersmit observes that, while the state was for a long time an arbiter of religious, monarchical and imperial conflicts, it (or more specifically, its control and configuration) eventually became the issue of conflict itself. The solution to the political problem of intrastate power conflict was, therefore, the devising of representative government. He attributes the emergence of representative democracy to two complementary sources – not only does he see it in the well-

known outcomes of the Enlightenment and the emergence of liberal principles, but also in a less discussed *juste-milieu* mentality that had its roots in political romanticism. According to the author, it was the latter that taught us “the possibility of achieving a minimum degree of peaceful coexistence in a society in which opinions are deeply divided on political principles, and even to use these divisions to the advantage of all parties” (Ankersmit 2002: 98). It is worth remembering, in this sense, that representation does not consolidate itself exclusively as a form of government; it is also, in essence, a substitute for physical violence and a mechanism of conflict resolution. Its potential of exercising a conflict resolution role, on the other hand, is frontally affected by the universe of actors it can integrate and, therefore, also by matters of political exclusions and inclusions.

Amidst a changing political scenario, the Hobbesian edifice was appropriated and occupied by projects different from his own. This helps to explain why, despite Hobbes’s close association with absolutism, authors still pinpoint his work as a precursor of liberalism. As David Held clarifies, Hobbes’s theory “is a decisive contribution to the formation of liberalism, but it is a contribution that combines, like the thought of Machiavelli, profoundly liberal and illiberal elements” (2006: 61-2). If, on the one hand, his defense of an all-powerful sovereign is an illiberal solution to the problem of conflict, on the other, his formulation of consented power and free and equal individuals would go on to become fundamental liberal pillars (ibid). Thus, it is important to keep in mind that the lessons drawn from Hobbes

...pointed in two very different directions – one reactionary and one revolutionary. It was the struggle between these two ways of thinking about the concept that shaped what representation was to become – an idea that seemed to stand in opposition to genuine democracy, and yet one that turned into the vehicle of democratic politics throughout the world (Vieira & Runciman 2008: 29)

Since the state’s primary concern and condition for legitimacy was the preservation of its citizens from harm, it was not too far of a stretch for thinkers to tip the scale towards citizens and reformulate this in terms of the state’s respect to people’s civil rights (Ankersmit 2002: 98). Since harm could also come from the state itself, safety from arbitrary state interference on people’s lives equally became a preoccupation. To use Wolin’s words, post-Hobbesian thought from different affiliations had in common a “rediscovery of society”, which was perceived and naturalized in opposition to Hobbes’s artificial and political construction (2004: 260). Along with the creation of the state as the detainer of political and coercive power came the other half of the long-lasting public/private dichotomy – the notion of civil society⁴⁶, framed by the ideas of a nascent bourgeois world. Such ideas

⁴⁶ For a discussion on the origins and evolution of the notion of civil society, see Bobbio 2017.

included the natural rights of individuals concerning state power and the “discovery” of spheres that escaped coercive regulation e.g. economic relations (Bobbio 2017: 41-2). A shared concern of such political thinkers, then, pertained the separation between public and private spheres, as well as the control of state power.

This movement is most evidenced by contrasting the Hobbesian political approach and the work of another defining contractualist – John Locke. Margaret Somers (2008) underlines that the modern liberal argument has attached freedom to a “privatization of citizenship” especially reliant on Lockean theory. She argues, in short, that Locke inverted Hobbesian logic by establishing a state of nature in which a pre-political and self-regulated civil society already existed as a unit, using its “temporal anteriority to explain and thereby justify its political authority over the government it had, after all, created” (p. 274). By building civil society as “the sole realm of true freedom” (p. 273), Locke was able to create a relational abyss between, on the one hand, the natural, noncoercive character of society and market relations and, on the other, the political, artificial and oppressive nature of the state. Commercial exchange, private property and public opinion gain center stage in this scenario. The role attributed to political representation is altered accordingly – representative government becomes “a fiduciary relationship to the people” made possible by civil society and a normative political culture (p. 275-6).

In other words, political representation goes from an abstract argumentative device that allows for the creation of the Leviathan to becoming a more practical mediating tool between society and a no longer all-powerful state. In the perspective of most political intellectuals of that time – with the notorious exception of Jean-Jacques Rousseau –, the adoption of representation as a form of government seemed to meet different needs. It was seen as compatible with liberal principles of freedom and equality and held the potential of guaranteeing order while – deviating from Hobbes’s project – also allowing for state power to be kept in check.

The adaptations to Hobbes’s creation by intellectuals are brought to life and indelibly marked by the 18th century revolutions in the United States and France and the choices made by their leaders. It is at this moment – be it as a challenge to monarchical power and the uneven distribution of power among estates or as a reaction to arbitrary taxation – that representation effectively becomes a *right* closely tied to the belief that all individuals are born free and equal. In this view, in the absence of consent to political rule, people were entitled to active resistance (Vieira & Runciman 2008: 31). As Pitkin underlines, this is how “representation

came to mean *popular* representation, and to be linked with the idea of *self-government*, of every man's right to have a say in what happens to him. And that is how it became embodied in our institutions" (1967: 3 – my emphasis). Thus, the triumph of bourgeois revolutions also meant the search for new modes of political expression and new forms of constituting, justifying and controlling both state power and popular activism.

While there were differences between American and French ideals of representative government, it is safe to say what they did *not* want – both sides equally repelled monarchical absolutism, the hereditary holding of political power, and direct rule by the people (Urbinati 2006: 138). If we start by tackling the first two points, one must notice that calls for freedom and equality, on both sides of the Atlantic, stood up against the unequal treatment rooted on arbitrary power relations and privileges. In the French case, this meant confronting inequalities rooted on birth, tradition and religion, which Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès immortalized in his pamphlet *Qu'est-ce que le tiers état?*. In this scenario, Sieyès portrays representation as pervasive, lending itself as a "strategy of institution-building" (ibid p. 23) directed specifically at the metaphorical gathering of the nation in the form of an assembly and the drafting and adoption of constitutions.

It also becomes the basis for the legitimate exercise of political power, meaning rulers are only deemed acceptable if elected in the representation of the people. Unlike what happened with estates and corporations, representation no longer referred to a previously existing reality; it now gave shape to it through its new subjects – individuals and the nation (Duso 2016: 64). It is through representation that the *nation* – not any more a centralizing sovereign, as Hobbes wanted – emerges as the unifying factor of this new political order. Yet, as Duso recalls, this also inaugurates "the historical tension between the establishment of universal rights (...) and the determination of a particular constitution, which necessarily entails exclusion" (ibid p. 60 – translated from Spanish).

The third point of agreement between American and French revolutionaries mentioned above (the rejection of direct rule by the people) concerns a central and lasting debate in studies of representation – its relationship with democracy and whether the two can coexist or not. To be sure, modern representative governments were established to *contain* rather than *achieve* a democratic format of politics as envisioned by the Greeks. The formulation of (direct) democracy and (indirect) representative government as self-excluding – labelled "the incompatibility theory" by Nadia Urbinati – is, according to the author, a result of modern conceptions of sovereignty, in particular those by Montesquieu and

Rousseau (Urbinati 2006: 6). Athens' reputation as "a violent, chaotic, unstable form of rule where those least capable of ruling wisely exercised power" (Hobson 2008: 453) was also central for the emergence of this oppositional interpretation. As we shall see, this debate – especially the idea that combining them leads to an oxymoron – never goes away.

The most influence in constructing the representation vs. participation opposition is often attributed to Rousseau. In every possible manifestation of representation, with an aesthetically derived argument, Rousseau saw it as deceiving and enslaving, separating the people from the state they created and deviating the general will from its truthful expression. Given that he believed sovereignty to be inalienable and indivisible, handing it over to representatives went utterly against the very reason for our entering in a social contract. A represented people would thus only be free while choosing their representatives and, as soon as this moment is over, they become slaves. In his words, "sovereignty, for the same reason as makes it inalienable, cannot be represented; it lies essentially in the general will, and will does not admit of representation" (Rousseau 1993: 266).

Sieyès and James Madison, two other central names in this discussion, did not see representation as an indirect substitute to democracy in its classical sense. Their predilection for representation derived not only from instrumental motivations – i.e. the idea that direct government would never work in large territories and was only fit for small polities –, but also from normative ones (Bobbio 2017; Mendes 2007). Both believed that representation is an essentially different system, superior to democracy. Madison did not see representative government as a technical approximation to the Athenian democratic government; he believed in the superiority of representation because it would serve to moderate passions and achieve less partial and theoretically sounder decisions than, in his view, would happen under a government driven by the popular will. Sieyès, in turn, considered that "representation was consistent with the principles of democratic equality but free from the pitfalls of democratic government" (Vieira & Runciman 2008: 37). He believed, moreover, that representation was the most appropriate form of government to the commercial nature of modern societies. That is, in an argument inspired by Adam Smith's ideas, he also saw representation as an application of the division of labor to the political environment (Manin 1997).

On the one hand, some of the revolutions' main features are fundamental modern democratic principles such as popular sovereignty, citizenship and nationalism. As noted by John Dunn, however, "[t]he democratic legacy of the

[French] Revolution was very much the product of its intense and often devastating political struggles. But it was no echo of its public symbols, nor of the language in which those struggles were openly conducted” (2019: 69). These principles are attached to a reshaped republican imaginary that went beyond its opposition to hereditary government; for Madison, a republic indeed meant “a government in which the scheme of representation takes place” (Hamilton et al 2017: 79).

Such preference also had to do with a perception that representative government was the fittest for avoiding political fragmentation and therefore violent conflict. Coming from a struggle that hit precisely against group privileges, experiencing a period of disillusionment with group interests and convinced that government was meant to look after the common interest of the whole nation, not for expressing sectarian politics, the founders of modern representation were extremely fearful of political factions. In this sense, representation served as a solution for the problem of maintaining order and justice and did so through a two-way mechanism of power restraint – neither did the people let the state have too much power by deciding who would run it, nor did the state let the people fragment itself and destroy their carefully crafted peace.

Madison defined factions as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community” (Hamilton et al 2017: 75). Since he thought the causes for their existence were not prone to elimination, it was paramount to control their effects so that no faction could achieve a majority and become tyrannical (ibid p. 78). In Madison’s view, such control could not be done in a “pure democracy”; it was only possible through a representative government accumulating a power that is vast but separated in both horizontal (among branches) and vertical (among federal spheres) orientations (Vieira & Runciman 2008: 38). Sieyès, in turn, strictly opposed federalism but followed a similar mindset concerning the role of group identities; due to his focus on homogeneity and unity in safeguarding a public and general will, he contributed towards “the repression of minority demonstrations, the prohibition of associations, unions and any form of organization of minority interests and civil society groups” (Tostes 2007: 8 – translated from Portuguese).

The modern founders’ rejection of “pure democracy” and their quest for a type of politics whose final objective is a nation’s common interest were also influential over the choice of those considered best to fulfill the role of representatives, as well as their level of responsiveness to electors. The architects

of American and French political institutions tried to move beyond similarity vs. difference and mandate vs. independence dilemmas, arguing precisely that since representatives are supposed to speak and act for all, it was pointless to have them resemble one or another, much less act exactly as they would⁴⁷. Representation, furthermore, was treated as an opportunity for making politics a realm of competence; any nation would be better off being run by those “most virtuous”. Edmund Burke’s idea of virtual representation⁴⁸ is a prominent example of this mindset. In the United States, this debate was crucially materialized by the clash between Federalists and Anti-Federalists. On the one hand, Anti-Federalists believed representatives should resemble the population, “[appealing] neither to the people nor to the masses, but to a representation of the social variety that made up the American people” (Brunet 2012: 256 – translated from Spanish). In a series of pamphlets, the Federalists “replied that the real question was to know not *who* should be represented, individuals or social groups, but rather *what* should be represented: either a common good, or the particular interests of the various layers of population” (ibid – my emphasis). The Federalists’ argument in favor of the “common good”, as widely known, was victorious.

Bernard Manin identifies a fundamental feature of modern representative regimes in what he calls the *principle of distinction* – representatives are conceived not as a reflection of the people, but as superior to the general population in terms of wealth, talents and virtues (1997: 94). This is a departure from the Athenian model, in which rotation and equal chances to hold power among all citizens were key. Manin argues that the representative form of government “was instituted in full awareness that elected representatives would and should be distinguished citizens, socially different from those who elected them” (ibid). He thus seeks to expose the transformations of this period through a comparative assessment of the principles governing the formation of legitimate political authority in classical democracy and the modern representative model. In the classic democratic model, Athenian citizens were guaranteed *isegoria* – the right to speak in the popular assembly –, and the main method for choosing political authorities was the lot. Randomness ensured that all citizens could equally exercise the roles of ruler and ruled. Such a rotation was seen not only as the fairest way to govern but also as a way to prevent power abuse.

⁴⁷ The idea of having imperative mandates, i.e., having representatives in limiting mandates, was ruled out by political founders from the start.

⁴⁸ For more on Burke’s view of representation see Pitkin 1967, Vieira & Runciman 2008 and Ankersmit 2002.

With the founding revolutions of modern representative government, on the other hand, the question of consent is established as a prerequisite for political legitimacy, which partly explains the preference for elections as a method for choosing authorities over the lot. At the time, according to Manin, election was considered an aristocratic method by political thinkers, not only due to the initial restrictive character of its application by these regimes but also because it was inherently less egalitarian than the lot. A new conception of citizenship was thus born, centered no longer on everyone's right to govern and be governed, but on the right to consent to legitimate representative government (p. 92). The idea of a "self-government of the people" is left behind and a border is drawn between rulers and ruled, state and society – with representation as its primary bond.

With all the above in mind, it becomes clear that the encounter between representation and democracy is far from unambiguous – no wonder it could be called “the most unlikely marriage of Athens and the Middle Ages” (Ankersmit 2002: 108). Initially dismissed in a near-consensus by those shaping modern political systems, a rearranged democratic label, stripped from its directness, eventually found its way back into normative ideals of politics. It is, however, a “modified Athens” we are talking about; John Keane remarks, for instance, that this is “a second stage” of democracy, in which it is re-signified with brand new meanings (2009: 177). As Christopher Hobson observes, democracy “only became politically acceptable, and later desirable, by having its most challenging dimensions – extensive participation, greater social equality – removed or limited” (2008: 467). It is to this re-signified democracy that representation is attached, a representation that is in turn consolidated around the electoral element and placed in an oppositional relationship with direct participation.

The starting point of this weaving together between democracy and representative government is often identified in the thought of Thomas Paine. In his *Rights of Man*, he becomes a minority voice not only for putting a positive spin on democracy but also for refraining to formulate it as an antithesis of representation. Paine takes a different direction, claiming representation enhances the democratic ideal, no choice between the two being necessary (Hobson 2008; Vieira & Runciman 2008). In an often-cited passage, he suggests we “[retain] democracy as the ground”, but in representative form, indeed “ingrafting representation upon democracy” (Paine 1995: 232). A “combining view” was also present in the thought of John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville. The latter believed the North American regime had been successful in establishing popular sovereignty and the representative mode of association, thus “solving” the problem

of democratic freedom (Bobbio 2017: 198). The separation between direct and representative democracy indeed becomes completely blurred by Tocqueville's words (ibid).

The acceptance of the democratic label, however, did not begin to address the issue of political exclusion; not without struggle. Nor did it immediately eliminate the idea that reserving the right and role of political representation to a very small portion of societies – a white, male, landowning elite – was compatible with the core principles defended by the founding fathers of modern representative democracy. The weaving between democracy and representation advanced in the 19th and 20th century, with the rise of socialist and Marxist ideas and the expansion of the rights of social sectors that had been kept out of politics and struggled to be included – mainly labor, black and women's movements.

Demands for a deeper understanding of democracy were faced with attempts at containing them, isolating the role of the people in the electoral moment. Between the late 19th and early 20th century, elitist thinkers like Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels argued that inequality is natural and the formation of elites, i.e. groups of individuals more capable and superior in their activities, inevitable. Based on this, Pareto pointed to the existence of governing elites and the rotation of members of such a group as an unstoppable constant. Part of the argument for this separation rests on the idea that the masses are unable to organize themselves and that, even when they try, limited committees and hierarchies naturally arise and give way to new elites (Miguel, 2013: 45). The separation and tension between representatives and represented are studied in large measure through the crystallization of power around governing minorities and its social implications, be it to justify or criticize such dynamics. Elitist and later pluralist conceptions of democracy thus contributed towards the confinement of representative politics around the holding of elections, naturalizing inequality and political domination by elites. Such transition was made possible by the professionalization of politics, the creation of procedural rules and an aggregative and competitive mode of functioning, i.e., the division of society into predetermined identities that were grasped and represented by elected officials. This model largely speaks an economicist language⁴⁹ that transfers a market mindset into the political realm and measures preferences as preordained and rational. As a result, it conceals the constitutive (and contested) role of representation and confines it to electoral choices.

⁴⁹ Schumpeter 2006.

On the other hand, the meaning of democratic equality, already firmly grounded on consent to representation, is pressured by a growing feeling that representation and democracy could only exist together when all citizens shared the same right to political participation, in particular the right to vote. Manin identifies a metamorphosis in representative government in this context, which leads what he calls “parliamentarianism”⁵⁰ towards a party democracy where mediated social conflict takes center stage. The representative regime thus becomes “democratized” in two ways: the eventual success in the establishment of universal suffrage and the recognition of the public function of mass political parties, a package we see consolidated as the norm after World War II (Bobbio, 2017: 200).

Once rejected and seen with distrust, political parties become the central regulating gear of representation, substituting parliamentarianism in combining both representation *before* state power and representation *of* state power. As Marco Novaro clarifies, “parties reconciled ... 'representation *before* power', being the projection of a differentiated and divided society into a unitary state, and 'representation *of* power', as long as they could act at the same time as the spokespersons and guarantors of the unity of the state before society” (2000: 24 – translated from Spanish; added emphasis). Unlike previous fears that the fragmentation of politics into competing parties would lead to more conflict, the role trusted to them was precisely one of being an additional layer between state and society, of mediating between the two spheres and gathering and consolidating diverse interests into political platforms. In theoretical terrain, such increased openness to group diversity is associated with pluralist traditions of democracy represented by authors like Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom (Held 2006; Dahl 1989, 1997).

Throughout the 20th century, the study of political representation started to be increasingly confused with democratic theory itself. For Urbinati, since it is “both an aspect of electoral behavior and a mechanism for determining government’s responsiveness to the public, representation has acquired the status of a democratic institution in political science” (2006: 17). It is symptomatic of the intermingling between studies of representation and democracy as well as the reduction of representative democracy to the electoral mechanism that Pitkin’s

⁵⁰ According to Manin, parliamentarianism was a model in which representative government worked as a rule of “notables”, an elite few who were elected by a small electorate due not to their political positions, but for being part of a specific community. Decisions were taken and preferences formed through parliamentary deliberation, in which representatives acted on behalf of their constituencies with total freedom.

1967 book *The Concept of Representation* remained for a long time the single and uncontested reference on the concept of representation. In the book, she sets out to define representation based on the identification of its different facets. The different perspectives of classic thinkers on the subject, usually seen as opposite and self-exclusory, for Pitkin served as different pieces of a complex puzzle she considered possible to reassemble. The author conceives a typology to grasp the main aspects of political representation, which she organizes around four types. The first is the formalistic, which she uses to evaluate the formal means for establishing a representative relationship. The second and third, the descriptive and symbolic types, both have to do with the characteristics of the representative and how s/he “stands for” the represented. The last one, substantive representation, refers to representative action and its relation to constituencies.

According to Pitkin, the formal element may happen before representation, through an authorization granted to the representative, or after, through accountability for her/his actions⁵¹. Descriptive and symbolic representation function as opposites in the sense that the first occurs when the representative belongs to the represented group and hence there is a similarity between representative and represented; in the second, in turn, there is no similarity but a link forged despite the difference. Substantive representation, finally, concerns the action taken by the representative on behalf of the represented (while “acting for” them), with emphasis on the degree of freedom of action attributed to such representative and the classical mandate vs. independence opposition. For Pitkin, these are all partial but interrelated accounts of representation.

Two challenges inherent to representative relationships can be pointed out from Pitkin's classificatory effort. First, there is the issue of authorization for representation, which is directly related to discussions on legitimacy and consent. Many authors point to Pitkin's excessive focus on formalist and substantive approaches as one of the major problems with her work, which leans towards normative electoralist portrayals of representation. Debora Rezende de Almeida ponders that her work lacks an internal critique of representation (2015: 18); Miguel observes that this places serious limits on representative relationships and risks the monopolization of politics by specific groups (2013: 18). I echo recent criticisms of Pitkin's reliance on authorization as a condition for representation to exist. Based on more recent works on the issue, I believe it is possible to reframe and perhaps widen the discussion on the “formal” establishment of representation by asking, if

⁵¹ Pitkin focuses most of her formalistic discussion on authorization, discarding accountability as secondary.

not authorization, what exactly is behind the identification of representative relationships. This debate is important to recognize how representation takes place in peace processes and will be taken up later.

The second challenge concerns the relationship between representatives and represented, both in relation to the ideal characteristics of the representative and her/his actions. In this relationship, the debate turns to questions of resemblance and fidelity to collective demands – should the representative be part of the collectivity s/he represents, resemble it, and more, should s/he act exactly as those represented want, as in an imperative mandate?

These are both issues that permeate the trajectory of modern political representation and remain relevant regardless of the transformations it has gone through and the way it is perceived and practiced. On top of Pitkin's inclination towards formal representation, there is a dismissal of descriptive representation in her analysis, as well as its detachment from representative action. As a consequence, we reach a point in which "the concern with representativeness and the different modes of representation does not give rise to a concept capable of incorporating other languages, precisely because of how it interprets these models" (Almeida 2015: 92 – translated from Portuguese). In a related note, Urbinati reminds us that "...its claim for a disenchanted objectivity notwithstanding, the electoralist paradigm reflects a political attitude that is not ideology-free or neutral" (2006: 13). Still, this debate is crucial to reflect critically about political inclusion and, in a wider manner, the democratic potential of political representation.

The theoretical agglutination between representation and democracy and the lack of theoretical rivaling to Pitkin's work did not eliminate the feeling of contradiction between the two, especially when it becomes clear that universal suffrage and political parties were far from enough for marginalized and less powerful sectors of society to feel contemplated by representative politics. In this sense, Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Leonardo Avritzer summarize a wide range of arguments concerning democracy in the 20th century into two main debates: in the first half of the century, the focus of discussions was the desirability of democracy, which was "resolved" by restricting participation in favor of the electoral procedure; in the second, the focus shifted to the structural conditions of democracy and its relationship with capitalism (Santos & Avritzer 2002: 39-40).

From the late 1960s on, the tensions behind structural conditions of democracy were embodied by discussions on inclusion and exclusion in representative politics, especially those raised by participatory, deliberative and

radical approaches. Such discussions, as indicated earlier, are inseparable from the issue of conflict in politics, as well as how it relates to the goal of consensus. Having dedicated the present section to the first debate, I will now turn to the second one, maintaining my original proposal of looking at representation from the perspective of a supposed antithetical relation between political inclusion and violent conflict, now also analyzed in consideration of perceived threats of a “crisis of representation”.

3.3.2

Inclusion, conflict and crisis in representative democracy

The present section will outline the alternatives presented to liberal representative democracy starting in the late 1960s and, in parallel, identify how they reflect on conceptual studies of political representation. Most of the tension arising in this scenario is still about the opposition between, on the one hand, struggles for political inclusion and, on the other, resistance to so-called threats to political stability. I will start with a discussion about participatory, deliberative and radical pluralist approaches to democracy, presenting their outtakes on political inclusion and conflict. Informed by such accounts and also relying on more recent works on political representation, I will draw on different arguments to question whether representative democracy is, or can be, in fact democratic. My objective with this is not to reach “the” answer to such question, but instead to present different perspectives on the possibilities of “democratizing representation”. I will then finish by discussing the feeling that representation periodically reaches the verge of a crisis, which will serve a dual purpose of further reflecting on the limits between institutional politics and armed conflict, and introducing the next section, which will address recent interpretations of representative politics beyond the state.

As suggested by Santos & Avritzer, the second half of the 20th century concentrated debates on the structural conditions of democracy. Struggles for inclusion from previous decades were “settled” with the acceptance of universal suffrage and party politics as both standard and ceiling for political inclusion. In this vein, Luis Felipe Miguel recalls that although the right to vote had been an achievement for marginalized sectors of society, it was also compatibilized with political institutions that remained impermeable to their democratic demands (2013: 71). Turned into an inseparable component of the liberal representative democracy combo, political representation was “frozen” and confined to its role of toning down democratic sentiments. As it became clear, however, voting every few

years did not come close to making citizens “free and equal” in practice – which gave way to alternative proposals for understanding and practicing democracy.

Participatory theories of democracy thus arise from the social activism of New Left student and working-class movements in the 1960s and 70s, which demanded direct involvement in decision-making concerning each of their spheres. Demands for participation also started targeting government decision-making; C. B. MacPherson observes that “the idea that there should be substantial citizen participation in *government* decision-making spread so widely that national governments began enrolling themselves, at least verbally, under the participatory banner” (1977: 93). At that time, however, participation was either seen as unrealistic by political sociologists or, due to a recent memory of fascist regimes’ high rates of mass participation, linked to totalitarianism instead of democracy (Pateman 1970). Participatory theorists therefore draw on traditional views of participation such as Rousseau’s and J. S. Mill’s to clarify its democratic credentials and try to build a modern version of the concept. This could translate into a denial of representation as detrimental to democracy and a second-best expediency to direct participation (Barber 2003; Gurza Lavalle & Isunza Vera 2011), but it could also be taken as a complement and improvement to representative democracy (Pateman 1970; Held 2006).

Participationists dispute and call for a flexibilization of the liberal separation between civil society and the state, aiming for a democratization of the latter and a politicization of the former, in particular the workplace. For Carole Pateman, participatory theory “...is built round the central assertion that individuals and their institutions cannot be considered in isolation from one another. The existence of representative institutions at national level is not sufficient for democracy” (Pateman 1970: 42). Going against the notion that the people should be kept away from the intricacies of politics, the argument here is that “people learn to participate by participating” (Held 2006: 213), which would in turn reflect positively in their choice of representatives and their engagement with national politics. According to Pateman, the educational and psychological effects of a participatory system are what make it self-sustaining and stable, which puts to rest arguments that increased participation would stimulate a rise in conflict (ibid).

In a similar key, Benjamin Barber distinguished “thin democracy” from a “strong” one, which would “[rest] on the idea of a self-governing community of citizens who are united less by homogeneous interests than by civic education” (2003: 117). Barber criticizes the way liberal democracy addresses conflict, trying to eliminate, repress or just tolerate it. In his view, strong (participatory) democracy

does more; “[it] begins but does not end with conflict: it acknowledges conflict but ultimately transforms rather than accommodates or minimizes it” (p. 135). As individuals become citizens by getting involved in political decisions, they concretize abstract notions of “We” and “Other” in the political arena, solving conflicts, achieving their purposes and implementing decisions (p. 152-3).

Until the early 1990s, participatory theory was “the leading counter-model” to liberal democracy (Held 2006: 209). Its critics highlight the difficulties entailed in the relationship between micro and macro political instances, especially when we consider for example that democratizing the workplace goes through dealing with market and private property logics. The model’s “excessive” faith in people’s willingness to participate is also pointed out as a weakness (Miguel 2013). Moreover, it may be argued that participatory theory paid little attention to representation (Vieira 2017). Recognizing representative dynamics in participation introduces an important discussion on the issue of democratic legitimacy, which participatory theories do not address (Almeida 2015: 119-20).

Alongside the social and political movements that inspired them, participatory approaches started declining in the late 1980s (Florida 2018: 37) and were then “substituted” by deliberative theories as the alternative democratic approaches with most expression. The latter aimed to improve the quality of democracy, shifting the focus of democratic legitimacy away from simple majorities obtained through votes – be it in the election of representatives or their legislative activities –, and towards reasoned and justified decision-making. In short, deliberative democracy understands as

a necessary condition for attaining legitimacy and rationality with regard to collective decision-making processes in a polity, that the institutions of this polity are so arranged that what is considered in the common interest of all results from processes of collective deliberation conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal individuals (Benhabib 1996: 69).

While the notion of deliberation in politics was not new – it was already crucial for Aristotelian thought, the American founding fathers, and political thinkers such as J. S. Mill and John Dewey, for example –, recent deliberative approaches represent an effort to bring it to the center of democratic theory and practice at that specific context. One of their sources is the US is a legal-constitutionalist debate raised in the 1980s concerning the interpretation of the American Constitution (Florida 2018). As discussed earlier in this chapter, the American founding fathers took representative government as superior to direct democracy, and deliberation was key for such preference – a political solution deliberated by “qualified” representatives would, in their view, lead to far superior results than a classic

Rousseauian decision, made through the participation of all without distinction, yet in the absence of deliberation. When it comes to contemporary deliberative traditions, on the other hand, it is the works of Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls that are usually reported as exercising the most influence⁵².

Habermas's conceptual formulation of the public sphere, based on the recovery of European bourgeois spaces of rational critical argumentation in the 17th and 18th centuries, is of particular importance for deliberative theories following the translation of his book *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. Craig Calhoun argues that this specific expression of the public sphere emphasized “its potential as a mode of societal integration”, a role similar to that exercised by state power and market economies (1992: 6). The development of the bourgeois public sphere thus gave way to a space between the state and the private realm, where free and critical discussion concerning political authority took place (Avritzer & Costa 2004: 707).

Much like participationists before them, deliberationists try to overcome the idea of politics as the realm of specialists (Almeida 2015: 123). Deliberative political proposals are also read as a counterpoint to aggregative models of democracy concentrated only on vote counting. Instead of focusing democratic legitimacy on the collection of people's electoral options, deliberationists argued that the best decision-making is born out of informed and respectful public reasoning, in which parties affected by such decisions can demonstrate their perspectives, are open to changing their minds and work together to reach a shared conclusion. This does not place deliberation and voting as self-excluding alternatives; it does mean that the first will serve to substantiate the second when it takes place, and make it provisional and at all times subject to reexamination. This is an important move away from then-dominant democratic theories, which judged preferences as individual and “out there” to be aggregated, treating citizens as consumers from economic models; deliberation, in turn, saw preferences as an open-ended process, constructed through learning and discussion (Manin 1987; Benhabib 1996). It can thus be argued that deliberative democracy aims “to bid farewell to any notion of fixed preferences and to replace them with a learning process in and through which people come to terms with the range of issues they need to understand in order to hold a sound and reasonable political judgment” (Held 2006: 233).

⁵² Habermas 1989, Rawls 1971, 1993. See Bächtiger et al 2018 for a discussion on the origins of deliberative democratic theory.

Given that it is an unfolding literature that picks up influence from different thinkers and disciplines, it is important to highlight that deliberative democracy cannot be centralized as a single theoretical field, being deemed at times not only a political ideal and a theoretical model, but also a paradigm in Kuhnian⁵³ terms (Florida 2018: 44). Considering its acquired clout, some would say it has reached a hegemonic status reliant on the ‘quasi-consensus’ on the virtues of deliberation (Curato et al 2019: v). As noticed and commented upon in the literature reviewed here, deliberative theories changed throughout time to accommodate some of the criticisms they received. Bächtiger et al separate such theories into two generations. The first, influenced by Habermasian and Rawlsian thought, was more generic and underlined “the ideals of high-quality argumentation or rational-critical debate, a focus on the common good, mutual respect, and the concept of a rationally motivated consensus to which all could agree” (2018: 3). The second generation, in turn, “[embodies] expansions of first-generation ideals, often driven by ideals of democratic inclusion and plurality” (p. 4-5).

Some of the most pressing criticisms received by deliberationists, however, concerned the issues of inclusion and conflict, especially in view of their intention of having deliberation take place in an environment of equality, rationality, impartiality and non-coercivity. Such conditions were ideal and hypothetical, the critics would say, ignoring and thereby also accepting unfair real-life conditions. Despite first-generation ideals of equality among deliberators, as well as the defense of including those affected by the topics under discussion, it was clear that material asymmetries, socioeconomic inequalities and communicative and discursive differences reserved such equality for a specific and very limited portion of societies. More than that, such standards derived from a starting point that had an intention of universality but was really a veiled *specific* form of knowledge production. The search for a rational and qualified argument rooted in deliberation, bracketing all identity-related issues, promotes social, political, as well as epistemic forms of exclusion. Not only does it deal poorly with inequality, then, it also fails to approach power by assuming coercion may be left at the door.

These arguments are often illustrated by the criticisms Habermas received for his focus on the European bourgeois public sphere⁵⁴ – a very restricted setting which had its own grammar, excluding the participation of groups such as workers and women, as well as “out-of-norm” forms of knowledge⁵⁵. As Calhoun observes,

⁵³ Antonio Florida clarifies that it refers to “a theoretical framework that reinterprets the phenomenon, allowing one to grasp hitherto hidden aspects and to discover new ones” (2018: 44).

⁵⁴ Later, Habermas adapted his previous work to build his theory of communicative action.

⁵⁵ Calhoun 1992, Avritzer & Costa 2004, Almeida 2015, Miguel 2013, Fraser 1990, Landes 1988.

it was “composed of narrow segments of the European population, mainly educated, propertied men, and they conducted a discourse not only exclusive of others but prejudicial to the interests of those excluded” (Calhoun 1992: 3). By focusing on ideal conditions for debate and neglecting substantive equality, deliberationists ended up reinforcing the exclusion of marginalized sectors of society (Miguel 2013: 69).

Furthermore, the Habermasian model of the public sphere fed into a strict separation between state and society; while civil society held the role of influencing and pressuring deliberative loci, it was not considered its role to become directly involved in political deliberation and decision-making. Although this argument also came from a place of preoccupation with civil society co-optation and colonization by the state, it is also limiting of its role as spokesperson and possibly as representative of society (Avritzer & Costa 2004; Almeida 2015). In sum, deliberative democracy advances in relation to liberal models by focusing on communicative aspects of politics and for calling attention to the question of preference formation; it nonetheless fares no much better than liberal approaches due to its difficulties in combining formal political equality and real-world socioeconomic inequalities (Miguel 2013: 84).

Another core of the criticism received by deliberative theories has to do with their treatment of conflict and their consensus ideal. For deliberationists, “it is better to deal with conflict and solve collective action problems through deliberation ... rather than through other means, such as coercion or conformity to tradition” (Bächtiger et al 2018: 23). While first-generation theories were very contested for their unrealistic objective of extirpating conflict and coercion from politics and their attachment to consensus as a tool for decision-making – a tendency Miguel has labelled the “demise of conflict” since the 1980s (2016: 15) –, Bächtiger et al argue efforts for “clarifying conflict” were incorporated into second-generation deliberative approaches (ibid., p. 4). Seyla Benhabib suggests we need both conflict of interests and cooperation in social life, claiming legitimate conditions for mutual cooperation need to exist within democratic procedures so that deliberation is equipped to deal with conflict instead of ignoring its existence or acting as if it was prone to elimination (1996: 73).

The issue of conflict in democratic politics is precisely one of the central topics of discussion for the third alternative approach to democracy I underlined above – radical pluralist theories. These revive principles of pluralism in a critical light; unlike previous pluralist approaches to democracy, radical democratic theories do not favor the utilization of interest or pressure groups as categories of

analysis, preferring to base their thinking instead on the contingency of social encounters and a permanently open process of contestation and renegotiation of social identities (Wenman 2003: 58; Almeida 2015: 140). It is the contingent aspect of politics, inspired in post-structuralist philosophical arguments, that drives these authors to go against other approaches' attempts to eliminate or contain conflict, preferring instead to bring it towards the center stage of discussions – a crucial step and a condition of possibility, they believe, for us to be able to construct truly democratic societies (ibid., p. 141). The main representatives of this line of thought include William Connolly, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe.

Mouffe's work, as well as her co-authored book with Ernesto Laclau (1985), have been briefly brought up and discussed in the previous chapter as a critique to the way PCS treats societal inclusion in peace processes. As it pertains the current discussion on democratic theory, it is important to highlight Mouffe criticizes deliberationists for substituting aggregative models of democracy with moral conceptions of political issues, which they see as susceptible to rational decision (1999: 746). Nevertheless, in an argument inspired by Wittgenstein's thought, she observes that "to have agreement in opinions there must first be agreement on the language used and this ... implies agreement in forms of life" (ibid., p. 749). In this view, procedures, rules and consensuses cannot ever be neutral, much less "ideally inclusive" – they are inscribed within shared forms of life. This argument, alongside the radical portrayal of conflict, unveils issues of inclusion and exclusion that previous theories were not able to expose.

Having said all the above on these three approaches to democracy, it is also important to look into the role they reserve for political representation. Participatory and deliberative approaches rely most on face-to-face interaction and thus do not, at least initially, tackle the issue of scale and representation. It is *through representation* that deliberation takes place, however, not only in traditional decision-making but also in public debate and informal settings; therefore, any attempt to widen inclusion in deliberation that falls short of direct democracy will still need to rely on representation⁵⁶. In this sense, Mark Brown argues that representation indeed complicates things for deliberation – "[i]t is relatively easy to argue that democracy should involve more and better deliberation, but it is much less clear whether and how deliberators should stand for, speak for, or act for those not present" (2018: 171). In Laclau and Mouffe's elaboration of radical democracy,

⁵⁶ In recent decades, the issue of scale and the role of civil society gained relevance in deliberative democracy traditions. It is perhaps best expressed by systemic approaches to deliberation, elaborated by Mansbridge (1999) and Mansbridge & Parkinson (2012). See Avritzer 2012.

in turn, representation is inserted within a wider framework of hegemony. In the context of power asymmetries and the articulation of discourses, representatives exercise a constitutive role in hegemonic bids for agglutinating universal and particular (Almeida 2015: 144). Representation is equally located within the authors' interpretation of subject positions – as incomplete and ambiguous, so that “representation is constituted not as a defined type of relationship, but as the field of an unstable oscillation “ (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 196).

With the discussion made so far in mind, it is important for the purposes of this research to once again question (i) whether representative democracy is an oxymoronic expression and (ii) what are the boundaries between institutional normalcy, crisis and (potentially violent) conflict. Although the modern (minimalist) model of democracy has been accommodated over a representative mode of political functioning, it is clear that the feeling of opposition between direct, participatory democracy and electoral representation never ceases to be a source of tension. While the approaches described above for a while fail to move beyond face-to-face solutions to political exclusion, authors slowly try to move beyond this sense of opposition and engage in debates concerning the “democratizing potential” of representative government⁵⁷. It is with this movement of revival and further exploration of representation as a platform for deepening democracy that we start witnessing in the 1990s a “representative turn” in democratic theory⁵⁸.

A few authors are outspoken in their defense of representation, while others are more critical and skeptical of its democratizing possibilities. In a provocative article whose title is “Representation is democracy”, David Plotke argues that we should try to improve representation instead of opposing it to direct participation. For the author, “the opposite of representation is not participation. The opposite of representation is exclusion. And the opposite of participation is abstention” (1997: 19). The author retorts both face-to-face politics endorsers and minimal democracy subscribers by contrasting democratic politics' constructedness with its formal, abstract features. Between abstract democratic prescriptions – such as citizens' rights to equal treatment – and the actual, “more or less artful construction” of democratic processes, stands representation (p. 32). As Vieira observes, Plotke's bold statements seemed like a “call to arms” to which other authors would respond (Vieira 2017: 6).

⁵⁷ This of course will always depend on one's interpretation of what both democracy and representation mean; the acceptance of democracy as the norm and its toning down in the process is not trivial for this debate either.

⁵⁸ See Vieira 2017, Disch 2015 and Näsström 2011. I will discuss the representative turn further in the next section.

Nadia Urbinati (2006) is another author who believes in and looks for democratizing avenues for representative government. In her book *Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy*, Urbinati maintains that democracy and representation are complementary, not antithetical, pointing out that if we choose to see democracy as the norm and representation as its denial, we are putting ourselves in a dead-end, “left with little to say about our political regimes except that they are a mockery of the norm” (Ibid. p. 4, 13). Her proposal is therefore to stretch the meaning of representation, seeing it as a process instead of a punctual event and making it less about will and more about judgment. In her words, “representation can encourage political participation insofar as its deliberative and judgmental character expands politics beyond the narrow limits of decision and voting. It can be a mechanism of democracy’s self-creation and improvement” (p. 16). Under this light, Urbinati argues democratization and a representative process have a shared genealogy (p. 20).

In an aesthetic key, Ankersmit believes that without representation we lose sight of who the represented is, our political reality’s contours, and therefore also of the nation as a political entity. For him, thus, “without representation, [there is] no democratic politics” (2002: 115). Laclau (2007) also stands by representation by reminding us of its constitutive role in political relations. In his view, the gap between representative and represented is filled and supplemented by the process of representation. He believes critiques to representation’s less than democratic tendency to ignore the will of constituencies are ill-grounded because they ignore the role of representation in the constitution of that very will – a constitution that is always challengeable and ever unfinished. Thus, “the condition of a democratic society is constitutive incompleteness – which involves, of course, the impossibility of an ultimate grounding” (p. 100). In other words, “there is democracy only if there is the recognition of the positive value of a dislocated identity” (ibid).

Other authors, while also trying to overcome the dichotomic portrayal of representation and participation, still call attention to the intrinsic tensions between democracy and representative government. As pondered by Almeida, “the encounter between representation and democracy does not rupture state-society dualism”, limited as it is to the institution of a punctual connection allowed by voting (2015: 64). Regardless of the widening of political rights and the consequent acceptance of “representative democracies”, it is important to underline that the expression still retains “a permanent tension between the noun, which refers to an ideal of political equality between all citizens, and the adjective, which introduces power discrepancies between those who make decisions (representatives) and

those submitted to them” (Miguel 2013: 97). Added to this differential of political power are the social and economic asymmetries that permeate contemporary societies, which together show the essential verticality of the representative model.

As mentioned earlier through Manin’s work, representation and elections were, at their roots, aristocratic mechanisms and therefore incompatible with self-government by the people. For Manin, then, even after the attachment between representation and electoral democracy, it remains a mixed form of government that maintains both aristocratic/elitist and democratic contours. Jacques Rancière also sees representative democracy as “a mixed form of government” – it is a form of state functioning initially based on elite privileges and slowly deviated from its original functions by democratic struggles, which are in turn constantly reconquered by oligarchic projects (Rancière 2015: 58). Among these more skeptical authors is also Hanna Pitkin, whose disillusionment with representative democracy since the publication of her canonical book made her re-evaluate the relationship between the two, admitting she had taken it for granted as unproblematic in her previous work (2004: 336). For Pitkin, the main result of attempts to democratize representation “has been that representation has supplanted democracy instead of serving it”, and therefore “[t]he arrangements we call ‘representative democracy’ have become a substitute for popular self-government, not its enactment” (ibid. p. 339-40).

The public/private divide is therefore an important aspect of this debate. Pitkin sees the scope of public problems and their existence side by side colossal private power and economic wealth precisely as one of the biggest obstacles faced by democracy (ibid. p. 341). As underlined in the previous section, in particular Margaret Somers’ point on the privatization of citizenship, the shrinking of the public space also has to do with a liberal narrative that counterposed a so-called coercive, artificial state and a peaceful and natural civil society. Rancière reminds us that governments tend to spontaneously narrow the public sphere (turning it into their own private business) and try to remove nonstate actors’ interventions to the private realm, one of the reasons why democracy needs to be a constant struggle against such privatization and a process of widening of the public sphere (2015: 59). He clarifies, in this context, that expanding the public realm does not mean, as liberal arguments go, “increasing state intervention”; it means facing head on a public/private (and as a consequence also a citizen/human being) division that allows for oligarchic dominance in both state and society. In the author’s words, “[t]his is what the democratic process implies: the action of subjects who, by

working the interval between identities, reconfigure the distributions of the public and the private, the universal and the particular” (ibid., p. 65).

The tensions contained within political representation are a central piece in such reconfiguration efforts, which are closely related to investigations on its “paradoxical” or “dual” nature and its perceived propensity to undergo crises. Recent studies of representation also dedicate a lot of attention to both topics, in particular to the presence/absence and mandate/independence issues, as well as the difficulties they entail for the relationship between representatives and represented. The exploration of “the paradox(es) of representation” thus multiplies in the literature⁵⁹. Adrian Gurza Lavallo (2015) analyzes Pitkin’s canonical stance on representation as vacillating when it comes to its built-in dual nature – while she seeks to deny or at least overcome it upfront⁶⁰, she comes and goes in considering it and rejecting it throughout her book. Gurza Lavallo maintains that, on top of its relational character, the paradoxical or dual nature of representation – its inherent tension between representative and represented – necessarily points to its “unavoidably agonistic political nature” (p. 315). Such agonism permeates the relationships between representatives and represented, as well as those within representatives and represented themselves. He concludes that Pitkin’s oscillation and analytical choices expelled conflict from political representation, also observing that it is up to representation to accommodate its own tensions, always remembering that “the results of such accommodation are political and, in this sense, contingent for political theory” (p. 316).

The existence of a “built-in paradox” in political representation is also important to understand the looming idea of a “crisis of representation”, or more specifically of representative democracy – i.e. a population’s growing sensation of disconnect from a representative system that seems not to represent them anymore, often identified in a drop in political engagement with institutional channels, low turnout rates and even social turmoil. It is most identified with the limitations of electoral representation, in particular its emptying out of meaning and impact, leading to what may be called “plebiscitary democracy”, or the transformation of elections in a plebiscite on the state’s behavior (Ankersmit 2002: 122).

For Benhabib, there are three public goods that need to be secured in complex democracies – legitimacy, economic welfare, and a viable sense of

⁵⁹ See for example Pitkin 2006; Disch 2011; Runciman 2007; Gurza Lavallo 2015.

⁶⁰ Gurza Lavallo is referring to Pitkin’s call for overcoming the “mystery” around the concept of representation, in particular in reference to the German literature, opting for a figurative solution to representation’s inherent contradictions.

collective identity –, which stand in a complex relationship with each other. All three have to do with the type of representative relationship established between the state and the people, and “not attaining one or a combination thereof would cause problems in the functioning of these societies such as to throw them into crises” (1996: 67). The balancing act among these three elements is never-ending, so representative democracy is always future-oriented; it “is and always will be in some kind of crisis: It is constantly redirecting its citizens’ gaze from a more or less unsatisfactory present toward a future of still unfulfilled possibilities” (O’Donnell 2007).

Because it is a phenomenon that dialogues with the goal of political stability, the reading that a representative framework is in crisis can give way to more or less caution about the prospect of further deepening democracy’s outreach and social mobilization⁶¹. The signals that a representative framework is in crisis thus raise concerns about the rise of authoritarian regimes and the eruption of civil wars. Recently there has been a lot of discussion on the different ways democracies are weakened or threatened when faced with such signs (see for example Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018; Runciman 2018; Tormey 2015; Castells 2018). The idea of crisis also activates fears that a society is reaching the brink of violence; it therefore approximates representation to the subject of PCS discussed in the previous chapter. It evidences the importance of viewing the two under a common language, or at least of making an effort not to separate the two situations (and disciplines) as if they had nothing to do with each other.

Bernard Manin’s study of the principles of representative government (1997) provides us with one of the most discussed interpretations of the “crisis of representation”. The author’s understanding is that it is not representation itself that goes into crisis, but its different forms of organization, which, once exhausted, enter processes of substitution. In other words, the sensation of crisis is a moment of adaptation for representation, in which its predominant model is replaced by another, seen as more appropriate for a given context. Based on what he has called the principle of distinction, mentioned earlier in this chapter, each “crisis” also means the rise of a new distinguished political elite that comes to substitute an old one, attached to old methods. He stresses that “[m]ore than the substitution of one elite for another, it is the persistence, possibly even the aggravation, of the gap between the governed and the governing elite that has provoked a sense of

⁶¹ An example of a “high degree of caution” argumentation is a report by Michael Crozier, Samuel Huntington and Joji Watanuki (1975), in which they claimed democracies had become unmanageable and feared the effects of “excessive” social mobilization (Miguel 2013: 104).

crisis” (p. 233). According to Manin, these model transitions do not alter the fundamental features of representation, which he says are four: the election of representatives at regular intervals; the partial independence of representatives; freedom of public opinion; and the making of decisions after trial by discussion (p. 197). Regardless of the rules stipulated to concretize representative relationships and the changes observed throughout time, his argument is that these core characteristics have remained the same and were never challenged.

He points out two such moments of crisis whose bottom line was a substitution in representative methods – first, in the early 20th century, from parliamentarianism⁶² to party democracy, and more recently from party democracy to what he labels audience democracy. Hence, our latest (current) crisis of representation is linked to the decline of political party elites and the “rise of the media expert” (p. 220). Two main causes explain this transformation. First, the era of mass communication alters the dynamics between representatives and those represented – through mass media, candidates and government officials see the possibility of speaking directly to the electorate, no longer needing the party machinery for this. Second, there is a complexification of the practical dimension of governing, so that it becomes even more impracticable to choose based on specific platforms – this further favors the focus on the candidate's personality versus her/his specific political proposals (p. 220-22). In this scenario, the electorate becomes an audience that responds to the action performed on the political stage, while representatives engage with it by proposing lines of division within it, trying to expose “cleavages within the electorate and to bring some of them to the public stage. They bring to public awareness this or that social division, drawing attention to a split in society that was not previously apparent” (p. 226).

Manin's attention to the performative facet of representation found an echo in the literature. The constitutive role of representation and the transformation of constituencies into audiences gained relevance and extrapolated the electoral format to which the author still clung, as I shall discuss in the next section. When it comes to the connection between representation and the event of crises, it is also interesting to contrast Manin's stance with the one developed by Didier Mineur (2012). Mineur extends the performativity of representation to the idea of crisis itself, arguing that there is a crisis of representation “from the moment that one is evoked” (p. 16). He also goes a different way in his analysis of how representation and crisis relate to each other, seeing it less as a cyclical event associated to

⁶² See footnote n. 50 above.

government configurations than as an embedded feature of representation from the moment of its modern conception. Unlike Manin, he does not portray representation as stable in its essence; quite the contrary, he believes the answer for our nonstop feeling of crisis is necessarily found at the very conceptual structures of representation. Mineur sees a disjunction between the abstract unity of the people and its empirical reality, a trait inherited from philosophical and juridical traditions.

The crisis of political representation, as a feeling of discrepancy between existing political representation and the supposed reality of the represented, is therefore due to the more or less explicit reference, by the critics of existing representation, to an empirical people that is foreign to the figuration that representatives make of it (p. 19).

Mineur highlights that while the identity of will between representatives and represented has always been a juridical abstraction, there is an important distinction to be made among its different expressions. In the Hobbesian absolute model of representation, the abstraction of the collectivity vis-à-vis its individual members can never be manifested; they are merged and undifferentiated. In representative democracies, on the other hand, the separation between the two brings the empirical problem of identification between representatives and represented under broad daylight (p. 22). For this reason, no matter the institutional and political environment in which it unfolds, Mineur argues that the crisis of representation always has to do with the unity, the diversity or the majority through which the actual will of the represented can be characterized (p. 24). To use his words, “the crisis of representation is ultimately confused with modern politics, insofar as it is inseparable from a society of individuals” (p. 29).

In the context of the above discussion, the three accounts of representation I propose in this chapter seem to intersect each other. As Mineur’s arguments make clear, the crisis of (state) representation leads us full circle back to Hobbes and the foundations of representation as a pillar of modern politics. It also reminds us loud and clear of the failure of party politics in trying to make (electoral) representation a preconceived and predictable enterprise (Novaro 2000). Furthermore, it paves the way to the discussion ahead, in what I am calling “representation beyond the state”. Current dynamics in studies of representation theory suggest a return to a premodern inspiration, in which multiple forms of representation coexist (Almeida 2015: 163). Due to the shortcomings of traditional approaches of representation – as well as the feeling that electoral representation and state channels of participation are insufficient in promoting political inclusion – , the last few decades have seen the rise of perspectives that try to remove

representation from its exclusive dwelling inside the state, moving it towards distinct times and spaces and widening the possibilities for thinking not only about representation but also about inclusion and conflict.

3.4 Representation beyond the state

The two reflections that I brought up at the end of the previous section – the “democratic potential” of representation and its proneness to crises – are central to discussing issues of inclusion and conflict in my account of “representation as state politics”. These debates are part of the impetus behind the state of the art in political representation theory since the 1990s – which authors have labeled the “representative turn” in democratic theory –, and, located within this movement, what I am calling “representation beyond the state”. In such approaches, we may observe not only an effort to grasp the exercise of political representation by *nonstate* actors such as civil society organizations but also a push towards the elaboration of political representation theories that can explain both state and nonstate representative relations⁶³. The aim of this section is therefore to map recent debates on political representation, with particular emphasis on its expressions outside the state realm. It tries to capture the widening move from “representative *government*”, as Manin terms it in his portrayal, back to “political representation” not only in Pitkin’s original account but also in light of new practices and ideas unfolding today. This means, for instance, analyzing the political and representative role of society, breaking with oppositional interpretations of the participation/representation pair, and enquiring how inclusive new forms of representation can be. I will start by exploring the representative turn and its main characteristics; I will then move on to discuss nonstate representation.

The renewed interest in political representation since the 1990s is inserted within a scenario that posed new questions and demanded new answers from students of politics. Having minimalist conceptions of democracy reached a sort of dead-end, issues that extrapolated the grasp of the nation-state, such as the environment, and pressures for political inclusion from societies sent specialists looking for new approaches⁶⁴. In large measure this meant, in Rancière’s terms, a

⁶³ Among such theories I may underline for instance Saward 2010, Rehfeld 2006 and Zarembek et al 2017.

⁶⁴ Some of the most prominent approaches to descriptive and other forms of inclusive representation in the context of the representative turn, such as those by Young 1990, 2000; Phillips 1995 and Williams 1998 will be discussed in the next chapter, which will cover women’s representation.

widening of what could be deemed public, the reshaping of civil society's political role, as well as a reimagination of representation beyond its confinement within an authorized representative government. It also meant reviewing representation's main frames of reference, especially the relationship between individuals and groups, as well as that between interests, discourses, preferences and identities. Given that theories of representation for a while lagged behind practice (Vieira 2017: 5-6), the rise of “*de facto* representation beyond elections” in local, regional and international spheres made it necessary for democratic theory to lean over these new forms of representation. In attempts to define practical experiences that challenged the specific model of unified state sovereignty, representation is reconceptualized through a series of new adjectives (Almeida 2015: 20) – e.g. promissory, anticipatory, gyroscopic and surrogate (Mansbridge 2003); self-authorized (Urbinati & Warren 2008); discursive (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2008); by affinity (Avritzer 2007); virtual (Gurza Lavallo et al 2006a); presumptive (Gurza Lavallo et al 2006b), and so on.

As defined by Lisa Disch, the representative turn is “a shift in empirical and normative scholarship on contemporary (mostly) democratic politics to both prioritize the study of political representation and to redefine where, how, and by what kinds of agents representation is performed” (2015: 489). A handful of authors have explained the origins, the main features and lines of thought involved in this turn, as well as the main critiques one can make and its implications for future research⁶⁵. Here, I will draw from the conceptual organization elaborated by Sofia Näsström (2011), which is helpful as an overview of this debate's main characteristics. She summarizes it into three main theses: “that representation is not just a matter of will, but also a matter of *judgment*, that it is not just constitutional, but also *constitutive*, and that representation for these reasons can be *non-electoral* as well as electoral” (p. 502).

The first thesis, centered on judgment, has deliberative and aesthetic developments which may be illustrated respectively through the works of Nadia Urbinati (2006) and Frank Ankersmit (2002). Näsström sees the move from will to judgment as “a way to unlearn” and an effort to restore a needed distance for democracies in contexts of political change (p. 503). As mentioned before, Urbinati sets out to stretch the meaning of representation beyond moments of decision, focusing instead on the public discussion that occupies the intervals between them. In her words, “focus on *presence through ideas and speech* reveals participation

⁶⁵ See for example Disch 2015; Almeida 2018, 2019; Avritzer 2012; Vieira 2017; Urbinati & Warren 2008.

and representation not as alternative forms of democracy but as related forms constituting the *continuum* of political judgment and action in modern democracies” (2006: 3-4). The aesthetic interpretation of judgment, in turn, proposes that democracy is a model of political rule based on vision (Näsström 2011: 504-5). In this vein, maintaining a certain distance between representative and represented emerges as necessary in order for the first to be able to perceive and capture the latter. Ankersmit believes that “...the origin of all legitimate political power must be situated in the aesthetic gap between voter and representative (the state)”, which is what allows for the identification of legitimate political power in democracies (2002: 118).

Emphasizing judgment instead of will helps pave the way for critical thinking regarding the substance and form of democracy, turning our attention towards public discussion. However, it could also lead to bypassing the will of the people – focusing on judgment also begs the question of who is doing the judging and how it relates to moments of decision (Näsström 2011: 504). Another important issue with interpreting representation from the point of view of judgment is that it still does not go as far as to untangle representative government and political representation; as Gurza Lavallo & Isunza Vera observe, accepting the two as synonyms “completely obliterates the pluralization of representation, keeping its analysis entirely within the borders of representative government” (2011:120). As long as political representation is hegemonized by representative government, a shadow of illegitimacy and irrelevance remains over other forms of representation (ibid). Regarding its aesthetic expression, one could question whether aesthetic interpretations lead us back to pre-modern views of representation, i.e., perspectives that prioritize observation and perception rather than reason as the core of politics, and with what consequences (Näsström 2011: 505).

The second thesis, grounded on the constitutive character of representation, corresponds to what many authors believe is a turn of its own in this literature – the “constructivist turn” of representation⁶⁶. A constitutive view of representation entails recognizing that representation does not reflect a prior existing reality, especially constituencies and their interests, but instead is part of what brings them to life and keeps them at constant negotiation and dispute. It also means moving

⁶⁶ Authors differ in how they relate the representative and constructivist turns. Some, like Disch (2015) and Vieira (2017) talk about the two as distinct movements, the first coming earlier and referring to more recent deliberative approaches such as Urbinati’s, and the second referring to more recent constructivist perspectives such as Saward’s. Others, like Näsström (2011), refer to the representative turn as a wider movement that encompasses both deliberative theories from the 1990s onwards and the recent contributions that make up the constructive turn – which would make the latter a sort of “turn within a turn”. On the constructivist turn, see also Disch et al 2019.

away from principal-agent models that dominated studies of the concept since Pitkin's 1967 book (Dutoya & Hayat 2016: 2). As mentioned a few times throughout this chapter, this is an important interpretation that has accompanied the history of the concept; however, it is also true that it remained in the background for a while and is now going through a singular revival and reshaping.

Thinking of representation as constitutive also brings to the fore perspectives that frame political representation in a performative key that involves the existence of stages, actors, audiences and scripts. In this sense, Mónica Brito Vieira rescues a theatrical view of representation to remind us that the state is an ongoing performance that needs the effort and beliefs of all those involved – not only those representing, but the ones being represented as well. She thus suggests “[s]overeign performance brings the state into being, and *the acting out of the state is the state itself*, in so far as the state is only in enactment” (2009: 168, added emphasis). Michael Saward likewise argues that even those characteristics we tend to see as “given” to polities – such as geographic borders and organizational features – are dependent upon consolidated and ongoing performances. Thus, “written constitutions, visual representations of legislative and other building-based institutions, political maps and so on, can be evoked to ‘perform’ the polity” (2017: 78). Thus, more recent approaches to political representation have been moving away from preordained notions of constituencies, identities, preferences and interests, and closer to the association between representative activities and notions of claims and audiences, which are more fitting if one considers the openness of the social (Laclau & Mouffe 1985; Novaro 2000; Rehfeld 2006; Saward 2006, 2010, 2017).

The constitutive facet of representation walks hand in hand with the third thesis listed by Näsström, which addresses non-electoral forms of representation. In Pitkin's typology, authorization and more specifically voting figure as a prerequisite for the establishment of representative relationships. In Hobbes's theory, authorization is a one-time deal; in a representative democracy, elections become the source of periodic authorization and legitimization of representatives. As recent debates elucidate, however, restricting representation to authorization and more specifically to electoral politics conceals many expressions of representation that take place in society under different frameworks and are not contemplated by minimalist interpretations of (democratic) political representation. For once, as argued by Andrew Rehfeld (2006), these do not even account for illegitimate forms of representation, in which there is no authorization but no one would disagree that they involve representation, for instance, authoritarian regimes

and the actions of nonelected state officials such as diplomats. Rehfeld thus reminds us that, while we have come to entangle democracy and representation in such a way that it became hard to think of one without the other, there is more to representation than its democratic and legitimate rendition. Thus, “[b]y simultaneously defining conditions by which someone becomes a political representative and the conditions for her legitimacy we are unable to explain how the cases of illegitimate representation ... arise” (p. 3).

Rehfeld proceeds to bring constitutive, performative and non-electoral aspects of representation together by providing us with a “general theory of representation” capable of grasping it beyond traditional electoral formats. He does so by reimagining the roles involved in the establishment and conduction of representation, the rules that guide it and the functions exercised by representatives. In this context, he stresses that “representation really does happen whenever a particular audience recognizes a case that conforms to whatever rules of recognition it uses, regardless of whether these rules are just or unjust, fair or unfair, legitimate or illegitimate” (Rehfeld 2006: 4). Such perspective, which makes representation a matter of mutual recognition, also opens up space for us to identify it in informal, deterritorialized scenarios in which traditionally we would not – including for example the actions of non-governmental organizations and social movements, international and regional organizations of state and nonstate nature alike. For Almeida, such informal types of representation destabilize both “the exclusivity of territorial representation as the main frontier of inclusion” and “the principle of mathematical equality provided by the vote” that makes the individual the central feature of representation (2015: 164).

Although the notion of audience can be interpreted as the reaffirmation of a political role for the population that is merely reactive, as I shall discuss briefly, it also allows viewing representation beyond its episodic character typical of the polls, as a continuous and disputed process that, in such a way, gives greater agency to the represented. In the absence of electoral authorization, these new representations are mixed and confused with political participation, which also indicates the need for further investigation into them. The post-Cold War world did away with the bases for the participation/representation dichotomy. The two have been going through a process of reciprocal resignification, in which participation has lost its self-evident normative character and automatic association with values of self-determination and political equality, whereas representation has overcome its automatic identification with representative government due to the pluralization

of extra-parliamentary representative experiences (Gurza Lavalle & Isunza Vera 2011: 109).

As an interesting result, participation has ceased to be the centralizing locus of democracy's internal critique, as it happened from the 1960s to the late 80s, and representation became more open to working "in a pluralistic and democratic register" and more attentive to the democratic legitimacy of actors that were until recently pegged as "participants", not "representatives" (p. 126-7). Hence, "today, an innovative flow of criticism operates in the register of representation, while participatory models have lost influence or been absorbed by the more sophisticated models of deliberative democracy" (p. 97). If we can move past antithetical interpretations of the two concepts, we may also realize that civil society resorts to participation and representation in complementary and sometimes simultaneous ways (Almeida 2015: 153); more than that, in the context of the representative turn, the borders between the two can even become blurred and confusing. Jenny Pearce ponders that recent participatory expressions "and what some would call disorganized politics, leads again to the search for some form of representation. We cannot ignore the issue of representation when it comes to participation" (2006: 23). Within the scope of the peace process, the exploration of the meanings attributed to representation and political participation, both by actors engaged in practice and by the literature that studies the topic, is also related to the intended unveiling of the meaning of "inclusion", often placed as one of its goals.

Urbinati & Warren (2008) acknowledge the rising complexity of the political terrain and its disjunction with standard accounts of representation, which fail to explain political dynamics that escape territoriality, are pluralized and rely on informal negotiation and deliberation in their attempted construction of legitimacy. The authors divide nonstate representation into two categories – first, "citizen representation", and second, what they call "self-authorized representation". Citizen representation refers to formal instances of social participation that still retain ties with elected governments; self-authorized representation, in turn, encompasses representative moves from a wide range of actors – e.g., advocacy networks, civil society organizations, philanthropic foundations, etc. – that do not necessarily hold strings attached to state governments.

As defined by the authors, citizen representation comprises "nonelected, formally designed venues into which citizens are selected or self-selected for representative purposes" (2008: 405). These are supplements, not alternatives to

electoral institutions. A few examples would include the idea of mini publics⁶⁷, as elaborated by deliberative approaches, and initiatives such as the creation of collegiate bodies for the approval and inspection of public policy, participatory budgeting, citizen observatories, civil electoral institutions, and so on (Gurza Lavallo & Isunza Vera 2011: 111-12). Despite the common association of initiatives like these with participation instead of representation, it is clear from the (still) limited volume of actors involved that they ultimately represent a wider range of individuals beyond themselves in their actions and decisions.

What Urbinati & Warren call self-authorized representation, in turn, is both nonelected and, most of the time, also of informal character. The absence of institutional ties makes it flexible, so it may or not be issue- and time-specific, refer to demands that are territorially located, and aim to compensate for the vacuums left by electoral politics. As Urbinati & Warren recall, it is not new – they mention, for example, the abundant source of historical cases in which exclusion from formal representation inspired representative moves by leaders of social sectors demanding inclusion. At the same time, they also stress that such forms of representation are not necessarily a precursor to formalized, electoral inclusion, constituting a phenomenon in its own right. What indeed reveals new about recent expressions of nonstate representation is their sheer volume and diversity.

In light of such trends, in particular the growing political role acquired by non-governmental organizations since the 1990s, Pearce underlines that “participatory movements ... have their own representation problems and their legitimacy is often undermined because their spokespersons have not been elected”, thus reminding us that “there are tensions around representation both within participatory ways of doing politics and within formal democracies” (Pearce 2006: 27). One may say that these tensions become even more pronounced in the context of armed conflicts and attempted transitions to peace; I shall further discuss them in the following chapters.

3.5

Final thoughts

If we choose to look at representation beyond its immediate association with representative democracies, i.e. accepting that it is not reducible to votes or

⁶⁷ For more on the notion of mini publics, see Fung 2007, Lafont 2015, Bächtiger et al 2018.

mandates, it becomes clear that it is a constitutive principle of political life and a condition of possibility for the modern state to exist. This is true both in abstract and practical ways. On the one hand, political representation is what allows for figuratively turning multiplicity into unity and absence into presence, and this is central for the fiction of the protective state to hold up. This also means analyzing the dynamics of social groups cannot do without the representative element that mediates between individuals and collectivities and, in a Hobbesian understanding, allows for a social contract to even be possible.

In a practical key, in turn, political representation is often said to have been a solution for creating a “government of the people” in polities that were much larger than the Greek cities. However, the adoption of representative regimes by revolutionary founding fathers in England, the United States and France was not taken as a feasible substitute for direct democracy; it was an elitist alternative to it. It was, indeed, considered a superior form of governing, capable of indirectly involving the people while at the same time filtering out their “passions” from political affairs. Despite the pressures for expansion and democratization of access to representation that followed this foundational moment – which led to universal suffrage and brought the representative model closer to what we know today –, this is often lost from sight in contemporary studies of representative democracies.

Representation as known and (democratically) exercised today relies not on equal chances to hold office, but on the egalitarian right of the many to consent and legitimate the actions of a few. This inserts an abyss between the people and their rulers, essentially promoting a formal detachment between political and social spheres. It also helps explain why the notion and practice of representation encapsulate both solutions and tensions inherent to political life. While institutionalized politics is destined precisely to vent tensions and conflicts without the use of violence, representation itself is a contradictory and tense principle, too often an unfulfilled promise, and, perhaps most important here, not limited to times of “peace” – whatever we are choosing to call peace. If representation (or lack thereof) is a vehicle leading societies both into and out of wars, reshaping power distributions and social dynamics, it seems only natural that the study of armed conflicts takes it into consideration. Next chapter will present critical views of political representation, based mainly in feminist and critical democratic theories. Based on these, I will outline the concept of representation used in this research and transfer it to the context of peace negotiations.

4

Unveiling inclusion in peace negotiations through women's political representation

"Definitions belong to the definers, not the defined."
(Toni Morrison)

The last chapter has gone through the conceptual history of political representation, presenting it through three distinct accounts – representation as foundation, as state politics and beyond the state. Since representation is both a supporting pillar and an indispensable practical tool of modern political narratives, it has a crucial role in peacebuilding which the PCS literature largely overlooks. The conceptual history outlined in the last chapter has also called attention to the dynamics between political representation, inclusion and conflict, which are important for thinking about the role of society in peace negotiations as well – especially when we consider that society's inclusion in such contexts is taken as a disturbance, as underlined in Chapter 2, and therefore directly pegged to the continuation of violent conflict. Lastly, it introduced discussions on the relationship between representation and participation, most often taken as self-exclusory opposites by the literature but recently approached from different, more complexified angles. From its dichotomic interpretation, the pair moved towards a view of complementarity and, more recently, one of increasingly blurred borders. These reflections also add towards a critical look at what is called "inclusion" in current PCS literature.

In a way, peace negotiations are a rare instance where all three accounts of representation intersect and influence each other – while representation and the political are being re-bargained in their most fundamental sense, it is also the key "multiplying mechanism" for debate and decision-making inside and out of formal negotiation spaces. Talking about inclusion in peace processes thus cannot do without an analysis of political representation, its main vehicle in more than one aspect.

In the present chapter, I want to promote a critical re-reading of the discussions conducted in the two previous chapters, and I will do so above all in light of feminist critiques of political inclusion and representation both in "peaceful"

and “conflictual” scenarios. The goal is to reflect on the role of the inclusion of women in peace processes, more specifically peace negotiations, by looking at theoretical and critical intersections between feminist, democratic and peace and conflict studies. This will allow me, first, to present the critical interpretation of representation I am adopting in this research and, second, to carry this approach of political representation over to contexts of peace negotiations, in order to propose an analytical framework that tackles the issue of societal inclusion from a new perspective.

Feminist approaches cut across all literatures mobilized here, bringing together political practice and theory and providing a common critical language from which to access the issues most important for this dissertation. Section 4.1 will be dedicated to inserting feminist lenses over the conceptual history provided by Chapter 3, touching upon feminist approaches to canonical political theory and representation-as-foundation as well as feminist democratic theory and representation as state politics. Having provided this overview, which will problematize what the previous chapter called “political inclusion”, I will move on to propose a critical outtake of the state of the art in studies of political representation (which I have called representation beyond the state). With all this in mind, section 4.3 will then work to unveil the meanings of inclusion in peace negotiations through the concept of political representation. It will start by introducing feminist critiques of the PCS discussion developed in Chapter 2 and, finally, propose an analytical framework for approaching inclusion in peace negotiations through a critical conception of political representation. This framework will then be taken up in Chapters 5 and 6, in which I will discuss the role of Colombian society, in particular women, in the Havana Dialogues between the government and the FARC (2012-2016).

4.1

Feminist critiques of political representation

There are several paths that one could take to criticize the conceptual history of representation presented throughout the last chapter, and perhaps no issue is more neuralgic than the inclusions and exclusions introduced by its adoption and configuration as the main organizing tool of politics, be it democratic or not. Critics who experienced diverse types of exclusion and oppression have come from different directions in pointing out the narrowness and exclusory character of this history – to stick with a few of the main critical viewpoints directed towards

traditional takes on representation, it is specifically oriented in terms of race and ethnicity, class, and gender. Women have been at the forefront of those who struggled to show that liberal values were intersected by a series of contradictions, and feminisms are born from women's demands for inclusion in politics and the concretization (and reinvention) of rights that were promised but left unfulfilled by the Enlightenment project.

From the outset, feminists have combined activism and theorization in such a way that made gender ineradicable from political discussions, showing, in other words, that "political theories are gender theories even when they do not address it" (Biroli 2017: 203). Such combination between activism and theory had a reflex over the transformation of feminist thought into a field of study; because it is interdisciplinary and "[cuts] across the divisions of knowledge that structure contemporary universities, feminist theory has been characterized as 'oppositional research' because it challenges the right of the powerful across these diverse disciplines to define realities (Devault 1999, 1)" (Disch & Hawkesworth 2016: 2). In short, feminist arguments help return the political to discussions from which it was veiled and muted.

How can feminist views of politics place political representation under critical light? Alongside criticisms rooted mainly in class and race, they are central to the dismantling of essentialized conceptions of the individual subject – the baseline for political representation at least since Hobbes, later converted into the liberal 'one person, one vote' principle of political inclusion. Every step of the path taken in the previous chapter – the three accounts of representation I proposed – may be re-read through women's unveiling of the exclusions embedded within ideals of universal equality and their development into political models and institutions.

As feminists have observed, these ideals are anchored in specific (male, white, upper-class, Eurocentric) expressions of knowledge and belonging. As a consequence, liberal democratic models proclaimed universal equality among individuals while at the same time absorbing and concealing diverse types of oppression. Against individualist and aggregative views of politics, feminist debates also provide a rich reflection on collective action, thinking about social groups and articulations beyond geographical constituencies and political parties, and challenging traditional ways of seeing political affinities. In more ways than one, then, women's political activism and theorizing have put in check universalizing narratives of political representation, be it addressing it directly or regarding discussions on the social contract and on justice; the limits between public and private spheres; the interplay between equality and difference; the

contrast between interests, standpoints, preferences, perspectives and rights; or the complex debate on identities and the category of “women” itself, in particular as it concerns issues of sex and gender.

While women’s relationship with politics touches upon such wide array of intersecting topics, in this section I will look at debates that later allow for a critical purview of the concept of representation in its widest, beyond-formality interpretation, and its translation into contexts of peace processes. This will first involve inserting feminist lenses over the landscape drawn in the last chapter, enquiring the place of women in politics and democracy, and what it has to say about political representation and inclusion as a whole. I will do this through two movements. First, I want to go over the relationship between feminisms and political theory, which will dialogue with and provide a critical view of what I have called the foundational key of representation in Chapter 3. Feminist authors have argued that the exclusion of women from politics is ingrained within and a condition of possibility for the state’s social contract and liberal representative politics, which is intimately related to the limits drawn between public and private realms.

The second movement refers to the relationship between feminist theories and democracy, touching upon my account of representation as state politics and paving the way for a deeper approach of nonstate representation in section 4.2. This second part will thus focus more specifically on feminist democratic theory, especially debates on women’s representation and the meanings behind the notion of social groups; the contentions about the universalizing category of “women” and its turning into inclusions and exclusions; as well as the links between representation and participation of women in formal and informal instances.

4.1.1

Feminisms, political theory and representation as foundation

The previous chapter began telling the story of political representation through a discussion of its role as a founding pillar of the modern state, especially in view of Thomas Hobbes’s conception of representation as an indispensable feature of the social contract. I have argued that, more than being a concrete format of (eventually democratic) politics, representation sustains the abstract narrative of transforming multiple, equally harmful individuals into one cohesive, stable political unity. I have also pointed out that the representation of individuals proposed by

Hobbes was a milestone because it was later appropriated and adjusted by revolutionary goals and the shaping of liberal representative democracy.

Feminist theorists, on the other hand, will argue that this is not the whole story – or, better yet, that this is a specific narrative of how political representation as we know it came to be. The objective of this section is thus to re-read the narrative presented in the last chapter through feminist voices, which will help in showing its specificity. This will be important later as I explore peace negotiations as a narrative of refoundation in which women struggle not only to have a voice and a presence but also to get written into peace accords and new constitutions.

As Mary Hawkesworth and Lisa Disch underline, “[b]oth ancient and modern philosophers have advanced universal claims about human nature and contradicted them by reifying gender difference in ways that suggest that women are not fully human” (2016: 6). Women’s exclusion from politics looms in both words and silences, seen and unseen – not only were they openly deemed inferior and bound by demeaning biological interpretations of sexual difference, but they were also overlooked and kept from taking part in the drawing up of reigning categories, norms and dichotomies of politics. Thinking about exclusion thus demands rummaging through different layers of action and inaction, refusing to remain attached to the immediately apparent. To borrow a metaphor from Zalewski (2000), tackling women’s exclusion means seeing political relations less as an apple, with a well delimited inside and outside and a discoverable core, and more like an onion, with multiple layers we peel out as we try to dig deeper into the issue at hand.

Feminist confrontations of exclusionary politics have been categorized in manifold ways, taking into consideration, for instance, their chronological unfolding, where they have developed (e.g. “French feminism”) or their ideological and epistemological affiliations. The well-known wave metaphor classifies feminist ideas based on their periodic emergence in differently shaped agendas – from pioneering first-wave struggles for educational and political (especially suffrage) rights; to approaches of sexuality and the confrontation of the public/private divide in the second; the taking on of universalizing categories and issues of equality, difference and identity in the third; and finally to a rising, ongoing fourth wave we now witness as marked by a massive use of social media⁶⁸. Another often cited form of categorization of feminist arguments is the so-called “hyphenation model”, first introduced by Alison Jaggar and reproduced with variations in other

⁶⁸ Miguel & Biroli 2015, Snyder 2008

classifications, based on their identification with and allocation within major Western philosophical traditions such as liberalism, Marxism, socialism, radicalism and postmodernism (Hawkesworth & Disch 2016: 2, Jaggar 1983, Dietz 2003, Zalewski 2000).

Attempts to categorize feminist thought have each inspired critique for their threat of essentializing and oversimplifying it. The wave classification runs the risk of diminishing feminist activism outside of its perceived “crests”, as well as implying that one wave is overcome and superseded by the next, falsely feeding into a generational conflict between feminists (Evans & Chamberlain 2015, Nicholson 2010). The hyphenation model, in turn, shapes women’s demands into a mold to make them fit existing categories, in whose conception they did not have a say. Positioning feminisms as derivative of existing philosophical traditions takes away from their critical input about those very traditions, making it seem as if different feminist approaches could not dialogue among each other, and maybe most critically, erasing the voices and faces of those women who do not fit these existing categories.

Flawed as they are, these categorizations may still find parallel and be useful to elucidate the relationship between feminisms and political theory, in particular works that have become canonical to the study of political representation. Even though the contemplation of women’s place in politics stretches back to the voices of pioneering women such as Olympe de Gouges, Mary Wollstonecraft and Sojourner Truth, feminists would not dwell on the basic tenets and works of political theory until the 1970s, when the revival of contractarianism invited a deeper reflection⁶⁹ on the subject (Miguel 2017: 2). Judith Squires (2000) explains that such delay also had to do with feminists’ prolonged suspicion of theorization; even when they did embrace theoretical enquiry, institutions of government were rarely their focus (p. 395).

Second-wave feminists were the ones to finally go back to classic works of political philosophy and enquire how women fit into the (masculine) political narrative of the state⁷⁰. The fact that the canon either ignored or belittled and undermined women as political agents was used both to suggest its uselessness and to recognize its centrality for the political struggles of women. Feminist interest in political theory grew, however, as it became clear that facing the exclusion of women also meant understanding the constitutive footprints of those political

⁶⁹ Which does not mean, on the other hand, that the topic had not been taken up by women contemporary to political thinkers like Hobbes. For more on the work of such women see Part 3 of Hirschmann & Wright 2012.

⁷⁰ Okin (1979, 1989), Elshtain (1981), Pateman (1988), Brennan & Pateman (1979).

categories they were struggling to occupy and displace. The attention directed towards the public/private divide from the 1960s onwards, with feminist calls for a politicization of the private through the rallying slogan “the personal is political”, is therefore also central for understanding the feminist pull towards grasping the place reserved for women in political theory.

Linda Zerilli (2006) identifies four critical projects taken up by feminist stances of canonical political theory – first, the discussion of women’s absence in the canon; second, the effort to integrate women into categories of political membership they had been previously excluded from; third, the realization that women do not fit those same categories because their exclusion was constitutive of political orders; and, lastly, coming to terms with this “impossible inclusion” and trying to displace and reconceptualize these political categories (p. 106-7, see also Squires 2000: 485).

In a somewhat similar vein, Squires provided us with three ideal archetypes of feminist approaches to gender in political theory – *inclusion*, *reversal* and *displacement* –, which may find some parallel in the last three projects underlined by Zerilli. The first strategy involves the inclusion of women in instances where they face political exclusion; the second pursues a political reconfiguration that accommodates gender specificities; and the third tries to destabilize apparent oppositions between inclusion and reversal, revealing “the extent to which gendered identities are themselves products of particular political discourses” (Squires 2000: 219). Squires associates the strategy of inclusion with liberal feminists, that of reversal with radical, maternal or cultural feminists⁷¹, and displacement strategies with feminists labeled as postmodern or post-structuralist (ibid). Advocates of gender displacement argue that inclusion and reversal alike echo dichotomic halves that are part of the same established power network, which is what actually needs questioning and deconstruction (Squires 1999: 3). My own view of women’s political representation is aligned with a strategy of displacement, with a few caveats, as I shall further discuss in section 4.2.

The organizing schema of both Zerilli and Squires are useful not only for understanding how feminisms approach political theory but also for locating their relationship with (and criticisms of) the concept of political representation in its

⁷¹ Radical, maternal or cultural feminists are known for calling attention to the differences between men and women; against liberal arguments for equality, they argue women need to be recognized for their specific characteristics, which can positively add to political debates and institutions due to their “differentiated sense of justice”. These feminists are criticized, in turn, for essentializing the meaning of ‘woman’, feeding into binary narratives instead of truly questioning them in their core. For more on maternal feminism see Elshtain 1997, Ruddick 1989, Hartsock 1998.

more abstract sense. As Zerilli indicates, feminist efforts began by pointing out women's absence from the canon, a task that quickly changed as it became evident that their exclusion from discussions of politics stemmed from secondary literature, not canonical thinkers themselves (2006: 108). In this sense, Anne Phillips observes that "what at first seemed an absence becomes on closer examination an unspoken but powerful presence, for under the seemingly innocent guise of gender neutrality, masculinity defined the terms" (1991: 5). What canonical thinkers did do, she says, was outwardly defend and justify the exclusion of women in their theories of public life (ibid). It is therefore widely known that the "malestream"⁷² of Western political thought built a notion of the political that rests over the exclusion of women (Shanley & Pateman 1991: 3). In this sense, "manhood and politics go hand in hand, and everything that stands in contrast to and opposed to political life and the political virtues has been represented by women, their capacities and the tasks seen as natural to their sex" (ibid).

One of the main avenues taken by women in criticizing modern political representation involved the acknowledgement and exposure of the specific nature of the liberal (equal, unattached, rational) individual. As underlined in the last chapter, liberal thought carried out a "privatization of citizenship", allegedly aimed to serve as a brake on state tyranny. The liberal subject is created as an atomistic being that exists prior to society itself, which should in turn make sure all individuals are equal and free to realize their competitive potential. In short, "the liberal individual might be understood as the competitive entrepreneur, his civil society as an economic marketplace, and his ideal as the equal opportunity to engage, as Adam Smith wrote, in 'the race for wealth, and honours, and preferments'" (Dietz 1998: 382). In this view, political representation takes place through the aggregation of existing interests in society.

Whereas the construction of such an autonomous agent had an intention of universality, feminists and other critics point out that the liberal individual does not follow from neutral observation and apprehension of a given reality; it in fact tries to fit differently shaped individuals into a single specific mold (Squires 2000: 648). As a result, such a conception of subjectivity does not apply equally to everyone. For women, turned into counterpoints to rational men, this mold meant not being deemed individuals at all. Feminists thus tried to expose the sexual hierarchization embedded within liberal conceptions of the self, an issue that reveals central for

⁷² The expression "malestream" was coined by Mary O'Brien (1981).

debating political representation as a concept and leads to deeper debates on gender, subjectivity and identity (Mariano 2005, Costa 2002).

Another prominent path taken to problematize such exclusion was to enquire into the place occupied by women in theories of social contract, in particular those of Hobbes, Kant, Locke and Rousseau. As Carole Pateman elaborated in her now-classic *The Sexual Contract*, social contract theory does not conceive of women as beings capable of contracting on equals grounds with men, or “making and keeping promises with political significance” (Zerilli 2006: 110, Pateman 1988). For the author, the social contract was only part of the story because it also involved a hidden *sexual* pact. Thus, “[t]he original pact is a sexual as well as a social contract: it is sexual in the sense of patriarchal – that is; the contract establishes men’s political right over women – and also sexual in the sense of establishing orderly access by men to women’s bodies” (1988: 2). Women’s capacity to enter a contract as individuals is thus dubious – while they are not deemed capable contracting parties, they are at the same time presumed capable of consent to individual men as tutors and husbands (O’Neill et al 2008: 4).

The sexual contract’s omission is guaranteed by the split between public and private realms in the modern world, which is fundamentally connected to the ambiguity behind the notion of “civil society”; once we enter the contract, it comes to be equated both with the constitutional order that exists in opposition to the state of nature and, on the other hand, with the public realm that exists in opposition to the private sphere (p. 10-11). In this context, “[w]hat it means to be an ‘individual’, a maker of contracts and civilly free, is revealed by the subjection of women within the private sphere” (p. 11).

In this aspect, as in so many others, Hobbes stands out from other thinkers. Overall, since he always addresses the topic in passing and in function of his theoretical priority (i.e. the creation of the state), a lot of his treatment of women is ambiguous and fairly open to interpretation⁷³. He differs on this matter above all because he was the only contractualist to establish a state of nature in which men had no natural dominion over women. Unlike Locke, Rousseau or Kant, who were vocal in proclaiming women as naturally inferior, Hobbes portrays men and women as equals in the pre-contractual stage⁷⁴. For Pateman, this element is crucial

⁷³ Authors point out that throughout his work, one may find a lot of demeaning references, e.g., his labelling of the woman as man’s “helper”, and a few more neutral or favorable ones, such as his characterization of women as capable of political rule.

⁷⁴ It is under this premise that he considers marriage an impossibility in such condition and speaks of mothers’ primary right over children. Even in relation to his view of equality as our ability to harm one another, Hobbes does not posit women as in any kind of physical disadvantage; in fact, he

because it allows Hobbes to be cohesive in his narrative that the state of nature is a context of radical horizontality which we forego to have a safe, albeit vertical, order – only in a situation where no one can prevail over others would we see a loose multitude voluntarily contracting to create a commonwealth.

Despite Hobbes's exceptionality when it came to define women's status in the state of nature, his version of the social contract subordinated them and alienated their rights just as much as any other. This is why Pateman argues that he and other fellow contractualists are patriarchal thinkers despite their differences with traditional defenders of paternal right such as Robert Filmer – theirs was a modern patriarchalism, rooted not on the father or the family, but first and foremost on marriage as an asymmetrical relationship⁷⁵. In other words, patriarchy was transferred to the private domain; "it was entrenched rather than eradicated" (Squires 2000: 669). Pateman also maintains that, in Hobbes's case, the agglutination of all things political around men is part of his obsession with unity, so that "if the representer is to be unified, he must be *he*. To attempt to represent both sexes within the figure of one master would be to dissolve his unity and oneness and to shatter political order" (1989: 461). In a symbolic key, this point may be illustrated by *Leviathan's* iconic frontispiece, which pictures the body politic as a man⁷⁶.

Whereas Hobbes did not adhere to universal freedom and equality rights in post-contract life, liberal and revolutionary thinkers who did ran a risk of contradiction in their constructed ideal of the modern individual but insisted upon the singling out of differences that kept women outside the political sphere.

Asserting that reproductive physiology determines individual character and political capacity, political theorists and republican revolutionaries on both sides of the Atlantic adopted the notion that sexual difference dictates proper political status and behavior, insisting that any transgression of the gendered political order threatened the very basis of society and civilization (Disch & Hawkesworth 2016: 5).

Pateman & Shanley observe that, before modern revolutionary doctrines proclaimed universal equality among individuals, the exclusion of women was unremarkable. As the rights of *man* evolved into the "currency of modern political argument", however, women became "a special problem" (1991: 4).

defends that, if done skillfully, even physically strong individuals are vulnerable to being killed by weaker ones.

⁷⁵ Other authors such as Gabriella Slomp argue that for Hobbes "patriarchal legislation is the product of *convention* and *unopposed custom*" (1994: 441 – added emphasis), not necessarily a fatal implication of the social contract, which may be followed by diverse forms of inequality (see also Lloyd 2012). For discussions on the concept of patriarchalism, see Elshtain 1981, Okin 1989, Fraser 1997.

⁷⁶ On this, see the debate between Pateman and Skinner in Hirschmann & Wright 2012.

The shortcomings of approaching women's political exclusion through a critique of the social contract, specifically Pateman's idea of the sexual contract and conception of the patriarchy, have been widely addressed by feminist literature⁷⁷. A few authors will say, for example, that her dismissal of the social contract is precipitated; others argue that the asymmetrical relationship identified by the author is not reflective of gender relations in the contemporary world (Fraser 1997, Okin 1990, Miguel 2017). For Wendy Brown, Pateman overestimates the importance of the social contract; she holds that the author "does not query whether or on what level *contemporary* liberalism requires a social contract" and suggests that liberal regimes no longer need a contract as a basis for citizenship and political legitimacy (1995: 137). As liberalism and modernity have become one and the same, she says, mythologies and legal fictions of origin are no longer needed (p. 138).

Looking beyond the social contract interpretation, then, feminist theorists argue women's exclusion is also rooted in the *historical practice* of liberal regimes (Squires 2000: 696). In this perspective, liberalism never maintains and respects the public/private separation we see it defend in theory; quite the contrary, "liberal states have actually enforced patriarchal power relations within the family, while formally denying their responsibility to intervene in familial disputes" (ibid, p. 702). In other words, it was by exerting influence over the private sphere that it was able to regulate and control the family realm as well as women's role in society.

The foundational narrative of political representation is very much part of this discussion, and it is one of the notions that, born masculine, transforms and is contested throughout time, as women question it and try to reshape it. Hence, instead of throwing away canonical political theory altogether, feminists found productive "to think of gender as a constitutive category of politics, a category that, were we to take account of it, has the potential to alter what we think politics is – especially democratic politics" (Zerilli 2006: 111). The challenge and contradictions of women's political inclusion therefore necessarily went through not only attaching themselves to existing political notions as they were but also rethinking such notions as exclusory and oppressive at their roots.

This brings a new perspective to the discussion on women's place in peace processes. As discourses of political refoundation, peace negotiations and their resulting peace agreements may be viewed as renegotiated social contracts, in which political subjects are redesigned and rights and responsibilities are

⁷⁷ For a roundup of critiques on Pateman's treatment of contract theory and patriarchalism, see Miguel 2017 and O'Neill et al 2008.

reassigned. They may also be read as an instance in which reigning liberal categories and practices are expressed and become liable to contestation. If we take gender exclusions to be constitutive of political representation as we know it, it also becomes clear that the inclusion lexicon mobilized in PCS literature is limited and unclear to critically address the place of women in peacemaking. Limiting oneself to speaking of women's "inclusion" in peace processes thus accepts that they will be uncritically attached to existing categories and modes of operation, refraining from questioning how these have contributed to women's exclusion in the first place. Displacing and trying to see these very categories under new light thus allow for coming to terms with such an "impossible inclusion". I will come back to this discussion further along.

4.1.2

Feminisms, democratic theory and representation as state politics

With the above discussion on women and political theory in mind, let's now turn to feminist critiques of democratic theory and some of the main debates and proposals concerning women's relation to political representation in its more practical expressions. As we know, for a long time women's representation was not even a problem to begin with; it was settled that they were represented by their fathers and husbands (Sapiro 1998: 161). Despite shared notions of equality and opposition to arbitrary power, feminist and democratic traditions did not share an automatic bond (Phillips 1991: 1). As feminist activism arose in demand of political rights, their acknowledgment as citizens in their own right slowly came about; "[f]rom this point onwards, the links with the democratic tradition steadily strengthened, though the belief that the two movements were related proved stronger on the feminist side" (p. 2). As highlighted in the previous section, however, inclusion as a mere attachment to a pre-existing political order, with no questions asked about its structural features, constitutes a problematic and partial solution to the exclusion and oppression of marginalized social sectors. Faced with the critiques outlined above, this is important especially because of how the liberal political order passed on what were particular worldviews as universalist projects.

Women have learned this following their formal political inclusion and granting of suffrage rights, which despite having been a significant breakthrough did not bring their exclusion from politics to an end. Even after being granted rights to vote and run for office, it was glaring that women were a small minority in the

universe of representatives and were not exercising enough influence to bring political attention to their own agenda. To use Iris Marion Young's formulation, *internal* exclusion remained (and remains) regardless of their overcoming *external* exclusion – while no longer kept outside of the political process, they still face internal and largely veiled barriers to exercising equitable political influence in societies (2000: 53). As Young stresses in her work, the persistence of internal exclusions for women have to do with how the political system is wired, i.e. its specific language and norms of operation, but they also have to do with structural inequalities and oppressions that make formal equality a very limited achievement.

From the second wave of feminisms onwards, the realization that formal political inclusion would not cut it led women towards questioning more fundamental political notions, with an emphasis on the extrapolation of debates on the liberal individual towards deeper problematizations of collective subjects, social groups and their relevance for addressing social exclusions. In this context, the tensions between demands for equality and the recognition of differences were of central importance. Whereas, on the one hand, equality seemed like a no-brainer of an objective, on the other, feminists could also see that equality in the face of fundamentally different and asymmetrical challenges in society did not help in solving their problem of political exclusion.

Moreover, as time went by it also became evident that not only the differences between women and men mattered but also those between women themselves; they could not be taken as a homogeneous collective without further entrenching the very problem they were going up against. Differences *among women themselves*, as well as deeper analyses of gender and what being a woman *means*, were also indispensable for critical perspectives of the status quo. The shift towards identity approaches and critical deconstructive theories of gender happened in the context of a “cultural turn” in theory following the loss of space by Marxism in the 1980s and 90s (Fraser 2013: 159).

The concept of representation has been central for feminist discussions of women's rights – as Disch acknowledges, “[it] may be second only to gender in its centrality to mid-twentieth-century feminist theory and practice” (2016: 781). In surveying different feminist approaches to political representation, a few main recurring topics may be pointed out. The first is feminist views of the relationship between participation and representation, especially in light of their treatment as opposites and, as underlined in the previous chapter, the fact that participation stood for a long time as the main locus of democracy's internal critique while representation was seen as *the* instrument of minimal democracy. In the 1960s

and 70s, many feminists were skeptical of mainstream party politics, so “the political participation advocated during this period by many within the women’s movement was direct participation in women’s autonomous organizations” (Squires 2000: 4109). As a natural response to the realization that formal representation was insufficient for women to gain political influence, the appeal to their direct engagement beyond formal politics gained strength.

Anne Phillips stresses the affinities between feminist ideals and participatory approaches, arguing that, “in an emphasis that overlapped with many of the practices of the contemporary women’s movement, democracy was conceived in terms of the rough and tumble of the meeting rather than the anonymity of the ballot box” (1991: 11). Feminist and participatory approaches also shared their challenging of distinctions between public and private realms and their push for moving beyond traditional political agendas (p. 16). Despite such affinities, direct experiences also proved largely unrepresentative in the sense that the absence of formal structures equaled a lack of parameters and accountability, leaving many women feeling silenced. From the 1980s onwards, therefore, formal representation made its way back to the center stage. Above all, however, there has been since then a preoccupation with moving beyond the dichotomic reading of the two and making an effort to integrate them in such a way that representation is reconfigured to work more responsively to informal political activities. Thus, representation and participation go from being seen as opposites to becoming complements; “the apparent dichotomy between formal and informal political activity, between representative and participatory conceptions of the political, is displaced in favor of a reconsideration of the inter-relation between the two” (Squires 2000: 4152).

The “representative turn” of the 1990s arrives with prolific work from feminists who were trying to rethink representation and make it more inclusive and critical. Such work reflected about women’s place on both sides of the representation coin, that is, both as represented and as representatives, which would ultimately help in raising issues with traditional takes of the concept and pave the way to the more critical views of political representation we currently see in the literature.

Basing myself on these two different roles, I want to go over important clusters of topics stemming from feminist approaches to political representation in this period. On the one hand, there are the discussions that revolved around women as *represented*, which unfolded from arguments that more than individual citizens, women needed to be considered a *social group* with shared interests and should therefore be represented as such. For Virginia Sapiro, “women (as well as many others) ask not for representation as individual citizens, but as members of

a group. They ask not only that citizens who happen to be women be represented, but also that women be represented because they are women” (1998: 162). Against interest-driven analyses, alternative interpretations countered such view by showing that it both homogenized a diverse universe of women, in a way replicating previous liberal universalizations, and assumed they all shared interests that preexisted representation. The contemplation of women as a group prompted a fierce debate on the essentialization of identities and brought about different proposals for understanding social collectivities and political articulation among them.

The questioning of individualist notions of citizenship and the defense of social groups as lenses for women’s representation also brings about a series of questions around their role as *representatives*, i.e. how to increase the proportion of female representatives, should gender quotas and other enabling devices be considered in doing so, how to choose representatives among a very diverse universe of women, etc. Pitkin’s concept of descriptive representation was brought back and largely dissected in investigations that sought to figure out whether having female representatives was more beneficial for other women and how. In approaching descriptive representation, authors aimed above all to detach it from strict proportional representation, as elaborated by Pitkin, and try to imagine special situations in which oppressed groups and democracy overall would be better off by getting their own representatives.

Feminist perspectives of political representation, in particular as it concerns group representation, have most often been classified in relation to their epistemological premises and the way they envision collective interaction (Dietz 2003, Disch 2016, Nash 1998). As it pertains the debate on women as a *representable collectivity*, Mary Dietz sees a “turn towards plurality”, which “posits democratic society as a field of interaction where multiple axes of difference, identity, and subordination politicize and intersect” (2003: 419). In this scenario, she sees two main feminist lines of concern – *associational* and *agonistic* approaches. Associational views of democracy “theorize (democratic) politics in terms of the proliferation, negotiation, and coordination of multiple, intersecting identities, selves, or groups”, studying their interaction mainly through communicative or deliberative traditions (ibid). Some of the main names behind associational approaches include Iris Marion Young, Anne Phillips, Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser. Agonistic feminists, in turn, “theorize politics as a persistently constitutive antagonism that is disruptive and potentially subversive”,

preferring to deconstruct the idea of identity rather than endorse it (p. 420). Among them are Chantal Mouffe, Judith Butler, Bonnie Honig and Linda Zerilli.

Young is one of the most prominent associational theorists, having leaned over the concept of social groups and differentiated them from interest groups by arguing for their singularity and defending the specific representation of groups facing social oppression⁷⁸. She saw a fundamental problem in the fact that political philosophy conceived of groups such as associations as mere aggregates of individuals, leaving no space for seeing things the other way around, i.e. how belonging to certain social groups based on gender or race for example also constitute and exercise influence over individuals' lives. Social groups, for Young, "are not simply collections of people", because they intertwine and have to do with people's identities and their shared experience (1990: 43). She defines them as "a collective of persons differentiated from at least one other group by cultural forms, practices, or way of life" (ibid). They express themselves and are relevant, not due to a fixed substance, but because they are fluid and give form to dynamic social relations (p. 44). As social groups differ from each other, structural relations of oppression surface and take place among them in multiple ways⁷⁹.

Since the public sphere is unable to transcend group differences and address oppressions if left alone and dominated by privileged voices, Young believes that "a democratic public should provide mechanisms for the effective recognition and representation of the distinct voices and perspectives of those of its constituent groups that are oppressed or disadvantaged" (p. 184). Thus, the author adopts a modified version of deliberative theory to argue for the incorporation of all those affected into public discussions but dedicating special attention to issues of political exclusion that the theory originally overlooks. While admitting that "a concept of inclusion presupposes some bordered unit into which those excluded can be included", which consequently "depends on some continued exclusion" (2000: 12), she claims to focus on *political* exclusion and the functioning of political processes that intend to be democratic but are dominated by privileged voices (p. 13).

To critics' fears that group representation might feed into conflict and divisiveness – an argument we also find in PCS debates on societal inclusion in peace negotiations –, Young responds that differences should be brought into the open for discussion. If oppression itself is the cause of conflict, she holds that group representation can help precisely because it equalizes groups' abilities to speak and be heard (1990: 189). Moreover, she argues that inclusion motivates political

⁷⁸ See also Phillips 1995, Williams 2000.

⁷⁹ See Young 1990, chapter 2.

actors to transform self-regarding interests into appeals to justice, also maximizing social knowledge available and contributing to wiser decision-making (2000: 115). In sum, inclusion of differently positioned groups becomes a matter not of opinions or interests, but *social perspectives*, since it “[situates] the partial perspective of participants in debate. Confrontation with different perspectives, interests, and cultural meanings teaches each the partiality of their own and reveals to them their own experience as perspectival” (p. 116). For Young, therefore, women’s access to public deliberation as a group is necessary not due to shared interests or opinions; it is justified because they share a social perspective, which works as a starting point for debate, not as a finish line (Miguel 2013: 197).

In line with Young’s idea of pluralizing deliberative democracy through political inclusion, Nancy Fraser contends that Habermas’s idealization of the bourgeois public sphere is fundamentally flawed because it ignored the existence of other competing, nonliberal public spheres. Against his privileged, unified public sphere, therefore, there were several counterpublics, e.g. nationalist, popular peasant, working-class and elite women’s publics, that already contested the exclusory nature of liberal politics back then (1990: 61). She calls these *subaltern counterpublics*, “parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs” (p. 67). Fraser criticizes liberal ideals of deliberation because they try to bracket structural inequalities instead of eliminating them (p. 65); for the author, the ideal of participation parity and the addressing of inequalities is best pursued through multiple publics rather than a single one (p. 70).

Fraser also criticized Young and other fellow associational theorists, on the other hand, for what she sees as an overemphasis on cultural issues (which she labels “politics of recognition”) in detriment of economic ones (or “politics of distribution”). In her words:

Once centered on labor and violence, gender struggles have focused increasingly on identity and representation in recent years. The effect has been to subordinate social struggles to cultural struggles, the politics of redistribution to the politics of recognition (Fraser 2013: 160).

Thus, she proposes a two-dimensional approach of parity of participation that gives attention not only to intersubjective cultural patterns, but also material conditions and division of labor issues (p. 164). On the other hand, Fraser herself has been

accused of constructing an oversimplified dichotomy⁸⁰ between economic and cultural issues (Miguel & Biroli 2015: 73).

Other important criticisms of Young's associational ideas include the understatement of the conflictive relationship between the interests of oppressed and privileged groups – for Miguel, without autonomy for interest construction, pluralization is not enough for oppressed groups (2013: 234). He also reminds us that incorporation of groups into the political sphere does not erase the issue of power inequality, stressing that the political arena is a hierarchized social space which tends to reproduce existing asymmetries and exclusions (p. 236-7). Thus, Young's elaboration of group representation does not necessarily “equalize groups' abilities to speak and be heard”.

Such critiques echo some of agonistic feminists' main concerns about associational elaborations of oppressed social groups and pluralized public spheres. Agonistic feminists criticize the consensual nature of deliberative approaches, reminding us that “the formation of subject positions necessarily takes place within complex webs of power relations” (Dietz 2003: 422). They also call out essentialized views of identity, noting that “Young appears to reject metaphysical essentialism (identity is fluid, contextual and multiple) only to reintroduce nominal essentialism (women all experience a socially determined exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, and so on)” (Nash 1998: 48). This extrapolation masks the fact that even within collectivities that are considered social groups there are relations of domination which render invisible those with the least power on their hands – specifically within feminist movements, this is made abundantly clear by the work of black feminists such as Patricia Hill Collins (2019), Angela Davis (2016), bell hooks (2019a, 2019b) and Lélia Gonzalez (2020).

Mouffe's and Butler's critiques of associational feminism are both labeled agonistic by Dietz because each in her way points out the problems with accepting that a social group has an essence, even a dynamic and mutable one as Young wanted it⁸¹. Thus, both believe that despite Young's attempts to capture the fluidity of collective dynamics, her insistence upon the given existence of oppressed social groups – rooted on gender, class, race or ethnicity –, with their respective identities and interests, makes her formulation not much different from interest-group pluralism (Mouffe 1992: 380). For Mouffe, “[such essentialist view] presents some

⁸⁰ Dietz explains that Young and Butler criticize Fraser for being “overly schematized and inadequately attentive to the political potentiality of identity-based struggles as well as to culture as a key site of resistance” (2003: 421).

⁸¹ For some of the main points of disagreement between Mouffe and Butler on feminist politics, see Napoli 2016.

inescapable shortcomings for the construction of a democratic alternative whose objective is the articulation of the struggles linked to different forms of oppression” (ibid, p. 370). It has an impact over how democracy is elaborated and how it deals with political exclusions; deeming an essential category of ‘women’ the subject of political representation dismisses the fact that “the domains of political and linguistic ‘representation’ set out in advance the criterion by which subjects themselves are formed, with the result that representation is extended only to what can be acknowledged as a subject” (Butler 2003: 1-2).

In view of the instability and openness of the category of ‘women’ as a subject of representation, as well as the political and formative character of getting to draw up the borders between different social groups, it also becomes clear that the element of power is underestimated in deliberative accounts such as Young’s. Communicative solutions to feminist struggles do not take into consideration that the subject of feminism itself is produced and restrained by the power structures in which women seek to be included and through which they seek emancipation (ibid, p. 2). For Butler, then, dialogic possibilities are indelibly marked by the power relations that condition them, which makes it problematic to assume “that speaking agents occupy equal positions of power and speak with the same presuppositions about what constitutes ‘agreement’ and ‘unity’ and, indeed, that those are the goals to be sought” (p. 15). Mouffe, for her part, argues that the creation of identities should not be seen to precede politics; it is in politics itself, through the transformation and articulation of subject positions, that new identities arise and radical democratic projects become possible. The convergence of such identities “can only result from a political process of hegemonic articulation, and not simply of free and undistorted communication” (p. 380-1). I will return to Mouffe’s elaboration of representation in the next section, as it will guide my approach to inclusion in peace negotiations in this chapter and the next ones.

Dietz aptly summarizes the debate between associational and agonistic views of feminist democratic theories:

associational feminists scrutinize the conditions of exclusion in order to theorize the emancipation of the subject in the public sphere of communicative interaction; agonistic feminists deconstruct emancipatory procedures to disclose how the subject is both produced through political exclusions and positioned against them (2003: 422).

The debate about women’s possibilities as a specific constituency and their prospects for group representation is key for thinking about their inclusion in peace process scenarios. One of the major issues raised concerning these arguments I just reviewed, especially the agonistic critique, pertains the practical possibilities of

all these concepts for women's political struggles. First, however, in order to wrap up the discussion on feminist critiques of representation, I will now turn to the flipside of the representative coin and go over the role of women as potential descriptive representatives, a topic of discussion that is made possible and stems from the emergence of notions of group representation.

As I mentioned above, the debate over having women as their own *group representatives* went back to the concept of descriptive representation and meditated on the value of aiming for a mirror image of societies in representative fora. The work of Anne Phillips is one of the most important references in this debate, in particular her book *The Politics of Presence* (1995). Phillips proposes her own reading of descriptive representation – contra Pitkin, whose interpretation was that representatives' activities mattered more than their characteristics – by interposing what she calls “the politics of presence” with “the politics of ideas”. While the first, moved by political exclusions motivated by race, ethnicity or gender, associates fair representation with political presence (p. 12-3), the second is grounded by the “broadly secular understanding of politics as a matter of judgment and debate, and expects political loyalties to develop around policies rather than people” (p. 1). In other words, while the politics of presence is more concerned with the “who” of representation, the politics of ideas is more focused on the “what” (p. 5).

Phillips argues in favor of a politics of presence despite the objections raised by its opponents – such as a fear of political balkanization or the undermining of accountability –, explaining that it should not be about perfect pictorial adequacy, but a specific solution to instances of political exclusion which demand careful analysis of existing social structures (p. 45-6). In the absence of descriptive representatives, she argues, women will lack aggressive advocates on the public stage and will never even make it into the political agenda (p. 44) – which justifies, for instance, the adoption of gender quotas. Precisely because she knows of the messiness behind sorting out political exclusions and choosing representatives based on them, the author does not favor complete substitution of ideas for presence; instead, she suggests a combination between the two is in order:

Taken in isolation, the weaknesses of the one are as dramatic as the failings of the other. Most of the problems, indeed, arise when these two are set up as exclusionary opposites: when ideas are treated as totally separate from the people who carry them; or when the people dominate attention, with no thought given to their policies and ideas. *It is in the relationship between ideas and presence that we can best hope to find a fairer system of representation, not in a false opposition between one or the other* (p. 24-5, my emphasis).

Her parameters for such combination are the level of autonomy and demands for accountability encountered by representatives in their activities – the more autonomous they are, the more important the factor of presence becomes, and vice-versa (p. 79). While Phillips stresses that female representatives will not necessarily look after women’s interests, which are contestable and diverging to begin with, she sees inherent value in presence, especially as it concerns the drawing up of political agendas. As she highlights, experience shows that attempts to tie down male representatives to gender rights programs have been moot; given autonomy, as they usually are, women’s agendas have seldom been sought after in parliaments when they are absent (p. 77-8). Following Phillips, other authors have elaborated and justified their modified versions of descriptive representation, based on their own understandings of social groups⁸².

The critiques received by descriptive elaborations of women’s representation have resorted to their political as well as their aesthetic implications, the major inspiration of which is probably Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s reading of representation in her essay *Can the subaltern speak?* Spivak calls out Eurocentric intellectuals and their place in the silencing of subaltern subjects, i.e., “the lower strata of society constituted by specific modes of exclusion from markets, political and legal representation, and the possibility of becoming full members in the dominant social strata” (Spivak 2000 apud Almeida 2010). With the support of German representation vocabulary, Spivak explains that two meanings of representation are conflated in approaches to subaltern subjects – there is *Vertreten*, which refers to representation in a political and substitutive sense of “speaking for”; and there is *Darstellen*, which refers to the aesthetic constitution of the subject, its re-presentation. While the two are intrinsically related, they are also discontinuous and should not be treated as one. “These two senses of representation – within state formation and the law, on the one hand, and in subject-predication, on the other – are related but irreducibly discontinuous” (Spivak 2010: 70).

Even when intellectuals refuse to “speak for” the subaltern, then, they are still re-presenting (*Darstellung*) them without their voice being heard, all the while also representing *themselves* as “transparent” (ibid). Furthermore, “acts of political representation follow on the more or less explicit constitution-by-picturing of the subject to be represented” (Disch 2016: 793, see also Alcoff 1991). Insofar as representing – both as “speaking for” and as “re-presenting” – entail a two-way

⁸² See for example Williams 2000; Dovi 2002, 2009; Mansbridge 1999, 2003.

dialogical setup, Spivak's conclusion is that, devoid of any agency, the subaltern indeed cannot speak (Almeida 2010: 15). As highlighted by Disch, proponents of descriptive representation go strictly opposite to Spivak's ethical differentiation, indeed merging aesthetic and political representation in search of pictorial accuracy (2016: 794). In doing so, they lose sight of the issues pointed out by Spivak, leaving the subaltern out of the representative conversation in more than one way.

Another critique received by theories of descriptive representation, which Disch labels as the "constitutive approach to representation", is their sole focus on formal institutions of government, shying away from analyzing how elected and nonelected political actors alike act in the construction of constituencies and, in the case at hand, what constitutes "women" as a represented group. Constitutive analyses of representation build upon Michael Saward's notion of representative claims, which, instead of merging aesthetic and political representation, "seeks to foreground the work that aesthetic representation does for political representation" (p. 796). For Disch, constitutive representation – a consequence of the "constructivist turn" brought up in the previous chapter – is helpful in creating a link between the politics of representation, knowledge creation and strategies of social justice. I will expand on Saward's concept in the next section, in which I will elaborate further on the concept of representation I will be using in my analysis of the Colombian case.

4.2

A critical view of inclusion and representation beyond the state

The feminist critiques outlined in the previous section bring to the surface several important issues of political representation that also come up in current discussions of the inclusion of women in peace negotiations. These involve, first, women's role as contractarians in instances of political and institutional renegotiation and consequently also the textual space occupied by them in the forging of new, post-conflict constitutional orders. It also means looking into the action behind such textual presence, including how collective articulations work in pursuit of representation, and how such representation works as it regards the relationship between "presence" and "ideas".

Faced with these issues, my objective in this section is to establish my theoretical stance, which will echo displacement strategies and agonistic

perspectives from the previous section. I want to do so by adopting a critical view of political representation that is attentive to the critiques above and echoes recent innovations in the literature, in particular the push towards studying representation as a phenomenon that includes but also extrapolates its state and electoral expressions, moving well beyond them. Such discussion will be informed by Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau's work on democracy and discourse theory and guided by Michael Saward's representative claim analytical framework. The theories will come together in my reflection on women's representation in general for now, but also, in section 4.3, on their representation in contexts of peace negotiations.

In order to *displace* the idea of women's *inclusion* in politics, to use two of Squires's archetypes, discourse theory and analysis will cut across my approach of representation. As I pointed out earlier, the argument of thinkers who defend displacement strategies is that mere inclusion to existing political frameworks ignores and accepts their discursive construction; arguments for reversal, in turn, do nothing more than attempt to flip the position occupied by women in existing categories and dichotomies, never questioning such categories and dichotomies themselves. The power to lay out the categories that frame our social and political lives goes unnoticed and unbothered.

Language and discourse are therefore far from dispensable to my discussion, given that what I seek here is precisely to destabilize simplistic interpretations of political inclusion. Instead of remaining within hegemonic political discourses and orders, I want to perforate and question them, treating power as constructive of reality and politics as a dynamic in which everything is constantly open to being done otherwise. I follow Laclau & Mouffe in deeming the social a discursive construction where meaning can never be ultimately fixed; "it is through conventions, negotiations and conflicts in social contexts that structures of meaning are fixed and challenged" (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 25). Contingent political orders, in their view, are partial hegemonic fixations of meaning which rely on the exclusion of other possibilities and are always liable to struggle from contesting discourses.

One of the main starting points for their theory, from their co-authored book *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* forward, is their defense of the openness of the social⁸³. They call for the renunciation of "the conception of 'society' as founding totality of its partial processes", arguing

⁸³ Laclau had already introduced the subject in his article "The Impossibility of Society" (1990 [1983]), but the idea is more deeply developed in the mentioned co-authored book.

that the openness of the social should be faced as a ‘negative essence’ of existing and social orders must at all times be seen as precarious (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 95-6). The lack of social essence translates into multiple possibilities of signification which are always contingent and never reach a totality (Mendonça 2009: 156). At the same time, “[w]hile Discourse Theory declares a finished society axiomatically impossible, it supports and even requires the existence of an incomplete one” (Jacobs 2019: 298). Power, in this context, looks less like something that is exercised over others than getting to produce this incomplete, partial and contingent social (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 37).

Such reading places them among thinkers recognized as post-foundationalist, i.e. they promote “a constant interrogation of metaphysical figures of foundation – such as totality, universality, essence, and ground” (Marchart 2007: 2). As Oliver Marchart underlines, post-foundationalism should not be confused with *anti*-foundationalism – unlike the latter, it does not do away with essence altogether, seeking instead to destabilize totalizing ideas and weaken their ontological status. Therefore, Laclau and Mouffe defend not the inexistence of social foundation, but one that is always incomplete, contingent, precarious and unstable (Marques 2020: 3). Such position is illuminating for last chapter’s account of representation as a foundational element of the state because it allows questioning of the final character of the narrative constructed by Hobbes and later liberal thinkers, as well as its practical influence on reigning political discourses. While Hobbes’s utmost interest with his formulation of representation was to achieve and proclaim political unity and order, placing the concept under post-foundational lenses allows not only to view it as a partial meaning fixation but also to open up space for contesting narratives of representation such as, for example, feminist ones.

Laclau & Mouffe’s denial of a “final” society and fixed identities, and their affirmation of the discursive and open nature of the social, in turn, do not mean that they lose touch with the material. They do deny a distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices, considering that every object is constituted as a discursive object; yet, at the same time, such position should not be read as the denial of the existence of an external world. To use their own example, an earthquake may exist and happen independently of anyone’s will or discourse; how it is specified as an object – a “natural phenomenon” or “the wrath of God”, for instance – depends on the structuration of a discursive field. Thus, despite their elaboration of social life as discursive, they also stress “the material character of every discursive structure” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 108). In other words, our access

to social and physical objects is always mediated by discourse, as are situations of physical conflict. In the authors' perspective, then, both linguistic signs and social action are relationally defined (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 35) and expressed through discursive articulation towards reproducing or changing common ascriptions of meaning (p. 36).

In their work together as well as apart, Laclau and Mouffe seek to outline the universe of concepts that sustain their conception of discourse⁸⁴. While some have been introduced previously, it is worth going back to them once again. Their concept of *articulation* is the starting point for their elaboration of *hegemony* and *antagonism*. They call articulation “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice”, which then gives way to a discourse. *Elements* and what they call *moments* are therefore defined in contrast to each other; the first is “any difference that is not discursively articulated”, while the latter refers to differential positions that are articulated into discourses (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 105). As the authors stress, however, the transition from elements to moments, that is, their articulation to a discursive chain, is never complete. Elements are considered floating signifiers – “the signs that different discourses struggle to invest with meaning in their own particular way” (ibid) –, which makes them polysemic and at all times politically contestable. Articulation, in short, is “the idea that people give meaning to the world around them by combining and connecting certain words, objects, ideas, and concepts in specific ways when they speak or act” (Jacobs 2019: 298).

Nodal points, in this context, are crystallizations of meaning within discourses, “privileged signs around which a discourse is organized” (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 28). The concept, inspired by Lacan's notion of *point de capiton*⁸⁵, serves as a reference-signifier whose meaning emerges from articulatory practice itself, which may shape it to assume diverse positions in relation to its surrounding moments (Marques 2020: 23). Thomas Jacobs illustrates such discursive networks which cluster around nodal points by comparing them with spider webs; peripheral signifiers are connected due to these central signifiers, running to the heart of the network (Jacobs 2019: 303). In political discourses, for example, democracy may be said to constitute a nodal point surrounded by other signifiers such as elections, political representation, participation, equality and the rule of law. In sum,

The practice of articulation, therefore, consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every

⁸⁴ For a comparison between theirs and other authors' approach to discourse, see Laclau 1993.

⁸⁵ Lacan 1993.

discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 113, italics in the original).

Laclau and Mouffe see the production of discourses and identities as inherently political, involving the construction of antagonisms and marked by power. The political primacy of their discourse theory also translates into a reigning discourse's vulnerability to being contested by forces that were excluded from its formation (Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000: 9). Two central concepts elaborated by the authors are important for understanding such political dynamics – antagonism and hegemony. For the authors, antagonism is “the 'experience' of the limit of the social. Strictly speaking, antagonisms are not *internal* but *external* to society; or rather, they constitute the limits of society, the latter's impossibility of fully constituting itself” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 125)⁸⁶. Identities are deemed antagonistic when they are mutually exclusive; the Other hinders me from being myself. Antagonism causes a collision of discourses and dichotomizes the discursive structure, giving rise to opposing camps (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 48, Jacobs 2019: 304).

Their idea of hegemony, in turn, has Gramsci's elaboration as a starting point, but without some of its restrictions, in particular its fixed division of society into classes. Mouffe explains that they “call ‘hegemonic practices’ the practices of articulation through which a given order is created and the meaning of social institutions is fixed” (2013: 158). Such articulation happens when a particular discourse assumes the representation of an incommensurable totality (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: x). In establishing such fixations of meaning that exclude their alternatives, hegemonic articulations are what “neutralize” conflict across antagonistic discourses. With this in mind, it becomes clear that discourse theory's definition of the political extrapolates party politics to try and capture how the constitution of the social is a constant and exclusory process (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 36).

Consolidated hegemonic orders achieve what the authors, borrowing from Husserl, call sedimentation. Sedimented discourses become “objective” in the sense that we go from political struggles to consensus and the feeling of naturalness and objectivity (and then back again) (Marques 2020, Jørgensen & Phillips 2002). Sedimentation conceals original acts of contingent political

⁸⁶ Jacobs (2018) warns that the authors' construction of all structure as antagonistic is no longer accepted in the literature and underlines Laclau's later elaboration of antagonism not as necessary, but as existing alongside heterogeneity (p. 306). In section 4.4.2, I will return to Mouffe's elaboration of antagonism and agonism as well.

institution, which are therefore accepted as self-justifying (Mouffe 2005: 16). In other words:

Just as the objective can become political again, so manifest conflicts can, in the course of time, disappear and give way to objectivity where one perspective is naturalised and consensus prevails. The development from political conflict to objectivity passes through hegemonic interventions whereby alternative understandings of the world are suppressed, leading to the naturalisation of one single perspective (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 36-7)

These concepts from Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory help in framing the representation-as-foundation account from feminist points of view. As previously observed, Hobbesian and later liberal political projects presupposed an idea of social unity and were rooted in the articulation (and sedimentation) of a specific hegemonic discourse. As the discussion on feminisms above shows, disputing discourses to this political order have always existed. What appears as a founding idea of political representation in the original narrative, therefore, is but a particular fixation of meaning that enlists itself as a totality, which relies on political representation as a nodal point of the liberal democracy model. The underlying meaning of representation, in turn, has been repeatedly contested as marginalized groups have sought to unveil its relational nature and their role in it, trying to re-signify the hegemonic narrative in a way that they manage to acquire a voice and political space.

The narrative of the social contract – and the exclusion of women from it – can be understood from the authors' interpretation of hegemonic articulation as the exclusion of alternative political possibilities. The relational character of discourse clarifies how women have been made to be emotional, passionate, motherly and private as a counterpoint to rational, interest-driven, competitive and public men, whose need of such contrast is veiled by the essentializing existence of a "universal subject". As Laclau & Mouffe point out, this "universal subject" that gets to be a contractarian in foundational political narratives blurs the identification of oppressive relations in society, and consequently also their politicization and contestation. As the authors point out, oppression is different from subordination – while the latter entails an agent being subjected to the decisions of another, the first encompasses relations of subordination that were transformed into sites of antagonisms (1985: 153). Thus, "[f]or this [subordinative] relation of power to be seen as a relation of oppression – as unjust and potentially open to change, rather than as natural and timeless – is a political matter" (Zerilli 2016: 635). The politicizing move of fleshing out and displacing antagonisms, therefore, has been the effort of feminist thinkers for centuries now – it was Mary Wollstonescraft's

intention, for example, to displace democratic discourse from “equality between all citizens” to “equality between men and women” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 154).

The feminist displacement of discourses on democracy and representation by women necessarily goes through some of the main discussions initiated above, in section 4.1.2 – especially the notion of social groups, the relationship between difference and equality, and the one between representation and participation. Mouffe and Laclau’s idea of individual and collective identity is critical of social group formulations such as Young’s. Because they postulate the discursive character of social action, they reject having individual subjects as the starting point of social relations, “as all ‘experience’ depends on precise discursive conditions of possibility” (p. 115). In their view, “individual and collective identity are both organised according to the same principles in the same discursive processes” (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 40).

They approach the individual through the notion of *subject positions*, which are discursively constructed and unfinished; subjects are fragmented, do not respond to objective determining conditions and can be associated with several, and at times conflicting, subject positions. Hence, the political subject in this interpretation is neither taken to pre-exist the structure nor simply believed to constitute it; “[r]ather, the political subject is forced to take decisions – or identify with certain political projects and the discourses they articulate – when social identities are in crisis and structures need to be recreated” (Howard & Stavrakakis 2000: 14).

As a consequence, there is not much difference between the way that the categories of ‘woman’ and ‘women’ are constructed – they are both permeated and fissured by plural subjectivities (p. 43), arising through discourses that delimit equivalences and differences between subject positions⁸⁷. In the articulation of identities, “...equivalence creates a second meaning which, though parasitic on the first, subverts it: the differences cancel one other out insofar as they are used to express something identical underlying them all” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 127). Moreover, some possibilities of identification must be found more relevant than others in this process, which makes group formation inherently political (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 44).

For there to be equivalence, on the other hand, there must also be difference – otherwise, we would be simply presented with identity. By neutralizing

⁸⁷ The discussion on the gender consequences of this formulation are indelibly attached to Judith Butler’s work and gender theory discussions in general, but it is beyond the scope of this research, which departs from the discursive articulation of who “women” are as political subjects to look into issues of political inclusion and representation.

differences between a certain collective of people through the establishment of a chain of equivalence, negative relationships of identity arise – “A” can only be “A” because it is not “B” (p. 128). As Anna Marie Smith stresses, logics of equivalence and difference are in constant tension, but such tension does not necessarily harm political discourse, which often makes use of equivalence and difference articulations that seem to clash against each other (1998: 175).

The conception of political representation that unfolds from the theoretical framework described above is necessarily one connected to discursive identity formations – the constitution of the agents involved in representation is indissociable from the emergence of social groups through discourse. Groups are not formed and later represented; they emerge *through* political representation. “It is not until someone speaks of, or to, or on behalf of, a group that it is constituted as a group (Laclau 1993b: 289ff)” (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 45). As any discursive articulation, then, political representation is also drawn by including some and delimiting who they are by excluding all others. This reading of representation offers a deeper understanding not only of group representation but also of descriptive representation, as discussed in the previous section – as opposed to seeing representation as just describing a reality that is given, the framework I adopt here sees such descriptive attachments as politically constitutive moves.

Apart from providing a more critical outtake on political representation, the theoretical framework above is also compatible with theories of representation that move it beyond its original electoral arenas. Michael Saward (2006; 2010) has produced one of the most currently referenced theories when it comes to expanding the reach of the concept of political representation beyond the state. He tried to overcome the limited explanatory capacity of traditional theories of representation when faced with contemporary political challenges, proposing instead what he called a *representative claim framework*. Such framework began from the idea that political representation is not a static fact grounded on presence, but a dynamic event made possible by representative claims, a conception he considers more capable of “[opening] up further ways for us to think about political inclusion” (2010: 3).

According to Saward, a representative claim is “a claim to represent or to know what represents the interests of someone or something. It is a *claim*; it may or may not be a well-founded claim” (p. 38). In this view, representative relationships are established when a claim-*maker* successfully alleges that a *subject* stands for an *object* before a particular *audience*. The maker and the

subject may be the same person, if someone claims s/he her/himself is the one standing for those represented. The object constitutes the idea or portrayal of the represented collectivity as defined by the claim-maker, based on the fleeting “real-life” *referent* of such collectivity. Finally, the audience is the group *to* which a claim-maker speaks, while the constituency is the group of people the claimant wants to speak *for*. The two are closely related and may overlap, contain one another or even be the exact same thing.

Both subject and object of representation are constructed portrayals, not an exact invocation of preexisting individuals and social groups. Potential representatives act a certain way, trying to define themselves around a specific profile that has to do not only with sociopolitical agendas but also with cultural and aesthetic choices. Much like they attempt to construct an identity for themselves, claimants also try to portray their intended constituencies in a certain way that is compatible and supposedly well represented by their persona. The intended audience, in turn, may endorse and accept or choose to contest claimants’ portrayals and their claims to represent it. In other words, “[c]onstituencies and audiences, intended or otherwise, may accept or resist particular claims, not least by accepting or resisting depictions of constituents in the object constructed by the claim-maker” (2010: 53).

This two-way street between prospective representatives and represented in both performing who they are and establishing a relationship of representation may offer more politicized accounts of struggles for political inclusion. It also calls attention to the way power dynamics play out and the fact representation is at all times an unfinished, partial product of political relations. In this sense, representative claims cannot be seen as inherently good or bad, as they may have silencing effects for the very constituency a claim-maker is trying to represent. On the other hand, claims “can activate and empower recipients or observers, even if that is not the intention of the makers. Recipients are ‘on the map’ by being invoked in representative claims, even if an initial effect of a claim is a silencing one” (2010: 55). Even claims aimed to silence and appropriate are thus potential sources of empowerment for social groups to “read back” their portrayals and enter a dialogue with those claiming to represent them.

Constitutive interpretations of representation and the representative claims framework have been mobilized and employed by feminist authors to criticize traditional takes on women’s representation, which usually rely on Pitkin’s formulations of substantive and descriptive representation and limit themselves to thinking of the concept as a state political mechanism. Squires (2008), for instance,

stresses the need to “highlight the extent to which, when claiming to speak for women, representatives are actively engaged in making claims about women, participating in the construction of feminine subject-positions” (p. 192). Through what she labels constitutive representation of gender (CRG), the author explores the possibility of analyzing constitutive representation in extra-parliamentary practices and the activities of players such as women’s policy agencies and women’s movements.

The constitutive approach to representation allows for more critical purviews of the political inclusion of women than elaborations that essentialize who they are or should be, because these deny the exclusions that remain in between the lines when one has as a starting point a fixed idea of a group. Discursive theory and the representative claims framework, in contrast, acknowledge such exclusions and propose to conduct analyses that keep them in mind at all times. Thus, Squires makes a crucial point when she ponders that

[t]he selection of future mechanisms of representation entails not only the pursuit of a pure expression of authentic selves, but also the modification of the art of government in which subjects are shaped. Rethinking the boundaries of political representation might well allow for a more inclusive politics, but it will also generate a new set of criteria as to what is to be deemed politically pertinent, which identities and interests perceived as authentic. We would do well to reflect on this and consider which exclusions are implicit in the new forms of inclusiveness proposed (Squires 2000: 4466).

One critique that constructivist approaches receive is that, since they presume no constituency preexists representation, they end up inverting principal-agent relationships, leaving all agency to the latter and stripping from the represented the ability to exert influence over the process. The contrast usually made in this argument is against Pitkin’s notion of responsiveness, which asserts representatives need to be responsive to their constituencies, also assuming these exist and have preferences that are independent of representation and the representative (Pitkin 1967; Severs 2010). There is, therefore, a fear that constructivist theories will “[legitimize] as instances of representation cases that do not involve representation at all but, rather, amount to the undemocratic exercise of power” (Disch 2015: 491). In this sense, one cannot forget that representative claims are not equal amongst each other; on the contrary, they are part of the constitution, transformation and contestation of power relations (Dutoya & Hayat 2016: 16).

As a final caveat regarding the critical discursive framework herein adopted, authors have also pointed out that inflexible rejection of universalizations is paralyzing for political action, which is why it is necessary to recognize that *some*

essentialization is always at the table – the actual issue should be how we choose to treat them. Spivak’ notion of strategic essentialism (McRobbie 1994), which is often brought up concerning this debate, is precisely about this. The silencing of the subaltern is not a call for inaction; quite the contrary, “Spivak contends instead that we should engage in the impossible and yet tactically crucial attempt to master universalizing rhetoric where it may serve our purposes and remain all the while vigilant about its totalizing effects” (Smith 1998: 161).

4.3

Unveiling inclusion in peace negotiations through political representation

Having approached political representation through its conceptual history and its feminist critiques, problematizing its relationship with the idea of inclusion and clarifying what my adopted perspective of the concept is, I now turn the discussion back to the scenario of peace negotiations. Informed by the arguments and literatures studied so far, the following section will (i) provide an overview and problematize the specific issue of the inclusion of women in peace negotiations, and (ii) move on to propose an analytical framework that looks at the topic through the concept of political representation.

4.3.1

The inclusion of women in peace processes

The problems faced by women in peacebuilding have gained increasing attention, with an emphasis on “their limited involvement in the international institutional design of peacebuilding strategies and the possibility that peacebuilding may actually reduce local women’s agency in society” (Chinkin and Charlesworth 2006: 938). The inclusion of women is probably one of the most (if not *the* most) studied and talked about topics both in theory and practice, but it is also one of the most complex ways of approaching inclusion. The main concern of this section is thus to locate the debate on the inclusion of women in peace negotiations so that later I shall return to this topic in light of the theoretical framework introduced in the previous section. To do this, I will provide a brief literature review of those (mostly women) authors researching this issue, listening to what they have been saying and their main criticisms to the unfolding of this

agenda over the last few decades. This will include a contextual introduction of the topic, a review of its recent normatization in the WPS Agenda, and finally a word on the main impacts and criticisms concerning the advances and persistent exclusions perceived by the discipline's gender specialists.

Several authors highlight women are affected in manifold ways by violence before, during and after armed conflicts are officially deemed to exist (see for example Bell 2013: 2, Chinkin and Charlesworth 2006: 941, Aroussi 2015: 14). In a way, this renders neat peace process stages meaningless from the standpoint of excluded women, for whose lives a peace agreement offers no improvements. On the other hand, oftentimes the (re)foundational narrative of peace processes, as a sort of temporal rupture or reset behind this experience of fundamental political changes, is seen as a “window of opportunity” for women to be included in politics not only during peacebuilding but also afterwards, once the structures of institutional politics are reinvented. Thus, as Kara Ellerby (2016) points out, “peace and post-conflict opportunities for women are not about a return to the status quo, but also a potential moment to disrupt gendered violence and exclusion moving forward” (p. 3).

Sahla Aroussi points out that armed conflicts have both negative and positive effects over women⁸⁸, and one of the potential positive changes made possible by a conflict is that it allows or even forces women into occupying positions they were previously absent from – they may for instance work jobs they did not get before, be it related to military matters or not; they may gain increased autonomy in the household; they may gravitate towards political positions to get justice for the harm imposed upon themselves and their loved ones (Aroussi 2015: 12-13). The place of women in times of war, peace processes and post-conflict stages is one of naturalized asymmetry. Perhaps there is no better example of this than the reduction of women to the place of victims and the consequences it brings. In Aroussi's words, “...women's experience of conflicts is not only that of victimhood. The victimization of women in wartimes should not overshadow their agency both in waging war and in building peace” (2015: 12). The consolidation of women as passive victims of conflict has a detrimental effect on their ability to access decision-making instances and exert agency over political provisions that will directly affect their lives. Ellerby clarifies that this narrative becomes an excuse for exclusion: “women are not considered primary stakeholders in peace processes because gendered belief systems promote the idea only those deemed to have

⁸⁸ See also UN 2017: 7-8.

participated in active conflict (men) are equipped to actually create peace” (2016: 5).

It is ironic to say the least; on the one hand, addressing sexual violence as a weapon of war has been one of women's groups main agendas, specifically their effort for it to be considered a ceasefire violation and a crime against humanity not eligible for amnesty. On the other, their reduction to the status of victims becomes a perfect cop-out from dealing with their actual multifaceted and central role to the waging and closure of war. Above all, the reduction of women to the place of victims is simply not true – even for those who were indeed victimized by conflict. In truth, a woman may be both a victim and an agent; she can integrate rebel forces, be a military officer, a governmental employee, she may be a civil society representative who acts in local, national or international realms.

The flattening of women's experiences and roles goes on in the context of the peace process as well. Due to essentializing portrayals of women as peace-loving caretakers and mothers, they tend to be regarded as naturals for communitarian reconciliation at the local level, but never as inherent mediators or negotiators, seeing that the peace table, in this view, is of course a place for high-level power politics and male-dominated military affairs. For Anderlini, such portrayal “is rarely translated into an acknowledgment of how women can be effective in promoting peace. On the contrary, a common reason given for the exclusion of women from peace talks is that they were not ‘waging the war’” (2007: 5). This creates a hierarchy that keeps women physically out not only of negotiation tables and “backroom conversations”, but also of the letter of agreements. When policy directed at women's issues is not dismissed as particularistic or more suitable for discussion at later stages of peacebuilding, it is tackled as unnecessary and substitutable for gender-neutral human rights provisions that are supposed to protect all social groups equally (see for example Ellerby 2016: 3, Anderlini 2007: 62). This is consonant with universalizing narratives of the liberal individual subject, as previously discussed.

In large measure, the debate on the inclusion of women in the literature has gone through the same transition underlined in Chapter 2 – it went from being perceived by most as an unnecessary disturbance to a necessary one in the last two decades. The main watershed in this, I believe most authors would agree, is the approval of Resolution 1325 by the UN Security Council and the subsequent

approval of additional SC Resolutions⁸⁹ making up the WPS Agenda. Chang et al (2015) argue there are two waves in the literature, separated precisely by Resolution 1325. The first, produced in the 1990s, focused on the implications of conflict for women and describing their informal roles (i.e. in local instances, away from decision making tables) in peacemaking (p. 17). The second wave, in turn, maintains these themes and adds explorations such as the effects of women's participation in both formal and informal venues, hence going beyond mere description to try and demonstrate how women expand agendas, producing better peace agreements, and help inject quality and durability into peace (idem). In this sense, Anderlini considers women's peace activism's ubiquitous presence "a new phenomenon", one with close ties to the new dynamics of the 1990s and "the changing nature of warfare, the blurring of lines between battlefield and community, victim and perpetrator, enemy and neighbor. It is both highly localized in nature and increasingly a global movement with its own characteristics" (2007: 5).

Early normatizing examples of women's rights in the international arena include clauses of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the creation of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) within the UN in 1946. In 1979, there was the approval of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which has more specific measures regarding women's rights guarantees⁹⁰, and, between 1975 and 1995, the promotion of four global conferences on the subject in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing (Aroussi 2015: 16-20). Documents and institutional routines resulting from these conferences, especially the Beijing Platform for Action⁹¹, made up the normative background for what Chang et al are calling the "first wave" in this literature.

Despite all the previous work and advocacy around the subject, the watershed-status carried by Resolution 1325 (2000) may be found in two main

⁸⁹ As of September, 2019, the agenda was made up by a total of nine SC resolutions: 1325 (2000); 1820 (2009); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2010); 1960 (2011); 2106 (2013); 2122 (2013); 2242 (2015), and 2467 (2019).

⁹⁰ Bell sees particular relevance in "Articles 2 and 6 (equality for women in political and legal institutions), 4 (temporary special measures to ensure women's participation), 5 (to ensure the modification of customary and cultural practices that impact negatively on women), 6 (the suppression of sexual trafficking and the exploitation of women), 8 (to support women to represent governments), 9 (women and citizenship), 12 (women and health equality), and 15 (equality before the law)" (2013: 3). Anderlini argues CEDAW "is seen as the international bill of rights for women" (2007: 14).

⁹¹ Strategic Objective E calls upon member states to "increase the participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-making levels and protect women living in situations of armed and other conflicts or under foreign occupation". See <https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/armed.htm>

points. The first one is the weight of having the Security Council approve a legally binding document⁹² fully dedicated to the issue of women, peace and security – up to that point, most UN efforts on women’s rights fell into the scope of social and developmental departments, but never those dealing with armed conflict (Aroussi 2015: 20). For Bell & O’Rourke (2010), “[s]ymbolically, the resolution marked the impact of war on women and provided formal high-level acknowledgement that the exclusion of women from conflict resolution is a threat to peace” (p. 943).

The second point is the level of effort and coordination it took from a number of international women’s NGOs⁹³, which came together, working alongside a few governments and UN organs in order to push for approval. According to Aroussi, “...the role played by international NGOs was instrumental. In fact, the idea of a Security Council resolution on women in armed conflict was an initiative of international NGOs” (p. 22). Not only does Resolution 1325 provide a legal framework for women to work with but it also promotes a “snowball effect” of norm diffusion within the UN and becomes an instrument for civil society organizations outside the UN to lobby for change (p. 27-29).

In a somewhat simplified manner, the WPS Agenda addresses women’s issues in armed conflict through two main thematic pillars: first, one that focuses on the protection of women from sexual violence and structural socioeconomic inequalities; and, second and most important for this chapter’s discussion, another that calls attention to the issue of women’s inclusion and participation in both peacebuilding and institutional politics, be it in the local sphere or high-level formal instances. The participation pillar, in turn, may be approached in two different ways: from a “gender balance” or a “gender mainstreaming” perspective (Chinkin and Charlesworth 2006: 939). The first refers to the balanced participation of *people* – men and women –, encouraging women to access spaces in which their presence had been previously denied; and the second concerns the mainstreaming of gender into actual agreement *texts*, as a lens from which women’s issues and rights may come across not only in terms of physical presence throughout processes but also become reflected in resulting documents, political agendas and adopted policy. It is more than just including women-specific clauses in agreements; instead, it is about having a gender-sensitive approach that cuts across the very production of political documents. Going back to von Burg’s point on different ways of seeing the inclusivity norm, one might say that, while gender

⁹² For a discussion on the legal nature of Resolution 1325 and the subsequent Resolutions that make up the WPS Agenda, see Aroussi 2015: 30-34.

⁹³ These include Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), International Alert, and Women Waging Peace (Aroussi 2015: 22).

balance is a process-related norm, gender mainstreaming is focused on content. Or, to use Phillips's concepts, we can say the first worries about presence while the second focuses on ideas. Both process and content facets of women's participation are treated as central by the WPS Agenda.

Resolution 1325 calls for the adoption of a "gender perspective" in peace processes (see Article 8) and stresses "the importance of [women's] equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution" (UN Security Council 2000: 1). The issue is further developed in a few of the subsequent resolutions approved by the SC, especially 1889 (2009), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015) and 2467 (2019). Recently, the UN also launched a Guidance on Gender and Inclusive Mediation Strategies (2017), a sort of more specified complement to the Guidance for Effective Mediation (2012) mentioned in Chapter 2.

The concept of gender mainstreaming and calls for a gender perspective in policymaking have their roots in feminist work on development from the 1970s and were launched and adopted in the 1995 conference on women in Beijing. Authors differ as to the emergence of mainstreaming – some point to European Commission actors, others to the mobilization of social movements and others still call attention to the role of transnational networks (Squires 2005: 370-71). Whichever way, it is an international phenomenon that raises reflections on the relationship between global, transnational and national policymaking. It is both a theoretical *concept* and a *practice* that seeks "the re-invention, restructuring, and re-branding of a key part of feminism in the contemporary era" (Walby 2003: 2). As a theory, it aims to "review the key concepts that enable a more adequate understanding of the world as a gender-structured element, rather than proposing a separate gender theory"; as a practice, it elaborates policy strategies that are structured around gender (Labrecque 2010: 901).

Two definitions of gender mainstreaming show up often in the literature. The first is by the ECOSOC (1997):

[t]he process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetrated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality (UN Women 2014: 7).

Another one, by the Council of Europe, calls it "[t]he (re)organisation, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality

perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making” (Council of Europe 1998).

The translation of gender mainstreaming into a tool of peacemaking comes, as mentioned, through Resolution 1325 and the WPS Agenda. From its initial development setting, it goes on to become a pillar of gender inclusivity measures in other contexts, such as that of peace processes. Anderlini stresses that gender mainstreaming in the drafting of peace agreements should make sure that they will not inadvertently harm – or perpetuate harm – against either men or women, protecting basic human rights and promoting equality. She sees it as “good programming” in the sense that it identifies benefits and constraints in the elaboration of policy, which includes for instance “planning and implementation of elections, the provision of supplies for camps, distribution of food, or investigation of war crimes” (2007: 202).

Although it stemmed from transnational dynamics, the use of gender mainstreaming is unevenly developed around the world, with European actors⁹⁴ and the UN being the main ones engaging with gender mainstreaming since its emergence (p. 2, 19). As pointed out by Marie France Labrecque, its origins in the field of development also inevitably made it a piece of the Washington Consensus; for the author, the treatment of gender policy as a way of tapping into the unrealized economic potential of women leads to its instrumentalization especially from 2001 forward, when the World Bank started correlating poverty and gender inequality in its work⁹⁵. In a related argument, Mieke Verloo points out that gender equality is usually framed alongside other goals (e.g. excellence in science) for gender mainstreaming to be sold as a “win-win situation” – which, in turn, stretches the concept and dilutes its political potential (2005: 16). In view of this, Labrecque sees gender mainstreaming as “a 'regulatory practice' of international governance stemming from the United Nations system” (2010: 911).

Because it is built from an overlap – and search of common ground – between specific (multiple) conceptions of gender equality and “the mainstream”, gender mainstreaming is at heart an essentially contested process. It entails combining the promotion of gender justice and policy effectiveness, which means a negotiated process that recognizes differences but above all looks for commonalities (Walby 2003: 3). Oftentimes, the compromises gender equality principles are driven to make at the negotiation table, as well as their confinement

⁹⁴ The engagement of the European Union and other European actors with gender mainstreaming is well documented by feminist literature. See for example Pollack & Hafner-Burton 2000, Beveridge et al 2000, Rai 2003, Shaw 2002, Stratigaki 2004, Verloo 2005.

⁹⁵ On this topic, see also Bergeron 2003.

within a “technocratic” box, have a depoliticizing effect over gender mainstreaming as an intended tool of empowerment. Verloo sees an effort to make it “less threatening” in order to avoid struggle, and the consequence of this is the exclusion of opposing voices. As she aptly observes, however, “change processes and hence gender mainstreaming processes and activities should be conceptualized as necessarily riddled with power, subject to mechanisms of power, and best understood in terms of power” (2005: 360).

Two decades past the approval of 1325, one can see an effort in the literature to understand what the practical results of the WPS Agenda were so far. There is concern among authors not only to assess whether the inclusion of women has risen both in content and process, but also to try and understand if the inclusion of women has a positive impact in peace quality and durability. Overall, research shows a disappointing scenario – women are still far from receiving their reclaimed physical and textual space in peace processes, despite such studies’ detection of their positive impact on peacebuilding. A UN Report released in 2012 showed women were only 9% of negotiating delegates, 4% of signatories and, up to that point, completely absent from the role of chief mediator⁹⁶ (p. 1-2).

Aiming to grasp the impact of the agenda on the drafting of agreements, Bell & O’Rourke⁹⁷ found that references to women have risen since 2000, going from 11 to 27%. They see this as a “modest impact”, especially considering these include cases in which there was only one generic reference to women or even those in which references limited instead of favoring gender equality (2010: 954-55). Ellerby (2016) found 65% of her sampled agreements⁹⁸ to include references to women and/or gender, but only 11,1% (6 out of 54) did it in what she deemed a substantial way. Aroussi evaluated 112 peace agreements⁹⁹ and found that 49 included references to women – 23 of which had only one (p. 115-118). Although these studies reveal a limited impact – which leads some to believe the agenda “[has] been more effective as a focus of mobilization for women outside of peace processes than in securing women’s participation within formal peace processes” (Bell & O’Rourke 2010: 969) –, it is also important to highlight there is a “steady progression” in the number of agreements referencing women (Aroussi 2015: 119), which may in turn signal in the direction of a slow but existent change.

⁹⁶ The study considered 31 major peace processes between 1992 and 2011.

⁹⁷ They evaluated a database that included 585 peace agreements in 102 peace processes between January 1990 and January 2010.

⁹⁸ She considered 54 negotiated peace processes between 1991 and 2014.

⁹⁹ Her sample included agreements signed between the adoption of Resolution 1325 (31 October 2000) and December 2008.

Having said that, when women did manage to make their way into peace processes, they had a positive impact as to reaching more gender-sensitive agreements and improving overall quality and durability of peace. For instance, Krause et al (2018) found a robust relationship between women signatories and the durability of peace, also discovering agreements signed by women “include a higher number of agreement provisions and a higher rate of provision implementation 10 years after the agreement compared to those not signed by women” (p. 3). In a wider conclusion, Paffenholz et al argued “the strength of women’s influence is positively correlated with agreements being reached and implemented” (2016: 6) – which not only endorses general assertions that the inclusion of women leads to durability and provides legitimacy but also challenges the widely accepted idea that inclusion will always be a disturbance to peace negotiations, independently of their utility or even necessity. The “potential utility” of the inclusion of women, in turn, is directly related to views of politics as a means towards ends, which instrumentalizes their place in politics. As Zerilli ponders, “[t]he powerful hold of this instrumentalist conception of politics on the thinking of many feminists is not unique to feminism but expresses the dominant modern view of democratic politics as primarily a means to pursue individual and group interests” (2016: 643).

The relation between direct and indirect channels of inclusion is also an issue of debate in the literature on the inclusion of women. Authors tend to stress no mode of inclusion alone is enough to remedy the exclusion previously experienced by women – on the one hand, women may be invited to the table only to be sidelined in negotiations, in what Young has called “internal exclusion”; on the other, advocacy networks may work tirelessly only to find no echo at the table due to a lack of allies in high-level instances. Authors indeed have been contending mixed strategies, such as having women negotiators act as brokers for women’s civil society groups (Krause et al 2018: 6-7), are the ones that work best and garner the most influence for women. Among Paffenholz’s modalities of inclusion, the ones most frequently used by women are consultations and mass action, while others, such as observer status and high-level problem-solving workshops, remain largely out of reach for them. Direct representation at the table, according to the author, receives excessive attention and works best in specific setups such as women-only delegations (2018: 177).

Beyond the limited progress made towards the WPS agenda’s concretization, a series of criticisms can be made about the agenda itself. The most obvious one concerns the fact women are not a homogeneous group and should

not be treated as such. This means the agenda cannot claim to contemplate *all* women involved in or harmed by conflict unless it self-consciously admits women are diverse and subject to intra and intergroup power politics – which also means that what inclusion entails for them will always be contested and connected not only to gender but also socioeconomic class, culture, race and ethnicity. While this may sound self-evident, it seems fitting to point out the agenda tends to focus on points of affinity for all women, but, at the same time, it is necessary to admit persisting or new exclusions will often stem from omissions in the face of issues deemed “too particular to be addressed”.

One could also argue the agenda sets the bar too low on gender issues. For once, a few authors question why structuring the agenda around “women”, not “gender”, which lets the whole discussion on masculinities off the hook and excludes LGBTI agendas. It contributes towards making issues of exclusion and violence against women solely about women, *handled by women* – as if men had nothing to do with it and nothing to change to truly avoid repetition of past/present patterns. A similar argument could be made towards having participation, not equality, as a pillar of the agenda. Participation is a rather loose term and therefore can be taken to mean a handful of things. One problem brought up by a few authors, for instance, is how the establishment of not-so-ambitious gender quotas to assure minimum participation may in practice stall women in a place of virtual exclusion while still “awarding” them a formal stamp of inclusion.

Another very problematic issue is the romanticizing of women’s abilities to overcome oppressions and violence in order to take advantage of small openings and occupy spaces of decision making. So, the story goes: although denied space, women demonstrate strength and articulation and, working much harder than any man would, finally reach their rightful place in peace processes. On top of everything else, women have been carrying a very much naturalized burden of creativity – not only do they have to stand against usual exclusory procedures but they must also work harder and “prove their worth”. Gender mainstreaming thus “has a tendency to become an additional task bestowed upon, or assumed by, an already overburdened person – frequently a woman – who ‘shows an interest in gender’” (Chinkin and Charlesworth 2006: 940). In the next section, my discussions on the inclusion and political representation of women so far come together to provide me with an analytical framework for the next chapters, which will look into all the main issues in this debate in the case of Colombia’s Havana Dialogues (2012-2016).

4.3.2

A proposed framework of analysis

The encounter of and intersections among literatures on peace negotiations, political inclusion and representation, and feminist critiques of politics and democracy surveyed so far allow me to propose an analytical framework that looks at peacemaking in practice. With the issues specifically related to the role of women in peace negotiations in mind, I will take my adopted view of political representation from section 4.2 and transport it to the peace process scenario. Given the limited critical scope of the inclusion vocabulary, as highlighted above, I aim to reread the literature on the topic through my discussion on political representation. I will start by assessing how the concept of political representation is currently employed in the PCS literature, when it does show up. Then I will go over some of the main problems with how the concept is utilized and propose another way of doing so through two main building blocks: the first concerns recent theorizations of representation beyond the state, in particular the representative claim framework, and the second has to do with my discussion of representation as foundation.

Both will be informed by a discourse analysis methodology and aim to establish a dialogue with agonistic peace approaches. Thus, I want to look at representation both as *discourse* and as an *analytical lens*. I will apprehend (and, as far as possible separate) (i) political representation as it appears in the PCS literature's discourse on inclusion – i.e., when the language shows up, what does it refer to and with what meaning?; and (ii) the added value of having contemporary debates on political representation as an analytical category. In practice, as we shall see, there may be contradictions between the two. In other words, I want to mobilize representation in two different ways – first, I want to look at the literature on inclusion in peace negotiations to understand how the lexicon of political representation shows up; and next, I want to analyze the discourse in light of theories that attach representation not to an electoral format but to founding political discourses and claim-making. As a theoretical lens and a discourse – not a practical verification per se – representation is different from “inclusion” or “participation”, and more importantly, perhaps allows one to ask new questions concerning the issue of inclusion.

One of the critiques received by Laclau & Mouffe's discourse theory framework concerns its alleged overestimation of the role of change in societies. This point is elaborated by the authors themselves and other students of discourse

who followed them, which help in further understanding how is it that, despite the central role of articulation in politics, continuity and stability are possible and observable all around us. However, in looking at the specific context of the peace process, it is precisely with change that we are dealing. The peace process therefore may be understood as an occasion in which political discourses are being rearticulated and disputed in order for antagonistic relations that have indeed gone the full way of violence to become agonistic, democratic ones. In this sense, having discourse theory as a methodological ground helps in destabilizing neat temporal stages and pyramidal levels of political engagement, as elaborated by scholarship and echoed in practice. Seeing peace processes through the lens of discourse theory and political articulation helps in reflecting about continuation and change across societies in the context of peace processes, indeed positing the transition from armed conflict to peace as a “formalized political unsettlement”, as Bell & Pospisil suggest.

Sara Hellmüller ponders that inclusion has become a *buzzword* in the peacebuilding field – while often repeated and ever-present these days, the term seems emptied out of meaning and impact. Thus, according to the author “calls for inclusivity have often become prescriptive, with the term becoming a buzzword often lacking a substantive analysis of the context” (Hellmüller 2019: 48). To use some of the discourse theory concepts outlined above, it may be said that inclusion has turned into a nodal point in discourses of peace negotiations. As the center of a peace discursive web, it has articulated around itself moments such as legitimacy, sustainability and ownership. Attempts to incorporate inclusion into hegemonic discourses of peace utilize equivalence moves and erase some fundamental differences while bringing out specific features and interpretations of what “good inclusion” means in peace process scenarios – i.e. an inclusion that is seen as harmless and non-disturbing. At the same time, the inclusion nodal point can also be said to be a floating signifier; as Jørgensen & Phillips explain, “[n]odal points are floating signifiers, but whereas the term ‘nodal point’ refers to a point of crystallisation within a specific discourse, the term ‘floating signifier’ belongs to the ongoing struggle between different discourses to fix the meaning of important signs” (Jørgensen e Phillips 2002: 28). In other words, while inclusion is increasingly being reclaimed by mainstream discourses that highlight some equivalences and conceal differences, it remains up for grabs in its inherent emptiness and critical voices also try to articulate it in their own way.

In general, the literature on inclusion tends to alternate between languages of participation and representation with little disambiguation. As the overview of the

concept of political representation showed, representation and participation went from being considered self-exclusory opposites to potential (or desirable) complements and, more recently, increasingly intermingled in light of new conceptual formulations and a sense of crisis in formal channels of representative democracy. Such interweaving between participation and representation, which complicates the separation between one and the other when it comes to the role of society in politics, makes it all the more important that the two are well defined in the context of peace processes. This is true not only in grasping the representative role of civil society actors and social movements, but also in making sense of representation not as referring to fixed actors and social groups, but as *constitutive* of representatives and represented themselves.

In their use of political representation, oftentimes PCS authors attribute a representative role to civil society actors; the use of the expression “civil society representatives” and similar variants show up a lot. Franzisca Zanker for example argues that “[s]ince the entire population cannot attend peace negotiations, *civil society groups become representatives for the population*. Through their involvement, prospects of ownership of both the negotiations and the outcome are increased” (2014: 65 – my emphasis). Bertram Spector underlines “[c]itizens and [civil society organizations] are motivated to engage in negotiation when they feel their interests will be impacted but the state will not clearly represent their concerns” (2015: 105). Anthony Wanis-St. John and Darren Kew observe “Track I negotiating teams occasionally include civil society representatives picked by the government or faction in question, such as trade union or religious leaders, NGO activists, academics, and so on” (2008: 19). Political representation is thus seen as a tool for expanding the range of people that feel contemplated by peace negotiations and, as a result, also the portion of society that will support the implementation once an agreement is reached. This is also associated with the creation of a general feeling of ownership of the process and the legitimization of new, post-conflict political institutions, as discussed earlier in Chapter 2.

I want to call attention to a few different meanings attached to representation by such studies, which coincide with Pitkin’s formalistic and descriptive aspects of representation. First, while the inclusion of society in peace processes usually lacks formal authorization in the electoral and institutional sense of the word, authors point out that *some* method of selection needs to exist for different social groups to access peace negotiations, be it directly or not. As a contested concept, the notion of civil society itself constitutes a challenge for this aspect of representation – as a sort of microcosm of any society’s internal dynamics, within

it lie fundamental differences and disagreements that are anything but trivial when it comes to who gets to take part in peace negotiations¹⁰⁰. The difficulty involved in this choice, a highly politicized one, is therefore recognized as a major challenge for inclusion in peace processes – which gets “particularly acute when civil society organizations reject fundamental principles on which the state is organized” (Bell & O’Rourke 2007: 294). Thania Paffenholz underlines that “even when mediators believe that civil society inclusion is a valid option and convince conflict parties to enlarge participation, identifying the appropriate groups can present a problem” (2014: 73). Not only will there never be enough space for all those who wish to exert influence over negotiations; civil society organizations may fundamentally disagree with the terms of negotiation and be deemed “uncivil” in their defense of alternative agendas.

The difficulty in dealing with this challenge has an impact on the selection methods for the inclusion of societal voices in the negotiation table. Since civil society may be divided along the lines of the conflict itself (Bell & O’Rourke 2007, Nilsson 2012, Belloni 2008), the negotiating parties may attempt to bring in groups that will help strengthen their positions. On the other hand, the lack of clarity regarding what in fact is this civil society set to represent the population also leads to self-selection by certain groups. Christine Bell & Katherine O’Rourke warn that, since peace agreements do not usually deal with defining what civil society *is*, this matter “is implicitly left to self-selection by groups in putting themselves forward to provide humanitarian relief, coupled with the selection power of international organizations and donors in choosing to work with and fund them, or not” (p. 299).

Putting a finger on what “authorizes” a specific person or group to become a representative of the population is therefore a complex matter, affected not only by the priorities of the conflict parties and the dynamics between them, but also the influence and funding of mediators, international sponsors and organizations, and the effort of self-selection and internal disputes of civil society actors. It is a political negotiation in its own right. The ad hoc selecting solutions found in this conformation of forces leads in turn to some other challenges, in particular those related to the legitimacy and accountability of such representatives. The absence of an uncontested procedure granting automatic legitimacy to this choice makes it difficult for it to achieve wide acceptance¹⁰¹. On the other hand, the issue of post-

¹⁰⁰ For a discussion on the concept and its consequences for inclusion in peace processes, please see Spurk 2010 and Belloni 2008.

¹⁰¹ It is worth noting that the word “legitimacy” acquires distinct meanings in this discussion. It is sometimes used to argue for the inclusion of civil society representatives, which are said to help consolidate the legitimacy of a peace process and the new political institutions it creates. Zanker

representation accountability – which Pitkin considers secondary in her work –, acquires a lot more relevance when considering a representative relation forged in the absence of formal authorization. In this specific context, one should think about accountability not only regarding the portions of society that correspond to a given representative's constituency, but also often those international and national donors/funders enabling their activities. If indeed there is accountability from civil society representatives, one should definitely ask to whom they are accountable. For Spector,

[civil society organizations] – whether at the international or national levels – can be seen as legitimate based on their longevity, their reliable and consistent positions on issues of concern to them, as well as their expertise and professionalism. Alternatively, CSOs can be viewed as accountable based on acceptance by their self-selected constituents and their responsible actions in support of their followers (2015: 102-103).

Another meaning of representation found in the literature comes from a descriptive key, in which the representation lexicon is mobilized as an adjective, i.e. regarding quality of representation, in particular the issue of *representativeness*. Paffenholz considers the choice of whom to include especially hard “when there are no strong, *representative civil society groups* available. In these situations, mediators run the risk of including only groups that echo the positions of the conflict parties or are the loudest in voicing their demands” (2014: 73 – my emphasis). Desirée Nilsson voices a similar concern, saying “civil society in some cases may be divided or may pursue interests of only a few individuals and hence *not necessarily [be] representative of broader segments of society*” (2012: 246 – my emphasis). In general, the term representativeness is taken as a purely statistical or mathematical matter, to indicate how well those chosen to be included (a certain “sample”) reflect the wider population – pointing towards parameters (or degrees) of exactness. Interestingly, when invoked as a neutral reality that is out there to be grasped, the word is stretched to the point of almost complete vagueness. “Representative inclusion” in peace negotiations may be a lot of things, depending on who is judging and how, so it is problematic that it surfaces under a promise of exactness or at least “a minimum acceptable degree” of exactness. As we shall discuss briefly, representativeness is, or needs to be, a *political* concept, subject to contention, that first and foremost derives from *political* representation (the noun).

inverts this line of thought, questioning “what would make peace negotiations more legitimate for the population, rather than in what ways civil society can contribute to the legitimacy of peace talks” (2018: 9). When speaking of the selection of these representatives, in turn, the term is also employed to highlight the lack of formal procedures for the choice of civil society representatives, which may lead to their rejection by the population.

Even when referring to so-called nontraditional forms of representation, PCS uses of the concept reflect and refer to traditional takes on it, i.e. state, electoral, formal expressions of representation. The same goes for the way representation is seen in practice; while the word shows up among practitioners, civil society, activists and conflict parties, the absence of formal structures of representation in most peace processes – apart from democratically elected governments, when they are conflict parties and sit at the negotiation table – seems to make it simultaneously reclaimed and rejected (Mendes 2019). I believe that this can be disambiguated by the adoption of a different view of the concept of political representation itself, which helps not only in expanding and clarifying the vagueness of the inclusion vocabulary but also clarifies its frequent conflation with the concept of participation in the context of peace processes.

Agonistic peace analytical frameworks provide me with some clues as to how novel ways of looking at political representation can help in thinking more critically about the role of society in peace negotiations. In their investigation of inclusion in peacemaking, Hirblinger & Landau discuss different framings of the topic across the literature, policy and practice. Apart from vague elaborations of inclusion anchored in expressions such as “stakeholders” and “civil society”, they found closed framings (i.e. those that refer to specific social groups, in particular women and youth) as well as relational ones, which “situate the objects of inclusion within their social and political relationships, and often hint at structural inequalities and power imbalances as underlying causes of armed conflict” (2020: 8). They warn that essentializing groups’ identities leads to a box-ticking mentality, creates competition among fragmented interest groups and reduces people’s inclusion to issues related to their group membership (p. 11). For these reasons, closed framings of inclusion with empowering intentions often end up serving tokenistic or instrumentalizing purposes (p. 12). Relational approaches, in turn, “[move] the focus to the space between actors, asking how their multiple relationships can be transformed through peacemaking” (ibid). Building upon the notion of agonistic peace, then, the authors contend that seeing inclusion as relational avoids depoliticized and essentialized interpretations, “[sharpening] mediators’ awareness of the power struggles that characterize peace processes, and of how identities are re-formed and re-shaped at the negotiation table” (p. ibid).

In a similar vein, Lisa Strömbom (2020) argues that agonistic peace frameworks should remain attentive to relations and identities, using the parameter of recognition to have a better grasp of the boundaries between conceptions of the self and the other.

This is indeed a challenging process as it questions dominant identity constructions of collectives in conflict that are difficult to alter as people often tend to act protectively when presented with challenging views of what formerly were understood to be stable categories of victims and perpetrators. In order to study this possible boundary transformation, narratives of the main groups involved in conflict need to be assessed, to see if and how they change over time so that a plurality of identity narratives are recognised in society” (p. 18)

The reflections above help me in clarifying my *first analytical building block*, which shall focus on the articulation of collective actors and their representative dynamics in peace processes. I share the authors’ arguments and believe that a critical view of political representation contributes towards furthering their discussions. Hirblinger & Landau’s analysis of group essentialization – especially when it comes to women – resonates with the critiques highlighted in previous sections. A critical interpretation of inclusion in peacemaking therefore would benefit from a framework that (i) rejects having social groups as fixed and “out there” to be grasped, and thus (ii) sees political representation itself as constitutive of collective subjectivities and those claiming to represent them. With this in mind, it is then important to see collective subjectivities in the context of peace processes as the result of discursive articulations aiming to acquire political influence – not as rigid and preexistent social groups.

Furthermore, in a more dynamic key than traditional PCS interpretations of inclusion or traditional perspectives on representation allow, Saward’s representative claims framework provides us with a powerful tool to complexify representative relationships in a noninstitutional scenario of change and unpredictability such as a peace process. In particular, it brings the issues of societal actors’ self-selection and accountability described above under new light. Hence, while looking at practical situations, this framework encourages us to try and understand how political articulations and collective subjectivities are forged and with what kind of impact. It also inspires us to search for representative claims in inclusion discourses, identifying how representative bonds emerge and how they are constantly contested and reshaped by intended constituencies.

A deeper look at the conceptual history of political representation, in turn, has shown that it constitutes a founding political pillar beyond the representation we typically envision “above the surface”, in its more practical and visible expressions. If political representation was Hobbes’s symbolic solution in his search of unity and stability, violent conflict is the fulfillment of his dreaded state of nature. As the reconstruction of a narrative of political unity, the peace process must also be seen as the reinvention of the political representation fiction. As discussed above through feminist critiques of political theory, the underlying

discourses of reinvented social contracts – their words and silences – are a fundamental piece in analyzing the issue of inclusion in the wake of new political orders. Thus, my *second analytical block* comes as a complement to the first, adding to the political dynamics between collective subjects the issue of textual presence and dispute in the refoundation of political orders. This will mean evaluating the letter of peace agreements as founding documents, starting points for new social contract narratives, that reinvent the state through political representation. For this research, more specifically, it will entail analyzing gender mainstreaming as a strategy of foundational political representation, as well as the discourses that follow from it.

Some of the recent PCS literature on inclusion has been focusing on rethinking the concept of social contract in light of peace processes and political transitions, enquiring into the conditions for the forging of resilient social contracts in conflictual scenarios¹⁰². Erin McCandless observes that despite being a well-established concept in political philosophy, its mobilization in contemporary contexts of conflict is not well understood (2018: 5-6). The author calls attention to enduring themes that must be kept in mind while looking at the construction of social contracts: (i) their purpose, (ii) who the contract is between, (iii) their forging mechanisms as well as those enabling sustainability, (iv) how they manage conflict, and (v) how (and whether) they distribute wealth (p. 9-10). Aiming to clarify what makes for resilient social contracting, moreover, she proposes the following definition:

A resilient national social contract is a dynamic *national* agreement between state and society, including different groups in society, on how to live together and notably around how power is exercised and resources are distributed. It allows for the peaceful mediation of different demands and conflicting interests and of different expectations and understandings of rights and responsibilities (including with nested and/or overlapping social contracts that may transcend the state), over time and in response to contextual factors (including shocks, stressors and threats) through varied mechanisms, institutions and processes (2018: 48 – emphasis in the original).

Political inclusion plays a big role in what, in this perspective, makes for resilient social contracts. In a similar manner as PCS debates surveyed before, there is an association between inclusion and a transformed, durable political order emerging from armed conflict. Marie-Joëlle Zahar & Erin McCandless (2020) argue that resilient social contracting is driven by three main elements – elite inclusion, societal inclusion, and the interaction between the two (p. 120). The first, they

¹⁰² See, for instance, the *Forging Resilient Social Contracts* project at <http://www.socialcontractsforpeace.org/>.

argue, builds political flexibility; the second build societal resilience; and the third, finally, leads to system resilience (p. 121-2).

The societal inclusion of women within new social contracts, in particular the way they try to “infiltrate” the text of agreements and become, more than participants, *contractarians*, revolves around the use of gender mainstreaming as a cross-cutting practice and a “translation apparatus” for peace negotiations. Beyond getting to sit at the table, all political and power dynamics considered in such articulation, gender mainstreaming has been recurred to as a way of writing gender issues into peace accords, thus changing the original social contract narrative that feminist theory has criticized. As indicated above, however, gender mainstreaming itself is multiple and contested, be it as a concept or a practice, aiming variously at goals such as equal opportunities and treatment, women’s or gender perspectives, and diversity (Squires 2005: 368). For Squires, gender mainstreaming should be viewed as a strategy of displacement; however, the diverse conceptions of the notion also mean that it aligns itself not only with strategies of displacement but also those of inclusion and reversal (2005: 368-9). Whether these strategies are self-excluding or combinable, on the other hand, is an issue of contention in the literature (p. 370).

Among Squires’ archetypes of feminist political strategy, the goal of inclusion is usually associated with what became known as integrationist approaches to gender mainstreaming; reversal strategies call for agenda-setting gender mainstreaming; displacement, finally, is attached to transformative approaches¹⁰³. Integrationist gender mainstreaming has “a focus on experts and the bureaucratic creation of evidence-based knowledge in policy-making” (p. 371), which despite having the potential to realize “effective integration”, tends to do so at the price of depoliticization and “rhetorical entrapment” (p. 374). In short, integrationist gender mainstreaming is associated with what became infamously known as the “add women and stir” approach, which tries to fit women into the status quo rather than transforming it (Verloo 2005: 357). Agenda-setting focuses on “participation, presence, and empowerment of disadvantaged groups (usually women in this context) via consultations with civil society organizations” (p. 371), which offers space and voice to non-elite actors, but, at the same time, has a tendency to reify group identities (p. 375). Lastly, transformative approaches are more theoretical and less clear as a practical mechanism in their intention of politicizing gender

¹⁰³ This is a typology of gender mainstreaming first introduced by Rounaq Jahan (1995) and diversely appropriated and utilized by different feminist authors in their reflections and classifications of the concept.

mainstreaming; for Squires, strategies of transformation need to take inspiration from democratic theory, a call that I echo here¹⁰⁴ (p. 376).

Gender mainstreaming thus stands between discourses that articulate it as technical expertise, and therefore a neutral tool, and those that conceive it as primarily a political process towards a more inclusive democracy (Walby 2003: 14). As Walby observes, this “raises larger questions about the changing nature of democracy in a gender unequal context and about the positioning of ‘expertise’ in debates on democracy” (ibid). Also importantly, Verloo suggests that “[t]he presentation of gender mainstreaming as technocratic implies that as a strategy, it potentially excludes certain political actors, the most important one being the feminist movement” (2005: 352). Against the backdrop of a peace process, one must remember that gender mainstreaming becomes about more than just policy – it participates of and seeks to influence the reframing of the political (i.e., the renegotiation of antagonism) and politics (i.e., the future terms for agonism). The gender-mainstreamed policy that comes out of peace processes responds to and reflects exactly the type of political reframing it set out to advance. This is why it is important to question the goals of gender mainstreaming, paying attention to what it means and what it does by analyzing the types of discourses it articulates and how. Where do women stand within the hegemonic discourses that come out of peace negotiations?

This discussion is indissociable from a much necessary reflection on the role gender mainstreaming plays in its relation to the state and the type of political representation that holds it together. To use Verloo’s words once again, “if gender inequality is about power and privileges, then gender mainstreaming should be about abolishing privileges, and if gender mainstreaming is about eliminating gender bias in policymaking, then *the state should be problematized*” (Verloo 2005: 359 – my emphasis). The diversity encountered within contrasting proposals of gender mainstreaming remind us of the contested character of the state as a political arena.

The project of gender mainstreaming is itself partially constitutive of the terrain of struggle around the state as well as operating within this terrain. The range of relevant forms of power include not only the representation of gendered interests through processes of formal democratic elections, but also through the constitution of specialised state gender machinery, and the constitution and articulation of gendered interests in civil society, both within NGOs and the grass roots. Gender mainstreaming is constructed, articulated and transformed through discourse that is clustered within frames that are extended and linked through struggle and argumentation (Walby 2003: 23).

¹⁰⁴ While Squires chooses to approach the topic from a deliberative perspective, I take a different avenue towards this same discussion, as elaborated in the previous chapter and the present one.

Squires observes that the constitutive nature of women's political action is central to the gender mainstreaming literature, which in her perspective should be extended towards the issue of representation as well (2008: 190).

Within debates on the post-conflict reconstruction of social contracts in general, as well as those around the constitutive character of gender mainstreaming, a critical reading of the concept of representation seems to remain a missing link. My second analytical building block therefore stems from such acknowledgment. A critical outtake of political representation, as developed above, will help show the limited critical outreach of mere inclusion as a feminist strategy, in Squires's terms, and embrace the discomfort between, on the one hand, risks of group essentialization and, on the other, diversity and transformative strategies that remain mostly theoretical. I believe that this discussion can be furthered by searching for foundational political representation discourses in the letter of peace agreements, in particular those around women and the way they feature within renewed discourses of post-conflict representation.

4.4 Final thoughts

As the epigraph by Toni Morrison above reminds us, definitions are power struggles. I have tried to keep this in mind throughout this chapter while unveiling political inclusion in peace negotiations through the political representation of women. I have done so by bringing together, organizing and putting into dialogue the diverse literatures and arguments surveyed so far, with a final goal of having such dialogue inspire and inform my analytical outlook of women's role in peace negotiations. I started by discussing feminist critiques of political representation, then turning to developing my own adopted perspective of the concept, and finally organizing this whole discussion in the specific scenario of the peace process and the debate on inclusion.

I have proposed to reframe the discussion on societal inclusion in peace negotiations through two analytical building blocks – the first looks at the political articulation of discourses and subject positions, holding political representation as a constitutive and at all times contested undertaking; the second considers the “below the surface” unfolding of such representative dynamics and considers the place occupied by societal inclusion in the (re)foundational role of political representation in peace agreements' discourses. In the next chapters, I will guide

myself by the analytical framework herein proposed in order to reflect on the role of society, and women in particular, in Colombia's Havana Dialogues.

5

The narratives of inclusion and representation in the Havana Dialogues

*"If they don't give you a seat at the table,
bring a folding chair."
(Shirley Chisolm)*

In 2016, the Havana Dialogues between the Colombian government and the FARC finally came to an end, and a peace agreement was signed and approved by Congress in November. After five decades of internal conflict, a series of failed negotiation attempts, four years of intense public negotiations and a shocking rejection of the first version of the peace agreement in a popular referendum, the parties' efforts were considered a major breakthrough and an example to be followed in future peacemaking. Even though FARC was not the only illegal armed group in the country – the ELN (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*) remains active, for instance, and paramilitary action continues threatening significant portions of the population –, the Havana Dialogues was seen to represent a major step forward in constructing peace and seeking atonement for the millions of victims through the promotion of truth, reconciliation, reparation and non-repetition.

This case is especially appropriate for thinking about the issue of inclusion through political representation. Despite having acquired an international reputation for being innovative in its inclusiveness, the negotiations were openly designed and conducted to be hermetic to outside interference and never intended for massive popular participation. The inclusive reputation of the process is due in large measure to the political incidence of society in demanding that they could be present, and their agendas were reflected in the final agreement. In this sense, the opening up of the process for victims' movements represents an inflection between an initially closed off process and the one that eventually came to embrace the inclusion discourse with a lot more willingness. The coordination of women's movements was also central in this, as I shall discuss in further depth in the next chapter.

In bringing over the conceptual and analytical discussion made so far to the context of an empirical case, it is important to elucidate and anticipate the

interaction between the methodological framework I adopt and the observation of representative relationships in practice. On the one hand, while appealing to the words of the actors involved in the process – which I take above all from my interviews, official documents and declarations –, I analyze how and why the concept of representation is mobilized in their discourses. In short, I found that the use of the representative lexicon by all actors involved – each one for their own reasons – was either erratic and cautious or plainly dismissive of its existence.

On the other hand, analytically I will argue that political representation was there all along, under the discursive layers of its own rejection. Aside from the indirect channels set up in the form of consultations with society, the fact is that the format of the negotiations left people with only one option – in an *improvised*, *diffuse* and often *reluctant* manner, to seek representation from those who either were part of the delegations or got the chance to personally reach the negotiating table due to social pressure. Even while denying the existence of representation in the talks, therefore, the bottom line is that what most actors sought was representation. This is why I will separate and clarify the perception of the actors involved and my choice of representation as a lens of analysis as I move forward with my argumentation (Mendes 2019: 17). As I see it, this point is key if one wants to unveil the meanings and political dynamics of inclusion in peacemaking.

With all this in mind, the first section provides a brief overview of the history of the conflict, pointing out some of the main driving factors behind it, describing the country's track record regarding previous peace negotiation attempts, and outlining the scenario leading up to the installation of talks in La Habana in 2012. The following section focuses on the inclusion discourse and political representation in the negotiations and is split into two parts – the first approaches the “official” place of society in the talks, calling attention to the inclusive mechanisms designed by the table and the inflection provided by social pressure for more presence and voice in the negotiations; the second searches for the missing link of representation in people's words, analyzing inclusion discourses from the standpoint of the three accounts of representation presented in Chapter 3. Ultimately, it becomes clear that social actors rejected being represented by either of the negotiating parties – even considering that the Santos government acted under a democratic electoral mandate –, preferring to stand behind informal representative attachments between social movements and their social bases. The contested representation that surfaced from the political back-and-forth dynamics between the negotiating table and society is reflected in the agreement and the way it renews the Colombian social contract and reshapes political representation

moving forward – i.e., it combined both traditional liberal peace and emancipatory elements that will continue interacting on the ground, as the country advances in the implementation.

5.1

A brief conflict history

Colombia's decades-long conflict, often underlined as the last one remaining in the Western hemisphere, has victimized millions of people. It involves several armed actors – not only the guerrillas, the government and the military, but also narco-traffickers, paramilitary groups and *bandas criminales* (“bacrim”). The characteristics of and dynamics among such actors transformed through time, which helps explain the level of complexity and the difficulty encountered in reaching a peaceful closure for the conflict. While it is a complex conflict that has changed over time and rejects easy explanations, I want to call attention to a few factors that are key to understanding its roots and developments. They are: the longtime interplay between politics and violence in the country; Colombia's state formation process and geographical specificities; the people's exclusion from politics as an instrument of social change; the issue of land use and distribution; and, more recently, the issue of narco-trafficking¹⁰⁵. These are all central for discussing not only where the conflict comes from, but also how it got to its present-day characteristics. Having gone over the conflict's roots, I will briefly discuss previous peace negotiation attempts and the more immediate background leading towards the current peace process.

Colombia has long been known and stereotyped for the levels of political violence it experiences. Elite groups, more specifically liberals and conservatives, have historically pursued political influence under the antagonistic perception that competitors needed to be fought against and excluded. The violent clashes between the two groups in search of political monopoly are well captured in Gabriel García Márquez's novels, for instance, which show how their relationship has been crosscut by violence. The country differed from its neighbors in the sense that its political parties preexisted the very consolidation of the state, which took place

¹⁰⁵ The roots of Colombia's conflict are well documented in the literature. See for example Bergquist et al 1992, Palacios 2003, Safford & Palacios 2002, Bushnell 1993, Braun 1994, Bethell 1994, LeGrand 2003, Farnsworth-Alvear et al 2017, Pécaut 2010, Restrepo & Aponte 2009. Efforts to better understand the reasons behind the conflict produced a literature of its own, by a specific type of specialist that became known as *violentólogos* (on this see Viana 2017).

amidst fierce disagreements between their contrasting political projects. As María Emma Wills observes, “[the country’s] political parties were forged before their state was consolidated and ... they were the central actors in the process of imagination and inculcation of a national community” (2015: 4). To use Mouffe’s concepts, from the very beginning Colombian politics has been driven by antagonistic relationships, as opposed to agonistic ones. This was the case throughout the 19th century, in which liberals and conservatives alternated political power by repeatedly picking up weapons and fighting each other. In this period alone, Colombia went through fourteen regional conflicts and eight national ones, the last of which, the War of a Thousand Days, ended with a period of conservative preponderance that lasted until 1930 (ibid, p. 5, Santos 2018: 476).

In view of this, it comes as a contradiction that Colombia’s violent reputation has been accompanied by a well-consolidated narrative of institutional stability – unlike Argentina, Brazil or Chile, which lived through many authoritarian experiences in the 20th century, the country has mostly been able to maintain a constitutional order and a formal democratic regime, albeit minimal and exclusory¹⁰⁶. Authors often refer to Colombian political arrangements from the 19th and 20th centuries as “oligarchic” or “semi-representative”. On the one hand, as Abel & Palacios highlight, “[a]n optimistic observer could point out that, since 1930, there have been more years of civilian government in Colombia than in any other country in South America”; on the other, “[a] pessimistic observer could underline that an almost continuous civilian government for eighty years did not succeed in converting the promises of civil liberties, social justice and meeting basic needs into a reality for all citizens” (1994: 526-7). In Colombia, then, state and non-state violence alike have been expressed in a somewhat different manner from fellow Latin American countries, with an odd coexistence between an exclusory political stability and the use of violence by different groups as a way of trying to influence, reform or overhaul the political system.

When approaching the country’s peace attempts, this is an important issue to bear in mind – despite its violent image, it differs from other internal conflicts throughout the world in that never, not even at the height of the narco-trafficking violence in the 1980s and 90s, has it been dubbed an unequivocally “failed state” with crumbled political institutions (LaRosa & Mejía 2017). The relationship between politics and violence in Colombia, however, does seem to be ingrained within its very structure as a state, something Jenny Pearce has labeled “perverse

¹⁰⁶ One often-cited exception to this “rule” is Gustavo Rojas Pinilla’s presidency from 1953 to 1957.

state formation". According to the author, state formation in Latin America has "[reflected] the ongoing indifference to social exclusion amongst the region's elites and the obstacles this has presented for social and cultural change which could reduce interpersonal violence" (2010: 297). Her use of the word *perverse* "[refers] to the way in which the state formation process fosters violent interactions and transmissions within society" (ibid). As an attempted negotiated solution to internal conflict, the Colombian peace process with the FARC tries to reshape this perverse narrative, accommodating previously antagonistic actors in a newly fostered agonistic political order. The political dynamics and the upsurge of violence against human rights activists in the country since the approval of the agreements show, however, that this should be a challenging and rocky process.

Colombia's geographical makeup concerns another marked feature of the conflict, having exercised a role in its state formation process and the shaping of political rivalries across the country. From *cordilleras* to rainforests and the Pacific and Caribbean coastlines, the creation of a centralized power center and the difficulty in reaching and installing state institutions in remote areas has left portions of the population largely unattended and left to fend for themselves. As Catherine Legrand remarks, the Colombian state stumbled upon many "internal frontiers" such as the Magdalena river, the Eastern plains and the Amazon rainforest down south (2003: 169). For a long time, for instance, the journey from Bogotá to other strategic cities in different parts of the country took weeks and even months; such physical types of obstacles also made safeguarding the population's basic rights and the establishment of infrastructure a quite difficult task. In practice, this left *campesinos* with two options – either to align with local elites, buying into their violent confrontations, or isolate themselves in remote areas, with little if no state control (Wills 2015: 6, LeGrand 2016).

Also related to the factors described above was the constant tension between centripetal and centrifugal pulls when it came to political power in the country – whereas political actors from Bogotá made an effort to extend their control over the regions, their absence from those same regions gave rise to local disputes in which violence often ended up as one of the people's few options. Specialists often point out that the state structure – including its Armed Forces – remained weak for a long time. Daniel Pécaut underlines that "[t]he multiplicity and intensity of the [Colombian] conflicts are mainly due to the fact that national unity has never been fully consolidated and that the central state has only had a precarious authority and, in any case, has not had a monopoly over violence" (2008: 26).

In a similar vein, one could say that the contrasts between urban and rural challenges are also key for understanding the conflict, in particular the issue of land use and distribution. There is a structural agrarian issue behind the Colombian conflict – land occupation, expropriation and concentration, not to mention the huge problem of internal displacement and the difficulty in sorting out property titles, are key for understanding its origins and development (Molano 2015). Such issue has at its heart “a problem of representation and political recognition of an actor, the peasants, who, thanks to their recursive appropriation of a geography on the edges of the national social order, developed over the decades their own forms of associative life” (Wills 2015: 38-9).

Along with the constant problem of political violence in Colombia always came the issue of conflict settlement, which is why LaRosa & Mejía consider that “Colombians have managed to resolve their conflicts through creative methods and efficient mediators” (2017: 162). This is said to be the case, for instance, with the country’s re-approximation to the United States after their role in the independence of Panama from Colombia in 1903, or the social pressure and consensus formed around the need for a new constitution in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and eventually the approval of the 1991 Constitution. Ironically, it is precisely a conflict resolution effort between elites in the 1950s – or, better said, an oligarchic power-sharing settlement – that helps explain the emergence of the guerrillas and Colombia’s current conflict.

In 1948, rising liberal populist and likely soon-to-be president-elect Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was assassinated in Bogotá, starting a street riot – the *Bogotazo* – and triggering a vicious wave of confrontations between liberals and conservatives, at first in urban settings but later migrating to different rural regions of the country. Conservatives, who were in power and controlled the military at the time, armed paramilitary groups in the countryside to target liberals; liberals, in turn, responded by forming self-defense and retaliation groups (LeGrand 2003: 172). Throughout the 1948-1958 decade, which became known as *La Violencia*, 200,000 Colombians were killed in such confrontations. The year of 1950 alone reached a death toll of 50,000 (Skidmore & Smith 2005). This period may be read in a handful of ways – while some view it as a renewal and continuation of liberal-conservative rivalries from the past, others see the initial spark of Gaitán’s death as simply a catalyst to conflicts that already existed in the countryside (LeGrand 2003: 172). Others still interpret *La Violencia* as an aborted social revolution, given that Gaitán never got to power and initiated popular reforms like other charismatic leaders in

the region such as Brazil's Getúlio Vargas or Argentina's Juan Perón (Hobsbawm 2017, Santos 2018).

The resolution of *La Violencia* came in 1958 with the establishment of the National Front (*Frente Nacional*) – a formalized, constitutional elite pact between liberals and conservatives that distributed power equally between the two parties. Both agreed to drop violent monopolistic pretensions in favor of a setup that revolved around two principles: parity and alternance. The presidency would alternate between them, and all other political positions would be evenly distributed among liberal and conservative representatives (Abel & Palacios 1994: 471). For Marc Chernick, the establishment of the National Front inaugurates a “long tradition of peacemaking” in Colombia (2015: 141). The arrangement worked well as a power-sharing scheme between the parties at least until 1974, but it had unintended effects over how political participation worked for Colombian society.

In other words, the oligarchic coalition government of conservatives and liberals did avoid violent confrontations between them, but it also debilitated the state in favor of private relationships and excluded everyone *but* the parties from political debates and decision-making. This would become evident later as “[t]he habit of entering into too easy commitments over a long period of the coalition government had weakened the system of checks and balances between the Executive, Congress and the Judiciary” (Abel & Palacios 1994: 514). The inability of the state to respond to social and cultural transformations in the country, as well as people's calls for wider channels of participation, are therefore central to understand the emergence of actors such as the guerrillas, paramilitary organizations and narcotraffickers (LaRosa & Mejía 2017: 109). The violent confrontation between this wide array of armed actors, in turn, has consistently served as a justification for the state to suffocate and criminalize social protest and organization.

This is the scenario in which the leftist guerrillas emerge in the 1960s. In 1964, the FARC originates in the countryside, in response to the Colombian Army's attack to communist guerrillas at Marquetalia¹⁰⁷. Founded by Manuel Marulanda (alias *Tirofijo*, or “Sureshot”), it stemmed from communist agrarian movements that existed at least since the 1920s or 30s and self-defense groups that were formed in response to *La Violencia* in the 1940s and 50s. Other guerrillas such as the ELN, the EPL (*Ejército Popular de Liberación*) and the M-19 (*Movimiento 19 de abril*)

¹⁰⁷ While it was officially formed in 1966, the adopted date of origin by the guerrilla itself is 1964 in reference to the military attacks to Marquetalia. For a full history of FARC see Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013a.

come into existence at around the same time¹⁰⁸. FARC's main claims upon its creation revolved around an agrarian reform that facilitated peasants' access to land and colonization of yet unexplored regions of the country (Pécaut 2008: 28).

As authors frequently highlight, FARC underwent deep transformations throughout its lifespan as an armed group, which in large measure reflects and interacts with the transformations suffered by Colombian society and the conflict itself. While it started as a self-defense agrarian movement with rudimentary firepower, in the 1980s the guerrilla went through a shift related to the emergence of paramilitary groups that targeted it; its transition towards an offensive stance and conversion into a popular army¹⁰⁹; and its resorting to illicit crops as a major financing source. Along with such changes came a loss of legitimacy by the guerrilla in the eyes of local populations; it was then perceived as far from its initial ideals and having become a "common" criminal (or, after 2001, terrorist) actor. At the height of its power, the FARC had an estimated 20,000 women and men within its ranks, spread among dozens of fronts. From this moment on, the conflict heats up and Colombia experiences soaring levels of violence related not only to triangular conflicts among drug cartels, guerrillas and paramilitaries but also to a rising militarized approach adopted by the state (Skidmore & Smith 2005, LaRosa & Mejía 2017).

As a result, it was also from this moment on that victimization spiked in the country. Colombia's conflict has left more than 9 million victims to date – around 18% of the population¹¹⁰. The difficulty of dealing with victimhood in this context thus has to do with the multiplicity of angles involved: a wide variety of actors committed a wide variety of crimes against a wide variety of people. Victimiziers include not only the guerrillas but also narcotraffickers, paramilitary groups and the state itself. Victims include people from urban and rural areas, from different social classes, ethnicities, genders, etc (Centro Nacional de Memória Histórica 2013b). On top of the list of victimizing crimes by far is internal displacement (currently over 8 million people), followed by homicide (over 1 million, including direct and indirect victims of over 200,000 deaths) and death threats (500,000)¹¹¹. A jarring 80% of the conflict's lethal victims are civilians (ibid, p. 349). Other perpetrated crimes

¹⁰⁸ While the FARC had connections to the Communist Party, the ELN was influenced by the Cuban Revolution, the EPL by Maoism and the M-19 had at its roots a revolt against the defeat of the ANAPO (*Alianza Nacional Popular*) in the 1970 presidential elections.

¹⁰⁹ In 1982, in its 7th Conference, the FARC adopted more ambitious plans for taking over political power and added an "EP" (standing for *Ejército Popular*) to its name.

¹¹⁰ *Unidad Nacional de Víctimas*. See more: <https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/registro-unico-de-victimas-ruv/37394>

¹¹¹ *Ibid*

include forced disappearance, kidnapping, sexual violence, false positives¹¹², torture and the recruitment of minors.

With the heating up of the conflict from the 1980s onwards came attempts at negotiated solutions¹¹³; “[s]ince 1982, each Colombian president has attempted in one form or another to negotiate peace with the country’s major guerrilla insurgencies” (Chernick 2015: 142). The first main attempt to negotiate peace with the FARC came from president Belisario Betancur, which produced the *Acuerdo de La Uribe* in 1984 aiming to advance social and agrarian reforms and reincorporation guarantees for former guerrilla members. As a result of the peace process, the FARC tried to make a transition towards politics through the creation of a party called *Unión Patriótica* (UP). In what became a traumatic legacy of the conflict, however, over the years UP members were persecuted and killed by rightwing paramilitary groups¹¹⁴, which in large measure made a successful restart between the parties impossible at that point. From 2,500 to 3,000 UP members and associated union leaders are estimated as having been killed in this period (Pécaut 2008: 46, LaRosa & Mejía 2017: 362). Another unexpected turn of events helped seal the fate of Betancur’s peace effort – M-19’s takeover of the Palace of Justice in Bogotá, a tragic event that ended with dozens of deaths and made defending a dialogue with the guerrillas that much harder.

While Betancur’s efforts with the FARC failed, in the following years a few advances were made as other guerrillas handed in their weapons – the M-19 demobilized during Virgilio Barco’s presidency, and under César Gaviria so did the EPL, the *Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame* (MAQL), and the *Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores* (PRT). Gaviria’s attempt to negotiate with the FARC happened during the 1991 Tlaxcala and Caracas dialogues, in which, together with the ELN and the EPL, the guerrilla participated in an umbrella of groups called *Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar*. In this case, the negotiations were inconclusive (Segura & Mechoulan 2017: 6).

The approval of a new Constitution, which he accomplished in that same year, is perhaps Gaviria’s main peace effort – replacing the 1886 Constitution by a more decentralized, inclusive and participatory one was perceived in itself as a path towards peace (LeGrand 2003: 188). On the one hand, the drafting process of the 1991 Constitution is usually praised for its diversity, having included different

¹¹² *Falsos positivos* were a specific type of extrajudicial killing by the state that took place between 2002 and 2010, under Álvaro Uribe. For more on the subject, see Giraldo 2020.

¹¹³ There is a vast literature that analyzes peace process attempts in Colombia. See for example Nasi 2014, Chernick 2014, Sarmiento 2011, Accord 2004.

¹¹⁴ See Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2019.

social collectivities such as indigenous organizations, religious groups, both left and rightwing parties, etc. The new constitutional text adjusted, clarified and widened the political and social rights of the population, opening up institutional and legal space for them to try and influence politics¹¹⁵. On the other hand, however, the constitutional text did not stand a chance when faced with what shaped up to be some of the conflict's most violent years, with intense activity by paramilitary groups and drug cartels, renewed combative impetus by the guerrillas and militarized state responses (Domingo et al 2015). The Constitution "did nothing to curb arbitrary military and police powers. Nor did it break the stranglehold of the two-party system, for that was not its intention" (Hylton 2006: 80). In parallel to his close work with the convention, Gaviria promoted neoliberal reforms that had additional consequences over an already strained social scenario; ultimately, "the Constitution of 1991 contained nothing that he (and in his view Colombia) could not live with" (Bushnell 1993: 251).

The next major negotiation attempt between the government and the FARC happened in the late 1990s, during President Andrés Pastrana's administration. Delivering on a campaign promise, Pastrana installed peace talks in the region of El Caguán, a territory the size of Switzerland that he demilitarized as a demonstration of goodwill towards the guerrilla. Specialists generally agree that the process was doomed from the start (Nasi 2014, Hylton 2006), especially because of the ambiguous behavior shown by both parties – the government took the opportunity to strengthen the military and negotiate Plan Colombia with the United States¹¹⁶; the FARC, in the meantime, was at its heyday and allegedly took advantage of the demilitarized area to regroup, rearm and train their people aiming for a military victory (Kline 2007: 71). Apart from the problem with the parties' willingness to truly negotiate and trust each other, the process suffered from a lack of clarity concerning its agenda and procedure and was often interrupted.

The welcoming of several international actors under a "the more the merrier" attitude was also later seen as having harmed the process (Borda & Gómez 2015, Barreto 2014). In this sense, "President Pastrana's 'Diplomacy for Peace' included as a clear strategy the linking of international actors for the solution of the Colombian armed conflict, leading it to internationalization" (Villamil 2016: 217).

¹¹⁵ It included measures intended to make the Judiciary and the Legislative more responsible and effective; reintroduced the popular elections of governors, who up to that point were appointed by the president; and introduced proportional representation into the Senate.

¹¹⁶ He first announced a "Plan Colombia" in 1998 as a development and investment plan to help consolidate the political solution he was then seeking with the FARC; as it is known, later the Plan got US financing and far extrapolated its initial declared goals.

This was a departure from previous trends in Colombian peace negotiations, and one that would not be followed afterwards either. The openness of the process to receiving social actors for public audiences with the parties also gave the impression of inclusiveness, but, in a similar manner as its openness to international actors was interpreted, such inclusion lacked focus and did not have a practical influence over the unfolding of the negotiations. Ultimately, the El Caguán process did not incorporate substantive participation of social actors. “The Pastrana government conducted the negotiations with the FARC in an exclusive way: [it] decided to conduct its peace policy within a closed circle of close confidants” (Isacson & Rodríguez 2014: 1300).

In 2002, Colombia chose Álvaro Uribe’s militaristic project at the polls. Faced with the failure of the El Caguán process, the people’s frustration with the continuation of the conflict and the changing winds at the international sphere due to the 9/11 attacks and US’s war on terror, Uribe’s call to arms resonated among many¹¹⁷. In his discourse, the only way out was beating the FARC by force¹¹⁸, which he intended to do through the enacting of *Plan Patriota* – i.e. pushing the guerrilla to peripheral regions of the country and cornering it into a military defeat (LaRosa & Mejía 2017: 365). The FARC, in turn, responded by returning to guerrilla tactics and splitting into smaller fronts (Chernick 2015: 144). Due to Plan Colombia and the US’s counternarcotic strategy¹¹⁹, which poured over 8 billion USD into the country between 2000 and 2012, heavy investments were made in the Armed Forces and the conflict took a violent turn (Tickner & Callejas 2015). Under these circumstances, we see an increase in human rights violations by state forces – the *falsos positivos* scandal¹²⁰ perhaps being the most notorious example –, and in the collusion between military personnel and paramilitary forces, a dynamic that existed for years and had already escalated during Pastrana’s presidency (Haugaard 2015: 264).

It is no coincidence, then, that Uribe’s main negotiated move towards trying to solve the conflict was with paramilitary groups, more specifically the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (AUC)¹²¹. AUC’s demobilization process raised

¹¹⁷ Despite this, as Pedro Valenzuela highlights, throughout the 2000s the majority of the Colombian public opinion still supported a negotiated solution for the conflict (Valenzuela 2018: 210).

¹¹⁸ Although, it must be said, Uribe did not admit the existence of an armed conflict or the guerrillas’ ideological and political character; he argued that they were narco-terrorist actors that needed to be fought against (Tickner 2008: 67).

¹¹⁹ On Plan Colombia and the interweaving between US counternarcotic strategies and the government’s confrontation with the FARC see for example Tickner 2003, 2008; Rodrigues 2014; Viana 2016, Isacson 2015.

¹²⁰ See footnote 8 above.

¹²¹ The AUC had emerged in the 1990s, under the leadership of Carlos Castaño, as a unified paramilitary actor combining nine far-right “self-defense” organizations. It targeted leftist guerrillas

controversy – whereas it is perceived to have contributed to diminishing paramilitary violence, it is also said to have had uneven results across the country, besides being lenient with AUC members and having failed to avoid the partial splintering of the organization into *bacrim* (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013b: 179). Furthermore, for specialists, these negotiations cannot be called a peace process, which entails the involvement of armed groups that *oppose* the state, not pro-state ones such as AUC (Chernick 2015: 143, Segura & Mechoulam 2017: 8). Despite this, the resulting legal framework provided by the Justice and Peace Law (*Ley 975 de 2005*) “generated a structure of political opportunity that repositioned the role of the victims and fostered an increase in social mobilization on issues of peace and social justice” (Alianza para la paz et al 2019: 10).

Uribe’s militaristic approach to the conflict with the FARC is seen as successful in the sense that, by the end of his second term, the guerrilla was significantly weakened and much farther from seeing its political project accomplished¹²². At the same time, neither was it defeated – its guerrilla tactics would have allowed it to continue acting against the state for an indeterminate period. The perception that the conflict had reached a point in which it was impossible for either side to have a clear military victory could be interpreted as a mutually hurting stalemate and a sign of ripeness for negotiation¹²³.

Pedro Valenzuela (2018) interprets FARC’s acceptance of negotiation through interparty, intraparty and contextual factors¹²⁴. The main interparty factor, as mentioned, was a change in the correlation of forces throughout the 2000s and early 2010s. The FARC was hit hard not only by Álvaro Uribe but by Juan Manuel Santos as well. A former Defense Minister to Uribe, Santos started his first term by simultaneously waving at prospects for negotiation and maintaining his predecessor’s military approach¹²⁵; it was under his command, for instance, that top-ranking FARC leaders Mono Jojoy and Alfonso Cano were killed.

Aside from the interparty element, Valenzuela stresses that, at the intraparty level, the guerrilla’s hierarchical, centralized and collective mode of organization helped keep internal contradictions under control (p. 210). Furthermore, he sees

and obtained financing through the drug economy (LeGrand 2003: 182). Paramilitary organizations have traditionally brought together Colombian actors such as drug traffickers, landowners, businessmen, politicians and members of state forces (Segura & Mechoulam 2017: 8).

¹²² For an alternative interpretation, see Chernick 2015: 145-6.

¹²³ Both concepts are by Zartman and were discussed in Chapter 2; see p. 33. For different interpretations of the MHS in Colombia see Nasi 2014 and Chernick 2014.

¹²⁴ In his analysis, the author adopts a modified and complexified version of Zartman’s ripeness theory – Pruitt’s readiness theory.

¹²⁵ The coexistence between backchannel and public efforts to establish negotiations and the continuation of military confrontations has been a constant in Colombia’s history of peacemaking. It had been the case, for instance, with Pastrana’s peace attempt in the late 1990s.

contextual factors such as an international sense of isolation due to the fact FARC became the last leftist guerrilla standing in the Latin American scenario – especially as a clear ‘turn to the left’ in formal politics took place in the region in the 2000s –, and a favorable public opinion positioning towards a negotiated peace. Most importantly for this research, perhaps, the author indicates that the military dead end also translated into a political dilemma for the FARC – it became “disconnected from the broader struggles of sectors it claimed to represent” (p. 212). Santos’s willingness to negotiate peace through an agenda that also appealed to the guerrilla, therefore, allowed it

to present itself as representative of the interests of the majority of the population, advocating socioeconomic and political reforms that, although compatible with the capitalist system and liberal democracy, may have an impact on the socioeconomic and political democratization on a national scale (Valenzuela 2018: 213).

At the root of the FARC’s embarkment upon the Havana Dialogues, therefore, are discursive articulations concerning its political identity and representative claims towards Colombian society about its socio-economic project for the country. Santos’s discourse, in turn, tried from the beginning to combine a tough posture on the guerrillas, utilizing the usual vocabulary of “illegal”, “terrorists”, “enemies” and others, and a pondered willingness to negotiate, assuming that some of his non-negotiable conditions were met (Semana 2010). A powerful and soon to become recurring metaphor is thus introduced as early as his 2010 inaugural speech, when he declared that “the dialogue door is not locked by key” (ibid). A year later, he declared that “the door [for dialogue] is locked and *the key is in my pocket*” (BBC 2011, added emphasis). This expression would come up again countless times in the following years, which has been interpreted as an indication that “Santos appears to want to be a historic president” (Chernick 2015: 145). His winning of the Nobel Peace Prize reinforces this narrative. From this perspective, and taking into consideration the leadership he assumed towards this goal, it is possible to affirm that his representative claims went beyond his electoral mandate, aiming for a long-term legacy beyond his role as president.

Thus, the inclusion narratives that emerged during the negotiations should be seen against the background of these back-and-forth dynamics between the parties’ discourses and representative claims. Given the social conditions of exclusion at the root of Colombia’s armed conflict and the people’s history of struggle for political influence, it is clear that such narratives also interact with the discourses and representative claims that emerge from Colombian society before and throughout the Havana Dialogues. “[T]he groundswell of activity from civil society and victims’ groups that had begun to mobilize to end the war”, therefore,

should not be forgotten (ibid, p. 145). In an effort to re-appropriate their narratives and obtain presence and voice, we see the political articulation of diverse collective subjectivities and the “reading back” of the representative claims coming from the parties.

5.2

Inclusion discourse and political representation in the Havana Dialogues

Despite the setbacks it experienced during negotiations and the challenges now encountered in the implementation phase, Colombia’s peace process with the FARC is usually considered a success story, one from which to draw lessons for future peacemaking. The process seems to have taken place amidst a rare star alignment, with serious trust-building and hard work between the parties and combining favorable conditions at international, regional and domestic arenas – although, as it became clear with the rejection of the accords in the 2016 plebiscite, domestic conditions were ultimately less favorable than they appeared. Aside from previously discussed timing aspects, the Havana Dialogues are often praised for sharp process design choices that picked up on mistakes from the past and managed to avoid them this time around. The issue of societal inclusion in the negotiations is necessarily connected to such choices, which may be inserted within the traditional dilemmas of inclusive peacemaking discussed in Chapter 2.

In this scenario, the element of inclusion acquired a somewhat ambiguous character. The parties stressed the importance of society’s participation from the beginning, and many, especially in the international arena, were enthusiastic of the innovative inclusive solutions found by the negotiation table in order for society to have a voice. Others, however, are critical of the hermetic conduction of the dialogues, which started in secret, took place outside Colombia and were extremely strict when it came to receiving social actors at the table, only opening up space for them as they pressured for inclusion. Given this, this section’s goal is to look into different inclusion discourses, trying to grasp how the topic was addressed by the parties and how it was appropriated, reframed and contested by society in its own discursive political articulations. I will start by outlining the negotiations’ main characteristics – how it was established, its main features, agenda, participants and *modus operandi* –, as well as the “official” place of inclusion in this. Next, I will turn to different discourses on inclusion we may find

concerning the process, highlighting the contradictions between them as I look for the “missing link” of political representation.

5.2.1

The place of society in the Havana Dialogues

Faced with such a long conflict, a handful of failed peace negotiations¹²⁶, and coming from a particularly belligerent few years, President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC established secret talks and finally agreed to launch public negotiations in 2012. Exchanges between the Santos administration and the FARC initiated as soon as he took office, through a well-known backchannel¹²⁷ for both parties, while the conflict unfolded as usual on the ground. The negotiations went through three distinct phases – secret preparatory or “clandestine” talks (2010-11), secret exploratory talks (2012), and public negotiations (2012-16) (Nylander et al 2018: 2). In the preparatory phase, the first meetings were held near Colombia’s border with Venezuela, and later a few others took place in Venezuelan territory as well. As early as such meetings, they decided on members of negotiating teams for the first stages and the facilitating role to be performed by Cuba and Norway¹²⁸. This phase is credited with important trust-building work between the parties; one of the most significant examples of this is FARC’s decision to carry on with the talks even after the government killed its leader, Alfonso Cano, in a military operation in November 2011. The guerrilla’s decision to move forward with the talks after this event is seen as proof of its commitment to a negotiated solution since the beginning of the process. In the second phase, talks moved to Havana, where ten negotiating rounds were held to agree on the most crucial terms of the peace process – its objectives, methodology, agenda, etc¹²⁹.

In August 2012, the parties at last announced that they would be pursuing a peaceful solution to their conflict. They signed and released the *General Agreement for the termination of the conflict and the construction of stable and durable peace* (“General Agreement”), which stated their intentions, rules and an

¹²⁶ See Bell et al 2015 for a chronology of peace processes and agreements in Colombia.

¹²⁷ Colombian economist Henry Acosta Patiño was responsible for the exchange of messages and the initial setting up of meetings, an experience he described in his memoir *El Hombre Clave* (2017). Contacts with the FARC had been going on since Uribe’s administration.

¹²⁸ Venezuela and Chile were also given accompanying roles.

¹²⁹ A full documentation of exchanges and documents from this period is available at the *Biblioteca de Proceso de Paz con las FARC-EP* (2018), Tomo I, “Inicio del Proceso de Paz: La Fase Exploratoria y el camino hacia el Acuerdo General”. Available at <https://www.archivogeneral.gov.co/acceda-la-biblioteca-del-proceso-de-paz-disponible-en-el-archivo-general-de-la-nacion>.

overall framework of negotiation. The talks would take place as a bilateral negotiation – a “Colombian solution” to a Colombian conflict –, with no official mediators or the presence of international organizations as third parties, but the presence and support of facilitating and accompanying countries. It would go through a six-point agenda – integrated agricultural development policy¹³⁰; political participation; end of the conflict; the solution to the problem of illicit drugs; victims; and implementation, verification and endorsement. They revealed that they would negotiate these six points in the order they commonly judged best, and under the principle that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”, a method known as single undertaking in international negotiations. Whereas no ceasefire was established at the time, they vowed not to let incidents on the ground interfere with the talks. They also announced that, once launched in Oslo in October 2012, the negotiation table would move back to Havana, where it remained until the end, in 2016. They established that discussions would not be made public but committed to drawing up periodic reports to guarantee the transparency of the process. They also released the drafts of the agreements on each of the points as they negotiated throughout the years.

The combined decisions of holding talks outside Colombia and doing so through an agenda that was much more reduced and to-the-point than those from previous negotiation attempts were seen by specialists as crucial for the success of the dialogues (Nasi 2014, Chernick 2014). The immediate comparison with the El Caguán talks, which led nowhere, had a lot to do with such decisions. The agenda adopted in Pastrana’s peace process was long and included several crucial issues to reach consensus on, such as the country’s economic model. Carlos Nasi observes that it constituted “a very complicated negotiating agenda, with forty-seven points, as if all the country’s problems could be resolved at the negotiating table” (2014: 2107). Due to a lack of clarity on the issues to be addressed at the table, the parties reportedly ended up spending a long time “negotiating negotiations”, which strained their peace efforts before they could even begin.

The parties came to the consensus – or, better said, the government managed to convince FARC – that the end of the conflict should be a starting point rather than the result of the structural reforms the guerrilla traditionally demanded (Herbolzheimer 2016). The process was hence designed as a middle ground

¹³⁰ I will be using the expression “rural reform” when speaking about this point in the agenda, in reference to its outcome in the final agreement – a “comprehensive rural reform” that addresses land issues and establishes development programs in the countryside.

between “the FARC-EP’s ‘positive peace,’ which relied on the argument that there cannot be peace until there is full and complete social justice; and the view of ‘negative peace’ traditionally held by the state, which understands peace merely as the absence of violence” (Segura & Mechoulan 2017: 13). This is considered a remarkable feat, especially considering the consistency and resoluteness of FARC’s demands for negotiated solutions, which remained largely the same since its foundation (Chernick 2014: 2226). The Havana dialogues’ agenda, therefore, is generally seen as neither too wide nor too restricted; it did include some of FARC’s historical claims, especially rural reform and political participation, while also including topics that are crucial for the state and civil society, i.e. the end of the conflict, the issue of illicit drugs and victims (p. 2441).

At the time, the parties decided that each delegation would be made up of up to 30 representatives. Table sessions would include ten people from each side, five of whom would act as plenipotentiaries and speak on behalf of the delegation. As time went by, however, these rules became obsolete, since “both delegations grew in size as the talks became ever more complex, requiring additional personnel” (Nylander et al 2018: 3). FARC’s delegation was integrated exclusively by members of the guerrilla, some of which were mid- and high-level commanders¹³¹. Their delegation went through quite a lot of rotation, which is usually seen as positive – those who returned to their units in Colombia exercised a pedagogical role of sharing information and cultivating support for the process among FARC’s ranks (ibid, p. 4).

The government’s delegation, in turn, was made up by key trusted people to the president, including former vice-president Humberto de la Calle and High Commissioner for Peace, Sergio Jaramillo. Each in his way, the two are generally seen as skilled negotiators. It is important to highlight, moreover, that “several members of the government delegation *represented crucial sectors of Colombian society*”, especially security and private sectors¹³². As many were skeptical of the process, it was “particularly important to include representatives that could relate to and liaise with these actors” (ibid, p. 4 – added emphasis). Neither delegation had women as negotiators at that point; I shall further elaborate on this in the next chapter.

¹³¹ The guerrilla’s delegation included leader Iván Márquez, Ricardo Téllez (alias Rodrigo Granda), Andrés Paris, Marco León Calarcá, and Simón Trinidad.

¹³² The delegation included for instance retired Army General Jorge Enrique Mora, retired Police General Oscar Naranjo, and business leader Luis Carlos Villegas (Nylander et al 2018: 4).

The role of international actors and Colombian society in the talks was limited, controlled, punctual and goal-oriented. Jaramillo summarized the parties' strategies for involving the international community in the process as follows:

After the traumatic process in Caguán, in which about two dozen countries were invited as friends of the process without really knowing why (once someone is assigned a role, they want to exercise it), we decided to opt this time for a minimalist strategy for the international community or, rather, one "determined by needs": to obtain the international support strictly necessary for the tasks to be carried out and gradually open it to other countries – mainly in the region –, in accordance with the needs of the process (Alto Comisionado 2018c: 39).

Borda & Gómez (2015) and Borda & Morales (2017) have called this approach a "contained form of internationalization" of the peace process, which does seek for international validation and involvement but does not let this drive focus away from its main objectives.

International actors such as the US and the EU had limited participation throughout the talks, although they did design special envoys to the process a while into negotiations (Borda & Gómez 2015). Guarantor and accompanying countries, in turn, had specific but crucial roles in the process and are often praised as such by the parties, insiders and civil society representatives. Cuba and Norway attended all meetings but did not intervene in them, always working to facilitate solutions between the parties in moments of crisis outside of the negotiating table. According to Jaramillo, Cuba "gave the FARC the necessary security guarantees, offered us a place where we could carry out negotiations with complete peace of mind, and provided us with all the human and material resources to make the negotiation a success" (Alto Comisionado 2018c: 39). Norway, in turn, "carried all its well-known professionalism and accompanied [the talks] with great intelligence – for example, leading groups of experts in transitional justice to speak with the FARC – from start to finish" (p. 39). In a more limited accompanying role, Venezuela and Chile were seen to exercise a role of liaisons between the peace process and regional actors, "visiting us in Havana and explaining the progress (and also the difficulties) to the different countries of the region" (p. 40). Venezuela had already played a key role in prenegotiations, rekindling relations with the Colombian government and supporting the initial contacts between the parties. In general, one could see that the four countries as a group reflected the parties' striking of a balance of choices that both could feel comfortable with.

The absence of international organizations from the negotiating table, in particular the UN, is also worthy of notice. Whereas for a while the UN exercised only peripheral and "carefully tailored" supporting roles when called upon by the parties (Nylander et al 2018: 1), it should be mentioned that its part grew by the

end of the negotiations due to the institution of a joint Monitoring and Verification Mechanism tasked with accompanying the ceasefire, in which UN played a central role¹³³. It is also important to underline, on the other hand, that UN's role in the negotiation period itself was basically focused on “[acting] as mediators between the Colombian government, the FARC, and civil society”, thus “[contributing] to the socialization of negotiations in Colombia and [transmitting] social demands and concerns to the negotiating table” (Borda & Gómez 2015: 182).

In a similar approach as the one reserved for international actors, the process did not foresee a high volume of direct participation or the granting of permanent seats to civil society representatives. There was an open effort by the government to “[reduce] the number of people coming in and out of the talks, as well as access to the press. It was convinced that a certain level of isolation of the negotiating teams would protect the talks from the naturally swaying influence of national politics” (Segura & Mechoulan 2017: 12). In the government's own words, “[i]t would not be an open mic negotiation” (Alto Comisionado 2018a: 224). FARC, in turn, had its limitations as to how far it could go in its engagement with society, given its status of an illegal armed organization.

At the same time, the negotiation table made it a point to adopt an inclusive discourse particularly reliant on indirect participation initiatives and a call for society to participate in the implementation of the agreements once they were reached. The General Agreement stated that “the construction of peace is a matter for society as a whole that requires the participation of all, without distinction” (Crisis Group 2012). There was also an emphasis throughout the negotiations that the conflict's victims would be placed at the center of their efforts. The indirect inclusion initiatives observed throughout the process are now largely seen by experts as successful and innovative given the closed character of the talks (Herbolzheimer 2016, Maldonado 2017, Koopman 2020, Salvesen & Nylander 2017, Mendes et al 2020), and they can be attributed not only to the spaces formally stipulated by the table but also to the pressure exerted by civil society organizations and social movements.

Three official inclusion mechanisms were established by the table: (i) the reception of proposals from the population regarding each of the points in the agenda; (ii) spaces of participation organized by third parties in Colombia; and (iii) direct consultations with experts and civil society as seen fit by the table (Alto Comisionado 2018a: 249). The *Biblioteca de la Paz*, which documents the whole

¹³³ <https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/11/544622-colombia-un-mission-government-and-farc-ep-start-joint-ceasefire-monitoring-and> (accessed January 3, 2020).

process, explicitly alludes to Paffenholz's modalities, identifying its early inclusive initiatives with modalities 3 (consultative forums) and 4 (consultations with civil society), also adding modality 8, i.e., the posterior approval of the agreements in a referendum (Alto Comisionado 2018a: 218-9). As mentioned, modalities 1 and 2 (representation and observer status at the table) were never in the parties' plans; the intention was to receive society's input throughout the dialogues in a *consultative* format. In short, the government's take on inclusion "was based on the principle of guaranteeing the widest possible participation *within the framework of the established mechanisms*, committing not only civil society but also national and territorial institutions" (ibid, p. 214, added emphasis). Thus, the government was clear in that both delegations sought to maximize participation as much as possible – as long as it stuck within the established mechanisms and the existing agenda, and was "timely and effective" (ibid, p. 43).

The first mechanism of inclusion – the reception of proposals concerning the six points in the agenda – worked through the launch of a website (as well as physical forms distributed in post offices and town halls across the country) for the submission of such suggestions by the population. According to the government, mayors and governors were called upon to contribute towards this effort, encouraging local populations to send in their proposals. As a result, the Network of Mayors and Governors for Peace was created, and the mechanism was promoted in the media and through alliances with cultural institutions and libraries (p. 50). It worked officially from December 2012 to August 2016, collecting 67,371 inputs from society. Participation came concerning all topics, but the ones with the most submissions were 1 and 5 (rural reform and victims) (p. 45). It also came from diverse social actors – victims' organizations were the most active, being responsible for 21.8% of the proposals, followed by *campesinos* (10.8%), women (10.6%) and the displaced (8.85%) (Fundación Ideas para la Paz 2018).

The next mechanism pertained the realization of regional and national thematic forums in Colombia for each of the points in the agenda, gathering civil society organizations and social movements to discuss and elaborate proposals to be taken to La Habana, as well as better explain the process as a whole to civil society actors. The organization of the forums and the selection of participants were delegated to the UNDP and the *Universidad Nacional* (more specifically the *Centro de Pensamiento y Seguimiento a los Diálogos de Paz*, or Center for Thought and Follow-up to the Peace Dialogues). This mechanism followed the lead of an initiative by the Congressional Peace Commission, in particular Senators Iván Cepeda and Gloria Inés Ramírez, which working alongside UNDP had

convened Regional Working Tables to hold local consultations with Colombian citizens. The National University joined in the organization on FARC's request, and the forums started being held in December 2012 as "larger versions" of the regional working tables (Alto Comisionado 2018a: 46-8). A total of nine regional and national forums took place as the discussion of each topic started in Havana, gathering over 7,811 participants and 40,658 inputs on the agenda's topics (ibid).

As they constituted a limited space of participation, it is worth questioning how the choice of participants and methodology for the forums took place and how the thousands of proposals were processed and utilized. The government stated that for both sides defining "who participated was decisive, since, to a large extent, the guiding principle of participation was to achieve, effectively, a broad and inclusive process, with *a good representation of all stakeholders, sectors and regions of the country*" (ibid, p. 47, my emphasis). In a similar vein, a UN official told me that the priority was "that the people who were participating were as *representative as possible*" (Interview 14, my emphasis). She goes on:

One of the ways of trying to have a global vision of the country was precisely to hold the regional forums, that is, to go directly to the regions, ... so they went to Cali, Barrancabermeja, Meta, Antioquia, Barranquilla... So, let's say that one way was to try ... to be able to have some kind of regional representation, it was to go directly close [to the people], in the territories ... And to clearly summon the greatest amount of diversity of organizations, clearly the victims were the main voices in these forums, and in that discourse clearly the idea was to be able to count on people and organizations of different backgrounds – afro, indigenous, trade unionists, students, women, and the LGBTI population, that is, to try to bring as many diverse voices as possible. And agendas. (Interview 14)

The methodology, in turn, was usually a combination of plenary sessions, working groups, panels and symbolic events (Alto Comisionado 2018a: 155).

The parties agreed that the proposals gathered from society through the two mechanisms outlined above would be analyzed and integrated into their argumentations separately at the negotiation table, as opposed to having them tackle the proposals together. According to a government official who worked at the talks,

[t]he discussion we had, which was a strong discussion, and in my opinion it was better that way, is that we were not going to make a joint analysis of the proposals, but rather that the proposals were input for each of the delegations, that is, the FARC reviewed them and they fed their own proposals for citizen participation, and so did we. Because finally, the logic of this was to reach an agreement to end the conflict, and in the government's vision, most participation would occur in the post-conflict scenario. These were elements simply to contribute to the proposals (Interview 15).

In order to have the proposals inform its work, the government hired *Fundación Ideas para la Paz* (FIP)¹³⁴ to process them into a focused database which it could

¹³⁴ FIP is a peace think-tank created by businessmen in 1999.

consult for statistical and qualitative reports with thematic, geographic and social actor variables. The variables inserted for each of the agenda topics were jointly agreed upon by the government and FIP, based on the discussion subpoints being addressed at the table (Alto Comisionado 2018a, Interview 13). Whereas the government has deemed this database “an invaluable input for many of the discussions on the country's public agenda” (ibid, p. 51), it should be noted that, as far as I could tell from my fieldwork, it remains classified information¹³⁵.

Unlike the government, the guerrilla did not have the means to process society's proposals into a database, which most likely compromised their ability and interest in engaging with them in detail. Jesús Santrich, one of FARC's negotiators, has stated in an interview that most of the guerrilla's proposals for rural reform for instance reflected those of rural organizations and platforms, but “in honor of the truth, the proposals that the people sent to the table ... were never opened, a book was never put on the table to be analyzed, a team was never appointed to analyze it, and not because of FARC's lack of will” (Behar et al 2018: 51). He goes on:

These packages of proposals must be stored in a warehouse [somewhere in La Habana]. And I don't know if Internet warehouses also have virtual cobwebs. That must be out there in the tangle, because nobody even looked at it. It was all added up and they said: so many proposals were made, *but what does that tell us? They really like numbers without a soul here, that says nothing*. That was never analyzed (Behar et al 2018: 52, emphasis in the original).

Given the conflicting discourses, it is unclear how influential society's proposals from the first two inclusion mechanisms were over the decisions made at the table. Reports go from an estimate of 73% of the forums' proposals having made it into the accords, to affirmations from government functionaries that they were a constant source of consultation, and admissions that they were increasingly ignored as time went by and negotiations became more and more rushed (Segura & Mechoulam 2017: 28). Among the critiques received by the participatory forums is the perception that they were merely symbolic and the fact that they seemed to “preach to the choir”, gathering social collectivities that were already supportive of the process while being unable to attract the same right-leaning sectors of society that later would mobilize to reject the agreement at the polls (ibid, p. 29).

The third inclusion mechanism laid out by the parties consisted of consultations with civil society on the agenda topics. It happened in common

¹³⁵ I was told by interviewee 15 that this content was reserved, considering that this may be sensitive information for those who submitted it; Interviewee 13 observed that there is a confidentiality agreement between the FIP and the High Commissioner's Office. FIP's Director, María Victoria Llorente, has stated that the organization expects “that, in the long term, [the database] becomes a source of social analysis on peacebuilding” (FIP 2018).

accord by the parties and for a specific period, so that “[e]ach one of the delegations invited different actors who, from their technical experience, their academic work or their experiences, had knowledge about the topics that the table was addressing” (Alto Comisionado 2018a: 45). Official estimates are that the negotiating table received more than a hundred experts over the years, including prominent academics, politicians and peacemakers from different parts of the world (ibid p. 46, Nylander et al 2018: 7). Although this was the mechanism involving the least amount of people in the dialogues, it should be said that, together with the regional and national forums, it provided society with an entry point to exert pressure and demand that the table received at least a small number of civil society representatives in La Habana.

Thus, Colombian society worked from these official channels as well as informal ways of reaching the table from afar, making use of existing domestic institutional tools and international norms and acting in coordination to expand the reduced space initially offered by the parties. The creation of the Gender Sub-commission, for example, was a clear result of civil society coordination, as I shall discuss further in the next chapter. Some institutional and civil society initiatives even received table endorsement and were afterwards considered “complementary mechanisms” – it was the case with the aforementioned Regional Working Tables, the Women’s Summit (*Cumbre de las Mujeres*) and the victims’ delegations (Alto Comisionado 2018a: 48). The latter, which I briefly describe next, was an initiative that ran parallel and related to the forums on the victims topic, but given their direct contact with the negotiating table it shows up in governmental documents of the process as part of the third mechanism, i.e. direct consultations with civil society.

The discussions on the point of victims and transitional justice, which began in June 2014¹³⁶ – i.e. over a year and a half into the negotiations, when agreements on the topics of rural reform, illicit drugs and political participation had already been reached –, may be regarded as a turning point when it comes to the inclusion of society in the talks. Thus, going into the discussions on point 5 of the agenda, the parties declared in a joint statement that it would “necessarily [require] the participation of the victims, by different means and at different times” (Alto Comisionado 2018b: 88). In this statement alone, the table determined the creation of the Historical Commission of the Conflict and its Victims (CHCV in its Spanish

¹³⁶ For a timeline of the negotiations, see <http://www.ideaspaz.org/especiales/dialogos-habana/#>

acronym)¹³⁷; the holding of the regional and national forums on that specific topic; and announced that it would be receiving victims' delegations "in order to present their proposals and expectations on the construction of peace in the territories and on the satisfaction of the victims' rights (to truth, justice and reparation), including guarantees of non-repetition" (ibid, p. 89).

Between August and December of 2014, the table received five delegations (one per cycle of dialogue) of 12 people each, totaling 60 participants. The choice of the victims' delegates was assigned to those same organizations responsible for the forums, with additional support from the Episcopal Conference of Colombia. If selecting thousands of participants to multiple forums was a sensitive issue, one can only imagine the level of tension involved in having to choose only a few dozens of victims from the universe of millions that exist in Colombia. Virginia Bouvier wrote at the time that "[w]ith more than 6.5 million victims registered with the government's Victims' Unit, and tremendous diversity among them, it will be difficult to ensure complete representation at the table" (Bouvier 2014a).

The parties, in turn, were clear that the selection was to be made "in such a manner as to ensure the plural and balanced representation of the different victims, as well as of the different victimizing events, but not intending to ensure that a delegation may represent the millions of victims left by the armed conflict" (Alto Comisionado 2018b: 89-90). The official selection criteria, issued in another communiqué, was to be guided by

balance, pluralism and fairness, which should be reflected in the composition of each one of the delegations. In particular, the delegations should reflect the whole universe of human rights violations and IHL [international humanitarian law] infractions that have taken place throughout the internal conflict, taking the different social sectors, populations and the regional approach into account. (...) The delegations' members *shall be direct victims of the conflict and they will participate in that capacity and not in representation of others*. The foregoing does not exclude the cases of collective victimization. (Alto Comisionado, 2018b: 169 – my emphasis).

The organizing institutions rejected calls for proportionality, arguing that i) some types of victims, especially the internally displaced, are quantitatively disproportional in their large numbers, which could compromise the integration of important albeit smaller groups of victims; and ii) it was not their role to tally or categorize the whole universe of the conflict's victims, a job the Truth Commission would fulfill later (UNDP 2014).

Tensions arose as members of the delegation were selected, with the issue of victimization variety (both type of crime and perpetrator) becoming a particular

¹³⁷ The Commission was tasked with producing a report on the causes of the conflict and its victimizing consequences. It was composed of 12 intellectuals with diverse perspectives of the conflict, only one of which – María Emma Wills – was a woman. See CHCV 2015, Benavides 2018.

source of contention¹³⁸. The national forum at Cali even had to be temporarily suspended due to quarrels between victims' groups (Segura & Mechoulan 2017: 20-1). Despite the challenges, it looks as if they were able to strike a balance in selecting a plural group of people:

Women made up 60% of the delegates, and a wide variety of victimizations were represented by victims or their family members – kidnapping, massacres, forced displacement, gender-based and sexual violence, homicide, child recruitment, disappearances, false positives, use of prohibited weapons, violence against vulnerable ethnic groups, etc. ... Several social sectors were made present, from rural to urban, from powerful politicians and well-known journalists to human rights and minorities' activists of afrocolombian, indigenous and women's groups. Keeping in mind that some territories were more affected by the conflict than others, the regional parameter was also respected – 28 out of the 32 Colombian departments were represented (Mendes 2019: 20).

Apart from the reconciliatory value of having the victims narrate their victimization and losses while facing their perpetrators, they took their proposals to Havana and urged the parties not to leave the table until an agreement was reached. Among the issues and demands raised by the victims one could mention the need for a ceasefire; recognition of responsibilities and guarantees of non-repetition; the need for a commitment with the truth about the crimes committed by the parties; the removal of landmines; etc. (ABColumbia 2015: 9). Camilo Villa Romero, a member of the fifth delegation whose father was killed by state-aligned paramilitary forces in the 1990s, pondered in an interview that some of the victims' demands indeed made it into the accords, especially those concerning mechanisms of transitional justice (Viana & Mendes 2016a: 3). He stresses, however, that victims' proposals on urgent and more sensitive topics such as changes in military policy and state depuration were left out by the negotiating table. "Our participation was non-binding... there was no list of commitments. *We were not part of the negotiating table*. It was important, but it cannot be seen as a determining factor for the agreements" (p. 4, added emphasis).

Beyond its more practical influence on the accords, the initiative received a lot of praise and, alongside the Gender Sub-commission, is responsible for a lot of the reputation of innovation acquired by the Havana Dialogues. It is also credited with having had a deep impact over negotiators from both parties, whose attitude is often said to have transformed due to the intensity of their direct exchange with the victims. For the FARC, this meant going from Santrich's infamous reaction back in 2012 to a reporter's question on whether they would apologize to the victims –

¹³⁸ There was controversy, for example, on whether to include victims of armed groups that were not part of the negotiations. The political opposition in Colombia wanted exclusively FARC victims to go to Havana, and the FARC in turn was sensitive as to the numbers of their own victims to be included. On this see Brett 2018.

jokingly singing “perhaps, perhaps, perhaps” – to a transformed discourse and attitudes. This involved not only pushing through the final stretch of negotiations, which were intensive and went over sensitive issues, but also taking part in ceremonies in which they publicly and personally apologized to their victims. One such example was the ceremonies held in Bojayá, Chocó, where a massacre resulting from confrontations between the guerrilla and paramilitary forces left dozens of killed and wounded civilians in 2002 (GSUM 2015a: 2).

As a consequence of this perceived shift, the victims’ delegations helped consolidate the idea that “[t]he victims point marked a ‘before’ and ‘after’ citizen participation in the Peace Dialogues. With it, the conversations process moved closer to the public sphere and the differential needs of victims’ groups in the regions” (Alto Comisionado 2018a: 226). In this scenario, the table started welcoming social groups that up to that point had not gotten much chance to engage with the parties directly – afrocolombians, indigenous people, youths, Colombians from the diaspora. Ethnic groups were ultimately able to go to Havana, and the final agreement has an Ethnic Chapter, even though this was achieved late in the talks and had to be tackled in a short amount of time. A few sectors that have reportedly been left out from the negotiations’ inclusive momentum, on the other hand, were *campesinos*, the disabled and cultural segments (Interview 1, Interview 5). The groups that were already close to the process by that time – victims, women and the LGBTI community – maintained and strengthened their leadership from then on (ibid, p. 227). The government started accepting that society was in a dynamic exchange with the table, giving way to “a participation model that depended on multiple interactions, with different degrees of representation and inclusion” (p. 226).

5.2.2

The missing link of political representation

As I argued in Chapter 4, inclusion has become a nodal point within peace discourses – the articulation of disputing discourses about peace now necessarily entail the weaving of elements (and their turning into articulated moments) around a specific idea of inclusion in the peacemaking scenario. The lack of a sedimented meaning of inclusion in practice or theory discourses, furthermore, remind us that inclusion is not only a nodal point but also a floating signifier in peace processes – it is in constant dispute, with different versions of it interacting and vying for hegemonic fixation.

The parties' positioning on the role of society in the talks is revealing of the discourse each of them sought to convey to Colombia and the world, as well as the discourses of inclusion they offered as candidates for hegemonic fixation. The government was intent on preserving the talks as well as associating them with the end of the conflict and FARC's demobilization, maintaining that the larger role of society would come in the implementation phase. Its choice of holding the negotiations outside Colombia and in Cuba, of all places – an island with limited access to the internet –, was an outward attempt to shield them from public scrutiny. The discourse of fragility and practicality is thus consonant with PCS narratives that place societal inclusion as a disturbance that needs spatial and temporal hierarchization and control.

The inclusive language that the state did employ was deeply reliant on a call for *consultations* with society and the utilization of its available *technical expertise*. It builds on the instrumentalizing idea that society's inclusion needs to be useful to the process, not the other way around. This is made clear by the elements that were articulated around the nodal point of inclusion in governmental official discourse, which align with the vocabulary mobilized by part of PCS literature and international experts and practitioners. For the government, then, "the inclusion of citizenship in the development of peace processes can bring *multiple benefits*", among them "the broadening of the topics that the agenda deals with, the increase in public *ownership* of the process, the increase in the *legitimacy* of the results and the achievement of greater *durability* and *sustainability* for peace" (Alto Comisionado 2018a: 217, added emphases).

In its inclusive language, it should also be noted, the government made no effort to differentiate between participation, representation and inclusion, in fact employing the three terms interchangeably, as the passage just quoted at the end of the previous section exemplifies. The lack of decision-making power in the hands of the people throughout the negotiations – which is directly related to the elusiveness of the inclusive language employed – supposedly would be compensated by the promise of a plebiscite in which the people would have the final say on the adoption of the agreements, as well as their active participation in the implementation phase.

FARC, in turn, sought to reaffirm its historical agendas at the table while simultaneously softening its political stance for it to "fit" Colombia's democratic order, in preparation for its transition towards party politics. While leaving the *monte* to negotiate was in itself a radical change of scene for FARC's delegation, the process demanded from it a reinvention in the eyes of both its troops and

Colombian society at large. Despite the facilitating factor for its decision-making provided by the group's hierarchical organization, the fact was that the chain of command needed to convince its women and men that demobilizing was the best choice for them, especially given the UP's traumatic precedent. Before society, on the other hand, the guerrilla needed to convincingly demonstrate to regret its human rights violations and reaffirm its socioeconomic principles, which proved a daunting task considering the level of rejection it suffered among the population¹³⁹.

The guerrilla argued that the government kept society out of the talks also as a way of stopping the people from empathizing with them. For a former FARC member, “[w]hen people manage to talk to us, the negative image that they have [of us] changed because people see us as terrorists, but when they meet us, they can think ‘they are like me’, and that brings people together. That does not suit the government” (Interview 10). FARC's actions and communication strategies throughout the process – including its use of social media and the release of public statements in its website (Henshaw 2020, Interview 12) – sought to publicize such reinvention and voice these different representative claims. In a different manner than the government, whose inclusion discourse was anchored on differentiation moves between itself and society, and between the society that was worthy of inclusion and the one that was not – in other words, societal inclusion required “standing out from the bunch” for offering technical skill or legitimating utility –, FARC's inclusion discourse relied on its historical social justice banners and its claims of likeness in relation to Colombian society.

The adaptability of both parties' discourses on inclusion in trying to “meet society halfway”, in turn, was what allowed for the inclusive initiatives of the Havana Dialogues to acquire a “benchmark status” in international peacemaking. The carefully crafted (and “contained”) internationalization of the process has a lot to say about the place of societal inclusion in the negotiations and the positive reading they got from international actors. At the same time that the government was intent on searching for a “Colombian solution” to the conflict, it could not forego international support and recognition, which would prove key politically and financially in the post-conflict scenario. In this sense, the peace process was also part of a larger reconstruction of Colombia's international image – from troubled, violent country to economic and diplomatic promise (Borda & Gómez 2015, Mendes et al 2020, Viana 2017). This tense balance between not wanting external

¹³⁹ A Gallup poll from October 2017 shows that throughout Santos's first term, FARC's rejection oscillated from 90 to 95%. Some improvement came in his second term, but as the accords were signed the guerrilla still faced a 78% rejection. See poll at <https://www.elpais.com.co/especiales/encuesta-gallup-121.pdf> (accessed January 2, 2021).

interference and wanting to abide by international norms is clearly expressed in the parties' approach to human rights international law, especially when it came to drawing up a transitional justice system (Borda & Gutiérrez 2018, Hoffmann & Ribeiro Hoffmann 2018), and their ambiguous observation of the international norm of inclusivity in peacemaking. In this scenario, the UN's involvement in the carrying out of the participation mechanisms designed by the table also served as a card up society's sleeve in trying to get included in the negotiations. The norm of inclusivity and frameworks such as the WPS Agenda both provide society with a basis for pressure and become a common language and levelling tool for all actors involved.

The view from Colombia, on the other hand, proved to be quite different and much more ambiguous. This is largely explained by the fact that

[t]his process bet on participation mechanisms that had to match two things that are contradictory. On the one hand, the reservation of the process and a protection from direct participation, and on the other hand the recognition that participation and inclusion were important. So [there is] that first thing, that the process tried to create different mechanisms (...) And, on the other hand, there is the other vision, that the process did not allow effective participation and inclusion because it was a process that took place behind closed doors. (...) [Inclusion was read as insufficient] because there were no negotiators who, on the government's side or the FARC, represented different views, but rather a political elite on both sides (Interview 11).

As Nylander et al acknowledge, in short, “[t]here was criticism from Colombian civil society that these [inclusion] mechanisms were too limited, which was exacerbated by the fact that the talks took place outside Colombia” (2018: 7).

Such limitation is often put in terms of the number of people that were allowed in. About the victims' delegations of which he was part, Romero argues that “this is a participation that lacks volume; ... we know that 5 or 6 thousand people participated in the forums [up to that point], but only 60 made it to Havana” (Viana & Mendes 2016a). The expectation of closer and more massive participation probably has to do with the plenary tradition of Colombia's peace movements; as Isacson & Rodríguez explain, between the 1990s and 2000s peace activism in the country organized around *encuentros de convergencia* (convergence meetings) that gathered thousands of people (2014: 1280).

It also seems to come from a comparison with the El Caguán talks, which happened in Colombian territory and allowed civil society organizations and social movements to travel to the negotiation site. An academic I interviewed mentioned that these talks were very open to civil society, so “[m]assive public hearings were held in the extension [demilitarized] zone, and I know it because I participated in an initiative that was opened to university students... and we went to the extension zone to talk to the guerrillas and bring our agendas” (Interview 6). In the Havana

talks, by contrast, “the participation of society ... occurred to the extent that civil society reclaimed it”, in particular Colombia’s organized peace movements (ibid). Despite this stronger feeling of “being a part of the process” with the El Caguán talks, authors have underlined that civil society input was never picked up by the parties and the process suffered from a fundamental lack of focus (see Kline 2007 and Isacson & Rodríguez 2014 for example). So, as a researcher from a Bogotá-based peace organization pointed out, “[t]he participation strategy [in La Habana] was more organized, more open, a little more willing to listen to the contributions of the organizations at the table itself, than in the case of El Caguán” (Interview 7).

In the absence of official negotiators in Havana and massive participation in either Havana or Colombia, society had to articulate itself to counter the government’s discourse on inclusion and enter the small openings provided, expanding possibilities and trying to influence decisions from within. As mentioned above, the government’s intention behind the making up of its delegation was deliberate in including and giving decision power to certain social sectors, especially the private sector and the military; that was not the case with the enormous and diverse Colombian civil society, whose absence at the table was not seen as detrimental to the negotiations. The main contradiction is this: whereas the parties were not willing to open the process, they sought to be “creative” and “focused” in the inclusion that they did go through with, also responding to society’s claims and at times allowing them in. This feature, which is what helped feed the “international benchmark” discourse, is seen as a problem by social actors who prefer to understand inclusion as a seat at the table and/or massive participation. What some view as the process’s strength, others see as a weakness.

A complexified understanding of political representation seems to be the missing link in this discussion. With official representation and massive participation out of the table, what society sought throughout the process was *possible* representation, be it from the delegates themselves or the civil society actors who did manage to get their ears. Even in the regional forums, it must be noted, that a small sample of participants was in one way or another representing a huge universe of people who could not be present in any scenario. This provides a necessary outlook for thinking about what inclusion is *politically*. In a scenario of closure and scarcity such as the one described, political articulation and equivalence moves become the only option, and this is not trivial for the practical results one gets in the end. If improvising representation – or demanding action from a person one did not choose to represent her/him – is what actually *happened*, then such dynamics need to be studied and better understood.

In order to analyze different representative aspects of the Havana talks, I will return to my three accounts of representation, starting with state representation. While it sounds self-evident, one of the parties at the table was a democratically elected government and had the power to represent the Colombian people in its treatment of the conflict with the guerrillas, in the most traditional view of representation as state politics. The peace process inevitably became associated with the figure of President Juan Manuel Santos and his administration, and as a consequence his image inside Colombia also became the foothold for the process itself, one thing feeding into the other. While the process was shielded in Havana precisely for it to be able to go all the way towards the signature of a peace agreement, in Colombia the political opposition – in particular former president Álvaro Uribe and his party, the Democratic Center – sent out representative claims to those portions of society that rejected giving the FARC the power to make decisions about their future.

Thus, although part of Colombia's society rallied behind the peace process as a unique opportunity that slowly demonstrated to be the best chance yet for the end of this conflict, there was also a part of the population that refused any solution other than a military victory or a justice system that sent former guerrillas behind bars. In other words, there was a portion of the population that did not want to be included at all, because it did not support Santos's government *or* the peace process in the first place, responding to and confirming representative claims from figures like Uribe. On the other hand, a lot (if not most) of the people who did support the process and saw it as legitimate – which polls show were the majority of the population¹⁴⁰ – did not feel represented by either of the parties at the table. The difference, in this case, is that these people sought to be represented by them in the process *despite that*, struggling to make their voices heard and reflected in the letter of the agreements. The fragility of this political scenario is made clear in June 2014, when Santos barely manages to get reelected; he beat his opponent, Uribe's candidate Óscar Iván Zuluaga, by a very thin margin that hardly gave him a resounding mandate from society. Interestingly, this coincides with the beginning of discussions on the point of victims and the opening up of the talks for a little more presential participation from society than they had previously allowed.

The closed nature of the talks helped feed the narrative that

for the FARC and the government to resolve the conflict, it was between the FARC and the government. *And that meant that civil society was not represented by either the FARC or the government.* In other words, neither of them could co-opt the

¹⁴⁰ See Gallup poll at <https://www.elpais.com.co/especiales/encuesta-gallup-121.pdf> (accessed January 2, 2021).

representation of one or the other. Because at some point it was perceived that then many social actors, especially the most popular social actors, that the FARC represented that society, and that was not the case, that is, the FARC did not represent the society. And neither did the government (Interview 7, added emphasis).

Had the peace talks touched upon exclusively the end of the conflict between the parties, their hermeticity would not have been such a problem. The issue, however, is that the parties were doing more at the table than simply agreeing to the terms of their permanent ceasefire and FARC's demobilization, disarmament and reintegration into society. They were also reorganizing some fundamental political rules and dealing with the rights of the conflict's victims.

The feeling that neither party sitting at the table represented the people and the fundamental character of the decisions being made by them invite additional analyses of other accounts of representation, i.e., both representation as nonstate politics and as foundation. While the parties did not achieve acceptance as representatives, Colombia's civil society and social movements – in all their decades of working for peace and their multiple agendas and demands – accumulated an unconventional, noninstitutional representative legitimacy that could not be found in any of the actors sitting at the table. Whereas Colombia's civil society is diverse and cut across by dissonant agendas and values – which also became heightened by the limited space provided for them by the table, fueling internal competition –, political articulations emerged in contestation of hegemonic discourses on inclusion. In short, most social actors refused both parties' representative claims, organizing and sending out their own claims towards their social bases in hopes that their acceptance would reach the table and change the parties' initial positions regarding their inclusion. The previous experience of social sectors in engaging with peace negotiations facilitated their gathering of proposals, their collective organization around existing structures and their reaching out to the delegations, be it directly or through third parties.

This scenario translated into a diffuse, fragmented and ambiguous sort of informal representation, in which different collectivities responded to the representative claims of civil society networks, organizations and individuals in an attempt to see their grievances voiced in Havana and reflected in the text of the agreement. This perception clearly came through in my interviews – when I asked whom each of the parties' delegates represented in Havana, most interviewees responded that the government's delegates represented the government and the FARC's delegates represented the FARC, ignoring or rejecting even the government's electoral representative mandate. In contrast, interviewees found

representative legitimacy in the actions of social leaders from different sectors. Thus, the founder of a traditional and well-established women's organization argued the following:

Social movements spoke on behalf of each movement. The victims' movement spoke on behalf of the victims, the women's movement spoke on behalf of women, the LGBTI movement spoke on behalf of the LGBTI, the unions spoke on behalf of the workers... The churches went and spoke on behalf of the churches, well, there is no social movement that I know of that can speak on behalf of other people, of other social and political subjects who were not represented in their movement (Interview 4).

The requirement for representation in this perspective becomes a sense of similarity and belonging, which is a complex matter due to the infinite possible ways of grouping Colombian society – someone may simultaneously be a woman, LGBTI, a victim, a union member and part of a religious community, for instance. A person's attachment to one subject position over another during the peace negotiations has to do with such person's experience and affects, as well as her interaction with discursive articulations and representative claims that *constitute* dynamic social groups as opposed to simply identifying them as “out there”. Dynamic as they are, such groups cannot escape internal contradictions, as the victims' and women's movements in Colombia illustrate. Faced with moments of political inflection such as the peace negotiations, however, we see that equivalence moves surface as strategies that aim specifically at political inclusion.

While there was a clear recognition of this diffuse representative relationship between civil society organizations and their social bases, what we see in general is that use of the representation lexicon by the government when it came to the place of society in the negotiations was selective and ambiguous. On the one hand, saying that an actor is a *representative* carries with it a burden of formality and responsibility, particularly due to the automatic association people make between representation and elected officials. On the other hand, a preoccupation with *representativeness* cuts through the government's discourse concerning the role of society in the talks. In other words, representation seemed to be preferred as an adjective but was never addressed as a noun. Most of the time, there is “a certain contradiction between the use of a language of representation and its simultaneous rejection” (Mendes 2019: 21).

This becomes most obvious in the case of the victims' delegations, whose selection was tricky, as described above, and involved both the mobilization of the concept and the denial that the victims' delegates were representing anyone other than themselves. While the parties insisted that they looked for a “representative” sample of victims to participate of the talks in Havana, it was clear in its joint

communiqué that the delegates would participate in the capacity of direct victims, not in representation of anyone else. The government curtailed any representative role by the victims' delegations in the spirit of protecting the process from political disputes and maintaining its usual depoliticizing strategy of inclusion as a mere technical or consultative tool. Social actors, in turn, often did not want to be attached to a negotiation whose agenda, functioning and objectives they did not have the power to influence. Thus, many social actors did not like the idea of openly talking about representation when the choice of representatives was not given to them. A government official I interviewed told me it was actually the victims who refused the label of representatives, which was seen as a burden in the multifaceted universe of victims in Colombia (Interview 15).

Despite this ambivalence towards the political representation of victims at the table, inevitably the initiative struck a representative chord not only as an adjective and its intention to be “representative”, but also as a *noun*, in reference to actions that stemmed from the initiative and acquired representative contours. As Roddy Brett explains,

a cohesive and unified victim-led peacebuilding agenda began to emerge. This agenda emerged directly out of the collective voice and thinking of the 60 members of the delegations, and logically did not speak for all victims and their organisations. However, it began to gain leverage at the national level and sought, to a degree, to represent itself as a formalised politics of victimhood within the context of peacemaking and peacebuilding. In this respect, to a degree, the delegations then amplified the voices of specific individual victims, while seeking to represent partially the broader demands of victims' organisations (Brett 2018: 287).

In other words, the victims' delegates made representative claims that were accepted and corroborated by victims who were not part of the delegations but felt contemplated by the delegates' grievances and actions.

Beyond the acceptance or not of the representative label concerning those few social actors who got to go to Havana and discuss their agendas with the negotiating table, as mentioned before the very structure of the process demands for political representation as a lens of analysis, given the absence of massive participatory channels. What different social collectivities sought at all times, I insist, was representation – in delegates they liked or disliked, in social movements they got along with or not, what they ultimately sought was to be represented. This is why it is important to try to separate “the perception of the actors involved on the nature of the [victims'] delegates' roles and, on the other hand, the choice of representation in a wider sense as a lens of analysis” (Mendes 2019: 17).

We must also remember that, as a future-driven endeavor, the peace process reshapes political representation at a deeper, foundational level. As

mentioned before, although the weakness of its political institutions lies at the roots of the armed conflict, Colombia was never seen or approached as a “failed state” in need of complete political reinvention. Political institutions are in place as mandated by the 1991 Political Constitution, and these institutions were the ones taking upon themselves to resolve the deep-seated violent conflict with the FARC. The Havana talks were not going to change that. However, the process did signify a reform of the country’s political order, addressing fundamental issues of rural reform, political participation, illicit drugs and transitional justice that could not go over the heads of the Colombian people. Being fundamental reforms, furthermore, and ones that are directly related to the people’s most basic rights, their reception into Colombia’s political order (as well as the need for the creation of new institutions and their consequences over the existing political institutions’ functioning) needed to be addressed.

There is an inherent tension within this specific aspect of representation, which involves the setting of collective standards that serve as a glue holding the state together, as well as the establishment of ground rules on the relationship between the state and the people. In the Havana talks, this is perhaps best exemplified by the controversy over the method adopted for the approval of the agreements by the population once reached and signed by the delegations. The government was adamant from the beginning of negotiations that such approval would take place through a popular vote; the FARC and Colombia’s civil society in general were against the vote and called for the installation of a Constituent Assembly to further discuss the agreements (GSUM 2015b, 2016a, 2016b).

FARC’s high popular rejection and the political polarization around the peace process served as arguments both to acknowledge the necessity of a Constituent Assembly and to point out its impossibility in that specific scenario. On the one hand, it was argued that giving the former guerrilla the power to amend the Constitution would have been a source of fierce conflict and that the political climate would have made such enterprise a disaster (Viana & Mendes 2016b, Interview 7). Others, in turn, felt that a Constituent Assembly would have helped in making the “peace agreements [be] seen not as a diplomatic success of the FARC, but as a victory for the whole of Colombian society” (Viana & Mendes 2016a: 6). For Camilo Villa Romero, a Constituent Assembly would have allowed for different sectors to “take their agendas to create a constitution that has the legitimacy of a negotiation of the whole society” (ibid). Arguments against the plebiscite also relied on the observation that peace was already a constitutionally mandated right of

every Colombian citizen and should not be up to a vote (Interview 12, Viana & Mendes 2016a).

The triumph of the government's option for a plebiscite¹⁴¹ and the shocking defeat of the agreements by a slim margin¹⁴² have been extensively discussed since October 2016 (Crisis Group 2017, GSUM 2016c, Mendes et al 2020, Dávalos et al 2018, Branton et al 2019, Gómez-Suárez 2017, Liendo & Braithwaite 2018, Matanock & García-Sánchez 2017). All the different explanations for the fate of the plebiscite aside, the results showed that there was no running from internal political dynamics. As the founder of *La Silla Vacía* Juanita León has stated, “[e]verything that contributed to the advancement of the process was lethal for the result of the plebiscite” (Segura & Mechoulam 2017: 30). In other words, the “protection” of the talks from society and Colombian politics, as well as from the international community, the to-the-point and technical discourse and Santos's style of leadership and demeanor ultimately contributed to the rejection of the agreements by a decisive portion of the people. Less than a week after the referendum, Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize – a clear message from the international arena for the parties to keep going in their peace efforts despite the setbacks they experienced¹⁴³. As widely known, after the plebiscite the parties had to sit down with the opposition and renegotiate parts of the agreement, which ultimately was approved through a congressional vote.

Looking back at the plebiscite vs. constituent assembly controversy reveals the importance of seeing peace negotiations as a fundamental reshaping of political representation in its most abstract and fundamental sense. The challenges of Colombia's state formation process, its profound inequalities and the ambiguity between its reputation of political stability and its historical institutional weakness are central for obtaining a critical purview of the Havana dialogues and the window of opportunity they provided for the construction of a resilient and inclusive social contract in the country (McCandless 2018). In this sense, Angelika Rettberg reminds us that “a focus on the social contract which peace agreements reflect and, in turn, shape, helps illustrate that peacemaking does not occur in an institutional or political vacuum, a fact that is often missed by more narrow accounts of specific processes” (2020: 96). In this sense, the Havana dialogues inaugurated

¹⁴¹ The government lowered the threshold for plebiscite approval to 13% of the Colombian electorate, which meant the “yes” vote needed around 4.4 million votes and the majority. Voting was not mandatory.

¹⁴² The “yes” vote had 49.76% of votes (approximately 4.5 million votes) versus 50.23% carried by the “no” vote. Although it surpassed the threshold, it did not obtain a majority. Abstention level was high, at around 62%.

¹⁴³ <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2016/press-release/>

foundational moves that will need to be accommodated over an existing institutional structure that is full of contradictions and reflects the core issues that have been driving the conflict in the first place.

In a discursive analysis of the final agreement, Pedro Valenzuela (2019) observes that it combined traditional liberal peace elements – democratization, the rule of law, neoliberal development, etc. – and more emancipatory concerns with social justice and local agency (p. 307-8). This reflects an amalgamation that happened between international pressures and Colombia’s own political tradition, on the one hand, and social grassroots incidence over the negotiations on the other. The agreement therefore allows “for an interaction between the universal elements in the liberal peace perspective and local concerns, processes, cultural practices, and institutions and offer thus an opportunity for the emergence of ‘hybrid peacemaking’ and a ‘hybrid peace’” (p. 308).

Such amalgamation reflects an accommodation between the contesting peace discourses that interacted throughout the negotiations – from the government’s wish to have the center of the process be FARC’s *dejación de armas*; to FARC’s historical calls for deep economic and political change; and society’s diverse demands for inclusion and attempts to influence the talks. In Laclau & Mouffe’s terms, what we see happen between the government and FARC is the hegemonic accommodation of a previously antagonistic relationship, which not only makes its way towards agonistic politics through the articulation of a political discourse that both could agree on but also (re)creates a political order and (partially) fixes the meaning of its social institutions. As mentioned earlier, hegemonic articulations entail the exclusion of alternative political possibilities, and it was precisely what the consensus reached in Havana did, or tried to do. Colombian society made its best effort to contest and influence such resulting discourse, which, despite not contemplating a great deal of the social movements’ main agendas, came to partially reflect their struggle due to their concerted action. To go back to Strömbom’s reading of the diverse expressions of agonistic pluralism reached in peacemaking, we could say that the agonism shaped by the process was neither shallow nor deep – while it did reach mid- and local levels in its institutional architecture, some issues came and went as elite-only territory.

What kind of representation emerged from the political discourse woven by the parties? Drawing from McCandless’s definition of resilient social contracts, it is worth questioning especially *who the contract was between* and its *purpose*. Were the Colombian people part of this contract? The government’s insistence on having the population vote on whether they wanted the agreement or not has symbolic

value in this aspect – a victory at the polls would have symbolized authorization by the population in foundational terms. The defeat of the agreement in the plebiscite, however, prevented such well-rounded discourse from emerging and becoming sedimented, as intended by the parties – practice proved to be more complicated and fragmented than theory, and thus there are no easy answers to the questions I posed above.

As Valenzuela observes, the discursive progress seen in the agreement encounters several empirical hurdles in Colombia and its “multiple sovereignties”. First, there are the challenges that the implementation faces in dealing with spoilers. Whereas “the agreement is far from promoting a radical transformation of the status quo” (p. 312), there is an area of overlap in which international practices and grassroots organizations meet and agree on much-needed reforms, such as the consolidation of the state’s presence in marginalized regions of the country. Even this minimal “common denominator”, however, finds resistance in social sectors that feel threatened by the agreement’s reformism. Secondly, among those who share their support for the agreement there are also fundamental differences, such as “the evident confrontation between elites bent on inserting the country in the international economic system on the basis of a model of extractive activities and the rejection of this approach at the local level” (ibid).

As Rettberg sums up,

...while the 2016 Colombian peace agreement accurately set out to address the main impediments for sustainable peace in the country, a necessary step in moving towards a more inclusive social contract, it also deepened and made visible profound social disagreements and structural limitations. This reflects a historical pattern of contestation among social groups over institutional and material resources at every level of the Colombian system, from the national to the sub-national, and across different sectors of society. As a result, despite the formal end to the country’s decades-long armed conflict, the emergence of a resilient and inclusive social contract will be a lengthy and tumultuous process (2018: 8).

All of these issues raised above have certainly been echoing in the implementation process and the challenges it faces¹⁴⁴.

5.3

Final thoughts

This chapter has analyzed the discourses of inclusion in the Havana Dialogues by resorting to the concept of political representation, in particular the three accounts of representation discussed in Chapter 3. I have argued that

¹⁴⁴ Kroc 2020b.

despite the rejection of the representation lexicon by most actors in their approach to inclusion in the negotiations – with the notable exception of the usual acceptance that social movements were representatives of their social bases –, the concept is a missing link for understanding and politicizing inclusion in peacemaking. I believe this to be true not only in relation to the most immediate political dynamics surrounding negotiations, but also the deeper interpretation of representation as a (re)foundational element of the state.

The diffuse and constitutive representative logic that we see emerge from social actors, which sent out representative claims and articulated counter-discourses in order to get included, was responsible for a significant inflection in the process – while designed and intended to be a closed negotiation with no interference from external actors, through time society managed to make room for itself and find ways to be heard. The coexistence and dispute between multiple political discourses, in turn, led to an equally contested renovation of foundational representation in Colombia's reformed social contract, which shall continue reverberating as the implementation of the agreement continues.

In order to keep “zooming in” on the missing link of political representation in peacemaking, the next chapter will focus on the role of women in the Havana dialogues. Paying attention to some of the same issues raised in this section, I want to analyze the emergence of a political articulation around the necessity of including women; the representative claims made and accepted or rejected by different women; the creation and activities of the Gender Sub-commission; and the importance of the gender perspective as a strategy of women's insertion within Colombia's new political narratives.

6

Women's representation in the Havana Dialogues

*“Ni guerra que nos destruya,
ni paz que nos oprima.”*

(Rallying cry used by feminist movements in Colombia)

Feminist and women's movements were among the most engaged with the Havana Dialogues, being a central element of the dynamics debated in the previous chapter. When negotiations began, there were no women in the negotiation teams and gender had no designated space in the agenda. Women's movements spoke up from the very start, mobilizing in order for women to be included as negotiators – which eventually happened – and a gender perspective to be adopted and come through in the agreements – which also took place thanks to the creation of the Sub-commission on Gender. In their breakthrough, women relied on their articulation capacity and counted upon the support of key international actors. The level of organization and experience seen among women's movements in Colombia, which have been working for peace for decades now, has been fundamental – as an interviewee told me laughing, women in Colombia always get to places with a previously prepared document in their hands (Interview 1).

Thus, I start the chapter by drawing a wide picture of women's place both in politics and in the internal conflict. I call particular attention to the different subject positions occupied by women in the conflict, as I try to avoid generalizations that oversimplify the diversity contained within the expression “Colombian women”. Some crucial characteristics of women's movements in Colombia are highlighted, in particular their diversity, decentralization, articulation capacity and tendency to work through diffuse structures such as networks, as well as their internal tensions and ambivalent relationship with formal political institutions – all of which are key for understanding how women's representation in Havana unfolded.

Building upon the reflections that already emerged from the narratives of inclusion in the negotiations and their analysis through the concept of political representation, the two following sections will look at the specific role of women in Havana by drawing from the two analytical building blocks proposed in Chapter 4. These sections are labeled with two well-known rallying cries echoed by women's

movements during the talks, which help synthesize and, in a way, encapsulate the discussion developed in each of them. The first half of the discussion, guided by my first analytical building block, looks at the discursive articulation and representative claims of women in the process in order to get included. This part is represented by the slogan “*la paz sin las mujeres ¡no va!*” (“peace without women does not go!”), which reflects women’s struggle to make room for them at the negotiating table, launched and conducted as it was for over a year by all-male plenipotentiary teams. The second part of the analysis comes down to the motto “*no queremos ser pactadas sino pactantes*” (“we do not want to be contracted on, we want to be contractarians”), which expresses women’s push for changing usual foundational narratives that exclude them and fail to reflect their rights and challenges. In this section, then, I look at the adoption of a gender perspective as a foundational aspect of representation and women’s struggle to become contractarians in Colombia’s renewal of its social contract.

In the first part of the analysis, it will become clear that women’s movements rejected the existence of representation on a personal basis with the women who were at the table, be it as negotiators or in technical positions, reinforcing and elaborating as representation strictly the actions of civil society actors in the name of their social bases. Nonetheless, through the interviews and official discourse it is possible to see that the Gender Sub-commission grew into an interparty effort and a *disembodied representative role*, becoming a catalyzing instance where women’s movements found an opportunity to voice their grievances. Sub-commission members, in turn, made an effort to incorporate such grievances into the agreement in their work transversalizing gender into the agreement. Women’s movements’ engagement with the Sub-commission and, in turn, the liaison role performed by women plenipotentiaries between the Sub-commission and the main negotiating table, made it so that a *diffuse chain of representative claims* running from the regions to the negotiating table in Havana became possible.

The second half of the analysis will look at the gender perspective applied by the Sub-commission in light of women’s bid to be included not only as participants, but as *contractarians* fully recognized as parties to the social contract renewal performed in Havana. While looking at the actual peace agreement, we can see that the gender perspective really stands out, with gender stipulations crosscutting all six points of the agenda – although, if one looks closer, there is an unevenness in how such stipulations are distributed among the agreement’s chapters. From a political standpoint, on the other hand, we can see that the government’s insistence on the *technical character* of the Sub-commission placed in it a “political ceiling”

regarding how far and how transformative women could go and be in their engagement with the text. The approach to women in the final agreement, in particular after the renegotiation forced by the opposition when they beat its first version in the referendum, has been criticized for not providing a representation of Colombian women that truly conveys their internal complexity, tensions, and, most importantly, their main political banners (Céspedes-Báez & Ruiz 2018, Céspedes-Báez 2017, Paarlberg-Kvam 2018). Having said all of the above, the agreement still holds up in the unprecedented space it dedicates to gender-related issues and provides women with political and institutional platforms from which they can work to demand a more transformative approach to gender in Colombia in the future.

6.1

Women, politics and conflict in Colombia

Where do women stand in the scenario described in the previous chapter? Although they are easily made invisible or mere victims by gender-blind narratives of the Colombian conflict, they affect and are affected by this story in crucial ways. If one looks closer, it is clear that women occupy a wide array of overlapping (and at times contradictory) subject positions in this conflict – they can be both victims and perpetrators, peacemakers and fighters, local leaders and politicians, engaged and indifferent citizens, and speak from infinite places of belonging when it comes to race and ethnicity, religious beliefs, class, region, age, etc. In short, a rich and diverse universe of women wear a variety of different hats in the context of Colombia's internal conflict. While the repeated use of the term "Colombian women" may have a homogenizing effect, such diversity must be kept in mind at all times, especially while looking into how different women interacted with each other in their role in the Havana talks. But first, in the present section, I outline women's place both in politics and in conflict prior to the peace process at hand, calling attention to the different subject positions to which they attach themselves in the context of the armed conflict and how they relate among each other.

Colombia was one of the last countries in Latin America to grant women the right to vote and be elected¹⁴⁵ – it happened only in 1954 under the dictatorship of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, and was only exercised for the first time three years later in the plebiscite that took him out of power (Archila 2010). As Pachón & Lacouture (2018) explain, Rojas's eagerness to approve a new constitution opened the way

¹⁴⁵ Their right to manage their own patrimony and to go to university had been granted in the early 1930s (Archila 2010).

for a suffragist movement “which, under the leadership of women like Esmeralda Arboleda, created a petition signed by thousands of men and women to the National Constituent Assembly to include women’s suffrage into the constitutional agenda” (p. 229). Nevertheless, in its first few decades, women’s engagement with formal politics was limited in numbers and framed by paternalistic politics within traditional elite party lines (Domingo et al 2015). This pattern would only start to change from the 1990s onwards.

The emergence of feminist and women’s movements in the 1970s, with agendas largely aligned with worldwide second-wave feminisms, is well documented in Colombian literature (Wills 2004a, 2004b, 2007; Lamus 2009, 2010; Luna & Villarreal 1994; Sánchez 1995; Velázquez 1995; Gómez 2010). The first steps towards the appearance of feminist organizations in the country were taken in the context of international events such as UN’s 1975 World Conference on Women, as well as national and regional women’s meetings such as the ones held in Medellín in 1978 and Bogotá in 1981 (Archila 2010: 14). Thus, as a result of women’s articulation, in the late 1970s and early 80s groups and organizations such as the *Colectivo de Mujeres* and *Casa de la Mujer* start arising in Colombia’s largest cities. The movements’ program then focused on topics of reproductive rights, mainly the right to legal and free abortion (Lamus 2010: 103).

By the late 1980s, the movement had spread to many cities, with the appearance of heterogeneous and popular feminist expressions in the regions and a strengthened convening capacity across the country (ibid, p. 105). In the words of pioneering Colombian feminist and *Casa de la Mujer* founder, Olga Amparo Sánchez:

Women’s social movement in our country does not reflect a linear, homogeneous, unique process or with the leading role of a single group or trend; its processes and roles are varied; it is a movement in which women from different sectors of class, ethnicity and thought and political positions converge; in other words, it is multi-class, multi-ethnic and pluralist; differential tendencies develop in it, with their own processes, strategies and proposals; however, ties of solidarity are built and micropowers are built with the possibility of disrupting and subverting the patriarchal order and the dominant system of social relations in our society” (Sánchez 1995: 387).

Regardless of their early diversity and capacity of articulation, authors underline that Colombian feminist movements had, from the very beginning, a fundamental internal dispute between activists who were affiliated to political parties and those who wanted nothing to do with parties or state institutions. Doris Lamus calls this the *fracture of origin* of Colombia’s women’s movements, a fissure which was to have repeated and lasting consequences. As the author explains, the movement built discursive and political limitations to its own action, questioning the

existing order due to its “rejection, criticism and distrust of state institutions, political parties and, in general, all those spaces and apparatuses of patriarchal domination, such as the Church and the ‘bourgeois’ family” (2009: 125; 2010: 237). Wills sees an “obsession with origins” in the movement, which unfolded into diverging calls for authenticity and the attempt to separate “true feminists” from “false ones” (2004a: 417).

As in so many other respects, the 1991 Constitution represented a social and political watershed for Colombian women. With the Constitution of 1886’s silence on their rights and the incompleteness of the rights earned from the 1930s to the 50s, the National Constituent Assembly provided an opportunity for women to organize and collectively push for the inclusion of their agendas in the new constitutional text. While women’s movements were unable to organize behind a single women’s list of candidates for the Constituent Assembly due to internal disagreements, which resulted in a low number of female representatives – only 4 out of 74 –, they did manage to articulate themselves in order to lobby constituents and guarantee the inclusion of some of their demands into the text (Archila 2010). Their slogans “*democracia en el país y en la casa*” and “*sin los derechos de la mujer la democracia no va*”¹⁴⁶ became symbols of their campaign.

Even though sensitive issues like reproductive rights never made it in, the constitution overall dictated and protected women’s rights – it gave them the legal right to regulate conjugal relationships, prohibited violence against women, safeguarded their political participation and left an open door for the establishment of positive discrimination legislation (Wills 2004a: 427). The legal platform provided by the Constitution – which, granted, by itself is not a guarantee of its practical observation – at least became a lowest common denominator around which women could organize and work to improve their status. The same could be said about international norms on women’s rights, especially regarding international treaties that gained constitutional status in Colombia’s legal order and the WPS Agenda. Hence, while some movements still preferred not to engage directly with the state and saw women’s democratic inclusion as a bottom-up construction, others started doing so and at times working from within it, be it in elected or “technical” positions.

Results from women’s lobbying of and engagement with state institutions since the 1990s are usually seen as mixed. On the negative side, one could stress the less than successful experiences in the Executive and the lack of coordination

¹⁴⁶ “Democracy in the country and at home” and “without women’s rights democracy does not work”, respectively.

in legislative institutions. The creation of the National Directorate for Women's Equity (Dinem in its Spanish acronym) in Ernesto Samper's administration, for instance, held promise but got caught by internal disputes, later being "downgraded" back to a department (*Consejería*) with little political power (Wills 2004a, 2004b). In Congress, in turn, it was not until 2006 that a Women's Caucus was created; it is generally acknowledged that "Colombian congresswomen do not share common political agendas" (Domingo et al 2015: 16). On the positive side, authors call attention to the importance of the Constitutional Court's rulings in favor of women's rights¹⁴⁷ and the approval of a Quota Law (*Ley de Cuotas*), which established standards for an improvement in the presence of women in state institutions¹⁴⁸.

Whether they were engaged with the state or not, feminist and women's movements' ability to advance their agendas in this period was indelibly compromised and shaped by the deterioration of the armed conflict, which forced a readjustment and reorientation of their efforts towards peace activism. In this context, women consolidate their roles as agents of resistance in the territories (Parrado 2018: 4) and launch a wide range of "initiatives for peace and against war that in an increasingly articulated way demanded negotiation between armed actors and denounced the specific impact of the conflict on women as victims" (Wills 2004b: 212).

The conflict intersects women's lives in many ways – even though they are a minority among those holding weapons or partaking in decisions of military nature, they are a majority among victims (50.3%, or over 4.5 million women)¹⁴⁹. Beyond quantitative aspects, we can also see that the conflict's victimization is gendered in the sense that women are victimized in specific ways, especially as it concerns the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and their particular experience of internal displacement. Women make up 84% of subjects of displacement – which is also by far the most massive type of victimization in Colombia – and 82% of those victimized with sexual violence (Contreras 2017:

¹⁴⁷ The Court, which was created by the 1991 Constitution, has decriminalized abortion in cases involving malformation, rape or risk to a woman's health, and has worked to safeguard the rights of displaced and indigenous women (Archila 2010, Domingo et al 2015).

¹⁴⁸ Law 581 was approved in 1998 and ruled constitutional in 2000. It determined that 30% of positions in all state branches must be occupied by women. In 2011, another 30% quota was approved through Law 1475, this time around for party and electoral lists. While specialists verified an increase in the number of women in such positions after these laws, it is also argued that the implementation of the quotas is patchy and the actual presence of women in politics is still far from the desirable. On this debate see Pachón & Lacouture 2018; Bernal Olarte 2006, 2011, 2014; UNDP 2012; Domingo et al 2015.

¹⁴⁹ *Registro Único de Víctimas*, October/2020: <https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/registro-unico-de-victimas-ruv/37394>

211). Studies have indicated that there is a relationship between these two victimizing events – women often suffer sexual violence *during* displacement or are displaced *due to* sexual violence, also becoming more vulnerable to abuse once they are drawn out of their homes (Meertens 2012, Céspedes-Báez 2010). While women are overrepresented as victims of sexual violence and internal displacement, men are over-represented as victims of homicide, forced disappearance and kidnappings (Salvesen & Nylander 2017: 1).

Colombia's Constitutional Court recognizes sexual violence as a “systematic, habitual and generalised practice” in the conflict; the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) recognizes sexual violence as a strategy of war by all armed actors involved, underlining that women “suffer from physical, psychological and sexual violence which has been designed to wound the enemy, dehumanise the victim, and/or spread terror in the community” (ABColombia et al 2013: 10). Although known to be a wildly underreported type of violence, there are estimates that, from 2001 to 2009, 149 women per day, or six women per hour, have been victims of sexual violence in Colombia (ibid, p. 7). Women who have been victimized by the conflict oftentimes refuse labels of helplessness and move on to become local leaders who are dedicated to speaking out against human rights violations and aiding other victims. Too frequently, their activism exposes them to threats and even re-victimization (Restrepo 2016).

We cannot forget, on the other hand, that women also held guns in this conflict. While no precise numbers are available, it is generally agreed that women represented up to 40% of FARC's ranks¹⁵⁰. The guerrilla's female fighters received next to no attention from researchers and society until the late 1990s, when their appearance in El Caguán – mostly young women in uniforms, holding guns and demonstrating military discipline – intrigued and captured the attention of the public eye (Castrillón Pulido 2015: 78). The literature on the subject has had to rely on journalistic pieces and investigations¹⁵¹, civil society reports¹⁵², and testimonies and memoirs from (usually demobilized) guerrillas¹⁵³. A lot of this research focuses on their reasons for joining the guerrilla. Descriptions of their role in the FARC have often led to their labeling as either victims who were lured by false promises or vicious perpetrators who fail to attend to social expectations of women.

¹⁵⁰ Women have a significantly smaller role in the Colombian Armed Forces; they were only incorporated into administrative positions in 1976 and were granted full access to military positions in 2009 (UN Women et al 2017), still not having been able to climb up its ranks (RESDAL 2016, Donadio 2018).

¹⁵¹ Lara 2000, Alape 2000, Molano 2009.

¹⁵² Mesa Mujer y Conflicto Armado 2001.

¹⁵³ Vázquez 2000; Rueda 2009; Grabe 2000; Nodo de Saberes Populares 2017.

Nevertheless, their experience in the conflict is surrounded by complex variables which are not easily summarized into exhaustive labels.

In its first years as a peasant self-defense group, the organization had worked under a familial model that incorporated women only in their traditionally gender-designated roles. In a second moment, as it adopted a model of mobile guerrilla, families were left behind and FARC became “basically an all-male organization” (Gutiérrez Sanín & Carranza Franco 2017: 773). The massive recruitment of women by the FARC came only in the 1980s, when it became a popular army with hierarchical, self-contained and militaristic organizational parameters (p. 770, Sánchez 2014). This shift in recruitment methods reflected both ideological and practical reasonings. On the one hand, FARC’s revolutionary and class-oriented project needed to function under inclusive banners, so to keep excluding women would not have been consonant with such project. On the other hand, its more ambitious plans demanded both a boost in its recruitment¹⁵⁴ (which allowing women onto frontlines would facilitate) and the creation of a self-contained, lifelong, isolated community that could only be complete with female presence.

Women, in turn, decided to join FARC for a series of reasons, the main ones being political conviction; emancipation from tradition and everyday life, oftentimes permeated by violence and abuse; the desire to avenge loved ones who had been victims of the guerrilla’s enemies; and the allure of military life (Ibarra Melo 2009). In many cases, unequal and patriarchal relations in rural regions of the country made joining the guerrilla a far more appealing choice – a way of getting a job, even (Sánchez 2014) – than being subjected to reigning social norms. Thus, “the FARC [offered] women a certain degree of autonomy and personal development otherwise unattainable for rural women” (Gutiérrez Sanín & Carranza Franco 2017: 772). It also meant “the possibility of becoming political subjects, of giving meaning to their life, of empowering themselves, of joining a collective project” (Castrillón Pulido 2015: 86).

When asked about gender roles in the guerrilla, FARC women usually argue that they received equal treatment in relation to their male peers, stressing not only that domestic work was executed by all without distinction, but also that they took on the same physical chores and combat duties as men. Many describe immense effort to deliver as fighters and the need to prove themselves for being women,

¹⁵⁴ For the same reason, it is also around this period that the FARC starts more massively recruiting minors. On this topic, see Human Rights Watch 2003, Vargas & Restrepo Jaramillo 2016, Downing 2014, Pachón 2009.

which frequently earned them the reputation of being more disciplined, skilled and dedicated than men. Also importantly, their entrance into the guerrilla gave them a sexual freedom that they did not enjoy as civilians. Whereas their massive incorporation came with the establishment of rules pertaining romantic relationships within ranks – which under no circumstance could jeopardize the guerrilla's activities –, women were given the freedom to choose their partners.

Notwithstanding their arguments of equal treatment, several problems with FARC women's life in the *monte* are widely known. Despite the seemingly liberal and pragmatic policy for their sexual relationships, their choices were still targeted and judged by stereotypical gender discrimination standards. One could also mention that even in what they see as equal treatment in the distribution of tasks there was a gender bias – some jobs, such as radio operator or nurse, were seen as inherently feminine and occupied by women in their majority. Moreover, they did not easily climb up the ranks to become commanders, and never reached a position in the Secretariat¹⁵⁵ (Caldera 2017: 89). Lastly, one of the most controversial issues concerns FARC's mandatory contraception and abortion policy. Since it was commonsense inside the guerrilla that having children was a risk and a potential military setback for their cause, women had to commit to the use of contraception and, when they did get pregnant, they needed either to abort or hand over their babies to trusted people who could raise them.

FARC women admit the existence of these gender-related issues within the guerrilla, although this is framed as a work in progress for internal improvement that does not take away from their overall positive experience as guerrillas (Herrera & Porch 2008). In their perspective, sexism exists within FARC just as it does anywhere else, and for its specificities they usually consider the guerrilla to be ahead of society at large in this regard. In their demobilization and reintegration path, however, FARC women need to come to terms not only with their experiences during their time as combatants, but, at a deeper level, with the very reshaping of their identity undergone as part of their adaptation to life in the movement. As Castrillón Pulido summarizes:

After going through military training, starring in acts considered 'cruelty' or 'barbaric', which conflict with the constructed female image, and sculpting and disciplining their bodies for war, closing the doors to motherhood, these women face a society that judges them for their violent past, for the abandonment of their children or the abortions carried out and that, in addition, forces them to place themselves in traditional functions and roles, relegating them to the private sphere (Castrillón Pulido 2015: 92).

¹⁵⁵ The Secretariat is a permanent directing organ made up by 7 members.

Feminist and women's movements made an effort to position themselves as independent and equidistant from all armed conflict parties in their activism for peace negotiations. Their post-1991 work has taken place within a larger scenario of mobilization for peace in the country¹⁵⁶ and a few transformations inside the movements themselves, which have gone through expansion, diversification and complexification in this period. A database of collective actions for peace from 1982 to 2017, kept by the *Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular* (Cinep), shows that women have been engaged in 363 of such actions, 33% of the time as convenors and 67% as participants – a signal of their sharing and collective work with other social sectors. Their activity has had peaks in years in which official peace negotiations either took place or unfolded into implementation and/or watershed transitional justice legislation. Marches and rallies stand out among their chosen methods of mobilization, followed by meetings, forums or seminars, and cultural or sports events. Their mobilization repertoire reflects “the presence and articulation of the women's sector to the political agendas of social mobilization for peace in general, in addition to the use of new forms of advocacy such as art and culture” (Parrado 2018: 4, also see Ibarra Melo 2016).

A few trends detected in women's movements since the 1990s are worth highlighting. There is the multiplication and decentering of organizations, focused on a wide gamut of activities from legal lobbying to victims' assistance, and a higher inclination towards institutionalization and professionalization – or “*ONGización*” (Lamus 2010: 236, also see Delgado 2011). The pull towards formal existence has to do not only with their entrance into formal political arenas, but also with the inflow of international financing, especially from international cooperation programs. This is a moment in which feminist movements' practices are transnationalized, and the most accessible elements of the feminist discourse are absorbed by formal political organizations. An unintended consequence of this, as Lamus highlights, has been its partial and selective appropriation; “devoid of its original intention, turned into technical discourse, translated into what the canons of development policy planning and design require, the strategic content of feminist politics is depoliticized and (re)politicized otherwise” (2010: 239).

Another marked feature of women's organizations in Colombia has been their articulation into complex and nonhierarchical entities, in particular networks,

¹⁵⁶ Looking beyond national and official peace initiatives in the country, one can attest that Colombians organize and undertake their own peacemaking and peaceful resistance initiatives in the regions. On society's mobilization for peace see for example Isacson & Rodríguez 2014, Mouly & Hernández Delgado 2019, Bouvier 2014b, Rettberg 2015, Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013b.

but also working groups, associations, observatories, platforms and other formats, which bring together different organizations and movements across the country, from urban to smaller initiatives in the regions with diverse principles, membership, degrees of formality and goals.

In Colombia, women's networks and organizations work at all levels and sectors. Women's groups are present in highly conflictive areas ranging from Putumayo in southern Colombia to the neighborhoods of Medellín, where there is a presence of illegal groups made up of ex-paramilitaries and ex-guerrillas. The headquarters of many women's organizations are not in Bogotá, the country's capital. In fact, many of the main networks and organizations have their headquarters in Medellín (Antioquia), Cartagena (Bolívar) and Barrancabermeja (Santander), which provides the movement with a highly decentralized structure (Rojas 2014: 5203).

This trend may be said to have been inaugurated in the context of the National Constituent Assembly, with the creation of the *Red Nacional de Mujeres* (RNM), and since then several other important networks – and even “networks of networks”, or “meta-networks”¹⁵⁷ – have surfaced in similar formats. The *Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres*, created in 1995 from an internal rupture within RNM, became one of the most well-known women's networks in the country, defining itself as a feminist, pacifist and antimilitaristic entity that advances a work of symbolic resistance to war (Rojas 2014: 5354). *Ruta* is “made up of women representing 300 organizations that radiate their actions to nearly 10,000 women located in more than 142 municipalities in 18 departments of Colombia”¹⁵⁸. Another important network called the *Iniciativa de Mujeres por la Paz* (IMP) emerged in 2002, with the aim of “[contributing] to the construction of peace through the defense of human rights with a gender perspective”¹⁵⁹. As Catalina Rojas stresses, these entities vary in their approach to the conflict, with some, like the *Ruta*, choosing to “exert pressure from the bases”, and others, like the IMP, doing so “from within” (2014: 5369).

More recently, as Rosa Emilia Salamanca summarizes, “women [have] specialized in public policy with a gender approach at the territorial level and [have] had an impact on their institutionalization” (Salamanca 2018: 3). The flexibility and reach of women's activism in Colombia are indicative of their articulation capacity. Despite the immense diversity of the movements and organizations regarding their philosophies, modes of functioning, peace agendas and political strategies, they

¹⁵⁷ In 1998, the *Confluencia Nacional de Redes de Mujeres* was created bringing together 10 networks and 150 women's organizations (Rojas 2014: 5326).

¹⁵⁸ <https://www.rutapacifico.org.co>

¹⁵⁹ http://www.mujezporlapaz.org/quienes_somos.html Other influential entities include the *Organización Femenina Popular* (OFP), the *Mesa Nacional de Concertación de Mujeres*, the *Mesa de Trabajo Mujer y Conflicto Armado*, the *Movimiento Nacional de Mujeres Autoras y Actoras de Paz*, the *Madres y Familiares de Miembros de la Fuerza Pública Retenidos y Liberados por Grupos Guerrilleros*, and the *Liga de Mujeres Desplazadas por la Violencia*.

have demonstrated time and again an ability of coordination both within themselves and with other movements in crucial moments – which they did during the Havana dialogues, for instance, as we shall see briefly. Occasions of coordination, however, are usually followed by disagreement and rupture. Lamus argues “articulations are episodic, quantitatively successful, but qualitatively weak and conjunctural” (2009: 126). With this in mind, Rojas suggests that, in order not to waste acquired political advantages, “it is necessary to strengthen their capacity to continue working together” (2014: 5503).

At the state level, on the other hand, women’s presence and their actual representation have not developed in a synchronized manner¹⁶⁰ (Wills 2004b: 9). On the one hand, elected state officials and nonelected *femócratas* alike tend to employ an inaccessible technical language, presupposing that technical approaches necessarily entail social support and representativeness. Women’s movements, on the other hand, still distrust state officials and are hesitant to work in coordination with them, a dynamic largely inherited from the above mentioned “fracture of origin”. Lamus argues that the representative dimension “operates in different spheres (state, parties, civil society); but there is no ‘outward’ representation if there is no recognition of inward leaderships” (2010: 282). In a similar vein, Wills reminds us that seeking distance from formal politics and parties does not make feminisms apolitical and should not deprive them from their critical and democratic vocation (2004b: 232). She thus raises a crucial point when she observes that

...the position before the armed conflict and before its central actors determines with whom alliances are woven, with whom approaches are promoted, who define themselves as opponents and who definitively as enemies. (...) For Colombian feminisms it is increasingly obvious that becoming political actors is also learning to determine borders and specify the criteria with which currents define who belongs to their increasingly heterogeneous community and who definitely does not, and in whose name and what project are they talking about before the country (Wills 2004b: 182-3).

This discussion will prove central to understanding the role of women in the Havana dialogues.

6.2

“La paz sin las mujeres ¡no va!”: women’s discursive articulation and representative claims

¹⁶⁰ For contrasting arguments see Rodríguez Valero 2013 and Schwindt-Bayer 2010.

We know that women have been disproportionately affected by the Colombian conflict, and women's social movements in the country have been organizing and working for peace for decades now. In Havana, however, they had to fight their way in. The initial logic of negotiations followed the naturalized and non-discussed impression that men should be the ones making decisions about armed conflicts, and gender was not a topic the delegations sought to prioritize in the initial framing of the talks. Since exploratory conversations were secret and, by the time the talks became public, an accord establishing the peace process already existed, women's movements never got the chance to chime in on these crucial decisions – especially the agenda points and the composition of the negotiating table. There were women on both sides in these prenegotiation phases¹⁶¹, but as I could assess from my interviews, gender was not a subject that got mentioned at that point (Interview 15).

For the first fifteen months of negotiations, in which partial agreements were reached for two of the six points in the agenda, women were absent from the negotiating teams¹⁶². Interestingly, they did integrate the delegations in advisory and technical positions, in which in fact they were a majority – a study has shown women made up 65.8% of commissions providing support to the delegations (Chaparro González & Martínez Osorio 2016: 79). Leading up to the Havana talks, women's near or complete absence from decision-making positions in recent peace negotiations had been a constant – their highest participation rate occurred in Samper's presidency (8.5% of female negotiators), and the record from the two previous processes was dire, with 2% of participation under Pastrana and complete absence under Uribe (p. 78).

Following the installation of the public phase in Havana, women were quick to react – they both utilized the official participatory channels provided by the table and articulated themselves to demand more space than they had been given. According to FIP, 301 women's organizations provided 7,172 proposals through different participatory mechanisms¹⁶³. Of these 301 organizations, 115 were classified as coming from the regions and thus developing work directly with local communities (FIP et al 2017: 9). A majority of their proposals concerned the victims' topic, in particular reparation, truth and victimization varieties. They also

¹⁶¹ On the government side there were Elena Ambrosi and Lucía Jaramillo; FARC had Sandra Ramírez.

¹⁶² FARC had the Dutch national Tanja Nijmeijer (alias Alexandra Nariño) and Shirley Méndez as collaborators. On the government side, Ambrosi and Jaramillo served as "alternate negotiators".

¹⁶³ This information was processed before the forums on the end of the conflict and implementation, verification and monitoring.

sent contributions on rural reform, especially rural social development and access to land, and political participation (p. 3). Beyond official channels, women demonstrated their discontent with the absence of women at the table by “organizing parallel meetings and events to discuss the points in the agenda being debated by the parties in Havana. This was a way of raising women’s demands and making their exclusion visible” (Céspedes-Báez & Ruiz 2018: 91).

In October 2012, more than forty NGOs came together and created the group *Mujeres por la Paz*. Two months later, the group organized the “National Meeting of Women for Peace”. In November 2013, they organized a public demonstration in which 8,000 women marched towards the presidential palace holding signs with calls such as “I am a woman and peace is mine” and “I am a woman and I believe in peace with social justice” (ibid, p. 96). The *Cumbre Nacional de Mujeres por la Paz* (Women’s National Summit for Peace), held a month earlier, was probably the most influential initiative resulting from women’s movements’ articulation; as mentioned in the previous chapter, the *Cumbre* was recognized by the parties as a complementary channel of participation in the process. With support from the High Commissioner’s Office, UN Women, Norway and Sweden, the event gathered almost five hundred women from all parts of the country and distinct platforms and organizations (Cumbre 2018: 50).

As the women responsible¹⁶⁴ see it themselves, their option for this format was not incidental. The *Cumbre* was not intended

as a forum or a broad meeting of women; but rather as a place of alliances, agreements, experiences, tensions, knowledge, complicities and solidarity. And also, as a space for advocacy, training and the construction of collective power, to wrest power from male hegemony in the public and private spheres (*Cumbre* 2018: 48).

Throughout two and a half days, the women gathered in twelve working groups and elaborated proposals on each of the agenda topics, which at the end of the event were forwarded to the negotiating table. They also heard from national and international experts and engaged with the events’ supporters. In its public statement following the event, the *Cumbre* converged on three main issues: (i) their support to the peace process and demand that the parties did not leave the table until an agreement was reached; (ii) their demand that women were present at the table and that they participated in all stages of the process; and (iii) the need for the inclusion of women’s viewpoints in the agenda, with particular emphasis on the

¹⁶⁴ The articulation of the initiative is credited to a joint proposal by *Casa da la Mujer* and *Ruta Pacífica* (Cumbre 2018: 46). Other organizations are listed as convenors in official documents; they are: *Mujeres por la Paz*, RNM, IMP, *Coalición 1325*, *Conferencia Nacional de Organizaciones Afrocolombianas* (CNOA), *Asociación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas, Negras e Indígenas de Colombia* (ANMUCIC) and *Colectivo de Pensamiento y Acción Mujeres, Paz y Seguridad*.

issue of violence (Cumbre 2014: 69). In 2016, another edition of the *Cumbre* was called, this time with a focus on the agreements achieved and women's role in peacebuilding (Cumbre 2018: 53-4).

The establishment of alternative forums of deliberation to the negotiating table such as the *Cumbre* may be interpreted as the constitution of subaltern counterpublics – spaces where women formulate and express counterdiscourses about themselves, their interests, needs and identities. In this case, the creation of such alternative spaces proves important both as a strategy of inclusion in spaces of public deliberation and decision from which they have been excluded – such as the negotiating table in Havana –, and as an enabler of collective articulation that stands for itself and stretches beyond the duration of the peace talks. As pointed out by Fraser, goals of participation parity and the addressing of inequalities are best tackled by multiple publics rather than just one.

The main driving force behind women's mobilization came from their discontent with the approach they received from the peace process, which either erased or misconstrued them. Aside from the absence of female negotiators, which already speaks for itself, another example that came up during an interview with a government official illustrates quite well the way women's erasure was naturalized in the first months of negotiations. As talks kicked off in Havana, *Revista Semana*, a high circulation magazine in Colombia, ran a cover story featuring the government's negotiators involved in the process and a headline that said “*Los hombres de la paz*” (“the *Men of Peace*”). A montage showed pictures of all six negotiators facing the camera, wearing suits; the word “peace” was larger and highlighted in bright red. As my interviewee explained, it was a silence that spoke volumes – “[n]obody noticed ... I don't think it was either sarcasm or intentional, but ... it was what it was. They [featured all negotiators] and they were all men, so ... ‘The men of peace’” (Interview 2).

When they did show up in the process, more specifically in the texts of the first drafts coming out of Havana, they felt frustrated by how they were portrayed. The first draft to be released – the one on rural reform, in May 2013 – left them upset for its framing of them strictly as mothers and caregivers, as opposed to addressing their rights and treating them as agents of political change. In this regard, the *Cumbre* criticized the draft for establishing a “family-oriented approach” that “recreated and strengthened not only sex/gender stereotypes, but also scenarios of subordination and oppression for women, thus contributing to the vision that supposes that the only space for women's development is the family” (Cumbre 2018: 48-9). In their struggle against erasure and for inclusion (in their

own terms), what these women were doing was, in Saward's language, "reading back" a constituted version of themselves with which they disagreed, attempting to create their own narrative regarding their place in the construction of peace in Colombia and sending out their own representative claims to their social bases.

FARC women were equally disputing constituted narratives about them, so another good example in this aspect is their launch of a website called *Mujer Fariana*, entirely dedicated to their story and their role in peace – an effort on their part to control and shape their own image before Colombian society¹⁶⁵. Alexis Henshaw observes that the FARC's social media strategy can be seen as "an effort to enhance the FARC's public image through counter-messaging, and as an effort that carved out a space for discourse on gender – giving voice to both individual women on the negotiating team and to FARC women more broadly" (2020: 518). For a FARC member I interviewed, "this is a page that ... is very valuable because it is like the identity of FARC women" (Interview 12). In their journey from laying down their weapons and reshaping their own ideals, FARC women will be dealing with the specific challenges posed by reincorporation to female combatants – the prejudices they face, the expectations that they go back to traditional gender roles and their coming to terms with maternity are a few examples. As part of this transition, *farianas* started developing their own notion of "insurgent feminism", which

can only be deeply classist, anti-patriarchal, emancipatory, a promoter of equal opportunities and, especially, for the guarantee of women's rights as a revolutionary and organizational principle; with the explicit commitment to fight for its materialization within society and within our own organization to the fullest (...) Insurgent feminism is a collective construction that we formulate from our daily practice, in interaction with theorists, activists and representatives of women's organizations (Sandino apud Caldera 2017: 99).

In November 2013, shortly after the *Cumbre*, the government finally appointed two women as plenipotentiaries – Nigeria Rentería, then High Presidential Adviser on Women's Equality¹⁶⁶, and María Paulina Riveros, then Director of Human Rights at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the speech delivered at the occasion of their appointment, President Santos declared that "[t]hey, like all negotiators, are appointed – *more than in representation of a particular group* –, they are named for their merits and for the positive and constructive contribution they can give to the process" (Presidencia de la República 2013). In April of that same year, the FARC had already incorporated Victoria Sandino to its team of

¹⁶⁵ <https://www.partidofarc.com.co/es/mujer-fariana> (the original website no longer exists; their page is now located within the FARC party's website).

¹⁶⁶ In May 2015, Rentería was substituted by then Minister of Foreign Affairs, María Ángela Holguín. She left the table to run for governor in the department of Chocó.

negotiators. A Commander at the time, Sandino later became a representative of the FARC party in the Senate. Regarding her arrival to Havana, she says “[w]e spent a long time without having a relationship with them [the female advisors who were already there] because there were almost no women to talk to” (Behar et al 2018: 192). Ultimately, the participation of women in the FARC delegation amounted to between 40 and 50%, which is consistent with the proportion of women in the guerrilla overall (Henshaw 2020: 518, Alto Comisionado 2018a: 280). On the government’s side, in turn, the proportion of women reached 15.7%, which – as a measure of comparison – despite being an all-time high still fails to even reach the 30% quota foreseen by Colombian law (Chaparro González & Martínez Osorio 2016: 78).

Although finally having women as negotiators was a victory, the drafts coming out of the table – after rural reform, the table had moved on to political participation and illegal drugs – showed it was still not enough to make women come through in the letter of the texts, and women’s organizations, as well as those at the table, kept pressuring the parties to allow their perspective into the agreements. This apparent detachment between the physical presence of women among plenipotentiaries and women’s representation in the agreements takes us back to a few topics raised in Chapter 4, especially Phillips’s debate about presence and ideas. As the author highlights, the presence of descriptive representatives and the debate and judgment of ideas that contemplate a certain group are not in opposition with one another; quite the contrary, they work in close mutual relationship. For the author, the more autonomous representatives are, the more important presence will be – and it is probably safe to say that parties involved in peace negotiations experience a much higher level of autonomy than elected representatives in formal politics.

This is consistent with Paffenholz’s argument that it is not enough to “count women”, it is necessary to “make women count”, in the sense that women need to be represented not only at the table, but at all levels of negotiations (2018: 173). As mentioned, then, authors generally contend that mixed strategies, such as having women negotiators act as brokers for civil society groups, are the ones that work best for women. Thus, making space for representation at the table can also happen through alternative strategies, and “[h]aving more groups at the table is usually made possible through working groups, sub-committees or technical committees dealing with specific issues” (Paffenholz et al 2016: 28).

This was just the case in Havana. In June 2014, the parties agreed to create a Gender Sub-commission, tasked with working a gender perspective into the

agreements reached by the negotiation table. At that point, a total of three topics of the agenda had been closed. The group, selected within the delegations and headed by Riveros and Sandino, went through these three and kept working on the remaining three as the table advanced. Each delegation had five to six people working in the sub-commission – there was some rotation depending on the topic under discussion, but most delegates were women and each side had only one man in their teams (Alto Comisionado 2018a: 284). The fact that the parties allowed the first three drafts to be reopened is considered a major accomplishment for these women. A government official told me that

one cannot measure how important this decision is when looking at it in retrospect, but... The government had never been able to reach agreements with the FARC. And at that time, we already had more than 60 co-drafted pages, and thinking of reopening the discussion of those 60 pages to include the gender approach was not a minor decision (Interview 15).

The Gender Sub-commission is considered an unprecedented initiative in peace processes¹⁶⁷, focused on “[establishing] measures that would guarantee the overcoming of the traditional social gaps that have marked Colombian society as unequal and stigmatizing” (Alto Comisionado 2018a: 283). It received a lot of praise not only for its work and the fact that delegates across party lines worked together towards including a gender perspective into the agreements, but also for becoming a formal instance to which organized women could resort. Many members of the Sub-commission felt the necessity of sitting down and studying gender, as gender experts were a minority; in a lot of ways, they learned as a group as they went on, and national and international experts from Cuba, Norway and Sweden, as well as UN Women officers, were considered key in their support. It is noteworthy that the group managed to exercise influence and act strategically considering the limitations they faced in their work – the Sub-commission did not have a fixed place and time to meet, which usually meant they met really early in the morning or really late at night, and this was considered extra work, so members participated on the condition that their previously assumed tasks would not suffer.

The members of the Sub-commission detail that inserting a gender perspective within the agreements demanded from them a lot of creativity and diplomacy, ability to multitask and personal abdication. In order to convince their (male) superiors to allow specific textual inclusions, women often articulated themselves to prepare them ahead of time, relying above all on Riveros and Sandino, so that when the time came for the issue to be discussed by the main

¹⁶⁷ Although a Gender Sub-commission has previously been established in the Sri Lankan peace process, it was not integrated by parties’ delegates and, with the failure of the process, it never got the chance to advance and demonstrate results (PRIO 2016, Salvesen & Nylander 2017).

negotiating table, they would not veto the sub-commission's proposals out of instant resistance.

So, for example the day before we had said 'ah, we need to convince the two heads of the delegations not to make a problem with this inclusion in such a text.' Or that 'we have to include this now'. So, the day before we agreed that Dr. María Paulina at breakfast or lunch was going to try to convince or soften or give the technical argument of why they needed to accept this, so that the next day when we would come to propose this, they already said yes. And Victoria Sandino did the same with her delegation, and in FARC's delegation was Camila Cienfuegos, who is Pablo Catatumbo's wife, there was Alexandra [Nariño], who has a lot of respect in Iván Márquez. They were in charge of doing it 'with their own men' [laughter] (Interview 2).

Such conciliatory abilities are narrated as fundamental to their work. Interestingly, it ends up reinforcing specific gender expectations that women are more equipped to approach things with flexibility, tactfulness and kindness. The same can be said regarding issues of care throughout the four years of negotiations, which were usually expected from the women in the delegations. They "had an additional workload of care, which may not have been asked of them, but if they are not done by them, who was going to do it? No one. [There were] things that they had to be aware of, such as 'oh, did you take the pill yet?'" (Interview 3). Another gender issue that does not stand out right away is the uneven personal sacrifices experienced by women in their choice of staying four years away from their families, which was not without consequences for them and their personal relationships. Ultimately, it was paradoxical that in order "to position the gender perspective, in an attempt to rectify discrimination against women and demand the transformation of traditional gender roles, the women themselves had to take on roles traditionally viewed as feminine" (Corporación Humanas & CIASE 2017: 103).

The Sub-commission managed to receive and listen to civil society representatives through three main initiatives. First, it received three delegations of six women's and LGBTI organizations each, totaling 18 people representing their organizations¹⁶⁸. In its choice of participants, the sub-commission was said to "[aim] at inviting a broad spectre of organisations representing various views, political affiliations and ethnic compositions, not only from Bogotá and provincial capitals, but also from rural areas. The format was inspired by the victims' delegations" (Salvesen & Nylander 2017: 3). The delegates' interventions called "not only [for] an inclusive language, but also a logic of compliance with the state's

¹⁶⁸ Within these organizations were, for example, Casa de la Mujer, IMP, Ruta Pacífica, Sisma Mujer, Corporación Caribe Afirmativo, Colombia Diversa, Red de Mujeres Excombatientes, *Asociación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas, Negras e Indígenas de Colombia* (ANMUCIC), among others. For a full list see Alto Comisionado 2018a: 246-7.

obligations to women, overcoming discrimination and inequality, and an understanding of women as subjects of rights, not just beneficiaries of programs” (Alto Comisionado 2018a: 294). Secondly, it also welcomed ten specialists in sexual violence to discuss this issue in particular¹⁶⁹. Lastly, it met with ten female ex-combatants from Indonesia, Ireland, South Africa, Guatemala, Uruguay, El Salvador and Colombia to discuss demobilization and reintegration (ibid, p. 34, Alto Comisionado 2018a: 296).

The issue of sexual violence mobilized a specific alliance of individuals and organizations that aimed to raise awareness and influence the negotiating table into addressing it in the discussions on victims and transitional justice. The campaign *5 claves para un tratamiento diferenciado de la violencia sexual* (“5 keys to a differentiated treatment of sexual violence”) was articulated in 2015 by *Corporación Humanas*, *Sisma Mujer*, *Red Nacional de Mujeres* and Jineth Bedoya, through her own campaign *No es hora de callar* (“It is not time to be silent”). Bedoya, an award-winning journalist who is a victim of sexual violence by paramilitaries, was also part of the fourth victims’ delegations. The group was skilled in gathering and disseminating an agenda of five straightforward demands: (i) a commitment by the parties to eradicate sexual violence in their de-escalation of hostilities; (ii) the creation of a truth commission exclusively dedicated to the topic; (iii) a differential treatment and a forbiddance of amnesty to sexual violence offenses in transitional justice mechanisms; (iv) a special reparations program to victims of sexual violence; and (v) a plan for a more inclusive society for women and girls in the post-conflict (Bedoya et al 2016). For Céspedes-Báez, no other gender-related strategy had as much impact as the *5 claves* (2017: 315).

The Sub-commission thus “became a critical outlet to channel to the negotiating table the insights that women organizations had structured and honed in the last twenty years regarding women in the context of the Colombian conflict” (Céspedes-Báez & Ruiz 2018: 99). It is also worth highlighting that these delegations participated not only in sessions with the Gender Sub-commission itself but also with the main negotiating table. For Salvesen & Nylander, this was an important achievement because it meant that “the heads of delegations made a commitment to integrate the gender approach into the peace talks, for which they could be held accountable” (2017: 3).

The impact and content of women’s agendas in the peace agreements were a product of a diverse articulated group of people and a reluctant and diffuse

¹⁶⁹ These included members from *Corporación Humanas*, *Dejusticia*, *Sisma Mujer*, among others. For a full list see Alto Comisionado 2018a: 373.

representative dynamic. In interviews, when I asked whom the few women plenipotentiaries were representing in Havana, most responses came in a negative logic, pointing out whom in fact they did *not* represent – i.e. women’s movements or Colombian women in general. A frequent answer I received was, in a similar manner as highlighted in the previous chapter, that the women on the government’s side represented the government and the women on FARC’s side represented FARC’s interests. A government officer told me:

I don’t believe that they [Rentería and Riveros] were at any time taking on a representative role. That is, they represented themselves and the government. I don’t think they were representing anyone. I think it is very difficult to conclude, for example, that Nigeria [Rentería] was representing afrocolombian women. I don’t think she was (Interview 11).

Another government officer more directly stated the following:

...we always tried not to have a logic of representation at the table. That is, people were there because the president had decided that they were people who represented him. The government. (...) That is, we were representing the government ... and, through it, yes, also society, but we could not attribute to ourselves the representation of a particular group (Interview 15).

Both statements align with President Santos’s declaration quoted above. This has to do both with the government’s directness about its objectives in choosing them and with the fact these were career government employees with previous contact with women’s organizations, but not a history of belonging to them. For the women working in the government’s delegation, furthermore, it would surely have been a heavy burden (and an impossible task) to have to meet the expectations of millions of Colombian women. Céspedes-Báez & Ruiz observe that seeing Rentería and Riveros as symbols risked tokenizing them and argue that “[t]his ‘essentializing’ tendency generated a misconception of women as a homogeneous group. It neglected the multi-layered and diverse experiences of women within conflict” (2018: 96).

Women from civil society equally rejected that there was a representative relationship between themselves and the delegates at the table. While women’s organizations fought hard to have women appointed as negotiators – at the very least managing to change the look of official pictures by adding a few women’s faces to a sea of camouflage uniforms and suits –, they also rejected the idea that their actions might be representing them. Such rejection of course has to do with the fact that women’s movements were not involved in the process from the beginning and were not consulted over whom it was that they wanted to represent them at the table, given the chance. However, from the previous discussion on Colombian women’s movements it is also possible to infer that the “mismatch” and distrust between social movements and formal representatives, be it elected

officials or *femócratas*, also help in understanding the refusal of the political representation language in this specific case. Having said this, the bottom line was that, even if reluctant and despite not having chosen them, what women's movements were doing the whole time was trying to influence these negotiators into representing their agendas at the table. They did so through coordinated arguments and well-organized sets of proposals, which managed to get the table's attention.

For FARC women, it seemed more uncontroversial that the negotiators acted on behalf of the guerrilla's objectives in general, but often had its women's interests in particular view. It thus came up in interviews that, despite some resistance here and there to the collective engagement towards a gender perspective, guerrilla women mainly shared a sense of pride that Sandino and the other female delegates involved in negotiations were working to represent them – in their perspective, this meant both setting the record straight on who they are and in pushing for measures regarding their future life as civilians and their policy platforms for Colombia. FARC negotiators and delegates therefore “felt that one of their most significant responsibilities was representing their female comrades – their interests and their lived experience – as guerrillas” (Corporación Humanas & CIASE 2017: 82). Thus, the same woman from FARC who told me “they [FARC women] went representing FARC [in general], because we do not differentiate” also observed she believed “our [female] comrades, as they became aware of what was being done, were able to feel represented. And I believe that among the *farianas*... there is huge appreciation for Victoria Sandino, for all she did” (Interview 10).

It is thus interesting to note that neither the women working in both delegations nor those groups of women seeking representation made explicit, individual representative claims concerning the work of such plenipotentiaries at table. Eventually, however, they (especially Riveros and Sandino, who remained at the table until the end and were in charge of the Gender Sub-commission) grew to be considered liaisons and allies of women's agendas, working strategically with the Sub-commission to make sure women's rights would make it into agreements. Since both were working simultaneously at the main negotiating table and the Gender Sub-commission, their work and intermediation was key. As a civil society representative told me, then, with time

the movement began to recognize in them [the negotiators] the commitment of wanting to ally with the movement, of wanting to position its demands. I don't know if we *always* felt represented by them, but I do believe that we grew to recognize the

effort they were making to position the women's agenda at the negotiating table (Interview 3).

In this sense, although individualized representative claims never came up, we can see that women sometimes made them in a toned down, more collectivized logic that referred primarily to the content of the accords or the sub-commission as an entity, not the women behind them. A government official who worked at the Sub-commission said, for instance, "I don't think we represented anyone, but what we tried to do was translate everything they wanted into specific measures in the actual text" (Interview 2). A woman from FARC, in turn, told me the following:

I believe we did represent a few important sectors related to social organizations, which for years have gathered the needs, the flags of women. In La Habana what we did was almost serve as a bridge between these organizations and what was agreed (Interview 8).

This is in line with the answer I got most often when I asked women if they felt personally represented by the process; they generally responded they did not feel represented by those women *personally*, but they did feel represented by the agendas they took to the table and the results achieved in negotiations in terms of gender.

Whereas in the relationship between women's movements and delegates there was reluctance and cautiousness to talk about representation, when it came to the representative value of women's movements, there were no controversies. In an inversion of usual associations concerning political representation and participation, it is in relation to women's social movements that the language of representation seemed most accepted. While civil society is not usually seen as a realm of representative engagement, the discourse across different collectivities considered in the fieldwork tended to place civil society representative attachments as the most genuine ones and the only ones that truly echoed societal voices. This did not mean, of course, that the civil society women who did get to work directly with the table were considered to represent all Colombian women – they merely were perceived as unequivocally representing those groups and organizations from which they came from, in particular those coming from the regions.

In the specific case of the women's movement, however, one can hardly exaggerate the level of diversity found in Colombia – different organizations tend to have very different backgrounds and conceptions of politics, peace and the role of women in society. As expected, this made the choice of the organizations that got to meet with the delegations to discuss gender issues a controverted one. At the same time, different interviewees from different affiliations pondered that a few traditional and consolidated organizations were natural choices for this. An

interviewee who worked in a Colombian women's organization at the time argued that "the organizations that got to go were the organizations that have worked all their lives for the women in this country, that is, one can agree or not with their positions, or can feel that some others were missing, but the ones that did go also had their place in Havana" (Interview 3). These include, for example, NGOs such as *Casa de la Mujer*, *Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres*, *Corporación Humanas* and *Sisma Mujer*¹⁷⁰.

It was also common, as one would expect, for organizations to "self-select" and step forward to reclaim previously denied voice and space. The group of included organizations thus ultimately depended both on a method of selection reliant on perceived merit and diversity of participants, as well as the self-selection push (or representative claims) made by organizations that were then acting in coordination. In Saward's words, we may say these women were making claims rooted on expertise and special credentials, as well as on the necessity of including wider interests and new voices to the process. They were thus relying, if not on formal authorization, on the authenticity of their trajectories as activists for women's rights.

For "beyond the state" forms of representation, as discussed earlier, issues of representativeness and accountability become especially neuralgic. So, despite the merit perceived in sending organizations that accumulated decades of experience and activism – and the fact that some, like *Ruta Pacífica*, develop solid work in the regions –, I also came across comments pointing out the privileged background of Bogotá-based organizations, the fact that they had access to structure and foreign funding, versus the difficulties encountered by women in the regions. For Saward, this would mean admitting representative claims may have silencing effects, and it should be noted that, in the context of an armed conflict, in which often there is a threat to people's lives, the capacity of reading back claims by less privileged sectors of society will most certainly be very reduced in comparison to less violent contexts. For this same reason, positional advantages that are the very condition for representative relationships to occur may not be accompanied by wide knowledge/acceptance of representation or the raising of constraints to its activity. As Squires reminds us, seeing representation under this lens contributes towards "analysing and understanding the *process* of political claims-making, and the questions it raises concerning nature of the *power* relations

¹⁷⁰ For a full list of attending organizations see Alto Comisionado 2018a.

that shape the productive and disciplinary manifestations of this claims-making process” (2008: 200).

Having said the above, the framework of representation mobilized here also sees it as a disputed and back-and-forth process. Given the limited possibilities offered by a bilateral negotiation that was designed to be removed from Colombia’s reality, one could also argue that the women involved – negotiators, delegates, international supporters and civil society actors – strived for variety and transparency of representation in inclusive initiatives. There was a clear discursive articulation towards making a counterpoint to hegemonic discourses on women and their place both in conflict and in peacemaking, as well as towards agreeing on a “bare minimum” on women’s rights and grievances that needed to make it into the accords. Despite the glaring differences among women across all these different subject positions, therefore, equivalence moves brought them together. Among Colombian women’s movements, as we have seen above, moments of coordination such as this one are not new. Their reach, flexibility and experience allow for such coordination, even though, as pointed out by Lamus above, moments such as these tend to be followed by disagreement and estrangement.

Perhaps there is no better example of such equivalence movement among women than the relationship of respect and alliance developed between delegates from both sides within the Gender Sub-commission. Indeed, in accounts I heard from both members of the government and the FARC, women were unanimous in explaining that, past initial stages of mutual suspicion and despite expected disagreements concerning the content and wording of the agreements, they genuinely developed a relationship of trust and respect. It was not unusual for FARC women to make complimentary comments on specific government delegates and vice-versa. Their work came to be reckoned as collective to a point that the whole commission was eventually nicknamed “*la subgénero*” (“the subgender”), with no distinctions made between the two teams.

Following Saward’s observation that in nonelectoral cases representation sometimes comes in a certain *mode*, not necessarily as a personified representative, it might be said that mainly due to its functioning dynamics, the Gender Sub-commission itself acquired representative recognition throughout time. In this view, the Sub-commission became a “disembodied” locus of representation, not a collection of individual representatives. This of course does not mean that this is an indisputable truth and all Colombian women were content to accept such representation; as all representative forms, it unfolded amidst a

back-and-forth making and acceptance or rejection of claims. It is therefore interesting to highlight that the sense of representation seen among FARC women

was not initially observed among the Government delegation women. Nonetheless, within the framework of the Subcommittee on Gender, they gradually began to develop a similar sense of collective responsibility vis-à-vis Colombian women. Given that the Subcommittee became the concrete possibility of having women's needs, mainly those of female victims, included in the negotiation agenda, the participating women came to see themselves, in different ways, as representatives of Colombian women writ large and responsible for conveying the voice of women's organizations (Corporación Humanas & CIASE 2017: 82).

In a similar fashion, the concerted action of social movements through the Gender Sub-commission "put pressure on the process to represent [their] interests, and the fact that ... the dialogue with the social movement allows the opening of spaces to incorporate the gender approach in the negotiations indicates an important advance in representation" (Chaparro González & Martínez Osorio 2016: 72).

The making and acceptance or rejection of representative claims in the context of the Havana talks developed in a unique manner, mainly due to the ambiguity seen in the employment of the representative lexicon when it came to society and the cautionousness that prevented and discouraged representative claims from individual women in decision-making positions. Representative claims did exist, however, and came in a collectivized form, be it concerning social movements and their articulations or the sub-commission as a group. At times they escaped usual formats in which the subject and the maker of the claims are the same person, i.e., the person making the claim is also the subject supposedly representing the group of people she delineated as her object of representation. But the claim-maker and the subject do not necessarily need to be the same person or group of people, and this is clear from the discourse of women's movements, which simultaneously claimed to represent their social bases (being both maker and subject) and called upon women in Havana, especially those in the sub-commission, to represent their agendas (thus being the claim makers of a subject other than themselves).

Women in decision-making positions, in turn, were more careful about making explicit representative claims, at the same time that a representative logic slipped in between the lines of their discourse, even as they declined having played a representative role in their work. Thus, at the same time that they denied being anyone's representatives, they explained that they did everything in their power to incorporate women's organizations' grievances into the accord. The audience of all representative claims made by women's movements included not only the women at the table, but also both delegations in their entirety, international actors

and Colombian women overall. While directing their claims to Colombian women as an audience also intended for larger sectors of society beyond articulated women to integrate the constituency of their agendas, the plebiscite later showed that the reach of their claims in society was limited.

This discussion is important to understand how society is grouped and re-grouped in contexts of peace processes. Political inclusion is not a static happening, a definitive snapshot; it happens through the always dynamic and tense constitution of groups which interact in trying to influence politics, and the way they come together in alliances or are estranged by disagreement also influences the emergence or renewal of exclusory patterns in society. As already argued back in Chapter 4, groups are not formed and later represented; they emerge *through* political representation. The women engaged with the process, many of which had a long history of activism for women's rights, articulated and constituted themselves in new and diverse ways while aiming to influence the process – the *Mujeres por la Paz* initiative, the *Cumbre de las Mujeres*, the *5 claves* initiative, for example, were all new and process-driven, despite involving previously consolidated actors. Thus, women's peace narratives, even the ones that started being written decades earlier, were still being constituted and re-constituted as the negotiations unfolded.

Women's representation happened through the repeated constitution and reshaping of representatives and represented at different levels, which gathered under the single discursive articulation concerning the importance of the inclusion of women in the process. The Sub-commission's efforts to echo women's voices and transmit their grievances to the negotiation table, trying to conciliate the two through the gender perspective, indeed made them a key link in a *diffuse chain of representative claims* running from local women's organizations in the regions all the way up to the negotiating table in Havana. In other words, civil society leaders made claims to represent their specific social bases before the Sub-commission; the Sub-commission served as a disembodied, collective representative of women's organizations before the negotiation table; and, finally, Riveros and Sandino, as members of both the Sub-commission and the main negotiating table, acted as representatives of the work of the Sub-commission's delegates before the (mostly male) negotiators.

6.3

“No queremos ser pactadas sino pactantes”: the gender perspective and representation as foundation

This section will analyze the gender perspective utilized in the work of the Gender Sub-commission so as to assess women’s efforts to be represented as contractarians in Colombia’s social contract renewal, considering in particular that “they asserted their right to take part on the social contract being negotiated in Havana, criticizing the patriarchal structures that marginalized them and acted upon them with violence” (Céspedes-Báez & Ruiz 2018: 94). I will examine above all the text of the agreements themselves and the dynamics behind their elaboration, enquiring into how the gender perspective managed to insert women at the core of the agreement and under which kinds of discourses and disputes. Looking at the final agreement, it is clear that the adoption of a gender perspective indeed made women’s issues and rights crosscut all six points of the agenda. It went far beyond the mere use of inclusive wording and generic statements of gender equality, indeed committing to reflect women’s historical struggles concerning the agenda.

On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that the detachment of the discussion of gender topics from the main negotiating table, as well as the Sub-commission’s inability to propose new measures beyond the ones coming out of the table, placed in it a “political ceiling” that cannot be lost from sight. In other words, the gender-related measures in the agreement are located within a specific political order and were elaborated so as not to question it. This is intricately connected to the insistence especially on the government’s part that the Sub-commission was a technical entity doing technical work. The “political ceiling” placed in the displacement potential of the gender agenda became evident in the imposed renegotiation of gender provisions following the defeat of the first version of the agreement at the polls. With all this in mind, it is also important to enquire which exclusions are attached to the inclusion achieved by women in Havana and how the results obtained by women in the accord will be carried over to its long-term implementation.

6.3.1

Women’s representation in the peace agreement

Women's efforts to insert themselves into state structures and institutions in their own terms did not begin in Havana. As discussed above, they have been trying to enter and influence the Colombian state in important ways at least since the 1991 Constitution. An example of feminist and women's movements' discursive engagement with the idea of foundational representation was their promotion, in 2002, of a *Constituyente Emancipatoria de Mujeres* (Women's Emancipatory Constituent). The initiative, which gathered 198 delegates, governmental authorities and political and social representatives, aimed among other things at creating a basic women's agenda for peace (Delgado 2017: 236). Their holding of a "women's constituent" is symbolic of their intention not to let peace be drawn and constructed in the country without them being present and accepted as contractarians. Other examples of their engagement with peace-related founding measures prior to the Havana talks include their effort to have transitional legal framework laws such as the *Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras* (Victims and Land Restitution Law, Ley 1448 of 2011) reflect and address the specific challenges experienced by women in the conflict (Benjumea & Rodríguez 2011, Rettberg 2015).

The legal stability and constitutional grounding of the *Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace* were sought through both domestic and international methods of validation. On the international front, the parties pursued recognition of the accord as a "special agreement" under the auspices of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; they also foresaw a unilateral presidential declaration towards the UN, which would welcome the agreement, associate it with UNSC Resolution 2261¹⁷¹ and generate an official Security Council document annexing and validating it (Betancur Restrepo 2016, Alto Comisionado 2018b: 298, GSUM 2016b). In the domestic scenario, the agreement's validation under the Geneva Conventions would translate as its reception in a "constitutional block"; in practice, however, the defeat of the original agreement in the plebiscite demanded adjustments to this strategy¹⁷², and "[t]he revised accord only gives constitutional status to the parts of the accord that have to do with human rights and international humanitarian law" (WOLA 2016).

Given the existence of a solid constitutional order in the country despite the extended armed conflict, the peace process with the FARC was never intended as

¹⁷¹ UNSC Resolution 2261 established a UN monitoring and verification mission to accompany the laying down of weapons by the FARC. Available at: [https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2261\(2016\)](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2261(2016)) (accessed December 12, 2020).

¹⁷² Regarding the legal status of the accord in Colombia see Orozco 2018.

a complete overhaul of the state structure; however, it did provide a “restart opportunity” in fundamental aspects of society, creating a wide array of new state institutions at different levels, foreseeing the approval of new normative bases within domestic law, and creating a long-term plan of implementation set to influence Colombian politics for decades to come¹⁷³. Faced with the opportunity to take part in this process, women set out to avoid a “sexual contract” (Pateman 1970) that would, through both silence and words, reconstitute and reinforce their oppression. In general, the women engaged with the process understood the gender perspective “as a fair minimum of women’s representation because ... [it] would be structurally incorporated into the state and, with this, the conditions would be created to challenge traditional gender arrangements and promote fairer and more equitable social pacts that are stable over time” (Chaparro González & Martínez Osorio 2016: 86).

As mentioned earlier, the creation of the Gender Subcommittee had to do with the perception that women’s presence among plenipotentiaries and action through civil society would not be enough for the agreement to actually reflect and address their grievances, treating them as relevant actors for the peace process in all its stages. Consistent with the process’s overall discourse on inclusion, the elaboration of the accords was guided by a territorial, differential and gender-focused approach (Echavarría Alvarez et al 2020). In other words, it not only admitted the need to address land-related issues at the local level, paying attention to regional patterns and specificities¹⁷⁴, but also acknowledged that parts of the population have been made especially vulnerable by the conflict and therefore should receive differential attention in the peace process. As part of such differential approach to the construction of the agreement, the gender perspective became “an *articulating principle*, associated with equal rights between men and women and the need to guarantee affirmative measures to promote equality, the participation of women ... and the recognition of the victimization of women due to the conflict” (UN Women 2018: 3, added emphasis).

The agreement provided its own definition of *enfoque de género* and determined that it must be applied in a cross-cutting manner in its implementation:

In this Agreement, the approach to gender means recognition of equal rights for men and women and the special circumstances of each person, especially those of women, regardless of their marital status, life cycle and family and community

¹⁷³ For an analysis of the interaction between the introduction of a transitional justice system and the existing constitutional order in Colombia, see Bernal-Pulido 2014, Bell 2016 and Nathan 2020.

¹⁷⁴ The territorial approach entails “an adequate division of the national territory centered on the regions, with harmonious settlement; coupled with consideration of economic and cultural vectors, which recognizes the social construction of space and the relationships between man and earth, society and nature” (Borja 2017: 62).

relationships, as enjoying rights and special constitutional protection. In particular, it implies the need to guarantee affirmative measures to promote that equality, active participation by women and their organisations in peacebuilding and recognition of the victimisation of women as a result of the conflict (Final Agreement 2016: 204).

The application of the gender focus is reflected in different types of measures throughout the accord, which may be said to be organized around four central ideas: (i) the enjoyment of equal rights between men and women; (ii) the establishment of affirmative measures that guarantee a differential approach to gender; (iii) the recognition of the disproportionate impact of the conflict over women; and (iv) the inclusion and security of women's equal political participation (Kroc 2020a: 11).

The negotiating table also delineated the priorities of application for the gender approach within the negotiation agenda by enunciating its *eight main thematic axes*:

access and formalization of rural property under equal conditions; guarantee of the economic, social and cultural rights of women and people with diverse sexual identities in the rural sector; promotion of women's participation in spaces of representation, decision-making and conflict resolution; prevention and protection measures that address the specific risks of women; access to truth, justice and guarantees of non-repetition; public recognition, non-stigmatization and dissemination of the work carried out by women as 'political subjects'; institutional management for the strengthening of women's organizations and LGBTI movements for their political and social participation; and disaggregated information systems (Alto Comisionado 2018a: 389).

Ultimately, gender-related measures ran through the whole text of the agreement and were accounted for in diverse manners. UN Women (2018) counted one hundred gender measures in the accord. In a joint report, *Sisma Mujer, Corporación Humanas* and the *Red Nacional de Mujeres* (2017) listed 122. The Framework Plan for Implementation (PMI) – “a national government policy document that identifies agencies responsible for implementing provisions, indicators used to measure advances, and timelines for over 15 years” (Kroc 2020a: 7) – listed 51 gender indicators based on the text of the agreement.

The Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies – which as accorded in the agreement itself is taking part in the monitoring of its implementation – identified a total of 578 stipulations in the agreement, 130 (or 22.5%) of which were considered to have a gender perspective (2020: 5). These are distributed among all six points of the agenda – 39 are on rural reform; 31 on political participation; 24 on the end of the conflict; 19 on the problem of illicit drugs; 11 on victims; and 6 on implementation, verification mechanisms and endorsement (Kroc 2020a). Furthermore, out of the 130 stipulations, 17 are considered to be “targeted towards improving women's political, social, and economic conditions”, while the remaining

113 “refer to gender perspective, women’s inclusion, and representation of women in mechanisms of implementation” (PRIO 2018).

Without aiming to exhaust all gender stipulations in the agreement, a brief illustration of how they include women is called for. In its first chapter, on Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR), the agreement “recognises the productive and reproductive role of women and thus their fundamental contribution to rural development and the rural economy”, vowing to “make every endeavour on their behalf and on that of the most vulnerable in society to guarantee conditions of well-being and dignity and to consolidate organisational and production methods” (Final Agreement 2016: 11). The text includes mechanisms to facilitate women’s access to land and property formalization, as well as specific measures to promote the voluntary return of displaced women to their homes. It also recognizes some of women’s challenges regarding health issues, food security and access to legal training and information in the countryside. Moreover, it foresees the participation of women’s organizations in institutions and programs such as the National Plans for Comprehensive Rural Reform and the Development Programs with a Territorial Focus (PDETs). Also importantly, the agreement devises participatory measures for women pertaining environmental zoning and conflict resolution mechanisms regarding land use and tenure.

Chapter 2, on political participation, admits that “there will be significant challenges in guaranteeing [women’s] right to participation” and thus “transforming these historical conditions will involve developing affirmative measures that will safeguard women’s participation in the various areas of political and social representation” (Final agreement 2016: 34). Women come through in stipulations aimed at guaranteeing the exercise of political opposition, for instance – the Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics incorporates special measures for women (p. 37) such as the requirement of specific information as to the risks and threats “concerning the participation and the political, social and community representation of women” (p. 40). Women’s balanced representation and participation in instances created by the agreement, such as the Special Transitory Peace Electoral Districts and the Territorial Planning Councils, are safeguarded by the text (p. 49, 55-56).

The chapter on the end of the conflict determines that “[e]very component of the reincorporation process shall have an equity-based approach, with a particular emphasis on women’s rights” (p. 69). It introduces security guarantees against criminal organizations that target human rights advocates, social and political movements, creating instances such as the National Commission on Security

Guarantees and the Special Investigation Unit, which must both incorporate women as participants and apply a gender perspective in their activities (p. 83, 85). Protective measures for FARC's new political movement, in particular psychosocial care measures for those who suffered attacks on their lives or physical safety, also include a gender-based approach.

The fourth chapter addresses the solution to the illicit drugs problem. The agreement makes a connection between criminal economies and marginalization, inequality and gender-based violence in rural areas of Colombia, arguing that these phenomena “[require] the training of women in the planning and monitoring of action to combat this kind of violence” (p. 104). The National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Crops Used for Illicit Purposes (NCPS), which is part of the CRR, has as one of its basic principles an equity-based approach according to the conditions in each territory – i.e., it must take into account economic, social and cultural issues of the territories contemplated in the program, “in particular of indigenous communities and communities of African descent, and of women in these communities and territories” (p. 109-10). Women’s participation is ensured in the planning, implementation and monitoring of crop substitution activities (p. 112). The agreement also addresses public health and drug use issues, with rehabilitation and reinsertion programs requiring a gender focus and prioritizing women, homeless people and prison populations in harm reduction actions. In the specific case of female drug users, “actions should take into account the relationship between illicit drug use and violence against women, especially domestic violence and sexual violence” (p. 126).

Chapter 5, on Victims, brought together a Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparations and Non-Recurrence made up by a few different judicial and extrajudicial mechanisms which, functioning in coordination, aimed to contemplate victims’ rights, hold perpetrators accountable and foster reconciliation, non-repetition and a transition towards peace (Sisma et al 2017: 52). The five main pillars of such system are: (i) the Truth Commission; (ii) the Unit for the Search for Persons deemed Missing; (iii) the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP in its Spanish acronym); (iv) Comprehensive reparation measures for peacebuilding; and (v) Guarantees of non-recurrence. Across all instances, there is the stipulation of women’s equitable participation and the adoption of a gender approach. In part as a result of specific lobbying by women’s organizations, especially the *5 claves* initiative, as highlighted above, the issue of sexual violence received special attention in the agreement.

The Truth Commission, for instance, was tasked with ensuring a transversal gender-based approach in its work

by creating a gender-based task force in charge of specific technical tasks, investigation and holding of hearings, *inter alia*. This task force will not be the only one addressing this topic, but it shall bear the responsibility for reviewing methodologies in order to ensure that all the Commission's instruments include this approach, and for liaising with women's and LGBTI organisations (Final agreement 2016: 146).

The agreement also foresees equal participation between men and women among the selected commissioners (p. 147). For the JEP, in turn, it singles out sexual violence as ineligible for amnesty or pardon alongside a number of other serious crimes such as torture, genocide and crimes against humanity (p. 161). It also determined that the JEP's Investigation and Prosecution Unit would have a special team for cases of sexual violence (p. 179).

Finally, Chapter 6 addresses implementation, verification and public endorsement, creating the institutional structure for such tasks, in particular the Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CMPVI). Apart from being where the parties provide us with their above-cited definition of *enfoque de género*, there are three main gender-related measures in this chapter that deserve attention. First, there was the creation of a Special Forum (*Instancia Especial*) made up by representatives of six national and regional women's organizations, charged with maintaining a permanent dialogue with the CMPVI so as to contribute towards the maintenance of the gender approach and the guarantee of women's rights (UN Women 2018: 39). The agreement determines that the composition of this forum shall "be defined in consultation with the women's organizations and in the context of the CMPVI" (Final Agreement 2016: 207). Secondly, the agreement decides that the Framework Plan for Implementation (PMI) shall "include as a priority the practical and strategic needs of women, identifying the multiple discriminations that must be addressed for the execution of the agreements" (p. 208). Lastly, it is also important to underline that the agreement includes within its international accompaniment component an instance dedicated to following the gender approach. It is made up by UN Women, the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) and Sweden (p. 228-9).

When I asked interviewees from different backgrounds – the government, FARC, civil society – which of the agenda topics were affected the most by the gender perspective, their answers were in general cohesive in that women's presence was felt the most in the texts of the agreements on comprehensive rural

reform and victims. Since these issues were seen as the ones most crucially affecting women in the context of the conflict – they are directly related to displacement and gender-related violence, as discussed above –, this result was treated as natural by the interviewees. Thus, a member of the Sub-commission summarized an argument I heard often in the interviews:

I believe that the [agenda topics] most affected [by the gender perspective] were undoubtedly number 1, for rural and comprehensive development, where there was a very important work to recognize the intersectionalities of rural women, and number 5, definitely, because that touches the heart of the work of many women's organizations and feminists, ... particularly sexual violence, which is the violence that par excellence affects women in the context of the conflict. I believe that these two were the ones who were most affected by the work of the sub-commission (Interview 11).

Although some interviewees had criticisms regarding the space occupied by gender in the agreements on political participation and illegal drugs, which were deemed as lacking in some respects in relation to gender provisions, the topic considered most problematic gender-wise by far was the one on the end of the conflict (point 3). Ending the conflict, negotiating the ceasefire and FARC's *dejación de armas* and reintegration into Colombian society were too sensitive an issue to allow much room of maneuver for women, according to most interviewees. A couple of them underlined that this had to do not only with the strategic nature of the topic, but also the fact that it was too technical and intricate¹⁷⁵. As a result, the gender stipulations in this specific agreement turned out too generic, leaving to each implementing entity the task of defining how to materialize them afterwards. As another government official explains:

[O]bviously, the most difficult to mainstream was point 3, the end of the conflict. We may say that all components of the comprehensive security system, the early warning system, protection of communities, have a gender perspective. However, in point 3, it is not said very well *how*. For example, in section 3.2, on reincorporation, it says 'the gender approach must be taken into account, and especially the rights of women.' But it doesn't say *how*. So, point 3 was mainstreamed, but the implementation implies that there has to be a development of each entity and each person responsible for how the gender approach is carried out on this point (Interview 5).

She sees a sharp contrast, in this sense, between the measures from point 3 and those concerning rural reform – the latter's measures are specific and palpable, e.g., prioritizing head-of-household mothers in land distributing measures, as opposed to the vagueness found in chapter 3.

¹⁷⁵ It is interesting to point out that a couple of members of the Gender Sub-Commission were also part of the Technical Sub-commission for the End of the Conflict and worked to try and insert a gender perspective into the provisions coming out of there as well. On FARC's side, there was Erika Montero; on the government's side, there was Juanita Millán, a ship lieutenant that is seen by many as key to the Gender Sub-commission's work.

One important consequence of this was that gender-specific reincorporation measures for FARC women fell a lot short from what they would have wanted. A FARC member argued, for example, that “there are a few things on the political, economic and social reincorporation of ex-combatant women that needed further consolidation” (Interview 10). Another one observed that “the topic of reincorporation was not specified and ended up too dispersed” (Interview 12). It also came up in the interviews that, especially regarding chapters 5 and 6 of the agreement, there was a timing issue that precluded a more thoughtful application of the gender perspective. The last few months of negotiations were surrounded by pressure for a final agreement to be reached, which helps to explain the vaguer gender provisions in these two chapters in general and within reincorporation measures in particular. Thus, according to a government official,

...it was one of the last months of negotiation, and the *subgénero* was working differently, we had already delivered the three previous points, and there was a huge discussion [at the main negotiating table] regarding the collective model [for reincorporation], how the reincorporation was going to take place, and the gender issue began to be diluted, diluted, diluted, and it became... minimal. At least the *jefas* [Riveros and Sandino] were there to say ‘everything has to be with a gender perspective’, and it was from there that we tied ourselves for the entire implementation now (Interview 2).

It is thus interesting to note that the effect of the gender perspective over the different topics of the agenda had to do not only with women’s presence at the table and how they shaped their lobbying strategies, but also with timing, thematic and methodological issues. When I asked interviewees about their takeaways from the negotiations, one of the things I heard the most was that in future processes they need to make sure women are present at the table from the very beginning. At the same time, one of the chapters they see as most successful in terms of gender mainstreaming – the one on rural reform – was actually negotiated before women plenipotentiaries were appointed and the sub-commission was created. The debates on the last two points in the agenda already counted upon the presence and pressure of women at the table, but the accords remained impervious to them due to the issues described above. Although they were not there to try and shape the accord on rural reform *as it was negotiated*, the fact that they had the time and opportunity to thoroughly work on it reportedly made a difference in the end¹⁷⁶. In crucial moments, such as the ones in which the table rushed to close points 5 and 6, it certainly becomes prominent that the gender perspective was something that *women* took upon themselves to uphold. Even

¹⁷⁶ The point on victims, on the other hand, seems to stand in a league of its own, considering it was the point that took the most time to be negotiated – over 18 months –, and was at the heart of women’s lobbying for representation.

though some of the women interviewed observed fellow delegates and negotiators grew to respect and some, like Humberto de la Calle and Sergio Jaramillo, even became enthusiasts of the gender perspective (Interview 11), it clearly was not a priority for the men, much less a task they viewed as their own.

6.3.2

The gender perspective, women and the Colombian social contract

The reflection above leads to another crucial discussion – the one on the *political role* of female negotiators, the gender sub-commission and the gender perspective in the Havana Dialogues. In assessing women’s place in the accord as *contractarians*, one must not forget the sub-commission’s spatial separation from the main negotiating table, as well as its limited scope of action – i.e., the fact it strictly reviewed the content decided on by negotiators in order to insert a gender perspective but was not part of negotiations and could not propose additional measures. In my interviews, these features were at times seen as having positively contributed to women’s impact over the accords – in this perspective, had gender remained an issue to be dealt with at the main table, it might have continued being simply sidelined and ignored, so creating a Sub-commission made up almost entirely by women seemed like a fitting solution for this problem. The limiting of the gender perspective to already closed, non-changeable decisions also may have helped contain the main table’s conflicts from leaking to the Sub-commission, and probably made it easier for women from both delegations to work as a team with common objectives (Interview 2, Interview 15).

On the other hand, this narrow and isolated scope of action, as opposed to a negotiation that already took gender into serious consideration *as it happened*, placed a political ceiling on how far women could go with their demands. This tension between having gender issues be present and taken into account in negotiations versus serving as a “lens” that is placed afterwards over closed agreements was clearly expressed in the reasoning of a government official I interviewed. It is worth quoting her at length:

... I think that the exercise of having done it technically was good. And it made things much easier. But if I have to think about what is correct ... it seems to me that it is not the correct way of doing things. That it is better from the beginning to be thinking *with the gender approach*, than to have to mainstream the gender approach after reaching the agreements. So I would think it would be much better to have those technical teams supporting the negotiations from the beginning, to also think in key guarantees of rights for women. ... [I]t seems to me that in the logic of construction of any agreement it is essential to be thinking [about gender] from the beginning, because perhaps we would have also addressed other problems that we did not

address. In the initial agenda, as we built the points, there was no room ... It's what I am telling you, we already had agreements on some points, and it was like, "how to put the gender focus in those agreements", but they were not agreements also designed in the logic of specific guarantees for women. They were more about how to include those guarantees in what already existed... One would have to do an exercise later, which would be very nice, to [see] other things that did not make it because [the agreement] was already limited to certain topics (Interview 15).

Even within the delimited scope of action attributed to the gender perspective there was intense internal negotiation between the sub-commission's members and the main negotiating table; as a member of a women's organization recounts, a lot of what was proposed either never made it into the agreements or was eliminated following initial inclusion into the text. Thus, "there were many things that the women say that they were struggling to keep in the text a day before closing the agreement and publishing it, while they [the negotiators] were taking them out". Moreover, "[t]here were measures that they managed to get included, but then were taken out [by the main table] without consulting them" (Interview 3). In her opinion, such dynamics partly explain why gender stipulations are not evenly distributed across the accords. Thus, it is clear that "the state tends to cut relations with the [women's] movement when the agendas it promotes are perceived as 'subversive' or dangerous for maintenance of the status quo" (Chaparro González & Martínez Osorio 2016: 81).

Precisely because the Sub-commission grew into a representative role, the insistence on its *technical character*, especially by members of the government, is another point that needs further reflection. There was often emphasis on the technical character of the gender approach in the sense that women of the *subgénero* needed as a group to "learn how to mainstream gender", relying for this on the support of international gender experts. Behind the focus on specific technical details is a concern that gender measures will either become blanket statements with little or no practical impact, as discussed in Chapter 4, or aim so high that they never leave paper. There was clear preoccupation, therefore, that "every gender inclusion we made in the text was supported by a *real need*" (Interview 2, my emphasis).

For this reason, I often heard in my interviews that the gender sub-commission's work was not political and instead involved meticulous research on specific needs and consultations on the state's capabilities to carry out gender measures. One example that stuck with me was a matter as seemingly simple as the emission of personal IDs for women, especially in the countryside, where they may go a lifetime without one. Lacking an identification document for these women means that "[they] do not exist for the system, they do not have health, social

security, a bank account... many of their husbands have been murdered so they will not be able to claim land because they do not exist for the system” (Interview 2). As a consequence, they would lag behind in benefits from agreement provisions such as land formalization campaigns and political participation initiatives. In the end, the agreement determined the realization of “a nationwide mass ID-issuance campaign, prioritising marginalised and rural zones, particularly those most affected by the conflict and neglect, and *providing measures to facilitate access to this campaign by rural women*” (Final agreement 2016: 52, added emphasis).

Thus, according to Interviewee 2, the process of including gender stipulations started with the identification of “real needs”; continued with sorting out proposals to address them and calling responsible state entities to receive information on state capabilities; and only then moved on to an internal negotiation in the sub-commission as to how such needs would be treated in the text. In short, their work was a constant interplay between proposals from women’s organizations, initiatives from the parties, the advice they received from experts and the research they carried out. The final step of the process, of course, was convincing negotiators of each measure’s necessity. The adoption of technical discourses with their superiors at this stage served as a persuasion strategy, since politicized argumentations repealed them and knowingly left them more inclined towards rejecting women’s suggested measures.

In other words, [we would say] ‘there is a huge exclusion here. If we do not manage to include identification documents for peasant women, this will cost much more time, to be able to access this’... And they would say ‘that’s fine, do it’. Because it had fundamental technical and strategic support, which was to have women who participate, who are included, organized, it was something that serves the country, democracy, etc. ... But if we went and said ‘peasant women have rights’, this kind of speech, [they would say no]. So, we had to have a lot of technical capacity within that team, because if not the men... Just because it is important, they will not do it. They have to understand why you want to do all that. If not, they won’t do it (Interview 2).

On the other hand, we cannot lose from sight that technical decisions are made within political frameworks. Framing gender mainstreaming as technical can be depoliticizing if it works to neutralize or conceal specific political choices, treating them as “objective” or “the available within the realm of the possible”. Despite the representative potential based on “expertise and special credentials”, as underlined by Saward, and the urgency of having gender experts in contexts like these, seeing an instance such as the Sub-commission as solely technical may work to veil the political limitations of activism and coordination, blinding us to fundamental power dynamics in the construction of peace.

Technical expertise can therefore be viewed as a moment within the government's nodal point of inclusion, which in turn is consistent with international vocabularies for peace alongside the production of "lessons learned" and "best practices", for example. The association between inclusion and technical expertise is consistent with usual interpretations of societal inclusion as a "necessary disturbance". Political standings are ruled out as distressing of the goals of the peace process, and to be useful or count as "necessary", inclusion must be viewed as orderly and as "having something to add" to negotiations. As O'Rourke reminds us, however, there is an implicit normativity in saying that something is not political, which implies the acceptance of an indeed *political* order as neutral. In this sense, what I am calling the "political ceiling" experienced by the Gender Sub-commission is actually symptomatic of the hegemonic accommodation between different grammars of peace and the articulation of women's inclusion that was ultimately adopted in official discourse. Such accommodation implies the depoliticization of women's inclusion and a *political* selectivity of what can be "technical" and what should be treated as a disruption. Recognizing that there is in fact representation in initiatives like this one might be important to elucidate the politics within expertise (Leander & Waeber 2019: 10) and to question this political ceiling placed on women in the future.

The political character of the gender perspective was perhaps made most evident by the plebiscite conundrum and the "gender ideology" issue. As it became clear in the aftermath of the result of the vote, part of the agreement's opposers relied on a disinformation campaign in which the gender perspective of the accords was framed as a "gender ideology" that represented a threat to traditional family and religious values in Colombia¹⁷⁷. The main spokespeople of such discourse were religious leaderships such as Pastor Eduardo Cañas Estrada, member of the Manantial Evangelical Christian Church in Bogotá, and former Attorney General Alejandro Ordoñez. In this view, then, "[t]he use of the term gender and the application of its underlying ideology [called] for a new way of understanding the person, the family, society, freedom, autonomy, fundamental rights and even the duties of the state" (Cárdenas 2016, quoted in Caldera 2017: 98).

From this excerpt we can see that such discourse spoke a language of foundational representation, claiming that the social contract would be overhauled in terms deemed detrimental to traditional values. Even though the opposition had refused to participate in the negotiations, when they got to sit down with the parties

¹⁷⁷ For more detailed analyses of how the "gender ideology" discourse unfolded, see Beltrán & Creely 2018, Maier 2019, Muelle 2017, Rondón 2017.

post-referendum to review the agreement, what they did seek was to see themselves in the text – which, for them, necessarily entailed eliminating from the agreement what they claimed was harmful to their principles. Their discourse consequently appealed to differences and equivalences between subject positions, that is, attempted to create equivalences between themselves and their target audience by accentuating their difference from feminist and LGBTI communities, relying in particular on sexist and homophobic arguments to do so. Such discursive articulation and the representative claims they sent out were picked up and emulated by part of Colombian society, as the result of the plebiscite demonstrated.

On the reverse side of this coin is a common takeaway narrated by the women I interviewed – they often listed as a lesson learned from the process that communication strategies are essential for the work of the gender perspective to be understood and backed by society. While they worried with pedagogy and worked to guarantee the support of important figures of the process, judging that including women’s rights into the agreement was self-evident in its advantages before society, they lost the social media battle. As they realized afterwards, they had been “preaching to the choir” instead of extending their social support. In Saward’s terms, their representative claims needed to be reoriented and reshaped in order to reach a wider audience and, ideally, also extend the constituency accepting their claims.

The agreement originally signed in Cartagena in September 2016 amid a climate of celebration was renegotiated and signed a second time in November, in a low-profile and closed ceremony held at the Colón Theatre in Bogotá. As a response to the grievances of religious sectors, the second version of the agreement included mentions of respect for family and for religious freedom and practice¹⁷⁸ (PRIO 2016: 3). For instance, the following provision was added to Chapter 6:

Nothing contained in the Final Agreement shall be understood or interpreted as denying, restricting or infringing the rights of individuals, regardless of their gender, age, religious beliefs, opinions, ethnic identity, on account of their membership of the LGBTI community, or for any other reason; nor shall it be understood or interpreted as denying, restricting or infringing the right to unhindered development of the personality or the right to freedom of conscience (Final agreement 2016: 204).

Interpretations of the renegotiation’s impact over the gender perspective of the accord vary. Hilde Salvesen, a Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official and a member of the Norwegian facilitation team during negotiations, declared that

¹⁷⁸ For a comparison between the first and second version of the agreements, see <https://draftable.com/compare/JjypTOKnafBktqvc> (accessed December 18, 2020).

“[she] was concerned that the gender perspective would be something the negotiating parties would easily give away. But ... in many ways it’s now better than it was” (PRIO 2016). Salvesen believes it to be the case because, in order to clarify the agreement’s gender stipulations for the opposition, they had to become more specific than they were in the original text. In a similar vein, an article from WOLA argues that “[w]ithout changing its fundamental meaning, the new accord tightens up language on gender equity in order to avoid further misinterpretation by social conservatives” (2016). In my interviews, it also came up that the renegotiation ended up representing “extra time” and becoming an opportunity not only to strengthen points that were weak in the original text, but also to include new measures (Interview 2).

Others, in turn, are more critical of the adjustments the agreement suffered, arguing that its measures went on to focus more on “women and men” and less on gender in its wider diversity (Contreras 2017: 217). For Diana Gómez Correal, the revised agreement “replaced [the differential and gender perspective] by a more general and abstract vision that takes up the modern universal subject, speaking of ‘the inalienable rights of the person’” (2017: 16). The language of the final agreement thus reflects this – some mentions of “gender” were substituted by “equality between men and women” or “sex”; the expression “LGBTI people” was erased from some passages and substituted several times by “groups and people in conditions of vulnerability and excluded sectors”; some uses of “gender-based violence” were changed to “violence against women”; etc. (Contreras 2017: 217).

It is also noteworthy that the definition of *enfoque de género* quoted above did not exist in the original text and is included in this scenario, which explains its wording (“[it] means recognition of equal rights for *men and women*”) and the erasure of the LGBTI community from it. Therefore, Contreras concludes that while the original text “understood gender beyond women’s rights”, in the second version “the meaning of ‘gender approach’ is expressly limited and its reference is excluded in a series of points – such as the special mention of LGBTI people in the point of political participation – or is limited and nuanced in others” (2017: 217).

For other authors, still, the original agreement’s gender approach already had limitations, which in turn were reflected and made more evident in the renegotiation. Céspedes-Báez & Ruiz (2018) contend that there was an excessive focus on women as victims of sexual violence, which became a threshold for the gender approach and led to a one-dimensional image of them and their sexuality. Céspedes-Báez (2017) argued elsewhere that this actually preceded the Havana talks – by the time women engaged with the parties in their search for inclusion in

the negotiations, an interpretation that laid sexual violence in the center of Colombian women's experience of the conflict was already in place, consolidated by the work of women's organizations in their legal activism before the state since the late 1990s.

Whereas women made an effort to contest masculine hegemony by reclaiming social, economic and political rights, their framing in the process reportedly failed to move past debates of participation and victimhood. In this sense, “[t]he selective engagement of the negotiating team with certain gender issues unveils the pervasive character in which silence played a role in the replication of male privilege and power” (Céspedes-Báez & Ruiz 2018: 104-5). On top of this, the renegotiation brought about a deeper “domestication” and an “aseptic reading” of the gender perspective, which, demonized and under controversy, ran the risk of being treated as a depoliticized “descriptive category” moving forward (Céspedes-Báez 2017: 296).

In exploring the embedded tensions of the gender perspective adopted in the text, one should not lose from sight that “the discursive progress [of the agreement] was the result of a limited consensus between cosmopolitan elites and social and grassroots organisations knowledgeable of the evolution of perspectives in the peace research field” (Valenzuela 2019: 313). The dynamics between elite and grassroots actors thus led to the specific combination between “liberal peace” and “emancipatory” measures within the text of the agreement. As discussed briefly in the previous chapter, in practice these two orientations have some shared interests but also fundamental tensions that most definitely have an impact over the construction of a “resilient social contract” in Colombia moving forward.

The dynamics surrounding the gender perspective – and as a result also the kind of contractarian women got to be in the negotiations and the foundational representation that emerged from them – do not escape the logic described by Valenzuela. Within the second building block of the analytical framework proposed in Chapter 4, we can say that the adopted gender perspective combined integrationist and agenda-setting approaches despite women's overall push for a transformative one. It was integrationist – i.e., reduced to what Squires would call mere inclusion into an untouched status quo – especially due to the government's technical discourse and evidence-based orientation, which tried to close off political dissonance by denying it was political at all. The method itself chosen to insert a gender perspective into the agreement – a separate sub-commission working on drafts over which it had no final decision-making power – by definition fits within integrationist approaches.

It was also expressed as agenda-setting mainstreaming, which does recognize itself as political, with special focus on participation and empowerment, but ultimately reifies women as a group identity. We can see such approach in many of women's achievements in the agreement, as well as on the critique that there was an overemphasis on women as victims of sexual violence. It could also be said that the post-referendum renegotiation reinforced a reified vision of women, in particular their placing over a binary interpretation of gender that was ultimately exclusory of the LGBTI population. Consequently, it is clear that the gender mainstreaming practiced in Havana was still far from an exercise of gender displacement and a transformative approach that, by Squires's own admission, remains mainly theoretical and less clear as a practical mechanism.

As it concerns women, then, it is important to highlight that "despite the significant representational gains made by women activists ..., feminist visions of peace in Colombia differ importantly from the conception of peace negotiated in Havana and enshrined in the accords" (Paarlberg-Kvam 2018: 2-3). While the agreement introduces crucial and welcome measures to address issues like land tenure, gender-based violence and deficits in political participation, it is also clear that the negotiations were hermetic to some of women's main banners, especially their critique of patriarchy, militarism, racism, classism, and economic exploitation (p. 4). Such "political ceiling" has to do not only with the choice of agenda topics under discussion – which for example did not include the country's economic model –, but also with how far transformative demands were allowed to go concerning the topics that did get discussed in Havana.

As a vision that incorporates structural change to what women consider the drivers and foundations of conflict, including patriarchy and the global militarizing project, women's peacebuilding in Colombia stands in contrast to the limited, partial vision of peace-as-accords advanced by the Santos administration, donor countries and international supporters. Women's peacebuilding in Colombia is a long-term project of permanent investment; a bottom-up, community-led process of constructing peace piece by piece (Paarlberg-Kvam 2018: 16).

Still, the agreement is recognized as a major step forward for women in peacemaking, and it provides Colombian women with a normative and legal ground from which they can reclaim their rights and contest state discourses on their political role. The next steps of women's engagement with peace in the country, as Paarlberg-Kvam underlines, have to do with how women's movements and former FARC combatants will mobilize to interact with Colombia's existing political order and the novelties brought in by the agreement's implementation. At the time of writing, gender stipulations lagged behind general provisions in the implementation progress, although the gap between them was reduced according

to Kroc's latest report on the monitoring of gender commitments (Kroc 2020a). Among the most serious issues currently faced by the implementation is the targeting of human rights activists and local communitarian leaders by armed groups. There has been a steep rise in the number of assassinations of such leaders since the signing of the peace agreement (Indepaz 2020, Crisis Group 2020, Kroc 2020b), which compromises social movements' ability to mobilize in order to influence its implementation.

6.4

Final thoughts

Whereas they began the Havana talks excluded from the negotiating table, through articulation and pressure Colombian women were able to contest established discourses about themselves and get represented, it may be said, both in presence and in ideas. As highlighted throughout this chapter, however, theirs was a spatially separated, temporally challenged and thematically restricted representation. I have guided my discussion through a discourse analysis framework and the two analytical building blocks proposed in Chapter 4, each in its way helping clarify some of the main tensions behind the inclusion of women in the negotiations.

First, the section guided by women's declaration that "*la paz sin las mujeres ¡no va!*" tracked their path towards making room for them in Havana – while initially absent from the negotiating teams, they spoke out, engaging with existing participatory channels and demanding (and getting) more as they went on. Eventually, both parties incorporated women as plenipotentiaries and agreed to create a Gender Sub-commission, made up mostly by women from the delegations, tasked with inserting a gender perspective into the accords coming out of the main table. The combination between feminist and women's movements' activism, the work of the Sub-commission, the presence of female negotiators committed to the gender agenda and the support of international gender experts is usually mentioned as the recipe for what was considered a major success in terms of the inclusion of women.

Anchored in my account of representation beyond the state, in particular Seward's representative claims framework, I have analyzed the words of women involved in the process in order to understand how they constituted themselves as a group and demanded representation. The dynamics between women of diverse subject positions in the peace process shows that their own perception of the

representative label was often one of reluctance, in particular when it came to questioning what kind of political ties existed between Riveros and Sandino and feminist and women's movements. Despite women's organizations' struggle for the inclusion of women in the negotiating teams, neither side considered that they were in Havana in representation of Colombian women, instead associating the existence of representative ties with women's organizations' relationships with their social bases. Such perceptions notwithstanding, I have argued that representation stood in between the lines mainly because the sub-commission centralized representative expectations of women, even if in a disembodied and collectivized manner. As a result, I argue, a diffuse chain of representative claims emerged and ran from women's social bases in the regions all the way up to the negotiating table.

The second part of my analysis revolved around women's intention of being "*pactantes y no pactadas*", associated with my account of representation as foundation and the second building block proposed in Chapter 4, which proposes to analyze this perspective of representation in light of gender mainstreaming approaches. In this part of the chapter, then, I add to interviewed women's voices the words of the peace agreement itself, questioning women's representation in it as contractarians. Whereas it is clear that the gender perspective runs through all chapters of the accord, making women present and contemplated in dozens of its measures, I pointed out a few critical points of their representation in this specific aspect, based on a few observations of how the inclusion of the gender perspective played out. I argued that the sub-commission's spatial separation from the main table and its limitation to inserting the gender perspective into already closed stipulations placed a political ceiling over women's transformative intentions. I also argued that the insistence on deeming the sub-commission a technical entity doing technical work helped conceal the fact that the political limitations experienced by women are part of the hegemonic accommodation behind the peace discourse coming out of the table.

7

Final remarks

Peace processes are constantly transforming, and so is political representation. This research has paid attention to recent transformations in both, promoting an interdisciplinary dialogue as a way of assessing the issue of inclusion in peace negotiations from a politicized and critical standpoint. I have argued that societal inclusion in peace processes has gone from being seen as a “unnecessary disturbance” to gradually moving on to a status of “necessary disturbance”. In short, inclusion has grown to be accepted as necessary for the construction of legitimate and durable peace, but it has not stopped being deemed a disturbance to peace processes, especially during the crucial stage of negotiations. Hence the constant placing of spatial, temporal and thematic hierarchies when it comes to studying inclusion and putting inclusive initiatives into practice.

I have proposed to look at such hierarchies, and inclusion more generally, through the conceptual lens of representation. As I highlighted throughout the dissertation, the notion of inclusion is vague and its meaning is contested, having become a nodal point in different discursive articulations concerning peace processes. My main discomfort with the use of the inclusion lexicon, therefore, is that the contestation surrounding it is not thoroughly addressed by the current PCS literature, which often treats it as a strictly descriptive category and a final product, not a disputed process. A critical approach of political representation, on the other hand, offers a theoretical platform from which to scrutinize different discourses on inclusion. Not only is political representation a vehicle for both inclusion *and* exclusion across diverging discursive articulations; it is also a common thread for evaluating the political activism of society before, during and after peace negotiations. Whereas it may be said that the neat division of peacebuilding into stages may work as a theoretical and practical disconnect especially between peace negotiations and post-conflict implementation, political representation once again provides a common ground to think about the role of society throughout the entirety of peace efforts. In great measure, I believe that not only current dilemmas and crises of political representation may be valuable to reflect about the construction of peace; peace processes could have a lot to add to future discussions on political representation as well. Ultimately, the objective here was to make a repoliticizing move that allows for inclusion to be seen as a political and disputed process that keeps unfolding once negotiations are finished.

In doing so, I took both theoretical and empirical avenues, which informed and inspired each other. As a theoretical ground for my discussion, I looked for intersections between political representation theory, feminist democratic theory and PCS critical approaches, in particular those that privilege the notion of agonistic peace. As a theoretical ground for my discussion, I bring in Laclau & Mouffe's discourse and democratic theory and Saward's representative claim framework, which provide the basis for the analytical framework I propose to reframe the inclusion debate through the concept of political representation. On the empirical front, I chose to analyze Colombia's recent peace process with the FARC, in particular the role played by women in the Havana Dialogues (2012-2016). The role conquered by women in the negotiations was a struggle – women speaking from diverse subject positions began the process virtually excluded from the negotiation table activities, made alliances and coordinated amongst themselves, being able to pressure the parties into making room for them. I approached women's role in the negotiations through a double analytical strategy: on the one hand, I looked at how representation shows up in discourses and perceived practice, and, on the other, I used the concept of political representation as an analytical lens to try and understand, and perhaps reframe, such discourses. I did this based mainly on official discourse, reports and fieldwork interviews.

Although representation was what women wanted, the use of the representation language was ambivalent and reluctant. At the same time that interviewees tended to associate representation to its electoral form when denying it was happening, the representative language was also mostly accepted in cases of close identification and belonging usually associated with participation, not representation – i.e., it was most associated with the actions of civil society actors. There seemed to be a weight in saying something is representation, but this does not stop it from taking place and being a potential tool for both inclusion and exclusion of collective subjects. The women from the government who did reach the table as plenipotentiaries were neither seen as representatives by other women, nor was this their own wish or the governmental directive. There was, on the other hand, representative attachment to the work of FARC delegates and civil society leaders among their specific constituencies.

The most interesting and crucial representative attachment in the Colombian case, however, was probably the Gender Sub-commission. Here was an instance of the negotiations not foreseen by the parties and earned by coordinated women's hard work, aimed at inserting a gender perspective into the agreements coming out of the table. They did not have a fixed space or time to function, nor were they

allowed to change or add anything new to the text beyond existing measures. Their task was said to be technical. Nonetheless, it became the center of what I called “a chain of representative claims” that went from the negotiating table all the way to grassroots organized women. While not all Colombian women would say they felt represented by the Sub-commission, for a specific audience and in the name of a specific constituency, it was indeed a representative intermediary. By consolidating a type of disembodied representation reliant not on individual representatives, but on a mode of operation, the sub-commission allowed for women to achieve more than they ever expected from this negotiation. Having said this, in order to better understand how representation unfolds in situations like this, it is necessary to further relate representative relationships in peace negotiations and the political role of expertise, the unequal distribution of “positional advantages” among civil society actors and the political ceilings they face at higher levels.

By way of conclusion, I want to call attention to a few reflections that come up from my analysis and might be useful for future research on the matter at hand. First, there is the issue of the representative role exercised by civil society actors, especially in contexts of violence. As highlighted in Chapter 3, the representative turn in democratic theory has brought the internal critique of democracy closer to the concept of representation, in opposition to what until then had been more common, i.e., a concentration of critical discussions around the concept of participation. The relationship between representation and participation, which is traditionally read as oppositional, increasingly became one of complementarity and even, in some situations, of conflation. As it has been recognized in democratic theory, even in contexts labelled as participatory there is always a great deal of representation involved – not even an assembly of thousands of people is exempt from having some people speak in the name of others (Araujo 2006). Such “representation within participation”, however, seems to remain an underexplored issue in the field, concealed as it still is behind either/or interpretations of the concepts. To keep reading representation simply as a state mechanism and an elite instrument of minimal democracy will not help in getting a deeper understanding of such phenomenon.

The representative role social actors may take upon themselves, be it among local communities or before the state, may become clearer when analyzed in light of Saward’s theoretical framework, which, in its wider conceptual intention, applies equally to the role of an elected politician and the one exercised by social leaders claiming to represent their communities. There seems to be a lot to gain from

looking into such relationships, which often exist outside formal structures and add up to diffuse and dynamic forms of representation that have direct impact over people's lives. It is also important, on the other hand, to assess how such representation interacts with the state. As the example of Colombian feminist and women's movements show, at times such dynamics occur in rejection of any involvement with the state; at other times, they intend exactly to influence state action from within. When I asked one of my interviewees from the government which questions I should be asking in my research, for example, she replied that she never understood why female social leaders did not run for office more often. The representative role of social leaders, as well as the dilemma of whether to interact with the state or not in trying to achieve their political agendas, get even more neuralgic in an armed conflict scenario, in particular when the state itself is a perpetrator of human rights violations. In Colombia, this is expressed by the crimes committed by the military and state-backed paramilitaries. A context in which political articulation offers a threat to one's life adds an important variable to the "beyond the state" representative equation, and this is true today in Colombia – given the rise in the number of massacres and the assassination of social leaders after the Havana Dialogues, one should ask herself: *who is it* that gets to collectively organize amidst violent conflicts?

Another important issue I came across in my analysis was the relationship between the way representation surfaced in people's discourses and what such discourses had to say about them as an analytical framework. As mentioned before, at times I saw representation in situations in which discourses were adamant in their rejection of its existence. However, an analysis of those very discourses show that a representative logic sneaked in even when it was being outwardly rejected. This has to do with a somewhat automatic association of representation with the electoral format – one government official told me, for instance, that having a representative logic in the talks would be difficult because it would need to involve elections. It also has to do with the fact that claiming to represent a group of people also entails taking responsibility before them for such representation. The dynamics analyzed here therefore lead me to ask, in a more general sense: what is it that changes when we choose to call something representation? What happens when representative claims themselves are ambiguous and permeated by tensions?

Lastly, it is also interesting to note the relationship between the constitutedness of represented constituencies through representation itself and, on the other hand, the "political ceiling" that is placed over collective subjects in

search of political transformation. Throughout the Havana Dialogues, it was clear that women's bid for representation was substantiated by their attempt to clarify who they are and what they went through in the conflict, versus the narratives about them that usually dominate in political spheres and that were present in Havana as well. In other words, to represent oneself is also to constitute oneself as a political subject. In this scenario, Colombian women were simultaneously trying to address the violence and subjection they experienced in the conflict due to oppressive understandings of their place in society while, at the same time, struggling to surpass such understandings to become recognized as political subjects in their own right. This makes them trapped between two worlds, the one in which they lived – and actually still live in – and the one they want to construct.

The political ceiling I mentioned, on the other hand, may be translated as an expression of the hegemonic accommodation that went on in the negotiations and exemplifies what I have called spatial, temporal and thematic control of inclusion in Chapter 2. The pressure exerted by women was directed at overcoming the usual narrative that inclusion can only happen in spaces other than the negotiating table, preferably after negotiations are over, i.e., during implementation rather than during peace talks, and concerning topics that are seen as non-strategic, i.e., rural reform and victims, but never military affairs. Whereas women were allowed in due to their activism and articulation, these control mechanisms were never lifted, only reshaped. To use Young's expression, there were multiple examples of "exclusion within inclusion" in the role women were allowed to play in the negotiating table, starting, as already mentioned, by the fact that they could only insert a gender perspective into existing and closed measures coming out of the main negotiating table. At the interpersonal level, it is also exclusory that women have had to resort to stereotypically "feminine" traits – a conciliatory and tactful demeanor, a preoccupation with issues of care – in order to achieve what they wanted in their activities.

While women were intent on being represented as contractarians in the Havana Dialogues as a way of introducing gender-related political transformation into Colombia's social contract, we are reminded by Galtung that peacemaking may be "less of more respectful of the status quo" (1976: 291). In the Havana Dialogues, the struggle between those wanting transformation and those wanting permanence led to a hybrid sort of accord, as pointed out by Valenzuela. The peace discourse that triumphed in Havana, in turn, will continue being disputed by the counter-discourses of those who still believe it to be exclusory, with women, as usual, leading the way.

8

References

ABCOLOMBIA. **Civil Society Voices: Agendas for Peace in Colombia**. London, May 2015.

ABCOLOMBIA, SISMA MUJER & US OFFICE IN COLOMBIA. **Colombia: Women, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and the Peace Process**. London, November 2013.

ABEL, Christopher & PALACIOS, Marco. Colômbia, 1958-c.1990. In: BETHELL, L (org). **A América Latina após 1930: México, América Central, Caribe e Repúblicas Andinas (Volume IX, História da América Latina)**. São Paulo: Edusp, 1994.

ACCORD. **Alternatives to War: Colombia's Peace Processes**. Special issue n. 14, 2004.

ACOSTA PATIÑO, Henry. **El hombre clave: El secreto mayor guardado del proceso de paz de Colombia**. Bogotá: Aguilar, 2017.

AGGESTAM, Karin; CRISTIANO, Fabio & STRÖMBOM, Lisa. Towards agonistic peacebuilding? Exploring the antagonism–agonism nexus in the Middle East Peace process, **Third World Quarterly**, 36:9, 1736-1753, 2015.

ALAPE, Arturo. La mujer en la guerrilla de las FARC, Archivo Chile, Centro de Estudios Miguel Enríquez. Available at: http://www.archivochile.com/Mov_sociales/mov_mujeres/doc_muj_otros/MSdoc_mujotros0017.pdf (accessed December 26, 2020).

ALCOFF, Linda. The Problem of Speaking for Others. **Cultural Critique**, No. 20 (Winter, 1991-1992).

ALIANZA PARA LA PAZ ET AL. **Sociedad Civil y Construcción de Paz, 2018-2019**. 2019.

ALMEIDA, Debora R. **Representação além das eleições: Repensando as fronteiras entre estado e sociedade**. São Paulo: Paco Editorial, 2015.

_____. Representação política: A virada construtivista e o paradoxo entre criação e autonomia. **Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais**. Vol. 33, n. 97. 2018.

_____. As geometrias da intermediação e/ou representação. **Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais**. Vol. 34, n. 99, 2019.

ALTO COMISIONADO PARA LA PAZ. Los mecanismos e instancias de participación de la mesa de conversaciones y la construcción de paz desde los territorios (Tomo VII). **Biblioteca del proceso de paz con las FARC-EP**. 2018a.

_____. La discusión del Punto 5 y de las medidas de construcción de confianza (Tomo V, parte 1). **Biblioteca del proceso de paz con las FARC-EP**. 2018b.

_____. Início del proceso de paz: La fase exploratoria y el camino hacia el Acuerdo General (Tomo I). **Biblioteca del proceso de paz con las FARC-EP**. 2018c.

_____. De la Refrendación al Acuerdo del Colón. El plebiscito, el Gran Diálogo Nacional, el Acuerdo Final y su refrendación (Tomo VIII). **Biblioteca del proceso de paz con las FARC-EP**. 2018d.

ANDERLINI, Sanam. **Women building peace: What they do, why it matters**. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007.

ANKERSMIT, F. R. **Political Representation**. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002.

ARAÚJO, Cícero. Representação, Retrato e Drama. **Lua Nova**, 67 (2006), p. 229-260.

ARCHILA, Mauricio. **Aspectos sociales y políticos de las mujeres en Colombia, siglos XX y XXI**. En Memorias del XVIII Congreso de la Asociación de Colombianistas, 2010. Available at <https://colombianistas.org/wp-content/themes/pleasant/biblioteca%20colombianista/03%20ponencias/18/Archila_Mauricio.pdf>

(accessed December 26, 2020).

AROSSI, Sahla. **Women, Peace, and Security: Repositioning gender in peace agreements**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

AUTESERRE, Severine. **Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention**. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

AVRITZER, Leonardo. Sociedade Civil, Instituições Participativas e Representação: Da Autorização à Legitimidade da Ação. **Revista de Ciências Sociais**, Vol.50, n.3, pp.443-464, 2007.

_____. Democracy beyond aggregation: the participatory dimension of public deliberation. **Journal of Public Deliberation**, vol 8, issue 2, article 10. 2012.

AVRITZER, Leonardo & COSTA, Sergio. Teoria Crítica, Democracia e Esfera Pública: Concepções e Usos na América Latina. **DADOS – Revista de Ciências Sociais**, Vol. 47, no 4, 2004.

BABBIT, Eileen. The Evolution of International Conflict Resolution: From Cold War to Peacebuilding. **Negotiation Journal**. October 2009.

BÄCHTIGER, A; DRYZEK, J. S.; MANSBRIDGE, J.; WARREN, M. E. (eds). **The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

BARBER, Benjamin. **Strong democracy: Participation politics for a New Age**. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003 [1984].

BARTOLI, Andrea. NGOs and Conflict Resolution. In: BERCOVITCH, J.; KREMENYUK, V.; ZARTMAN, I. W. (eds.), **The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution**. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2009.

BARRETO, Miguel. Los procesos de paz en Colombia y el rol de la comunidad internacional: ¿crónica de un nacimiento anunciado? **Revista Análisis Internacional**, vol. 5, n. 2, jul-dec 2014.

BARRINHA, André. Debates Críticos: os estudos de segurança e o futuro dos estudos da paz e dos conflitos. **Universitas Relações Internacionais**, v. 11, n. 2, p. 1-8, jul./dez. 2013.

BBC. **Juan Manuel Santos dice tener "la llave de la puerta de la paz" en Colombia.** August 13, 2011. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/ultimas_noticias/2011/08/110812_ultnot_colombia_santos_paz_cch> (accessed December 25, 2020).

BEDOYA, Jineth; BENJUMEA, Adriana; MEJÍA, Claudia; CABRERA, Linda; QUINTERO, Beatriz. **5 claves para un tratamiento diferenciado de la violencia sexual en los acuerdos sobre los derechos de las víctimas en el proceso de paz.** Bogotá, mayo de 2016.

BEHAR, Olga; BEHAR, Carolina A.; NAVARRETE, Pablo. **Lo que la guerra se llevó: veinte voces que retratan medio siglo de conflicto en Colombia.** Cali: Universidad Santiago de Cali Editorial / Icono, 2018.

BELL, Christine & POSPISIL, Jan. Navigating Inclusion in Transitions from Conflict: The Formalised Political *Unsettlement*. **Journal of International Development**, vol 29, issue 5. 2017.

BELL, Christine; O'ROURKE, Catherine; MATZNER, Sissela. **A Chronology of Colombian Peace Processes and Peace Agreements.** The Political Settlements Programme Consortium, Briefing Paper 1, 2015.

BELL, Christine. **What we talk about when we talk about political settlements: towards inclusive and open political settlements in an era of disillusionment.** Edinburgh: Political Settlements Research Programme, 2015.

_____. **Women and peace processes, negotiations, and agreements: operational opportunities and challenges.** Oslo: NOREF Policy Brief, 2013.

_____. *Lex Pacificatoria Colombiana: Colombia's Peace Accord in Comparative Perspective.* **American Journal of International Law.** Symposium on the Colombian Peace Talks and International Law, 2016.

_____. **Political Power-sharing and Inclusion: Peace and Transition Processes.** Edimburgh: Political Settlements Research Programme, 2018.

BELL, Christine; O'ROURKE, Catherine. The People's Peace? Peace Agreements, Civil Society, and Participatory Democracy. **International Political Science Review**, vol. 28 (2007), n. 3, p. 293-324.

_____. Peace agreements or pieces of paper? The impact of Resolution 1325 on peace processes and their agreements. **International and Comparative Law Quarterly** / Volume 59 / Issue 04 / October 2010, pp 941-980.

BELLONI, Roberto. Civil society in war-to-democracy transitions. In: JARSTAD, A. & SISK, T. (eds). **From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding.** New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

BELTRÁN, William M. & CREELY, Sian. Pentecostals, Gender Ideology and the Peace Plebiscite: Colombia 2016. **Religions** 2018, 9, 418.

BENAVIDES, Javier T. Los nombres de nuestra guerra: Balance del Informe de la Comisión Histórica del Conflicto y sus Víctimas en Colombia. **Análisis Político** n.93, mayo-agosto 2018.

BENHABIB, Seyla. Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy. In: BENHABIB, S. (ed). **Democracy and Difference: Contesting the boundaries of the political**. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

BENJUMEA, Adriana & RODRÍGUEZ, Natalia P. El derecho a la tierra para las mujeres: una mirada a la Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras. In: **Tierra y Territorio: Afectaciones y retos para las mujeres**. Bogotá: FOKKUS and Corporación Humanas, 2011.

BERCOVITCH, Jacob. A mediação em conflitos internacionais – Panorama teórico e revisão das práticas. In: HERZ, M; SIMAN, M; DRUMOND, P (org). **Mediação Internacional**. Rio de Janeiro: Editora PUC-Rio / Editora Vozes, 2016.

BERGERON, Suzanne. The Post-Washington Consensus and Economic Representations of Women in Development at the World Bank. **International Feminist Journal of Politics**, 5:3 November 2003, 397–419.

BERGHOF FOUNDATION. **National Dialogue Handbook: A Guide for Practitioners**. Berlin: Berhof Foundation, 2017.

BERGQUIST, Charles W.; PEÑARANDO, Ricardo; SÁNCHEZ, Gonzalo. **Violence in Colombia: the contemporary crisis in historical perspective**. Wilmington: SR Books, 1992.

BERNAL OLARTE, Angelica. ¿Qué es ganar y qué es perder en política?: los retos en la participación electoral. **Análisis político** n° 56, Bogotá, enero-abril, 2006: págs. 72-92.

_____. Elecciones parlamentarias de 2010: análisis de la inclusión de mujeres. **Colombia internacional**, Issue 74, 2011.

_____. **Las mujeres y el poder político: una investidura incompleta**. PhD dissertation, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, 2014.

BERNAL-PULIDO, C. Transitional Justice within the Framework of a Permanent Constitution: The Case Study of the Legal Framework for Peace in Colombia. **Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law** 3 (4): 1136–1163, 2014.

BETANCUR RESTREPO, Laura. The legal status of the Colombian Peace Agreement. **American Journal of International Law**. Symposium on the Colombian Peace Talks and International Law, 2016.

BETHELL, Leslie (org). **A América Latina após 1930: México, América Central, Caribe e Repúblicas Andinas (Volume IX, História da América Latina)**. São Paulo: Edusp, 1994.

BEVERIDGE, Fiona; NOTT, Sue; STEPHEN, Kylie. Mainstreaming and the engendering of policy-making: a means to an end? **Journal of European Public Policy**, volume 7, issue 3, 2000.

BINNINGSBØ, Helga Malmin. Power sharing, peace and democracy: Any obvious relationships? **International Area Studies Review**, 16: 89, 2013.

BIROLI, Flávia. Teorias Feministas da Política, Empíria e Normatividade. **Lua Nova**, vol. 102: 173-210, 2017.

BOBBIO, Norberto. Estado, Governo, Sociedade: Fragmentos de um Dicionário Político. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2017.

BONITEAU, Adrian E. Thomas Hobbes and the Monarchomachs: Radical Huguenot Ideas in *Leviathan*. Available at: <https://www.academia.edu/23442626/Thomas_Hobbes_and_the_Monarchomachs_Radical_Huguenot_Ideas_in_Leviathan> (accessed December 9, 2020).

BORDA, Sandre & GÓMEZ, Santiago. The internationalization of Colombia's Current Peace Process: From Isolation to Containment. In: BAGLEY, B. & ROSEN, J. D. (eds). **Colombia's political economy at the outset of the twentieth-first century: From Uribe to Santos and beyond**. Lanham: Lexington books, 2015.

BORDA, Sandra & MORALES, Mateo. Colombia: la Internacionalización de la paz. **Anuario Internacional CIDOB** 2016-17.

BORDA, Sandra & GUTIÉRREZ, Martha. Between peace and justice: the role of human rights norms in Colombia's peace process. In: FUENTES JULIO, Claudia & DRUMOND, Paula (eds). **Human Rights and Conflict Resolution: Bridging the Theoretical and Practical Divide**. London and New York: Routledge, 2018.

BORJA, Miguel. Perspectivas territoriales del acuerdo de paz. **Análisis político** nº 90, Bogotá, mayo-agosto, 2017: págs. 61-76.

BOULDING, KennethE. **Stable peace**. Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1978.

BOUVIER, Virginia. **Update on the Peace Talks**. Colombia Calls, July 11, 2014a. Available at: <<https://vbouvier.wordpress.com/2014/07/11/update-on-the-peace-talks/>> (accessed December 25, 2020).

_____. **Colombia: La construcción de la paz en tiempos de guerra**. Bogotá: Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 2014b. Kindle edition.

BRETT, Roddy. The role of the victims' delegations in the Santos-FARC peace talks. In: DRULLIOLE, V.; BRETT, R. (eds). **The Politics of Victimhood in Post-Conflict Societies: Comparative and Analytical Perspectives**. Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

BRANTON; DEMERITT; AMALIA PULIDO; MEERNIK. Violence, voting & peace: Explaining public support for the peace referendum in Colombia. **Electoral Studies**, vol. 61, October 2019.

BRAUN, Herbert. **Our guerrillas, our sidewalks: A journey into the violence of Colombia**. Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1994.

BRENNAN, Teresa & PATEMAN, Carole. 'Mere auxiliaries to the Commonwealth': Women and the origins of Liberalism. **Political Studies**, XXVII (2): 183-200. 1989.

BROWN, Wendy. **States of injury: Power and freedom in late modernity**. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

BROWN, Mark. Deliberation and Representation. In: BÄCHTIGER, A; DRYZEK, J. S.; MANSBRIDGE, J.; WARREN, M. E. (eds). **The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

BRUNET, Pierre. Acerca del concepto de representación política. **Revista Internacional de Pensamiento Político**, vol 7, 2012.

BUSHNELL, David. **The making of modern Colombia: A nation in spite of itself**. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

BUTLER, Judith. **Problemas de gênero: Feminismo e subversão da identidade**. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização brasileira, 2003 [1990].

BUZAN, Barry & HANSEN, Lene. **The Evolution of International Security Studies**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

CALDERA, Anais D. L. Ni víctimas, ni victimarias: las guerrilleras de las FARC-EP y su papel en el conflicto armado en Colombia. **Revista Venezolana de Estudios de la Mujer**, vol 22, n. 48, enero-junio 2017.

CALHOUN, Craig. Introduction. In: CALHOUN, C. (ed.) **Habermas and the Public Sphere**. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992.

CASTELLS, Manuel. **Ruptura: a crise da democracia liberal**. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Zahar, 2018.

CASTIGLIONE, Dario & POLLAK, Johannes. Introduction. In: CASTIGLIONE, D; POLLAK, D (eds). **Creating Political Presence: The New Politics of Democratic Representation**. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2019.

CASTRILLÓN-PULIDO, Gloria Y. ¿Víctimas o victimarias?. El rol de las mujeres en las FARC. Una aproximación desde la teoría de género. **Revista Opera**, núm. 16, enero-junio, 2015, pp. 77-95.

CELIK, Ayşe Betül. Agonistic peace and confronting the past: An analysis of a failed peace process and the role of narratives. **Cooperation and Conflict**, 2020.

CENTRO NACIONAL DE MEMÓRIA HISTÓRICA. **Guerrilla y población civil: trayectoria de las FARC 1949-2013**. 2013a.

_____. **¡Basta ya! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad**. Informe general. 2013b.

_____. **Análisis cuantitativo del paramilitarismo en Colombia: Hallazgos del mecanismo no judicial de contribución a la verdad**. 2019.

CÉSPEDES-BÁEZ, Lina. La violencia sexual en contra de las mujeres como estrategia de despojo de tierras en el conflicto armado colombiano. **Estud. Socio-Juríd** [online]. 2010, vol.12, n.2, pp.273-304.

_____. En los confines de lo posible: inclusión del enfoque de género en el Acuerdo de La Habana. In: CÉSPEDES-BÁEZ, L.; PRIETO-RIOS, E. (eds) **Utopía u oportunidad fallida: Análisis crítico del acuerdo de paz**. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario Editorial, 2017.

CÉSPEDES-BÁEZ, Lina; RUIZ, F. “Peace without women does not go!’ Women’s struggle for inclusion in Colombia’s peace process with the FARC”. **Colombia Internacional** (94): 83-109. 2018.

CHANG, Patty; ALAM, Mayesha; WARREN, Roslyn; BHATIA, Rukmani; TURKINGTON, Rebecca. **Women leading peace: A close examination of women’s political participation in peace processes in Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines**. Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, 2015.

CHAPARRO GONZÁLEZ, Nina & MARTÍNEZ OSORIO, Margarita. **Negociando desde las márgenes: La participación política de las mujeres en los procesos de paz en Colombia (1982-2016)**. Dejusticia, 2016.

CHERNICK, Marc. Santos, the FARC, and the Evolution of Peace Negotiations in Colombia. In: BAGLEY, B. & ROSEN, J. D. (eds). **Colombia’s political economy at the outset of the twentieth-first century: From Uribe to Santos and beyond**. Lanham: Lexington books, 2015.

_____. Las FARC y los diálogos de paz: de Marquetalia hasta el gobierno de Uribe. In: BOUVIER, V. (ed). **Colombia: La construcción de la paz en tiempos de guerra**. Bogotá: Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 2014. Kindle edition.

CHINKIN, Christine & CHARLESWORTH, Hilary. Building Women into Peace: the international legal framework. **Third World Quarterly**, 27:5, 937-957, 2006.

COLLINS, Patricia Hill. **Pensamento Feminista Negro. Conhecimento, Consciência e a Política do Empoderamento**. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2019.

COMISIÓN HISTÓRICA DEL CONFLICTO Y SUS VÍCTIMAS (CHCV). **Contribución al entendimiento del conflicto armado en Colombia**. February/2015.

CONTRERAS, María Isabel N. Aspectos novedosos de la participación política de las mujeres en el proceso de paz con las FARC-EP. **Cuadernos de estrategia**, Nº. 189, 2017.

CORPORACIÓN HUMANAS & CIASE. **Experiences, Contributions and Recognition: Women in the Peace Process in Havana**. Bogotá, 2017

COSTA, Pietro. El problema de la representación política: una perspectiva histórica. **Anuario de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid**, 8 (2004), pp. 15-61.

COSTA, Claudia de Lima. O sujeito no feminismo: revisitando os debates. **Cadernos Pagu**, n. 19, p. 59-90, 2002.

COUNCIL OF EUROPE. **What is gender mainstreaming?** 1998. Available at: <<https://www.coe.int/en/web/genderequality/what-is-gender-mainstreaming#:~:text=In%201998%2C%20the%20Council%20of,normally%20involved%20in%20policy%2Dmaking.>> (accessed December 24, 2020).

CRISIS GROUP. Appendix B – General Agreement for the termination of the conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace. **Colombia: Peace at Last?** Crisis Group Latin America Report N°45, 25 September 2012.

_____. **In the Shadow of “No”: Peace after Colombia’s Plebiscite.** Report n. 60 / Latin America & Caribbean. January 31, 2017. Available at: <<https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/060-shadow-no-peace-after-colombia-s-plebiscite>> (accessed December 25, 2020).

_____. **Leaders under Fire: Defending Colombia’s Front Line of Peace.** Report n. 82 / Latin America & Caribbean. October 6, 2020. Available at: <<https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/82-leaders-under-fire-defending-colombias-front-line-peace>> (accessed December 26, 2020).

CROZIER, Michel; HUNTINGTON, Samuel; WATANUKI, Joji. **The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission.** New York: New York University Press, 1975.

CUMBRE NACIONAL DE MUJERES Y PAZ. **Cumbre Nacional de Mujeres y Paz, Bogotá, Colombia (octubre 23 al 25 de 2013) – Sistematización.** Bogotá, January/2014.

_____. **Mapas, Rutas y Pistas: Sistematización de la experiencia de incidencia de la Cumbre Nacional de Mujeres (2013-2018).** Bogotá, 2018.

CUNNINGHAM, David E. Who Should Be at the Table?: Veto Players and Peace Processes in Civil War. **Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs.** Volume 2, Issue 1. April 2013.

CURATO, Nicole; HAMMOND, Marit; MIN, John B. **Power in Deliberative Democracy: Norms, Forums, Systems.** Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

DAHL, Robert. **Democracy and its Critics.** New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.

_____. **Poliarquia: Participação e Oposição.** São Paulo: Edusp, 1997.

DARBY, John; MACGINTY, Roger. **Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-War Reconstruction.** New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

DÁVALOS, Eleonora; MORALES, Fabio L.; HOLMES, Jennifer S.; DÁVALOS, Liliana M. Opposition Support and the Experience of Violence Explain Colombian Peace Referendum Results, **Journal of Politics in Latin America**, 10, 2, 99–122. 2018.

DAVIES, John & KAUFMAN, Edward Edy. **Second Track Citizens' Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation.** Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.

DAVIS, Angela. **Mulheres, raça e classe.** São Paulo: Boitempo, 2016.

DE CONING, Cedric. Sustaining peace. Can a new approach change the UN? **Global governance Spotlight**, 3 / 2018.

DELGADO, Patricia P. Aportes de las mujeres colombianas a la paz. **EN OTRAS PALABRAS...** no. 24 / Dossier. 2011.

DIETZ, Mary. Current controversies in feminist theory. *Annual Review of Political Science.* 6:399–431, 2003.

_____. Context is all: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship. In: PHILLIPS, A. (ed). **Feminism and Politics**. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

DISCH, Lisa. The “Constructivist Turn” in Democratic Representation: A Normative Dead-End? **Constellations**, Volume 22, No 4, 2015.

_____. Toward a Mobilization Conception of Democratic Representation. **The American Political Science Review**, Vol. 105, No. 1, February 2011.

_____. Representation. In: DISCH, Lisa; HAWKESWORTH, Mary (eds). **The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

DISCH, Lisa; VAN DE SANDE, Mathijs; URBINATI, Nadia (eds). **The Constructivist Turn in Political Representation**. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019.

DOMINGO, Pilar; ROCHA MENOCA, Alina; HINESTROZA, Verónica. **Progress despite adversity: Women’s empowerment and conflict in Colombia**. Overseas Development Institute, 2015.

DONADIO, Marcela. **La perspectiva de género en los Ejércitos: misiones y conformación interna**. RESDAL, 2018.

DOVI, Suzanne. In praise of Exclusion. **The Journal of Politics**, vol. 71 (2009), n. 3, p. 1172-1186).

_____. Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Will Just Any Woman, Black, or Latino Do? **American Political Science Review**. Vol. 96 (2002), n. 4, p. 729-743.

DOWNING, Cristal. Child Recruitment to Illegal Armed Groups in Colombia: Peacebuilding and Development Challenges. **Journal of Peacebuilding & Development**, vol. 9, n.3, 2014.

DRYZEK, John. S. & NIEMEYER, Simon. Discursive representation. **American Political Science Review**. Vol. 102, n. 4, 2008.

DUNN, John. **Setting the People Free: The story of democracy**. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019.

DUSO, Giuseppe. La representación política: Génesis y crisis de un concepto. Buenos Aires: UNSAM Edita / Jorge Baudino Ediciones, 2016.

DUTOYA, Virginie & HAYAT, Samuel. Making representative claims: the social construction of political representation. **Revue française de science politique**. Vol. 66, No. 1, 2016.

ECHAVARRÍA ALVAREZ, Josefina; DITTA, Elise; ESGUERRA-REZK, Juanita; MCQUESTION, Patrick. Colombian Peace Agreement 2016. In: RICHMOND, O., VISOKA, G. (eds) **The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Peace and Conflict Studies**. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.

ELLERBY, Kara. A seat at the table is not enough: understanding women’s substantive representation in peace processes. **Peacebuilding**. Volume 4, 2016.

ELSHTAIN, Jean Bethke. **Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought**. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

_____. **Real politics: at the center of everyday life**. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997.

EVANS, Elizabeth & CHAMBERLAIN, Prudence. Critical Waves: Exploring Feminist Identity, Discourse and Praxis in Western Feminism. **Social Movement Studies**. Volume 14, issue 4, 2015.

FARNSWORTH-ALVEAR, Ann; PALACIOS, Marco; LÓPEZ, Ana María G. (eds). **The Colombia Reader: History, Culture, Politics**. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2017.

FERNÁNDEZ, Marta M. Reversing Polarities: Anarchical (Failed) States versus International Progress. **Brazilian Political Science Review**. Vol 9, n.3, pp.64-87. 2015.

FETHERSTON, A.B. Peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peacebuilding: A reconsideration of theoretical frameworks. **International Peacekeeping**, 7:1, 190-218. 2000.

FINAL AGREEMENT TO END THE ARMED CONFLICT AND BUILD A STABLE AND LASTING PEACE. November 2016. Translation available at: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/> (accessed December 26, 2020).

FISAS, Vicenç. **¡Alto el fuego! Manual de procesos de paz**. Barcelona: Icaria editorial, 2010.

FLORIDIA, Antonio. The origins of the deliberative turn. In: BÄCHTIGER, A; DRYZEK, J. S.; MANSBRIDGE, J.; WARREN, M. E. (eds). **The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

FRASER, Nancy. Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy. **Social Text**, 25/26: 56–80. 1990.

_____. **Justice interruptus: critical reflections on the “postsocialist” condition**. Nova York: Routledge, 1997.

_____. **Fortunes of feminism: from State-Managed Capitalism to neoliberal crisis**. New York: Verso, 2013.

FUNDACIÓN IDEAS PARA LA PAZ (FIP). **Conozca el aporte de la FIP a los diálogos de paz con la guerrilla de las FARC**. August 28, 2018. Available at: <http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/1695> (accessed December 25, 2020).

FUNDACIÓN IDEAS PARA LA PAZ (FIP); UN WOMEN; GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN. **Participación de las organizaciones de mujeres que realizaron aportes en el marco del proceso de paz con las FARC**. 2017. Available at: <http://cdn.ideaspaz.org/media/website/document/5a1735ee6eb2c.pdf> (accessed December 26, 2020).

FUNG, Archon. Minipublics: Deliberative Designs and Their Consequences. In: ROSENBERG, Shawn W. **Deliberation, Participation and Democracy: Can the People Govern?** London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

GALTUNG, Johan. Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. **Journal of Peace Research**, vol. 6, n. 3. 1969.

_____. Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding. **Impact of Science on Society**. PRIO Publications, 1976.

GIRALDO, Isis. 'Pedagogies of cruelty' and the patriarchal order of the nation state: the falsos positivos as a paradigmatic example. **Postcolonial studies**, May/2020.

GLOBAL SOUTH UNIT FOR MEDIATION (GSUM). **Radar GSUM #3**. November 18, 2015b. Available at: <<https://bricspolicycenter.org/publicacoes/radar-gsum-3/>> (accessed December 25, 2020).

_____. **Radar GSUM #1**. December 18, 2015a. Available at: <<https://bricspolicycenter.org/publicacoes/radar-gsum-1/>> (accessed December 25, 2020).

_____. **Radar GSUM #9**. April 4, 2016a. Available at: <<https://bricspolicycenter.org/publicacoes/radar-gsum-9/>> (accessed December 25, 2020).

_____. **Radar GSUM #12**. May 18, 2016b. Available at: <<https://bricspolicycenter.org/publicacoes/radar-gsum-12/>> (accessed December 25, 2020).

_____. **Radar GSUM #19**. October 4, 2016c. Available at: <<https://bricspolicycenter.org/publicacoes/radar-gsum-19-2/>> (accessed December 25, 2020).

GÓMEZ CORREAL, Diana M. **Dinámicas del movimiento feminista bogotano; Historias de cuarto, salón y calle. Historias de vida (1970-1991)**. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2010.

_____. Mujeres, género y el Acuerdo de la Habana. Debates: Procesos de paz en América Latina. **LASA Forum**, Winter 2017, volume XLVIII: issue 1.

GÓMEZ-SUÁREZ, Andrei. Peace Process Pedagogy: Lessons from the No-Vote Victory in the Colombian Peace Referendum, **Comparative Education**, 53, 3, 462–482, 2017.

GONZALEZ, Lélia. **Por um feminismo afro-latino-americano**. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2020.

GRABE, Vera. **Razones de vida**. Bogotá: Planeta, 2000.

GUELKE, Adrian. Negotiations and Peace Processes. In: DARBY, J; MACGINTY, R. (eds). **Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace processes and Post-war reconstruction**. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

GURZA LAVALLE, Adrián. Representatividade e Representação Democrática – Falso problema ou dualidade constitutiva. In: GURZA LAVALLE, A; DE VITA, A.; ARAÚJO, C. O Papel da Teoria Política Contemporânea: Justiça, Constituição, Democracia e Representação. São Paulo: Alameda, 2015.

GURZA LAVALLE, Adrián & ISUNZA VERA, Ernesto. A trama da crítica democrática: da participação à representação e à *accountability*. **Lua Nova**, São Paulo, 84: 353-364, 2011.

GURZA LAVALLE, Adrián; HOUTZANGER, Peter P.; CASTELLO, Graziela. Democracia, Pluralização da Representação e Sociedade. **Revista Lua Nova**, São Paulo, 67: 49-103, 2006.

_____. Representação política e organizações civis: Novas instâncias de mediação e os desafios da legitimidade. **Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais**, vol. 21, núm. 60, fevereiro, 2006.

GUTIÉRREZ SANÍN, Francisco & CARRANZA FRANCO, Francy. Organizing women for combat: The experience of the FARC in the Colombian war. **Journal of Agrarian Change**, 2017;17:770–778.

GUZZINI, Stefano. The Concept of Power: A Constructive Analysis. **Millenium: Journal of International Studies**, Vol. 33, n. 3, 2005.

HABERMAS, Jürgen. **The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere**. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989.

HAMILTON, Alexander; MADISON, James; JAY, John. **The Federalist Papers**. Seattle: Amazon Classics, 2017. Kindle edition.

HAMPSON, Fen Osler; CROCKER, Chester A.; AALL, Pamela R. Negotiation and International Conflict. In: WEBEL, Charles & GALTUNG, Johan (eds). **Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies**. New York: Routledge, 2007.

HARTSOCK, Nancy C. M. The feminist standpoint: developing the ground for a specifically feminist historical materialism. In: HARTSOCK, Nancy C. M., **The feminist standpoint and other essays**. Boulder: Westview, 1998.

HAUGAARD, Lisa. Human Rights Abuses in Colombia: From Uribe to Santos. In: BAGLEY, B. & ROSEN, J. D. (eds). **Colombia's political economy at the outset of the twentieth-first century: From Uribe to Santos and beyond**. Lanham: Lexington books, 2015.

HAWKESWORTH, Mary & DISCH, Lisa. Introduction. Feminist Theory: Transforming the Known World. In: DISCH, Lisa; HAWKESWORTH, Mary (eds). **The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

HELD, D. **Models of Democracy**. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006.

HELLMÜLLER, Sara. Beyond Buzzwords: Civil Society Inclusion in Mediation. In: JEONG, Ho-Won (ed). **Conflict Intervention and Transformation: Theory and Practice**. London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2019.

HELLMÜLLER, Sara; PALMIANO FEDERER, Julia; ZELLER, Mathias. **The role of norms in international mediation**. Bern: swisspeace / NOREF, 2015.

HENSHAW, Alexis. 'Peace with a Woman's Face': Women, Social Media and the Colombian Peace Process. **Contexto Internacional**, vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020.

HERBOLZHEIMER, Kristian. **Innovations in the Colombian Peace Process**. NOREF Report, 2016.

HERRERA, Natalia & PORCH, Douglas. 'Like going to a fiesta' – the role of female fighters in Colombia's FARC-EP. **Small Arms & Insurgencies**, vol. 19, issue 4, 2008.

HERZ, Monica; SIMAN, Maira; DRUMOND, Paula. O que é a mediação internacional: Mapeando o debate. In: HERZ, M; SIMAN, M; DRUMOND, P. (orgs). **Mediação Internacional**. Rio de Janeiro: Editora PUC-Rio / Editora Vozes, 2016.

HIRBLINGER, Andreas & LANDAU, Dana. Daring to differ? Strategies of inclusion in peacemaking. **Security Dialogue**. Vol 51, Issue 4, 2020.

HIRSCHMANN, Nancy J. & WRIGHT, Joanne H. **Feminist interpretations of Thomas Hobbes**. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012.

HOBBSAWM, Eric J. **Viva la revolución: A era das utopias na América Latina**. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2017.

HOBSON, Christopher. Revolution, Representation and the Foundations of Modern Democracy. **European Journal of Political Theory**, 7(4) 449–471, 2008.

HOBBS, Thomas. **Leviathan**. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994.

HOFFMANN, Hasso et al. Le concept de représentation: un problème allemande? **Raisons politiques**, Vol. 2, n. 50, p. 79-96. 2013.

HOFFMANN, Florian & RIBEIRO HOFFMANN, Andrea. International human rights institutions and conflict resolution. In: FUENTES JULIO, Claudia & DRUMOND, Paula (eds). **Human Rights and Conflict Resolution: Bridging the Theoretical and Practical Divide**. London and New York: Routledge, 2018.

HOOKS, bell. **Teoria feminista: Da margem ao centro**. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2019a.

_____. **E eu não sou uma mulher?: Mulheres negras e feminismo**. Rio de Janeiro: Rosa dos tempos, 2019b.

HOWARTH, David & STAVRAKAKIS, Yannis. Introducing discourse theory and political analysis. In: HOWARTH, D.; NORVAL, A.; STAVRAKAKIS, Y. (eds). **Discourse theory and political analysis: Identities, hegemonies and social change**. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. **'You'll learn not to cry': Child Combatants in Colombia**. New York: HRW, 2003.

HYLTON, Forrest. **Evil hour in Colombia**. London and New York: Verso, 2006.

IBARRA MELO, Maria Eugenia. **Mujeres e insurrección en Colombia: Reconfiguración de la identidad femenina en la guerrilla**. Santiago de Cali: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2009.

_____. La Paz en Colombia también Es un Asunto de Mujeres. **GÉNEROS – Multidisciplinary Journal of Gender Studies** Vol. 4 No. 3 February 2016 pp. 887-910.

INDEPAZ et al. **Informe especial – Registro de líderes y personas defensoras de DDHH asesinadas desde la firma del acuerdo de paz (Del 24/11/2016 al 15/07/2020)**. Bogotá, July 15, 2020. Available at: <<http://www.indepaz.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Informe-Especial-Asesinato-lideres-sociales-Nov2016-Jul2020-Indepaz.pdf>> (accessed December 26, 2020).

INTERVIEW #1. Civil society representative (recorded and transcribed with authorization). Rio de Janeiro: October 23, 2018.

INTERVIEW #2. Government official (recorded and transcribed with authorization). Bogotá: November 6, 2018.

INTERVIEW #3. Civil society representative (recorded and transcribed with authorization). Bogotá: November 7, 2018.

INTERVIEW #4. Civil society representative (recorded and transcribed with authorization). Bogotá: November 8, 2018.

INTERVIEW #5. Government official (recorded and transcribed with authorization). Bogotá: November 8, 2018.

INTERVIEW #6. Academic (recorded and transcribed with authorization). Bogotá: November 9, 2018.

INTERVIEW #7. Civil society representative (recorded and transcribed with authorization). Bogotá: November 13, 2018.

INTERVIEW #8. FARC member (email exchange). Bogotá: November 9, 2018.

INTERVIEW #9. Academic (recorded and transcribed with authorization). Bogotá: November 15, 2018.

INTERVIEW #10. FARC member (recorded and transcribed with authorization). Bogotá: November 16, 2018.

INTERVIEW #11. Government official (recorded and transcribed with authorization). Bogotá: November 19, 2018.

INTERVIEW #12. FARC member (recorded and transcribed with authorization). Bogotá: November 20, 2018.

INTERVIEW #13. Civil society representative (recorded and transcribed with authorization). Bogotá: November 20, 2018.

INTERVIEW #14. UN officer (recorded and transcribed with authorization). Bogotá: November 22, 2018.

INTERVIEW #15. Government official (recorded and transcribed with authorization). Bogotá: November 25, 2018.

ISACSON, Adam & RODRÍGUEZ, Jorge R. Los orígenes, la evolución y las lecciones del movimiento colombiano por la paz. In: BOUVIER, V. (ed). **Colombia: La construcción de la paz en tiempos de guerra**. Bogotá: Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 2014. Kindle edition.

ISACSON, Adam. The Role of United States and the Military in Colombia. In: BAGLEY, B. & ROSEN, J. D. (eds). **Colombia's political economy at the outset of the twentieth-first century: From Uribe to Santos and beyond**. Lanham: Lexington books, 2015.

JABRI, Vivienne. Revisiting Change and Conflict: On Underlying Assumptions and the De-Politicisation of Conflict Resolution. **Berghof Handbook Dialogue**, n.5. Aug/2006.

_____. **War and the Transformation of Global Politics**. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

JACOBS, Thomas. The Dislocated Universe of Laclau and Mouffe: An Introduction to Post-Structuralist Discourse Theory. **Critical Review**, 30:3-4, 294-315, 2018.

JAGGAR, Alison M. **Feminist Politics and Human Nature**. Totowa: Rowman & Allanheld Publishers, 1983.

JAHAN, Rounaq. **The Elusive Agenda: Mainstreaming Women in Development**. London: Zed books, 1995.

JARSTAD, Anna K. Dilemmas of War-to-Democracy transitions: theories and concepts. In: JARSTAD, A. & SISK, T. (eds). **From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding**. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008a.

_____. Power sharing: former enemies in joint government. In: JARSTAD, A. & SISK, T. (eds). **From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding**. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008b.

JARSTAD, Anna K. & SISK, Timothy. Introduction. In: JARSTAD, A. & SISK, T. (eds). **From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding**. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

JAUME, Lucien. **Hobbes et l'État Representatif moderne**. Paris: PUF, 1986.

JONES, Peter. **Track Two Diplomacy in theory and practice**. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015.

JØRGENSEN, Marianne W. & PHILLIPS, Louise J. **Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method**. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2002.

KALDOR, Mary. **New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era**. Malden: Polity Press, 2012.

KANOL, Direnç. Civil Society at the Negotiation Table, Legitimacy Beliefs and Durable Peace. **Peace and Conflict Studies**. Vol. 22: No. 1, Article 1. 2015.

KANTOROWICZ, Ernst H. **The King's Two Bodies: a Study in Medieval Political Theology**. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016.

KEANE, John. **The life and death of democracy**. London: Simon & Schuster, 2009.

KLINE, Harvey F. **Chronicle of a failure foretold: The peace process of Colombian President Andrés Pastrana**. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2007.

KOOPMAN, Sara. Building an inclusive peace is an uneven socio-spatial process: Colombia's differential approach. **Political Geography**, vol 83, 2020.

KÖRPPEN, Daniela. Space Beyond the Liberal Peacebuilding Consensus: A Systemic Perspective. In: KÖRPPEN, D; ROPERS, N; GIESSMANN, H. J. (eds), **The Non-linearity of Peace processes: Theory and Practice of Systemic Conflict Transformation**. Opladen & Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2011.

KRAUSE, Jana; KRAUSE, Werner; BRÄNFORS, Pii. Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace. **International Interactions**. Volume 44, Issue 6. 2018.

KRIESBERG, Louis. The Evolution of Conflict Resolution. In: BERCOVITCH, J.; KREMENYUK, V.; ZARTMAN, I. W. (eds.), **The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution**. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2009.

_____. The Development of the Conflict Resolution Field. In: ZARTMAN, I. William; RASMUSSEN, J Lewis. **Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques**. Washington: USIP, 1997.

KROC INSTITUTE. **Towards implementation of women's rights in the Colombian final peace accord: Progress, Opportunities and Challenges**. Special Report on the monitoring of gender commitments. Notre Dame and Bogotá, 2020a.

_____. **Tres años después de la firma del Acuerdo Final de Colombia: hacia la transformación territorial**. Diciembre 2018 a noviembre 2019. Bogotá, 2020b.

LABRECQUE, Marie France. Transversalização da perspectiva de gênero ou instrumentalização das mulheres? **Estudos Feministas, Florianópolis**, 16(3): 901-912, setembro-dezembro/2010.

LACAN, Jacques. **The Psychoses. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III**. London: Routledge, 1993.

LACLAU, Ernesto & MOUFFE, Chantal. **Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics**. New York: Verso, 2001 [1985].

LACLAU, Ernesto. **Emancipation(s)**. London: Verso, 2007.

_____. The impossibility of society. In: **New reflections on the revolution of our time**. London: Verso, 1990.

_____. Discourse. In: GOODIN, R.; PETTIT, P.; POGGE, T. **A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy**. Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell, 1993.

LAFONT, Cristina. Deliberation, Participation, and Democratic Legitimacy: Should Deliberative Mini-publics Shape Public Policy? **The Journal of Political Philosophy**. Vol 23, n. 1, 2015.

LAMUS, Doris. **Movimiento feminista o Movimiento de mujeres en Colombia**. Ponencia presentada en el Seminario internacional "Mujer con voz la política sí va", Medellín, septiembre 23 y 24 de 2009.

_____. **De la subversión a la inclusión: movimientos de mujeres de la segunda ola en Colombia, 1975-2005**. Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, 2010.

LANDES, Joan. **Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution**. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.

LANZ, David. Who Gets a Seat at the Table? A Framework for Understanding the Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion in Peace Negotiations. **International Negotiation** 16 (2011), pp. 275–295.

Lara, P. **Las mujeres en la guerra**. Bogotá: Planeta, 2000.

LAROSA, Michael J. & MEJÍA, Germán R. **Historia concisa de Colombia, 1810-2017**. Bogotá: Debate / Penguin Random House, 2017.

LEANDER, Anna & WÆVER, Ole. Introduction. In: **Assembling Exclusive Expertise: Knowledge, Ignorance and Conflict Resolution in the Global South**. LEANDER, A; WÆVER, O. (eds). London and New York: Routledge, 2019.

LEDERACH, John Paul. Cultivating Peace: A Practitioner's View of Deadly Conflict and Negotiation. In: DARBY, J; MACGINTY, R. (eds). **Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace processes and Post-war reconstruction**. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

_____. **Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies**. Washington: USIP Press, 1997.

LEGRAND, Catherine. The Colombian Crisis in Historical Perspective. **Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies**, Volume 28, Issue 55-56.

_____. **Colonización y protesta campesina en Colombia (1850-1950)**. Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 2016.

LEHTI, Marko. From Antagonism to Agonistic Peace: Rethinking Identities and Dialogic Transformation. **ISA's 57th Annual Convention**. Atlanta, 2016.

LESSA, Renato. **Da representação: história natural e filosofia política**. Seminar, PUC-Rio/Departamento de Direito. 24-28 outubro, 2016.

LEVITSKY, Steven & ZIBLATT, Daniel. **Como as democracias morrem**. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Zahar, 2018.

LIENDO, Nicolás & BRAITHWAITE, Jessica M. Determinants of Colombian attitudes toward the peace process. **Conflict Management and Peace Science**. Volume 35, issue 6, 2018.

LIJPHART, Arend. Consociational Democracy. **World Politics**, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jan., 1969), pp. 207-225.

LLOYD, S.A. Power and Sexual Subordination in Hobbes's Political Theory. In: HIRSCHMANN, N. J. & WRIGHT, J. H. (eds). **Feminist interpretations of Thomas Hobbes**. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012

LUNA, Lola G. & VILLAREAL, Norma. **Historia, Género y Política: Movimientos de mujeres y participación política en Colombia, 1930-1991**. Barcelona: Edición del Seminario Interdisciplinar Mujeres y Sociedad, 1994.

MACPHERSON, C. B. **The life and times of liberal democracy**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

MADDISON, Sara. Relational Transformation and Agonistic Dialogue in Divided Societies. **Political Studies**, vol 63, 1014-1030, 2015.

MAHMOUD, Youssef. **Sustaining peace: what does it mean in practice?** International Peace Institute. Issue brief, 2017.

MAIER, Nicole. Queering Colombia's peace process: a case study of LGBTI inclusion. **The International Journal of Human Rights**, 24:4, 377-392, 2020.

MALDONADO, Andrés. What is the Colombian peace process teaching the world? **New England Journal of Public Policy** 29(1), 2017.

MANIN, Bernard. **The principles of representative government**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

_____. On legitimacy and political deliberation. **Political Theory**, vol. 15, n. 3, August 1987.

MANSBRIDGE, Jane. Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent "Yes". **The Journal of Politics**, Vol. 61, No. 3, pp. 628-657. Aug, 1999.

_____. Everyday talk in the deliberative system. In: MACEDO, S. (ed). **Deliberative Politics: Essays on 'Democracy and Disagreement'**. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

_____. Rethinking representation. **American Political Science Review**. Vol 97, n. 4, Nov. 2003.

MARCHART, Oliver. **Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau**. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007.

MARIANO, Silvana A. O sujeito do feminismo e o pós-estruturalismo. **Estudos Feministas, Florianópolis**, 13(3): 320, setembro-dezembro/2005

MARQUES, Marcelo de Souza. Status ontológico da teoria do Discurso (tD) em laclau e Mouffe: Diálogos, perspectivas teóricas e conceitos básicos. **DADOS**, Rio de Janeiro, vol.63(2), 2020.

MATANOCK, Aila M.; GARCÍA-SÁNCHEZ, Miguel. The Colombian Paradox: Peace Processes, Elite Divisions & Popular Plebiscites. **Daedalus**, 146 (4), 2017.

MCCANDLESS, Erin. **Reconceptualizing the social contract: in contexts of conflict, fragility and fraught transition**. Wits School of Governance Working Paper Series, 2018.

MCROBBIE, Angela. Strategies of vigilance: an interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. In: MCROBBIE, A. **Postmodernism and popular culture**. London and New York: Routledge, 1994.

MEERTENS, Donny. **Forced Displacement and Gender Justice in Colombia: Between Disproportional Effects of Violence and Historical Injustice**. International Center for Transitional Justice, 2012.

MENDES, Denise Cristina V. R. Representação política e participação: reflexões sobre o déficit democrático. **Rev. Katál. Florianópolis** v. 10 n. 2 p. 143-153 jul./dez. 2007.

MENDES, Isa. Inclusion and Political Representation in Peace Negotiations: The Case of the Colombian Victims' Delegations. **Journal of Politics in Latin America**. Vol 11, issue 3, 2019.

MENDES, Isa; SIMAN, Maira; FERNANDEZ, Marta. The Colombian peace negotiations and the invisibility of the 'no' vote in the 2016 referendum. **Peacebuilding**, 8:3, 321-343, 2020.

MENDONÇA, Daniel de. Como olhar “o político” a partir da teoria do discurso. **Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política**. nº 1. Brasília, janeiro-junho de 2009.

MESA DE TRABAJO MUJER Y CONFLICTO ARMADO. Informe sobre violencia sociopolítica contra mujeres y niñas en Colombia. Segundo avance – 2001. Available at: <https://www.coljuristas.org/documentos/libros_e_informes/ii_informe_mesa_mujer_y_conflicto.pdf> (accessed December 26, 2020).

MIALL, Hugh. **Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task**. Berghof, 2001.

MIGUEL, Luis Felipe. **Democracia e Representação: Territórios em Disputa**. São Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2013.

_____. Carole Pateman e a Crítica Feminista do Contrato. **Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais**. Vol 32, n. 93, 2017.

MIGUEL, Luis Felipe & BIROLI, Flávia. **Feminismo e política: Uma introdução**. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2015.

MINEUR, Didier. **Archéologie de la representation politique: Structure et fondement d'une crise**. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2012.

MOLANO, Alfredo. Fragmentos de la historia del conflicto armado (1920-2010). In: COMISIÓN HISTÓRICA DEL CONFLICTO Y SUS VÍCTIMAS. **Contribución al entendimiento del conflicto armado en Colombia**. February/2015.

_____. **Ahí les dejo esos fierros**. New York: Debolsillo, 2009.

MOUFFE, Chantal. **Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically**. New York: Verso, 2013.

_____. Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism? **Social Research**, vol. 66, n. 3, 1999.

_____. Feminism, Citizenship, and Radical Democratic Politics. In: BUTLER, J.; SCOTT, J. (eds). **Feminists theorize the political**. New York and London: Routledge, 1992.

_____. **On the Political**. London and New York: Routledge, 2005.

MOULY, Cécile & HERNÁNDEZ DELGADO, Esperanza (eds). **Civil resistance and Violent Conflict in Latin America**. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

MORNAY, Philippe du Plessis. *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos*. In: FRANKLIN, J. H. (ed). **Constitutionalism and Resistance in the Sixteenth Century: Three Treatises by Hotman, Beza & Mornay**. Western Publishing Company, 1969.

MUELLE, Camila E. Cómo hacer necropolíticas en casa: Ideología de género y acuerdos de paz en Colombia. **Sexualidad, Salud y Sociedad - Revista Latinoamericana**. n. 27 – dec. 2017 - pp.172-198.

MULIERI, Alessandro. Hasso Hofmann and the Polysemy of Representation. **Redescriptions**, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Autumn 2016).

NAPOLI, Magdalena M. Feminismo y democracia radical. Butler, Laclau, Mouffe, Žižek y un debate insuficiente. **Avatares filosóficos** #3, Dossier. Filosofía de Género. 2016.

NASH, Kate. Beyond liberalism? Feminist theories of democracy. In: RANDALL, V.; WAYLER, G. (eds). **Gender, Politics and the State**. London and New York: Routledge, 1998.

NASI, Carlos. Los procesos de paz en Colombia, 1982-2002: Condiciones, estrategias y resultados. In: BOUVIER, V. (ed). **Colombia: La construcción de la paz en tiempos de guerra**. Bogotá: Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 2014. Kindle edition.

NÄSSTRÖM, Sofia. Where is the representative turn going? **European Journal of Political Theory**, 10(4) 501–510, 2011.

NATHAN, Laurie. The real deal? The post-conflict constitution as a peace agreement. **Third World Quarterly**, 41:9, 1556-1574, 2020.

NEWMAN, Edward. RICHMOND, Oliver. **Challenges to peacebuilding: Managing spoilers during conflict resolution**. New York: United Nations University Press, 2006.

NICHOLSON, Linda. Feminism in "Waves": Useful Metaphor or Not? **New Politics** Vol. XII, No. 4, Whole Number 48, 2010.

NILSSON, Desireé. Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace. **International Interactions**, vol. 38, n. 2, p. 243-266. 2012.

NODOS DE SABERES POPULARES. **Guerrilleras: Testimonios de cinco combatientes de las FARC**. 2017.

NOVARO, Marco. **Representación y liderazgo en las democracias contemporáneas**. Rosario: Homo sapiens, 2000.

NYLADER, Dag; SANDBERG, Rita; TVEDT, Idun. **Designing peace: the Colombian peace process**. NOREF Report, February 2018.

O'BRIEN, Mary. **The politics of reproduction**. London: Unwin Hyman, 1981.

O'DONNELL, Guillermo. The Perpetual Crises of Democracy. **Journal of Democracy**, Vol 18, n. 1, 2007.

O'NEILL, Daniel I.; SHANLEY, Mary L.; YOUNG, Iris M. Introduction. In: O'NEILL, Daniel I.; SHANLEY, Mary L.; YOUNG, Iris M (eds). **Illusion of consent: Engaging with Carole Pateman**. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008.

O'ROURKE, Catherine. Gendering Political Settlements: Challenges and Opportunities. **Journal of International Development**, 29, 594–612 (2017).

OKIN, Susan. **Women in Western Political thought**. Princeton: Princeton University, 1979.

_____. **Justice, Gender, and the Family**. New York: Basic Books, 1989.

OROZCO, César R. Estatus jurídico internacional del acuerdo de paz colombiano. **Estudios de Derecho**, 75(165), 131-149, 2018.

PAARLBERG-KVAM, Kate. What's to come is more complicated: feminist visions of peace in Colombia. **International Feminist Journal of Politics**. Volume 21, Issue 2, 2019.

PACHÓN, Mónica & LACOUTURE, Santiago E. Female representation in Colombia. In: SCHWINDT-BAYER, Leslie A. (ed). **Gender and Representation in Latin America**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

PACHÓN, Ximena. **La infancia perdida en Colombia: los menores en la guerra**. Georgetown University, Center for Latin American Studies. Working Paper Series No. 15, 2009.

PAFFENHOLZ, Thania. International peacebuilding goes local: analysing Lederach's conflict transformation theory and its ambivalent encounter with 20 years of practice. **Peacebuilding** 2 (1), 11-27. 2014.

_____. Unpacking the Local Turn in Peacebuilding: a critical assessment towards an agenda of future research. **Third World Quarterly**, 36:5, 2015a.

_____. **Can Inclusive Peace Processes Work? New evidence from a multi-year research project**. Graduate Institute of Geneva. Policy brief. 2015b.

_____. Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Beyond the Inclusion–Exclusion Dichotomy. **Negotiation Journal**, vol. 30 (Jan/2014), n.1, p. 69-91.

_____. Women in peace negotiations. In: AGGESTAM, K.; TOWNS, A. E. (eds). **Gendering diplomacy and international negotiation**. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

PAFFENHOLZ, Thania; ROSS, Nick; DIXON, Steven; SCHLUCHTER, Anna-Lena; TRUE, Jacqui. **Making women count – not just counting women: Assessing women's inclusion and influence in peace negotiations**. Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative, 2016.

PAINE, Thomas. **Rights of Man, Common sense and Other political writings**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

PALACIOS, Marco. **Entre la legitimidad y la violencia: Colombia, 1875-1994**. Bogotá: Grupo editorial Norma, 2003.

PARIS, Roland. Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism. **International Security**, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 54-89.

_____. Saving liberal peacebuilding. **Review of International Studies** / Volume 36 / Issue 02 / April 2010, pp 337 – 365.

PARKINSON, John & MANSBRIDGE, Jane (eds). **Deliberative systems: Deliberative democracy at large scale**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

PARRADO, Erika. Movilización social por la paz: las luchas del movimiento de mujeres en Colombia. **Las mujeres en la movilización social por la paz (1982-2017)**. CINEP, Datapaz (Reporte trimestral), julio-septiembre 2018.

PATEMAN, Carole. **Participation and Democratic Theory**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

- _____. **The Sexual Contract**. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988.
- _____. 'God Hath Ordained to Man a Helper': Hobbes, Patriarchy and Conjugal Right. **British Journal of Political Science**, Volume 19, Issue 04. October 1989.
- PÉCAUT, Daniel. **As FARC: uma guerrilha sem fins?** São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2010.
- _____. Las FARC: fuentes de su longevidad y de la conservación de su cohesión. **Análisis político** nº 63, Bogotá, mayo-agosto, 2008, págs. 22-50.
- PETERSON, Jenny H. Creating Space for Emancipatory Human Security: Liberal Obstructions and the Potential of Agonism. **International Studies Quarterly** 57, 318–328, 2013.
- PEARCE, Jenny. ¿Hacia una política post-representativa? La participación en el siglo XXI. **Cuadernos de trabajo Hegoa**, n. 40, 2006.
- _____. Perverse state formation and securitized democracy in Latin America. **Democratization**, Vol 17, Issue 2, 2010.
- PITKIN, Hanna. **The Concept of Representation**. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
- _____. Representação: Palavras, Instituições e Ideias. **Lua Nova**, São Paulo, 67: 15-47, 2006.
- _____. Representation and Democracy: Uneasy Alliance. **Scandinavian Political Studies**, Vol. 27 – No. 3, 2004.
- PHILLIPS, Anne. **Engendering Democracy**. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991.
- _____. **The politics of presence**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- PLOTKE, David. Representation is Democracy. **Constellations**, vol. 4, n. 1, p. 19-34.
- PODDER, Sukanya. Non-State Armed Groups and Stability: Reconsidering Legitimacy and Inclusion. **Contemporary Security Policy**. Vol. 34, Issue 1. 2013.
- PODLECH, Adalbert. La représentation : une histoire du concept. **Trivium**, 16. 2014.
- POLLAK, Johannes. Contested Meanings of Representation. **Comparative European Politics**, 5, (87–103), 2007.
- POLLACK, Mark A. & HAFNER-BURTON, Emilie. Mainstreaming gender in the European Union. **Journal of European Public Policy**, volume 7, issue 3, 2000.
- PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA. **Declaración del Presidente Juan Manuel Santos sobre los nuevos miembros del equipo negociador del Gobierno en La Habana**. November 26, 2013. Available at: http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2013/Noviembre/Paginas/20131126_04-Palabras-del-Presidente-Santos-sobre-los-nuevos-miembros-del-equipo-negociador-del-Gobierno-en-La-Habana.aspx (accessed December 26, 2020).

PRIO. Gender and Inclusion in the Colombian Peace Process. **PRIO Gender, Peace and Security Update**. Issue 4 (2016).

_____. Implementing the Final Colombian Peace Agreement, 2016–2018. **GPS Policy Brief**. 01/2018.

PRUITT, Dean G. **Whither ripeness theory?** Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University. Working paper n. 25, 2005.

RAI, Shirin M. **Mainstreaming gender, democratizing the state**. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003.

RAMSBOTHAM, Oliver. **Transforming Violent Conflict: Radical disagreement, dialogue and survival**. Abingdon: Routledge, 2009.

RAMSBOTHAM, Oliver; WOODHOUSE, Tom; MIALL, Hugh. **Contemporary Conflict Resolution**. Malden: Polity Press, 2011.

RANCIÈRE, Jacques. **O ódio à democracia**. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2015.

RANDAZZO, Elisa. The paradoxes of the 'everyday': scrutinising the local turn in peace building. **Third World Quarterly**. Vol. 37, Issue 8. 2016.

RAWLS, John. **A Theory of Justice**. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

_____. **Political Liberalism**. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

REHFELD, Andrew. Towards a General Theory of Political Representation. **The Journal of Politics**, vol. 68 (2006), n. 1, p. 1-21.

_____. What is Representation? On Being and Becoming a Representative. In: VIEIRA, M. B. (ed). **Reclaiming Representation Contemporary Advances in the Theory of Political Representation**. New York and London: Routledge, 2017.

RESDAL. **Atlas Comparativo de la Defensa en América Latina y Caribe**. Edición 2016.

RESTREPO, Elvira M. Leaders against all odds: Women victims of conflict in Colombia. **Palgrave communications** 2, 2016.

RESTREPO, Jorge A.; APONTE, David (eds). **Guerra y violencias en Colombia: Herramientas y interpretaciones**. Bogotá: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2009.

RETTBERG, Angelika. Victims of the Colombian Armed Conflict: The Birth of a Political Actor. In: BAGLEY, B. & ROSEN, J. D. (eds). **Colombia's political economy at the outset of the twentieth-first century: From Uribe to Santos and beyond**. Lanham: Lexington books, 2015.

_____. **Peace-making as a long-term struggle over the social contract in Colombia: Challenges and opportunities of the new peace agreement**. Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Análisis 6/2018.

_____. Peace-Making Amidst an Unfinished Social Contract: The Case of Colombia. **Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding**, Volume 14, Issue 1, 2020.

RICHMOND, Oliver. A Genealogy of Peacemaking: The Creation and Re-Creation of Order. **Alternatives: Global, Local, Political**, vol. 26 (July-Sept. 2001), n. 3, p. 317-348.

_____. **Peace in International Relations**. Abingdon: Routledge, 2008.

_____. UN peace operations and the dilemmas of the peacebuilding consensus. **International Peacekeeping**, 11:1, 83-101, 2004.

RODRIGUES, Thiago. **Narcotráfico: uma guerra na guerra**. São Paulo: Desatino, 2014.

RODRÍGUEZ-VALERO, Luis Alfredo. La representación substantiva de las mujeres en el Congreso colombiano de 1998 al 2012: Una vision más allá del número total de legisladoras. **Documentos del Departamento de Ciencia Política** 21: 1-37. Universidad de los Andes, 2013.

ROJAS, Catalina. Las mujeres y la construcción de la paz en Colombia: Resistencia a la guerra, creatividad para la paz. In: BOUVIER, V. (ed). **Colombia: La construcción de la paz en tiempos de guerra**. Bogotá: Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 2014. Kindle edition.

RON, Amit. The “Public” in “Public Peace Process” and in “Mini-Publics:” A Dialogue between Democratic Theory and Peace Studies. **Peace and Conflict Studies**, vol. 17, 2010.

_____. Peace Negotiations and Peace Talks: The Peace Process in the Public Sphere. **International Journal of Peace Studies**. Vol. 14, No 1, 2009.

RONDÓN, Manuel Alejandro R. La ideología de género como exceso: Pánico moral y decisión ética en la política colombiana. **Sexualidad, Salud y Sociedad - Revista Latinoamericana**. n. 27 – dic. 2017 - pp.128-148.

ROSANVALLON, Pierre. **El Pueblo Inalcanzable: Historia de la representación democrática en Francia**. Ciudad de México: Instituto Mora, 2004 [1998].

ROUSSEAU, Jean-Jacques. **The Social Contract and Discourses**. North Clarendon: Everyman, 1993.

RUDDICK, Sara. **Maternal thinking: toward a politics of peace**. Boston: Beacon, 1989.

RUEDA, Z. **Confesiones de una guerrillera**. Bogotá: Planeta, 2009.

RUNCIMAN, David. The Paradox of Political Representation. **The Journal of Political Philosophy**: Volume 15, Number 1, 2007.

_____. **Como a democracia chega ao fim**. São Paulo: Todavía, 2018.

RUSTIGHI, Lorenzo. Rethinking the sexual contract: the case of Thomas Hobbes. **Philosophy and Social Criticism**. 1–28, 2018.

SAFFORD, Frank & PALACIOS, Marco. **Colombia: Fragmented land, divided society**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

SALAMANCA, Rosa E. El movimiento de mujeres en Colombia. **Las mujeres en la movilización social por la paz (1982-2017)**. CINEP, Datapaz (Reporte trimestral), julio-septiembre 2018.

SALVESEN, Hilde & NYLANDER, Dag. **Towards an inclusive peace: women and the gender approach in the Colombian peace process**. NOREF Report, July 2017.

SÁNCHEZ, Olga A. El movimiento social de mujeres. In: VELÁZQUEZ, Magdala. **Las mujeres en la historia de Colombia – Tomo I: Mujeres, Historia y Política**. Bogotá: Grupo editorial Norma, 1995.

SÁNCHEZ, Carolina J. Las mujeres y la guerrilla: ¿un espacio para las políticas de género? **Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades**, año 16, nº 32. Segundo semestre de 2014.

SANTOS, Boaventura de Sousa; AVRITZER, Leonardo. **Democratizar a democracia: os caminhos da democracia participativa**. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2002.

SANTOS, Fábio Luís B. **Uma história da onda progressista sul-americana (1998-2016)**. São Paulo: Editora Elefante, 2018.

SAPIRO, Virginia. When are interests interesting? The problem of political representation of women. In: PHILLIPS, A. (ed). **Feminism and Politics**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

SARMIENTO, Fernando (ed). **Lecciones para la paz negociada: Retrospectiva histórica en Colombia**. Bogotá: CINEP/USIP/Trocaire, 2011.

SAWARD, Michael. The Representative Claim. **Contemporary Political Theory**, 5, (297–318). 2006.

_____. **The representative claim**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

_____. Performative representation. In: VIEIRA, M. B. (ed). **Reclaiming Representation Contemporary Advances in the Theory of Political Representation**. New York and London: Routledge, 2017.

SCHAAP, Andrew. Agonism in divided societies. **Philosophy & Social Criticism**, vol 32 no 2, pp. 255–277, 2006.

SCHUMPETER, Joseph. **Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy**. London and New York: Routledge, 2006.

SCHWINDT-BAYER, Leslie A. **Political Power and Women's representation in Latin America**. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

SEMANA. **Discurso completo de posesión de Juan Manuel Santos**. July 8, 2010. Available at: <<https://www.semana.com/politica/articulo/discurso-completo-posesion-juan-manuel-santos/120293-3/>> (accessed December 25, 2020).

SEGURA, Renata & MECHOULAN, Delphine. **Made in Havana: How Colombia and the FARC Decided to End the War**. International Peace Institute, February 2017.

SELBY, Jan. The myth of liberal peace-building. **Conflict, Security and Development**, 13:1, 2013.

SEVERS, Eline. Representation as claim-making: quid responsiveness? **Representation**, Vol. 46, No. 4, 2010.

SHANLEY, Mary L. & PATEMAN, Carole. Introduction. In: SHANLEY, Mary L. & PATEMAN, Carole (eds). **Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory**. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991.

SHAW, Jo. The European Union and gender mainstreaming: Constitutionally embedded or comprehensively marginalised? **Feminist Legal Studies** 10 (3):213-226 (2002).

SHINKO, Rosemary. Agonistic Peace: A Postmodern Reading. **Millennium: Journal of International Studies**, Vol. 36 No. 3, pp. 473-491, 2008.

SINTOMER, Yves. The meanings of political representation: uses and misuses of a notion. **Raisons politiques**, vol. 2, n. 50, p. 13-34. 2013

SISMA MUJER; CORPORACIÓN HUMANAS; RED NACIONAL DE MUJERES. **Equidad de género y derechos de las mujeres en el Acuerdo Final de Paz**. Bogotá, June/2017.

SKIDMORE, Thomas E. & SMITH, Peter H. **Modern Latin America**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

SKINNER, Quentin. Hobbes on Representation. **European Journal of Philosophy** 13:2, pp. 155–184, 2005.

_____. **Visions of Politics – Volume 3: Hobbes and Civil Science**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

SLOMP, Gabriella. Hobbes and the Equality of Women **Political Studies** XLII, 441-452, 1994.

SMITH, Anna Marie. **Laclau and Mouffe: the radical democratic imaginary**. London and New York: Routledge, 1998.

SNYDER, R. Claire. What Is Third-Wave Feminism? A New Directions Essay. **Signs**, Vol. 34, No. 1. 2008.

SOMERS, Margaret. **Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

SPECTOR, Bertram. Citizen Negotiation: Toward a More Inclusive Process. **International Negotiation**. Vol 20, pp. 89-108. 2015.

SPIVAK, Gayatri C. **Pode o subalterno falar?** Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2010.

SPURK, Christoph. 2010. "Understanding Civil Society." In: PAFFENHOLZ, T. (ed). **Civil Society & Peacebuilding**. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010.

SQUIRES, Judith. **Gender in Political Theory**. Cambridge and Maldon: Polity Press, 2000. Kindle edition.

_____. Is mainstreaming transformative? Theorizing mainstreaming in the context of diversity and deliberation. **Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society**, Volume 12, Issue 3, Fall 2005, Pages 366–388.

_____. The constitutive representation of gender: extra-parliamentary representations of gender relations. **Representation**, 44:2, 187-204, 2008.

SRIRAM, Chandra. **Peace as Governance: Power-Sharing, Armed Groups and Contemporary Peace Negotiations**. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

STEIN, Janice G. Getting to the table: The Triggers, Stages, Functions, and Consequences of Prenegotiation. In: STEIN, J. G. (ed), **Getting to the table: The Process of International Prenegotiation**. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989.

STRATIGAKI, Maria. The Cooptation of Gender Concepts in EU Policies: The Case of Reconciliation of Work and Family, **Social Politics** 11(1): 30-56, 2004.

STRÖMBOM, Lisa. Exploring analytical avenues for agonistic peace. **Journal of International Relations and Development**, 23, pp. 1–23, 2020.

TICKNER, Arlene B. Colombia and the United States: From Counternarcotics to Counterterrorism. **Current History**, February 2003.

_____. Colombia y Estados Unidos: una relación “especial”. **Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica**, Vol. 8, n. 4, 2008.

TICKNER, Arlene B. & CALLEJAS, Mateo M. Narrating Success: Colombian Security Expertise and Foreign Policy. In: BAGLEY, B. & ROSEN, J. D. (eds). **Colombia's political economy at the outset of the twentieth-first century: From Uribe to Santos and beyond**. Lanham: Lexington books, 2015.

TOSTES, Ana Paula. Dilemas teóricos da representação política na origem do estado moderno – Hobbes e Sieyès: tão distantes e tão próximos. **Synesis**, v. 9, n. 1, p. 1-16, jan/jul 2017.

UNITED NATIONS. United Nations Charter. New York, 1945. Available at: <<https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vi/index.html>> (accessed December 7, 2020).

_____. **Peacebuilding: An orientation**. Peacebuilding Support Office, 2010. Available at: <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/peacebuilding_orientation.pdf> (accessed December 7, 2020).

_____. **The United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation**. 2012. Available at: <<http://peacemaker.un.org/resources/mediation-guidance>> (accessed December 7, 2020).

_____. **Guidance on Gender and Inclusive Mediation Strategies**. 2017. Available at: <<https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/1.%20English%20-GIMS.pdf>> (accessed December 24, 2020).

UN WOMEN. **Gender mainstreaming in development programming**. Guidance note, 2014.

_____. **Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence**. Second edition, October 2012.

_____. **100 medidas que incorporan la perspectiva de género en el Acuerdo de Paz entre el Gobierno de Colombia y las FARC-EP para terminar el conflicto y construir una paz estable y duradera**. 2017. Available at:

<<https://colombia.unwomen.org/es/biblioteca/publicaciones/2017/05/100-medidas-genero-acuerdos>> (accessed December 26, 2020).

UN WOMEN et al. **Mujeres militares: historias de grandeza al servicio de la paz.** 2017. Available at:

<<https://colombia.unwomen.org/es/biblioteca/publicaciones/2017/03/mujeres-militares>> (accessed December 26, 2020).

UNDP. **Gender equality and women's empowerment in public administration: Colombia case study.** 2012.

_____. **Primera delegación de víctimas viaja a La Habana a encuentro con la Mesa de Conversaciones.** August 15, 2014. Available at: <<https://www.co.undp.org/content/colombia/es/home/presscenter/articles/2014/08/15/primera-delegacion-de-victimas-viaja-a-la-habana-a-encuentro-con-la-mesa-de-conversaciones-.html>> (accessed December 25, 2020).

URBINATI, Nadia. **Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy.** Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.

URBINATI, Nadia; WARREN, Mark. The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory. **Annual Review of Political Science.** Vol 11, pp. 387–412, 2008.

VALENZUELA, Pedro. The end of the armed conflict in Colombia: a multiple causal factor explanation. **Peace & Change**, vol. 43, n.2, 2018.

_____. The values of peace in the Colombian Peace Agreement: discursive progress and empirical hurdles. **Peacebuilding**, 7:3, 2019.

VARGAS, Gonzalo A. & RESTREPO-JARAMILLO, Nataly. Child Soldiering in Colombia: Does Poverty Matter? **Civil Wars**, 18:4, 467-487, 2016.

VÁZQUEZ, Maria Eugenia. **My Life As A Revolutionary: Reflections Of A Former Guerrillera.** Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005.

VELÁZQUEZ, Magdala. **Las mujeres en la historia de Colombia – Tomo I: Mujeres, Historia y Política.** Bogotá: Grupo editorial Norma, 1995.

VERLOO, Mieke. Displacement and empowerment: reflections on the concept and practice of the Council of Europe approach to gender mainstreaming and gender equality. **Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society**, Volume 12, Issue 3, Fall 2005, Pages 344-365.

VIANA, Manuela T. **A dimensão internacional do conflito armado colombiano: A internacionalização dos processos de paz Segundo as agendas hemisférica e global.** São Paulo: Hucitec editora, 2016.

_____. **Preparing for War, Preparing for Peace: The Colombian “Success Story” and the Transformation of the “Military Professional”.** PhD dissertation, Institute of International Relations, PUC-Rio. 2017.

VIANA, Manuela T & MENDES, Isa. **GSUM entrevista Camilo Villa Romero, Membro do Movimento Nacional de Vítimas de Crimes de Estado (MOVICE).** Rio de Janeiro: GSUM, 2016a.

VIEIRA, Mónica Brito & RUNCIMAN, David. **Representation**. Malden: Polity Press, 2008.

VIEIRA, Mónica Brito. Introduction. In: VIEIRA, M. B. (ed). **Reclaiming Representation Contemporary Advances in the Theory of Political Representation**. New York and London: Routledge, 2017.

_____. **Elements of Representation in Hobbes: Aesthetics, Theatre, Law, and Theology in the Construction of Hobbes's Theory of the State**. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2009.

VILLAMIL, Ximena A. C. La comunidad internacional y su participación en los procesos de paz en Colombia. **Equidad Desarro**, n. 26: 207-222, jul-dec/2016.

VON BURG, Corinne. **On Inclusivity: The Role of Norms in International Peace Mediation**. NOREF/swisspeace. March, 2015.

WALBY, Sylvia. **Gender mainstreaming: Productive tensions in theory and practice**. Contribution to ESRC Gender Mainstreaming Seminars, 2003.

WALLENSTEEN, Peter & ERIKSSON, Mikael. **Negotiating Peace: Lessons from Three Comprehensive Agreements**. Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2009.

WANIS ST.-JOHN, Anthony; KEW, Darren. Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Confronting Exclusion. **International Negotiation**, vol. 13 (2008), p. 11-36.

WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA (WOLA). **Key Changes to the New Peace Accord**. November 15, 2016. Available at: <<https://colombiapeace.org/key-changes-to-the-new-peace-accord/>> (accessed December 26, 2020).

WEBER, Max. Politics as Vocation. In: BESTEMAN, C (ed). **Violence: a Reader**. New York: New York University Press, 2002 [1921].

_____. **The theory of social and economic organization**. New York: The Free Press, 1964.

WEISS, Thomas. **Thinking about global governance: Why people and ideas matter**. New York: Routledge, 2011.

WENMAN, Mark A. What is Politics? The Approach of Radical Pluralism. **Politics**, vol 23(1), 2003.

WILLIAMS, Melissa. **Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation**. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998. Edição Kindle.

WILLS, María Emma. Los tres nudos de la guerra colombiana. In: COMISIÓN HISTÓRICA DEL CONFLICTO Y SUS VÍCTIMAS. **Contribución al entendimiento del conflicto armado en Colombia**. February/2015.

_____. Los cinco viajes de los feminismos en Colombia (1980-1999): Avances y estancamientos. In: PANFICHI, Aldo (coord). **Sociedad Civil, Esfera Pública y Democratización en América Latina: Andes y Cono Sur**. San Diego: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2004a.

_____. **Las trayectorias femeninas y feministas hacia lo público en Colombia (1970-2000) ¿Inclusión sin representación?** PhD Dissertation

presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin, 2004b.

WOLIN, Sheldon S. **Politics of Vision**. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004 [1960].

YOUNG, Iris Marion. **Justice and the Politics of Difference**. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

_____. **Inclusion and Democracy**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

YOUSUF, Zahbia. **Navigating inclusion in peace transitions: Beyond elite bargains**. London: Conciliation Resources, 2018.

ZAHAR, Marie-Joëlle. Reframing the Spoiler Debate in Peace Processes. In: DARBY, J; MACGINTY, R. (eds). **Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace processes and Post-war reconstruction**. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

ZAHAR, Marie-Joëlle & MCCANDLESS, Erin. Sustaining Peace One Day at a Time: Inclusion, Transition Crises, and the Resilience of Social Contracts. **Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding**, 14:1, 119-138, 2020.

ZALEWSKI, Marysia. **Feminism after Postmodernism: Theorising through practice**. London and New York: Routledge, 2000.

ZANKER, Franziska. Legitimate Representation: Civil Society Actors in Peace Negotiations Revisited. **International Negotiation**, vol. 19, n. 1, p. 62-88. 2014.

_____. **Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Rethinking Civil Society Involvement in Peace Negotiations**. Abingdon: Routledge, 2018.

ZAREMBERG, G.; GUARNEROS-MEZA, V.; LAVALLE, A. G. **Intermediation and Representation in Latin America: Actors and Roles beyond elections**. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

ZARTMAN, I. William. Conflict Resolution and Negotiation. In: BERCOVITCH, J; KREMENUYK, V; ZARTMAN, I. W. (eds) **The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution**. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2009.

ZERILLI, Linda. Feminist Theory and the Canon of Political Thought. In: DRYZEK, J.S.; HONIG, B.; PHILLIPS, A. (eds). **The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

_____. Politics. In: DISCH, Lisa; HAWKESWORTH, Mary (eds). **The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.