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MUST INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY BE DEFENDED?

Bordering techniques and international organizations

TESE DE DOUTORADO

Thesis presented to the Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais of the Instituto de Relações Internacionais, PUC-Rio as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doutor em Relações Internacionais.

Advisor: Prof. Nicholas Onuf
Co-Advisor: Prof. Paulo Luiz Moreaux Lavigne Esteves

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To my brother Pedro,
for each and every step you take

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Abstract

Souza, Letícia Carvalho de; Onuf, Nicholas (Advisor); Esteves, Paulo Luiz Moreaux Lavigne (Co-Advisor). **Must international society be defended?** Bordering techniques and international organizations. Rio de Janeiro, 2015. 259p. PhD Thesis – Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

The thesis investigates the involvement of international organizations in states reconstruction processes, emphasizing the role played by the League of Nations and the United Nations in the period between 1919 and 2009. The aim is to discuss the institutionalization and the transformation of (re)construction processes over time; and reinterpret them as a set of techniques of government related to the preservation and promotion of specific versions of order in the international system and the constant (re)production of its borders.

Keywords

Resumo

Souza, Letícia Carvalho de; Onuf, Nicholas (Orientador); Esteves, Paulo Luiz Moreaux Lavigne (Co-Orientador). **Em defesa da Sociedade Internacional?** Organizações Internacionais e (Re)Construção de Estados. Rio de Janeiro, 2015. 259p. Tese de doutorado – Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

A tese investiga a participação de organizações internacionais em processos de (re)construção de estados, com ênfase no trabalho realizado pela Liga das Nações e pela Organização das Nações Unidas no período entre 1919 e 2009. O objetivo é discutir a institucionalização e a transformação dos processos de (re)construção ao longo do tempo; e reinterpretá-los como um conjunto de técnicas de governo relacionadas à preservação e à promoção de versões bastante específicas sobre as possibilidades de ordem no sistema internacional e a constante (re)produção de suas fronteiras.

Palavras-chave

Ordem; Governança; Organizações Internacionais; (Re)Construção de Estados.

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1
Introduction

To those who study International Relations, or are simply interested in the topic, it is not unusual to come across the idea that people around the world are becoming alike. To globalization enthusiasts, the fact that today we can travel faster and communicate more than a hundred years ago has opened a new horizon of expectations and possibilities for people's lives. Wherever you may live, it is becoming easier to get the best of what the world has to offer in your living room and even share it with someone on the other side of the planet: we can use the same clothes, read the same best-sellers, join the same advocacy networks or watch the release of the new season of our favorite television show simultaneously, from New York to Mumbai.

To those who fear this process, however, the proximity with things and people that once belonged exclusively to distant lands is making us lose track of ourselves. According to them, children are less interested in traditional stories of their communities than in the adventures of Harry Potter and his wizard friends; young people are adopting foreign political ideas; and old people sometimes do not recognize their neighborhood with so many immigrants on the streets. To some, even the existence of national states is threatened: multinational corporations take control over local economies; the will of powerful foreign leaders colonizes national political debates; and the constant flux of goods and people turn borders into conventions that are far from having the same meaning they once did.

Either way (or in many other ways), there is an impression of sameness in the air. In the academic field of International Relations, this impression is reinforced by the idea of an expanding international society that already covers most part of the planet. The expansion of the international society, as narrated by the English School (Bull; Watson, 1984; Watson, 2004), is, arguably, the only grand narrative that prevails in the field (Little, 2013). It is commonly repeated as

an official story of International Relations, and associates the international environment with a group of formally equal members who would be conscious of some common interests and values, and conceive themselves as bound by a common set of rules and institutions in their relations with one another (Bull, 2012). As there is no hierarchical level of sovereignty above that of each state, the international society is defined as anarchical: as long as they are organized sovereign entities and respect the principles of the group, members will all be independent, free.

At least in part, the effort of this thesis will be to challenge the impression of sameness and horizontality that surrounds the concept of international society, and dispute the notion that its limits correspond to those of the Earth. I would like to discuss how the very idea of an international society has inscribed borders that differentiate and separate spaces, peoples, and even time. Most importantly, I will investigate the multiple hierarchies involved in the construction and management of these borders and show that, although constantly transformed, they have not yet ceased to exist; on the contrary, they have contributed to turning inequality into an everlasting feature of international relations.

The starting point for these discussions will be the study of processes of construction and reconstruction of states, especially those that happened between 1919 and 2009, and had intense participation of international organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. Inspired by the ideas of Michel Foucault, my intention is to form something similar to a small archive of (re)construction: a collection of documents, concepts, stories, statements, images, and the like, that may have contributed to forge our current understanding about a few things. Throughout the chapters, I will revisit trusteeship, decolonization, spheres of influence, the discourse of development and peace operations, reviewing their records with a magnifying glass. The aim is to unveil their modus operandi, to identify their mechanisms, and to reflect on how they have been unfolded, preserved and transformed over the years, outlining the most recent prospects of changing the international environment by (re)constructing states.

My hope is that, while excavating our present and trying to reconstitute the innumerous paths that have brought us here, we may come to see as political some ideas that are often taken for granted, naturalized, and therefore, de-politicized. I would like to focus on some of these ideas – about statehood, international

society, difference, and (re)construction – searching for clues to how they have been forged with the gathering of apparently strange pieces, and how they have been placed in the center of modern systems of meaning.

The argument that will be developed here is that the (re)construction of states can be interpreted as an ensemble of capillary techniques of power through which difference and differentiation have been played out in the international society, particularly between this international society and its supposed others. While these others were classified as threatening deviances – uncivilized, non-self-governing, underdeveloped, irresponsible, failed – that should be normalized as (good) states, the *state* itself and the *international society of states* were (re)produced as norms of political life. They were gradually associated to notions of order, progress and even peace, and converted into an ideal mode of existence that should be expanded and perpetuated, what included the need to save others (even from themselves if necessary) and to subject them in so many senses.

This interplay between self and other embedded in states (re)construction can be read as evidence of the stabilization of the idea of international society through the demarcation and management of its borders. Precisely, my claim is that states (re)construction can be understood as a broad technique of power that re-articulates the problem of government discussed by Foucault – not in the level of the state, or above the state, but in a level of *states*, of the international society. It involves some sort of multilateral convergence, of unity, that, albeit discrete, is one of the conditions of possibility for turning the international society into something that *must be defended*. This is not to say that the international society has become a subject, nor an agent in its own right; it is to say, however, that it has become a totalizing instance of discursive practice. It became a referent of political life, with its own history (grand narrative), its own principles, rules, and values. Something in the name of which actions are authorized and actors gain agency. It is in this sense that international organizations, trustees, development agencies and peacekeepers got their mandates to change the world: they were civilizing, developing and pacifying *on behalf of* the international society.

To me, it is important to comprehend that (and how) these actions and those acting on behalf of the international society have changed. In fact, the way people see this international society has changed quite a lot. As Nicholas Onuf (1998) reminds us, thinking about International Relations involves some sort of

understanding about how parts relate to wholes. Theorists, methodologists and students may "differ on whether to proceed from parts to wholes, or wholes to parts – but they agree that whatever they see consists of *parts* and *wholes*, and parts *as* wholes" (Onuf, 1998, p.208). As perspective changes, we have a potentially infinite series of parts and wholes, and different pictures of the world we live in. Understandings about the international society are no exception to this. It is not hard to see that they have had different parts and formed different wholes over the years. At some point, the whole has been a European society of states, or an international society divided by superpowers; maybe even a globalized international society. Anyway, investigating how these *wholes* have been imagined certainly sheds light over International Relations – and is worth trying.

In this sense, Chapter 2 offers an overview of Foucault's approach on the problem of government and its connection to power relations, especially in the modern world. It briefly presents three forms of power relations – pastorate, discipline and biopower –, and the techniques related to them, focusing on the process through which different political communities ended up being organized as sovereign states. Later, it discusses how these relations and techniques might have spilled over the level of particular states, and contributed to the consolidation of a society of states.

Chapter 3 discusses the interplay between the international society and its borders, trying to unveil some of the various techniques of power that both inscribe and manage lines separating a civilized world from its supposedly barbaric surroundings. The emergence, internationalization and institutionalization of trusteeship are also discussed, and reinterpreted as a technique of power directed to governing, normalizing these surroundings. Thus, trusteeship would inhabit a place between anarchy (as a chaotic outside environment) and the anarchical society (as an ordered and progressive group of civilized states), and mediate their relation.

Chapter 4 concentrates on the years that followed World War II, investigating how spheres of influence, politics of alignment, decolonization, and the discourse of development are embedded in the consolidation of a new order (under the aegis of the superpowers) – particularly in the redefinition and control of its borders. These changes will be re-interpreted in terms of the expansion of

the state as a means to relate to government, and of the re-inscription of difference (and inequality) in the ordering mechanisms of the international society.

Chapter 5 is dedicated to the post-Cold War period and the normative, institutional and operational transformations in the ways the United Nations approaches international peace and security. I will discuss how they have created the conditions of possibility for new – and multilaterally articulated – techniques to (re)produce/govern difference, and re-written the borders of the international society. Finally, I will try to show that behind the promise to transcend inequality, lays a re-enactment of the pastoral logic of power that distinguishes those who can lead from those who must follow.

2
Power and Government beyond the Anarchical Society

Stories about the emergence and expansion of an international society have frequently highlighted the construction or the reconstruction of sovereign states. It can be read both as a concept and a process deeply connected to the production and reproduction of order and is often presented as a classical path for achieving peace in times of political instability, such as wars and generalized civil conflict. During the XX century, the share of the world land governed by sovereign states has increased dramatically. At least in part, this was due to the international responses to World Wars I and II that notably involved the construction of new states – especially to deal with areas that belonged to ruined empires, defeated powers and colonial possessions – and the reconstruction of some old ones which had been considered compromised. That increase clearly appears in the following series of maps showing world states and governments in 1912, 1952 and 1997. Observing the maps one can notice that the area classified as having "no self-government", "no government" or put in the "category uncertain" has diminished sharply, as an evidence of what Shapiro (1992) would call colonization of world land by the imaginative geography of sovereign states.

Figure 1: World Map - States and Governments in 1912.
Source: Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century, 1999.

Figure 2: World Map - States and Governments in 1952.
Source: Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century, 1999.

Figure 3: World Map - States and Governments in 1997.
Source: Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century, 1999.

This thesis will investigate some aspects of states (re)construction processes, paying special attention to the involvement of international organizations such as the League of Nations (LON) and the United Nations (UN). Focusing on the period that goes from the end of WWI until our days, I will try to show how it has been increasingly institutionalized (and transformed) as a mechanism of governance administered by these organizations of behalf of the international society – as part of a broader attempt to maintain peace and security, and thus, to preserve/promote specific versions of the international order. To the purpose of this study, the role played by international organizations in the (re)construction of states has been divided in three categories, according to the discursive framework in which it is embedded and to the kinds of activities performed. First, the idea of tutelage of dependent peoples and the Mandate (LON) and Trusteeship Systems (UN); secondly, the decolonization and development assistance notions (UN) that came into being in the context of the Cold War; and, finally, the nexus between security, development and humanitarian assistance that informs the deployment of multidimensional peacekeeping operations (UN) after the Cold War.

The great analytical potential of research topics such as international intervention, state-building or peacekeeping is not something new, as is evident from the rapidly growing International Relations' academic literature, especially since the 1990s. According to Pugh (2004) and Esteves (2010), this literature can be divided in two major groups: *problem solving* and *critical* approaches. Generally speaking, the first group is characterized by policy-driven concerns, such as the scope of the mandates, availability of resources, operational design, coordination of actors involved and prescriptive agendas for improving the performance of international teams and forces (Durch *et al*, 2003; Dobbins *et al*, 2005, 2007).

The second group, in its turn, presents an alternative consideration of international intervention and states' (re)construction, examining the political framework of world order within which they occur (Pugh, 2004; Esteves, 2010). This group can be divided in at least three subgroups. The first one frames the debate in terms of the transformation of the international order settled in Westphalia by a shifting balance between state sovereignty and international authority (Lyons; Mastanduno, 1995; Keohane, 2003; Krasner, 2004).[1] To them, peace operations would promote a partition of sovereignty between peacekeepers and the states under intervention. In fact, international forces would assume control over some sovereign prerogatives of these states in order to reconstruct national authority, what contrasts with the principles of formal equality and non-intervention of the westphalian order.

The second one focuses on ethical and legal dilemmas of intervention – especially when associated to humanitarian justification – and on the evolution of international norms that deal with it. The main argument is that this normative evolution would encompass the possibility of defining domestic issues as objects of international concern (and action) and also re-discuss the rights and

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[1] If one paints a picture of the academic field of International Relations today, it is not very likely that scholars as Keohane, Krasner and Mastanduno would appear as critical approaches (to be fair, they would probably be classified as mainstream). However, when we shift the focus specifically to peace operations, the terms of the debate can be quite different. Here, the term "critical" refers to the effort of discussing the place of peace operations in international politics – in the case of Keohane, Krasner and Mastanduno, particularly from a conceptual point of view – and the challenges they may pose to classic understandings about states and the relations between them. To Pugh (2004) and Esteves (2010), this critical position is defined in contrast to a much more practical approach, concerned with the development of strategies for improving the performance of international teams and forces.

responsibilities related to the states' exercise of sovereignty over territories and populations (Wheeler, 2000; 2004; Holzgrefe, 2003; Roberts, 2004; Shue, 2004). Finally, the third group discusses the relationship between the strengthening of an actualized version of the XVIII century liberalism and the reorganization of the international system after the Cold War. Specifically, they discuss the articulation between a discourse of liberal peace and the transformation of global governance mechanisms (Duffield, 2001; Dean, 2001; Chandler 2004, 2007; Richmond, 2005; Zanotti, 2005; Jabri, 2006).

Despite the particularities of each group/author, critical approaches normally draw on very general logics and concepts – such as sovereignty, humanitarianism and liberalism – to discuss mechanisms of global governance and their relation to international order. One of the aims of the thesis is to take part on these discussions from an alternative starting point, that is, an archive research of the technical state (re)construction apparatuses of international organizations. Specifically, I will draw on documents such as mandates, rules of engagement, budgets and performance reports, produced by the League and the UN and try to show a capillary face of power/knowledge techniques produce states as legitimate subjects of an international society and often (re)construct its surroundings.

The idea developed throughout the chapters is that the study of processes of state (re)construction led by international organizations may shed some light on the normative/institutional discursive claims that underpin particular versions of international political order and its governance mechanisms. Therefore, I will try not only to paint a big picture of (re)construction in each of the periods studied, but also to retrieve part of the debate that led to the crystallization of those particular political arrangements over a myriad of possibilities. The assumption here is that taking into consideration various – and often contrasting – political claims involved in these debates will offer some clues about the setting of conditions of possibility for membership and action in the international society. It works as an investigative strategy to unveil relations of power, the production of differential subjectivities and naturalization of a modernist hierarchy that informs how states, territories and individuals will be associated and shape international political orders. From this perspective, the (re)construction of states can be reinterpreted as an instance of spatialization of political power, a bordering

technique that mediates the relationship between what became known as international society and its supposed others.

2.1
Discourse, truth, power and the state

In his lectures at the Collège de France during the 1970's, Foucault had to respond to Marxist critics who complained that his writings lacked a solid theory of the state. His answers to these critics were dubious: Foucault remarked that he would refrain from pursuing a theory of the state "in the sense that one abstains from an indigestible meal" (2004, p.78); but later claimed that the problem of the state was at the centre of the questions he wanted to pose. To Thomas Lemke (2007), this apparent contradiction can be easily understood if we consider that, in order to do his "genealogy of the modern state", Foucault developed an "analytics of government", a mode of inquiry that might be a major contribution to any theory of the state.

Foucault's analytics of government investigates the conditions under which specific entities emerge, exist and change (Dean, 1999), combining the "microphysics of power" – focused on questions of discipline and normalization – with the macro-political question of the state (Lemke, 2007).[2] Foucault (1991) defined it as *historical nominalism*, a methodological and theoretical perspective that tells a political history of truth. To him, it should be a critical investment that subverts what is taken as natural or true, "re-discovering the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies and so on which at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary" (Foucault, 1991, p.76).

This interpretative analytics pays special attention to language and discourse as the main elements of cognitive activity. To Foucault, there is no truth beyond

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[2] Mitchell Dean defines an analytics of government: "an analytics is a type of study concerned with an analysis of the specific conditions under which particular entities emerge, exist and change. It is, thus, distinguished from most theoretical approaches in that it seeks to attend to, rather than efface, the singularity of ways of governing and conducting ourselves. Thus, it does not treat particular practices of government as instances of ideal types and concepts. Neither does it regard them as effects of a law-like necessity or treat them as manifestations of a fundamental contradiction. An analytics of government examines the conditions under which regimes of practices come into being, are maintained and are transformed" (1999, p.20-21).

discourse, and even the most general structures of intelligibility and knowledge are discursively constituted. Therefore, language is not seen from the viewpoint of its supposed referential function, "but as a stock of discursive assets that constitute sets of enabling and disenabling human identities and enabling and disenabling social locations [...]" (Shapiro, 1992, p.14).

Discursive acts can be characterized by their claim to create truth and intelligibility, which can only be realized when the claimer has proper discursive authority. This authority is given by the articulation of power and knowledge, and supports systematic and institutionalized justifications that assert certain discursive acts as truths. The authorized enunciations, being capable to articulate power and knowledge, generate discursive practices that draw lines separating what is considered normal and pathological, true and false. These distinctions come out from a discursive confrontation between rival truth claims, from its ability to normalize the world by means of political practices that have material impact.

In order to study the process through which truth is established, one should adopt what Foucault called a genealogical perspective, that can be described as having a diachronic look at history, in an attempt to dissolve the coherence of the structures of truth that support order and its processes of normalization (Rabinow; Dreyfus, 1995). Genealogy would allow us to see as political what is often granted as natural (Shapiro, 1992) and enable critical understandings of order and the systems of meaning that rule the present world. According to Foucault, to the eyes of the genealogist, there are no fixed essences, laws or metaphysical goals. On the contrary, the aim is to seek out discontinuities where only recurrences can be apparently found. Thus, he says that the great truth that matters to the genealogist is the secret that things have no essence or that their essence was forged through gathering apparently strange pieces (Foucault, 1979). Other than traditional historical approaches, that accept as natural all that prevailed and disregard alternative possibilities offered by defeated discourses, "Foucault, like Nietzsche, assumes that there is an indeterminate range of possible selves and that every institutionalized version of the self represents a political victory" (Shapiro, 1992, p.16).

This research can be seen as an attempt to have this diachronic look at the international society, investigating how this notion was forged and transformed

over the years, and how it has been gradually placed in the center of our political imagination. I am interested in how the stabilization of an understanding (or some) about international society is, at least in part, articulated to its interplay with supposed others. While these *others* were classified as threatening deviances – uncivilized, non-self-governing, underdeveloped, irresponsible, failed – that should be corrected, (re)constructed, the *international society of states* and the *state* itself were (re)produced as norms of political life. They were gradually associated to notions of order, progress and even peace, and converted into an ideal mode of existence – in this sense, an institutionalized version of the self – that should be expanded and perpetuated. Most importantly, international society became a totalizing instance of discursive practice, authorizing a rage of actions that have been changing the world on its behalf.

It is important to notice that, to Foucault, power is dynamic and engaged on the constitution and sustenance of systems of value and meaning, the production of subjects, the construction of identities and knowledge, pervading the organization of all societies. According to him, power must be considered as a productive network that operates in the whole social body, instead of a purely repressive negative instance (Foucault, 1979). Therefore, discursive practices endorsed by power and articulated to it convert themselves into historically produced political economies of meanings, values and practices.

Following a foucauldian perspective, the modern sovereign state is part of this productive dynamics of power relations and represents a political victory – it is a major effect of a regime of truth (Foucault, 2004). It is not an object to be studied, known, manipulated by philosophers, social scientists or politicians; it is a "transactional reality" (Foucault, 2004, p.301), a dynamic ensemble of relations and synthesis that produce both the institutional structure and the knowledge of the state (Lemke, 2007).

As Thomas Lemke (2007) points out, although the state might function as an instrument and a site of strategic action, its most important facet is one of establishing a frontier regime that authorizes specifics forms of being, acting and knowing. It creates multiple borderlines separating those forms of life that might be rendered as acceptable and those that might not; moreover, this "state effect" produces an ensemble of internal divisions and provides various resources of power. In the centre of this activity of differentiating, classifying,

institutionalizing subjects, objects and the relations among them is the problem of *government*. To Foucault, the state is a way of discursively codifying the problem of government as a field in which the exercise of power is rationalized and assume clear institutional effects (Foucault, 2004; Lemke, 2007; Rose and Miller, 1992). Therefore, he remarks that "[…] it is necessary to address from an exterior point of view the question of the state, it is necessary to analyze the problem of the state by referring to the practices of government" (Foucault, 2004, p.79).

To Foucault,

> it is certain that, in contemporary societies, the state is not simply one of the forms of specific situations of the exercise of power – even if it is the most important – but that, in a certain way, all other forms of power relation must refer to it. But this is not because they are derived from it; rather, it is because power relations have become more and more under state control […]. Using here the restricted meaning of the word 'government', one could say that power relations have been progressively governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under the auspices of, state institutions (2000a, p.345).

Analyzing heterogeneous and plural "arts of government" (2004, p.4), Foucault can concentrate on the multiple relations between the institutionalization of the state apparatus and historical forms of subjectivation, and discuss how the modern sovereign state and the modern autonomous individual co-determine each other's emergence. The study of government – or the conduct of conduct – ranges from the government of the self to the government of others (Foucault, 2000) and allows one to investigate "[…] how power relations have historically been concentrated in the form of the state without ever being reducible to it" (Lemke, 2007, p.17).[3] In the next section, I will summarize the foucauldian approach on technologies of government and how they account for power relations and state constitution and transformation. Three forms of power relations – pastorate, discipline and biopolitics –, as well as the multiple technologies of government associated to them, will be briefly presented in order to re-discuss the process through which various political communities were organized as sovereign states and formed an international society of states – or many versions of it.

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[3] Moreover, it is an evidence of the larger belief that power techniques, forms of knowledge, regimes of representation and modes of intervention are reciprocally constituted.

2.2
Power, government and the state

In order to discuss the emergence and the consolidation of the sovereign state as the main form of organizing relations inside political communities, Foucault turns to the establishment of regimes of truth/power and to mechanisms of government. The state is defined both as an effect of power (2004) and as a practice – specific ways of acting and relating to the problem of government (2007). To him, the history of Western societies can be re-written from the point of view of the development of mechanisms aimed at the government of men; at the conduct of conduct (Foucault, 2007). Great part of Foucault's work is dedicated to carefully analyzing technologies, techniques and institutional effects of power involved in different forms of governing the self and others.[4] To the purposes of this thesis, I will concentrate on three of those forms – pastorate, discipline and biopolitics – and its connections to the sovereign state and to international society.

2.2.1
Pastoral Souls

According to Foucault (2007), the idea of governing people does not come from the Greeks. In Greek literature, government is often exercised over territories and objects – cities and ships, for example. Individuals were not targets of government, they were governed only indirectly, insofar as they have boarded a ship or lived in a city.[5] To him, the origin of the idea of a government of men

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[4] As Jessop notices, "[…] to study governmentality in its generic sense is to study the historical constitution of different state forms in and through changing practices of government without assuming that the state has a universal or general essence" (2007, p.37).

[5] To Foucault (2007), the notion of government is not rigorously associated to the state at least until the sixteenth century. Before that, it covers a very wide semantic domain "in which it refers to movement in space, material subsistence, diet, the care given to an individual and the health one can assure him, and also to the exercise of command, of a constant, zealous, active, and always benevolent prescriptive activity. It refers to the control one may exercise over oneself and others, over someone's body, soul, and behavior. And finally it refers to an intercourse, to a circular process or process of exchange between one individual and another" (p.167). The specific political meaning of government, however, was only acquired from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century.

should be sought in the pre-Christian[6] and Christian societies, and develops in the form of a pastoral type of power and a spiritual direction, the direction of souls. The term pastoral power is used to describe a special kind of relationship between the gods – or God – and men, mediated by a third party that is commonly described as a shepherd. As Foucault (2007) noticed, the shepherd is subaltern figure to which God has entrusted the flock of men. He cares for and leads the flock until the time has come for it to be returned to God. Pastoral power is, therefore, a power of care, that "[…] initially manifests itself in its zeal, devotion, and endless application" (Foucault, 2007, p.172). It is not exercised over a territory, but over a group of people constantly moving; or over a "multiplicity in movement" (2007, p.171). Moreover, the power of the shepherd is portrayed as a beneficent power, one that watches over the flock and cares for its salvation.[7] Salvation, to Foucault (2007) assumes at least two distinct meanings: (i) providing subsistence to the flock, feeding and leading it to good pastures, protecting and treating the injured; and (ii) spiritually guiding the souls, helping people to live according to God's will and achieving an endless peace.

There is a paradox concerning the role played by the shepherd that assumes two forms. First, he must keep his eye on the whole flock and on each sheep at once, performing both totalizing and individualizing tasks. The second form of the paradox is related to the problem of sacrifice. On the one hand, the shepherd must be ready to sacrifice himself to save the whole of his flock. On the other hand, however, he may have to sacrifice the whole of his flock to save each of the sheep. In one way or the other, the shepherd is playing the part designated to him and mediating the relationship between God and men (Foucault, 2007).

Although the Catholic Church did not create the figure and the functions of the shepherd, the history of the institution can be interpreted as an effort to organize pastoral power and its mechanisms. The Church has institutionalized this form of power as a model of government that aims at directing daily activities of men on a humanity scale; it is such an intense form of power that politics was once understood as a matter of pastorship (Foucault, 2007).

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[6] "The theme of the king, god or chief as a shepherd (*berger*) of men, who are like his flock, is frequently found throughout the Mediterranean East. It is found in Egypt, Assyria, Mesopotamia, and above all, of course, in the Hebrews" (Foucault, 2007, p.169).

[7] Talking about the supposedly beneficent character of pastoral power, Foucault, says that "its only raison d'être is doing good, and in order to do good. In fact, the essential objective of pastoral power is the salvation (*salut*) of the flock" (2007, p.172).

Nevertheless, Foucault (2007) reminds us that the model of pastoral power institutionalized by the Church did not remain the same over time. The ways in which pastoral power was exercised were in fact arduously disputed among Christian institutions. Episodes such as religious wars or the Reformation and Counter-Reformation developed around questions about aims and mechanisms involved in the government of men and culminated in a separation of at least two forms of pastoral power: the protestant form − meticulous and flexible in relation to hierarchy; and the catholic form − more controlling and hierarchical (Foucault, 2007). In one way or the other, Christian churches have organized and justified its power as a pastoral power; institutionalized pastorship creating rules, norms and procedures; developed mechanisms to choose leadership in which priests, bishops and others would take over the tasks and the privileges that should belong to the shepherd; and created rituals (as baptism or communion) that renewed, from time to time, the connection between the flock and the church and its leaders (Foucault, 2007).

To Foucault, the immense institutional network to which Christian pastorate gave rise was something entirely new[8] in history and coextensive with the entire Christian community:

> In Christianity the pastorate gave rise to an art of conducting, directing, leading, guiding, taking in hand, and manipulating men, an art of monitoring them and urging them on step by step, an art with the function of taking charge of men collectively and individually throughout their life and at every moment of their existence (2007, p.222).

Over the years, innumerous connections were established between pastoral power and political power. However, Foucault considers that they have remained distinct powers at least until the eighteen century:

> […] despite all of this, the king remained king, and the pastor a pastor. The pastor remained a figure exercising power over the mystical world; the king remained someone who exercised power over the imperial world […]. The Western

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[8] "What I would now like to show is that the Christian pastorate, institutionalized, developed, and reflected from around the third century, is actually completely different from a pure and simple revival, transposition, or continuation of what we have been able to identify as an above all Hebraic and eastern theme. I think that the Christian pastorate is absolutely, profoundly, I would almost say essentially different from the pastoral theme we have already identified" (Foucault, 2007, p.221).

sovereign is Caesar, not Christ; the Western pastor is not Caesar, but Christ (2007, p.207-208).

Pastoral power is exercised over daily conduct and individual consciousness and is involved in the production of some of the most important characteristics of modern subject: an economy of faults and merits connected to the perspective of salvation; obedience; and the establishment of truth (Foucault, 2007). Subjectification is part of the operation of pastoral power and of its three distinct elements: salvation; obedience/law; and truth.

Salvation is related to the process through which the shepherd leads individuals and communities towards progress and redemption. The connection between men and (good) future is sewed up by the pastor based on the analysis of their daily *faults and merits*. If they are considered ready and worthy, the pastorate will guide individuals and communities on the way to salvation (Foucault, 2007).

Obedience/law, by its turn, is related to the relationship of subordination developed between the shepherd and the flock. In order to be saved, individuals and communities must make sure they submit to the will of God, translated to them in the words of the shepherd. Christian pastorate has organized an instance of pure obedience in which giving up one's own will and obeying is taken as the best conduct and valued in itself (Foucault, 2007). If the Greek citizen had to be convinced by the law or by rhetoric, Foucault (2007) says, the Christian flock simply obeys; submission and subordination to the law prescribed by the leader is following the path to be saved by God.

Finally, pastoral power teaches the *truth*; salvation is conditioned to accepting, believing and professing this particular truth. To Foucault,

> […] the Christian pastorate is also absolutely innovative in establishing a structure, a technique of, at once, power, investigation, self-examination, and the examination of others, by which a certain secret inner truth of the hidden soul becomes the element through which the pastor's power is exercised, by which obedience is practiced, by which the relationship of complete obedience is assured, and through which, precisely, the economy of merits and faults passes (2007, p.239).

The art of governing men, therefore, needs a pastor who "[…] guides to salvation, prescribes the law, and teaches the truth" (Foucault, 2007, p.224).

These mechanisms of power participated in the constitution of "the modern Western subject", what "makes pastorate one of the decisive moments in the history of power in Western societies" (Foucault, 2007, p.240). To Foucault (2007), pastorate is the prelude of governmentality and of the specification of a field of political intervention in which truth and subjects are constituted. It was only when governmentality became a calculated and reflected practice that the modern state was born; and Christian pastorate seems to be the background of this process (Foucault, 2007).

As Foucault (2007) has noticed, the development of technologies of government related to pastoral power did not occur without its setbacks, which assumed the form of episodes of resistance and counter-conduct. Revolts against pastoral power were normally directed to its way of dividing individuals in two different categories – those who should lead and those who must follow. They challenged the primacy of the shepherd and tried to consolidate new forms of governing men.[9] Throughout the years, the Church tried to circumscribe resistance and encompass some of its methods, in an effort that reshaped the limits and mechanisms through which pastoral power was exercised. Social transformation has contributed to the emergence of political and economic relations that could no longer be accommodated in feudal model giving room to a separation of a private and a public sphere that will later be the site in which sovereign power is exercised and assumes tasks related to the conduct of souls (Foucault, 2007). To Foucault (2007), the crisis of pastoral power did not culminate in a global rejection of the conduct of conduct; on the contrary, there was a multiplication of the need to be conducted and an intensification of the intervention over the lives of individuals.[10]

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[9] In the Middle Ages, Foucault identifies at least five forms of counter-conduct that question pastoral procedures for conducting others: ascetics; communities; mystics; return to holy books; scatological beliefs (Foucault, 2007). These forms of counter-conduct were directed to some of the divisions, differentiations, disqualifications that were inherent to pastorship at that time; they were, therefore, frontier-elements of pastoral power. Not before long, Christianity started to deal with these frontier-elements, discussed them, and somehow incorporated them. This incorporation occurred in processes such as Reformation and Counterreformation that have certainly modified Christian power relations and pastorship itself. However, as Foucault (2007) highlights, neither Christianity nor the pastoral logic of power have ceased to exist after that.

[10] To Foucault (2007), these changes include a rebirth of philosophy as a new form of reflecting about conduct, one that is not specifically religious or ecclesiastic.

So there was not a transition from the religious pastorate to other forms of conduct, conduction or directing. In fact there was an intensification, increase, and general proliferation of this question and of these techniques of conduct. With the sixteenth century we enter the age of forms of conducting, directing, and government (Foucault, 2007, p.307).

At this point, the Church and pastoral power would care for the private life of men, while the sovereign power over men emerged as a new problem (Foucault, 2007). The object of this kind of government and its rationality had to be defined and, at least in the beginning, governmental reason of the sovereign was inspired by an analogy between the king and God, nature and the shepherd.

With the analogy with God, the analogy with nature, and the analogy with the pastor and father of a family, there is a sort of theological-cosmological continuum in the name of which the sovereign is authorized to govern and which provides models in accordance with which he must govern […]. This great continuum from sovereignty to government is nothing else but the translation of the continuum from God to men in the – in inverted commas – "political" order (Foucault, 2007, p.310-311).

To Foucault (2007), the great continuum that justifies the government of men by the king is what breaks in the XVI century. XVI and XVII centuries are characterized for the search of a new form of government that is specific to the exercise of sovereignty. Nevertheless, he describes the operation of a pastoral power as a moment of individualization of Western men and of definition of the contours of his identity.

Western man is individualized through the pastorate insofar as the pastorate leads him to his salvation that fixes his identity for eternity, subjects him to a network of unconditional obedience, and inculcates in him the truth of a dogma at the very moment it extorts from him the secret of his inner truth. Identity, subjection, interiority: the individualization of Western man throughout the long millennium of the Christian pastorate was carried out at the price of subjectivity. By subjectivation. To become individual one must become subject (in all the senses of "subject") (Foucault, 2007, p.308).

It is this individualized and subjected man who will take part on the break-up of the cosmological-theological continuum that informed pastoral power. Amid the crisis of pastorate, the cosmos was de-governmentalized (Foucault, 2007), giving rise to new (particular) ways of reasoning, very different from simply finding out – and obeying – the will of God. On the one hand, natural phenomena

are reinterpreted as a matter of rules and laws ready to be deciphered; on the other hand, state and government enter the field of reflected practice in which discipline will constitute a new logic of power.

2.2.2
Discipline and *Raison d'État*

To Foucault, the foundation of the classical episteme in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the time of a world "[…] purged of its prodigies, marvels, and signs, and of a world that is laid out in terms of mathematical or classificatory forms of intelligibility that no longer pass through analogy and cipher" (2007, p.312) that constituted God's pastoral government. The exercise of sovereignty over subjects was not analogous to the task of God in relation to nature, or of the shepherd in relation to his flock. It was a particular level and form of government evidenced by "[…] the new problematization of what was called the *res publica*, the public domain or the state (*la chose public*)" (Foucault, 2007, p.313). The government of this new domain – politics – needed a specific rationality, one that was found with the introduction of *raison d'État* into the general forms of sovereignty as a new art of government.[11] Foucault emphasizes that it would make no sense to say that the state (as a set of institutions) dates from this period, since great part of its apparatuses – such as armies, justice and taxation systems – existed long before that. What emerged at this point, he argues, was the state as a fundamental political issue, as an object of knowledge, as a reflected practice, one that can be situated in the field of practices of power.[12] "The state is a practice. The state is inseparable from the set of practices by which

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[11] "With *principia naturae* and *ratio status*, principles of nature and *raison d'État*, nature and state, the two great references of the knowledge (*savoirs*) and techniques given to modern Western man are finally constituted, or finally separated" (Foucault, 2007, p.314).
"*Raison d'État* is an innovation, therefore, which is immediately perceived as such; it is an innovation and scandal, and just as Galileo's discoveries" (Foucault, 2007, p.318).

[12] "The problem is knowing when, under what conditions, and in what form the state began to be projected, programmed, and developed within this conscious practice, at what moment it became an object of knowledge (*connaissance*) and analysis, when and how it became part of a reflected and concerted strategy, and at what point it began to be called for, desired, coveted, feared, rejected, loved, and hated. In short, it is the entrance of the state into the field of practice and thought that we should try to grasp" (Foucault, 2007, p.324-325).

the state actually became a way of governing, a way of doing things, and a way too of relating to government" (Foucault, 2007, p.357).

Following the logics of *raison d'État*, the state is an end in itself and the essential task of its leaders is to identify what is necessary and sufficient for the state to exist and expand its activities (Foucault, 2007). Its focus should be the wealth, prosperity and happiness of the state, taken both as a principle of intelligibility of reality and an objective that could be achieved with the operationalization and rationalization of the art of governing.

> The state is the principle of intelligibility and strategic objective that frames the governmental reason that is called, precisely, *raison d'État*. I mean that the state is essentially and above all the regulatory idea of that form of thought, that form of reflection, of that form of calculation, and that form of intervention called politics: politics as *mathesis*, as rational form of the art of government (Foucault, 2007, p.376).

When the state became a regulatory idea of politics and of the art of governing men, history was opened up to human exploring: time no longer followed a cyclical pattern; "instead, we now find ourselves in a perspective in which historical time is indefinite, in a perspective of indefinite governmentality with no foreseeable term or final aim. We are open in historicity due to the indefinite character of the political art" (2007, p.341-342). While the unity of the cosmos is breaking up and nature is being freed from its tragic character, politics is reorganized, informed by a logic that makes reference to the necessities of the state and do not follow a "uniform and final temporal organization" (Foucault, 2007, p.340). The world now finds itself in an era of "open time and multiple spatiality" (p.379) in which men will never reach a final empire of union and peace; they are trapped in a politics dominated by concurrent states focused in their own laws and their own ends. As Foucault puts it,

> with *raison d'État* we exist within a world of indefinite historicity, in an open time without end. In other words, through *raison d'État* a world is sketched out in which, necessarily, inevitably, there will forever be a plurality of states that have their law and end in themselves. In this perspective, the plurality of states is not a transitional phase between a first unitary kingdom and a final empire in which unity will be restored. The plurality of states is not a transitional phase imposed on men for a time and as a punishment. In fact, the plurality of states is the very necessity of a history that is now completely open and not temporally oriented towards a final unity (2007, p.379).

The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 institutionalized this version of history – a history of concurrent states – and buried away old forms of universality represented by the Empire and the Church. Men no longer wait for the day in which states will merge into a single empire or they will finally be reunited in a reign of God, at least concerning politics.[13] Political aims and decisions would no longer have to be in accordance with religious adherence of states; they would follow the logics of *raison d'État*.

> We are now dealing with absolute units, as it were, with no subordination or dependence between them, at least for the major states, and – this is the other aspect or side of the historical reality on which all this is articulated – these units assert themselves, or anyway seek to assert themselves, in a space of increased, extended, and intensified economic exchange. They seek to assert themselves in a space of commercial competition and domination, in a space of monetary circulation, colonial conquest, and control of the seas, and all this gives each state's self-assertion not just the form of each being its own end […], but also this new form of competition. To use somewhat anachronistic words for this reality, a state can only assert itself in a space of political and economic competition, which is what gives meaning to the problem of the state's expansion as the principle, the main theme of *raison d'État* (Foucault, 2007, p.380).

In the seventeenth century, the phenomenon of concurrence between states was seen through a reflexive prism and it was part of the *raison d'État* to develop strategies that would allow the state to cope with its challenges. The force of the kingdom did not depend on the treasures of its prince and the wealth of states was considered the greatest factor of power in the politics among them. To Foucault (2007), this transition from the rivalry of princes to the competition of states was one of the most important changes in the history of Western political life. It was a slow and complex transition that has given rise to the concept of strength, or force, in political vocabulary. With this concept, "politics, political science, encounters the problem of dynamics" (Foucault, 2007, p.383) and the real focus of its rationality is redefined as the preservation and development of a relation – or a dynamic – of forces in which the state could exist and expand. Government itself was now about preserving the dynamics of force inside the states and among them. In this scenario, the idea of peace did not depend on the unification of men

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[13] It is important to mention that, according to Foucault (2007), neither the Church nor the idea of an empire fall in total ostracism; they retained their power of focalization, attraction and intelligibility, but lost their meaning at the level of universal logics that orients history.

to form a spiritual empire; it was re-written in terms of the coexistence of states in a balanced plurality, in a stable relation that would prevent one from dominating the others (Foucault, 2007).[14]

The development of the internal forces of the states without the breakup of the whole balanced plurality would be possible through the rationalization of the dynamics of force and the setting up of a security mechanism. This mechanism is constituted by two apparatuses: (i) a military-diplomatic; and (ii) a police apparatus. In both of them "the objective will now be to ensure the security in which each state can effectively increase its forces without bringing about the ruin of other states or of itself" (Foucault, 2007, p.387). The establishment of this security mechanism (discussed below), has sealed the replacement of the imperial dream and the ecclesiastical universalism by the objective of maintaining the balance (equilibrium) of Europe. Before dissecting the military-diplomatic and the police apparatuses, it is worthy to talk about the ideas of *balance* and of *Europe* that have supported their development.

First, the idea of balance meant the impossibility of the strongest state to impose its law on all the others and make them all behave according to its will. Secondly, balance meant the constitution of a group of strong states and of an equality of forces among them. Finally, it meant the possibility of establishing coalitions of states to counterbalance any growing power that might threaten them and prevent one from leading over the others. In sum,

> the absolute limitation of the force of the strongest, the equalization of the strongest, and the possibility of the combination of the weaker against the stronger are the three forms conceived and devised to constitute European equilibrium, the balance of Europe (Foucault, 2007, p.387).

Based on this idea of balance and equilibrium, Foucault stresses that "peace will no longer come from unity, but from non-unity, from a plurality maintained as plurality" (2007, p.387).

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[14] To Foucault, "This idea of an indefinite governmentality will subsequently be corrected by the idea of progress, that is, by the idea of progress in man's happiness. But this is another matter that precisely implies something that you will note is absent from this analysis, namely the notion of population" (2007, p.342). Until this point, *raison d'État* refers to a relationship of the state to itself and men are only a means to state's ends. This logic will change latter on, when the population emerges as an element that demands reflection.

The idea of Europe, by its turn, was of a quite limited geographical division that no longer had the universal vocation of Christianity (Foucault, 2007). Despite the differences from one state to another, there was not hierarchy or subordination between states and no sovereign could turn Europe into a culminating unity. More than its geographical characteristics, Foucault observes that the specificity of Europe during this period is the kind of ties it establishes with the rest of the world: ties of domination and colonization.

> […] its relationship with the whole world marks the very specificity of Europe in relation to the world, since the only type of relationship that Europe must have and begins to have with the rest of the world is that of economic domination or colonization, or at any rate commercial utilization. The idea formed at the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century, which crystallized in the middle of the seventeenth century with the set of treaties signed at that time, and which is the historical reality that is still not behind us, is that of Europe as a geographical region of multiple states, without unity but with differences between the big and the small, and having a relationship of utilization, colonization, and domination with the rest of the world. That is what Europe is (2007, p.386).

Since the relationship between European states was the basis on which an international system was later developed, observing the interface this system and what was beyond its borders might be insightful to the analysis of how the modern international system has historically dealt with its limits. The thesis that is being defended here is that the (re)construction of states can be interpreted as one of the various techniques that mediates the relationship between what became known as an international society and its supposed others, drawing borders that separate what is brought inside and what is left outside.

After elucidating this point, we can return to the analysis of the apparatuses that should maintain the dynamic of forces of the European balance. According to Foucault (2007), the military-diplomatic apparatus can be read as a technique to limit the ambition of states and allow each of them to grow without provoking the disappearance of adversaries or its own. This technique had at least three instruments: war; diplomacy; and the establishment of permanent armies. If, during the Middle Age, war was understood as a site in which the judgment of God would manifest itself, it is now seen as an instrument that should be used to preserve balance between states. It might be necessary to wage war for the sake of equilibrium and men will fight these wars in the name of their own state and in the name of the state as the main model of organizing political communities. As

Foucault (2007) says, it is no longer a war of right; it is a war of the state, for the sake of balance.

The second instrument of the military-diplomatic apparatus would be diplomacy. Diplomats now talk in the name of the state (not of the prince) and negotiations and treaties between states consider not only rights of inheritance and victory, but also what Foucault (2007) calls 'physical principles' of interstate balance. Aiming at preserving the balance, states have developed permanent systems of information, consultation and negotiation what have contributed to the consolidation of the notion of a society of states. Important attempts to establish a *jus gentium*, or a law of nations, date from this period and can be read as attempts to fix and codify the relations between these new individuals (states) that should coexist in a (international) society (Foucault, 2007). As Foucault (2007) says, the desire for empire had given room to the obligation of Europe.

Finally, the deployment of permanent military apparatuses was an instrument of the security mechanism. It included the professionalization of soldiers; the development of infrastructure; and a new form of knowledge based on tactical reflections on military matters. It evidences that military logic had spilled over the practice of war and consolidated itself within the system of peace (Foucault, 2007).

Besides the military-diplomatic apparatus, the dynamic of forces of the European balance was supported by a political apparatus of police. In this context, the meaning of police was very different from the one we are used to. The goal of the police was the good use of states' forces and it would be achieved with a set of means, calculations and techniques that made it possible to combine the increasing of state forces with the preservation of order. On the one hand, the good use of states' forces and the wellbeing of states depended on keeping internal order; on the other hand, the European equilibrium could only be maintained if states could prevent the relation of forces to be turned to disadvantage, what demanded the good use of their forces. Although the police was not rationalized and institutionalized in the same manner in different states, Foucault (2007) argues that European equilibrium depended on the existence of good police in every state. Police here is not an instrument of justice, but the direct exercise of power over individuals so that the state can draw its force from men. The true subject of the police is man, insofar as his activities can be useful to

the state: the police deals with "the problem of living and doing a bit better than just living" (Foucault, 2007, p.421).

In "Society Must Be Defended" (2004), Foucault affirms that this relationship between individuals, states' forces and systemic stability was framed within a disciplinary power. It is a technique of government in which the body of the individual constitutes an object to be modeled, regulated in order to serve the greatness of the state. Power materializes itself on the bodies and subjects are individualized through a disciplinary technique. There is no center of power; power becomes invisible, pervasive, and incessant. To Foucault (2004), the seventeenth century unlocks technologies of productivity of power, and sovereign monarchies are converted into disciplinary societies in which an institutional network[15] produces docile and useful bodies.

The scheme of disciplinary power was described in "Discipline and Punish" (1995) as including techniques, instruments and procedures in which bodies, daily behaviors, spaces and the distribution of individuals in these spaces are kept under surveillance. There is a general process of normalization of the society, performed by the identification and detail of abnormalities and pathologies. To Foucault (1995), examination is the best example of this process of tracing lines between what is considered normal and what is not. Examination combines hierarchical surveillance and normalizing sanction in a ceremony that constitutes individuals as objects that can be analyzed, differentiated, classified, and treated to correct deviations. "In this space of domination, disciplinary power manifests its potency, essentially by arranging objects" (Foucault, 1995, p.187) and normalizing conduct.[16]

As it happened with pastoral power, the operation of disciplinary power is also informed by three basic elements: salvation; obedience/law; and truth (Foucault, 2007). However, here they assume different meanings referring to the

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[15] This institutional network includes prisons, factories, schools and hospitals and contributes to the spread of discipline through the social body (Foucault, 1995).

[16] In "Discipline and Punish" (1995), Foucault gives two examples in which this ceremony of examination can be identified with distinct consequences. The first one is the quarantine, the isolation of presumably sick individuals for 40 days in specific spaces. There was a physical separation between healthy (normal) bodies and those that must be treated. Space is disciplined to facilitate surveillance and investigation of daily life and individual characteristics. After being treated (normalized), these people could join society once again. The other example is the leprosarium. Here the possibility of treatment is absent and lepers are dismissed from space or, in other words, sent to a non-space that seals their permanent exclusion.

state instead of God, to this world instead of the next. *Salvation* in this context involves the notion that the state must be preserved at all costs: common law may be forgotten and men sacrificed in the name of the state. Promises of progress and redemption of men – essential to the pastoral scheme – give room to the commitment to the future of the state. *Obedience*, by its turn, refers to submission to the law of the state and to the requirements for its preservation: men should obey and work for the state to grow and become stronger. Finally, *truth* can be found through the knowledge about human beings and their relation to the state. Individuals are at the same time subjects and objects of truth: their bodies must be studied and controlled as any other element that can serve the state and this is how truth can be found.

To Foucault (2007), although the framework of disciplinary power roughly outlines population as a means to the prosperity of the state (something that the state must know and act upon), this idea – of population – is not operatory of the *raison d'État*. This is to say that population has not yet entered a reflexive prism as a collective phenomenon and that the focus of the conduct of conduct is still the state itself. To the operation of discipline, individuals and the society are distinct poles that power cannot reunite (Foucault, 2007). However, the very mechanisms developed in the daily operation of disciplinary society will initiate a process of transformation in which the idea of population will become central to state practice. During the eighteenth century, Foucault (2007) identifies interventions, especially in the field of practice known as the police, which will make room for population to emerge as the axis of political activity, a single pole that reunites individuals and society. This transformation was described as the emergence of biopower (Foucault, 2004; 2007).

2.2.3
Biopower

The transformation of police practices in the eighteen century began in a context of food shortage and physiocrat criticism about economic activities. A few years later, the success of the classical economics' thesis about an auto regulated market instigated changes in governmental reason: if equilibrium would be

spontaneously reached with the competition among individuals, police control over them did not have to be so intense (Foucault, 2007). The belief on the connection between free market and equilibrium restored the faith on the existence of a natural order of things that could do without – or, in fact, would do better without – the interventionism (artificial regulation) of the state. The natural engine of this order, however, would no longer be God (as it was in the Middle Age), but the regulating logic of market economy. In this scenario, ties between individuals would be naturally established, and not necessarily forged with the state serving as intermediary. Therefore, "[…] the population as a collection of subjects is replaced by the population as a set of natural phenomena" (Foucault, 2007, p.451) and a domain of specific rationality, a field of knowledge and intervention (Foucault, 2004). The relation between state and people takes contours of responsibility: in order to conduct the conduct, state must investigate social processes and ensure respect for their natural characteristics. The people – or the nation – become the bearer of knowledge and truth (Foucault, 2004).

As population emerges as a problem, disciplinary techniques of administration of the body are complemented by techniques of management of life. When power undertakes life, Foucault (2004) says, discipline is turned into biopower. "The state has essentially to take care of men as a population. It wields its power over living beings as living beings and its politics, therefore, has to be a biopolitics" (Foucault, 2000, p.416) focused on the control of regularities.

> It becomes a matter of obtaining productive service from individuals in their concrete lives. And, in consequence, a real and effective 'incorporation' of power was necessary, in the sense that power had to be able to gain access to the bodies of the individuals, to their acts, attitudes, and modes of everyday behavior […]. At the same time, though, these new techniques of power needed to grapple with the phenomena of population, in short, to undertake the administration, control, and direction of the accumulation of men (Foucault, 2000, p.125).

State develops mechanisms to monitor and intervene on collective phenomena (births, deaths, life expectancy) and during the nineteenth century, the overlap of disciplinary power and biopower draws on this intervention in order to making live and optimizing life (Foucault, 2004). Norm is where disciplinary power and biopower become convergent and, together, they normalize society as a tricky combination (in the same political structure) of individualizing techniques

and totalizing procedures[17] (Foucault, 2004). To Foucault the modern state is part of "[…] a very sophisticated structure in which individuals can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns" (2000, p.334). This individualizing character makes the modern matrix of biopower come closer to pastoral technique; however, "a series of 'worldly' aims took the place of the religious aims of the traditional pastorate" (Foucault, 2000, p.334). Being saved takes on different meanings, related to particular notions of health, security, wellbeing, protection and many others that spread over the social body (Foucault, 2004). The aims of power were multiplied and found support in various institution (and even private venues), so that "[…] instead of a pastoral power and a political power, more or less linked to each other, more or less rivalry, there was a individualizing 'tactic' that characterized a series of powers: those of the family, medicine, psychiatry, education and employers" (Foucault, 2000, p.335).

With biopolitics, the three elements that inform the operation of power – salvation, obedience/law, and truth – assume new meanings once again. *Salvation* is reinterpreted as the imperative that society will prevail over the state, even if saving society includes fighting against a state (Foucault, 2004). Besides the state, certain lives might also be sacrificed to preserve others. To Foucault (2004), death has a clear function in the economy of biopolitics since eliminating the danger of some (or letting die) is often seen as a necessary evil to make others live better. *Obedience* in this context concerns respect for a law based on the rights of individuals and the prerogative of suspending obedience to a state and its laws if the rights of individuals are not observed (Foucault, 2004). Nevertheless, it is important to notice that the exercise of rights is only possible as long as individuals are subjected to the rules and patterns of modern citizenship. Finally, the notion of *truth* has individuals, or the nation, as its bearer (Foucault, 2004). It is through the study of men that one may say some truth about the world; therefore, men are both object and subject of knowledge and truth (Foucault, 2000; 2004).

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[17] Individual and population; body and life; discipline and regulation; individualization and massification: it is all joined together in biopolitics (Foucault, 2004).

2.3
Beyond the Anarchical Society

Despite subtle differences from year to year and lecture to lecture, Foucault (2007; 2000; 2004; 1995) takes pastoral, disciplinary and biopower as historically constituted categories of power, related to different techniques of conducting conduct. However, they are not taken as stages of power in the sense that the crystallization of one logic leads to the complete abandonment of the others. Although conduct of conduct has been clearly transformed over time, Foucault claims that there is a high degree of overlapping between pastoral, disciplinary and biopower, and that the full deployment of a specific set of techniques may lead to the advancement of a different logic. In the end, they all work as keys to analyze the mechanisms of operation of power in the societies based on the study of its capillary effects (Pogrebinschi, 2004). Even if its forms may vary, power "[…] is always a way of acting upon one or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions" (Foucault, 2000, p.341). Thus, power relations implicate framing a field of possible actions. It is a matter of conducting conduct; it is, in the end, "a question of government" (Foucault, 2000, p.341).

In his writings about power relations and the constitution of modern forms of subjectivity, Foucault (2000; 2004; 2007) stresses its articulation to the emergence of the state as the main model of organizing relations among individuals. As mentioned earlier, to him, "[…] power relations have been progressively governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under the auspices of, state institutions" (Foucault, 2000, p.345). The path that Foucault has chosen to show the governmentalization of power relations was, above all, the study of the development of means of social control inside state institutions such as schools, hospitals and prisons. These institutions would be privileged sites in which power manifests itself positively, translated into organized practices through which subjects might be produced and governed. However, the problem of government spills over the context of particular political communities. Especially from the eighteenth century onward, state forms and techniques of power related to the government of the self and others have been rearticulated as a framework for relations between political

communities. In this sense, they have become defining characteristics of modern politics and shaped what we today call international relations. Even though Foucault does not ignore this international facet of government, it has never been his main preoccupation and the topic has been further developed by other authors.

In his "Genealogy of Sovereignty", for example, Bartelson claims that the emergence of a modern logical space involved an epistemic revolution in which the relations between man, language and states were reinterpreted, historicized and understood as a "game of mirrors" (1995, p.206). Following this logic, individuals would organize themselves as interpretative communities – human aggregates that aver to share the same language, symbolic assets and values – represented before each other by particular states (sovereign units). Every state, its territory and the people that lived on it would form a unique continuum what implied the establishment of borders between communities and of otherness itself. To Bartelson (1995), modern world renders the state a subjectivity analogous to that of man. States were seen as moral persons while sovereignty was depersonalized, what is to say that it no longer referred to the figure of the sovereign and was attributed to the state. In this sense, the constitution of modern states has followed a logic of differentiation and territorial exclusion that separates inside from outside. States' external relations would be informed by the same logic, what contributed to consolidate sovereignty as the organizing principle of political relations both inside the states and between them (Bartelson, 1995). This sovereign duality enabled the emergence of a regime of power that produced international society, generating individuals – states – and normalizing the relations among them – international relations (Esteves, 2006). The expansion of the regime of power that produces international relations implies the colonization of the empty spaces between political communities. It territorializes these empty spaces, forging communities as states and inscribing them in an international order. In a foucauldian vocabulary, state and international society both represent political victories: they are effects of a specific regime of truth and power articulated to the discourse of sovereignty that attributes a new meaning to spatial arrangements.

In "Security, Territory and Population" (2007), Foucault says that his analysis of governmentalized power relations and state mechanisms is focused on European states and the collectivity they formed over the years. He affirms that

the interface between this collectivity and an outside world was important to give Europe a certain degree of unity, and to preserve internal equilibrium (as pointed out in the discussion about the meanings of a European balance). Emphasis is given to colonialism and its logic of domination, particularly to how it pictured Europe as having the right to master the rest of the world. Nevertheless, the narrative is interrupted at this point, and Foucault (2007) clearly states that, despite being important to understand modern politics, the relation between Europe and its borders is beyond the scope of his research.

The aim of this thesis is precisely to explore this faded boundary and discuss how only Europe, but international society, has governed its borders during the last century. The (re)construction of states is, arguably, one of the many ways to do so, one that has both reproduced and renegotiated conceptions about international society and outside worlds, offering a privileged view of the capillary means through which power operates.

In "Beyond the Anarchical Society" Edward Keene (2002) discusses the patterns of political and legal order that have characterized international relations since the XVII century and the logics that have sustained them, saying that "[…] there has been a long standing division in the modern world between two different patterns of international political and legal order; and […] the world we live in today is a combination of both, an extremely awkward and unstable combination of that" (Keene, 2002, p.5).[18] According to Keene (2002), orthodox accounts of modern world politics have described only one of these patterns – the coexistence and reciprocal recognition between equal and mutually independent European states – and overlooked another one that evolved during roughly the same period – the colonial and imperial relations between Europeans and non-Europeans. The concept of civilization performed a central role in the dynamics between these two patterns of modern international order: it defined the border separating them and described the ultimate purpose of the extra-European order (Keene, 2002).

Thus, international political and legal order would have been clearly divided in two: an order promoting toleration within Europe, and an order promoting civilization beyond (Keene, 2002). Through the years, the admission of new

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[18] In his book, Keene (2002) revisits the account of the law of nations developed by Hugo Grotius to say that orthodox interpretations of it generally overlook certain features of international order developed outside Europe.

members to the European society and the multiple disputes between its great powers have moved the borders between these two logics, transforming both sides.[19] During the twentieth century, international politics can be seen as an everlasting effort to merge those two patterns of order and form a single one, despite the profound differences in their normative principles, legal rules and institutional arrangements. "The toleration of different ways of life has thus become an absolutely central principle in the new global political and legal order. But the old idea that one of the purposes of order in world politics is to promote civilization has by no means been abandoned" (Keene, 2002, p.9).

International organizations created in this scenario, as the League and the United Nations, and their mechanisms of governance reflect different combinations of these patterns. They encourage respect for the equality and independence of all sovereign states, but at the same time foster specific ways through which the world – and also the states – should be organized to facilitate economic and social progress and promote civilization (Keene, 2002).[20] To Keene (2002), international political and legal order today encompasses these two very different – and often contradictory – purposes: toleration and civilization.

> Our central problem is that we still think in the same dualistic way as nineteenth-century international lawyers and diplomats about the purposes of order in world politics, but we have abandoned the discriminatory method that they used to resolve the resulting contradictions […]. We are stuck, in other words, with the fundamental modern problem of having to choose between toleration and civilization as purposes of international order, but we now have to work out a completely different way of deciding how that choice ought to be made (Keene, 2002, p.10).

The twentieth century has found no clear answer to this problem. The dynamics between the logics of toleration and civilization has been transformed over time, accompanied by the reformulation of normative principles, institutional arrangements and operational mechanisms. This process takes place through an ensemble of interconnections between discourses, institutions, practices and so on

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[19] In this movement, Keene considers that "while the toleration of political and cultural differences was becoming a more important aspect of relations between European and non-European peoples, the promotion of civilized values was becoming a more important feature of relations between European states" (2002, p.8).
[20] According to Keene (2002), the mechanisms to do that would include the promotion of economic development, international humanitarian law, democratization, improvement of decision-making processes and so on.

that are put together by – and at the same time bring about – strategic logics of power in a given period (Foucault, 1980, 2008; Andersen, 2003). In other words, the contours of international order and its mechanisms of governance have changed.

Therefore, considering that (i) the international society is part of a regime of power/truth that produces states as subjects and normalizes the relations between them establishing rules to be admitted and act; (ii) that the international society seeks to maintain and reproduce an order that permits its expansion and perpetuation; (iii) that the patterns of order change over time, according to different combinations of a logic of toleration and another of civilization; and finally (iv) that the mechanisms of states' (re)construction of the League and the United Nations work as stabilization mechanisms of the international society; the thesis proposes the following research problem: to comprehend how state (re)construction processes led by international organizations take part on the diffusion of a particular model of subjectivity, thus contributing to the maintenance of order and to the expansion and perpetuation of the international society and the regime of power and truth through which it has been produced.

In order to address this problem, the thesis will try to identify the mechanisms of state (re)construction developed by international organizations, particularly the League of Nations and the United Nations, and to describe how they're linked together to bring about a particular version of international political order. In this sense, the (re)construction of states can be re-written as a mechanism of government and its content might be transformed from one period of time to another following changes in its constitutive elements.

My intention is to explore these issues by taking a less traveled road, starting from an archive research of the technical state (re)construction apparatuses of international organizations. As stated earlier, I will draw on mandates, rules of engagement, budgets, performance reports, etc produced by the League and the United Nations (UN) and try to show a capillary face of power and some means through which it operates in the international society, particularly through the (re)construction/production of states as its legitimate subjects. These documents will cover three different models of state (re)construction, following a chronological order: (i) the mandate system of the League of Nations and its successor, the trusteeship system of the United Nations; (ii) the guidelines for

decolonization, development assistance and preservation of the balance between superpowers during the Cold War; and (iii) multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations deployed after the Cold War.[21] These models will be described in the following chapters and characterized as three mechanisms developed by the international society to manage its borders, respectively: (i) an *imperial mechanism* focused on the administration of the estates of former empires and of non-self-governing territories; (ii) a *national mechanism* that deals with the demands for self-government, development and the alignment of states following the logic of Cold War; and (iii) an *international mechanism*, that responds to the management of emergencies and crisis situations in states defined as fragile or failed.

This way of investigating states' (re)construction processes led by international organizations should allow me to show the relevance of relatively local analysis and micro powers to the discussion of broader issues such as government and the relation between the maintenance of international society and the management of its borders. States and international societies are considered here as part of the same frontier regime that codifies government and dictates the limits of acceptable forms of being, acting and knowing. To Ralph Wilde (2008), the management of borders by international society is developed around two main issues. The first issue has been named *sovereignty* and refers to the definition of an identity for the local authority: who enjoys administrative control over territory and population. The second issue would be *governance* and involves the establishment of models and standards to inform the capacity to govern and the quality of government in any given territory.

The various responses that have been given to those issues during the last century illustrate changes on the norms of the political space that define how states must look like and how they can act. Reflecting about these changes will allow me to discuss the mechanisms of conducting the conduct that participate in the production of political communities and also the different ways of articulating a hierarchy between center and periphery inside international society. Thus, the

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[21] The analysis of the technologies of state (re)construction deployed in these periods should reveal how the regime of power is rearticulated over time and how the means through which it operates and the kind of state that is (re)constructed are transformed until assuming its present form.

locus of peripheral subjects can be destabilized, politicized and, maybe, re-written.

3
Trusteeship: between anarchy and the anarchical society

The conception of Europe as collectivity is one of the most striking ideas unfolded by the liberal art of government. According to Foucault (2008), the development of this conception was accompanied by the revision of the status of the European society in relation to the rest of the world and by a process of re-writing differences as steps on what would be a universal ladder for human progress. For the purposes of this thesis, I would say that it is deeply connected to the establishment of very particular ways through which international society relates to its borders – or to what can be found beyond (maybe behind) its borders. In his book "Children of the Mire", Octavio Paz writes that on the rise of Modern Age, European society has been seduced by novelty and armed with a knife that has cut time in two: now and before. Permanently falling in love with itself, and also fighting itself, modernity implies identifying the present with a single model of civilization and denying the past, regarding it as something inferior. To him, although this is not the first time that a civilization has imposed its ideas and institutions on others, it is certainly the first time that, instead of proposing a timeless principle, one has set up time and change as universal ideals (Paz, 2013). In many ways, this temporal distinction between now and before was spatialized by the European states: *now* (an era of progress and civilization) would be represented by Europe itself or, broadly speaking, by an emerging international society; *before*, in its turn, would refer to other peoples who lived beyond (or behind) the limits of this society and were presumed ignorant and immature.

In the field of International Relations, a significant part of the narratives that attempt to describe how the international society has achieved its present form, such as the provided by the English School,[22] tell a story of expansion – of how outsiders became insiders – but keep mostly silent about the inscription and management of borders that has differentiated the international society from its

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[22] For a narrative about what would be the expansion of an international society, see especially Watson (2004), and Bull and Watson (1984).

supposed others – other spaces, other people, other times. This chapter will look precisely into this matter and try to unveil at least some of the various means through which power operates between international society and the allegedly uncivilized world that surrounds it, an how these means are unfolded, preserved, and transformed. I will focus on trusteeship, understood here as one of these means, and show that, despite emerging as a notion that informed the relation of particular European colonial powers with their colonies, it later became a multilateral mechanism operated by international organizations – especially the League of Nations and the United Nations – on behalf of the international society.

As it will be discussed, trusteeship was initially related to the administration of colonies, and later expanded to deal with former colonies (particularly those that belonged to countries defeated in World War I) and non-self-governing territories. It is clear that reinterpreting trusteeship as a technique of power is not the only way to approach this issue, not even the most common way. The notion of trusteeship and especially the administration of colonies have been looked at from innumerous perspectives. Nevertheless, they hardly ever consider this multilateral facet of trusteeship, this connection to the stabilization of conceptions of international society that interests me; let alone their transformation.

Marxist approaches of International Relations,[23] for example, usually consider colonies and overseas possessions as means of the capitalist expansion, and highlight the economic logic behind it (Linklater, 1990). To Marx (2008), capitalism had a universalizing character that propelled it to expand beyond Europe and become a dominant mode of production in the whole world. According to Lenin (1916), the need to export surplus capital, create new markets and expand access to raw materials took capitalism to its next stage: imperialism.[24] Emphasis is given to the economic exploitation of the colonies, and even political domination would derive from economic relations (Linklater,

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[23] It is clear that there are many approaches to International Relations based on Marxist ideas and that they are extremely diverse. It is not my intention to offer a panorama of these approaches, but to point out a few important arguments they unfold in order to show how they might diverge from the purpose of this chapter. For a comprehensive view about Marxism and International relations, see Linklater (1990) and Kubálková and Cruickshank (1989).

[24] To Marx, extending its mode of production to the periphery of the system would precipitate the crisis of capitalism, since the new proletariat formed in the colonies could join the proletariat from mature countries, strengthening revolutionary processes (Marx, 2008). Lenin (1916), in his turn, considered that the expansion of capitalism in the colonies would delay revolution. To him, the surplus from new markets would be used to co-opt part of the proletariat of advanced capitalist countries into the capitalist project.

1990). In fact, imperialist powers and other capitalist states are seen as instruments of a dominant capitalist class, working to ensure ideal conditions for production and commerce (Marx, 2008; Kubálková; Cruickshank, 1989). Therefore, although colonization, trusteeship, and the like are certainly relevant research topics, states, and especially an international society of states, normally do not play a central role in Marxist approaches.[25] Even Wallerstein's (2000) world-systems theory paints a picture of a modern interstate system characterized by a division of labor that redistributes surplus value from the periphery to the core. This arrangement clearly has political, social and cultural implications, but they derive essentially from economic relations.[26] The point about economic exploitation and inequality made by Marxist approaches is an important one; however, the nuances of the relationship between colony and colonizer, entrusted territories and trustees, or underdeveloped and developed countries, for example, are mostly overlooked. These approaches successfully acknowledge that domination and exploitation exist, but usually fail to see how they have been transformed over the years – the repertoire of techniques that they describe is not that varied.

The repertoire of colonialism is exactly the focus of colonial studies.[27] Even though there are many approaches to the topic, it is possible to say that great part of the bibliography is dedicated to the history of specific colonial empires; the colonization of particular areas; and often to comparing two or more examples of colonization.[28] There are books examining European colonialism in general,[29] but

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[25] It is important to consider that Lenin (1916) believed that the internationalization of imperialism through colonial expansion would drag colonial powers into war, what would end up contributing to the decline of capitalism. He also paid special attention to colonial people's struggle for independence, which he understood in part as an opposition to capitalist exploitation. Therefore, Leninism gained notoriety as a doctrine that supported self-determination, a contribution that will be briefly discussed in chapter 3.

[26] Dependence theorists like Prebisch and Furtado also understand the world as divided in center and periphery and define underdevelopment as a byproduct of the capitalist expansion in a global scale, crystallizing a pattern of exploitation that is hard to subvert (Santos, 2000).

[27] The term "colonial studies" is used here with no pretension to define an academic approach, a field of studies, or anything like that. It refers, mostly and quite simply, to a topic, a research subject.

[28] Loyd (1996) and Bell (2007), for example, offer a historic overview of the British Empire, and Quinn (2000), of the French. Fieldhouse (1965), for example, does a comparative study between the colonial methods of different European empires. About the colonization of specific areas, , see, for example, Marshall (1968) about the British presence in India; Cairns (1965) about the British colonies in Central Africa; Cohen (1980) about the French colonies in Africa; Hochschild (1998) about Belgian domination in Congo. Needless to say that it is not intended to be an extensive list, but a few examples of books on the discussed topics.

they describe it more as a sum of parts (methods and experiences of particular empires and colonies) than as a whole, in the sense of suggesting some sort of multilateral convergence between colonial Empires.

The origins, specificities and effects of colonial experiences are also studied by a related set of perspectives often labeled as postcolonial thought. According to Young (2003), these perspectives have in common a wish to shift the dominant ways in which the relations between western and non-western people and their worlds are viewed. Broadly speaking, these perspectives de-stabilize ideas that have legitimized colonial/imperial rule and portrayed the people of the colonized world as inferior and requiring paternal guidance; and highlight narratives, knowledge(s) and needs developed outside the west.[30] The endurance of traces of colonialism in the present is another recurrent topic, embedded in discussions about racism, economic inequality, indirect rule and various forms of subordination, for example.[31] These discussions are often accompanied by one about how colonization and its legacy have been contested through active and passive forms of resistance, and how the various forms of contact between colonizer and colonized have changed both sides.[32]

Postcolonial perspectives would certainly be good choices for studying borders and the international society, and some "postcolonial ideas" will show up quite a lot in this chapter and in the next ones. In many senses, the international society that we have today is an heir of colonialism, and this connection was probably even stronger years ago, as it will become evident in the discussion about trusteeship. Even though, this research was not designed as a postcolonial approach to these issues, nor will it be focused on colonial and postcolonial legacies in International Relations. Instead, it will be focused on what would be a resilient *pastoral logic* of power and its articulation to *bordering techniques* that, arguably, have contributed to stabilizing conceptions of international society through the definition of and relation with outside worlds – and that have changing nuances over time. This chapter, specifically, will investigate trusteeship, and reinterpret it as a bordering technique that has been

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[29] For panoramas of European colonialism, see, for example, Easton (1961), Wesseling (1997), and Smith (1982).
[30] See, for example, Said (1997), and Nandy (1995).
[31] See, for example, Fanon (2008); Inayatullah and Blaney (2010); Inayatullah, Rosow and Rupert (1994); and Spivak (1988).
[32] See, for example, Nandy (2010) and Bhabha (2004).

internationalized and institutionalized, giving rise to specific mechanisms for civilizing barbarians and protecting civilization that have been unfolded, most collectively, on behalf on an international society. This international/multilateral facet has been brilliantly captured by William Bain (2003), and his understanding of trusteeship as inhabiting a place *between anarchy and society* will inform the argument developed in the next pages.

The construction of states will be understood here as encompassed in the broader technique of trusteeship – a way of creating subjects who will be able to follow patterns of conduct and moral vocabularies that comply with specific version of international order. Read through these lenses, the documents that tell the story of trusteeship and the construction of states, such as those produced by the League and the United Nations, no longer represent an ordinary historical record; they constitute an archive that may offer a challenging point of view of the normative framework and the modes of existence of the modern international life.[33]

3.1
"The game is in Europe, but the stake is the world"

To Foucault (2004; 2007; 2008), from the eighteenth century on, politics has been armed with economic knowledge and liberalism has fostered the development of a new art of government. Following a liberal logic, competition between individuals (and between states) would lead to a more efficient allocation of productive resources and to the establishment of a natural equilibrium of prices, bringing profit and well-being to the societies. Nevertheless, the good functioning of this engine would require an environment as free as possible: state intervention on commercial relations should be reduced to a minimum degree and market would have to be opened so that its "invisible hand" could work properly and establish equilibrium. The belief was that the development of commerce between units with different comparative advantages would prove itself to be more

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[33] For example, the notion of formal equality between sovereign states, the territorial integrity of the state and the principle of non-interference.

profitable than war and bring progress to all.[34] However, this opportunity for enrichment was associated to the diversification of the goods that European countries could buy and sell, giving rise to what Foucault (2008) has called a "globalization of market".

Of course, this was not the first time that Europe, as a geographical location, exchanged goods with other parts of the world. Furthermore, it was not the first time that European countries tried to affirm their political, economic or military preponderance. The novelty and relevance of the globalization of market that was taking shape from the eighteenth century onwards was its multilateral facet: Europe, as a whole, was thinking the world as its domain, as a European market. About this period, Foucault says:

> […] this may be the first time that Europe appears as an economic unit, as an economic subject in the world, or considers the world as able to be and having to be its economic domain. It seems to me that it is the first time that Europe appears in its own eyes as having to have the world for its unlimited market. Europe is no longer merely covetous of all the world's riches and sparkle in its dreams or perceptions. Europe is now a state of permanent and collective enrichment through its own competition, on the condition that the entire world becomes its market (2008, p.55).

In a certain sense, the endeavor of progressing through commerce would make the relations between Europe and its distant domains more complex. The old colonial pact, in which a metropolitan state enjoyed exclusive privileges on buying raw materials and selling manufactured goods, became an unsatisfactory model and the shores of Africa, Asia and Americas had to be opened to a bigger number of countries, and definitely incorporated to the geography of market economy. This process would take a long time and assume various faces throughout its history. Notwithstanding, it has always implied a "difference of both kind and status between Europe and the rest of the world" (Foucault, 2008:55). Under the rule of liberal market, power and space were rearticulated (Foucault, 2000c), giving room, among other things, to the emergence of Europe, or the European society of states, as an instance of discursive practice, a political referent on behalf of which some people were authorized, entrusted with the mission of teaching other people to play the economic game. To Foucault (2008),

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[34] Although some would certainly progress more and faster than others would, the idea is that commerce provides the opportunity of progress and enrichment to all.

it was "[…] the start of a new type of global calculation in European governmental practice" (2008, p.56) – and the emergence of new techniques of conducting conduct outside of Europe.

This global feature of European governmental practice aimed at creating an environment favorable to commerce and involved, most notably, the establishment and spread of patterns and regulations. To Foucault (2008), it has promoted a "juridification of the world" in the name of the organization of a global market and of the progress it would bring. Evidence of this juridification was the development of maritime law, which can be read as an attempt to define the sea as a space of free competition and elaborate worldwide space in terms of legal principles that contribute to the intensification of market relations (Foucault, 2008). The increasing number of congresses, conferences and agreements of state representatives to deal with supposedly global matters and even the creation of the first international organizations later in the nineteenth century can also be mentioned as evidences of the same process. They resemble an argument found in the writings of Adam Smith (1999), according to whom nature (or the world) would have been given over to economic activities of production and exchange and that, in order to be fully enjoyed, would require the meeting of certain obligations. Some of these obligations were systematized as international laws that were part of this broad political calculation of a liberal rationality of government.[35] In Foucault's words, "the game is in Europe, but the stake is the world" (2008, p.56).

About the liberal art of government, it is also important to notice that its operation supposes a certain degree of freedom among individuals and states. If units are not free to compete, market will not be as efficient as it should and progress will come only at a snail's pace. Therefore, liberalism implies the management of freedom, its production and its limitation. To Foucault, liberal

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[35] Foucault (2008) stresses that establishing an international law that supports free market was not the only example of political rationality at that time. Other initiatives, often contradictory ones, still existed, such as commercial barriers, economic protectionism and a strong notion of national economy. The existence of different initiatives, however, does not undermine the emergence of forms of imagining the world as a whole and acting to make it comply with the civilization standards of Europe. To Foucault, three features of liberalism would command the creation of an international space: market (economic truth), utility, and Europe (understood as a land of progress). About utility, Mill (2001) says that, in a broad sense, it is grounded on the permanent interests of a man as a progressive being. Therefore, it would be related to "what is best for mankind", or the social benefits of human liberty (Mill, 2001).

governmentality rewrites freedom as a special kind of relationship between governors and governed:

> it is a consumer of freedom inasmuch as it can only function insofar as a number of freedoms actually exist: freedom of the market, freedom to buy and sell, the free exercise of property rights, freedom of discussion, possible freedom of expression, and so on. The new governmental reason needs freedom therefore, the new art of government consumes freedom. It consumes freedom, which means that it must produce it. It must produce it, it must organize it. The new art of government therefore appears as the management of freedom, not in the sense of the imperative: 'be free', with the immediate contradiction that this imperative may contain. The formula of liberalism is not 'be free'. Liberalism formulates simply the following: I am going to produce what you need to be free. I am going to see to it that you are free to be free (2008, p.63-64)

Liberalism must produce and manage freedom and this management implies the establishment of patterns of acceptable behavior; obligations; limitations; and forms of coercion. It sets the conditions under which subjects can be free. This is to say that liberalism allows these subjects to be as free as the subjection to its rules makes freedom possible. To Foucault, "we have then the conditions for the creation for a formidable body of legislation and an incredible range of governmental interventions to guarantee production of the freedom needed in order to govern" (2008, p.64-65). The importance of governmental regulations is permanently reaffirmed as a necessity to protect freedom against dangers that risk limiting and destroying it. Thus, the progress of humankind would demand states that are capable of watching over freedom and of controlling danger through strategies of security.

> In short, strategies of security, which are, in a way, both liberalism's other face and its very condition, must correspond to all these imperatives concerning the need to ensure that the mechanism of interests does not give rise to individual or collective dangers. The game of freedom and security is at the very heart of this new governmental reason whose general characteristics I have tried to describe. The problems of what I shall call the economy of power peculiar to liberalism are internally sustained, as it were, by this interplay of freedom and security (Foucault, 2008, p.65).

What Foucault has called "culture of danger" (2008, p.67) is one of the pillars of liberal government. It grants to the state the power of supervising the threats of everyday life, and making sure people live according to what is considered to be normal. The argument presented in this chapter is that, in an

international scale, the liberal arbitration between freedom and security assumes (among many others) the form of governing those that are considered 'not yet able to be free'. Furthermore, it is translated as a responsibility for normalizing their lives according to what would be standards of civilization of an increasingly articulated international society. Following this argument, the dichotomy between barbarian and civilized peoples is a condition of possibility for the construction of a discursive border separating the international society from an outside labeled as backward and dangerous. In the next section, I will explore the writings of John Stuart Mill as evidence of this construction and show its connection to the notion of trusteeship. This notion will be later reinterpreted as a *bordering technique* (of power), that both stabilizes an understanding of European society – later of international society – as a (collective) political referent; and authorizes the development, on its behalf, of multilateral mechanisms for conducting conduct beyond borders. In this sense, trusteeship would represent that juridification of the world that Foucault was talking about, setting the terms of the relationship between insiders and outsiders – between peoples who are supposedly ready to enjoy liberty and those who are not.

3.2
On Liberty

The essay "On Liberty", written by John Stuart Mill in the middle of the nineteenth century, reflects a significant part of the debate on the importance of freedom and the requirements for enjoying it in a context of liberal government. To Mill, one of the most challenging political discussions of his time was about "[…] the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual" (2001, p.6). According to him, the advancement of civilization implied finding balance between individual and societal rights and making sure that this balance favored the individual. Every man should be endowed with some basic liberties – such as liberty of conscience; thought and feeling; expressing and publishing opinion; tastes and pursuits; combination among individuals – and able to make his own choices, as long as his actions do not cause harm to others.

No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified. The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. (Mill, 2001, p.16).

Despite being essential to any free society, defining the limits of individual independence and societal control is not easy and societies have established particular standards of acceptable behavior. Amid so much diversity, Mill's essay aims at asserting a universal principle to judge the interference of society over individual choices. To him,

The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign (2001, p.13).

In Mill's (2001) argument, the respect for liberty is a condition to human progress. He understands diversity of opinions and forms of living as societal goods: since humans are not infallible, truth can cross even the most improbable mind and will only be available to others if opinions can be expressed and discussions happen in a free environment. It is important to notice that he assumes the existence of moral truths related to the concept of utility – that is to the ability to serve a greater good and bring the greatest amount of happiness to the most number of people. As such, truth foments progress; therefore, silencing an opinion that might be true would be equivalent to robbing the human race (Mill, 2001).[36]

Although the expression of individuality is essential to progress, Mill (2001) does not say that all opinions are equally valid or that every living being should be listened. The exercise of freedom requires the ability to make full use of human faculties and to engage in what he calls "fair discussion" with others. It is a complex process of learning and individuals have to be trained in what he calls the accumulated knowledge of human experience, rules of fair discussion and a basic vocabulary of moral and political issues in order to succeed. When this process is

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[36] Mill (2001) adds that even true ideas should always be discussed and contested (and not simply taken as dogmas); it is a way to spread it among a large number of people and to safeguard it from eventual mistakes, leaving room to revision and change.

completed individuals will have reached maturity, characterized for the development of the account for society. In that stage, "[…] each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest" (Mill, 2001, p.69) and everyone will be able to live in freedom. Children, people under-age and all those generally classified as being "least fitted to judge for themselves" (Mill, 2001, p.76) would not yet be considered ready for liberty and, hence, have to be educated, led and protected against themselves by "more highly gifted and instructed one or few" (p.62).

Just like individuals, societies would also have to be trained for liberty and basic freedoms should only be granted to mature ones. There is a clear (and allegedly universal) notion of human progress informing the whole essay, one that implies at least two consequences that are worth noticing for the purposes of this chapter: first, the ideas of progress and civilization are articulated and identified with a mode of existence found in Europe and only a bit further than that; and second, a hierarchy of societies is established, ranging from barbaric to advanced ones. Mill (2001) describes 'barbarians' as peoples that have not yet developed the account for society; child-like; and lacking the tools for self-government. To him, these peoples must be taken care of and educated like children, until they become fit for liberty. Like children, there must be someone with absolute power over them to make them capable of rational conduct in life: someone to teach virtues, train the exercise of faculties, command, enforce obedience and protect (Mill, 2001). The author is very specific about the requirements of a liberal doctrine concerning that topic:

It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to

find one. But as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion (a period long since reached in all nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), compulsion, either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others (Mill, 2001, p.13-14).

Freedom would only be possible under the rule of civilization. Furthermore, civilized people would have the responsibility to extend the benefits of progress and good life to others, caring for them like parents care for their children (Mill, 2001). To Mill (2001), Europe was 'the most improved portion of mankind' and, as such, should make the light of civilization shine upon those who lived in the darkness, by subjecting them to its rationality and modes of organizing social, political and economic relations. Once barbarians were well versed in the art of government of modern states, the world would become a pacific place, inhabited by autonomous individuals and independent states ready to reap the benefits from free market and progress.

The notions of tutelage and trusteeship were imagined and re-imagined over the years as paths to this distant future. Through trusteeship, Europe and the emerging international society would be able to deal with backward peoples, prepare them to play according to predetermined rules, and make them cross the deep chasm separating anarchy from (anarchical) society. In the next sections, I will concentrate on documents that tell stories about the emergence, systematization, internationalization, institutionalization and various transformations of the idea of trusteeship. By the end of the chapter, these stories should allow me to re-write trusteeship as a multilateral mechanism, a collective enterprise of the international society to relate to outside worlds.

3.3
Trusteeship in British India: the obligations of power

According to William Bain (2003), the origin of trusteeship as an acceptable practice in international society can be traced back to the eighteenth century. Specifically, to the governmental practices of Britain in India, following the troubled relationship between the crown, Indian rulers, and the East India Company (EIC). The EIC started as a modest merchant house charged by

Elizabeth I with the task of establishing trade, but soon was granted permission to build permanent trading stations and gained political power over Indian territories (Keay, 1993; Robins, 2012). With the decay of the Mughal Empire, EIC required its employees to work for keeping the conditions of order and security upon which their commerce depended and, in 1698, King William III authorized the Company to use force to protect their properties – even though he reaffirmed the primacy of the British crown over India (Wild, 1999; Robins, 2012). By the mid-eighteenth century, French influence had grown in some parts of India and the Company behaved more intrusively in local affairs in order to preserve its privileged position (Wild, 1999). Some provinces became British protectorates and to the East India Company it was granted the right to collect and administer revenue, besides building and controlling a growing army. Soon the Company had to face the challenges of government, and revealed itself to be ill prepared for that task (Keay, 1993; Wild, 1999; Robins, 2012).

After the EIC was charged with mismanagement, corruption, exploitation and impoverishment of local population, British Parliament considered intervening on its activities;[37] but in the end, the North Act (1773) simply affirmed the Company's responsibility for making rules and regulations in order to promote and maintain public order. A few years later, a parliamentary commission investigated the EIC and classified its activities as "offensive to the honor" of Britain, and disrespectful of trading regulations (Robins, 2012). With the India Act of 1784, Parliament reaffirmed EIC's commercial rights, but designated a commission to supervise the Company's activities and established some principles of good government – related to security and to the conditions under which natives lived. From that time on, "recognition of the Company's claim to rule […]depended on the performance of duties pertaining to the general well-being of people on behalf of whom the government of India was obliged to act as a faithful trustee" (Bain, 2003, p.37).

The fate of the East India Company and of British rule in India may not be particularly relevant to the topic discussed in this thesis; nevertheless, the pages of the India Act (1784) contain at least three ideas that are worth noticing. The first

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[37] Although the charges were serious and the EIC had many creditors, intervening in the Company was considered to be a violation of the property rights and a dangerous precedent for British businesses; therefore, this idea was rejected (Robins, 2012; Bain, 2003).

one is the affirmation of a natural inequality between the European ruler and the Asian subject and that, in order to progress, the later should be reformed following the example of the former. Native ways of life were regarded as primitive and as obstacles to achieving stability, prosperity and good government, what both justified the need to reform and defined its goals. It is clear that this presumed inferiority was not new; still, the acceptable behavior towards inferiors had changed (or at least acceptable justifications for it had changed). The appeal to divine right that Portuguese and Spanish colonizers made in the fifteenth and sixteenth century was no longer enough, and the improvement of the lives of natives – not just their salvation through catechism – became part of the justification for alien rule. Although the methods of rule were still very similar, Bain (2003) argues that at least concerning the justification for their presence, European powers had to respond to some of the matters raised by the American and French Revolutions, such as rights of man and social contract. Besides that, they had to deal with an increasing demand for progress, both in Europe and in the colonies. Intervening in an outside world was legitimate, in part, when it was done on behalf of those people considered unfit for self-government. Just to keep at India, James Mill once argued it had been "built upon the most enormous and tormenting superstition that ever harassed and degraded any portion of mankind" (Mill *apud* Bain, 2003, p.41). To him, their minds were unaware of truth and reason what made them incapable of progressing on their own; therefore, the only way out of ignorance and barbarism was to have someone governing on their behalf. In India's case, this *someone* would be the British Empire.

The second relevant idea contained in the India Act of 1784 is that the conditions under which natives lived were considered to have practical importance for guaranteeing the secure and ordered environment required for commerce to flourish around the world. In this context, the lives of natives were not mere inspirations for oriental tales or objects of study for Macaulays or Richard Burtons; they were also evidences of the European progress and justified extending its domain overseas.

Finally, the third idea is that government and any activity performed in British imperial possessions would have Parliamentary supervision. This requirement was reinforced after the episode the British called the "Indian Mutiny" in 1857, a generalized popular movement that led to the dissolution of

the East India Company. After that, the governmental machinery absorbed the functions of the EIC and the crown nationalized its private armies as part of a general reorganization of British rule in India (Wild, 1999).

Natural inequality; rule on behalf of backward peoples; supervision of that rule: these are the three pillars of the notion of trusteeship that were joined together and gained normative significance. They justified alien rule as a path to moral existence in the colonies, and translated it in terms of what Bain (2003) called "obligations of power". Gradually, trusteeship became an acceptable conduct towards traditional societies based on the possession of political and economic power. From that point on, it would be internationalized and institutionalized as a practice; or, as I will argue in the next sections, articulated as a bordering technique of power that both separates and connects international society and its supposed others.

3.4
From Berlin to New York

Although the notion of trusteeship was rendered acceptable to justify European rule over the so-called barbaric people, colonial and imperial powers of that time developed singular means to do it. Despite the pretense universality of its assumptions, the conduction of trusteeship was mostly a particular affair for quite some time. In Bain's words:

> Each of the European imperial powers disclosed a self-assured certainty about their unique fitness for acting as trustees of civilization. The French endeavoured to civilize the 'lower races' by assimilating them to the excellence of French culture; the Portuguese by introducing the Christian religion; the Belgians by imparting their religion and ideology; and the British by bringing their charges to self-government. And, in consequence of their self-assured superiority, all of the colonial powers disclosed an equally pronounced hostility to the idea of subjecting their colonial undertakings to international scrutiny (2003, p.20).

What I am calling internationalization of the means of trusteeship was a gradual process with innumerous discontinuities. During its course, important ideas such as establishing and reinforcing local administrations were incorporated and had their share on shaping the multilateral practice of trusteeship as it is known to us. An eloquent – though often forgotten – voice that has spoken for the

internationalization of trusteeship belonged to the Abolitionist movement and its various streams. Their fight against slave trade and slavery in general contained an argument that is highly relevant for the topic discussed in this chapter: it affirmed that what happened in the colonies throughout the world should be a matter of international concern. That was the missing piece to the trusteeship puzzle. It was so particularly after the Abolitionist campaign gained the members of the British Parliament, leading to the formal abolition of slave trade within the British Empire in 1807.

As it is well known, the period comprised between the fall of Napoleon and the beginning of World War I was described as 'Britain's imperial century', since the country enjoyed unchallenged sea power and economic strength. Besides the formal control over its long list of imperial possessions, Britain informally had the final word on the administration of the colonies of weakened powers, for example, Brazil in the twilight of the Portuguese Empire. In this context of primacy, Britain assumed the role of global policeman and got involved in matters happening far beyond its domains. Some of these matters, such as suppressing piracy and slave trade are particularly relevant to this research as they expose colonial administration to foreign scrutiny. To a considerable extent, British government adopted the diagnosis elaborated by the Manchester School[38] that stated that the high costs of war and protection in the colonies made them less profitable to the crown. The solution to this problem was investing in what the British government called "lawful trade" and inculcate in savages the perfection of British morality. This would allow the crown to keep order and enhance productivity outside Europe at reasonable costs. Following the same line of thought, Christianity and commerce would be the engines of civilization to save the world from slavery and barbarism and should be spread by governmental agents trained on the advantages of well-ordered societies and lawful trade. In order to maximize the chances of success, those who refused to listen to the advices of British agents would often have to face the persuasive powers of the Royal Navy.

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[38] The Manchester School is the name given to the mid-Victorian school of thought propagating the advantages of *laissez-faire* in general and free trade in particular. Its foremost representatives were Richard Cobden and John Bright. They advocated that colonies were a burden to the taxpayer and a potential source of international tension, which were maintained partly as a form of outdoor relief for the sons of the aristocracy (Plowright, 2006).

However, taking people away from the sordid tale of anarchy, war and paganism in which, to the eyes of the British Empire, they lived and teach them to be virtuous citizens demanded organized patterns of intervention (Bain, 2003). Britain started to devise methods of rule that could face some basic needs: maintaining law and order; dispensing justice; and protecting individuals and private property. If government succeeded, it would be possible to secure savages in the *Pax Britannica* and to secure profitable commerce to the Empire. Great part of these governmental methods were systematized in Lord Lugard's notion of a *dual mandate*, designed to work as a principle of colonial administration. According to him, the exploitation of Africa's natural wealth should benefit both the industrial classes of Europe and the native population of Africa (Lugard, 1929). In other words, advanced people should help backward ones and receive something in return. The argument of Lord Lugard went further and he affirmed that the wealth of the earth was a common inheritance of all man, so that Europe should rightfully have its share especially of Africa: "[w]ho can deny the right of the hungry people of Europe to utilise the wasted bounties of nature, or that the task of developing these resources was […] a 'trust for civilisation' and for the benefit of mankind?" (Lugard, 1929, p.615). The notion of a dual mandate was inspired by the British experience in India and was part of the consolidation of trusteeship as a standard of rule that deserved internationalization.

A major step for this internationalization of trusteeship was taken at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, that was organized to discuss three major aspects of the European presence in Africa (especially in the Congo): (i) commercial liberty; (ii) maintenance of peace and development of civilization; and (iii) suppression of slave trade. In the very beginning, signatory powers affirm that the General Act should be understood as "a Declaration introducing into international relations certain uniform rules relative to the occupations which may take place in the future upon the coasts of the African Continent" (General Act of the Conference of Berlin, 1885, para.6). The most significant rules concerning commercial liberty are defined in Articles 1, 5 and 25. Article 1 states that "the commerce of all nations shall enjoy complete liberty" (General Act of the Conference of Berlin, 1885). To make it work, signatories agreed to ask for the consent of the power which governed a targeted region before developing any commercial activity there and, in exchange, to "assure to the transit of all nations

the most favorable conditions" (General Act of the Conference of Berlin, 1885). Article 5 contained what later would be known as the principle of "Open Door", that affirmed the need to respect private property and to avoid monopoly concessions.[39] Finally, Article 25 reinforced that all dispositions concerning trade would still be valid in times of war.

The second aspect – maintenance of peace and development of civilization – was regulated specially by Article 6 that talked about the improvement of the lives of natives and about religious liberty and the protection of missionaries and travelers.

> All Powers exercising rights of sovereignty or an influence in the Said territories engage themselves to watch over the conservation of the indigenous populations and the amelioration of their moral and material conditions of existence and to strive for the suppression of slavery and especially of the negro slave trade; they shall protect and favor without distinction of nationality or of worship, all the institutions and enterprises religious, scientific or charitable, created and organized for these objects or tending to instruct the natives and to make them understand and appreciate the advantages of civilization (General Act of the Conference of Berlin, 1885, Article 6).

The third aspect – suppression of slave trade – was clearly contemplated in Article 9 that stated that "each of the powers engages itself to employ all the means in its power to put an end to this commerce and to punish those who are occupied in it" (General Act of the Conference of Berlin, 1885).

For this thesis, however, there are at least three further articles that deserve mentioning. Articles 8, 18 and 19 authorize the establishment of an international commission of navigation endowed with the right to supervise the conduct of European powers concerning the dispositions of the General Act; moreover, the commission would assume the task of arbitrating eventual disputes (General Act of the Conference of Berlin, 1885). The members of the Commission[40] would be delegates nominated by signatory powers, also responsible for elaborating

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[39] In Article 5 we read that "every power which exercises or shall exercise rights of sovereignty in the territories under consideration shall not concede there either monopoly or privilege of any kind in commercial matters" and also that "strangers shall enjoy there without distinction, for the protection of their persons and their goods, the acquisition and transmission of their movable and immovable property and for the exercise of the professions, the same treatment and the same rights as the allegiants" (General Act of the Conference of Berlin, 1885, Article 5).

[40] Article 18 states that "the members of the International Commission as well as the agents named by it are invested with the privilege of inviolability in the exercise of their functions. The same guarantee shall extend to the offices, bureaus and archives of the Commission" (General Act of the Conference of Berlin, 1885).

suggestions which signatories could approve or disapprove. Consular agents had to address any complaints they might have to the Commission that would investigate and recommend a course of action.

To William Bain, the deliberations at the Conference reflect the idea of dual mandate formulated by Lord Lugard: "the interests of Europe and those of Africa would be served best by the interrelated and reciprocal benefit of free commerce, tutelage, and security from war" (2003, p.63). In that sense, signatories would be obliged to act on behalf of the natives and to extend the goods of civilization with an important difference: their performance would be supervised by others. Many of the principles adopted in Berlin were reinforced at the Brussels Conference of 1890, once again held to discuss the suppression of slave trade. Notwithstanding, the resolutions of this Conference went further and European powers committed themselves with the improvement of the infrastructure of African territories; the organization of local administrations; and the reform of natives' social, political, economic and religious behavior (General Act of the Brussels Conference, 1890).

Taken together, the conferences held in Berlin and Brussels set international principles of conduct concerning the relation of European powers and those societies they saw as barbaric. Furthermore, these documents asserted that the government of overseas territories should be regulated by international law and would be subjected to international supervision. To Bain, the "experience in Africa furthered the development of the idea of trusteeship by establishing its status in international law so that the condition and welfare of the world's most underdeveloped people became a legitimate subject of international scrutiny" (Bain, 2003, p.77). Gradually, trusteeship had lost its particular grip (each colonial state acting on its own) and been rendered the status of an international practice.[41]

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[41] An interesting example of this internationalized grip of the idea of trusteeship is the episode of the Congo. The establishment of the Congo Free State was demanded by King Leopold II of Belgium to do what he called "introducing civilization in the Congo" and should be administered by volunteers. Besides being rendered as a philanthropic experience by Belgium, many complaints about the administration of the territory emerged, especially about the use of compulsory labor, violence against natives, irregular punishments, corruption and violation of private property. The British government addressed a diplomatic note to the signatories of the Berlin Act affirming that Belgium was dishonoring its humanitarian justification and demanding action (Bain, 2003). The USA, Italy and Turkey agreed with British criticism and the matter was evaluated by the international commission established by the Berlin Act that recommended changes. Although Belgians were resistant to the criticism, the failure of their enterprise at the Congo was recognized a few years later and in 1908, when Belgium decided for the annexation of the territory (Bain, 2003).

If, on the one hand, these changes evidence the triumph of a specific conception of how societies must be organized, on the other hand they have contributed to stabilizing a notion of international society (at this point led by Europe) as a group of ordered and civilized states, in opposition to uncivilized surroundings. This international society became an instance of discursive practice, a political referent on behalf of which some actions, such as "the reform of natives' social, political, economic and religious behavior" were authorized. It is this sense that, for many years, trusteeship was regarded as a legitimate practice, and a way of protecting civilization from barbarism. While barbarians were allegedly civilized and saved, the *state* itself (as form of organizing life) and the *international society of states* were (re)produced as norms of political life. Still, the application of trusteeship principles lacked institutionalization, what would begin to change a few years later, with the creation of the League of Nations. As it will be discussed in the next sub-sections, after the League was created, and later the United Nations, trusteeship became a real multilateral enterprise. International organizations were authorized to (in fact, mandated to) operate trusteeship systems in the name of the international society.[42]

3.4.1
League of Nations

Especially after World War I (WWI), the answers given to systemic instability privileged the category "state" and its "sovereign" form. The reconstruction of old states and the construction of new ones was understood as means to stabilize relations and ensure that the prospects of international order could actually come true. In fact, the (re)construction of states became a technique of governance of the international system, based on the conviction that international relations should be conducted by very specific beings: sovereign states. International order would rest upon mechanisms of governability deployed by these states to discipline individuals, adjusting them to the requirements of

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[42] Although one might argue that multilateral or transnational dimensions of international relations are limited by the strength of the principle of sovereignty, it is important to remember that the very idea of a sovereign state is thought of in relation to others – mostly, other states in a group of sovereign states. In this sense, I would say that sovereignty and multilateralism are much more articulated than opposed.

modern freedom. The endless reproduction of this model normalizes both domestic and international relations. In one realm or the other, it can be associated to the production of subjects ready to play according to specific rules, and to the systematic separation of those considered unfit for the game. These bordering techniques – of differentiation, classification, separation –, so connected to the idea of international society, have been transplanted to as many spaces as possible: by controlling, sometimes bringing in, those that were beyond (or actually behind).

To Bartelson (1995), the survival of international society is discursively articulated as a *prophecy of expansion* and a *promise of transcendence*. The first one is related to a spatial expansion of the model "sovereign state" that would be disseminated throughout the globe and overcome inferior forms of organizing political life. The second one is related to an ideal of projecting the relations between similar beings – that characterizes intrastate dimension – to the international level, as part of the moral progress of individuals and the development of reason. In this sense, moving towards the future means suppressing differences; progressing; and establishing a perpetual peace among man. Strictly speaking, peace is not perpetual because it lasts infinitely; it is perpetual in the sense of transcending history and taking place outside time itself. To Bartelson (1995), "[…] having usurped Time, man is not only king, but also God. He is released from the duality of his political condition and the alienation fostered by it; he stands not at the end of history, but at its beginning, always ready to remake it" (p.236).

The story of the Paris Peace Conference (the final chapter of WWI) is often told as an attempt to remake, or to reinvent, the ways in which international relations were conducted, headed by gifted political leaders looking forward to peaceful times. If we look to the negotiations through less poetic lenses, however, what pops up is a fierce discursive battle over the terms and the limits of the international order. What came out from this battle was the well known narrative of ruined empires, bloody territorial disputes and failed diplomatic methods being replaced with a an arrangement that would daringly bring matters of war and peace to the table and make decisions about them most collectively.

As Herz and Hoffmann (2004) point out, the *collective security system* was based on the commitment of member states to prevent – or even suppress –

aggressive behaviors against one another[43] and to act together in face of a threat. The idea was to promote an outstanding aggregation of resources and, therefore, raise the costs of using violence as means to an end to the point of becoming a deterrence mechanism. In the end, the decision to use force would be somehow submitted to international authorization, what, hopefully, would bring stability to the system. The League of Nations was created to manage this collective security system, making the absence of war the routine of international relations. The League declared itself the first universal organization, able to combine big and small states and to deal with international order in a global manner. To Herz and Hoffmann (2004), its agenda and institutional design expressed, at the same time, the will of great powers to preserve the *status quo* – an order of independent states and their special role in its management – and to transform the system by the belief in progress, reason and democratization of international relations.

What I am arguing here is that taking this project forward implied, in that context, an expansion of the international society, what would be done with the dissemination of the model of sovereign state throughout the globe. This expansion conveyed the promise that, by sharing a common vocabulary and establishing collective rules, states could secure a path to transcend their present condition and achieve moral progress and peace. Therefore, a *prophecy of expansion* and a *promise of transcendence* would make way to paint the world with the colors of international society.

This logic is evident in most of the peace treaties signed after the war, particularly in the state solutions designed to stabilize international politics. The proposals for disarmament, commercial, economic and financial regulations, and especially the system of collective security depended on the existence and collaboration of well-structured (normalized) states. Thus, under the ashes of the defeated German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the treaties of Versailles (1919), Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1919), Trianon (1920), Sèvres (1920) and Lausanne (1923) determined the creation or recreation of states, the return of territories conquered during the war and the recognition of independent

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[43] The only exception to this logic would be in case of self-defense against a foreign attack (Herz; Hoffmann, 2004).

countries.[44] The former Russian Empire that by the end of WWI had already been taken by the Bolshevik Revolution, also lost its territorial conquers of the last two centuries and the redefinition of its borders involved the (re)creation of independent states.[45]

Nevertheless, the contours of the international order after WWI also accommodated new powers, especially the United States, and smaller states. There was an increasingly sound demand for self-determination enunciated by important voices of that time, especially US president Woodrow Wilson. Even before the last shot of the war, Wilson declared that the fate of the colonies was a practical problem for the preservation of an emerging international order. In his statement known as the "Fourteen Points" he suggested measures to achieve postwar peace and, amid many of the territorial arrangements cited before, Wilson notably included the necessity of:

> A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined (Wilson, 1918, Article V).

A careful reading of Wilson's proposal allows one to foresee that simply put colonial practices under international scrutiny and supervise the civilization of those people taken as barbarians, as the Conference of Berlin enacted, was no longer considered enough. The proper functioning of the international order that was to be established following WWI demanded that an active role was played to prepare for self-determination. At that point, the acquisition of new colonies was hardly ever seen as a legitimate practice and the stability of the relations between major powers implied that colonial possessions of defeated contenders were not

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[44] The Treaty of Versailles (1919) determined the end of the German Empire and the redefinition of the borders of Germany that had to give up territories stripped of France, Belgium and Poland. Furthermore, the independence of Poland and of Czechoslovakia had to be recognized. In the same vein, the treaties of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1919) and Trianon (1920) sealed the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and created, or recreated, the states of Austria; Hungary; Czechoslovakia; and Yugoslavia. Some remaining territories were transferred to Poland, Romania, Belgium, Italy and Denmark. The treaties of Sèvres (1920) and Lausanne (1923) decided the fate of the Ottoman Empire. Their most important arrangements gave rise to the Republic of Turkey and delimitated the borders of Greece and Bulgaria, besides rendering some territories to international supervision (Milza, 2002).

[45] The redefinition of Russian borders involved the establishment of the states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and, after a long dispute between Germany and Russia during the war, Finland was finally recognized as an independent state (Milza, 2002).

simply divided among them. To make peace possible to all, 'backward societies' would have to walk faster towards future; still, especially in the eyes of European colonial powers, most of them could not do that on their own and remained unprepared for independence.

To Anker (1945), the enactment of these points produced an innovation in international law: the creation of international mechanisms to deal with the administration of non-self governed territories and lead them to independence. However, the definition of the means to do so was disputed between major powers. Initially, France opposed to the idea, referring to it as "a serious disruption to the imperial structure" (Callahan, 2008, p.104) and Britain favored a policy of annexation of German colonies on the grounds of national honor. Furthermore, the British control of overseas possessions, especially African ones, was intensified and new councils (in which Africans were not admitted) were created to supervise their administration (Housden, 2012).

Of course, many voices dissented from these positions and, even during wartime, the slogan "no annexations" gained popularity among people in Europe, in the US, and especially in the disputed areas (Bain, 2003). To Lenin (1916), European imperialism was the great cause of the war and peace would never be possible if people were not free to pursuit their development independently. To Leonard Woolf (1920), European imperialism was harmful for commerce, and the construction of a better world required leading countries to work as trustees for colonial populations, especially in Africa, and educate them for self-government. Remarkable names of the British political scenario at that time, such as the member of the pacifist movement Edmund Morel (1920) and the left-wing journalist Henry Brailsford (1928) sustained that peace would only be possible with the neutralization of dependent territories from European wars and the observance, by all powers, of the principle of the Open Door, as enunciated in the Berlin and Brussels acts. Even so, most of these voices also considered that what they called "subject races" would not be ready for self-government.

The prevailing solution for the impasse was the elaboration of the idea presented by Jan Smuts in "The League of Nations: a practical suggestion" (1928): the application of trusteeship as a collective enterprise to create a 'halfway house' between a territory being a colony and being fully independent, since "[…] autonomy in any real sense would be out of the question, and the administration

would have to be undertaken to a very large extent by some external authority" (p.16-17).[46] The League would be put in charge of the collective operation of trusteeship, institutionalized in the Covenant as the "Mandates System". To Wilson (1918), the League represented the collective strength of the international community and was a guarantee that: (i) the dispute for colonies would not bring war back to the modern world; and (ii) that the work of civilization would be ensured and perfected with international machinery. In the end, the Mandates System reconciled the obligations of trusteeship and the maintenance of international security in a single institutional arrangement (Bain, 2003) and consolidated trusteeship and the civilizing mission as a particular area of international public policy (Wilde, 2008). As I am arguing here, trusteeship is a bordering technique of power that both separates and connects the international society and its surroundings. From this point on, this order of things will be increasingly institutionalized and delegated to international organizations authorized to act on behalf of the international society. If, on the one hand, the Mandates System appropriated the principle of trusteeship forged by the Berlin Act; on the other hand, it perfected the old arrangement, specifying procedures of international administration.

The Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations outlined the guidelines of the Mandates System. The document stated that those territories that belonged to powers defeated at the war and "[…] which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" (Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919, Article 22, para. 1) should be "[…] entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility" (para. 2). Also according to the document, "[…] the well-being and development of such peoples form a *sacred trust* of civilisation" (para. 1, emphasis added). As the League lacked the capacity to administer all the territories directly, advanced nations would exercise tutelage as "Mandatories" (para. 2) and their actions would both be based on the obligations established by international law and supervised by the League.

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[46] Smuts' ideas were originally published as a pamphlet in 1918.

To be controlled, disciplined, subjected, the territories entrusted to the League and its mandatory states were also differentiated and classified according to what was referred to as their *readiness for autonomy and for statehood*. To Smuts (1928), the "conditions for self-determination, autonomy or self-government vary very considerably" and even the most developed of the former colonies can be considered only "[…] capable of autonomy but not of complete statehood" (p.16). In all these cases, territories and their native inhabitants must "[…] subject to some degree of external assistance and control" (Smuts, 1928, p.16). Smuts' suggestions were taken into serious consideration when the Mandates System was designed and the mandated territories were organized in three different classes, A, B or C. The Covenant of the League of Nations provided that "the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances (1919, Article 22, para.3).

Class A mandates included territories that belonged to the Ottoman Empire, considered developed enough to be provisionally recognized as independent if their government would "[…] subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone" (Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919, Article 22, para. 4). Class B mandates intended to deal with territories from Central Africa to which autonomy was not considered an option. In these cases, the League determined that:

> Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses (…), and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League (Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919, Article 22, para. 5).

Finally, Class C mandates included the territories of South-West Africa and the Pacific Islands, considered absolutely unfit for self-government due to the "[…] sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances"; therefore, they should be "[…] administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory (Article 22, para. 6). The list of territories entrusted to the Mandates System, their class and mandatory power have been summarized in the Figure 4 below.

Class	Entrusted Territory	Mandatory
A	Palestine	United Kingdom
	Transjordan	United Kingdom
	Iraq	United Kingdom
	Syria	France
	Lebanon	France
B	Cameroun	France
	Cameroons	United Kingdom
	Togoland	France
	Togoland	United Kingdom
	Tanganyika	United Kingdom
	Ruanda-Urundi	Belgium
C	Pacific Islands	Japan
	South West Africa	South Africa/United Kingdom
	Western Samoa	New Zealand/United Kingdom
	New Guinea	Australia/United Kingdom
	Nauru	Australia/New Zealand/United Kingdom

Figure 4: The League of Nations' Mandates System.
Based on: Series of League of Nations Publications VI.A, 1945.

In all the cases, the League determined that foreign administration should consider the welfare of natives, their moral and material progress and also the rights and interests of other members of the organization, besides the preservation of international order (Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919). To make sure that mandatory powers would fulfill their obligations, the League instituted at least three important safeguards. First, the members of the organization would previously agree upon the degree of authority and control exercised by the mandatory and the clauses of the mandates were to be explicitly defined, case by case, by the Council of the League. Second, every mandatory submit annual reports in reference to each territory committed to its charge. Finally, a permanent Commission would receive and analyze these reports and advise Council and mandatories on all matters relating to the mandates (Article 22).

The Commission started its activities in 1921 and included a permanent body of delegates appointed by state members considered "neutral" in colonial matters. Nonetheless, European colonial powers, such as Britain and France, demanded participation in the Commission and the neutrality rule was bent to

include figures like Lord Lugard, who had been the British governor in Nigeria a few years earlier (Housden, 2012). Besides receiving and analyzing reports, the Commission received petitions of native inhabitants (forwarded by consular representatives of member states). In some cases, it interviewed natives, collected supporting material, produced and published its own reports detailing the management of the system, and made recommendations. As Housden (2012) observes, those reports gave publicity to the system and, more generally, to the matters involved in the administration of colonies, even the rights of native populations.[47]

Notwithstanding, Ostrower (1996) reminds us that the Commission lacked enforcement mechanisms and its recommendations were frequently ignored;[48] even in investigations the Commission had to rely on information supplied by mandatories. The author also considers that, although the system was inspired by liberal idealism, it also had roots in the imperial realities of the nineteenth century and before, and was used for taking control over the colonies of former enemies and opening them up to commerce. Housden (2012) adds that mandatories often knew little about mandated regions, followed senseless courses of action and adopted artificial solutions that did not last.[49] The former director of the Mandates Commission, William Rappard, recognized that the system was far from being beyond criticism, even though, maintained that it was a "progressive solution" (Calahan, 2008, p. 191) to the problem of the colonies.

Taken as a whole, Mandates System was an institutionalized mechanism that aimed at maintaining order in international society. This task involved a huge disciplinary effort towards its outside world, articulated in the League's discourse as a civilizing mission and as the promotion of self-government. About the institutional aspect, Bain (2003) affirms that the international machinery created with the Mandates System represented a novelty since called upon international

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[47] In some cases, Geneva's scrutiny led mandatories to change their policies. Britain, for example, promoted a more tolerant religious policy in Tanganyika after a League's report criticized the methods they had been adopting (Housden, 2012).

[48] Ostrower (1996) notices that, although France and Belgium fully respected the recommendations of the Commission, other countries generally ignored them. South Africa, for example, "[…] exercised its authority in South West Africa as colonialism pure and simple; indeed, Smuts himself reportedly called Pretoria's mandate an 'annexation in all but name'. The other mandatory countries fell somewhere between these two extremes" (Ostrower, 1996, p.81).

[49] There was also a considerable degree of opportunism to choose mandated regions and some places that fulfilled all the criteria to have been included as a mandate, like Armenia, were left outside because most of the powers were not interested on it (Housden, 2012).

law to determine general duties and acceptable policies to deal with non self-governing territories. What I am claiming is that the international form of trusteeship embodied by the League of Nations can be interpreted as means to conduct those non self-governed territories, managing the borders between anarchy and an increasingly disciplined, normalized international society.

An important part of this thesis research was dedicated to the investigation of the documents that registered the activities of the Mandates System, in an attempt to reconstitute the work of the League in the (re)construction of states and outline the main techniques of power deployed to normalize the borders of the civilized world, ensuring its expansion and perpetuation. Most of the documents about the Mandates System were compiled by the United Nations or by historians that have studied the League since its dissolution. To form the research archive I have also included annual reports and other documents produced by the mandatory powers concerning the administration of the territories, normally compiled and published a few years later.[50] Despite the fragmented character of the documentation, it is not hard to identify the gradation of the clauses following the class of the mandate considered. Roughly speaking, these clauses comprised topics that I have organized in three different areas, all of them observing the classification of the territory according to what the League called their "stages of civilization": (i) principles of trusteeship; (ii) mechanisms of control of the Mandates System; and (iii) operational/administrative provisions.

The *principles* of trusteeship listed in the mandates generally included social progress of native populations; good governance; and the authority of the trustee. According to the League, they were all elaborated on behalf of native populations aiming at their best interest. To class C territories, social progress consisted of *imposing* a minimum degree of morality to native societies and *prohibiting* what were considered barbaric religious practices or widespread vices, such as "intoxicating spirits and beverages". Clauses of good governance included *preventing exploitation* of native populations and *ordering domestic matters* in

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[50] For archival materials of the League of Nations Mandates System, see: The League of Nations Archives (1920-1946); Series of League of Nations Publications VI.A, 1945; Permanent Mandates Commission Annual Reports; British Cabinet Papers; British Foreign Office Papers; Iraq Administration Reports (1914-1932); Palestine and Transjordan Administration Reports (1918-1948); Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Papers; U.S State Department Archives; Documents on the Foreign Relations of the United States; UNISPAL Documents Collection; and World Peace Foundation Papers. Some documents and extracts have also been compiled by Anker, 1945; Callahan, 2008; Ostrower, 1996; and Housden, 2012.

ways consistent with international stability. In all class C mandates, the authority of the trustee supposed the permission to "[…] apply its own legislation on the territory, subjected to local modifications as circumstances may require" (Series of League of Nations Publications VI.A., Mandates, UN, 1945).

Class B mandates involved a different choice of words. Instead of prohibited, superstitious practices and the consumption of beverages and drugs should be *controlled* to bring social progress. The idea of good governance included the *regulation* and *supervision* of contracts and economic transactions to *protect* natives against frauds and usury and *create* capacity for self-government, besides clauses about preventing exploitation of native populations and preserving international stability, which were very similar to those of class C mandates. In class B territories, the authority of the mandatory should take native laws and customs into consideration to *establish local regulations*, albeit with a *great degree of administrative intervention*.

The vocabulary used to set the obligations of class A mandates was even smoother. British mandate in Iraq, for example, never had an official document to regulate the activities that were developed in that territory. In all the other cases, the terms of the mandates predicated that social progress could be achieved by *encouraging* moral and material well-being of native societies and *improving* their capacity for independence. Also in this sense, good governance included *preparing* the territories to self-government by: *making sure* that commitments and obligations will be fulfilled after the end of the mandate; *helping* them to establish representations in agreed foreign countries;[51] *adhering* on their behalf to international conventions that have been or will be approved by the League. The authority of the mandatory of a class A territory was described in terms of assisting and advising changes that favored independence and a peaceful entrance to international society. The only case of actual independence of a territory entrusted to the Mandates System was Iraq. British representatives considered it was ready for self-government and for joining the League as an independent member state in 1929, what actually happened three years later.[52]

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[51] This idea was specially emphasized in the documents of the British administration in Iraq. In countries where it did not have formal representatives, London would act on behalf of Iraqi nationals (Iraq Administration Reports, 1914-1932).

[52] Although the Mandates Commission considered that Iraq was not ready to protect minorities' rights, British mandate terminated in 1932. As Ostrower (1996) observes, the decision to end the

The *mechanisms of control* of the Mandates System were very similar in territories classified as A, B, or C. They basically included: the production of annual reports about the conditions of the territories and measures adopted to carry out the provisions of the mandates; rules to guarantee that there would be no discrimination of nationals of any member-state of the League in mandated territories; and a special provision about disputes between members of the League, which should be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Finally, the mandates detailed a series of *operational/administrative provisions* of international trusteeship. These provisions were intended to solve, or at least minimize, recurrent problems that somehow undermined the prospects of self-government in entrusted territories. The definition of these problems, however, was far from straightforward. Throughout the years, the relation of the League with mandatory powers alternated moments of dispute and cooperation, with both sides gathering information, developing strategies of intervention and reviewing procedures. The League evaluated the Mandates System annually, pointing out what were considered setbacks or successful practices. These practices were later compiled as 'guidelines to promote the advancement of backward societies'[53] and their adoption recommended to those acting on behalf of the organization.[54]

The League's effort can be interpreted as an attempt to translate what were considered general requirements of civilization into detailed administrative procedures and policies to turn non-self-governing territories into independent and civilized states. Maybe for this reason, operational/administrative provisions registered an even more significant variation according to the class of the territory, if compared to the principles and mechanisms of control of the Mandates System. The provisions of class C mandates consisted of *vague principles and obligations*.

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mandate "[…] followed Iraq's promise to give Britain access to both oil and airfields following the grant of independence" (page 81).

[53] Reviews about the Mandates System can be found in the Permanent Mandates Commission Annual Reports and in the Series of League of Nations Publications VI.A, 1945.

[54] Mandatory powers also evaluated the work that was being done in the territories entrusted to them and frequently reviewed their procedures. Sometimes they organized the information in reports submitted to the Mandates Commission. However, an important part of this material can only be found in governmental archives. The most systematic compilations about mandated territories are the Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan Administration Reports published by the British government in the 1990s.

In class B territories, the exercise of the mandate implied the *definition of local rules* to govern the lives of native populations and set the terms of the yet limited relations they could establish with the "civilized world". In their turn, class A mandates compelled the mandatory to develop real capacity for self-government, through the *improvement of local bodies of legislation* and the *establishment of local systems and institutions* "fit for independent nations", that should progressively assume the control over the territory and the population.

Even though procedures and policies changed following the class of the entrusted territory in question, the subjects (or issue-areas) to which they related were often similar. Based on these subjects, I have organized the mandates' operational/administrative provisions in four categories: (i) slave trade and forced labor; (ii) political, social and religious matters; (iii) economic, financial and commercial activities; and a combination of provisions related to (iv) peace, security and order. The provisions related to each category have been summed up in Figure 5 below, according to the class of the mandate. They have been implemented by mandatory powers acting on behalf of the League and described in reports produced by both sides.

	Class C Mandates	Class B Mandates	Class A Mandates
Slave trade and forced labor	Suppress slave trade	Suppress slave trade and provide for the elimination of all forms of slavery	Suppress slave trade, slavery and forced labor. Adhere to international conventions about these topics on behalf of the mandated territory
	Suppress forced labor, except for essential works (remuneration)	Suppress forced labor, except for essential works (remuneration)	
Political, Social and Religious matters	Ensure freedom of conscience and worship	Develop local rules to ensure freedom of conscience and worship	Prepare local legislation to protect freedom of conscience and worship, respecting public order and moral requirements
	Ensure freedom and security of missionaries	Develop local rules to ensure free transit of missionaries and rights to acquire property, erect religious buildings, open schools	Supervise missions and religious institutions
	-	Supervise contracts and labor relations	Prepare body of legislation regulating privileges and immunities of foreigners (including consular jurisdiction)

	-	Promote good government	Establish political regulations to encourage progressive autonomy and preserve ties with the LON and its member states
	-	-	Organize the juridical system
	-	-	Create body of legislation to protect minorities
	-	-	Promote social, educational and sanitary standards recommended by the LON
	-	-	Conduct territory's external relations
	-	-	Adhere to international conventions and treaties recommended by the LON on behalf of the territory
Economy, Finance and Commerce	Foster international commerce and protect private property	Create economic, fiscal and customs legislation	Organize economic, financial and commercial systems and bodies of legislation
	Observe principles of non-discrimination and open door	Create open-door legislation against discrimination of nationals from any member-state of the League concerning: residence, property, trade, transit, navigation, economic activity and concessions for exploring natural resources	Create open-door legislation against discrimination of nationals from any member-state of the League concerning: residence, property, trade, transit, navigation, economic activity, concessions for exploring natural resources and antiquities
	-	Create laws for protection and transference of private property (especially rights over native land to non-natives)	Create laws for protection and transference of private property (especially rights over native land to non-natives)
	-	Create legislation prohibiting usury and monopoly and ensuring the principle of the open door to commercial matters	-
	-	-	Organize the cultivation of land
Peace, Security and Order	Prohibit natives' access to arms and ammunition	Control natives' access to arms and ammunition	Control natives' access to arms and ammunition
	Maintain security and public order	Maintain security and public order	Secure the territory

	Organize troops of natives to repel possible attacks[55]	Organize local forces to defend the territory and keep order
-	-	Create laws authorizing Mandatory to move troops through the territory and establish military bases

Figure 5: League of Nations Mandates System: operational/administrative provisions.
Based on: Permanent Mandates Commission Annual Reports; Series of League of Nations Publications VI.A, 1945; The League of Nations Archives (1920-1946); Iraq Administration Reports (1914-1932); Palestine and Transjordan Administration Reports (1918-1948).

In class C territories, considered the most uncivilized ones, trusteeship was directed to *erasing the paramount traces of barbarism*; *fomenting contact with civilization*; and *ensuring that local or international disputes for the territories would not threat the international society*. In the first category – slave trade and forced labor –, these goals were translated as a vague call for suppressing slave trade and forced labor, except for works and services that administrative authorities defined as essential.[56] Economy, Finance and Commerce (category iii) included provisions compelling mandatory states to respect the principles of non-discrimination and open door and to protect private property of nationals of the League's member states. The provisions related to Peace, Security and Order (category iv) were also vague. Administrative authorities were responsible for maintaining security and public order and should prohibit the establishment of bases and fortifications, military training[57] and the commerce of arms and ammunition. Finally, the responsibility for improving Political, Social and Religious matters (category ii) was mostly delegated to foreign missionaries[58] who should be "free to prosecute their calling" (Series of League of Nations Publications VI.A, 1945), disseminating civilized faith and manners.

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[55] This was an innovation of French class B mandates in Cameroun and Togoland. In these cases, native troops could also be used to defend other French territories, especially if a war was to take place.

[56] In these cases, the League established that administrative authorities should provide adequate remuneration for the work done (Series of League of Nations Publications, 1945). The same clause can be found in mandates for class B and C territories. The suppression of slave trade and forced labor can be found in the vast majority of the mandates for classes A, B and C territories. However, in class B territories it was supplemented by the requirement of suppressing all forms of slavery; and in class A territories mandatory states should adhere to international conventions about these topics on behalf of native populations and their future governments.

[57] The prohibition of military training referred especially to native populations, except in cases that the mandatory power identified the need for creating a local police.

[58] Mandatory states had to commit to allowing freedom of conscience and worship in entrusted territories and to providing access and security to these missionaries.

The presence of foreign missionaries was also important for civilizing natives in class B territories. An annual report of the Belgian administration in Ruanda-Urundi from 1938, for example, describes what would be advances in the organization of families, especially concerning marital practices and the role of women in native groups, due to the work of missionaries.[59]

> Polygamy is decreasing to a noticeable extent as a result of the increasing influence of missionaries and the standing of a sole wife has improved […]. Under the influence of civilisation, the woman tends to an increasing extent to become equal to her husband. The latter cannot go away for a long period without her consent. Man and wife eat together, which is rare among black races. Among the chiefs and the principal Batutsi, where this custom was slower in spreading, it is now general, even when strangers are present (as reproduced in Housden, 2012, p.146).

In these territories, the work of missionaries should be protected by local rules that granted them free transit and rights to acquire property, construct religious buildings, schools and hospitals, for example.[60] Nevertheless, foreign administrators should play a more direct role in what the League called *adjusting the daily behavior of local groups to civilized standards*. The same report of the Belgian administration in Ruanda-Urundi (1938), for example, calls attention to administrative decisions to promote changes in eating habits. According to the report, "progress has been particularly striking" and, instead of having "[…] nothing to eat but bananas and sometimes only the leaves of kidney-beans and the roots of various plants", natives now "have at least two good meals a day", including "foods previously considered taboo, such as the flesh of sheep, goats, pigs and chicken, fish and eggs" (extracts of this report have been reproduced in Anker, 1945, p.68-69 and Housden, 2012, p. 145-146).

Along with the introduction of new habits, the establishment of local regulations should help to *create the foundations for the emergence of a civilized*

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[59] Although the report considered that a more active role of women in native societies was an important step towards civilization and highlighted the efforts of the administration to make them equal to their husbands, it is important to notice that, in great part of what the League defined as the 'civilized world' women were not that equal. One of the most important social movements of the twentieth century was the women's suffrage, especially strong after World War I, the same period of the creation of the League. In 1938, when the report about Ruanda-Urundi was written, some countries had recently granted women (or some women) the right to vote (UK, 1918; Sweden, 1919; USA, 1920). In other countries, they had to fight for it a little longer (Canada, 1940; France, 1944). Belgium, the mandatory power in Ruanda-Urundi only granted women the right to vote in the national level in 1948. In Switzerland, they had to wait until 1971.

[60] The League also compelled mandatory states to create local rules ensuring freedom of conscience and worship, considered paramount characteristics of the civilized world.

life in class B territories. These regulations were often related to fiscal and commercial matters, the acquisition and transference of property, and individual rights (categories ii and iii). Native populations would also be given their first *lessons about the maintenance of international order and security and the preservation of peace* (category iv), especially by training native troops to repel foreign attacks and granting them controlled access to arms and ammunition for this purpose.

In class A territories, mandatories were clearly *teaching the arts of the state*, supervising the creation and improvement of bodies of legislation and the establishment of institutions in all areas. Therefore, besides ordinary economic, commercial and financial regulations, mandates notably involved the construction of health, educational and sanitary systems and gave special attention to issues involving migration and minorities. In 1925, the Permanent Mandates Commission affirmed that "the success of the methods to treat natives" depended on the development of statistics and enhanced control over population (Minutes of the Sixth Session, PMC, 1925). In the next year, the Mandates Commission prepared a list of questions to be included in the annual reports prepared by mandatory powers and that demanded improved and systematized use of statistics, especially in class A territories. In the questionnaire, there were questions such as:

> What is the population of the territory in natives, coloured persons other than natives, Asiatics, Europeans and Americans? Are the figures supplied the result of a census or are they merely an estimate? Is there any considerable emigration from, or immigration into, the territory? If so, what are the causes? What are the countries of destination or origin of emigrants and immigrants respectively? (PMC, 1926).

The Commission also asked mandatories to supply "quinquennial or decennial comparative statistics of the population" (PMC, 1926), containing information about the issues mentioned before and general statistics concerning births, marriages and polygamy, deaths, minorities, payment of dues and taxes. The census conducted by mandatory powers began as mere estimates but were systematized as demographic matters increasingly interested the Mandates Commission and were seen as a good mechanism to give an idea of the development of the entrusted territories and even accelerate it. The first census was in Palestine in 1921, but until 1930, data was mostly incomplete, especially

due to natives' resistance to give information about their families (PMC Report for Palestine, 1930). In 1931, following laws for compulsory registration of births and deaths, the Census of Palestine classified the population by 'religion and race (Arabs, Jews, others)' and included data about nomad groups (PMC, 1931). In 1935, the Office of Statistics was created to prepare statistics that could assist the formulation of public policies and mandate's provisions (PMC Report for Palestine, 1938). An analogous office had been created in Transjordan in 1926 as part of the Department of Public Health (PMC Report for Palestine, 1938) and in Syria and Lebanon, after laws of compulsory registration (1925) and penalties for not registering information (1931), the Order 3633 established that every male over 14 should carry an identity card (Annual Report Syria and Lebanon, 1933). The document should include information about family, religion, profession, dwelling and ability to read/write, besides the color of skin, hair and eyes, the size of the nose and ears, height, and other special characteristics, for example, whether if the person wore a beard, a moustache, or had any peculiar sign (See Annex 1, État Du Grand Liban, Carte d'Identité,). In Palestine,[61] Jew immigrants were granted citizenship as a mean of submitting them to local legislation and to government's control (Housden, 2012).[62]

In all those cases, difference was racialized, ranked and incorporated to a complex system of techniques that forged and governed the borders of the international society. As this section has showed, despite the diversity of mandatory states in charge, the administration of entrusted territories had highly similar characteristics, contrary to what is commonly pictured. Most importantly, these similarities were not mere coincidences; they were related to a long process of internationalization and institutionalization of trusteeship as a set of techniques of power through which the borders of the international society were defined and controlled. In this sense, the much-explored dichotomy between civilization and barbarism worked as a condition of possibility for the emergence of a multilateral system of government of the other, based on differentiation and on the production

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[61] In the case of Palestine, British officials were accused by the League of making confusing promises to Arabs and Jews and failing in avoiding bloodshed between the two groups (Housden, 2012). It was one of the few cases in which the Permanent Mandates Commission challenged a mandatory power, but there was no punishment.

[62] It is worth noticing that the census in class A territories excluded information about foreign officials, administrators, missionaries and businessman. In some cases, these groups were considered separately.

of inequality. Trusteeship, though, can be seen as a particular combination of knowledge and power that inscribed a discursive border separating an international society of modern, civilized and independent states from those labeled as territories unfit for self-government.

The delimitation of this border is deeply connected to the construction of a figure of authority responsible for its administration: those who should govern barbaric outsides in the name of the international society – and allegedly on behalf of native populations. In the case of the Mandates System, this role was played by mandatory powers, entitled to govern every aspect of the lives of natives as part of a civilizing mission that should, at the same time, save barbarians and protect civilization. They assumed a so-called sacred trust of expanding the modern world, but also worked as *gatekeepers*, protecting it from dangerous outsides. They were mandated to defend the international society.

Even though the relationship that characterizes the tutelage of the international society over those territories included in the Mandates System is not one of the topics discussed by Foucault, it is possible to say that it resembles a pastoral logic of power: a structure of power relations based on the hierarchic differentiation between a shepherd that should lead and a flock that must follow, that must be subjected in order to be saved. Following this argument, it is impossible to ignore the role played by foreign missionaries in the administration of entrusted territories. In those areas considered the most uncivilized, they were responsible for virtually all political, social and religious matters, for changing and conducting the daily conduct of native populations towards civilized standards. In class B territories, from which the modern world was less distant, missionaries shared the responsibility for the conduction of conduct with rudimentary local regulations and administrative structures ran by foreign officials. In these cases, the division of labor was quite simple: the regulation of public life was the responsibility of foreign administrators, while the conduction of private conduct was mostly left to missionaries. Class A territories, in their turn, were considered to be just around the corner of the civilized world. They were organized as states in which bodies of legislation, systems and institutions should be further developed as a passport for independence. In these 'almost modern' territories, religious institutions and foreign missionaries should be

supervised by a state in the making (assisted by foreign administrators), almost ready for disciplining populations and normalizing subjects on their own.

The argument defended here is that mechanisms of systematic differentiation, classification and hierarchization, discursively articulated to the dichotomy civilized x barbarian, have separated the international society from those who are beyond (or behind its borders), and converted these borders into a field of investigation and action for organizations such as the League of Nations. In this sense, trusteeship in general, and the Mandates System particularly, can be reinterpreted as a multilateral arrangement, an international ordering mechanism based on capillary techniques of power directed to securing and managing the borders of the international society.

It is clear that administering entrusted territories has never been an easy job for the mandatory states acting on behalf of the League. Besides refraining from collaborating with data collection, as mentioned above, local populations often accused the League of promoting a new imperial control of their land and resisted many of the regulations imposed. In some places, such as Syria, South West Africa and Palestine, resistance culminated in armed rebellions to which foreign administrators responded violently. Nevertheless, some groups were more than happy to collaborate. They were usually local elites that saw the mandates as an opportunity to consolidate and advance their privileged position, hoping to become the leaders of new independent states in the future. The various resistance strategies adopted by local populations and the complex relationship that local elites had with other natives and foreign officials is certainly relevant to understand the fate of the Mandates System. However, they are out of the scope of this research and will not be discussed here. For now, it is important to say that in spite of its many challenges and problems, international trusteeship outlived the League of Nations. When the organization was officially dissolved by a motion in 1946 (Assembly of the League of Nations, A.32.(01), 1946) most of the responsibility for territories under mandate had already been transferred to a new international organization with universal pretensions, the United Nations. The UN's role towards trusteeship and entrusted territories will be discussed in the next subsection.

3.4.2
"The League is dead. Long live the United Nations"[63]

Despite some disturbances, the contours of international order drew in 1918 remained very much the same until 1939. The outcomes of World War II (WWII) and the order negotiated at its end were multiple, and most of them will not be discussed here. For the purpose of this thesis, the most important feature of post-war arrangements was the dispute between a devastated Europe and the rising powers of the USA and USSR to set the bases upon which a new international society should stand. In fact, European countries lost most of the control over the system, and the task of managing it was significantly transferred to Washington and Moscow. Nevertheless, the rules and institutions that had been at the core of the European era have survived: sovereign states remained the protagonists of the world order and the main instruments of international governability still belonged to them. In this subsection, I will argue that trusteeship, as an institutionalized way of dealing with borders, has survived (and changed) and was an important part of the job of the United Nations, especially during the first decades of its existence.

Even before the war was over, there was much discussion about how the world should look like afterwards. In 1941, the Allies signed a policy statement on the topic, known as the Atlantic Charter, which had been drafted by representatives of Britain and the USA. One of the principles presented in this document was people's right to self-determination; however, there was a fundamental disagreement concerning the role of trusteeship in relation it, one that put Britain and the USA in opposite sites. The British interpreted trusteeship in the context of their imperial tradition, as a standard against which colonial administration should be judged, and the tutelage of what they called dependant peoples worked as the ultimate justification for empire. Coming from a different political tradition, Americans were less inclined to see trusteeship as an integral part of the administration of empires. Rather, they took it as an alternative to the

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[63] This phrase, attributed to Lord Cecil, is cited in Scot, 1973, p.404.

perpetuation of imperial international relations. This suspicion towards colonial empires was shared by the USSR, albeit with innumerous differences.[64]

The right of self-determination as a basis for a peaceful world, as outlined in the Atlantic Charter (1941), triggered a debate about the future of empire in world affairs. As Bain (2003) puts it, the matter was no longer defeated empires alone; victorious ones, used to be protagonists of international relations, also felt threatened. Winston Churchill strongly rejected the idea that self-determination could be applied to the territories belonging to the UK and made a sharp distinction between what he called the affairs of Europe and the affairs of the British Empire.

According to Churchill, the principle expressed in the Charter did not contradict those of British colonial administration – best interest and well-being of dependent peoples – and the territories they ruled would gradually evolve to self-determination. In this argument, trusteeship appears as the ultimate justification for the existence of an empire that was determined to hold its position in world politics. A few months later, during one of his most memorable war speeches, Churchill reaffirmed this position: "Let me, however, make this clear, in case there should be any mistake about it in any quarter: we mean to hold our own. I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire" (Churchill, 1942).

Roosevelt, by his turn, used the Teheran Conference of 1943 to publically criticize European imperialism, particularly the French rule in Indo-China that, according to him, had been worse to local inhabitants than leaving them on their own. Despite the American bonds with France and Britain, Roosevelt often repeated that the practice of imperialism endangered the achievement of peace, exploring people and creating incentives for war. To him, world peace demanded liberty, often related to self-government and independence, and trusteeship should speed up the qualification of non-self-governing peoples for independence.

Although British politicians affirmed that Americans were ignorant in colonial affairs and misunderstood the relationship between colonies and imperial authorities, criticism was not unnoticed. Furthermore, the situation in the colonies, especially in India, became an increasingly important topic in the British political

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[64] Following Lenin's (1916) argument, the Soviet government considered European imperialism as a cause of WWII.

scene, deserving attention from members of the Parliament and the press. Even before Germany surrendered, the non-violent movement of non-cooperation led by Gandhi was a sound hard to be left unheard. The slogan "Quit India" was frequently associated to the presence of over 2.5 million Indian soldiers fighting in World War II; to the huge sums of money that came from India to support the war effort; to the powerful industry developed in the region fomented by the production of armament; to the importance of the Indian territory as a base for USA's military operations in Asia; and, of course, to the significantly smaller amount of money available in London to be invested in the imperial possessions. The resistance of Indian population to the British rule and the separatist movements springing up throughout the region were also mentioned in the texts of this period.

In 1945, it was clear that the situation in the colonies would not remain the same for a long time and the disagreement over the so-called solution to the problem, evidenced by the debate about trusteeship, was a matter of form, more than of principle. On the one hand, Americans proposed an *international trusteeship*, a formal system led by an international organization – in that case the UN – to prepare colonial peoples for independence; on the other hand, British insisted on an *imperial trusteeship*, led by the colonial powers with the support of regional commissions, to train dependent peoples for self-government, but not necessarily full independence (Bain, 2003). International or imperial, the principle of trusteeship remained very much the same: a parental-like relationship between advanced peoples and those rendered as incapable to stand for themselves and, thus, only beginning a gradual journey to become modern sovereign states and legitimate members of the international society under close supervision. Clement Attlee, who served as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom succeeding Churchill (1945-1951), summarized this understanding in a Public Declaration of Colonial Policy by saying: "No doubt, the time may come when even the most backward of our Colonies also become adult nations. But at present they are children and must be treated as such" (1942, cited in Bain, 2003, p.121).

The Charter of the United Nations, signed as a birth certificate to a post-war international order, contained, in a certain sense, both the British and the American proposals regarding trusteeship. Three out of nineteen chapters of the document were specifically dedicated to trusteeship and the situation in overseas

possessions. Chapter XI contained the Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories, expressing principles there were not so different from those found in the Berlin and Brussels acts and in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 73 states that:

> Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories (UN Charter, 1945, Article 73).

As it had happened in the Covenant of the League of Nations, trusteeship was referred to as a *sacred trust* and linked to a scale of civilization and fitness for self-government. Administrative powers would be in charge of protecting and making advance "according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement" (UN Charter, 1945, Article 73). They must also periodically provide the Secretary General with "statistical and other information of a technical nature" (Article 73) about the territories. As Wilde (2008) argues, once the Charter was signed, colonial powers accepted trusteeship as an institution of the international society and a technique "to further international peace and security" (UN Charter, 1945, Article 73), but did not subject the whole of their colonial possessions to international machinery of intervention and supervision. As the British wanted, for the territories of the victorious states, trusteeship could remain mostly a general principle and would not foster any specific operational provision or commitment.

Chapters XII and XIII, however, were clearly based on the American proposal and set a system of trusteeship that relied upon international supervision and administration. The International Trusteeship System and the Trusteeship Council would be responsible for promoting a "[…] progressive development towards self-government or independence" (UN Charter, 1945, Article 76) and ensuring that newly independent states would join the international society in a stable and ordered manner, contributing to the maintenance of international peace

and security.[65] The Trusteeship Council was one of the six organs of the United Nations[66] and, besides considering the reports submitted by administering authorities (as the League's Mandates Commission), could also receive petitions of local inhabitants directly, and dispatch periodic missions to observe the conditions of trust territories (Article 87).[67]

The territories were divided in three categories, according to Article 77: (i) territories held under mandate of the League of Nations; (ii) territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of WWII; and (iii) territories voluntarily placed under the system by those responsible for their administration.[68] The trusteeship system had been clearly designed to deal with regions beyond (or behind) the borders of the international society. Article 78 stated that trusteeship would never apply to UN Members, and that the relationship among them always "[…] shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality" (UN Charter, 1945).

Although limited in scope, the trusteeship system established by the UN Charter was conceived as a successor to the League of Nations Mandates System (Weiss; Forsythe; Coate, 2004), and as a mechanism for reintegrating the economy and society of the colonies with world capitalism (Chandra, 1999). Following the agreements of 1945, 1946 and 1947, territories that had been classified by the League as B or C automatically became trust territories and their UN mandates were elaborated one by one. The territories that belonged to class A were put in a scale to attain independence within a short period. In 1945, the former mandated territories of Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan (later Jordan)

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[65] The System should also ensure equal treatment for all UN members in social, economic and commercial matters regarding trust territories (UN, 1945).

[66] The other five organs are the General Assembly; the Security Council; the International Court of Justice; the Economic and Social Council; and the Secretariat. After the last territory under administration attained independence, the Trusteeship Council suspended its operations on 1 November 1994, but the organ continues to exist on paper to avoid amendments to the Charter.

[67] Article 88 (UN, 1945) determined that the Trusteeship Council should formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory. Administering authorities should conduct research based on the questionnaire and prepare annual reports to be submitted to the General Assembly.

[68] The terms according to which each territory should be administered would be defined by particular trusteeship agreements, approved by the UN Trusteeship Council. UN Trusteeship System also created the category of *strategic trusts* to deal with areas considered essential to the maintenance of international peace and security and that demanded special attention. Although objectives were broadly the same, administrative tasks performed in these areas should be supervised directly by the Security Council (UN, 1945). The Pacific Islands, that the League had entrusted to Japan, were the only territories designated as strategic trusts. Their administration was conducted by the United States.

became independent states, and later joined the United Nations.[69] Palestine, under British mandate since the end of WWI, would be divided in two independent states. Even though the original script has not been followed, Israel became an independent state in 1948, sealing the end of British rule over the region, and joined the UN in 1949. Along with League's former B and C trusts, Somaliland was also included in the Trusteeship System and Italy assumed its administration in 1950. Figure 6 below sums up territories that belonged to the UN Trusteeship System, their administering authority and present status.

Territory	Administering Authority	Status
Cameroun	France	Independence as Cameroon in 1960
Cameroon	United Kingdom	Northern part joined with Nigeria, 1961. Southern part joined with Cameroon, 1961
Togoland	France	Independence as Togo, 1960
Togoland	United Kingdom	Joined Gold Coast, independence as Ghana, 1957
Tanganyika	United Kingdom	Independence, 1961. Joined with Zanzibar, 1964 to form Republic of Tanzania
Ruanda-Urundi	Belgium	Independence as Rwanda and Burundi, 1962
Pacific Islands	USA	Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands (1990), Palau (1994) in free Association with the USA. Northern Mariana Islands, Commonwealth of the USA, 1990
Western Samoa	New Zealand	Independence as Samoa, 1962
New Guinea	Australia	Independence as Papua New Guinea, 1975
Nauru	Australia	Independence as Nauru, 1968
Somaliland	Italy	Joined with British protectorate of Somaliland. Independence as Somalia, 1960

Figure 6: United Nations Trusteeship System[70]
Based on: UN and Decolonization: Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories, 1945-1999 (2015).

Observing the figure, one can notice that the administrative authorities responsible for the territories in the trusteeship system remained almost the same as in the League's Mandates System: most of them European colonial powers. The principles and mechanisms of control related to trusteeship also suffered only

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[69] Syria and Lebanon joined the UN in 1945 and Jordan in 1955.
[70] The territory of South West Africa that had been entrusted by the League to South Africa was not put under UN Trusteeship as administrative authority refused to do so. The territory was governed as non-self-governing until 1966, when South African mandate was terminated by the General Assembly. In 1971, the International Court of Justice declared South African continued administration to be illegal, within a scenario of local armed groups struggling for independence. In 1988, South Africa agreed to end its occupation of Namibia, following a UN peace plan for the region monitored by the UNTAG. Namibia officially became independent in 1990.

a few transformations from the Mandates to the Trusteeship System. Under the UN, trusteeship's operational and administrative provisions were reorganized into four groups – (i) good governance; (ii) rule of law; (iii) welfare issues; and (iv) peace and security –, but methods of foreign administration remained mostly the same. Broadly speaking, general principles and obligations, creation of bodies of legislation and establishment of institutions were part of the administration of all territories, and there was no fix categories as in the Mandates System.[71]

Measures of *good governance* included infrastructure projects and technical assistance. In the category *rule of law*, actions referred to ameliorating native laws and making them compatible with what the UN called civilization standards. The protection of foreigners living in trusted territories was especially recurrent and so was the adequacy of local legislation to the provisions of international treaties. The area of *welfare issues* included the most intrusive agenda, clearly aiming at the transformation of local societies "[…] ensuring that certain cultural, religious and social norms were followed and that other such norms considered objectionable were stamped out" (Wilde, 2008, p.333). Provisions were mostly related to the creation and transformation of bodies of legislation and institutions for health, education, sanitation, suppressing slavery, slave trade and compulsory labor, controlling the consumption of alcohol and drugs. In some places, like Somalia, there were specific mention to the prohibition and regulation of practices such as child marriage and prostitution. Finally, the area of *international peace and security* included the control of arms and ammunition and, notably, the delimitation of borders. In territories like Cameroon, Togoland, Ruanda-Urundi and Somalia, the UN considered that territorial adjustments – merging or dividing – were essential to make sure that one day these territories could join the international society as stable sovereign states and assume their role to preserve international peace and security.

All territories entrusted to the UN became independent, most of them in 1950s and 1960s, and, after Somalia, no other was ever included in the system. In fact, while entrusted territories became independent, the legitimacy of the idea of trusteeship was rapidly eroded. As Bain (2003) argues, it was relegated to the dustbin of history along with the legitimacy of empire because of a normative

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[71] For documents and information about the Trusteeship System, see Chowdhuri (1955), UNTC Archive, UN and Decolonization (2014).

shift whereby independence became an unqualified right and colonialism an absolute wrong. Parallel to the activities of the trusteeship system, the demands for independence coming from the colonies were strengthened. As former colonies were accepted as members, the General Assembly of the United Nations was almost converted into a forum used to put forward a broad decolonization agenda. This move was supported by the new superpowers and their belief that, once independent, colonial territories could join the international society and be placed inside the zones of influence of the USA or the USSR. Furthermore, their presence would help to legitimize a new world order and put an end to the European predominance in international relations. Due to the organization of the text, this transformation will be discussed in the next chapter.

3.5
Trusteeship: production of difference and denial of coevalness

Discourses about trusteeship that have been presented throughout this chapter, and particularly the methods involved in the management of trust territories, produce and naturalize differences between peoples. These differences are organized in a hierarchical scheme that separates an (anarchical) international society – constituted of modern sovereign states – from what is pictured as a world of anarchy (as chaos) and backwardness that can be found beyond – or behind – its borders and must be governed, transformed, perfected. In this sense, essentialized characteristics and classifications produced within trusteeship unveil one of the many faces of the process denounced by Octavio Paz in the beginning of this chapter: a knife of modernity cutting time into now and before. *Now* is associated with the time of the international society, providing a celebrated model of civilization; while *before* refers to peoples behind the borders of this international society, depicted as living in a time of barbarism and inferiority that must be denied, must be overcome. In this scheme, time itself poses as a universal ideal and history becomes a succession of events, a progression of stages, endlessly moving forward. As Ricardo Benzaquen de Araújo (1988) has noticed, the rise of modern age has re-written past as dark and mysterious place where

about anything could have happened, and transformed it in a location for terror stories – an age destined to be erased, to be forgotten.

What is being argued here is that this understanding of past and present as a hierarchical succession, as a path of progress and civilization, is inscribed in space by the mechanisms of trusteeship. The present of most African and Asian societies, for example, was seen as the past of Europe, as the infancy of the international society. While associating past with specific locations, the logic of trusteeship contributes to what Johannes Fabian (2002) has called the *spatialization of time*: physical and cultural differences are represented as sequence in time and this image is projected over human dispersal in space. To Fabian (2002), the diagnosis that life in distinguishable societies would occur in diverse (parallel) temporalities – past and present – produces a *denial of coevalness*. More than naturalizing differences between self and other, it places other in another time; precisely, outside the flow of time. In this sense, "all living societies were irrevocably placed on a temporal slope, a stream of time – some upstream, some downstream" (Fabian, 2002, p.17). Travelling to distant places becomes equivalent to travelling to earlier times, and other people, living just outside the border, are seen as primitive ancestors of the self. Geography, therefore, is subordinated to an evolutionary taxonomy of peoples that takes life inside the international society as a model against which the level of social and political progress can be judged.

This discourse of difference that puts the international society in the center (space) of a brilliant present (time), as the fulfillment of human destiny, and all that contrasts with it in a peripheral (space) gloomy past (time) awaiting salvation, is produced within a very particular set of power relations. Tutelage, as a bordering technique, preserves the international society; also, it is regarded as a path to progress and salvation based on the attainment of standards of civilization. This set of power relations between international society and its borders involves an ensemble of particularities and do not play the same tune that can be heard inside the borders. While Foucault paints a picture of Europe, and latter of the international society, entangled in discipline and biopower, the world that lies behind it is governed in a way that resembles the pastoral of souls, differentiating those who should lead from those who must follow.

With this argument, I do not intend to do a mechanical application of Foucauldian analytical categories of power relations, neither to affirm that conduct in the borders of the international society is conducted in a pure pastoral fashion. What I am saying is simply that the government of outside worlds is related to bordering techniques of power that contrast with those identified among independent members of the international society. The paces are not the same. In what I am calling the center, a world of independent sovereign states, discipline and later biopower was consolidated with the break-up of a cosmological-theological continuum that ordered human relations and the secularization of life and of power. This break-up, however, has not yet been completed in relation to the periphery of this world. To the lands and peoples behind the borders, coevalness is denied. They are still represented as inhabiting another time, as belonging to the past. Europe, and the international society to which it gave origin, might have been purged of its prodigies, marvels and signs as Foucault (2007) said; but it keeps looking to its borders identifying signs of mysticism and barbaric practices that tell horrendous tales of backwardness. In this world, they are still not subjects; they are to become subjects with trusteeship and with the fulfillment of a civilization project. As it has been discussed in this chapter, bordering techniques such as trusteeship resemble traces of a pastoral conduct of conduct, and the role it plays in the production of subjectivity.

The myriad of differentiations implied in these power relations also produce a clear hierarchy between the anarchical society and its' others (or its' borders). In the systems of trusteeship developed by the League of Nations and by the United Nations, the power of those who shall lead over those who must follow is described as a beneficent and caring power, just as the power of the shepherd who watches over the flock and takes care of its salvation. In a pastoral scheme, salvation relates to the subsistence (feeding, protecting and treating) and to the spiritual guidance (perfects people to live according to God's will and achieve an endless peace) of the flock. In a like manner, administrative authorities should accept their task as a sacred trust, care for the subsistence of the peoples entrusted to them and teach them standards of civilization that will help to achieve salvation through progress. As tutelage is often associated with "inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another" (Foucault, 2008b, p.26) it also demands obedience. Just as the flock must follow the shepherd to be saved, those

who are not considered able to stand for themselves must learn to obey and to submit themselves to gifted/civilized ones in order to advance. Finally, the creation of truth, another essential element of the pastoral conduction of conduct, is also present in trusteeship, assuming the form of fundamental principles, basic bodies of legislation and institutions that establish minimum requirements of civilization. Truth is taught as the norm of the international society.

Producing a particular version of the tripod salvation-obedience-truth, relations of power between international society and its borders would inculcate notions of citizenship and civility, as described by Mill (2001), into savages and barbarians. These power relations demarcate a field of political intervention that allows the constitution of 'dependent peoples' as political communities that will, one day, become legitimate political subjects. In the end, the operation of those capillary techniques described here as part of the Mandates and Trusteeship Systems would produce political individuals organized as sovereign states, or as normalized members of the international society. In addition, as Foucault (2007) reminds us, to become an individual, one must become a subject in the sense of subjecting to a particular set of rules of existence and conduct.

It is important to notice that, just like traces of pastoral guidance were not completely suppressed in Foucault's account of the modern world and there was a multiplication of the need to be conducted and an intensification of the intervention over the lives of individuals, disciplinary and later biopolitical techniques were also included in the conduction of borders towards the future (or the present). Throughout its existence, trusteeship also experienced the proliferation of techniques to conducting conduct and the operationalization and rationalization of the art of government, especially with the specification of mechanisms of state construction. Overall, the model of independent sovereign state remained the regulatory ideal of politics and of the government of borders and, as such, must be expanded. In fact, the very preservation of the form of life found inside the international society depended on this expansion, on the government of its savage borders as tutelage, in terms of trusteeship.

4
Tale of Three Worlds

> "Nineteenth-century conceptions of empire are dead".
> Memorandum of the British Ministry of Colonies, 1942[72]

> "Every modern nation is a product of colonization: it has always been to some degree colonized or colonizing, and sometimes both at the same time".
> Étienne Balibar, 1996[73]

In his contribution to the compilation of English School works "The Expansion of International Society", Hedley Bull (1984) has tried to give an account of what he called "the revolt against the West": a rise of Third World countries against the dominance of Western powers over the system. It would have been a decisive move, able to "change the legal and moral climate of international relations", "overturn old structures" and "universalize international society". The scenario of Bull's revolt is a changing world order that combines weakening European powers; the affirmation of the principle of self-determination, contradictory to the legitimacy of colonial rule; increasing feeling of empathy towards the aspirations of non-Western peoples; and most importantly, the rise of the USA and the USSR as superpowers, establishing a new equilibrium. Together, these shifts would have opened room for some former colonies to join an expanding international society and its organizations as sovereign states. In fact, Bull affirms that "the great instrument these peoples have used to advance their purposes has been the state: they began by capturing control of states and then used them [...] [to] expound their views in the councils of the world" (1984, para.16). In this case, expounding their views would mean to advance an agenda comprising five phases or themes – equal sovereignty; political independence; racial equality; economic justice; and cultural liberation. Later, these themes were, at least in part, related to a series of rights spelt out in conventions, declarations and treaties. By the end of his text, however, Bull recognizes that, although these changes might have transformed the face of the international society forever, the so-called "Western states" still hold a position of

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[72] Quoted in Betts, 2006, p.28.
[73] Quoted in Patil, 2008, p.137.

dominance over the system, and attributes that to an everlasting set of guidelines for organizing international political life inherited from the European society of states.

The aim of this chapter is to discuss what Bull calls the expansion of international society – and some of the normative shifts that came along with it – not in terms of capturing states or a revolt against the West, but of the universalization of *the state* as a means to relate to government, and of the re-inscription of difference (and inequality) on the ordering mechanisms of the system. I will show how the definition of spheres of influence and a politics of alignment, the process of decolonization, and the discourse of international development are embedded in the consolidation of a new order (under the aegis of the superpowers), particularly in the redefinition and control of its borders.

As it has been discussed in the last chapter, until the Second World War, the imperial/colonial rationality remained mostly unchallenged. It spatialized a temporal distinction between two parallel worlds – a civilized international society (now) and its barbaric outside (before) –, producing what Johannes Fabian (2002) named '*denial of coevalness*'. The borders between these two worlds were hierarchically ordered based on an ideal of civilization and the possibilities of civil life. International society was inhabited by civilized individuals, fit for autonomous action, and politically organized as free states which could live in a peaceful society. On the outside was the time of barbarism, of immature beings and groups, incapable of reasoning or developing the account of society, and thus destined to live in darkness and ignorance. Tutelage was on the center of a set of power relations existing between anarchy and society, ensuring the continued existence of these two worlds and the predominance of one over the other. On the one hand, tutelage preserved civilization, controlling its borders and protecting it from the dangers of barbarism; on the other hand, it offered what was pictured as a benevolent guidance towards salvation or a sacred civilizing mission entrusted to European colonial powers above all.

To say that this rationality remained mostly unchallenged is not the same as ignoring the existence of those who, for centuries, have tried to speak against it and to resist it (as it will be briefly discussed later). It is simply to acknowledge that the greatest part of these dissonant voices have been systematically silenced or managed to make changes of limited reach in the margins of a very stable order

of things. As it will be argued here, this stability began to fade once the role of European powers as keepers of a civilized world and the norm of civilization/barbarism were caught in the middle of a fierce discursive battle focused on the reconfiguration of international order in the aftermath of World War II. In this scenario, alternative narratives about the essence of colonial/imperial relations and claims for political independence from all over the world met USA's defense of democracy and USSR's fight to end capitalist exploitation, and participated in the establishment of a new world order. From that point, colonies and empires were progressively overshadowed by the ideological divide between superpowers, and by an increasing number of newly independent states that joined international society and its organizations year after year.

Gradually, the legitimacy of colonial guidance eroded and its institutional mechanisms – such as the UN's Trusteeship System – were relegated to limbo, while self-determination was reaffirmed as a right and demands for political independence took over international forums like the UN's General Assembly. However, the greatest part of those former colonies and non-self-governing territories recognized as independent states was rapidly framed in the logic of bipolarity and became open spaces over which the superpowers would project their power. In this sense, the state, understood as a form of government, spilled over into the anarchical borders of the international society, and the (re)incorporation of these areas and of the political communities that populated them was part of the consolidation of the role of USA and USSR as protagonists of a new world order.

In this movement, the spatialization of the temporal distinction between a civilized now and a barbaric before was blurred and the ways in which international society relates to borders has been reframed in at least three important manners. These manners, particularly their interface with international organizations, will be the center of discussion in this chapter. In the first part, I will concentrate on the definition of spheres of influence based on a politics of alignment that delimited spaces for USA and USSR to project their power, and minimized the possibilities of military confrontation between them. In the second part of the chapter, I will give an account of the process of decolonization, showing how political independence and statehood were detached from the idea of civilization/attributes of the civilized and re-defined as expressions of the right

of self-determination. In the third part, I will turn to the discourse of international development and discuss how it reframes difference and inequality as stages – from underdevelopment to development – and produces new ordering mechanisms based on the alleged problem of poverty. The aim is to show that the ways through which borders are defined and treated over time do change; however, the resilience of a rationality of inequality perpetuates the gap between different parts of the world and justifies continued intervention on new grounds.

4.1
Spheres of Influence and Politics of Alignment

The end of WWII was characterized as the progressive configuration of set of political, economic and military relations that culminated in a Cold War between superpowers. Broadly speaking, core decisions about international politics moved from Western Europe to Moscow and Washington and the borders of a new order were drawn mostly following East x West logic. The idea of this section is not to give a comprehensive account of international relations during this period. I will briefly come back to some ideas and proposals that shaped this new order, and to the power relations that produced, organized and controlled its borders in terms of spheres of influence and politics of alignment. The documents considered in this section focus on the establishment of Eastern and Western Blocs, the ties linking their members, and the management of their limits. The relationship between superpowers, their blocs, and former colonies and non-self-governing territories – or with the regions that became known as the Third World will be discussed in the following sections.

The aftermath of WWII, like many previous wars, revolved around questions such as territorial losses and gains, spoils of war, reestablishment of sovereignties, reorganization of governments – and most of the traditional answers to these questions were accepted. Even the arrangements for a system of collective security and for dealing with a world not yet fully organized into states (despite their celebrated innovations and particularities), strongly resembled what had happened almost two decades before. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the matters involved in reestablishing international order in 1919 and in 1945

were interpreted differently. When WWI ended, order was framed in terms of stabilizing relations between European powers, smaller states, distant partners and satellite supporters, besides pushing forward an alleged civilizing mission at the anarchical outside. At the end of WWII however, the challenge was described as the need to stabilize emerging powers, a marked ideological cleavage, a devastated, wistful (and still crucial) Europe, and its unstable colonial inheritance, now forcing the door from the past to the present. Even if we cannot say that there has been a radical rupture between the orders that related to these two diagnoses, it is clear that they were different in many aspects.

The move from one to the other started long before war against Axis powers was over and was far from a straightforward development. As Resis (1981) has noticed, security zones created by Allies in the course of war might have inspired the later division of the world into spheres of influence. However, this was not the only – and maybe not even the preferred – proposal for postwar order. A quick look at diagnosis of the causes of war and recommended prophylaxis conveyed at the time shows that ideas about postwar arrangements varied between different social groups, and even official positions assumed by state representatives changed quite often. If one concentrates on the proposals presented by the leaders of the Big Three during the war and its immediate aftermath, it will be clear that the definition of zones of influence (especially in Europe) was only one of the possible outcomes; one that progressively acquired the status of need or political truth.[74]

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[74] Even before avowedly joining the war effort, USA's representatives opposed the idea of establishing spheres of influence in Europe, a position they would keep officially defending at least until 1946. The documents used to prepare the American delegation for Potsdam Conference in 1945 clearly reproduce the main argument behind this point of view: that the establishment of spheres of influence in Europe, to be administered by victorious countries, would repeat the mistakes of the old European power politics, which led to war in the first place. According to them, spheres of influence were synonymous with hostile blocs and would endanger prospects of any lasting postwar peace (US Department of State, 1945). To President Roosevelt, a much better option for postwar order would be creating a system of collective security capable of joining as many states as possible to defend independence, self-determination and sovereignty. Before he could count on American support in the war, Churchill had also started to discuss postwar prospects with other European leaders who agreed that international cooperation to avoid future aggressive behaviors would be a safe bet for establishing enduring peace in the continent (Saint James Agreement, 1941). During the following years, the creation of a system of collective security and of an international organization to oversee it would be effectively negotiated, even though there was much disagreement about its rules and procedures. Stalin's declarations during and early after the war indicate that he believed spheres of influence to be the best option for stabilizing Europe and strengthening the USSR, even though he feared the emergence of opposing blocs as ended up happening later (Resis, 1981). This belief would have informed his actions at least since 1939, when USSR signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with the Germans. One could

In this sense, Resis (1981) affirms that policies adopted by the Soviet government during and immediately after WWII were essential to seal the division of Europe into spheres of influence. Forging a Soviet sphere of influence had been initially imagined as an option for consolidating USSR's position in the continent and keep possible enemies far from its borders. This strategy was later adopted by both sides and understood as the best alternative to avoid another generalized conflict. The diagnosis and prophylaxis of spheres of influence were soon to encompass many goals: containing German ambitions; solving territorial disputes; supporting governments and enabling them to settle unstable political environments; and preserving the division of the European continent into sovereign states. Appropriated by politicians, diplomats, journalists, academics and the public, the idea assumed new contours, became a political guideline and acquired the status of truth in the postwar context.

Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the world divided by spheres of influence, as it was to be seen at least for the next forty years, was far from what had been advertised by Stalinist rhetoric. Instead of a strong USSR able to protect itself from the imperialist and conflictive nature of capitalism – that would eventually lead to another war – the world of international politics was reorganized in terms of an East x West political, economic, military and ideological dispute. In this world, the space occupied by European powers and their colonial politics was taken the power relations that forged USA and USSR-led blocs as opposite (and threatening) ways of living, redefining the limits of international society.

The idea that a new world order was being consolidated can be clearly identified in a famous speech delivered by Churchill in 1946, when he gave his impression of what would be the "sinews of peace"[75] after WWII. To Churchill, the strength of the British Empire remained unabated;[76] still, he acknowledged that, at that point, the USA stood "at the pinnacle of world power" (Churchill,

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say that the prospects of postwar order indicated that Europe would no longer occupy the privileged position it once did and that world boundaries were on the verge of a major reorganization. At that point, spheres of influence were understood as a possible path to follow.

[75] "The Sinews of Peace" was the title of Churchill's speech, delivered at the Westminster College (Fulton, Missouri) in March 1946. President Truman introduced him to the audience to give the latest updates about the situation in Europe after the war.

[76] A few years later, Churchill would say about postwar order that the division of the world, especially Europe, into spheres of influence, that it had not been favorable to Britain (Churchill, 1953).

1946, para.5) and the USSR had a "rightful place among the leading nations of the world" (para.19). He added that the growing powers of these countries were crucial for defeating the Germans, but created a situation that does not contain "the essentials of permanent peace" (para.22). According to him, the combination of Soviet resources and interest in indefinite expansion culminated in the division of the world in two:

> From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow (Churchill, 1946, para.20).

On the other side of this iron curtain – in fact opposing to it – would be another world, characterized by freedom, democracy and respect for the rights of man (Churchill, 1946). This world and the principles it represented could only survive if democratic countries managed to unite themselves to face the tyranny of communist parties and the "growing challenge and peril" (para.24) they represented.[77] In order to do so, there should be support for consolidating freedom and democracy in all parts of the West. Also, a collective attempt to negotiate the limits of an Western world reaching, as soon as possible, "a good understanding on all points with Russia under the general authority of the United Nations Organization", to be supported "by the whole strength of the English-speaking world and all its connections" (para.29).

In a very short time, the idea that there was an irreconcilable division between East and West, and that each side constituted a threat to the existence of the other became part of the international political imaginary, giving rise to an order in which forms of life were grouped as blocs that the superpowers represented and protected. The borders of this order were no longer those of the European system, and their management changed. In fact, the arrangement of spheres of influence was preserved by reaffirming the differences between both sides and by a politics of alignment that would bring as many communities and territories as possible to join one of the blocs.

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[77] To Churchill (1946), the Soviets might not desire war; however, the best way to prevent it and ensure safety of the democratic world would not be a policy of appeasement.

To Stalin, victory against Germany had proven that "Soviet social system is a better form of organization of society that any non-Soviet social system" (1946, p.27), since it liberated people from foreign exploitation and from the dangers of capitalism, besides providing more equitable life conditions for working-class people. The preservation of this social system was defined as a duty of the Soviet government and would be fulfilled by expanding it to other countries and supporting their generalized transformation.[78] In his turn, Truman slowly abandoned the cautious approach that characterized American foreign policy towards USSR until the end of the war.[79] Soviet moves in Europe and the Middle East[80] were interpreted as signals of a growing threat to the way of life represented by the USA, an understanding that informed the reorientation of foreign policy in terms of *containment* and contributed to shape an American sphere of influence in the West.

Despite their ideological differences, both sides were seeking expansion through alignment, what included strategies such as economic aid, trade agreements, technical cooperation, political and military support to friendly governments or friendly groups trying to ascend to power and military alliances. The first targets of these strategies were European countries, but what started as a battle for Europe would soon be expanded to other areas, even if the terms of their inclusion were usually different. I will now turn to the political strategies that shaped spheres of influence and alignment, first in Europe. The expansion of these strategies to other areas and the terms of their inclusion will be discussed in the sections about decolonization and development.

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[78] By 1948, communist governments had been established in many Eastern and Central European countries, such as Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, with the support of the USSR.

[79] To Kissinger (2007), American cautious behavior towards USSR was based on the hope that the strength of a continental country that had not been devastated by the war and possessed nuclear weapons would prevent Stalin from taking hostile action against it. The logic behind this hope was reflected on USA's official documents at least until the end of WWII, preparing diplomats, secretaries and their teams to innumerous meeting with the Soviets (US Department of State, 1945; 2014). President Truman himself expressed a similar point of view in 1945 when he wrote to his wife Bess from the Potsdam Conference. "I like Stalin. He is straightforward, knows what he wants and will compromise when he can't get it" (Truman, 1945, para.3).

[80] Oil concessions (Iran), base and transit rights (Turkey), rejection of Baruch plan for international control over nuclear energy and weapons.

4.1.1
New Old Continent

President Truman's speech delivered to a joint session of the American Congress in March 1947 is a good example of combination of new world order and clear borders between spheres of influence with irreconcilable differences and strategies of alignment. The backdrop to his speech was a deteriorating British capacity to provide assistance to Greece and Turkey and to keep order in that region, what would leave to the USA the great responsibility to fight for world peace. According to the President, the moment of history experience in the mid-1940s was marked by the existence of alternative – or opposing – ways of life.

> One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.
> The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms (Truman, 1947, para.32-33).

Therefore, if the USA failed to assume the responsibility to help others to survive as "free nations", it would open way to the expansion of Communist totalitarian regimes. To Truman, this expansion "undermine[s] the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States" (para.29). In the face of this threat, the USA was compelled to assist peoples in their struggle against totalitarian regimes and help democracy to flourish, engaging in "the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion" (para.28). In the cases of Greece and Turkey, these conditions would be created with relief assistance, what included sending financial and material resources, civilian and military personnel to "restore internal order and security" and also to promote "economic and political recovery" (para.8).

The President's formula to contain communist expansion was perfected and broadened, becoming a guideline on the reorientation of American foreign policy. Along with the reformulation of security apparatus, this reorientation was called the Truman Doctrine. With its economic and security facets, the Truman Doctrine is understood here as evidence of the techniques that constituted and controlled borders articulated in terms of spheres of influence and politics of alignment. The

policies developed in its scope participated in the process of forging and maintaining a Western Bloc and were especially directed to European countries.

A good example of these policies is the Marshall Plan,[81] a comprehensive aid program aiming at the reconstruction of Western Europe (1948-1952). The Plan was based on the assumption that the revitalization of European economies was the key to reestablish political stability in the region and reduce the attraction of communism to its populations, sealing their partnership with the Americans (US Department of State, 1947; Kalijarvi, 1947). Speaking at Harvard University in 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall outlined the pillars of the economic reconstruction program.

> It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace […]. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist (Marshall, 1947, para.6).

Only few months later, Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act, authorizing the release of funds to the Marshall Plan. From 1948 to 1952, US government spent over 13 billion dollars in grants and loans to finance the reconstruction of Europe. Aid was divided per country (see Figure 7) and supervised by the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC),[82] a permanent international organization created in 1948 (US Department of State, 1947; Kalijarvi, 1947; OECD, 2014).

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[81] Officially, it was the European Recovery Program (ERP).

[82] The OEEC diminished its activity after 1952, when the USA attached the aid provided to European countries to NATO. In 1961, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) replaced the OEEC. The European countries of the OEEC plus others like the USA and Canada financed the new Organization that should support development projects worldwide (OECD, 2014). In the last section of this chapter, I will discuss the replacement of the OEEC by the OECD and the development assistance provided by the organization.

Country	Grants and Loans (Approximately, in millions of US dollars)
Austria	678
Belgium and Luxembourg	559.3
Denmark	273
France	2,713
Germany (Federal Republic)	1,390
Greece	706
Iceland	29.3
Ireland	147,5
Italy	1,508
Netherlands	982.1
Norway	255.3
Portugal	51.2
Sweden	107.3
Turkey	225.1
United Kingdom	3,189
Regional Aid	407

Figure 7: Marshall Plan – Grants and Loans by Country (1948-1952)
Based on: Agency for International Development, 1967; US Department of State, 1982; US Department of State, 1947-1952.

Despite the variety of projects and programs financed by the Marshall Plan, it is possible to identify some targets. For example, create and administer a stock of food and medicine; reconstruct essential infrastructure; modernize and increase the efficiency of industry and agriculture; and promote foreign and intra-European trade. To achieve their goals, projects related to industry and agriculture relied heavily on technical assistance and training programs designed to promote economic recovery in Europe based on the successful examples that could be found in the USA. Significant sums of money were used to buy raw materials, fertilizers, fuel, tools and machinery (mostly from American suppliers), and to finance insurance programs to guarantee the value of investments in European companies. Along with incentives to productive activities, the Marshall Plan sponsored the creation and expansion of organs to promote foreign trade and international cooperation (US House of Representatives, 1967; Agency for

International Development, 1967; US Department of State, 1982; US Department of State, 1947-1952).[83]

Investments on European recovery aimed at creating market economies with strong links to the United States as part of a process of social and political reconstruction of the continent. Once integrated to an American way of life, Western Europe would no longer be an easy target for the expansion of communism; on the contrary, it would create a line that the USSR could not cross. As the Marshall Plan was getting off the ground, an American sphere of influence was being established in Western Europe, and participated in the consolidation of the order led by superpowers.

Soviet approach to Europe was quite different. As it has been said before, Stalin sponsored communist groups and their rise to power, creating a network of satellite states of the USSR. The establishment of communist governments, however, was not the only aspect of the constitution of an Eastern Bloc. In the following years, the USSR would put forward an agenda to stop the "American imperialism" that also shaped Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, including its oppositional attitude towards the Western Bloc. In 1947, the USSR sponsored the creation of the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau), an organization to coordinate the actions of communist parties and governments. When the Marshall Plan was announced, USA's diplomats tried to negotiate the inclusion of Eastern European states and invited many of them to the meetings where the recovery program was outlined. Moscow managed to avoid their participation and classified the American attitude as a "political pressure with dollars" and "an attempt of world domination" (Kalijarvi, 1947). To counteract the threat, Soviets engaged in what they called a "comprehensive program for the intensification and improvement of cooperation and development of Socialist economic integration", embodied in the Comecon, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, created in 1949 (Brine, 1992).

The Comecon was an international socialist organization led by the USSR that originally included other socialist states from Eastern Europe.[84] Officially, it

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[83] Aid to create and administer stocks of food and medicine was given mostly in the form of relief packages. Many of these packages included private donations, but resources of the Marshall Plan covered delivery and distribution expenses. The reconstruction of infrastructure focused on transportation system and the production of energy (US House of Representatives, 1967; Agency for International Development, 1967; US Department of State, 1982; US Department of State, 1947-1952).

aimed at enabling member states to "exchange economic experiences, extent technical aid to one another and render mutual assistance with respect to raw materials, foodstuffs, machines, equipment, etc" (Butler, 1978). Nevertheless, projects went further than that and the Comecon was partially responsible for reconstructing member states and reorganizing their economy. In the beginning, the USSR provided the inputs to resume their productive activities; later, it promoted coordination of national economic plans, what created a kind of division of labor between socialist countries and irrevocably linked them to Moscow. The following "integration proposals" were responsible for coordinating production, currency and financial questions, internal and foreign trade (including the prices of most products), and the management of natural resources (Marer, 1984; Butler, 1978; Brine, 1992). All of that was part of shaping a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, in a complex mixture of economic dependency and domination that would be essential to maintain the status of great power the USSR enjoyed for over 40 years (Marer, 1984).

Besides economic activities, the order of the superpowers also had a security/military face that reflected the growing antagonism between them. Increase of security investments, reorganization of military, secret service, and intelligence establishments were used by both the USA and the USSR to meet the threat posed by the other part. One aspect of this policy, an arms race between the superpowers that included nuclear weapons, became the trademark of the Cold War, along with the understanding that direct confrontation between the USA and the USSR would mean mutually assured destruction.

Security/military concerns were also – and most importantly – articulated to the definition and maintenance of spheres of influence. Delimitating spaces of action for superpowers minimized the possibilities of direct confrontation, but also meant that each would be responsible from protecting its allies and for keeping order inside the bloc. Maybe the best example of the consolidation of this arrangement was the Berlin Crisis,[85] which led to the creation of two independent

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[84] The original members were Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Later, Albania, East Germany, Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam joined the Comecon. The organization also granted observer status to many states, including some from Latin America, Asia and the Middle East.

[85] As Western Europe was being reconstructed, USA, Britain and later France decided to merge their occupied zones in Germany and to create a new country, West Germany. It would be the last missing piece for structuring an American sphere of influence in Europe and limiting the advance

states, West and East Germany, and their integration to the spheres of influence of the superpowers, often working as a showcase of their accomplishments to the other side. Systems of collective defense were also created in both blocs, the NATO in the West and the Warsaw Pact in the East, meaning that order between the blocs and inside them would not be easily disrupted.

The consolidation of an order of superpowers was also decisive to the fate of projects contained in the Charter of the United Nations. The Organization's original structure already resembled the idea that new powers were rising and that equilibrium between them would be essential for maintaining peace and security. The structure of the Security Council is a good example of that. The organ was designed to have "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" (Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Article 24) and entitled to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken [...] to maintain or restore international peace and security" (Article 39). The greatest part of this responsibility was placed in the hands of five permanent members: the big powers of the European colonial order, Great Britain and France; and three powers rising outside Europe, the USA, the USSR and China. All of them had the right to vote and veto substantive decisions of the UNSC, a provision for unanimity that should avoid conflict between them.

Although not incompatible with the collective security system, spheres of influence and politics of alignment of the superpowers adapted it to the new order. Both the USA and the USSR participated in the UN and used its channels to put forward their agendas, especially those that were not considered of vital importance. As far as security was concerned, the new international order offered scarce possibilities to resort to multilateral mechanisms of consent (Gaddis, 2005). Security issues were preferably dealt with inside the spheres of influence, under the supervision of the superpower in charge, and the UN was drained of most of its power. Decisions of the Security Council were repeatedly vetoed and, with few exceptions, UN security apparatus was used to handle situations that interested

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of the Soviet influence in the continent. To the USSR, the new country and its new currency introduced in 1948 were attempts to attract other countries and put them under American influence. As a response, they cut off all rail and road connections to West Berlin – the Berlin Blockade. By its turn, the USA engineered a massive airlift of supplies that continued until the blockade was suspended, in a clear demonstration that those who belonged to their bloc would enjoy their protection.

neither the USA nor the USSR, and in some rare cases, that had potential to lead to direct confrontation between them.

Peace operations are a perfect match for this description. They were the classical formula developed to deal with these cases, consistent with the goals of limiting the use of force and stabilizing crises (Bellamy *et al*, 2004). The mandates of peacekeeping operations launched from 1948 to 1989 (see Figure 8) normally referred to negotiation of cease-fires and peace agreements; withdrawal and separation of rival forces; and monitoring borders and security zones.

	Ceasefire and Peace Agreements	Withdrawal of Forces and Buffer Zones	Monitoring Borders and Security Zones	Territorial Integrity and Political Independence	Law and Order	Humanitarian Assistance	Refugees and IDPs	Elections	DDR
UNTSO - UN Truce Supervision Organization (Palestine, 1948-)	✓								
UNMOGIP - UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (1949-)	✓								
UNEF I - First UN Emergency Force (Suez, 1956-1967)	✓	✓							
UNOGIL - UN Observation Group in Lebanon (1958)			✓						
ONUC - UN Operation in the Congo (1960-1964)		✓	✓	✓	✓				
UNSF - UN Security Force in West New Guinea (1962-1963)	✓				✓				
UNYOM - UN Yemen Observation Mission (1963-1964)	✓	✓							
UNFICYP - UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (1964-)	✓	✓				✓			
DOMREP - Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (1965-1966)	✓								
UNIPOM - UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (1965-1966)	✓	✓							
UNEF II - Second UN Emergency Force (Suez and Sinai, 1973-1979)	✓	✓							
UNDOF - UN Disengagement Observer Force (Golan, 1974-)	✓	✓							

	Ceasefire and Peace Agreements	Withdrawal of Forces and Buffer Zones	Monitoring Borders and Security Zones	Territorial Integrity and Political Independence	Law and Order	Humanitarian Assistance	Refugees and IDPs	Elections	DDR
UNIFIL - UN Interim Force in Lebanon (1978-)	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		
UNGOMAP - UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (1988-1990)	✓								
UNIIMOG - UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (1988-1991)	✓	✓							
UNAVEM I - UN Angola Verification Mission I (1989-1991)		✓							
UNTAG - UN Transition Assistance Group (Namibia, 1989-1990)	✓							✓	✓
ONUCA - UN Observer Group in Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala Honduras and Nicaragua, 1989-1992)	✓	✓	✓						✓

Figure 8: Elements of UN Peace Operation Mandates (1948-1989).
Based on Security Council resolutions that established, extended and/or adjusted mandates of UN peace operations deployed from 1948 to 1989.

The contents of these mandates reinforced a general perception that order would be maintained mostly by governing instruments of particular states. During this period, (re)construction of states and reform of their institutions were not on the table (at least not for the United Nations). In this sense, the main objective of international organizations in a peacekeeping operation was to restore states' control over their territory and population and limit the damages they could cause to the order of the superpowers – especially violent confrontation between them.

Contours of a new world order and spheres of influence might have been imagined taking the reorganization of Europe into especial consideration. Even though, the order of the superpowers would soon be expanded to areas of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean that had left or were leaving the colonial condition. The terms under which these regions would be able to join this new order, however, would be very different from those of Western or Eastern Europe,

and their negotiation has reframed the borders of international society and its mechanisms of management and control. These ways, namely, political decolonization and development assistance will be discussed in the next sections of this chapter.

4.2
Decolonization

Even though its importance is undeniable, the framework provided by spheres of influence was not the only transformation in the way borders of international society were forged and managed since the end of WWII. In the middle of the discursive battle focused on the reconfiguration of world order, alternative narratives about the essence of colonial/imperial relations and claims for political independence from all over the world eventually converged with USA and USSR's condemnation of European imperialism, blurring the contours of what had been international society's colonial outside. In the narratives of the emerging superpowers, spread of democracy and fight against capitalist exploitation were constructed as substitutes for the old power politics as the logic behind international order;[86] furthermore, they would coat the new order with legitimacy and propel it to the edges of the world. Voices that came from these edges, in their turn, interpreted the War as a sign of decadence of European power, and its aftermath as the moment for challenging colonial hierarchies and renegotiating the terms under which the so-called dependent territories would join any new order. The complex interplay between these two understandings is at the center of a process known as the wave of political decolonization that took place during the second half of the twentieth century. Having discussed the rise of superpowers and their views on world order previously, I will now turn to the process of decolonization: how it related to, negotiated with, and ultimately challenged the constructions of space, time and identity that informed the colonial

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[86] Considering what has been discussed in the last chapter, it is possible to say that anti-imperialism and the defense of self-determination are not new topics in the agenda of the USSR and the USA. They had been raising these flags roughly since the end of WWI. If back in 1919 these ideas had been incorporated to international arrangements that privileged European countries, in 1945 they were part of much more internationalized arrangements.

international society and participated in the construction of a new – although not entirely different – order.

As it has been discussed in Chapter 3, relations of power that forged and controlled the colonial world can be understood as part of the constitution of the European society of states. They were the external face of this society, projected to what was laying outside of its borders, a framework for dealing with difference in terms of opposition: a modern, civilized self versus a backward, barbaric other. In this sense, colonialism, imperialism, trusteeship, and administration of non-self-governing territories can be seen as more or less institutionalized mechanisms that defined limits and mediated the relationship between these worlds. They relied on the distinction – that was both spatial and temporal – between *more advanced sovereign states* and *less advanced dependent territories* as well as on the claim that the civilized should rule over (and in fact save) the barbaric. In this scheme, the categories "state" and "territory" produced some as subjects (those who can guide) and others as less than subjects (those who require guidance), besides naturalizing a hierarchical association of these two forms of existence. The relations of power that produced/were produced by this distinction were articulated to parallel temporalities (now and before) and inscribed in space as different worlds, inhabited especially by European society and its anarchical outside, respectively. In this scheme, order was related to preserving this society (civilization) from dangers posed by its anarchical outside (barbarism); and to the attempt of civilizing this outside, subjecting it to the norm of civilization.

Despite its apparent coherence and stability, the discourse that affirmed parallelism of distinct temporalities and all that derived from it progressively lost its status of truth. It was challenged by the very discourse of the state – as a form of government – that had once participated in the transformation of relations of power inside Europe; or more specifically, by the spilling over of this discourse of the state into colonial space. In this process, the anarchical outside of (a now internationalized) European society has been transformed by the rules of existence and conduct that constituted a modern form of political life. On the one hand, the communities living in these areas were profoundly transformed by the discourse of the state; on the other hand, the movement of expansion through which these areas and populations were incorporated and their demand for participation would

change the face of international society. In the process, new relations of power were established, drawing new limits and giving rise to new bordering techniques.

In this section, I will trace some anti-imperialism and anti-colonial narratives that gained notoriety in the twentieth century, and re-interpret them as evidences of this spilling over of the discourse about the state into colonial world, as well as of the fading coherence of the notion of parallel temporalities. Here, it is important to acknowledge that this process had started long before, when the first colonies became independent in the Caribbean and in Latin America. For the purpose if this thesis, however, I will focus on its final stage, when the challenge was directed to the colonial condition as a whole and not so much to the status of particular areas. In this sense, I will be especially interested in what happened inside international organizations: how colonial and anti-colonial claims were confronted, and how decolonizing dependent territories became something close to an international duty and a requirement for stability, order and peace. To make my point clear, I will give an account of the debate about political decolonization that took place inside the United Nations. It will be interpreted as evidence of the reaffirmation of the state as the most acceptable – and in fact the most desirable – mode of political existence in every space, and of the detachment of independence from normative accounts of civilization and its progressive association to the mechanisms of daily management of political communities. Finally, I will be able to show how the idea of an expanding international society related to spheres of influence and politics of alignment discussed in the last section.

4.2.1
Anti-Colonialism and Post-Colonial Communities

The degree to which the discourse of the state as a form of government has been imposed on the colonial world or appropriated by it is difficult to determine. It is much more reasonable to acknowledge that both happened at the same time and that it would be too simplistic to reduce the process to one alternative or the other. Communities that got to know colonialism could never come back to what they were before that, and the alternatives imagined for a post-colonial life were never totally authentic (Patil, 2008; Kohn, McBride, 2011). Nevertheless, they learned how to play in their liminal condition and combined criticism and demands for participation in a way that would change international society forever.

It is clear that opposition and resistance to colonial rule were not peculiar characteristics of life after 1945; they existed "[…] whenever and wherever the Europeans disembarked or moved inland in the age of overseas expansion" (Betts, 2006, p.14-15) and assumed the most different forms over the years. However, most of the stories of resistance have been omitted from historical records by the violence of colonial systems, and the truth claims they carried were practically lost. Among those that survived, the most prominent ones vocalized their particularities using terms familiar to the so-called civilized world. They were political movements that often reinterpreted the language of rights and self-determination and incorporated it to a claim to independence that demanded the creation of new – and more favorable – bonds with the international society, rather than a radical rupture.[87] In most cases, they wanted to become sovereign states that could join the international society as legitimate members. In other words, they had assimilated the discourse of the state as a form of government, read it according to their own references, and demanded inclusion in the world of independent sovereign states. Especially from the nineteenth century on, leaders of pro-independence movements from different colonies gathered and tried to act as a concerted voice against colonialism. They were groups like the African

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[87] There were some groups demanding return to a pre-colonial form of life; others relied on religious and familiar structures to imagine post-colonial societal organizations that had very few in common with the state model. These groups, however, were not the majority. Their proposals normally referred to specific contexts and received the support of small groups, not getting enough attention in other parts of the colonial world or outside of it.

Association[88] that encouraged local leaders to discuss issues resulting from colonization and join with other anti-colonial and anti-racism leaderships to form a network to fight for the right of self-government of native populations and to present their demands to the rest of the world (Adejumobi, 2001; Betts, 2006).

During the first half of the twentieth century, various manifestos, declarations, journals, conferences and associations from different parts of colonial world articulated a "collective we" that publically denounced the evils of colonialism and helped to put forward a demand for self-determination (Betts, 2006; Patil, 2008; Kohn, McBride, 2011). Important to this process was the spread of literary production from colonies and overseas territories of European powers. Many of these works narrated a brutal side of colonial rule from the point of view of native populations. In René Maran's "Batouala", for example, the torch of French civilization turned into a destructive device: "you are not a torch, but a fire. Whatever you touch, you consume" (quoted in Betts, 2006, p.13), reversing the notion of a civilizing mission that had been long used as justification for foreign administration.[89]

Nationalist and pro-independence movements also denounced the brutal and repressive character of colonial rule and "hardly a colony was without a political organization giving vent to such expressions" (Betts, 2006, p.14). A famous example of this argument can be found in *Le Procès de La Colonisation* (Colonization on Trial), written in 1926 by Nguyên-Aï-Quôc, the future Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh. The book described the violent behavior of French colonizers and of what the author classified as 'cultural arrogance' and 'economic exploitation'. According to him, "to hide the ugliness of its criminally

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[88] The African Association was created in 1897 to encourage the unity of Africans against the partition agreed in the Congress of Berlin a few years earlier. The organization grew over the years and promoted the gathering of local leaders struggling for political and other rights in the colonies. It soon engaged in a movement for the recognition of the right of self-government to the colonies and played an important role defending this cause. The Association organized the First Pan-African Conference, an event held in London in 1900 with participants from colonies of Africa and the West Indies, besides anti-colonial and anti-racism leaderships from Britain and the USA. After the event, it became the Pan-African Association. The organization should meet periodically to discuss and promote self-determination. Members prepared a document demanding the recognition of the right of the colonies to self-government and sent it to various heads of states, including Queen Victoria. The Association organized similar conferences that gained notoriety, for example in Paris, 1919; London, 1921 and 1923; New York, 1927; and Manchester, 1945 (Betts, 2006; Adejumobi, 2001).

[89] René Maran was born on the Caribbean island of Martinique, a French possession, in 1887. As a young man, he joined the French colonial service in Equatorial Africa and the time spent there clearly inspired his novels. For Batouala, he won the coveted Goncourt Literary Prize in 1921, an indication of the novel's cultural impact, becoming the first black author to win (Betts, 2006).

exploitative regime, colonial capitalism always decorates its rotten shield with the idealistic device: Fraternity, Equality, etc" (in Betts, 2006, p.14). Gandhi used a similar line of thought in his writings associated to the campaign for Indian independence. In these texts, 'civilization' appears as a normative concept, a product of a specific time and space that kept up the masquerade of universality to the violent and highly particular colonial enterprise. Maran, Ho Chi Minh and Gandhi are all examples of challenge to the narratives of progress and universality that supported the claim of a civilizing mission being conducted in the colonies. In the twentieth century, this challenge was especially sound and poly-vocal. It came from all over the colonial world and reached even the higher circles of Europe, offering alternative accounts of colonization and imagining new possibilities of political life in the colonies.

In Europe, ideas that colonial experience was doomed to failure or that its high cost caused economic troubles for colonizers were already disseminated. They appeared in literary works, such as E.M. Forster's "A Passage to India", a metaphorical account of the confusion and misunderstandings that characterized British colonization in India that concluded with the suggestion that the two peoples should now follow separate paths (Betts, 2006). Speeches of members of communist parties (Hargreaves, 1993) and even of the British Labour Party (Howe, 1993) from the same period present similar arguments. If most of the continent had once imagined its colonies as "something far away, out there, in broad sunlight"[90] (Betts, 2006, p.19), the discussions that happened during WWII – about the danger represented by Axis powers and war effort to face it – brought stories of daily life in the colonies to the daily lives of people at the center of empires. Suddenly, colonies were no longer only distant appendixes of European powers; they had become strategic battlefields, converted into military bases to foreign armies or suppliers of human and material resources, and home of anti-colonial and pro-independence movements that grew in number, size and importance, casting doubts on the prospects of post-war stability.

Finally, to the rising powers, the USA and the USSR, European colonialism was the symbol of a dying era, and the areas it used to control should be assimilated into a new order, some of them as independent states. All these lines

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[90] Statement made by the French senator Lucien Hubert in the 1920s, quoted in Betts, 2006, p.19.

of thought were on the table while the international order was reconfigured and were important to destabilize the image of coherence and inevitability that had been forged around colonialism. If the structures of an internationalized European society were about to change, bordering techniques were already changing. Since 1945, an important part of this change could be seen in the United Nations.

When the UN was created, colonial empires such as Britain, France and the Netherlands had announced their intention to end rule in some areas; however, they were not willing to let independence become a widespread condition among their colonies and struggled to retain the greatest part of their possessions overseas.[91] Colonies which had recently become independent manifested their will to join the future organization and pro-independence movements from all over the world participated as observers in the San Francisco Conference, demanding that the UN took action to support independences.[92] The USA and the USSR mostly welcomed self-determination as a principle, but were also sympathetic to the concerns of Europeans and, above all, acknowledged their importance to extending the prospects of future stability, even in areas considered remote. In a certain sense, the Charter of the United Nations reflected these contrasting understandings and offered more than one proposal to renegotiate bonds with the colonial world.

An overview of the document is enough to show that it combines perspectives, values and agendas related to reaffirming the old hierarchy of adult and childlike political communities, and to incorporating colonial areas into an expanding international society. In this sense, both sovereign rights and self-determination were described as principles of the new Organization, and appear in the document at similar levels; however, they are not equal in importance. As

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[91] Britain had announced its intention to end rule in India, Burma and Ceylon and recognized their inability to hold on to Palestine, but also stated that the control over other colonies would be reestablished. The French advocated that retaining the structure of colonial empire was essential, but agreed to grant independence to Syria and Lebanon. The Netherlands also promised to grant independence to its multi-insular possession that would later become Indonesia, but later fought tenaciously to keep it (Betts, 2006).

[92] Among many documents submitted to the Conference, two examples were especially considered here. The African Academy of Arts and Research, founded by the Nigerian student at Columbia University K.O. Mbadiwe, joined the Conference as an observer and issued a memorandum asking the UN to recommend the establishment of a timetable to free the colonies; the African Students Union, headquartered in London, submitted a manifesto with similar request. Also in 1945, an edition of the Pan-African Conference happened in Manchester, affirming that any new world order could not do without discussing colonialism and its oppressing effect over native populations (Betts, 2006).

Patil (2008) puts it, sovereignty is as a master principle that overrides all others, including self-determination that was closely associated to the anti-colonial struggle. Furthermore, the principles of the Charter had different meanings for different groups, since the document made a clear distinction between "more advanced" sovereign states and "less advanced" dependent territories. As it has been previously discussed, 3 out of 19 chapters of the Charter were dedicated to the institutionalization of mechanisms to deal with these dependent territories: Chapter XI, Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories; Chapter XII, International Trusteeship System; and Chapter XIII, Trusteeship Council. In all of them, the idea of trusteeship was somehow re-enacted responding to the demand of European colonial powers, even though some aspects were revised according to a "more internationalized form of tutelage" suggested mainly by the USA. The apparent resilience of tutelage as an institutionalized international mechanism is enough to show us that colonial rationality would not cease to exist so rapidly; however, during the next few years its legitimacy would collapse like a house of cards, engulfed in a normative shift whereby independence became an unqualified right and colonialism an absolute wrong (Bain, 2003). Evidences of this shift are find in debates that happened inside the United Nations, particularly its General Assembly (UNGA).

Despite trusteeship arrangements, the establishment of the United Nations was seen by anti-colonial and pro-independence movements as a sign of hope. The Organization admitted four countries of recent colonial status as members, with equal right to speak and vote in organs such as the UNGA. The Charter had also let the door opened for others to join the UN in the future and although the document did not specifically mentioned colonial areas as suitable candidates, the possibility was not denied either. By 1967, there were 49 former colonies, now independent states, admitted as members of the UN. Until then, the UNGA was almost converted into a forum used to put forward a broad decolonization agenda led by former colonies. To some extent, this move was supported by the USA and the USSR and their ambition to place newly independent countries inside their spheres of influence, diminish the importance of Europe in international relations, legitimize the new order and take it to the edges of the world.

4.2.2
Decolonization and the United Nations

As Patil (2008) argues, colonialist and pro-decolonization claims can be clearly identified in debates concerning the situation of trusts, non-self-governing and dependent territories that took place inside the UNGA – and culminated in the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960 (A/RES/1514). Between 1945 and 1960, these issues were the main topic of at least 54 discussions in which anti-colonial and colonial narratives about colonialist experience and the meaning of independence were enunciated and (re)negotiated. Colonial narratives often presented what Patil (2008) calls a rational appeal: they relied on a literal understanding of the Charter and affirmed that initiatives to speed up independences violated rights of existing states and jeopardized both the logic of UN system and the international order. It was a relatively homogeneous position that considered progress/civilization as a pre-condition for independence/autonomy and affirmed that the lack of such conditions justified dependence and foreign rule as a training stage. It claimed the existence of ontological difference between categories of humanity and described it using recurrent terms. Peoples living in colonial regions were often characterized as primitive, backward, immature, childlike, uneducated and incompetent beings. About them, one representative agued:

> They are so backward that, where they do not altogether escape the administration of the State to which they belong they are placed under a special legal or administrative constitutional system […]. Furthermore, they are totally different, not only by reason of their primitive character, but also race, language and culture from the peoples from whom the government administering the State emanates (Mr. V. Langenhove, Belgium, Sess 8, 1953, quoted in Patil, 2008, p.103).

The other category, sovereign and especially colonialist states, was described as highly advanced, responsible, wise and competent. This differentiation was connected to the underlying hierarchical metaphor of scale of civilization and to the assumption that the advanced should rule over the primitive through a paternalistic relationship of tutelage and guidance that would bring them to maturity. The following speech, delivered by a British representative in the United Nations in 1946, is an expression of the logic that combines paternalism and tutelage as training mechanisms for childlike peoples.

> We in the United Kingdom are proud of what we are doing in the colonial field. It is with great pride that we have been able to bring various members of the British Commonwealth and Empire along the road to full self-government. We feel the same pride that a parent feels when he sees his children going out into the world and making their own way. Sometimes the children, when they are given the key to the door, may kick over the traces a little bit but we do not mind that any more than the parent does. More often we have seen growing affection between ourselves and our children and we look forward to an extension of that process. We shall feel increasing pride as we see ourselves able to bring more and more of the dependent peoples who look up to us, along this road to self-government and independence (Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom, Sess 1, 1946, quoted in Patil, 2008, p.103).

If legalism, rationalism and paternalism informed the colonial position, anti-colonial narratives often contained a moral appeal (Patil, 2008) based on the language of rights – representation, self-determination, human rights. They advocated that the UN should engage on the fight for independence following what they called a broad interpretation of the Charter, inspired by its spirit. Another important difference is that while colonial narratives were relatively homogeneous, anti-colonial responses had at least three different versions. The first kind of response repeated the idea of scale of civilization and agreed that dependent territories must be prepared for independence; but disagreed about the need to maintain the *status quo* in these areas. This anti-colonial construction reinterpreted the duty of a higher civilization towards less advanced peoples as the obligation of administering authorities to foster social change, speed up independences, and increase material welfare of dependent territories and newly independent states.

The second kind of anti-colonialist response also relied on the notion of backwardness and agreed that dependent territories occupied a lower position on an evolutionary scale. Nevertheless, backwardness is described as consequence of European colonialism, rather than an inherent condition. According to this kind of response, "there is an infinite distance between colonization and civilization (Mr. Aw, Mali, Sess 15, 1960:1965, quoted in Patil, 2008, p.118) and what colonization did was to stop progress in the regions they targeted. Following this argument, paternalism and trusteeship were a guise, an excuse for a system that relied on brute force to maintain (or enlarge) the gap between industrialized countries and societies they exploited. Thus, it inverted the relationship between progress and independence: here, independence would be a condition to progress.

It also dismantled the image of linear progression, of peoples going from infancy to maturity because of tutelage: "we are of age from the moment when we have the full use of our freedom. There are no countries which are under age when it comes to the exercise of freedom (Mr. Kaka, Niger, Sess 15, 1960, quoted in Patil, 2008, p.109). The idea of immaturity itself was understood as a version of racism directed to entire populations and resulted in unfair economic and military agreements for colonies and former colonies after independence.

Finally, the third kind of anti-colonialist response rejected the wholesale of colonialist narratives. It contested the idea of backwardness and described difference as singularity. It also rejected the notion that progress and independence were related and denied the necessity of any form of tutelage, as it can be seen in the example below. This kind of response, however, was quite rare in the UNGA's discussions.

> The former colonial peoples and those who are still not independent have their own cultures, their own civilizations, their own traditions, their own languages and their own customs. They are not only proud of their heritage but they want to maintain it. They are determined to preserve it and to develop it in their own way […]. If some colonial Power would venture to say it […] that some colonial territories are not prepared to assume independence, then we must treat with the greatest suspicion the assertion advance by that Power (Mr. Asha, United Arab Republic, Sess 15, 1960, quoted in Patil, 2008, p.109).

As former colonies joined the UN as independent states, the second kind of response became more frequent, popularizing a cynical view of the white man's burden. Instead of protection and civilization, colonial policy and international instruments related to it – such as the Trusteeship System – were described as often resulting in domination, exploitation, maltreatment, racism, loss of land and culture, therefore ignoring the interests of local populations and also those of humanity. In their speeches in the UNGA, anti-colonialists offered infinite examples of what they classified as violations of trust and associated the very concept of trusteeship with political oppression, depicting it as a cruel device to camouflage the exploitative nature of imperialism as humanitarian service (Nkrumah, 1962). To Bain (2003), the notion of a failed civilizing mission and the defense of self-determination as a fundamental human right are part of a normative shift in which trusteeship was classified as an unsustainable practice by definition. This change would irreversibly alter the terms of the debate about

international peace, stability and prosperity in favor of decolonization: they "no longer depended on the provision of a gradual political, economic, social, and moral education, but on the speedy granting of independence" (Bain, 2003, p.133).

The narrative associating self-determination (as a right) and international peace and stability eventually became a major one and informed the debate that led to the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, in 1960.[93][94] The document proclaims the necessity of bringing to "speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations" (GA Resolution 1514, 1960, preamble). It affirms that "the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation" (para.1). The Declaration regards self-determination as a supreme value and detaches independence from any requirement of civilization: "all peoples have the right to self-determination. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence" (para. 2-3). Finally, it highlights the special role of the United Nations in assisting the general move for independence without any distinction.

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[93] It is clear that the debate about decolonization and the construction of a strong anti-colonialist narrative did not develop exclusively in the context of the United Nation. Many other conferences as meeting were important to advance these views. Consider, for example, the Final Communiqué of the Bandung Conference of 1955. The document regarded colonialism as evil and stated that the "subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights […] and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation" (Topic D, para. A and B) and received various mentions during negotiations inside the UN. For the purposes of this thesis, however, I have decided to focus on the debated and institutional arrangements concerning decolonization developed in the context of major international organizations, particularly the United Nations.

[94] In September 1960, in response to pro-independence demands and to the geopolitical scenario of the Cold War, the USSR representative Nikita Khrushchev submitted to the UNGA a Draft Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, focusing on territories controlled by European countries and the USA. When the draft was presented, a group of 26 anti-colonialist African and Asian countries (that eventually grew to 48), declared that the cause of independences was being misappropriated to serve the purposes of Cold War disputes and presented an alternative and more inclusive proposal in November. Two weeks of intense discussions followed, with 70 delegations actively participating and proposing several amendments to both drafts. In December, negotiations ended with the adoption of the African-Asian version, GA RES 1514 (XV) that formally decided the colonial problematic in the context of the United Nations by privileging independence. After the Declaration, the UN actively engaged in the cause of political decolonization. In 1962, it established the Special Committee on Decolonization to monitor and make recommendations to the implementation of the Declaration (GA RES 1654, 1961). Later, the UN would declare the periods of 1990-2000; 2001-2011; and 2011-2020 as the First, Second, and Third International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism, respectively (Patil, 2008; Betts, 2006; Kohn, McBride, 2011; Bain, 2003).

From 1960 on, the United Nations took several measures to support independences and decolonization was included as a topic of international agenda. In 1962, the UNGA created the Special Committee on Decolonization (C24) to monitor the implementation of the Declaration and support its application (A/RES 1654, 1961).[95] In the next year, the Security Council formally acknowledged the interpretation of self-determination as a right in the terms of the Declaration (S/RES 183, 1963). It is the same interpretation contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of 1966, affirming, "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development" (A/RES 2200A(XXI), 1966, article 1).

Also in 1966, responding to a broad anti-colonial campaign, the UNGA rejected South Africa's attempt to assimilate the mandate of South West Africa and determined the revocation of mandatory rights declaring that the country did not fulfill trust obligations (A/RES 2145 (XXI), 1966). In a similar vein, Resolution 2621 (XXV) of 1970 declared colonialism a crime and stated that colonial peoples should "struggle by all necessary means at their disposal" (Article 2) to secure freedom and independence. In 1973, while Portugal fought against the independence of Guinea Bissau, another resolution denounced the "illegal occupation by Portuguese military forces of certain sectors of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and acts of aggression committed by them against the people of the Republic" (A/RES 3061 (XXVIII), 1973). Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde joined the UN in 1974 and 1975 respectively. From 1960 to 2011, more than a hundred states became members of the United Nations and the vast majority had a recent colonial status (UN Member States, 2014).[96]

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[95] The official name of the C24 was Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/RES 1654, 1961). The Committee, which is still working, conducts visiting missions, hears statements of NSGT representatives and elaborates annual reports about the situation of dependent territories. It also organizes seminars on their political, social and economic situation, makes recommendations and has the task of disseminating information and mobilizing public opinion in support of decolonization (The United Nations and Decolonization, 2014).

[96] Most of these countries joined the UN before 1990. To solve the matter of the remaining dependent territories, the UN declared the period of 1990-2000 the First International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism. During this period, the Trusteeship Council ended its activities. There was a Second International Decade (2001-2011) and the Third started in 2011 and should

To Bain (2003), the wave of political decolonization "signaled an historic change in the criteria that determined membership in the society of states" (p.135), as considerations of fitness and preparedness were outdated and replaced by the recognition of self-determination as a right. The argument defended here is that this change can be re-interpreted as evidence of the spilling over of the discourse of the state (as a way of relating to government) to areas once depicted as the anarchical outside of international society. While the colonial project reaffirmed differences and organized them hierarchically, this discourse about the state gradually took over the political imagination of colonized communities that have re-written their particularities in terms of more or less nationalized local identities and associated them with boundaries of territorial spaces. The language of rights and freedom was appropriated, transformed and connected to the attainment of statehood what reinforced the normalizing perception that adhering to the allegedly universal form of the modern sovereign state was not only the most acceptable, but also the best way of organizing political life and preserving particularities.

Once painted with the colors of the state, these communities have put forward the argument against political tutelage and asked for the homogeneous empty time and space of the nation as a bid for access to its form of subjectivity and prevailing system of power. Their claim eventually converged with the challenge to European colonial system embodied by emerging superpowers and participated in the renegotiation of international order, its limits and its mechanisms of management and control. This movement came along with the configuration of a new set of relations of power that undermined the discourse of differential subjectivities (subjects and less than subjects) and differential temporalities (now and before) informed by notions of civilization and civility. The anarchical outside was both subjected and subjectified by the normalizing discourse of the state and definitely incorporated to the time of an expanding international society (present) as legitimate members (sovereign states).

The inclusion of new members certainly expanded the boundaries of subjectivity of the international society, but also universalized and naturalized the nation-state system, its constructions of space, time, identity, agency, knowledge

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last until 2021. The UN currently acknowledges the existence of 17 dependent territories that are still to become independent (The UN and Decolonization, 2014).

and power, and the multiple underlying hierarchies within them. Although coevalness could no longer be denied, this particular form of subjectivity that is the state had its own performative requirements and they have become a new site of differentiation and reconfiguration of hierarchy. After all, the discourse of the state has always been articulated to the idea of progress, and this connection would not be easily dismantled. In the next section, I will turn to the discourse of development to show how it re-enacted this connection between state and progress, re-wrote the problem "to be a state" in terms of "how to be a state", and re-framed inequality in international society, creating borders based on the language of poverty, underdevelopment and development assistance. Finally, I will show how this discourse of development relates to ideological borders of the order led by superpowers, and the diffusion of isomorphism in state practice.

4.3
Development

The last two sections have discussed challenges posed to some of the claims that sustained an international order articulated to spatial and temporal borders differentiating the internationalized European society of states from its colonial outside. While their pillars lost their status of truth, these borders were reframed in at least two ways: the logic of spheres of influence/politics of alignment; and decolonization. The first re-organized the world in terms of the separation between forms of life associated to the ideological divide East x West and brought the USA and the USSR to the center of international political stage as emerging superpowers. The second dismantled the logic of parallel temporalities that trapped colonial spaces to a past in which subjectivity was denied, and opened room to the incorporation of theses spaces to the endless present of international society as sovereign states.

In this section, I will discuss a third way in which the definition and control of borders of international society have been reframed: the discourse of development. I will show how this discourse instantiates the linkage between the state and the idea of progress – two normalizing aspects of modern political life –, and produces new authorized modes of being, thinking and acting, and peculiar

methods of order and truth based on the diagnosis of poverty and the prophylaxis to it. In this sense, the discourse of development maintains a gap between different (or unequal) subjects, no longer in terms of parallel temporalities, but of successive stages of a common scale that goes from underdevelopment to development. Finally, I will give an account of how the matter "to be a state" is (re)formulated as "how to be a state" and how the diffusion of isomorphism in state practice is progressively attached to the control of populations in a scenario of Cold War rivalry.

4.3.1
Tale of Three Worlds

The emergence of the contemporary development discourse can be traced back to post WWII scenario and to the integration of former colonial regions of Africa and Asia, but also Latin America and the Caribbean, into the political and economic structures of an increasingly divided international society. The USA and the USSR reaffirmed differences between them in terms of distinct (and in fact opposing) forms of life. Free market and democratic government would characterize the first one, while public ownership of the means of production and equitable conditions of life would define the other. However, Cold War was more than simply maintaining these differences; it was also about extending these forms of life to other areas and defining spheres of influence for each of the superpowers. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, postwar settlements in Europe were a crucial step for this dispute. Physical reconstruction and new political, economic and military ties with Americans or Soviets forged two different blocs and secured alignment to one or the other. In a short period, the continent was divided into spheres of influence and so were most of the countries that had eventually joined the European society of states before the war.

It is important to consider, though, that projects of a new international order were not limited to Europe. As discussed in the second section, anti-imperialist claims and dismantling the colonial system were also part of the transformation and should propel this new order to the edges of the world, that is, to the former anarchical outside of international society. In the late 1940s, as the dispute in

Europe was reaching equilibrium, interest in areas coming out of colonialism grew to both superpowers. As the contours of the old world faded, these areas were opened up for exploring and targeted as new spaces of projection of power that should help to consolidate the new status of the USA and the USSR. Nevertheless, the expansion of the international society to its former colonial outside supposed the renegotiation of the terms according to which new members would be able to join it, embedded in intense production of knowledge and a different set of power relations.

The reassessment of colonial and former colonial areas by an expanding international society had a tragic character, emphasizing misery, starvation, social unrest, political disputes, and economic and productive systems that could only make sense in a colonial context. Then, this situation was not that much worrying. Seen through colonial lenses, natives were only primitive beings and their capacity to deal with the modern world was nil, what compelled civilized empires to assume responsibility for their subsistence and for keeping their primitiveness under control. As far as economy and production were concerned, the role of colonies was usually limited to the condition of suppliers of raw materials with no direct access to international markets. In sum, colonial masters mediated their whole existence. This situation had begun to change as these areas demanded to exist on their own: political guidance ceased to be an acceptable condition, and so did indirect access to international market and economic system. In this sense, demand for political independence was a demand for accessing a form of subjectivity formerly unavailable (the state) and the possibilities opened to it, such as more even economic relations and a bigger share of world's wealth. However, more than a will to adhere to a new order, this bid for access coming from the poor was seen as a source of instability that could undermine it.

The discourse of development emerges in this scenario; it produces and is produced by new knowledge about areas leaving colonialism and new relations of power that (re)connected them to international society. The power/knowledge articulation of the development discourse entails a series of differentiating and ordering mechanisms that put together a dominant representation of the social context, which gained status of truth. Poverty became the main differentiating element, defined in relation to the standards of wealth found in more industrialized countries, specifically as lacking what they had. The World Bank

defined as poor those countries with an annual *per capita* income below U$100, a category that included most of the newly independent countries and those territories classified as dependent (Escobar, 1995). If the defense of capitalism and socialism had created two different worlds, the discourse of development created the Third World as a reality for knowledge and action based on the alleged problem of poverty. This is not to say that harsh conditions of life did not exist in these areas or that the idea of mass poverty was made up out of nowhere, as an absolute fiction. The important point here is to see how this discourse of development organized, classified and interpreted these conditions of life and defined poverty as a social problem that justifies intervention on the grounds of fighting instability and of the impossibility of doing nothing in the face of extreme needs. What is being discussed is precisely this problematization of poverty and the kind of intervention it authorizes. In this regard, the discourse of development defined a Third World as a political referent, outlined its borders and a range of mechanisms of management and control.

It is also important to emphasize that the definition of a Third World is not contrary to the logic of spheres of influence or to the process of decolonization discussed previously. Inside its borders were everything and everyone that had not yet been included into one sphere of influence or the other, or that systematically refused to be included, working mostly for decolonized areas disputed by superpowers. As Haraway (1989) puts it, the tale of the three worlds brings about a political order that works by the negotiation of boundaries achieved through ordering differences. It is in that sense that the development discourse is being discussed here, as another face of the bordering techniques of power of modern political life.

4.3.2
Imagining Development

A famous expression of the development discourse was the Inaugural Address of Harry Truman's second term as president of the USA, a speech delivered in January 20, 1949 and regarded by many as giving rise to the "development age" (Rist, 2002). Among other things, the presidential speech

defined four guidelines on American foreign policy. Point one, the United States would continue to back the new United Nations; point two, it would keep up the European reconstruction effort by means of Marshall Plan; point three, it would create a joint defense organization (NATO) to meet the Soviet threat; and point four, it would work on a program of development for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas or the world.

Contrasting with the rather conventional first three points, "Point Four" puts forward a new way of conceiving international relations (Rist, 2002), affirming the death of "old imperialism" (Truman, 1949, para.54) and giving an expanded account of international society, including regions leaving colonial status. Even though, the president made clear that political independence and formal equality (sovereign condition) were not synonym to even conditions of life and drew on the economic situation for differentiating and ordering what he called developed and underdeveloped areas. The first were associated to economic growth, advances in industry, science and technology, while the second were described by terms like poverty, hunger, disease and "primitive and stagnant" (para. 45) economic life. Poverty and underdevelopment were attributed to internal conditions, but Truman classified their effects as an international challenge, affirming, "Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas" (para. 45). Following Truman's argument, facing this threat required "wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge" (para.57) on underdeveloped areas as a way of ensuring "greater production" (para. 57) and, therefore, "the achievement of peace, plenty and freedom" (para. 52).

To Santos Filho (2005), this argument takes focus out of the demand for more even economic relations and a bigger share of world's wealth posed by new countries and pro-independence movements. According to Truman, their situation results from internal conditions and not from the characteristics of international economic relations or the role they played in them. Besides, he declared that "the material resources which we can afford to use for assistance of other peoples is limited (Truman, 1949, para.47) and made a clear connection between development assistance and modern science and technology. They would have the power of inducing transformation of internal elements and accelerating the transition from poverty and economic backwardness to development, following

the steps of modern countries. With science and technology inputs, underdeveloped areas would be able to "through their own efforts, […] produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens" (para. 50). Commenting the logical sequence of Truman's argument, Santos Filho (2005) says that "the old principle of progress as evolution, maturation, modernization is reissued, no longer as a colonial imposition of the European civilizer, but as 'development assistance', aiming at altering the historical stage from which backward societies needed to leave" (p.27, free translation). The discourse of development re-reads progress, a primary principle of modern life: instead of being attached to a civilizing mission, it would now refer to assistance to foment economic growth, advances in industry, science and technology.

The meanings attributed to the pair development/underdevelopment evoked not only the idea of change towards a final stage but, above all, the possibility of making this change happen and happen faster. Now it was possible to use assistance to develop a country or a region. To Rist (2002), "*'development' took on a transitive meaning* (an action performed by one agent upon another) which corresponded to a principle of social organization, while 'underdevelopment' became a 'naturally' occurring (that is, seemingly causeless) state of things" (p.73, emphasis in the original). These changes were not merely semantic; they were evidences of an also changing organization of international relations. In the Third World, hierarchical political subordination was mostly substituted by formal political equality and the colonizer/colonized opposition by developed/underdeveloped dichotomy. If colonizer and colonized belonged to different temporalities and opposing universes, between the developed and the underdeveloped there was an underlying idea of "continuity of substance" (Rist, 2002, p.74). The underdeveloped were an incomplete, embryonic form of the developed and one could bring about their potentialities, using growth and science to bridge the gap. In Truman's (1949) speech, the 'underdeveloped and the 'developed' appear as members of a single "human family" (para.58). To Rist (2002), it means that "the one might be lagging a little behind the other, but they could always catch up – rather as a 'deputy manager' can always dream of becoming a manager himself… so long as he continues to play the same game and his conception of managing is not too different" (p.74).

By means of the development discourse, what has happened to some suddenly becomes available to others and, in fact, can be reproduced to them. In this argument, history appears as a natural path and becomes empty of context, what includes, in the case of the 'underdeveloped', the effects of colonial past and of present economic inequalities (Rist, 2002). Despite all this, the trick of development assistance would make it possible to bring people from scarcity to abundance. To Santos Filho (2005), development assistance operationalized the myth of Prometheus, now "[…] as rational certainty derived from the possibilities opened by the predictability of Modern Science" (p.15, free translation). In Truman's project, this operationalization took the shape of a comprehensive multilateral effort, coordinated by international organizations: "this should be a cooperative enterprise in which all nations work together through the United Nations and its specialized agencies whenever practicable" (1949, para. 52).

As Rist (2002) reminds us, although "Point Four" had been imagined more as a public relations strategy (less traditional, more benevolent) than as a central feature of Truman's project, the main headlines the next morning were all about it. Since then, development assistance and eradication of poverty were definitely included in the agenda of the USA and international organizations, specially the United Nations, as the best approach to Third World problems. Organs of foreign policy and international cooperation all over the world worked to create a clear framework for development action and established a strong institutional apparatus of research, planning and implementation.

In 1949, UN General Assembly decided to increase technical assistance through the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA), the Technical Assistance Board, and the Technical Assistance Committee, that progressively turned their focus to the underdeveloped countries. In 1958, the GA created a Special Fund to finance projects in the poorest countries, and in 1965, the EPTA merged with the Special Fund to form the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), an agency designed to assist underdeveloped countries in economic, social and political aspects (A/RES 2029/XX). A similar transition process was already happening in the World Bank that since 1948 was turning from post-war reconstruction to assistance to the underdeveloped. In 1956, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) was established to promote development through the private sector, and in 1960, the International Development Association (IDA)

complemented the original lending arm of the WB, the IBRD, financing projects to reduce poverty in many countries. In the same vein, the OEEC became OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 1961, with a special line for financing studies and projects in Third World countries. Regional banks were also established to fund projects in Africa (1954), Asia (1966) and Americas (1964).

The huge institutional apparatus of development anchored its diagnosis and prophylaxis related to the problem of poverty in the methods of modern science. Thousands of studies and recommendations were elaborated based on comparative statistical operations and economic indicators, such as Gross National Product (GNP), *per capita* income, import and export rates, which painted a picture of poverty on a global scale and suggested paths for a wealthier world. As Santos Filho (2005) notices, these diagnoses were based on a fallacious argument that equated underdeveloped economies with traditional societies and assumed that there was a historical sequence between underdevelopment and development. They supposed a connection between changing economic conditions (production and consumption) and transforming social and political structures, understood as the 'secularization' of these societies.[97] Therefore, they saw cause/effect relations were there was only a supposition of historical antecedence. This logical weakness was overshadowed by the mathematical aura of objectivity and certainty that surrounded the discourse of development and created a label, "the poor", defined as a social problem that required intervention. In this sense, the discourse of development was able to generalize situations observed in very specific contexts to a whole group of countries classified as underdeveloped, promoting a homogenization of the Third World and systematizing its inferiority.

Relying mostly on European context, Foucault (1991; 1995; 2000b; 2012) stated that history of modernity is not only the history of knowledge and the economy; it is especially the history of the social, the history of how life is subjected to mechanisms of production and administration by the state and other institutions. In this vein, Escobar (1995) argues "[…] the history of development implies the continuation in other places of this history of the social" (p.23). It is

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[97] The concepts of traditional and modern societies and the idea of secularization found in Santos Filhos's (2005) text are based on the work of Max Weber.

the history of how the life of the poor, specifically the Third World poor, was produced and administered by the state – and particularly by international organizations. Poverty became a political referent and, above all, the object of a kind of problematization that "[…] brought into existence new discourses and practices that shaped the reality to which they referred. That the essential trait of the Third World was its poverty and that the solution was economic growth and development became self-evident, necessary and universal truths" (Escobar, 1995, p.24). As the colonial civilizing mission lost its status of truth, this 'developmentalization' of the Third World emerged as a powerful normalizing force in international relations.

The idea of development was very soon dissociated from Cold War rivalries and became something almost impossible to question. Of course, there were critical trends, but they were unable to articulate a rejection of the "need" for development and to conceptualize social reality in other terms. Proposals for "another development" and "socialist development" emerged as a criticism to the prevailing capitalist methods, "[…] but the fact of development itself, and the need for it, could not be doubted. Development had achieved the status of a certainty in the social imaginary" (Escobar, 1995, p.5). To question it, as Rist (2002) suggests, "would have been to attack the underlying belief of a programme designed for universal happiness" (p.77).

4.3.3
Modes of Operation of Development Discourse

The operation of development discourse involved the professionalization of knowledge about the Third World and the institutionalization of practices to treat its illnesses. Especially since 1950s, East x West rivalry moved to the periphery and this move was intrinsically connected to development policies as a way of extending spheres of influence and of having access to raw materials and new markets (Santos Filho, 2005; Rist, 2002). Furthermore, as Escobar (1995) noticed, superpowers' confrontation lent legitimacy to the enterprise of development,

notably in the USA,[98] where the idea that if poor countries were not rescued from their poverty they would succumb to communism became a compelling argument. This was so especially after the Cuban Revolution. Until then, most requests for bilateral aid coming from 'poor' countries were denied, as Secretary Marshall (the same that had just elaborated the plan to reconstruct Europe) explained to the Chilean Foreign Minister Germán Vergara during the Rio Conference in 1947:

> I assured Dr. Vergara of our interest in the economic problems of Chile and other countries. I emphasized the tremendous strain on our economy resulting from our efforts to assist Europe […]. I explained to him in some detail how completely the European business structure had been disrupted and pointed out that there had been no such disruption in Latin America and that, with good planning […], these countries should be able to progress in an orderly manner (Memorandum of Conversation, in US Department of State, 1947, p. 45).

When development aid reached Latin America and other Third World countries, it was devised to assist the fight against communist threat, normally as a supplement to security and military assistance given with this purpose (Mason, 1964). Actions like the Operation Brother Sam, in Brazil, supported *coups d'état* that established military governments with strong anti-communist platforms; later, development projects of these governments were financed, especially those intended to promote economic growth.[99] The report of the Clay Committee in 1963 clearly associates foreign aid and development assistance to a worldwide effort to strengthen the security of the free world (US Department of State, 1963).[100] In the case of Third World countries, significant part of this aid was given through business corporations as a special mission of foreign policy on behalf of the developed world. They started activities in underdeveloped countries following agreements negotiated by the American government to ensure privileges of all sorts, and became influent even in the formulation of local

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[98] American diplomacy created many organs that devised and implemented development assistance programs, such as the Technical Cooperation Administration, created in 1950 within the Department of State, the Foreign Operations Administration, and the International Cooperation Administration (US Department of State, 2014). Most of them merged into the USAID by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (US House of Representatives, 2003). When USAID was created, its budget surpassed the sum of its predecessors' and the number of development programs conducted in the Third World, especially technical assistance programs, increased (US House of Representatives, 2003).

[99] Similar operations were conducted in Chile, Argentina and many other countries. Later, the American government supported information exchange between these governments and supported the creation of repressive apparatuses under the label of anti-communism efforts.

[100] Actually, the official name was Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World.

economic policies (Furtado, 1969).[101] Furthermore, these agreements should guarantee continued alignment of the client governments to the Western bloc as a condition for receiving development aid (Mason, 1964).

On the Soviet side, the Comecon conducted most of the aid, which sometimes assumed the form of bilateral agreements negotiated directly by the central government (Butler, 1978). The scarce record of USSR's activities show that Moscow privileged industrial projects or those of major impact and highly visible results – such as a steel mill in India and impressive stadiums in Indonesia and Mali – that should cause pro-socialist psychological effects (Brine, 1992). Soviets often decided to finance projects that had been refused by the USA and European countries, investing huge sums of money as a demonstration of strength, as they did with the dam in Aswan (Ginsburgs; Slusser, 1981). Technical assistance was also an important field, in which the USSR privileged the deployment of diagnosis missions to solve specific technical problems or train local technicians, but actions lacked regularity. In some cases, technical assistance was combined with infrastructure building, as in polytechnic institutes in Guinea and Burma and hospitals in Indonesia and Cambodia (Ginsburgs; Slusser, 1981). Informal records show that Soviet government provided aid to areas controlled by pro-socialist leaderships, paramilitary groups, and newly independent countries in which they saw socialist trends. In some of these cases, like Nepal, Burma and Cambodia, most of the aid was given as grants, not loans. In sum, the Soviets too used development policy as compensation or incentive for political alignment.

Even though bilateral agreements were important to both sides, the main site in which development assistance was operationalized was international organizations. UN agencies, the World Bank and the OECD were obviously influenced by Western views of development, but they created their own apparatuses and deployed their own programs, normally under the label of eradication of poverty and modernization of economy. In 1948, the World Bank issued the first loans to Africa, Asia and Latin America and, in 1949, it started to cooperate with the UN and other agencies on comprehensive economic survey missions, the first one happening in Colombia (WB, 2014). Part of the WB Group,

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[101] Furtado (1969) emphasizes that this kind of agreement let strategic decisions out of the reach of local populations and even local governments. Also that the focus on economic growth increased inequality and dependency what contributed to increase social tension.

the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) elaborated general development programs for client countries, containing detailed analysis of economic situation and sets of prescriptions with quantifiable targets, investment needs, design criteria, methodologies and time sequences. The production of knowledge of these organizations relied on methods from the natural sciences what would guarantee precision, neutrality, and universal applicability, creating the impression of a process that was a-political and instrumental. They intended to map economic and social life of underdeveloped countries and ended up producing a "political anatomy" (Escobar, 1995, p. 42) of the Third World that gave problems a visible reality and made them amenable to particular treatments. The operation of development discourse, therefore, was based on the production of difference and classificatory schemes; it labelled life and created abnormalities – the illiterate, the malnourished, the unemployed – that it would later treat and reform.

Recommended treatments often included structural and irreversible changes that demanded high public investments and had economy as a starting point. In the reports of the IBRD, for example, there are constant references to industrialization, urbanization, modernization of agriculture, investments on infrastructure, increasing of foreign commerce and trade and qualification of work force as basic transformations. To achieve these goals, underdeveloped states should become agents of development, creating favorable conditions for change. This included planning, opening the economy to foreign investment, ensuring political stability (by keeping its population under control), and, in Cold War scenario, usually declaring support to one bloc or the other. To a significant part of the Third World, alignment worked as a condition for development assistance, and underdeveloped countries would receive aid if they did not represent a major risk to international arrangements. Unlike what happened in most of Europe, where reconstruction was used as an incentive for alignment, in the Third World alignment was normally a primary condition for any kind of support.[102]

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[102] Although the reconstruction of Europe was a frequent reference in development actions (an example of success), the differences between that and the assistance provided to Third World countries was striking, especially in the first two decades. The amount of resources available; the proportion of aid given in the form of grants or loans; the focus on technical assistance; the role of private corporations, the continuity of projects and actions, almost nothing was similar to what had been done in Europe. Still, the success of the First World was advertised as the future of the Third.

Both sides made their predilection for strong and reliable governments very clear and used development assistance as a reward for those who behaved according to their expectations, usually overlooking the specificities of their methods to maintain order. Even to the Western bloc, which relied heavily on a democratic rhetoric, authoritarian regimes became a lesser evil, as long as they could keep the communist threat under control in their countries. Almost anything was valid in name of order and development – censorship, political oppression, expropriation of land, environmental degradation, large public debts, inflation, unequal distribution of wealth, pauperization of marginal groups – and hardly ever associated to the modernizing project (Santos Filho, 2005). The persistence of inequality between developed and underdeveloped countries, in spite of the growth of development aid, called the attention of some. Inside the CEPAL – Spanish acronym for Economic Commission for Latin America[103]–, a group of intellectuals questioned the applicability of dominant economic paradigms to underdeveloped countries and tried to develope an economic theory based on the particularities of their economic structures and dynamics, and the asymmetry of international economic relations (Bielsthowsky, 2000). However, even their critique reinforced the "need for development" and reproduced most of the terms of the development discourse, searching new means for achieving very similar ends. As Escobar (1995) noticed, the consequences of these new means were also dubious and sometimes reinforced the problems they tried to solve.

With standard and critical approaches, economic crisis in the 1980s, neoliberal adjustments and the like, the face of development assistance has changed over the years. Nevertheless, the architecture of the discursive formation that sustained it has remained pretty much the same. It is as if "the achievement of development clouded the awareness of the impossibility of fulfilling the promises that development seemed to be making" (Escobar, 1995, p.52-53).[104] Thus, the

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[103] The CEPAL was established by Economic and Social Council resolution 106(VI) in February 1948 and began its activities that same year. The Commission should monitor and promote development in Latin America, but its scope was later broadened to include the countries of the Caribbean (resolution 1984/67 of July 1984). Its name was changed to Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), but the Spanish acronym remained the same.

[104] None of the development theories account for the fact that countries like the UK were industrialized in completely different situations and contexts, when they could dictate the rules of economic game and among other things extract surplus from colonies, while "Third World countries in the postwar period had to borrow under the opposite conditions: deterioration of the terms of trade against the periphery, extraction of surplus by center countries and a position of subordination in terms of policy formulation" (Escobar, 1995, p.83).

emergence of new development problems – such as women, children, and the environment – have contributed to the discourse's self-(re)creation. It continued to label and translate life into abstract concepts and statistic figures and authorized development agents to act upon them. As Foucault (1994) once said about another context, the illness of some was continually transformed into the experience of others.

Despite difficulties and broken promises, the dream of development still inhabits the imaginary of states, communities and organizations and is an important feature of international society. People all over the planet appropriated, incorporated, resisted, reinterpreted development, and changed their lives in many ways. Even though, one did not become the other. As Escobar (1995) argued, the political technologies of development entailed a promise to erase underdevelopment from the face of the Earth but ended up, instead, multiplying it to infinity.

4.4
Expanding International Society, Reframing Inequality

In this chapter, I have discussed three processes through which the definition and management of borders of international society have changed, especially after WWII. The first is the emergence of the spheres of influence of the superpowers and a politics of alignment, what reorganized the world in terms of an ideological dispute between East and West, and transferred the role of protagonists of the international order from European colonial empires to the USA and the USSR. The order of superpowers was characterized, among other things, by the rhetoric of anti-imperialism and the impetus to expand the international society to the edges of the world, that is, to its former anarchical outside.

The encounter of anti-imperialism with the anti-colonial and pro-independence claims coming from the colonies marked the second process discussed in the chapter, the wave of political decolonization of the twentieth century. Political decolonization has been understood as the climax of the spilling over of the discourse of the state – as a way of relating to government – to the space of the colonies. The modern sovereign state was finally universalized as the

best, and possibly the only, form of organizing political communities. It subjected and subjectified those who were laying beyond the borders and placed them inside an expanding international society.

Nevertheless, the terms under which the areas that had left or were leaving colonialism would be able to join the international society were still under negotiation, and part of this negotiation took the shape of the third process discussed here: the emergence and spread of the discourse of development. Based on the alleged problem of poverty, this discourse of development has forged a new domain of thought and action with differential subjectivities and peculiar methods of order and truth. It delineated the borders of the Third World, its mechanisms of management and control.

Together, these three processes have challenged the understandings of space, identity and time that once informed the colonial international society and participated in the construction of a new – although not entirely different – order. The colonial system relied on the notion of civilization to delimit and control borders separating legitimate modern subjects from the barbaric masses (regarded as less than subjects) awaiting for salvation. It systematically denied spatial claims (occupation and control of a certain space) and identity claims (subjectivity and control of the self) to the so-called dependent peoples and confined their very existence to the past, a parallel temporality that existed somewhere beyond – or behind – international society. Against this backdrop, decolonization detached political independence from that notion of civilization and entitled colonial peoples with the right to assume control over the spaces where they lived and to act in the political domain. Gradually, the colonies assumed the identity of sovereign states and were incorporated to the (present) time of international society. The discourse of development mediated this incorporation and re-organized differences (now between states) as sequential positions in an imaginary line leading from underdevelopment to development. Within this discourse, the understanding of time was definitely rearranged and *temporal parallelism* has given room to *stages of development*.

Instead of a "revolt against the West" (as in Bull, 1984), the expansion of the international society can be read as the dissemination of modern conceptions about politics and about life (the state, progress) to other spaces, and as definition of new borders separating, for example, the developed from the underdeveloped.

In this sense, as the quotes that open this chapter suggest, the legitimacy of colonial justifications and methods certainly died, but some elements of the colonial reasoning, particularly the inscription of inequality in the ordering mechanisms of the system, have outlived it. The binary development/underdevelopment, for example, instantiates the articulation of order and inequality, defining and maintaining a gap between reformers (donors) and those to be reformed (beneficiaries) and justifying continued intervention on new grounds: the impossibility of doing nothing in the face of extreme needs.[105]

Despite assuming a sequence from underdevelopment to development, the discourse of development (re)produces an endless separation between underdeveloped and developed states and clearly marginalizes one form of subjectivity while privileges the other. The underdeveloped remained inferior, associated to poverty in many senses, and was divided in a number of client categories – the malnourished, the illiterate, the unemployed – defined as elements to be displaced from the order of things. These labels embody a normalizing set of power relations through which 'the poor' became masses to be measured, controlled and transformed by the state as both a modernizing effort and a condition for joining and preserving international order. The modes of operation of disciplinary societies had left the original (European) context in which Foucault described them and reached the outside that had been born with it, as its other face: the world of the colonies and empires.

The ideas of peace, order and stability were also reframed in the context of an expanded international society. Instead of civilized individuals fit for autonomous action, they would now rely on the disciplinary mechanisms of the state, on its capacity to identify, detail and treat abnormalities, producing docile, useful bodies. In addition, in a scenario of rivalry between superpowers, they depended on the adherence of the states to the logic of the spheres of influence and politics of alignment. The problem "to be a state", governed by an *imperial mechanism* of management of borders, was definitely substituted by the problem "how to be a state", articulated to a *national mechanism* of management of borders, and the answers to it combined control and alignment, or non-alignment,

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[105] As Escobar (1995) argues, there has been overlapping of colonial and developmentalist regimes of representation; however, especially since the 1950s, the discourse of development became a major form of organizing the world, especially the Third World.

as far as it matched the geography of Cold War. In the end, the state (as a model of organizing political relations) and the society of states had to be preserved.

The dimension of salvation, however, was not lost. Especially in the discourse of development, the notion of "conducting others to the best" was frequently evoked, resembling the conduction of souls in a pastoral fashion. To Escobar (1995), in the messianic feeling and the quasi-religious fervor of development, "salvation" entails the conviction that there is only one right way and that it is pointed out in the assistance provided by donors to beneficiaries. In this sense, Wilde (2008) affirms that inequality and subordination are still important features of international law and institutions. In the next chapter, I will discuss the post-Cold War scenario, particularly, how these features participate in the reformulation of the problem "how to be a state" in terms of "how to be a good state", articulated to the emergence of a *global mechanism* of management of borders.

5
Bordering Peace

The end of the Cold War inaugurated a new period of transformations in the international system. The order of superpowers had collapsed, reopening discursive disputes over proposals to establish a new order, one capable of bringing stability back to the system. Among these proposals, an actualized version of liberal principles gained notoriety, affirming the primacy of individual rights and suggesting that the responsibility for their observation should be ultimately taken internationally. For the advocates of these ideas, the 1990s would inaugurate a new era of peace and prosperity to international society, in which barriers between opposing ideological blocs and superpower rivalries could be overcome or, in fact, replaced by the establishment of open dialogue between peoples. As Laura Zanotti (2005) has noticed, the themes of democracy and governance have converged in the debate about the role of international organizations in orchestrating systemic transformation based on new rules and implementation mechanisms that would translate liberal democracy into an agenda for peace.

In this chapter, I will concentrate on how proposals for systemic transformation were unfolded in the context of the United Nations; especially, how they changed the ways in which the Organization deals with its mandate to maintain and promote international peace and security. In order to do so, I will analyze a series of documents produced by the UN aimed at rethinking and reorganizing its activities to cope with what was understood as a changing international scenario. My goal is to trace normative, institutional and operational transformations that have happened inside the United Nations and show how they relate to the conditions of possibility for the emergence of new – and multilaterally articulated – techniques to produce/govern difference in international society. As I will argue, the emergence of these techniques is embedded in a broad rearticulation of the regime of power that produces international society, supplementing the sovereign *form* of the state with a liberal

content. This process gives rise to a profusion of differentiations that re-write the borders of this international society in terms of the distinction between good and bad, responsible and irresponsible members. Most importantly, it entitles international organizations to convert bad and irresponsible members into good and responsible ones, defining it as a necessary step on the road that would lead to an everlasting systemic peace. What I will try to show is that behind the promise to transcend inequality through the diffusion of what would be universal values and an ethic of responsibility, lays the re-enactment of a pastoral logic of power that distinguishes (and ranks) the shepherd from the flock – those who can lead from those who must follow.

5.1
Agendas for Peace

As it has been discussed in previous chapters, although UN's normative, institutional and operational frameworks have changed between 1945 and 1989, it is clear that these changes often responded to specific issues-area events. Since the 1990s, however, the Organization has attempted to make a broad plan to restructure international order and redefine its role in its expansion and perpetuation. One of the most significant evidences of the beginning of this process was "An Agenda for Peace" a report submitted by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to the Security Council in 1992 in which he stressed the necessity to improve instruments of collective security and strengthen the position of the United Nations in the international arena. In the document, the end of the Cold War was described as a second chance given to the Organization to "achieve the great objectives of the Charter – a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom"" (UN, 1992, para.3). Nevertheless, seizing this opportunity involved building capacity to deal with what Boutros-Ghali defined as "new security challenges", especially the increasing number of violent conflicts taking place within state borders. In this sense, the Organization's "security arm, once disabled by circumstances it was not created or equipped to control, has emerged

as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace" (UN, 1992, para.15).

One of the main purposes of "An Agenda for Peace" was exactly to suggest ways for making this security arm stronger and more efficient in dealing with the challenges it had just described. Hence, Boutros-Ghali revisited the concepts of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, and added a new one, post conflict peace-building. Each instrument was related to a specific path leading to the larger objective of preserving international peace and security. With preventive diplomacy, it would be possible to identify and provide early responses to potential conflict situations; with peacemaking, find ways to interrupt current conflicts and negotiate settlements; through peacekeeping, assist the implementation of agreements negotiated by peacemakers and preserve peace, however fragile; and finally, through peace-building, reconstruct institutions and infrastructure in post-conflict situations, build bonds of peaceful and mutual benefit among nations and address the deepest causes of conflict (UN, 1992, para.15).

The emphasis given to this last instrument – post-conflict peace-building – evidences the beginning of a large transformation in the way the United Nations and many other international organizations engaged with matters of peace and security. Instead of working to stabilize conflict situations, as it did during the Cold War, they would turn their efforts to remedy situations actually or potentially leading to armed conflicts. This was based on the assumption that "[…] only sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation" (UN, 1992, para. 57). Following this logic, in the next decade or two, peace operations became a central mechanism of international governance, used especially by the UN to preserve systemic order. In this sense, they have changed from being a containment strategy directed to threats found on the fringes of the bipolar order (see Chapter 4) to a huge international enterprise designed to preserve and promote international security through complex processes of pacification, reconstruction, and ultimately prevention. Boutros-Ghali justified this shift by stating that, in a changing international environment, the path to peace could no longer be imagined as restricted to discouraging aggressive behaviors; it should include the provision of "[…] support for the transformation

of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions" (UN, 1992, para.59).

As Esteves (2010) has noticed, this line of reasoning turns democracy into a key element for international order and articulates it to the well-known notion of progress that have informed the very idea of international society. In this sense, the narrative constructed in "An Agenda for Peace" can be read as a reinterpretation of what would be the official story of this international society in terms of the expansion of democracy. In this context, democracy is described as a principle that has gradually guided governments towards the respect for human rights, open dialogue, and establishment of multilateral ties. Ultimately, the UN considers that "democracy at all levels is essential to attain peace for a new era of prosperity and justice" (1992, para. 82);[106] and defines the preservation and expansion of democratic regimes as a mission, a real agenda for international peace and security. This is not to say that state sovereignty would be forgotten or even ignored, but it certainly means that something as a democratic clause was attached to it. After all, a future of peace would only be available to the international society once the sovereign form of the state incorporated a democratic content.

Read through these lenses, "An Agenda for Peace" enunciates the redefinition of some ideas and concepts that lay on the bottom of the notion of international society. Built upon the contrast between an optimistic view of the future and a growing number of threats to it, the document delineates a new vocabulary, a new order of things to guide the practice of international relations (Esteves, 2010; Debrix, 1999). The very understanding of international security was redefined to a certain extent, having its focus shifted from systemic constraints to precarious domestic structures; from avoiding wars between states to reconstructing patterns of the daily lives of political communities.[107] In this process, the formal sovereign condition of the state ceased to be the main criterion

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[106] To the UN, "democracy is a system of government which embodies, in a variety of institutions and mechanisms, the ideal of political power based on the will of the people" (1996, para.1).

[107] To the UN, the list of security threats – once led by interstate conflicts and superpower disputes – had been expanded and now included more diffuse items, usually not bound by state borders, such as the proliferation of small arms and weapons of mass destruction; environmental problems; terrorism; and the spillover of civil conflicts to neighboring countries. The roots of these problems were normally to be found in corrupted national institutions, precarious infrastructure, authoritarian regimes and other illnesses that attacked national governments (UN, 1992; CGG, 1995).

for belonging to international society (at least as a good member); by the same token, the conditions that would ensure the expansion and perpetuation of this society began to include aspects of the internal order of its members. In the UN's formulation, "global security must be broadened from its traditional focus on the security of states to include the security of people and the planet" (CGG, 1995, p.78).

What is being argued here is that this broadened security focus converts "humanity" and "the planet" into major referents of a victorious discourse that re-instantiates – and in fact rearticulates – the myth affirming the convergence (both spatial and temporal) of the international society with the entire globe. Firmly anchored in the corollary of human rights and multilateralism, this discourse produced an aura of universalism around the international society and the organizations it had created. It was as if time had finally come for them to escape the greed of empires, the selfish concerns of superpowers, and become instruments through which all human beings – *we the peoples* – could speak and struggle for a better life. As will be discussed in the next pages, the question *"how to be a state"*, and its answers based on sovereignty, was gradually converted into *"how to be a good state"*, incorporating elements of internal governance and living standards of populations. One of the goals of this chapter is to show that despite the impression of universality and humanity, the content attributed to a "good state" and the requirements for becoming one did not bring equality or sameness to the international arena. On the contrary, the discourse of the "good state" articulates new conditions of possibility and new techniques for (re)producing difference, for drawing and governing borders that end up perpetuating inequality in international relations.

Crucial for consolidating these enlarged understandings of security and even statehood in the post-Cold War was the concept of *human security*,[108] defined in the Human Development Report produced by the UNDP in 1994 (MacFarlane; Khong, 2006). The concept attaches new meanings to the traditional

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[108] About the concept of human security, MacFarlane and Khong (2006) point out that its roots can be found still in the Cold War years, associated with the development of fields such as human rights, the protection of civilians and refugees. However, they stress that the formalization of the concept and its broader application were stopped by the strength of the principle of state sovereignty and by the disputes between superpowers taking place during this period. Therefore, it was only since the 1990s that the concept of human security was systematized and incorporated to the normative, institutional and operational structure of the United Nations and other international organizations.

understanding of security, including safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression, as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. This comprehensive understanding divided security in seven areas – economic security; food security; health security; environmental security; personal security; community security; and political security –, claiming that only when all of them become available to every person international security could be considered a reality (UNDP, 1994).

The initial success of the concept of human security was reinforced by the publication, also in 1994, of a series of studies conducted by the World Bank called *Voices of the Poor*.[109] The results indicated security as the greatest preoccupation among people living in poverty and extreme poverty situations, leaving behind items normally considered as basic needs such as shelter and food. Therefore, the World Bank began to classify security – actually the modified version of the concept – as a primary condition to ameliorate quality of life of poor communities, especially those affected by violent conflict (Chandler, 2007). In this context, security embraced far more than the absence of violent conflict; it was related to the improvement of life standards of populations, encompassing

> human rights, good governance, access to education and health care, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict (CHS, 2003 p.4).

The inclusion of democracy and development as elements of international security was systematized in two other agendas elaborated by the UN-Secretary-General in the following years: "An Agenda for Development" (1994), and "An Agenda for Democratization" (1996) (Haq, 2007; Esteves, 2010). In these documents, both development and democracy are presented as fundamental human rights (UN, 1994; UN, 1996)[110] and their combination described as not only one, but also the best way to organize political relations, enhancing the

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[109] These studies were based on interviews with over 60 thousand people from 60 poor countries about their life conditions, needs, anxieties and wishes for the future (WB, 1994).

[110] According to "An Agenda for Development", "development is a fundamental human right. Development is the most secure basis for peace" (UN, 1994, para.3). Later, the document affirms that "democracy is a fundamental human right, the advancement of which is itself an important measure of development" (UN, 1994, para.120).

prospects of security, stability and prosperity inside the states and among them.[111] To Boutros-Ghali, these new understandings of development and democracy should have a marked impact on UN efforts in the field of peace and security, compared to what had happened with the idea of self-determination a few years earlier.

> Just as newly independent States turned to the United Nations for support during the era of decolonization, so today, following another wave of accessions to statehood and political independence, Member States are turning to the United Nations for support in democratization (UN, 1996, para.5).

The parallel between decolonization and the spread of democratic institutions traced by the Secretary-General is worth noting and, according to Esteves (2010), suggests a re-interpretation of the principle of sovereignty based on a democratic imagination. As it appears in the agendas, sovereignty is not simply a matter of constructing authority; it is a matter of creating democratic means for exercising authority. In the same vein, the maintenance of international order could no longer rest solely on the capacity of particular states to preserve political independence and control their populations. As it is being argued, sovereignty gained a democratic clause and order was redefined as a combination of security, development and democracy both in domestic and international environments.

Although the documents discussed so far should not be taken as the cause of anything, it seems fair to say that they do tell a story about relations of power in the international society and how they are being rearticulated under the aegis of new discourses about order, especially since the 1990s. Specifically, it is possible to say that there has been a shift in the way disciplinary efforts of particular states connect to the maintenance of peace. In the last chapter, while discussing the Cold

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[111] As it has been discussed in Chapter 3, the connection between security and development was also common during the Cold War; however, in this context, development discourse was subsumed to security concerns, informed by geopolitical imperatives and used as currency to further strategic alliances. Development policies were normally restricted to technical cooperation and investments to modernize the productive structure of the so-called backward economies, in order to induce economic growth and, therefore, enable the country to meet basic needs of its population (Chandler, 2007; Santos Filho, 2005). Even though development policies did contribute to the maintenance of international order, they were not associated to conflict resolution and normally were not included in the mandates of peace operations, then focused on stabilization (Dobbins *et al*, 2005; Roberts, 2004; Weiss; Forsythe; Coate, 2004). About the recurrent elements of peace operations' mandates, see chart on chapter 3.

War scenario, I have argued that the prospect of a stable international order relied greatly on the disciplinary mechanisms of states and their capacity to maintain both internal order and a consistent position regarding their alignment (or non-alignment) in the dispute between the superpowers. It also relied on the ability of the USA and the USSR to maintain order inside the blocs they controlled and to preserve the bipolar structure.[112] The means they used to do it did not matter much, at least not as long as they effectively contributed to systemic order and stability, regarded as a greater end. What the documents discussed in this chapter suggest, however, is that the means sovereign states use to govern have been put in the spotlight in the post-Cold War and connected to international prospects not only of stability and order, but also of peace. Means matter and could no longer be justified by their service to a greater end. In fact, good means became a condition for achieving a greater end; they became part of the end itself and their quality was to be assessed based on what would be an international model of (good) governance. In this sense, the techniques of power embedded in controlling populations and ordering domestic environments by state institutions were opened to international scrutiny. Most importantly, state institutions could and should be changed, perfected, disciplined as a path to peace, and their conduct would be conduct by international organizations.

The connection between agendas of peace/security, development and democracy supported the idea conveyed in the final report of the *Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict* (1997) that the success of conflict prevention through the treatment of its deep (structural) causes depended on the ability of international actors to foster and coordinate processes of social transformation based on the protection of human rights, democratic institutions and development practices. This nexus between security, development and democracy informed the restructuring of the whole range of policies designed to address threats to peace and of the international machinery responsible for implementing it, operated by the UN and its partners.

Notably, the concept was appropriated by the field of peace operations as providing a new basis for the debate on humanitarian intervention as well as for

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[112] Broadly speaking, the USA and the USSR should preserve their superpower status, prevent the rise of a new power that could destabilize the bipolar system, and reach reasonable terms in their dispute, avoiding a nuclear war and the destruction of the whole planet. For a more specific discussion, see Chapter 4.

the diversification of the tasks included in the mandates of missions deployed since the 1990s (Shue, 2004; McRae, 2001). In this process, traditional peacekeeping was largely substituted by multidimensional operations (DPKO, 2007b) "[...] aimed to help reconstruct the political, economic and social foundations of countries that were just emerging from civil wars" (Paris, 2007, p.405) and thus "[…] to alleviate human suffering, and create conditions and build institutions for self-sustaining peace" (DPKO, 2007a).

According to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the main tasks of peacekeeping operations were redefined as: (i) to prevent the occurrence or spillover of conflicts; (ii) stabilize conflictive situations after ceasefire and create grounds for enduring peace agreements; (iii) assist the implementations of those agreements; and (iv) lead transition processes towards stable governments, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development (DPKO, 2007a). Therefore, new peacekeeping operations "[…] involve the use of armed force as a part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors" (Dobbins *et al* 2007, p.XVII). To Dobbins *et al* (2007):

> During the Cold War, UN troops were usually deployed to separate combatants, to police demilitarized zones, and to monitor ceasefires. In recent years, the objectives for these missions have expanded to include reuniting divided societies, disarming adversaries, demobilizing former combatants, organizing elections, installing representative governments, and promoting democratic reform and economic growth (p.XVII).

Informed by concepts such as human security and prevention, the idea of pacification of communities under international intervention was expanded to include development policies, building of democratic institutions and provision of basic assistance to affected populations (Paris, 2004). As it can be read in Dobbins *et al* (2007), there was a growing belief that international peace necessarily involved the transformation of societies labeled as prone to conflict, a process that could only be triggered by a combination of security, development and democracy on the basis of international action.

> The prime objective of most missions is to make violent societies peaceful, not to make poor societies prosperous or authoritarian societies democratic. Nevertheless,

the three are interconnected, and most successful missions accomplish all three, albeit to different degrees. Successful transformations of violent societies into peaceful ones are thus almost always accompanied by some degree of economic development and political reform (p.189).

Here, it is important to notice that, besides references to human rights and the participation of international actors in conflict resolution, security could only be guaranteed in the long run by the construction – or reconstruction – of *states*. To the UN, the sovereign state remains the basis of international society and the primary responsible for keeping peace. The important addition here is that the sovereign prerogative of the state was being progressively attached to its capacity to protect individual rights, and to practices of good governance.[113] This reaffirmation of the importance of sovereign states to the maintenance of peace, combined with the belief that many of them must be reformed to be able to meet their primary obligations, was central to the vast reformulation of UN peace operations during the 1990s and most of the 2000s.

The axis of this reformulation was the notion that any durable peace would require a multidimensional reconstruction of state structures in areas coming out of violent conflict. Once converted into a general guideline, this new discourse comprising the role of international society in the reconstruction of states created the conditions of possibility for broadening the scope and the timeframe of peace operations, besides making their tasks more and more complex. In another important turn, the job involved in peace operations was shared with a large number of UN agencies, other IGOs, NGOs, governmental agencies and even private companies, who play increasingly relevant roles on the structure of the missions. In this sense, Paris (2007) affirms that peacekeeping operations were reinvented in the 1990s as

> [...] a vast, complex, and growing network of private and public agencies that provided a kind of 'life support' to fragile states just emerging from conflict – a decentralized (and at times chaotic) system for reconstituting a peaceful civil society, effective governance and economic life in war-torn states (p.410).

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[113] Following this logic, in "An Agenda for Peace" the UN acknowledges that "the foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world (ONU, 1992, para.17).

From now on, I will turn to this reinvention of peace operations as a mechanism of international governance and try to give an account of its contours during the period that goes from 1990 until 2009. I am well aware of the fact that discussions about peace operations – especially UN peacekeeping missions – are a bit overdone in the field of international studies. In the last twenty years or so, there has been an immense amount of research covering almost all aspects of these operations and of the contexts in which they have been deployed. Even though, I believe that there is still something to be further explored about this topic. More than instruments to deal with actual and potential threats to peace and security, peace operations can be interpreted as a multilaterally articulated technique (or ensemble of techniques) for dealing with difference, redefining and administering the borders of international society.

Based on the normative consensus forged around liberal values and institutions, international organizations efforts towards peace and security operationalizes a distinction between good and bad members of the international society, between those that should be taken as a model to be followed and those classified as deviances to be treated and reformed. In this sense, the borders of this international society, once characterized by the spatiotemporal distinction between civilized and barbarians, states and non-states, are rearticulated in terms of good and bad states, according to their structures for organizing political life domestically and their mechanisms for governing populations. These borders separate a peaceful and prosperous international society of liberal-democratic states from a dangerous, violent and almost hopeless outside labelled as authoritarian, irresponsible or failed.

A remarkable feature of the field of peace operations is that while it reinforces this separation, it also operationalizes the promise to transcend it, what would be possible due to the benevolence and expertise of organizations, groups and states willing to intervene and reconstruct. In this discourse, the existence of borders is mitigated by the impression that immature and irresponsible states can still be rescued and that one day they will be capable of looking alike, thinking alike and even being alike the mature and responsible ones. To be saved, their conduct has to be conducted, so that they can learn the language of international society and profess its (differentiating) truth.

It is precisely this re-articulation of borders, and the promise to transcend them, that I intend to explore. In the next sections, I will discuss the consolidation of peace operations as a technique for producing order through the government of difference and the management of the flux of life between international society and its outside. To do so, I will retrace the conversion of these operations into the vast and complex network that Paris (2007) has described, based on the documents that redefined their mandates and rules of engagement; consolidated contributions and expenses; regulated the participation of new actors; determined the integration of projects and the strengthen of coordination; and developed strategic guidelines for policy implementation by field teams. As I will show, these transformations have merged security, development, and humanitarian assistance into a path to peace based on the reconstruction of states and transformation of their sociopolitical contexts.

5.2
Reinventing Peace Operations

Since the first changes involving their purposes and rules, UN peace operations have experienced an impressive growth. From 1989 to 1994, the Security Council authorized 20 peacekeeping missions, increasing the contingent involved with their deployment from 11 to 75 thousand people (UN, 2014). Figure 9 below shows the number of peace operations deployed by the United Nations per decade from 1948 to 2007 and illustrates their increasing use as instruments for maintaining international security, especially since the 1990s.

Figure 9: UN peacekeeping operations (*per decade*) since 1948.[114]
Based on: UN Peacekeeping, 2014.

Besides growing quantitatively, peace operations have also changed qualitatively over the years, with new tasks being added to their mandates. Figure 10 below illustrates this qualitative shift, identifying the main elements of their mandates from 1948 to 2007. Observing it, one can easily notice that during the Cold War their focus was basically interrupting armed hostilities and restoring the sovereign form of states (territorial integrity and political independence), what was done by assisting/monitoring the negotiation of ceasefire and peace agreements; supervising the withdrawal of forces and creating buffer zones separating rival ones; and monitoring borders and security zones.[115] Since the 1990s, however, the scope of peace operations was broadened to include the reconstruction of state institutions, economy and infrastructure, and particularly the organization of domestic society. In addition to restoring the sovereign form of states, peace operations should also reform their content, fomenting the adoption of norms and principles related to democracy, humanitarian and human

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[114] Since MINURCAT, in 2007, the UN has launched six peacekeeping operations: MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), 2010; UNISFA (United Nations Organization Interim Security Force for Abyei), 2011; UNMISS (United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, 2011; UNSMIS (United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria), 2012; MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali), 2013; MINUSCA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic), 2014. Except for UNSMIS, ended in 2012, all these missions are still in course (UN, 2014), but haven't been contemplated in this thesis due to the period chosen to study, that goes until 2009.
[115] In the 1960s, the mandates of operations established in the Congo (ONUC) and West New Guinea (UNSF) also included helping ensure law and order in the territory. However, it was not a common clause in peace operations mandates during the Cold War.

rights. This (re)construction of (good) states often included periods of international civil administration and the training of local leaders.

	Ceasefire and Peace Agreements	Withdrawal of Forces and Buffer Zones	Monitoring Borders and Security Zones	Territorial Integrity and Political Independence	Law and Order	Economic Reconstruction and Infrastructure	Institutional Reconstruction	Humanitarian Assistance	Refugees and IDPs	Elections	DDR	Human Rights and Protection of Civilians	Civil Administration
UNTSO - UN Truce Supervision Organization (Palestine, 1948-)	✓												
UNMOGIP - UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (1949-)	✓												
UNEF I - First UN Emergency Force (Suez, 1956-1967)	✓	✓											
UNOGIL - UN Observation Group in Lebanon (1958)			✓										
ONUC - UN Operation in the Congo (1960-1964)		✓	✓	✓	✓								
UNSF - UN Security Force in West New Guinea (1962-1963)	✓				✓								
UNYOM - UN Yemen Observation Mission (1963-1964)	✓	✓											
UNFICYP - UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (1964-)	✓	✓						✓					
DOMREP - Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (1965-1966)	✓												
UNIPOM - UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (1965-1966)	✓	✓											
UNEF II - Second UN Emergency Force (Suez and Sinai, 1973-1979)	✓	✓											
UNDOF - UN Disengagement Observer Force (Golan, 1974-)	✓	✓											
UNIFIL - UN Interim Force in Lebanon (1978-)	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓	✓				
UNGOMAP - UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (1988-1990)	✓												
UNIIMOG - UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (1988-	✓	✓											

	Ceasefire and Peace Agreements	Withdrawal of Forces and Buffer Zones	Monitoring Borders and Security Zones	Territorial Integrity and Political Independence	Law and Order	Economic Reconstruction and Infrastructure	Institutional Reconstruction	Humanitarian Assistance	Refugees and IDPs	Elections	DDR	Human Rights and Protection of Civilians	Civil Administration
1991)													
UNAVEM I - *UN Angola Verification Mission I (1989-1991)*		✓											
UNTAG - *UN Transition Assistance Group (Namibia, 1989-1990)*	✓									✓	✓		
ONUCA - *UN Observer Group in Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala Honduras and Nicaragua, 1989-1992)*	✓	✓	✓								✓		
UNIKOM - *UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (1991-2003)*	✓		✓										
MINURSO - *UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (1991-)*	✓	✓							✓	✓			
UNAVEM II - *UN Angola Verification Mission II (1991-1995)*	✓				✓					✓			
ONUSAL - *UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (1991-1995)*	✓				✓		✓			✓		✓	
UNAMIC - *UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (1991-1992)*	✓												
UNPROFOR - *UN Protection Force (Former Yugoslavia, 1992-1995)*	✓		✓					✓	✓			✓	
UNTAC - *UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (1992-1993)*	✓				✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
UNOSOM I - *UN Operation in Somalia I (1992-1993)*	✓		✓					✓					
ONUMOZ - *UN Operation in Mozambique (1992-1994)*	✓	✓	✓					✓	✓	✓	✓		
UNOSOM II - *UN Operation in Somalia II (1993-1995)*	✓		✓		✓			✓	✓		✓		
UNOMUR - *UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (1993-1994)*			✓										
UNOMIG - *UN Observer Mission in Georgia (1993-2009)*	✓		✓						✓				
UNOMIL - *UN Observer Mission in Liberia (1993-1997)*	✓		✓					✓		✓	✓		

	Ceasefire and Peace Agreements	Withdrawal of Forces and Buffer Zones	Monitoring Borders and Security Zones	Territorial Integrity and Political Independence	Law and Order	Economic Reconstruction and Infrastructure	Institutional Reconstruction	Humanitarian Assistance	Refugees and IDPs	Elections	DDR	Human Rights and Protection of Civilians	Civil Administration
***UNMIH** - UN Mission in Haiti (1993-1996)*	✓		✓		✓					✓			
***UNAMIR** - UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (1993-1996)*	✓		✓		✓			✓	✓		✓	✓	
***UNASOG** - UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group (Chade, 1994)*	✓												
***UNMOT** - UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (1994-2000)*	✓				✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	
***UNAVEM III** - UN Angola Verification Mission III (1995-1997)*	✓				✓			✓		✓	✓		
***UNCRO** - UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (1995-1996)*	✓	✓	✓					✓		✓			✓
***UNPREDEP** - UN Preventive Deployment Force (Macedonia, 1995-1999)*	✓	✓	✓					✓					
***UNMIBH** - UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2002)*					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	
***UNTAES** - UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (Croatia, 1996-1998)*			✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
***UNMOP** - UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (Croatia/Yugoslavia, 1996-2002)*											✓		
***UNSMIH** - UN Support Mission in Haiti (1996-1997)*					✓	✓	✓						✓
***MINUGUA** - UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (1997)*	✓												
***MONUA** - UN Observer Mission in Angola (1997-1999)*					✓	✓				✓	✓		
***UNTMIH** - UN Transition Mission in Haiti (1997)*					✓	✓	✓						
***MIPONUH** - UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (1997-2000)*					✓								
***UNPSG** - UN Civilian Police Support Group (Croatia, 1998)*					✓				✓				
***MINURCA** - UN Mission in the*					✓	✓	✓			✓	✓		

	Ceasefire and Peace Agreements	Withdrawal of Forces and Buffer Zones	Monitoring Borders and Security Zones	Territorial Integrity and Political Independence	Law and Order	Economic Reconstruction and Infrastructure	Institutional Reconstruction	Humanitarian Assistance	Refugees and IDPs	Elections	DDR	Human Rights and Protection of Civilians	Civil Administration
Central African Republic (1998-2000)													
UNOMSIL *- UN Mission in Sierra Leone (1998-1999)*	✓				✓			✓			✓	✓	
UNMIK *- UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (1999-)*			✓		✓		✓			✓			✓
UNAMSIL *- UN Mission in Sierra Leone (1999-2005)*	✓		✓		✓			✓		✓	✓		✓
UNTAET *- UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (1999-2002)*					✓	✓	✓	✓		✓			✓
MONUC *- UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1999-)*	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
UNMEE *- UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (2000-2008)*	✓	✓	✓					✓					
UNMISET *- UN Mission of Support in East Timor (2002-2005)*				✓	✓					✓			✓
UNMIL *- UN Mission in Liberia (2003-)*	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
UNOCI *- UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast, 2004-)*	✓	✓	✓		✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MINUSTAH *- UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (2004-)*			✓		✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ONUB *- UN Operation in Burundi (2004-2006)*	✓		✓		✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
UNMIS *- UN Mission in the Sudan (2005-2011)*	✓	✓	✓		✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
UNMIT *- UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (2006-2012)*					✓	✓	✓			✓		✓	✓
UNAMID *- African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (Sudan, 2007-)*	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
MINURCAT *- UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (2007-2010)*	✓				✓	✓		✓	✓			✓	

Figure 10: Elements of UN Peace Operation Mandates (1948-2007).

Based on Security Council resolutions that established, extended and/or adjusted mandates of UN peace operations deployed from 1948 to 2007.

To the UN, the speed and depth of these changes created a disparity between the high expectations for peacekeeping operations and the Organization's capacity to fulfill them. This gap was normally associated to problems such as inaccuracy of mandates, lack of resources and political support, deficient coordination of field activities, and the sometimes limited capacity to get rival groups to reach agreements ceasing armed conflict. The diagnosis of senior UN officials was that these problems were undermining pacification and reconstruction processes and occasionally involving the Organization in catastrophic events that compromised its reputation, having the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda as compelling examples (UN, 1995; UN, 2013; Thakur; Schnabel, 2001; Bellamy *et al*, 2004). Informed by this diagnosis of failure and by the widespread criticism targeting peace operations, the Security Council decided to reduce the number of missions deployed in the following years and[116] [117] to promote extensive discussions about peacekeeping (UN, 2013; Durch *et al*, 2003; Thakur; Schnabel, 2001).

Despite the overall understanding that the problems persisted, the demand for peacekeeping operations began to rise again in the late 1990s. In just one year, peacekeepers were called to intervene in complex situations such as the ones in East Timor and Kosovo and the UN decided to engage in new long term operations (UN, 2013). Even though its peacekeeping staff had tripled in the last few years, the Organization used more than two thirds of the available personnel in these missions. This, combined with several operational difficulties, the recrudescence of old weaknesses, and the limitations of an already overburdened

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[116] Even with the decreasing number of operations since 1995, the UN gave sequence to its long term operations in the Middle East, India, Pakistan and Cyprus and authorized new operations in Angola, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti and Guatemala, besides a few observation missions (UN, 2013). However, most operations dating from this period were regarded as small scale missions lacking of political relevance (Durch *et al*, 2003).

[117] Between 1995 and 1999, the number and visibility of UN peacekeeping operations was reduced, and so was the contingent of troops involved. Therefore, the General Assembly determined that the DPKO ceased to borrow employees from member states, known as "*gratis personnel*" (A/RES/51/243, 1997). These employees were specialized in planning and logistics, and were responsible for organizing most of the work related to the missions, enabling the UN to deal with their rapid growth in the previous years. The dismissal of the *gratis personnel* was concluded in February 1999, and according to Durch *et al* (2003) "[…] left much of DPKO's operational support capacity and institutional memory for military and logistical planning severely depleted" (p.3), reinforcing the demand for a broad restructuration.

DPKO, was the axis of a discourse annunciating a potentially terminal crisis of the UN peacekeeping in the late 1990s (Durch *et al*, 2003; Thakur; Schnabel, 2001).

Confronting this line of criticism, in March 2000, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. The panel was composed of experts in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding that should identify the shortcomings of the existing system and make "specific and realistic" recommendations for change (UN, 2013; Thakur; Schnabel, 2001). The final report of the Panel, known as the Brahimi Report[118], was submitted to the General Assembly, the Security Council, and chiefs of state and government. According to the UN, it marked the beginning of a new and more intense phase in the reform of peace operations (UN, 2013). Broadly speaking, the Brahimi Report called Member States to renew their political commitment towards peace operations and highlighted the need for increased financial support and significant institutional change. According to the document, in order to be effective these operations would need bigger and more complete teams, suitable equipment and resources, and a "new understanding" that included them in the list of core activities of the United Nations. In addition, robust rules of engagement would be established, while the Security Council should assume the responsibility of providing each operation with a "clear, credible and achievable mandate" (UN, 2000, p.10).[119]

Studying the emergence of this "new understanding" about peace operations mentioned in the Brahimi Report provides us with a privileged view point from which we can observe the transformation of the apparatus dedicated to promoting and maintaining international peace and security. Most importantly, the meticulous and well documented discussion about normative framework, institutional structure, operational guidelines, policies and procedures related to peace operations puts forward a very particular view of what would be the foundations of peace and how international organizations could work to achieve it. In the next pages, I will try to identify the milestones in this changing process and discuss some aspects related to it. Behind their descriptive surface, lies a

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[118] After the Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi, the chair of the Panel (UN, 2013).
[119] The Report also discussed more specific challenges of peace operations, such as communications; planning; logistics; leadership; availability of troops, police and civil personnel and capacity to dispatch them on a short notice; and issues related to human rights and rule of law (UN, 2000).

genealogical effort intended to unveil the multilateral articulation of new conditions of possibility for producing difference in the international society, also of new techniques for (re)producing and governing borders between this international society and its supposed others

5.2.1.
New Responsibilities

In December 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) published a report intended to review major normative shifts related to international interventions that had been taking place especially since the 1990s. The report substantiated the connection between international security and human rights and systematized a framework for international intervention based on humanitarian justifications, what should enhance the capacity to act in situations regarded as humanitarian crisis, such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (ICISS, 2001). The of the document, "The Responsibility to Protect", gives a hint about its content, a reorganization of what would be the internal and international dimensions of the concept of sovereignty, based on the notion of human security. Internally, the exercise of sovereignty was conditioned to the capacity of the state to protect its citizens from avoidable catastrophes, to respect and ensure basic rights. Internationally, it implied the responsibility to join the international community to protect the life and well-being of populations in cases in which a state was proven unable or unwilling to do so, an effort that should be coordinated by international organizations, especially the United Nations.

The terms of this international responsibility to protect were further developed in another report, "Human Security Now", published by the Commission on Human Security in 2003. According to the Commission, international security referred to both states and individuals and would be ensured by the combination of "[...] the human elements of security, of rights, of development" (CHS, 2003, p.4). In order to promote it, "the responsibility of states and the international community to protect people in conflict should be complemented by a responsibility to rebuild – including after an international

military intervention" (p.57). Hence, the report considers that "the measure of an intervention's success is not a military victory – it is the quality of the peace that is left behind" (p.57), what would be reflected in the level of human development and in the establishment of democratic institutions that respect human rights and are able to empower people (CHS, 2003).

Ideas developed in documents such as the ICISS or the CHS reports carry an underlying assumption that the outbreak of violent conflict disrupts domestic and international order and is directly associated with inadequate and inefficient mechanisms of governance used by some states. These states, usually labeled as fragile or failed, would be characterized by a record of corruption, poverty, authoritarianism, rights abuse, and/or lack of control over means of coercion, that result in an irresponsible conduct towards people. This diagnosis of failure is constructed in opposition to another category of states that master mechanisms of (good) governance and are not only able to promote the welfare of their populations but also to assume the responsibility to protect people in distant places from irresponsible state behaviors. In a scenario where international security refers both to states and individuals, coping with this "responsibility to protect" becomes a requirement for peace, now associated with rapid multilateral response to rights violations, and also with preventing such violations in the future by spreading mechanisms of good governance.

This division of the world into responsible and irresponsible states has been substantiated by the reorientation of international efforts for peace and security towards state reconstruction. Within the field of peace operations, the corollary of democracy, development and rights has given rise to more or less objective parameters for evaluating and classifying mechanisms of governance, what would allow international organizations to identify dysfunctional states and perform interventions to treat them and correct their behavior on behalf of international society and its prospect of peace and security. Following this logic, those states depicted as good/responsible become not only models to be followed, but also leaders acting on behalf of universal values and entitled to conduct others (bad/irresponsible states) towards a better future; to save them even from themselves if it is proven necessary.

As it has been argued, one can consider that the criteria changes for differentiating those who could be and act as members of the international society

from those who could not. In many senses, the narrative of an international society that had expanded its perimeter to encompass the whole planet, welcoming self-determination as a right, blurred the essentialized dichotomy civilized/barbarian that for centuries separated the society of states from an outside of overseas possessions and non-self-governing territories. Gradually, the claim that there were some people who did not deserve or were not ready to form a state lost its status of truth, eroding the legitimacy of civilization or fitness for self-government as parameters for differentiating, classifying, ordering. Of course there are competing narratives about decolonization and about the birth of states in different places, but it does not seem wrong to say that they point out to a similar direction: peoples are entitled to states.

If once there was a time of the state and a time before the state – and even if this time had lingered a little longer in some places –, the overall impression now is that this time has passed, and that the whole world lives in the time of the state. To be more precise, in the time of international society. To acknowledge this impression – endlessly reinforced in UN documents – as a dimension of international relations nowadays is not the same as saying that differences between states have ceased to exist; nor that differentiation lost its importance as an ordering mechanism. It is to say, nevertheless, that difference and differentiation have been rearticulated; also, that the techniques for (re)producing and governing borders have changed.

In this sense, we can read the "responsibility to protect" as a discourse that rearticulates difference and differentiation in terms of mechanisms of (good) governance and the cleavage between responsibility and irresponsibility. Within this movement, the borders of the international society have been reframed: they no longer separated civilization and barbarism, sovereign states from non-self-governing territories; but what would be a normatively superior model of state from its shadows. According to this alternative reading, multidimensional peace operations to reconstruct failed or deviant states can be understood as techniques of power that (re)produce and govern these borders by disciplining deviances and conforming to the norm.

To some scholars, there is no big distinction between forms of international trusteeship (as discussed in Chapter 3) and peace operations as mechanisms for inscribing and managing a border separating international society and its supposed

others. Wilde (2008) summarizes this position, affirming that contemporary peacekeeping works as a form of international territorial administration that suspends sovereignty based on the claim that local actors have no capacity to exercise control over their territory, or that there is a governance problem – which can be a lack of governance or a lack of good governance. According to him, this repeats the logic of the civilizing mission as an established practice in international relations and raises the possibility that "colonial ideas live in today in practices that operate in the exactly same manner as colonial trusteeship, the only variation being the identity of the administering actor" (Wilde, 2008, p.297), once colonial powers, now international organizations.

Even though the idea makes sense (it is actually very appealing), the argument being made here is that this is not exactly the case. Of course there are noteworthy similarities between the League of Nations Mandates System, the United Nations Trusteeship System and contemporary peace operations, some of them identified and discussed here. However, there are also noteworthy differences. The most obvious is possibly that, although one might understand state reconstruction today as the suspension of sovereignty (which is an already disputed definition), to most of the territories entrusted to the League or to the UN in the past this was not the case, simply because they were not organized as states, but as colonies or overseas possessions which held no recognized sovereign status to be suspended. We may consider that all of them were somehow struggling for independence, that the intrusiveness of international intervention was quite similar or whatever, but this would all be beyond the point. The formal status attributed to them matters in many ways.

Another considerable difference is that the *racialized* conception of standards of civilization that was on the core of the idea of trusteeship has lost its status of a legitimate and widely accepted justification for international action of any kind. Again, one may argue that there is still a strong racial bias and an equally strong concept of civilization informing the activity of peacekeeping, but this discussion would also be beyond the point, or at least beyond the scope of this research. What I am claiming here is that not finding barbarians, inferior races or the white-man's burden in UN debates about state reconstruction is not simply a matter of choice of words.

Things did change, albeit not entirely; and in the end, differences in differentiation are one of the most remarkable features of international society and of modernity itself. Only by exploring these differences we can glimpse how relations of power have been reinvented over time and, perhaps most importantly, how the logic of borders rearticulates itself as a way of reasoning – how everything is different and, still, how we are never going to be the same. If we pay attention to these differences, we will see that the focus of multidimensional peace operations is reconstructing state institutions, while the goal of trusteeship was primarily to civilize individuals. The justifications and principles of international intervention have been reformulated in terms of disparities in efficiency and quality of state institutions, the national and international responsibility for the lives of individuals, and a multilateral/collective search for peace. I will now turn to the reformulation of mechanisms of control, operational and administrative provisions related to peace operations to show how they also reflect these changes and how the whole activity of reconstruction is transformed.

Despite the tasks performed by peacekeepers having changed since Cold War times, the UN still considered that there was a mismatch between normative shifts and the existing international machinery to reconstruct states. Based on this diagnosis, the report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change – "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility" – published in 2004 insisted on the need to reform the institutional and operational apparatus of UN peacekeeping, so that "the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect" (UN, 2004, para.203) could be translated into guidelines for action. In 2005, the proposals of institutional reform outlined by the Secretary-General in "In Larger Freedom" and authorized by the final document of the World Summit (UN, 2005) determined the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission to develop best practices concerning the coordination of relevant actors in reconstruction processes and the financing of their activities.[120] In the next year, the UN began the reform of its Department of

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[120] According to the document, financial aspects of reconstruction activities needed more transparency to encourage donors. Therefore, it was determined that the meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission would be attended by representatives of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other institutions that offered financial support (UN, 2005). Administrative and budgetary issues related to reconstruction activities were also the focus of the report "Peace Operations 2010", published by the DPKO in 2005, that made recommendations for restructuring peacekeeping in five areas: resources; personnel; organizational structure; and

Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), what should change the way reconstruction was organized and translated into actions on the field (DPKO, 2009).[121]

One of the most important changes in the DPKO was the establishment of a complementary department, the Department of Field Support (DFS), which took immediate control of field activities in all ongoing operations as well as of a budget of over 5 billion dollars (GA/10602, 2007).[122] Together, the DPKO and the DFS should face two main challenges: first, to institutionalize the learning process about peace operations; and second, to standardize central peacekeeping activities, including those planned and performed by its partners, regardless of the context. To do so, they considered it essential to bring together the experiences collected over the nearly 60 years of peace operations and use tested and accepted practices to guide UN teams and its partners in carrying out their roles and responsibilities in new missions and/or new assignments for ongoing operations. To both Departments, the result of this effort should be a "new doctrine" of peace operations, as well as a complete set of manuals and training materials with guidelines on expectations and procedures of directed mainly to the field teams and made available on the internet (DPKO; DFS, 2008).

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doctrine (DPKO, 2005). The recommendations were incorporated to a document submitted to the General Assembly in 2006 (A/60/696) and guided the beginning of the reform of the DPKO that is still in course.

[121] As the DFS took control of field activities, the focus of the DPKO turned to improving the planning of missions, the elaboration of policies, and the staff training. The reform began with investments in information technology (IT), strategic communication, logistics, recruitment and training, and monitoring (DPKO, 2009). Later, the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (PETD) was created, merging the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PBPS), the Integrated Training Service (ITS) and some smaller groups dedicates to evaluation mechanisms and management of partnerships (DPKO, 2009). As part of the DPKO reform, its Policy Division was strengthen with the creation of two new offices, the Office of Military Affairs and the Office of Rule of Law and security (GA/10602, 2007), toughening its institutional and operational structure.

[122] The DFS would be responsible for improving the daily working of reconstruction. Inside the Department there are: the Logistics Support Division (LSD), responsible for implementing and monitoring all logistic activities related to peace operations (LSD, 2009); and the Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU), that incorporated the Conduct and Discipline Team of the DPKO. The CDU is responsible for developing and monitoring disciplinary procedures, training, investigating complaints, conducting studies, elaborating reports, and releasing information to peacekeeping partners and to the media (CDU, 2009). The DFS also operates the Contingent Owned Equipment System (COE System) that organizes and supervises member states contributions to peace operations (DFS, 2009).

5.2.2.
Indoctrinating Peace

The "Capstone Doctrine" (officially United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines) was published by the DPKO/DFS in 2008 and is probably the most complete inventory of UN activities aimed at promoting and maintaining international peace and security. According to Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations at the time, the idea was systematizing normative frameworks, principles, institutional resources and experiences related to peace operations and translating them into clear directives, focal areas, guidelines, policies and standard operating procedures (DPKO; DFS, 2008). In this sense, the ten chapters of the Capstone Doctrine are a key to understanding the modus operandi of state reconstruction, which it organizes in three parts: (i) the evolution of UN peacekeeping; (ii) operations planning; and (iii) successful strategies for implementing mandates.

The first part summarizes the story about the changing nature of conflicts demanding international attention in the post-Cold War – from interstate to intrastate conflicts – and how it has transformed both the nature of peace processes and the work of international organizations, particularly the United Nations, to promote it. According to the Capstone Doctrine, the foundation of international peace would be states capable of conduct their populations through a path paved by democracy, individual rights and sustained human development. In places where states were unable or unwilling to do so, the international society should take charge of reconstructing them by deploying peace operations to revamp local institutions and structures, and eliminate current and potential causes of violent conflict. In this scenario, missions should be understood as broad political processes that require the combination of the UN's main instruments of peace and security – preventive diplomacy, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding – (see Figure 11), and sometimes the use of force (DPKO; DFS, 2008).

Figure 11: Peace Process
DPKO; DFS, 2008, p.19

Among the many topics discussed in the next two parts of the document, emphasis is given to the multidimensional nature of reconstruction activities and to the need to engage external partners (state and non-state actors) in different moments of their deployment. The Capstone Doctrine divided the political process of peace in three sequential (also overlapping) phases – stabilization; peace consolidation; and long-term recovery and development –, each one characterized by a specific set of tasks to be performed by different groups of actors. Figure 12 illustrates the phases of peace processes, highlighting the multidimensional character of the activities that should be performed and the division of the reconstruction labor between international partners.


Figure 12: Stages and activities of multidimensional peace operations
DPKO; DFS, 2008, p.23

It is interesting to notice that tasks and actors involved in state reconstruction are organized in three focal areas – security; humanitarian

assistance; and development – that guide the integrated planning process of peace operations, described in detail in Chapter 5 of the Capstone Doctrine.[123] The document acknowledges particularities of each of these areas and determines that they will have a specific fund raising and action plans, leaving to the DPKO the responsibility for coordinating them in a collective effort towards peace.

It is possible to establish an overall connection between these areas and the stages of peace processes also defined in the Capstone Doctrine, albeit with vast gray areas between them. Usually, before peacekeeping operations are authorized by the Security Council, humanitarian organizations – such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for example – begin their work in conflict zones, providing emergency assistance to affected populations. These organizations are often associated to the United Nations and supply decisive information for authorizing, planning and establishing peace operations. Once UN troops arrive, they combine their efforts with those of humanitarian teams in order to stabilize the situation as soon as possible. In fact, ensuring safety and access to humanitarian workers are elements found in almost every peacekeeping mandate and considered essential to operations' success because, according to the UN, they "enable an effective response for the people we serve" (OCHA, 2012, para.8).[124]

Once a peacekeeping operation is established, emergency relief is combined with stabilizing efforts of international forces and the beginning of a political process to reconstruct state institutions and basic infrastructure. Reaching a minimum degree of security and outlining new state institutions – usually with the conduction of free and democratic elections – are the most important requirements for development assistance organizations stepping in. The organizations involved are normally branches of UN agencies or of the World Bank Group which have

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[123] According to the Capstone Doctrine (2008), organizing and coordinating the planning process are responsibilities of the DPKO and a fundamental step for the success of the peace process, since it puts all partners on the same page about the objectives of the missions and the best way to achieving them. Chapter 5 is dedicated to the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP). Besides security concerns related to the stabilization of conflict situations and establishment of the foundations of state reconstruction, normally covered by peacekeeping operations mandates, Chapter 5 identifies and describes two other areas that require specific planning: humanitarian and development assistance (DPKO; DFS, 2008), and details how they should be conducted.

[124] According to OCHA (2012), although the mandates of humanitarian organizations is to deliver aid in a neutral, independent and impartial manner, the challenges found on the ground often require that they work side by side with UN peacekeepers or political officers to fulfill their duties. At the same time, a primary justification for peacekeeping operations is alleviating human suffering, what is virtually impossible without the collaboration of humanitarian teams (OCHA, 2012). For both reasons, peacekeepers and humanitarian workers have developed a system to integrate their efforts, described in the Capstone Doctrine (2008).

special funds for financing basic development activities and providing analytical and advisory services to countries under reconstruction that, therefore, are not considered appealing for international investors.[125] Their participation is essential for the beginning of the stage of Peace Consolidation and especially for the transition to the final stage, Long-Term Recovery and Development, when regular development organizations (such as other branches of the WB and the IMF) and other international organizations gradually establish their connection to the reconstructed state (UNDG, 2014).

As a result of the structural integration between security, development and humanitarian assistance detailed in the Capstone Doctrine (2008), a single UN official often wears three hats at the same time: deputy head of the peacekeeping or political mission (Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General); highest-ranking humanitarian representative (Humanitarian Coordinator); and chief development official (Resident Coordinator).[126] The expectation expressed by the United Nations is that a reconstruction process that effectively coordinates the work of international and local actors, and combines actions of security, development and humanitarian assistance will be able to transform the entire structure of the state and the context in which its population lives, building a long lasting peace. The arch of reconstruction would be completed once UN officials and other international experts could be replaced by local agents on the control of the renovated state and its institutions, which would continue to operate following international standards of good governance. At this point, these states should be ready to follow the road of sustained (human) development on their own and reestablish their ties with the international society, now as recognized and fully accepted (good) members that would no longer represent a threat for peace and security.

When we take a closer look at the reinvention of peace operations after the Cold War, as this section attempted to do, at least two aspects are obvious: first, how maintaining and promoting systemic order is increasingly understood as a prerogative of international organizations; and second, how state reconstruction becomes the primary mechanism through which it could be done. In this process,

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[125] As it has been discussed in Chapter 3, these organizations and agencies also provide assistance to poor countries that are not necessarily under reconstruction.

[126] In 2012, for example, this was the case in 11 of the 18 international integrated interventions for state reconstruction (OCHA, 2012).

the state is constantly reproduced as the norm – the best, and possibly the only, way of organizing life in political communities –, and constantly distinguished from deviant others that should be treated. In many senses, the state was reinforced as the unity of international society and the guardian of international order itself. However, beyond its sovereign *form*, the legitimacy of particular states has been progressively tied to their mechanisms for governing populations, in a multilaterally articulated discursive formation that linked the very notion of statehood to ideas like democracy, human rights and development. The *content* of the state, its means of government, were also connected to prospects of international peace and security and gradually converted into objects of international scrutiny. Underlying the idea that peace operations and state reconstruction could be used as tools to advance an agenda for peace, there is also a belief that it would no longer be enough to restore the borders of the state and its prerogative to control a territory and a population. Order no longer rested upon the mechanisms of governance of particular states; it depended on the deployment of international techniques of government directed to conducting conduct of states. Of some states, at least.

Reconstruction efforts, therefore, have been informed by the idea that the world can be divided in two groups, responsible and irresponsible states, a perception substantiated by innumerous standards, patterns, indicators and so on that have translated "good governance" into very specific lines of state conduct. In just a few years, the liberal tradition professed by some states and groups around the world became a model for the whole world, an international model, or, to be more precise, a universal model that should be reproduced. Following this logic, the international society and its organizations no longer represented a group of states (or *the state* as a possibility for political relations), or civilization, as they claimed to do in the past; they were now committed to represent and (re)construct (when and wherever necessary) viable states in relation to the individuals within their jurisdiction. To be accurate, in the post-Cold War, international organizations such as the UN have put forward a claim to represent humanity. They reconstructed to save, to include, to develop humanity. In fact, they claimed to have the responsibility and the mandate to protect humanity – and this order of things made the argument for intervention much more powerful.

Actually, this way of differentiating and organizing difference is essential to produce the authority of those entitled to administer it, in this case, international organizations. The claim that peace operations will bring peace to the world and preserve the international society by converting bad states into good states produces the authority of peacekeepers as administrators of difference and of transformation.[127] While the problem "how to be a state" became "how to be a good state", peace operations emerged as an ensemble of techniques of power directed to normalizing the conduct of the so-called bad, irresponsible, failed, deviant states. They would, at the same time, *subject* them to a model of state practice and *subjectify* them as (good) members of international society, members that could contribute to its expansion and perpetuation. In this sense, they end up serving as *gatekeepers* who have a mandate to manage the flux of life through the border that still separates international society from its others. If "the state", as a model, is the subject of international society *par excellence*, the new discursive construct about peace and security turns (some) states into objects of investigation and intervention that one day might become subjects. Peace operations, therefore, can be reinterpreted as one of the means through which power operates on the borders of the international society, representing a meticulous ritual of power for subjectifying political communities: they are free for being states and act as states to the extension that their subjection to the rules makes this freedom possible.

In the next section, I will go over this meticulous ritual of power with a magnifying glass, by reviewing documents that describe the modus operandi of state reconstruction on the field. These documents refer to projects developed in the areas of security, humanitarian assistance and development, as part of the multidimensional reconstruction processes conducted by the UN in Haiti, Timor-Leste, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Liberia – comprising the period between 1998 and 2009. I will identify the components of reconstruction in each of the three areas and give an account of which tasks they comprise. My goal is to unveil how the relations of power between international society and its others become capillary techniques of government; also to discuss how these capillary techniques may give us a glimpse of both norm and normalization

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[127] The idea of ownership and the involvement of local agents in reconstruction process are also essential for constructing this authority and will be discussed in the next section.

5.3
(Re)Constructing States

When one is looking for cases of UN peace operations to analyze in depth, there is no shortage of options, and the choices that are made often leave some good material behind. This will not be different here. As my objective was to study reconstruction processes, and not one specific case of reconstruction in one specific place, I have tried to select cases that match the model described in the Capstone Doctrine: comprehensive multidimensional operations, involving all sorts of partners, and combining actions in the areas of security, humanitarian assistance and development. In addition, to cover the whole process I needed well documented cases in which the UN considered reconstruction to be completed, or to be close to the stage of Long-term Recovery and Development. Since the model presented by the Capstone Doctrine is based on the best practices used in UN missions so far (DPKO; DFS, 2008), I also needed cases in which the mission was finished or got close to the stage of long-term recovery around the time when the document was published, that is 2008.

The most obvious choice was Liberia, with the UNMIL.[128] The UN's page about success in peacekeeping opens with a picture from the mission's archive, showing Ellen Johnson Sirleaf after she won the 2005 presidential election conducted by the UNMIL,[129] and refers to Liberia as one of the Organization's

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[128] Between 1993 and 1997 there was another peacekeeping operation in Liberia, UNOMIL (United Nations Observer mission in Liberia, established by the Security Council (S/RES/866, 1993) to monitor a ceasefire agreement – negotiated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with the support of the Organization of the African Unity (OAU) (Aning, 1999) – and assist the peace process. The mandate of the UNOMIL, as the name of the mission suggests, was limited in scope and did not include proper reconstruction activities. Following the national elections in 1997, the Security Council established the UNOL (United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia) to work assist the Liberian government in the promotion of national reconciliation and good governance, and encourage international support for reconstruction and development activities (UN, 2000). The UNOL was considered the first UN experience in supporting post-conflict reconstruction; however, its activities followed the peacekeeping operation in the country instead of being part of it (Adebajo, 2002). The activities of the UNOL were resumed in 2003 when another period of civil conflict in the country led to the establishment of the UNMIL.

[129] Sirleaf was not only the first Liberian president elected since the UNMIL started its activities. She was also the first woman to be elected head of state in Africa and was re-elected in 2011. In the same year, she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, along with the also Liberian Leymah Gbowee and Tawakel Karman, from Yemen, "for their non-violent struggle for the safety of women and for women's rights to full participation in peace-building work" (Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2011). The Nobel Committee press release also said "we cannot achieve democracy and lasting peace in the world unless women obtain the same opportunities as men to influence developments at all levels of society". In 2014, Sirleaf was listed by Forbes as the 70th most powerful woman in the world (Forbes, 2014). To the UN, her government symbolizes a new era

greatest achievements in peace processes (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2014). The case frequently serves as a model for new peace operations and many of the best practices described in the Capstone Doctrine were developed and/or tested in Liberia (UN Forum, 2005; UN Foundation, 2012). Another case regarded as a success by the UN is Timor-Leste and its three peacekeeping operations, UNTAET, UNMISET, and UNMIT (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2014). To me, it was an example of another well documented and highly complex reconstruction process that had reached its final stage. Most importantly, it happened in a different continent, and did not have most of its projects financed by a single rich state as Liberia did (by the USA government and American civil society organizations).

Haiti was an interesting choice considering its location,[130] but also for other reasons. The country had one peacekeeping mission focused in the security area (police training) from 1998 until 2000 (MIPONUH), and later a comprehensive reconstruction operation (MINUSTAH) started in 2004 and that should be concluded in 2008. It is considered relatively successful and important for the development of the UN's capacity to react to unexpected situations, particularly natural catastrophe (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2014). Closing the list is the operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUC,[131] considered one of the most challenging cases of multidimensional reconstruction, and including innumerous setbacks regarding civilian protection, human rights violations and resume of violence (Bayo, 2012; Cilliers, Malan, 2001; Grono, 2006). It is one of the longest ongoing multidimensional peace operations, having started its activities in 1999.

Following the time frame of the four cases of reconstruction analyzed here, the research will cover the period between 1998 and 2009. The year 2009 has

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for Liberian politics, an era that has the mark of good governance and was only possible due to the success of international intervention.

[130] Considering this aspect, the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo would also be an interesting case. However, the organization of the mission is very different from all the others, especially due to the direct involvement of the European Union in tasks that are exclusive responsibility of the UN in almost every other mission.

[131] The operation has been renamed MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in 2010, following Security Council Resolution 1925. This would "reflect the new phase reached in the country" and concentrate international teams and their partners to concentrate in the "protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders" and "to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts" (MONUSCO, 2014).

been chosen because it was then that the operations in Liberia, Timor-Leste and the Democratic Republic of the Congo should have been concluded (the operation in Haiti would originally be finished in 2008). Although all mission mandates have been extended,[132] there were no additions to their mandates that have significantly changed the course of the reconstruction processes. Therefore, the period of ten years that has been studied covers most part of the basic activities usually involved in the reconstruction of states by the UN and its partners.

The selection of documents was based on the division of tasks proposed by the Capstone Doctrine, according to which reconstruction activities are divided in three areas – security, humanitarian assistance and development. Activities related to the security area are defined by the Security Council in the mandate of a peacekeeping operation and detailed in the mission's Budget, a document elaborated annually by the DPKO/DFS and approved by the General Assembly. The expenditure on security and the progress of the activities are revised in the mission's Financial Performance Report, another annual document released by the General Assembly (A/60/696, 2006). Both the Budget and the Financial Performance Reports translate the security objectives established in the mandate into specific goals, tasks and indicators that should facilitate the deployment and evaluation of the operation. At any time, the Security Council can review the security activities to be developed and adjust the mission's mandate.

The activities of humanitarian assistance are planed and deployed following the guidelines established in two kinds of documents: the Consolidated Humanitarian Appeal Process (CHAP); and the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). They are both annual reports elaborated by the UN, containing the description of humanitarian assistance projects proposed by the Organization's peace teams and other agencies, NGOs and agencies from partner states to a specific country/emergency situation. They also inform the amount of resources required for each project; who is contributing; how much has been given; and the percentage of the total that has been covered. The final sections review the status of projects mentioned in earlier reports and give an account of the humanitarian situation in the targeted region or country.

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[132] The reconstruction activities of the MINUSTAH in Haiti and the UNMIL in Liberia were still going on in February 2015. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as it has been said, the MONUC was renamed MONUSCO in 2010 and this operation is still in course. In Timor-Leste, the UNMIT was concluded in 31 December 2012, marking the departure of UN peacekeepers.

Finally, development assistance tasks are defined in two groups of documents. The first, prepared by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), deals specifically with the activities from the beginning of the reconstruction process, detailed in the Joint Assessment Missions (JAM) and in the Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNA). The second group of documents consists of the Common Country Assessment (CCA), the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). It describes projects focused on the reestablishment of cooperation between the government of the reconstructed state and the UN system and other development partners. These projects are normally developed in later stages of the peace process with the participation of local authorities and are regarded as an opportunity for them to practice what they have been learning about good governance.

Part of the research for this chapter consisted of reviewing these sets of documents and trying to identify which are the main components of reconstruction in the areas of security, humanitarian assistance and development; and which subcomponents are attached to them. The components and subcomponents of each area are pretty much the same in all the cases studied, reinforcing the argument that they refer to a model of good governance that should be followed by every country.[133] However, the names listed in the next sections follow my categorization; it is similar to what can be found in UN documents, but has been simplified and adjusted to create a single representation based on what has been found in the four cases studied. In another stage of the research, the projects developed in each area have been analyzed to identify goals and specific tasks of the subcomponents, giving me a better understanding of what is done during reconstruction and how it is done.[134] Again, the description of these activities is a representation of the reconstruction work that I have created to encompass all four cases studied.

In the next sections, I will show how reconstruction tasks and actors were organized in security, humanitarian assistance and development areas and how they interacted in a collective effort aiming at preserving and promoting peace.

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[133] Of course, there are variations intended to adjust the peace process to particularities found in each country, but they do not significantly alter the course of reconstruction.

[134] First, I have considered all projects that should be developed, but I have later excluded those that were not financed.

With this, I intend to discuss how the concept of multidimensional reconstruction implies the redefinition of the role of international organizations, especially the United Nations, in peace operations: to coordinate a division of the work between organizations and agencies that are increasingly specialized. This specialization, I will argue, reflects the redefinition of the very notion of peace and the means to reach it, increasingly associated to the reform of the state following a model of good governance that combines security, development and humanitarianism and is considered to be universal. Peace, therefore, would come from a coordinated international work to subject states (especially state institutions) according to a particular understanding of statehood and of sovereignty, based on the corollary of liberal democracy.

5.3.1
Security

The mandate of a multidimensional peace operation is usually organized in groups of tasks, later translated in the mission's Budget as the components of the reconstruction process. Based on the cases studied, these groups of tasks or components normally refer to: (i) Ceasefire; (ii) Security Sector Reform; (iii) Human and Humanitarian Rights and Rule of Law; (iv) Peace Process and Consolidation; and (v) Support.[135] Those components were held relatively constant during the period of activity of the missions considered here. The only exception is "Ceasefire" that was not a component of the operation in Haiti and was excluded from the attributions in Liberia in 2007.[136] Each component is related to several subcomponents, according to the specific tasks that the mission is supposed to perform, as Figure 13 shows.

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[135] The activities of Support are related to securing mission's facilities and personnel. As their focus is securing the means of reconstruction and not any specific end, this component will not be considered in the analysis.

[136] The mandate of the MINUSTAH does determine that the mission should ensure a secure and stable environment and assist security forces; However, Ceasefire is not listed as an attribution. In Liberia, the component was removed in 2007 as the UN understood that the tasks related to it were accomplished or could be taken over by local government.

Components	Subcomponents
Ceasefire	Maintain security and ceasefire; DDRR; Policy Formulation and Implementation
Security Sector Reform	Restructure Police Service; Restructure National Armed Forces; Maintain order and security; Monitoring and Research; Capacity-building; Restructure Legal and Correctional systems; Infrastructure
Humanitarian and Human Rights and Rule of Law	DDRR; Refugees and IDPs; Humanitarian Assistance; Protection of Human Rights; Legal Frameworks, Policy Formulation and Implementation; Infrastructure and Basic Services; Investigation, Justice and Reconciliation; Capacity-building; Monitoring and Research
Peace Process and Consolidation	Legal frameworks, policy formulation and implementation; Elections/Referendums; DDRR; Monitoring and Research; Capacity-building; Infrastructure; Refugees and IDPs

Figure 13: Components and Subcomponents of Peace Operations (Security)
Based on: Mandates, Budgets and Financial Performance Reports of the UNMIL, MONUC, MINUSTAH, UNTAET, UNMISET, UNMIT (1999-2009).

The components "Ceasefire" and "Security Sector Reform" relate to the broader objective to restore state's capacity to maintain security and monopolize the means of violence; also, enable the (re)constitution of a civil society, especially through Disarmament, Demobilization (DD) processes. In its turn, "Peace Process" includes (re)construction of institutions and administrative structures as means to restore the basis of a sovereign state and, progressively, let it regain independence in relation to international actors and extend central authority to the whole territory under its jurisdiction. Moreover, with elections being understood as part of Peace Process, it is clear that the independence of this state that is being recreated as a legitimate subject of international society does not include total autonomy in organizing political relations domestically. On the contrary, democracy appears as the model for organizing this relations and an essential step on the path towards peace.

The inclusion of elements of protection and promotion of individual rights and freedom indicates the importance attributed to legal frameworks that characterize modern democratic states. In its turn, the presence of subcomponents related to humanitarian assistance during the whole period aims to facilitate control over emergency situations and also to guarantee the improvement of basic life standards, including education, health and nutrition. Another subcomponent relates to Rehabilitation and Reintegration (RR), including training of former combatants and groups affected by violence in exchange for food and/or money in the short run and, in the long run, for jobs and financing of productive activities

carried out by these groups and the communities which received them. Besides helping to stabilize the security situation, creating work and livelihood opportunities for former combatants fosters the reconstitution of an internal market. The existence of an internal market, along with stability and the support of a functioning legal framework and international standards of governance would accredit the reconstructed state to receive resources from international partners in the form of grants, loans and even investments. These partnerships should be reinforced by development activities and help to finance reconstruction and (re)integrate internal and international markets.

Figure 14 details the main activities related to each subcomponent, based on the projects developed in the cases studied.

Component: Ceasefire	
Maintain security and ceasefire	Monitor ceasefire agreements; confiscate unauthorized weapons; ensure freedom of movement; security of key facilities, staff and partners
DDRR	Conduct voluntary disarmament and demobilization; destruction of weapons and ammunition; conduct reintegration and rehabilitation programs
Policy Formulation and Implementation	Establish DDRR commission and programs; create DDRR implementation plan; technical assistance to DDRR program implementation
Component: Security Sector Reform	
Restructure Police Service	Create technical committee and plan for reforming, restructuring and rebuilding domestic police; recruitment and training of police officers; veto police officers for lack of competence or HR violations; increase police contingent; establish special units to support women and young people; create military units in different regions; remove high caliber weapons from police contingent
Restructure National Armed Forces	Dismantle irregular forces; create and implement armed forces reform plan (partnership with IO and UN member states); recruitment and training; improve operational capacity of police and armed forces
Maintain Order and Security	Provide technical assistance and support to police and armed forces; patrol targeted areas and strategic facilities
Monitoring and Research	Monitor the police and armed forces; create crimes database; monitor correctional system; monitor and report trials; monitor tribal and traditional courts (compliance to international standards and legal practices)
Capacity-building	Create Law courses; train professors and justice professionals; offer scholarships; assist the creation and consolidation of legal associations; HR, democracy, gender issues and combat to sexual abuse training to justice professionals, police and armed forces contingents; offer training on legal procedures and processes, mediation and combating corruption
Restructure Legal and Correctional Systems	Create national plans of judicial and correctional reform; assist and coordinate legal, judicial and correctional reform, according to international conventions; establish and assist courts; recruit and train

	judges and justice professionals; technical assistance and provision of reference materials about legal and correctional systems
Infrastructure	Rehabilitate infrastructure of the judicial system; reform detention centers

Component: Humanitarian and Human Rights and Rule of Law	
DDRR	Rehabilitation and Reintegration programs (jobs, training, campaigns); monitor and coordinate programs of partner organizations
Refugees and IDPs	Repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of refugees and IDPs; reconstruction of community ties
Humanitarian Assistance	Ensure access of humanitarian organizations to local population; support and train NGOs and civil society organizations
Protection of Human Rights	Protect Human Rights and fundamental freedoms
Legal Frameworks, Policy Formulation and Implementation	Provide technical assistance to planning, coordination and implementation of development and reconstruction policies; assist the creation of legal frameworks in accordance with international standards; assist and train government workers on Human and Humanitarian Rights, DDRR and donor-beneficiary relations; assist DDRR programs; assist policy formulation and implementation plans related to HR; develop local capacity to monitor and protect HR; assist the formulation of anti-corruption legislation; strengthen legal frameworks; report HR and Rule of Law situation to donors and partners
Infrastructure and Basic Services	Rehabilitation of infrastructure and basic services
Investigation, Justice and Reconciliation	Establish independent HR commissions, and truth and reconciliation commissions; establish local committees for peace, reconciliation and dispute settlement; create plan for correctional reform; regulate courts (including tribal and traditional) according to international standards; reform judicial and correctional systems; investigate human rights violations and cases brought to courts
Capacity-building	Offer HR training to local government, IOs and NGOs staffs and local communities; offer HR courses to law students; create national campaign about HR, dispute settlement, reconciliation and good governance; open communication channels between government, UN agencies, IOs, NGOs and donors; train justice professionals
Monitoring and Research	Create and update databases on environmental issues, natural resources, HR, humanitarian assistance, justice, correction, health, RR

Component: Peace Process and Consolidation	
Legal Frameworks, Policy Formulation and Implementation	Rebuild local institutions and administrative structure; consolidate national authority; reform national constitution; encourage dialogue between local government, political leaderships and civil society; present reconstruction and stability plan to donors; run national reconciliation campaigns; offer training on policy formulation and implementation; establish legal frameworks for natural resources; coordinate actions of UN, IGOs, NGOs partner states; encourage the return of local leaders and public employees to their functions; economic management; support to the establishment of international partnerships
Elections/ Referendums	Elaborate electoral law; create and assist electoral commission; elaborate plan to secure free elections; register and train voters; encourage female participation; train and support journalists and international observers; run educational campaigns about elections; run local and national elections; ensure
DDRR	Increase number of RR program participants; expand job and income

	generation programs to receiving communities
Monitoring and Research	Establish and assist monitoring and implementation committees; prepare general and financial reports to the UN, other organizations and donors; prepare reports on humanitarian issues; monitor DDRR programs, borders and land mines
Capacity-building	Train local journalists and leaders; train local staffs to replace international ones; train local government workers in practices of good governance, economic management and establishment of international partnerships; create national strategy for empowering women; increase and train teams to respond to humanitarian emergencies
Infrastructure	Establish local government units and public services networks in different regions; establish and support local radio stations
Refugees and IDPs	Improve humanitarian conditions; support the return of refugees and IDPs; job and income generation programs for returned groups

Figure 14: Activities of Reconstruction (Security)
Based on: Mandates, Budgets and Financial Performance Reports of the UNMIL, MONUC, MINUSTAH, UNTAET, UNMISET, UNMIT (1999-2009).

Concentrating on the activities of peace operations, one can notice that they do not aim at reconstructing any kind of state, but a democratic state with a strong internal market and public administration guided by good governance standards, as defined by international organizations. Once functioning, this state would be capable of offering better life conditions to its population and act as a legitimate member of international system and its main institutions. However, the conclusion of this project would depend on the support offered by humanitarian and development activities that will be discussed in the following sections.

5.3.2
Humanitarian Assistance

In all the countries studied, humanitarian assistance preceded the establishment of the peace operation and was adapted later to accompany its deployment.[137] In these cases, almost all important humanitarian projects developed were part of the country's CAP (Consolidated Appeal Process). The CAP report is elaborated by OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

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[137] In Liberia and Haiti there was a CAP one year before the peace operation was established. In Timor-Leste and Congo, the CAP was released in the same year as the UN missions, however, activities started months before. In all cases, the information provided by the OCHA was essential to design the peace operations – especially their humanitarian assistance component – and the CAP was later adapted to coordinate the humanitarian work and the reconstruction process.

Affairs),[138] that defines it as "[…] a tool developed by aid organizations in a country or region to raise funds for humanitarian action as well as to plan, implement and monitor their activities together" (OCHA, 2009, para.1). According to OCHA, since its implementation in 1992, CAP became a reference for humanitarian community, including "[...] non-governmental organizations, United Nations agencies, and other international and local organizations" (OCHA, 2009, para.3) as it offers "a more strategic approach" (para.2) to provide assistance and encourage cooperation between agencies, governments and donors (OCHA, 2009).[139]

As with peace operations' budgets, CAP projects are organized in relation to the broad objectives of humanitarian assistance in each country. Applying the same categorization, these objectives are identified as components and subcomponents. The final sections of CAP contain a summary of the projects that should be carried out, including: the organization responsible for them; the estimated cost of the projects; their financing sources; and the sum that has been raised so far. OCHA also releases the status of projects in course or that have been developed in previous years, containing the same kind of information. Although humanitarian appeals are often intended to cover one year of activities, sometimes projects are extended and there is not a new appeal every year.

Again like peace operations, the components and subcomponents of humanitarian assistance that appear in the CAP are similar in the cases studied and appear recurrently during the period investigated. This reflects the standardization effort that has been made specifically in the field of humanitarian assistance, but also in the field of peace and security in general. Figure 15 shows

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[138] OCHA is part of the United Nations Secretariat, responsible for "bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies". It also "ensures there is a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort". According to the Office, its mission is to: mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies; advocate the rights of the people in need; promote preparedness and prevention; and facilitate sustainable solutions for humanitarian problems (OCHA, 2014).

[139] In fact, CAP brings together projects of various assistance agencies and the appeal is directed to the international community. Financing can come from the agencies involved, as well as from UN member states, sometimes through specialized organs dedicated to assistance and cooperation. Donations can finance CAP as a whole or be directed to specific projects. Although not all humanitarian assistance organizations join the CAP and some do not include all their projects in the document, broad humanitarian assistance programs, especially those involving large sums of money are normally on the list. As OCHA (2009) points out, the CAP is a way of organizing humanitarian assistance; participating gives credibility to humanitarian organizations and has proven effective to increase financing to their projects.

the components and subcomponents that usually organize humanitarian assistance, according to what could be observed in the cases studied.

Components	Subcomponents
Agriculture	Emergency food support; Monitoring Food Security; DDRR; Capacity-building (Agricultural Development); Policy Formulation (Agricultural Development); Water and Sanitation
Health	Emergency Support/Care; Health Infrastructure; Food; Capacity-building (health); Monitoring; Water and Sanitation; Violence prevention and support to victims; Focal activities: reproductive health; HIV/AIDS; hygiene
Food and Food Security	Food Distribution; DDRR; Policy Formulation; Education (Food assistance to Education); Support to agriculture; Immunization; Monitoring
Shelter and Non-Food Items	DDRR (DDRR Packages and community assistance); Emergency Support; Capacity-building; Infrastructure; Communities Reconstruction and Mediation
Water and Sanitation	Emergency actions; Infrastructure; Hygiene, immunization general disease prevention; Capacity-building
Education	Capacity-building; Monitoring; Infrastructure; DDRR; Support to focal groups
Protection, Human Rights, Rule of Law	DDRR; Capacity-building; Protection and Assistance to vulnerable groups (women, children, refugees, IDPs); Monitoring and Evaluation; Justice
Economic Recovery and Infrastructure	DDRR; Capacity-building; Infrastructure; Job/income generation; Justice; Reconciliation; Policy Formulation
Multi-Sector Assistance (refugees and IDPs)	DDRR; Emergency Assistance; Recovery and Development of communities

Figure 15: Components and Subcomponents of Peace Operations (Humanitarian Assistance)[140] [141] Based on: CAP Liberia (2002-2008); CAP Democratic Republic of the Congo (1999-2005);[142] CAP Timor-Leste (1999; 2000; 2002; 2006-2008);[143] CAP Haiti (2003; 2004; 2007; 2008).

[140] In Haiti, Risk and Disaster Management appear as a component of humanitarian assistance and the same happened in Timor-Leste in 2008. This component and the actions related to it, however, were included as a response to specific environmental circumstances observed in these countries and do not appear regularly in other appeal. Therefore, it will not be considered in the analysis.

[141] In Liberia (2003) and Congo (2003-2005) Mine Action appear as a component of humanitarian assistance. In Liberia, the number of land mines was not considered significant and the component was soon excluded. In the Congo, it was mentioned in three consecutive years, but the actions related to it were not specified. Therefore, this component was not considered in the analysis.

[142] Between 2006 and 2008, there was no CAP for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Instead, OCHA released a Humanitarian Action Plan for the country.

[143] In 2001, there was no complete CAP to Timor-Leste; however, OCHA did release a Financial Summary of the projects that were being developed. The components and subcomponents did not change significantly, even though, the information was not complete and I have decided to exclude this year from the analysis. In 2003 and 2004, the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) launched humanitarian appeals directed to Timor-Leste. Although many of the projects listed were developed in partnership with the UN and other organization, I have decided not to consider it in the analysis.

In most of the cases studied, the plan for humanitarian assistance as described in the CAP was a comprehensive one since the beginning and included most of the components and subcomponents from the table above. However, a significant part of the projects that were planned (and, sometimes financed) was not developed due to lack of security for humanitarian teams. Some of these teams left the country and some never arrived. In Liberia and the Congo, only teams that should provide really emergency care stayed before the arrival of UN peacekeepers and in reduced numbers.

The arrival of peacekeepers and the stabilization of the security situation, even if precarious, coincided with the increase of the humanitarian presence in the countries and of the number of tasks they performed. According to the activities developed, humanitarian assistance can be roughly divided in three phases: emergency relief; continued care; and reconstruction assistance. The first phase is previous or parallel to the establishment of the peacekeeping operation and usually includes tasks related to just three of the humanitarian assistance components listed above: Health; Food and Food Security; and Protection. During this phase, humanitarian teams basically provide emergency health care and protection to vulnerable groups they can reach and distribute food.

When humanitarian organizations consider that the peace operation in course can offer at least a minimum degree of security, assistance reaches its second phase. Then, temporary health units are substituted for permanent ones; health care and food distribution are expanded and intensified; a consistent system of distribution of water is devised and implemented; and broader assistance is provided to refugees and IDPs. Another important task performed during this phase is assistance to contingents that are being disarmed and demobilized. At this point, it is normally emergency health care and the distribution of DDRR packages.

The third phase begins when the security situation is stabilized and peacekeepers have started to reconstruct the institutions of the state under intervention. Then, the focus of humanitarian work shifts to a more comprehensive assistance to the population in response to what are considered to be chronic problems – precarious infrastructure and underdevelopment. This phase is characterized for the increase of the number and range of projects developed relating to all components and subcomponents listed above. Emphasis

is given to activities that could help the state under reconstruction to identify urgent needs and provide better services to its population (research, monitoring, capacity-building, policy formulation) in areas as diverse as agriculture, sanitation and the elaboration of a legal framework that protects human rights. Humanitarian teams also play a special role in what they call "reconstituting a civil society" what should be done through the rehabilitation and reintegration of former combatants to civilian life. This work includes providing sustained assistance to them and their communities and offering education and training so that they could learn skills to allow them to survive in times of peace.[144]

As mentioned in the previous section, the information provided by humanitarian teams is essential for authorizing and devising peacekeeping operations, and for defining the areas they should target during the reconstruction process. Along with stabilization of the security situation, providing access to humanitarians is a central component of these missions and essential for justifying their deployment. This close relation between peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance continues throughout the state's reconstruction. To the UN, improving the humanitarian situation supports the peace process and makes it easier for the population to accept the presence of peacekeepers and other international workers. Also, observing the components and subcomponents of humanitarian assistance it is clear that they contribute directly to build new institutions and even improve the infrastructure of the state under reconstruction. This assistance aims at improving state's capacity to provide basic services to the population and respect human rights. In order to give a better idea of the reconstruction tasks that are performed by humanitarian teams, Figure 16 summarizes the activities related to each component/subcomponent listed in the CAPs of the countries that have been studied.

Component: Agriculture	
Emergency food support	Food distribution
Monitoring Food Security	Research and monitoring

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[144] Parallel to what I have called reconstruction assistance, humanitarian teams continue to carry out emergency activities, especially in the poorer areas of the targeted countries, to assist the most vulnerable groups.

DDRR	Production and distribution of agricultural inputs; training in agricultural practices
Capacity-building	Structural improvement; production and distribution of inputs; livestock recovery; training in agricultural practices; pest control; resume agricultural activities; increase productivity in agriculture
Policy Formulation	Develop national food security strategies and implementation plans
Water and Sanitation	Improve sanitation infrastructure and services; build water wells; develop irrigation systems

Component: Health	
Emergency Support/Care	Provision of emergency medical supplies, equipment and staff; epidemic control; immunization; medicine and vitamin distribution; reduce maternal and child mortality
Health Infrastructure	Build and rehabilitate health facilities; create mobile medical clinics; distribute medicines, medical supplies and equipment; transport supplies, equipment and patients
Food	Supplemental and therapeutic food distribution
Capacity-building	Rehabilitate and equip health training institutions; preventive health education
Monitoring	Research and monitoring (nutrition, epidemiology, healthcare)
Water and Sanitation	Rehabilitate sanitation and water distribution
Violence prevention and support to victims	Physical and psychosocial rehabilitation (sexual violence and mental illnesses); educational campaigns to prevent sexual violence
Focal activities: reproductive health; HIV/AIDS; hygiene	Educational campaigns to prevent HIV/AIDS and PTSD-related diseases; treatment of HIV/AIDS and PTSD-related diseases; reproductive health educational campaigns; monitor and improve hygiene conditions

Component: Food and Food Security	
Food Distribution	Food distribution; food distribution to targeted groups (IDPs, refugees, returned groups, DDRR program participants); distribution of therapeutic food (prevent and treat malnutrition, prevent mortality)
DDRR	Food-for-work and food-for-training (DDRR participants and communities)
Policy Formulation	Strategic planning; capacity-building for decision-making; policy formulation
Education (Food assistance to Education)	Food distribution to increase access to education
Support to Agriculture	Input, supply and equipment distribution (agriculture, livestock, fishing, urban horticulture); infrastructure rehabilitation
Immunization	Immunization (targeted diseases)
Monitoring	Research and monitoring

Component: Shelter and Non-Food Items	
DDRR	Distribution to DDRR packages (individuals and communities)
Emergency Support	Emergency shelter for IDPs, refugees and receiving communities

Capacity-building	Capacity-building in local institutions, communities, businesses
Infrastructure	Rehabilitation of permanent shelters; rehabilitation of water and sanitation infrastructure
Communities Reconstruction and Mediation	Initiate reconstruction dialogue; communitarian participatory planning for physical and social reconstruction

Component: Water and Sanitation	
Emergency actions	Water distribution
Infrastructure	Construct and maintain septic tanks and sanitary facilities; water distribution infrastructure (schools, healthcare facilities, camps)
Hygiene, immunization general disease prevention	Educational campaigns (prevention and treatment of cholera and diarrhea); immunization (focal diseases); improvement of general hygiene conditions on camps
Capacity-building	Training and training-support for local institutions

Component: Education	
Capacity-building	Training and assistance to teachers, caregivers and parents; training for education professionals (curriculum and learning materials development); educational campaigns (prevention and control of HIV/AIDS; gender issues)
Monitoring	Monitoring and evaluation of educational activities; research and development of educational database
Infrastructure	Renovation of schools and educational facilities; distribution of learning materials, supplies and equipment to schools and educational facilities
DDRR	Training; skills development activities; psychological and social support to children and child-soldiers
Support to focal groups	Support to the education of children (especially girls)

Component: Protection, Human Rights, Rule of Law	
DDRR	Support to DDRR programs and reconciliation processes
Capacity-building	Educational campaigns and training about Human and Humanitarian Rights (police, health and education professionals)
Protection and Assistance to vulnerable groups (women, children, refugees, IDPs)	Delivery of basic assistance and healthcare; improve educational infrastructure; prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS and PTSD-related diseases; prevention and response to sexual violence; psychological and social assistance to victims of violence; assistance to the return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs; empowerment of women; prevention of family separation and family reunification
Monitoring and Evaluation	Research and monitoring rights; development of conflict and violence maps; database about family separation; improvement and monitoring of detention centers; elaboration and publication of information and report
Justice	Investigation and documentation of violence during conflict (support to courts); property rights to IDPs; support the reform of the correctional system; legal assistance; combat human trafficking; support to transitional justice; capacity-building on justice; support state communitarian presence; support to communitarian protection groups; increase and regularize birth registry

Component: Economic Recovery and Infrastructure	
DDRR	Job and income generation to DDRR program participants; support to the development of receiving communities
Capacity-building	Planning and management of community recovery; training and skills development; educational campaigns about Human Rights
Infrastructure	Rehabilitation of public buildings; infrastructure rehabilitation and improvement (roads, rails, airways, power, communications, water distribution, sanitation system); rehabilitation of local market
Job/income generation	Create jobs in emergency activities; microcredit to local businesses and agriculture
Justice	Support transitory justice; legal assistance to victims of violence
Reconciliation	Support to victims of violence; promote peace and trust in local communities
Policy Formulation	Formulation and improvement of financial and sustainable development policies; support to the development of financial supervision, insurance and safeguard systems; build local capacity to decentralize healthcare access; support the establishment and management of a fund for agro-industrial development

Component: Multi-Sector Assistance (Refugees and IDPs)	
DDRR	Support repatriation, return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs; support subsistence of refugees, IDPs and receiving communities
Emergency Assistance	Basic care; support return and repatriation; emergency assistance programs to refugees and IDPs (especially to their reintegration); establishment and management of early-warning and early-response systems to crisis situations
Recovery and Development of communities	Infrastructure rehabilitation and development action in receiving communities; monitor food security (refugees and IDPs); support reconciliation (reintegration, job and income generation to returning groups areas with high migration rates); cross-border cooperation for repatriation of refugees; human development programs to borderline areas

Figure 16: Activities of Reconstruction (Humanitarian Assistance).
Based on: CAP Liberia (2002-2008); CAP Democratic Republic of the Congo (1999-2005); CAP Timor-Leste (1999; 2000; 2002; 2006-2008); CAP Haiti (2003; 2004; 2007; 2008).

If the deployment of the peacekeeping operation would give the state the monopoly over the means of violence in its territory (ensuring security in its traditional sense), humanitarian assistance would develop state's capacity to guarantee the human aspects of security, as defined by the UNDP (1994). Economic security would be fostered with direct investments in productive activities – as the ones developed by former combatants, returned IDPs, refugees and the communities that received them –, microcredit, provision of inputs for production and training people to work in times of peace. Food security would be improved through food distribution, food-for-work programs (as part of DDRR) and support for agriculture and other economic activities. These actions are also

related to community security, as well as projects of reconciliation and education for peace and democracy.

Personal and public security are related to the (re)construction of institutions and infrastructure. Hence, humanitarian agencies carried out projects to support the creation of a strong legal framework, based on respect for human rights, maintenance of peace, protection of civilians and development of monitoring mechanisms. Moreover, humanitarians supported diffusion of democracy through training, capacity-building education for peace and national reconciliation in all levels of the society, from schoolchildren to president candidates. Training and education programs would also foster environmental security, teaching appropriated ways to use natural resources to improve life standards of the whole population. Finally, health security would come with better infrastructure, water and sanitation, direct provision of healthcare, capacity-building for health assistance, policy formulation and implementation.

Once state institutions are working according to these guidelines, humanitarian assistance reaches a transitional period in which responsibilities will gradually be transferred to local authorities. At this stage, humanitarian appeals may assume the form of Transitional Strategy Appeals, as it happened in CAP for Timor-Leste in 2008; or, humanitarian activities can be redirected to fixing problems identified as "critical humanitarian gaps", as in the CAP for Liberia, also in 2008. In this case, many components and subcomponents were excluded from the appeal, since OCHA considered that major humanitarian goals related to them had been achieved (CAP Liberia, 2008).

To humanitarian teams, efforts to improve state's capacity to protect and take care of its own population would affect positively the prevention of conflict and humanitarian catastrophes. To them, and also, to the UN, these results could not be achieved by peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance actions alone. In the end, it would depend on the integration between these actions and development assistance projects, planned and implemented according to guidelines presented in the UNDAF, which will be discussed in the next section.

5.3.3
Development Assistance

The UNDAF (*United Nations Development Assistance Framework*) was established in 1997 as part of a reform to improve UN work on the field of development and make it more coherent on the local level. It is a planning framework consisting of common objectives, common strategies of cooperation and timetables, intended to lay the foundation for cooperation among the UN System, government and other development partners (UNDG, 2010). Nevertheless, traditional UNDAF was hardly ever able to meet the needs of states coming out of violent conflict and the UN developed the "Modified UNDAF", especially designed to "[...] bring together humanitarian assistance and peace-building in a development continuum" (UNDAF Liberia, 2003, p.2).

The document summarizes the main development actions to be undertaken in a country, as a means to complement state reconstruction and humanitarian assistance and consolidate peace process. Thus, UNDAF takes into account national reconstruction plan and the development strategy proposed by the transitional government with the assistance of international agencies (MTP, *Medium Term Plan*), as well as priorities set by the UN Country Team and by humanitarian workers in the CAP (UNDG, 2010).[145]

The actions to be developed by the UNDAF are chosen based on the underlying assumption that there is a causal relationship between poverty and conflict and vice-versa. An extract of the UNDAF for Liberia from 2003 illustrates the vicious circle that development assistance should struggle to break:

> Conflicts induce poverty. Conflicts dislocate populations, disrupt productive activities, destroy social infrastructures such as schools, health facilities, water works and power installations. Besides, the mismanagement of natural resource divert national resources from development. Collaterally, conflicts undermine government capacity to govern effectively. All of these ultimately lead to a lowered standard of living of the Liberian people. Conversely, poverty leads to conflict. Poverty is a breeding ground for violence. Poverty induces conflicts and provides opportunities for self-enrichment (UNDAF Liberia, 2003, p.5).

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[145] When transitional government gives way to a permanent one, the new ruler is responsible for elaborating a document describing development actions to support the consolidation of peace and security – called Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) – that is inspired by the Millennium Development Goals. The elaboration of the document is assisted by international consultants and is used as a reference for the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) to indicate a set of actions to reinforce those chosen by the government. Based on this document, UN develops a new UNDAF, following the traditional model.

In order to put an end to violent conflict and prevent it from being resumed in the future, development assistance should consist of an integrated, holistic, multifaceted approach to alleviating the multiple causes of poverty (UNDG, 2010). In the cases studied, UNDAFs attributed poverty and conflict to the lack of infrastructure and of good governance practices, resulting in problems such as high rates of population growth; unemployment; poor education; poor housing conditions; food insecurity; lack of access to drinking water; lack of sanitation; precarious health services; and, particularly in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS. Except for the UNDAF for Timor-Leste, all other documents call attention to some kind of irresponsible conduct of local authorities before international intervention. The most common examples are lack of transparency and accountability; disrespect for the rule of law; low popular participation in national policy formulation; sanctions of opponents; and human rights abuses.

Based on this diagnosis, UNDAFs are divided in components and subcomponents related to state reconstruction; specifically, they aim at institutionalizing an approach towards governance that combines peace-building, humanitarian assistance and poverty alleviation to promote sustainable human development. Figure 17 summarizes the components and subcomponents found on the UNDAFs for the countries studied and that should inform the projects of the development assistance organizations working on the field.

Components	Subcomponents
Conflict Resolution, peace building and relief	DDRR; Refugees and IDPs; Political Dialogue, Consultation, Empowering Civil Society; Restructuring Security Forces; Reconciliation and Education for Peace
Food Security and Sustainable Recovery	DDRR; Capacity-building; Infrastructure; Monitoring and Research; Policy Formulation and Implementation; Productivity and Sustainable Development; Social Welfare and Assistance to Focal Groups
Reproductive health, HIV/AIDS and other diseases	Preventing/Controlling Diseases; Infrastructure, Materials and Equipment for Health; Support to Infected People; Policy Formulation and Implementation; Capacity-building (Health); Reproductive Health and Combating Mortality
Good Governance	Policy Formulation, Legal Frameworks and Implementation; Capacity-building; Monitoring, Research and Evaluation; Justice; Civil Society and Media; Elections
Cross-cutting issues	DDRR; Policy Formulation, Legal Frameworks and Implementation; Capacity-building; Equity and Empowerment (Gender); Protection;

Support to Victims of Violence; Support to Young People; Environment and Sustainable Development

Figure 17: Components and Subcomponents of Peace Operations (Development Assistance).[146] Based on: UNDAF Liberia (2003-2005; 2008); UNDAF Timor-Leste (2003-2005); UNDAF Haiti (2002-2006); UNDAF Democratic Republic of the Congo (2008).

Figure 18 summarizes the activities related to each component and subcomponent listed in the UNDAFs of the countries that have been studied.

Component: Conflict Resolution, peace building and relief	
DDRR	Registration of participants; conduct disarmament and demobilization; run food-for-training and skills development programs; provision of assistance for basic needs; run rehabilitation and rehabilitation programs; provide agricultural inputs, micro-credit, basic services, training and development planning and monitoring to receiving communities
Refugees and IDPs	Protection of refugees and IDPs; support voluntary repatriation; provide assistance for basic needs (food, shelter, health and transport); support resettlement and reintegration; support the development of receiving communities
Political Dialogue, Consultation, Empowering Civil Society	Establish peace and reconciliation commissions; promote consultation processes in local communities; encourage dialogue between government, civil society and opposition leaders; strengthen civil society and community-based organizations; strengthen local cooperatives
Restructuring Security Forces	Assist implementation of rehabilitation plans for security forces; train security contingents; assist border monitoring
Reconciliation and Education for Peace	Run education for peace programs in schools and communities; train teachers and community leaders in education for peace and reconciliation; create national campaigns for tolerance, coexistence and respect for common goods

Component: Food Security and Sustainable Recovery	
DDRR	Food support; provision of agricultural inputs; training
Capacity-building	Train ministerial staff; teachers, healthcare professionals and farmers; train community members in equipment maintenance; train groups in early-response procedures to disasters
Infrastructure	Rehabilitate health and education units; build water and septic tanks; install water pumps; rehabilitation of roads, bridges and accessibility systems; rehabilitate commercial facilities
Monitoring and Research	Develop and update agricultural database; create research institutes
Policy Formulation and Implementation	Assist the creation of national plans for agriculture, health and education; create and manage response systems to disasters
Productivity and Sustainable Development	Micro-credit; development of technology to increase productivity (agriculture and livestock); support harvest (storage, processing, commercialization); promote sustainable management of forests, animals and fishing; support exportation of local products

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[146] UNDAFs for Haiti do not contain the components Conflict Resolution, Peace building and Relief; and Cross-cutting issues. These components were still considered in the analysis because they appear in the UNDAFs for all other cases.

Social Welfare and Assistance to Focal Groups	Provide information and training in family and social welfare issues; assist the reform of educational guidelines; encourage register and frequency in schools

Component: Reproductive health, HIV/AIDS and other diseases	
Preventing/Controlling Diseases	Create awareness and prevent HIV/AIDS, malaria and targeted diseases; deliver healthcare material and services; support focal groups (women and children)
Infrastructure, Materials and Equipment for Health	Rehabilitate healthcare facilities; provide medicines, materials, equipment and water; rehabilitate sanitary systems; support therapeutic nutrition
Support to Infected People	Counseling and healthcare service to infected people; educational campaigns to combat stigmatization of infected groups
Policy Formulation and Implementation	Create national plan for health; implement treatment protocols to HIV/AIDS; establish and run national systems of information, evaluation and research on health
Capacity-building (Health)	Training in reproductive health, prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS and targeted diseases
Reproductive Health and Combating Mortality	Create programs of reproductive health, life expectancy and fertility

Component: Good Governance	
Policy Formulation, Legal Frameworks and Implementation	Restructure and strengthen governance institutions, systems and processes; assist the revision of laws and policies according to international standards of HR, democratic governance and inclusive participation; provide technical and best-practices support to judicial, legislative and governance institutions; support to government decentralization, transparency and accountability; adequacy of economic, financial and commercial institutions to international standards; policy formulation and implementation (education, business and industry, investment)
Capacity-building	Offer training in budget and tax reforms; research and report economic situation; support coordination of humanitarian assistance; offer training in good governance, human rights, rule of law and justice (schools, media, security forces); capacity building on monitoring and response systems to disasters
Monitoring, Research and Evaluation	Produce reports about tax and economic policies, assistance flux, prices and expenses; create statistics offices; conduct census; strengthen assistance coordination units
Justice	Support to justice and training of justice professionals
Civil Society and Media	Strengthen civil society and community-based organizations and cooperatives; increase their participation in decision-making processes; training and strengthening of media; protection and creation of security networks for vulnerable groups; promote a culture of peace and human rights
Elections	Provide technical assistance and disseminate best-practices about the electoral system; create and support electoral commissions (resources and training); register and train voters; monitor elections; guarantee free and safe elections

Component: Cross-cutting issues	

DDRR	Reintegration and Rehabilitation programs and support to child-soldiers
Policy Formulation, Legal Frameworks and Implementation	Strengthen security and rule of Law; encourage ratification of international conventions and protocols
Capacity-building	Provide technical support to public service; offer training in planning, setting priorities, implementation, funds raising, coordination, IT, development and sustainability; evaluate availability of personnel
Equity and Empowerment (Gender)	Literacy program, micro-credit, protection of women rights (especially property and inheritance)
Protection	Promote awareness and educational campaigns about children rights; assist the development of childcare programs); protect and assist refugees and IDPs
Support to Victims of Violence	Support, counseling and treatment for victims of violence
Support to Young People	Promote formal and informal education; create training and income generation programs; create reproductive health and disease-prevention programs; encourage participation of young people in decision-making
Environment and Sustainable Development	Develop systems of environmental governance focused on conflict reduction, recovery and sustainable economic growth; create and support national environmental commissions; evaluate the environmental impact of public investments and infrastructure rehabilitation actions; offer training in environmental best-practices;

Figure 18: Activities of Reconstruction (Development Assistance)
Based on: UNDAF Liberia (2003-2005; 2008); UNDAF Timor-Leste (2003-2005); UNDAF Haiti (2002-2006); UNDAF Democratic Republic of the Congo (2008).

Most part of the actions to be undertaken aim to reconstruct states' capacity to govern their populations and resources by rebuilding institutions. This task should be focused on the recovery of key development sectors (such as health, education, water distribution and sanitation), including the improvement of local infrastructure; policy formulation and implementation processes; and monitoring and evaluation tools. The success of development assistance programs should empower the state under reconstruction to start working effectively to reduce inequality and foster income generation throughout the country, contributing to decrease the share of population living in conditions of poverty and extreme poverty. This new scenario would accredit the state to receive assistance from all development organizations (not only from those dedicated to reconstruction) and even to attract foreign investments to boost their economy.

Following this logic, peace, security and political stability become imperative to reestablish direct bonds between reconstructed states and major international organizations, especially those dedicated to development. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Liberia, for example, the World Bank

suspended its activities for a decade due to "fragile security conditions". They were only resumed after peacekeepers and humanitarian teams had some degree of success in stabilizing the situation and starting the reconstruction of state institutions. The WB re-engaged in the DRC in 2001 and in Liberia in 2003 with the goal of supporting the reconstruction work (WB DRC, 2014; WB Liberia, 2014). This would be done especially through the World Bank Group's branches dedicated to reconstruction – such as the IBRD – the same ones responsible for most part of the development assistance offered to Timor-Leste and Haiti. The work of the WBG during reconstruction usually includes financing infrastructure works and strengthening good governance. In Haiti, for example, the largest part of the resources have been spent on housing, electricity, and advisory and training programs for improving public policies and the services delivered to the population by the local government (WB Haiti, 2014).

As the reconstruction work progresses, other branches of the WB start contributing to the UNDAF. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) is an important contributor that assists states under reconstruction to establish partnerships to finance development work in key sectors. In the DRC, for example, MIGA intermediated an agreement with the Standard Bank of South Africa, the Belgian Investment Company (BIO) and the German Investment Corporation (DEG) to finance part of the reconstruction of the telecommunications infrastructure (Project 11804, MIGA, 2014). The International Finance Corporation (IFC) usually focuses its activities on the rehabilitation of the private sector in order to create jobs. In Haiti and Timor-Leste, for example, IFC has engaged in advisory projects and trained entrepreneurs and managers to revitalize tourism (WB Haiti, 2014; WB Timor-Leste, 2014); in the DRC, the targets were mining and agriculture businesses (WB DRC, 2014).

The regularization of the relationship between states under reconstruction and the World Bank depends on the good work of local authorities in the field of development. In Liberia, this regularization happened in 2007, following the consolidation of the new government, when the country had access to the Bank's program that provides debt relief to the poorest countries (WB, 2009). Timor-Leste, by its turn, had its first Country Partnership Strategy approved by the World Bank in 2013 (WB Timor-Leste, 2014). Other international organizations,

such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) require an even better performance concerning good governance indicators to reestablish its ties to reconstructed states. Haiti, for example, received in 2006 its first loan from the IMF in 10 years (IMF Haiti, 2015); in the DRC there were 13 years until the 2002 loan (IMF DRC, 2015). The transactions between the Liberian government and the IMF were only resumed in 2008 (IMF Liberia, 2015), after 5 years of reconstruction work.[147]

5.3.4
Merging Security, Humanitarian Assistance and Development

The range of activities involved in multidimensional peace operations suggests the consolidation of new ideas about maintaining and promoting peace in the international level. If during the Cold War peace was commonly associated with the absence of armed conflict between states, the normative, institutional and operational shifts described in this chapter suggest that the concept has been broadened to include aspects of the organization of life inside particular states. At least as far as the work of international organizations directed to peace and security is concerned, state sovereignty has gained a predicate related to standards and best practices of good governance based on the corollary of liberal democracy. In this sense, liberal democracy becomes a model that both legitimizes (good) states as members of the international society and authorizes intervention to reconstruct others (bad states) normalizing their conduct to what would be the requirements of peace. The transplant of the liberal-democratic state to new spaces merges security, humanitarian assistance and development in a common and comprehensive agenda for peace designed as an ensemble of best practices to be applied in any case. Figure 19 organizes the activities of reconstruction described in previous sections in three sets, corresponding to the three areas of the peace process – security, humanitarian assistance and development. The merger of these areas is illustrated by dense intersection zones between the three or at least two of them.

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[147] Timor-Leste only joined the IMF as an independent state in 2002 (IMF Timor-Leste, 2015).

Figure 19: Diagram of distribution of activities of reconstruction: security, development and humanitarian assistance.
Based on: Mandates, Budgets and Financial Performance Reports of the UNMIL, MONUC, MINUSTAH, UNTAET, UNMISET, UNMIT (1999-2009); CAP Liberia (2002-2008); CAP Democratic Republic of the Congo (1999-2005); CAP Timor-Leste (1999; 2000; 2002; 2006-2008); CAP Haiti (2003; 2004; 2007; 2008); UNDAF Liberia (2003-2005; 2008); UNDAF Timor-Leste (2003-2005); UNDAF Haiti (2002-2006); UNDAF Democratic Republic of the Congo (2008).

On the one hand, the presence of activities related to the reform of state institutions – such as reformulation of legal frameworks and processes of policy formulation and implementation, capacity-building and the delivery of public services – in all three areas suggests that the multidimensional character of peacekeeping has spilled over humanitarian assistance and development. On the other hand, there is still a certain degree of specialization among the areas. Peacekeeping operations concentrate tasks related to controlling violence and maintaining public security, like arms control and the reform of the security sector; and to (re)creating the institutional structure of the state. Humanitarian assistance will be primarily responsible for providing emergency support to the population, particularly its most vulnerable groups (IDPs, for example). Finally, development assistance should focus on reestablishing the country's economic activity, and reconnecting it to development organizations, partners and the international market.

Since the standards and practices of good governance according to which a state should be reconstructed are considered to be based on universal models, a vast network of actors is accredited to join peace processes: non-governmental organizations, religious groups, philanthropists, governmental agencies, and even private companies. In this scenario, the United Nations, especially peacekeepers, would be responsible for creating a framework for reconstruction and coordinating the division of work between all groups involved. Figure 20 was elaborated based on the example of the reconstruction in Liberia. It shows some of the actors that were significantly involved in the peace process and organizes them in three sets, again corresponding to the areas of security, humanitarian assistance and development.[148]

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[148] Organizations, agencies and other participants of the reconstruction process that appear in Diagram 2 were identified based on the lists of participants of projects and projects included in the documents analyzed in sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2, and 4.3.3. Despite being representative, these lists are not definitive. Some projects and programs are only vaguely described and information about relevant participants is sometimes suppressed, especially when they are Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), often listed as closed categories.

Figure 20: Diagram of distribution of organizations involved in the reconstruction of Liberia (see Annex 2).
Based on: A/58/539, 2003; A/58/744, 2004; A/59/630, 2005; A/60/653, 2006; A/61/783, 2007; A/63/734, 2008 (Budgets); A/59/736/Add.11, 2004; A/60/852, 2005; A/61/852/Add.7, 2006; A/62/781/Add.10, 2007; A/63/746/Add.8, 2008 (Financial Performance Reports); CAP Liberia, 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; UNDAF Liberia 2003-2005; 2008-2012; UN, 2009 (UN in Liberia, At Work Together).

As it can be observed, most UN agencies (in bold) appear in the intersection zone between security, humanitarian assistance and development, reinforcing the idea that they are responsible for coordinating the reconstruction work. It is worth noting that major non-governmental organizations that operate internationally – such as the ICRC, World Vision International, OXFAM, and CARE – as well as governmental cooperation agencies from countries with high-level performances in good governance indicators – for example GTZ and USAID – also appear in all three areas.[149] Humanitarian assistance is the area with the largest number of organizations involved suggesting a significant level of specialization of their work.

In sum, both the convergence of tasks and the division of labor can be interpreted as evidences of a nexus between security, humanitarianism and development, or the merger of them, in multidimensional reconstruction. This merger informed a range of capillary techniques of power that normalize the conduct of the (re)constructed state, understood here as mechanisms of global governance. The success of the process would be associated to the ability of international teams to normalize the conduct of the (re)constructed states according to the parameters of good governance defined by the international society. This would enable the gradual transition of these states from objects of international intervention to proper subjects of the international society.

5.4
Gatekeepers

It is in this sense of attempting to produce subjects that I believe the reconstruction processes resemble the pastoral logic of power described by Foucault. The rationale for intervention, justifications provided, polices planned, encompass the constant differentiation of responsible states from irresponsible ones and (re)produce the gap between these two forms of existence. Like the shepherd to whom a flock had been entrusted, those responsible members of the international society should offer a beneficent guidance towards salvation; or,

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[149] They normally develop different projects in each area.

conduct the conduct of entire populations so that we all could live in endless peace.

As this chapter has shown, reconstruction techniques performed in the areas of security, humanitarian assistance and development give power a capillary form, exercised over the daily lives of communities under intervention so that even their consciousness could be reshaped. To the agents of reconstruction are given the keys of the gates that separate the international society from its shadows. It is translated in the authority to administer difference, combining power, investigation and examination in an economy of faults and merits that should reveal some kind of inner truth, hidden in the soul of those political communities labeled as conflict-prone. Just as the pastor struggles to know each sheep, peacekeepers, humanitarians and development experts turn the state (or some states) into a field of investigation. Instead of resorting to allegedly divine models, however, international intervention teams are informed by the analysis of mechanisms of governance, classifying and treating states according to standards multilaterally. In the end, they should all conduct to better forms of living, like pastors.

An important way of evaluating governance mechanisms of particular states and classifying them as good or bad is the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, developed by the World Bank. The project defines what would be six dimensions of governance – Voice and Accountability; Political Stability and the Absence of Violence; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and Control of Corruption – and has developed indicators to measure them.[150] According to the Bank, data from the WGI is decisive for allocating resources and used in risk assessment research conducted by donors and invertors; the information also inform proposals for improving states' governance mechanisms and are especially useful in cases of reconstruction (Kaufmann; Kraay; Mastruzzi, 2009). The description of the causes of internal conflict that open the UNDAFs for Liberia, Timor-Leste, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti, mentioned in previous sections, are clearly backed by the analysis such

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[150] According to the World Bank, these indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents from industrial and developing countries. "They are based on 32 individual data sources produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms" (WGI, 2014).

as provided by the WGI. They attribute poverty and violence to bad governance, and describe the road for peace as a collective work to improve states' performance in governance indicators.[151]

Re-reading these procedures through foucauldian lenses, the systematic diagnose of social, political, economic problems participates in an economy of faults and merits connected to the authority attributed to reconstruction teams to prescribe a new law to be obeyed, and teach a new truth to professed by targeted states. Prescriptions of reconstruction teams come in the clear and supposedly neutral language of international bureaucrats and would make it possible to create "visibility out of obscurity, transparency out of opacity, accountability out of corruption, efficiency out of redundancy, effectiveness out of aimlessness, rights out of abuses, rule of law out of unpredictability" (Zanotti, 2005, p.13). International organizations describe this formula for fighting insecurity as a universal one; therefore, it could be applied to reconstruct any deviant state, in a collective work developed by all good members of the international society (states and individuals) and the vast array of institutions that represent them, from the DPKO to the YMCA, or the Phoebe Hospital. In this sense, good governance becomes part of what Huysmans (2006) calls "transnationalization of techniques of governing insecurity" (p.42), serving as parameter for a global project of state engineering that addresses state institutions and promotes programs of diffused institutionalization of social processes (Zanotti, 2005).

In the end, reconstruction processes should transform states institutions and political communities, following the norm of the international society. In multidimensional peace operations, an important step of this normalization process is the publication of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). It is a document elaborated by the local government in which it shows that lessons of good governance have been learned and it is now prepared to take control over the state's future and create a strategy for development. To the UN, the PRSP is one of the many ways in which the new state gains *ownership* over the peace process and show they are ready to join the international society (Lopes; Theisohn, 2003).

The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers of the countries studied in this chapter were published by the government of Timor-Leste in 2005; Haiti and the

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[151] As it has been discussed, the state's performance in reports such as those of the WGI marks out its connection to international organizations, especially those dedicated to development.

Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2007; and Liberia in 2008. They start like a confession in which the local government describes a series of mistakes and problems that have culminated in armed conflict. Reinforcing the causal relation between violence and underdevelopment assumed by international organizations, governments associate conflict with a bad performance in all socioeconomic indicators, the deterioration of infrastructure and the failure of the state as a whole. International intervention is described as an opportunity to break with the vicious cycle of underdevelopment and conflict and direct the country to peace and development. This would be done through the transformation of society and reconstruction of state institutions, preparing the local community to assume responsibility for its future.

The policies described in the PRSP should allow the government of the reconstructed state (assisted by international partners) to consolidate peace and security in the region, strengthen governance and rule of law, rehabilitate infrastructure and basic services, and revitalize the local economy, reconnecting it to international markets. The capacity of the state to advance in these fields would have direct impact over its autonomy to negotiate the terms of its relationship with other states and international organizations. If governance indicators show that the state is turning into a responsible (good) one, it should be allowed to translate its particularities in terms of demands to be considered on the formulation of international projects for the region and on financing agreements, including the negotiation of conditions and safeguards normally imposed in exchange for the funds received (Lopes; Theisohn, 2003).

To Lopes and Theisohn (2003), the consistency of local government's propositions for the development field is a sign that the country under reconstruction is internalizing the reforms proposed by international teams and is ready to participate actively to make them continue in the future. This new consciousness of the state would mark the transition of its condition from a passive object of assistance to an active agent of development. Attesting the success of the transplant of ideas about peace, governance and statehood, the president of Timor-Leste, Xanana Gusmão, affirmed that the PRSP was the first chance given to the Timorese people to think about their future and that "the vision which sprang from people's participation in the planning process encapsulates all that is fundamental to development – peace, security, freedom,

tolerance, equity, improved health, education, access to jobs and food security" (PRSP Timor-Leste, 2005, p.19). In a similar way, the president of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, claimed that the strategies for reducing poverty presented by her government were "truly ours – home grown by all of us" (PRSP Liberia, 2008, p.7).

In both cases, the PRSP can be interpreted as an attempt to show that the government of the (re)constructed state had reached some sort of maturity, to create an image of responsibility and capacity to own its future. Needless to say that international organizations assist local governments during the formulation of the PRSP[152] and that the policies detailed in these documents are almost the same as those from the countries UNDAFs. In Liberia, even the pictures that illustrate the PRSP were taken by the same photographer hired by the UN during the elaboration of country's UNDAF. According to the World Development Report of 2011, this special assistance to the governments of post-conflict countries should be a long-term work, since they take, on average, between 15 and 30 years to transition out of fragility and to build resilience (WB, 2011). Therefore, international organizations should monitor their progress closely and continue to offer advice on the formulation and implementation of policies, so that they are consistent with durable peace and sustainable development.

States reconstruction, then, can be interpreted as an intense program of normalization and a set of techniques through which the international society (re)produces and administers its borders. It is directed to the creation of (good) members of this society and to the continuous actualization of their content, granting some degree of autonomy at the price of subjectivity; precisely, by subjectivation. To become a good member of the international society, a state must become a subject in all senses.

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[152] As the International Monetary Fund (2015) acknowledges, the elaboration of the PRS involves a group of international experts and development partners, including the IMF itself and the WB. It is usually endorsed by the Especial Representative of the Secretary General in the country and by several other representatives of UN agencies working there. In the case of Liberia, the coordinator of the peacekeeping mission Margrethe Løj signed the PRS, highlighting the great opportunity it represented to put Liberia back on the road of development. Representatives from the following agencies also signed: FAO, UNESCO, WFP, ILO, UNPFA, WHO, IMO, UNHCR, WB, OHCHR, UNICEF, OCHA, UNAIDS, UNIFEM, UNDP, UNOPS (PRS Liberia, 2008).

6
Must International Society Be Defended?

In the series of maps that open the first chapter of this thesis, one can grasp what Shapiro (1992) has called the colonization of world land by the imaginative geography of sovereign states, and have a sense of how recent and gradual this process is. To those who study International Relations, the spread of the form 'sovereign state' – as a model for organizing human relations – to the edges of the planet is usually understood based on the framework proposed by the English School, which has become a sort of official narrative of the area: the expansion of the European Society of states through the incorporation of new members, what will eventually give room to the International Society of states. According to Bull (2012), this international society would be characterized by the formal equality of its members, who would be conscious of some common interests and values, and conceive themselves as bound by a common set of rules and institutions in their relations with one another. As there is no hierarchical level of sovereignty above that of each state, the international society is defined as anarchical: those who join it as members would be independent and entitled to express their particularities.

Following a foucauldian perspective, one could re-read Bull's narrative about the expansion of the international society as representing the victory of a major regime of power that has reorganized life around the political form of the state, and normalized it through state institutions, creating impressions of truth and certainty that have left little or no room at all to alternative proposals. To Foucault (2004), the state should be understood as an ensemble of practices and techniques of power through which first European societies, and later others have come to deal with the problem of government – of conducting conduct.[153] About this spilling over of the sovereign state as a model to other spaces, Foucault (2004) says that it has involved a significant degree of hierarchy, embedded in

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[153] As it has been discussed, to Foucault (2000), the study of government – or the conduct of conduct – ranges from the government of the self to the government of others and allows one to investigate "[…] how power relations have historically been concentrated in the form of the state without ever being reducible to it" (Lemke, 2007, p.17).

complex relations of domination and colonization; however, he has not explored the topic much further.

At least in part, this thesis has been an attempt to discuss this expansion of *the state*, as form of organizing life, to spaces considered to be outside of (and sometimes on the limit of) the European, and later the international society. I have tried to show how the conversion of these spaces and people into states has involved more than processes in which a colonizer heads the transplant of its mode of existence to another community; or discursive renegotiations between colonizers and colonized, and the emergence of hybrid societies. Of course this is not to say that colonization, domination, resistance and hybridism are not important, nor that the particularities of these experiences in different places should be ignored. It is to say, however, that along with all that, it is also important to discuss how the problem of government, of conducting conduct, has been re-articulated in a level that may not be above the state, but clearly is a level of *states*, of the international society and the interplay with its borders.

My starting point was to study processes of construction and reconstruction of states, interpreted here as evidences of this re-articulation. They are one aspect of the heterogeneous and plural arts of government directed to the normalization of an increasingly consistent international environment, and of whatever may be on and beyond its limits. Throughout the chapters, I've concentrated on the intricacy of (re)construction processes over time, highlighting how difference and differentiation have been played out, and how they have inscribed (and constantly re-inscribed) borders separating what would be an international society (of legitimate states) and it's supposed others. The argument unfolded here is that the re-articulation of the problem of government in the international society involved some sort of multilateral convergence, of unity, that, albeit discrete, is one of the conditions of possibility for turning international society into something that *must be defended*.

It is clear to me that international society has not become a subject, or an agent in its own right. However, the operation these various *bordering techniques* has certainly stabilized the idea of international society. It became a totalizing instance of discursive practice, a referent of political life, with its own history (grand narrative), principles, rules and values – something in the name of which actions are authorized and actors gain agency. It is *on behalf* of this international

society that the (re)construction of states has been imagined as a prerogative of some – colonizers, trustees, peacekeepers –, a mechanism of governance directed to the establishment and maintenance of order.

Especially in the twentieth century, this prerogative/mechanism has been embodied by organizations such as the League of Nations, and particularly the United Nations, and translated into a myriad of (changing) capillary techniques for conducting conduct. It is in this sense that mandates, trusteeship, development and peace operations, for example, have usually been understood as multilateral enterprises to take civilization, progress and democracy to those on the borders.

Besides the governmental and multilateral aspects of state (re)construction, this research has emphasized how it has preserved what I have called an underlying *pastoral logic* of conducting conduct, focused on the production of subjectivity through an intense program of normalization. Such an emphasis did not come from my ignorance of the extensive academic literature about facets of disciplinary and bio-power in international relations, but from my interest to study how the operation of power can combine different and overlapping logics. According to Foucault (2000; 2004; 2007), pastorate, discipline and bio-power are not stages or excluding forms of power; and the crisis of the religious pastorate did not culminate in a global rejection of conduct of conduct. On the contrary, there would have been a multiplication of the need to be conducted and an intensification of intervention over the lives of individuals, what has been incorporated to the logic of the state –, and, maybe, of the international society as well. My point here is that, although the cosmological-theological continuum that once informed religious pastorate has been broken, a residual (but still significant) element of this form of governing has survived in international relations. It is not pastoral power as Foucault described it; it would probably be better named as a *pastoral logic* of power that remained important to the ways in which the international society defines, relates to, and administers its borders. This pastoral logic, I am arguing, becomes especially visible in the (re)construction of states.

As it has been discussed, the consolidation of (re)construction as an international mechanism of governance is based on the (hierarchical) separation between a group of normal states who should lead, and a group of deviant shadows who must follow. The systematic differentiation of these groups and the affirmation of hierarchy between them authorize international organizations to

administer difference, defining it as a path to salvation. Their work is imagined as that of the shepherd: they conduct souls from a world of violence, scarcity and failure, to another in which peace, development and good governance ensure better conditions of life. They act precisely as *gatekeepers*, managing the borders between the international society and the others. The only way of crossing that gate would be to learn their language, to profess their truth, to obey their rules. In this journey, the state, or at least some states – underdeveloped, irresponsible, failed states – become objects of study and intervention. Objects to be transformed and perfected, to be subjected, in so many senses.

Read through these lenses, it is possible to say that the consolidation of what we now call the international society has involved the establishment of 'frontier regimes' similar to those of the sovereign state: they authorize specific forms of being, acting, knowing; and differentiate these forms from others, rendered as inferior, and often unacceptable. The development and expansion of the apparatus of state (re)construction in the context of international organizations both evidences and (re)produces this frontier regime. They have codified membership and action in the international society, also the problem of government, in very specific terms.

It is clear that the gap between acceptable and unacceptable forms of existence and the techniques for normalizing what would be unacceptable have assumed many shapes over the years – civilizing mission, tutelage, the discourse of development, and peace operations are only a few examples. It is also clear that the power relations that have (re)produced civilized and barbarians, empires and colonies, states and mandated territories, donors and beneficiaries, peacekeepers and states under (re)construction are not the same. By the way, the whole purpose of studying these processes has been to show that they do change, that different versions of what should be international order are preserved and promoted by distinct techniques of management of borders. In the order of the European colonizers, the normalization of outside communities involved a colonial/imperial form of government; in the order of the superpowers, a national/post-colonial one; and in the liberal-democratic order of the post-Cold War, there is an internationalized form of government. These orders and mechanisms of governance are based on particular versions of the triad salvation, obedience/law

and truth. They also divide the world in different ways, usually reframing hierarchy, not subverting it.

Sometimes, this logic is discontinued. The East x West division of Europe at the end of WWII, for example, represents a moment in which the focus was not on who would be inside and outside international society, but on who would be in its Eastern and Western halves. Nevertheless, the strong colors of the bipolar arrangement have begun to fade very soon, and the focus was once again redirected to what lay on (or beyond) the limits of the order led by superpowers. In this sense, decolonization and the discourse of development produced new forms of differentiation, also new forms of administering difference.

While borders and bordering techniques are reframed, the contours of international society are also redefined. Taking a look at the normative, institutional and operational transformations of the post-Cold War, for example, it is possible to see how these contours were increasingly articulated to ideas about individual rights, democracy and human development. In the language of the United Nations, it was as if time had finally come for escaping the greed of empires and the selfish concerns of superpowers, and becoming a channel through which all human beings – *we the peoples* – could speak and struggle for a better life. This aura of universalism substantiates the idea that the international society is ready to fulfill both the prophecy of expansion and the promise of transcendence, and finally become equivalent to the world – a real world society.

However, even this universalism has its others, for example, those irresponsible and failed states whose existence *per se* constitutes a threat to any prospect of peace. In fact, it reinforces the claim that international society must be defended. On its behalf, much more intrusive techniques of (re)construction are authorized and unfolded, perpetuating the logic differentiation and hierarchy that comes along with it. Anyway, while we excavate our present and try to reconstitute what has brought us here, there is one piece of permanence, of similarity, that often resurfaces: the gap itself. This apparently undefeatable impression of truth that reaffirms a fundamental difference between the state, the states (international society), and the lands and people that are beyond them, behind them, on their limit. Especially, between those who should lead and those who must follow. In the end, we are not becoming alike.

My impression is that this tricky bond between change and permanence that has accompanied the ways in which difference and differentiation have been dealt with in international relations should be further discussed. More than simply acknowledging that there are hierarchies and that they have harmful effects, it is important to pay attention to the many ways through which they have been produced and reproduced. Exploring these nuances, continuities and transformations is essential to understanding and re-discussing the idea of periphery in international relations and the possibilities (sometimes impossibilities) of integration of peripheral countries to the international society. If the existence of a periphery and the labels that usually describe it are simply taken for granted, they become a powerful trap for difference and an even more powerful justification for inequality. To show that the international society, and not only the state or even particular states, articulates differentiation, hierarchy and government is essential to think about inequality in international relations. It is not something natural and it does not result from cruel plans of resourceful and greedy states; it is one face of modern relations of power.

As Foucault reminds us, this kind of research and discussion will not open the cage of our own time and allow us to see a world beyond the one (re)produced by the regimes of power under which we live. Even though, it could get us close to the limits of this world and let us see it – especially its unequal constructions – from a new perspective, a less natural one. As far as (re)construction processes are concerned, they could be seen beyond the promise of a new and pacific world, or the exercise of a responsibility to protect and save. They could be seen as an aspect of government, as the (re)production of very particular orders of things. Looking through these lenses, it might be possible to distinguish the hierarchical character of their foundations, some side effects of their techniques of power; and maybe realize that, instead of bridging the gap separating international society and its others, these techniques of government, of normalization, of correcting deviances, contribute for making inequality an everlasting feature of international relations.

7
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Annex 1
État Du Grand Liban, Carte d'Identité

Annex 2
Organizations Involved in the Reconstruction of Liberia

AASMAM - Anti- AIDS/STD/Malaria Awareness Movement Inc

ACBF - African Capacity Building Foundation

ACDI/VOCA

ACF - Action Contre la Faim

ACTED - Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development

ADB - African Development Bank

ADEN - African Development Network

ADRA - Adventist Development and Relief Agency

AEL - Association of Environmental Lawyers

AEL - Association of Evangelical of Liberia

AFELL - Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia

Africare

AGENDA - Actions for Genuine Democratic Alternatives

AGRHA - Action for Greater Harvest

AGROSPHERE

AHA - African Health Assistance

AI - Amnesty International

ANDP - Aid for the Needy Development Programme

ANPPCAN - African Net for the Prevention & Protection against Child Abuse
and Neglect

ANPPCAN - African Network for the Prevention & Protection Against Child
Abuse

ARC - American Refugee Committee-International

ASUR

AU - African Union

AVSI - Associazione Volontari Il Servizio Internazionale

AWEPA - Association for European Parliamentarians for Africa

CADI - Children Aid Direct

CAI - Church Aid Inc

CAL - Community Aid Liberia

CAM - Christian Aid Ministries

CARD - Comunity Assistance for Rural Development

CARE

CARITAS

Catholic Hospital

CBOs - Community Based Organizations

CCC - Concerned Christian Communities

CCF - Christian Children's Fund

CEDE - Center for Democratic Empowerment

CEEP - Center for Environmental Education and Protection

CEMESP - Center for Media Studies & Peacebuilding

CEMIR - Conférence Episcopale pour les Migrants et les Réfugiés

CENAP - Centre d'Alerte et de Prévention des Conflits

CENTAL - Center for Transparency & Accountability in Liberia

CES - Catholic Education Secretariats

CESP - Christian Empowerment & Sustainable Program

CGD - Center for Global Development

CHAL - Christian Health Association of Liberia

CHERISH International

Child Art

CHS - Catholic Health Service

CI - Conservation International

CIRID - Centre Independant de Recherches et d'Initiatives pour le Dialogue

CISV - Communita Impregno Servizio Volontariato

CIVICUS - World Alliance for Citizen Participation

CJPC - Catholic Justice and Peace Comission

COBEC-AIDS - Community-Based Education and counselling for HIV/AIDS

CONCERN Worldwide

CONWASA - Concern Women Against the Spread of AIDS

COOPI - Cooperazione Internazionale

CORD

Cordaid

CPAR - Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief

CPD - Center for Peacebuilding and Democracy

CRID - Center for the Rehabilitation of the Injured and Disabled

CRS - Catholic Relief Service

Crusaders for peace

CS - Combat Stress

CSOs - Civil Society Organizations

CTCCR - Center for Trauma Counseling and Conflict Resolution

CUAMM - Medici con l'Africa Cuamm

CUSD - Community Union for Sustainable Development

CUSS - Community United for Sanitation Services

CVT - Center for Victims of Torture

DEN'L - Development Education Network for Liberia

DFID - Department for International Development - United Kingdom

DKH - Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe

Don Bosco Homes

DRC - Danish Refugee Council

DWHH - Deutsche Welthungerhilfe

ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States

ECREP - Evangelical Children Rehabilitation Programme

EFA - Environmental Foundation for Africa

EMSF - Enfance Meurtie Sans Frontiere

EPA - Environmental Protection Agency

EQUIP

ERADRO - Environment Relief and Development Research Organization

ERF Emergency Response Fund

ERS - Emergency Rehabilitation Services

EU - European Union

FACE - Farmers Associated to Conserve the Environment

FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FAWE - Forum for African Women Educationalist

FCA - Finn Church Aid

FFI - Fauna and Flora International

FHRD - Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy

FIND - Foundation for International Dignity

FLY - Federation of Liberian Youth

FOHRD - Foundation for Human Rights & Democracy

FOL - Friends of Liberia

FPAL - Family Planning Association of Liberia

FRC - Finnish Refugee Council

GAA - German Argo Action / Deutsche Welthungerhilfe

GFTAM - Global Fund for Tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and Malaria

Girls in Crisis

Gold Child

Goya Medical Association

GTZ - Gesellschaft Fűr Technische Zusammerenarbeit

GWSS - Global Water Supply and Sanitation

HDF - Human Development Foundation

HDP - Human Development Program

HELP Liberia Foundation

HI - Hope International

HR - Horn Relief

HRGSH - Human Rights Group to Save Humanity

HRPF - Human Rights and Protection Open Forum

HU - Humanity United

Humanist Watch

IAS - Initiative pour une Afrique Solidaire

IAVE - International Association for Volunteer Effort

Ibis Education for Development

ICG - International Crisis Group

ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross

ICTJ - International Center for Transitional Justice

IFESH - International Foundation for Education and Self Help

IFRC - International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

ILO - International Labour Organization

IMC - International Medical Corps

IMC - International Missionaries of Charity

IMDD - Institute for Media Development and Dignity

IMF - International Monetary Fund

INTERSOS - Organizzonazione Umanitaria per L'emergenza

IOM - International Organization For Migration

IRC - International Rescue Committee

IRD - International Relief and Development

JFK Hospital

JSI - John Snow, Inc.

JUWADA - Julijuah Ward Development Association

JVC - Jesuit Volunteer Corps

LAPS - Liberia Association of Psychosocial Services

LATRU - Lakayta Township Resettlement Union

LCDF - Liberia Community Development Foundation

LCIP - Liberian Community Infrastructure Program

LDI - Liberia Democratic Institute

LEAP - Local enterprise assistance programme

LIFE - Liberia Indigenous Forum for the Environment

LINFU - Liberia National Farmers Union

LINNK - Liberian NGOs Network

LIURD - Liberia Islamic Union of Reconstruction and Development

LMDA - Liberia Medical and Dental Association

LNGG - Liberia National Girls Guides

LNRC - Liberia National Red Cross

LOIC - Liberia Opportunities Industrialization Center

LUHWASA - Liberians United Humanitarian Water & Sanitation Agency

LUSH - Liberians United to Save Humanity

LWF - Lutheran World Federation

LWI - Liberian Women's Initiative

LWMAC - Liberian Women Media Action Committee

MALAO - Movement Contre les Armes Légerès em Afrique de l'Ouest

MARWONET - Mano River Women's Peace Network

MC - Mercy Corps

MCI - Mines Clearance International

MDA - Médecins d'Afrique

MDM - Medicins du Monde

Medica Mondiale

MENTOR - Malaria Emergency and Technical Operational Response

MERCI - Medical Emergency Relief Cooperative International

MERLIN - Medical Emergency Relief International

MOSWOM - Maryanne's Outreach for Single Women and Mothers

MRU - Mano River Union

MSF - Médecins Sans Frontières

MSG - Management Steering Group

MTI - Medical Teams International

MUSH - Men United to Save Humanity

NARDA - New African Research and Development Agency

New Era Integrated Agriculture and General Construction

NFPR - National Federation for Peacebuilding and Reconciliation

NMC - National Muslim Council

NRC - Norwegian Refugee Council

NUOD - National Union of the Organization of the Disable

NWMTI - Northwest Medical Teams International

OCAM - Organisation for Children and Adolescent Mothers

OCHA - Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OCPH - Organisation Catholique pour la Promotion Humaine

OFDA - Office for Disaster Assistance

OHCHR - Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights

OSIWA - Open Society Initiative for West Africa

OXFAM

PAP - Prisioners Assistance Programme

PARACOM

PBRC - Peace Building Resource Center

PCG - Protection Core Group

Phebe Hospital

PMU - Pentecostal Mission Unlimited Inter-life

POCAL - Pollution Control Association of Liberia

PRECA - Prisoner Rehabilitation & Empowerment

PSI - Population Services International

PU - Premier Urgency

PUL - Press Union of Liberia

PWJ - Peace Winds Japan

READ - Rural Economic & Agricultural Development Corp

Refugee Care

SCF - Save the Children Fund

SCNL - Society for the Conservation of Nature of Liberia

SDA - Service and Development Agency

SDC/SHA - Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation/Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit

SDP - Sustainable Development Promoters

SECADEV - Secours Catholique et Developpement

SEWODA - Southeastern Women Development Association

SFCG - Search for Common Ground

Smile Africa

Solidarité - Aide Humanitaire d'Urgence

SPI - Samaritan's Purse International

Stichting Vluchteling

Susukuu

Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)

TCC - The Carter Center

TEARFUND

THINK

Trocaire

UCCA-AIDS - United Christians Campaigning Against AIDS

UMCOR - United Methodist Church Committee on Relief

UNAIDS - Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

UNDEF - United Nations Democracy Fund

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

UNDSS - United Nations Department of Safety and Security

UNEP - United Nations Environment Programme

UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNFPA - United Nations Populations Fund

UNHABITAT - United Nations Human Settlements Programme

UNHCHR - United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF - United Nations Children's Fund

UNIDO - United Nations Industrial Development Organization

UNIFEM - United Nations Development Fund for Women

UNMAS - United Nations Mine Action Service

UNOPS - United Nations Office for Project Services

UNSECOORD - United Nations Security Coordinator

US Embassy

USAID - United States Agency for International Development

VETAID

VIA - Visions in Action

WACSI - West Africa Civil Society Institute

WAH - Women Against Hunger

WANP - West Africa Network for Peacebuilding - Liberia

WB - World Bank Group: WB, IBRD, IFC, MIGA

WDB - World Development Bank

WFP - World Food Programme

WHDN - Women's Health Development Network

WHO - World Health Organization

WIPNET - Women in Peacebuilding Network

WLCU - World Lebanese Cultural Union

WONGOSOL - Women NGO Secretariat of Liberia

WR - World Relief

WVI - World Vision International

YAEHD - Youth Aid Education Health & Development Liberia

YAI - Youth Action International

YMCA - Young Men's Christian Association

YOCAD - Youth Capacity Development International

YUSUD - Youth United for Sustainable Development

YWCA - Young Women Christian Association

ZOARC - Zoa Refugee Care

ZODWOCA - Zorzor District Women Care