Pontifícia Universidade Católica
do Rio de Janeiro

Luísa Cardoso Guedes de Souza

Peacekeeping Economies and the Labor Market: a Gendered Perspective

Dissertação de Mestrado

Thesis presented to the Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais of the Instituto de Relações Internacionais, PUC-Rio as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Mestre em Relações Internacionais.

Advisor: Prof. Kai Michael Kenkel

Rio de Janeiro

April 2015

Luísa Cardoso Guedes de Souza

Peacekeeping Economies and the Labor Market: a Gendered Perspective

Thesis presented to the Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais of the Instituto de Relações Internacionais, PUC-Rio as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Mestre em Relações Internacionais.

Prof. Kai Michael Kenkel
Advisor
Instituto de Relações Internacionais – PUC-Rio

Prof. Cláudio Ferraz
Departamento de Economia – PUC-Rio

Profa. Maíra Síman Gomes
Instituto de Relações Internacionais – PUC-Rio

Profa. Mônica Herz
Coordinator of the Centro de Ciências Sociais – PUC-Rio

Rio de Janeiro, April 27th, 2015.

Luísa Cardoso Guedes de Souza

The author graduated in Economics from Universidade de Brasília (UnB) in 2012.

Bibliographic Data

Souza, Luísa Cardoso Guedes de

Peacekeeping economies and the labor market: a gendered perspective / Luísa Cardoso Guedes de Souza ; advisor: Kai Michael Kenkel. – 2015.
92 f. : il. (color.) ; 30 cm

Dissertação(mestrado)–Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Relações Internacionais, 2015.
Inclui bibliografia

1. Relações internacionais – Teses. 2. Operação de paz. 3. Conflito. 4. Mercado de trabalho. 5. Gênero. I. Kenkel, Kai Michael. II. Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro. Instituto de Relações Internacionais. III. Título.

CDD: 327

To Vó Yolanda,
with love.

Acknowledgements

First, I thank my parents, João and Lívia, for their unconditional love and for their support to my choices.

Thanks to Norma, Daniel and Léozinho.

To Tio Maurício and Tia Tânia, for always being there.

To my advisor Professor Kai Michael Kenkel, for his patience and for the trust he placed in me.

To Professor Cláudio Ferraz, for his kindness and essential support since our first contact.

To Professor Maíra Síman, for her availability and willingness to evaluate my thesis.

To the staff of Instituto de Relações Internacionais da PUC-RIO, Lia González in particular.

To CAPES and to PUC-Rio, for the financial aid provided.

To Fernando Meneguin, Flávia Vera, Marcos Mendes, Paulo Springer e Tarciso dal Maso, for being admirable professionals and a great source of academic inspiration.

To my dear friends, who always encouraged me. I am deeply grateful for their friendship. Aline Gianni, Amanda Jardim, Ana Paula Pellegrino, Arturo Tovar, Camila Almeida, Catherina Godeghesi, Cauê Dobbin, Diana Zacca, Felippe de Rosa, Juliana Gonçalves, Juliana Pinto, Lorena Arantes, Lucas Galvão, Marina Bezzi, Matheus Braga, Racquel Stepanski, Raduan Meira, Rodrigo Magalhães and Rodrigo Ramos de Oliveira, thank you all very much!

Abstract

Cardoso, Luísa; Kenkel, Kai (Advisor). **Peacekeeping Economies and the Labor Market: a gendered perspective.** Rio de Janeiro, 2015. 92 p. MSc. Thesis – Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

Peace operations, although not specifically designed to interfere in the host-state's economy, present important impacts on the economic environment where they are deployed. This thesis aims to analyze specifically the effects on the formal economy, evaluating whether the presence of peacekeeping operations with multidimensional mandates affects local women's and men's participation in the host-state labor force.

A fixed-effects panel data regression model is estimated for 74 countries where conflict has occurred from 1990 to 2012. The major findings are as follows. GDP per capita is highly significant and presents a positive relation to female and male labor force participation rates. The conflict variable is significant at a 95% level, but peace operations were not found to be significant for female labor force participation rates. The labor market in Islamic countries does not seem to be affected by the occurrence of conflict or the deployment of peace operations.

Keywords

Peacekeeping; Conflict; Labor Market; Gender.

Resumo

Cardoso, Luísa; Kenkel, Kai (Orientador). **Economias de Operações de Paz e o Mercado de Trabalho: uma perspectiva de gênero.** Rio de Janeiro, 2015. 92 p. Dissertação de Mestrado – Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

As operações de paz, embora não especificamente concebidas para interferir na economia local dos países para onde são enviadas, apresentam importantes impactos econômicos. Esta dissertação tem como objetivo analisar seus efeitos sobre a economia formal, avaliando especificamente se a presença de operações de paz com mandatos multidimensionais afeta a participação de homens e mulheres na força de trabalho.

Um modelo de regressão de dados em painel com efeitos fixos é estimado para 74 países onde conflitos ocorreram entre 1990 e 2012. As principais conclusões são apresentadas a seguir. O PIB per capita apresentou alta significância e relação positiva com a taxa de participação da força de trabalho feminina e masculina. Para as mulheres, a variável de conflito é significativa ao nível de 95%, mas as operações de paz não são significativas para a taxa de participação da força de trabalho feminina. Por fim, o mercado de trabalho dos países de maioria muçulmana não parece ser afetado pela ocorrência de conflito ou a pela presença de operações de paz.

Palavras-chave

Operação de paz; Conflito; Mercado de Trabalho; Gênero.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

(...) peacekeeping never was for the faint of heart.

Angela Mackay[1]

[1] In: **Gender, Conflict and Peacekeeping**. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2005; p. 279.

Introduction

This thesis aims to evaluate whether the presence of peace operations with multidimensional mandates affects local women's and men's participation in the host-state labor force. This study conducts an econometric analysis of the impact that the deployment of peacekeeping forces has on national labor markets. Specifically, it seeks to assess the effect of peace operations on gender-specific labor force participation rates.

The literature on conflict and peace operations is examined through two main channels: economic impact assessment and gender studies. Generally, both paths are limited, as they do not intersect; however, in this thesis, they do. The fact that economic practices are gendered at the same time that gender performances are affected by economic outcomes outlines the analysis framework of conflict and of peacekeeping.

This thesis presents empirical evidence on the impact of peace operations on labor force participation rates, thereby contributing to the empirical literature within gender studies, but also to the broader literature concerning conflict studies. In addition, although countries are specific in their cultural and historical processes, it is important to challenge another limitation of the literature: the exclusivity of case studies when it comes to studying civil conflicts and/or the deployment of peace operations.

To date, empirical research on the gendered outcomes of peacekeeping economies has largely been restricted to qualitative studies. This thesis sets out to help fill this gap by gathering and modeling data that could permit a more systematic and wider view of how conflicts and peace operations impact economies and therefore the men and women that participate in them.

This thesis, then, beyond converging economic evaluations with gender perspectives, broadens the methodological scope of the literature to offer a general overview of the economic impacts of conflict and peace operations on women and men. To this purpose, this thesis estimates a fixed-effects panel data regression model for 74 countries over a 23-years timespan.

Performing economic evaluations through a gendered perspective is important to understanding peacekeeping operations effects more comprehensively. Considering the complex social scenarios that are inherent to conflict situations, it is fundamental to measure and track operations' outcomes in order to develop an understanding of their intended and unintended consequences.

In their mandates, peace operations are not designed to interfere directly in host-states' economies, but they generally present important impacts in the economic environment where they are deployed. The indirect creation of job posts due to the demand shock created by the presence of international personnel is a central idea for this thesis.

Strengthening the host-state's economy through employment is an important part of the recovery process. Jobs generate income that can be the basis for future investments. At the same time, an increased number of workers in the formal labor force raise the overall level of national labor productivity, an important factor for broad economic development.

The indicator of labor force participation rate is used to examine the labor market behavior of different categories of people. The level and pattern of labor force participation rates depends on employment opportunities and the demand for income, which differs from one demographic category to another according to a multiplicity of factors.

Labor force participation is a key variable to long-term economic development. This happens because, as the economy grows, more individuals are to participate in the labor market and are willing to share the benefits of a stronger economy. Labor force participation, therefore, is both a crucial driver of growth and one of its consequences.

In times of conflict, however, employment patterns are more prone to be distorted. High mortality rates bring about demographic changes that usually lead to an increased number of female-headed households and to a reallocation of the labor force. Besides, the deployment of peace operations during or in the post-conflict period brings new money flows to the host-state economy, also affecting labor allocation.

This phenomenon is the main object of study of this thesis. The model represents the application of statistical methods to the analysis of

economic data. Generally, econometric models are important and reliable tools of analysis, although their constraints must be recognized. Statistical information by itself does not explain economic phenomena.

The econometric model tests three hypotheses: that conflict and peace operations affect men and women differently in the formal economy; that conflict and peace operations are significant to the labor market with regard to labor force participation; and that the deployment of peace operations positively impact women's labor force participation rate.

This assessment is complex. Conflicts and the deployment of peace operations are usually interrelated with preexisting histories of underdevelopment and both conflict and international interventions can have unpredicted effects. Although not intended as development efforts, the economic outcomes of the deployment of multidimensional peace operations are usually byproducts of the new economic scenarios created by the very presence of international personnel. Most importantly, these consequences always present gender effects.

In regards to analyzing the gendered impact of conflicts, the United Nations has mainly focused on sexual violence and female vulnerability. In this sense, a driving motivation for this study is that it should also examine the economic, social and political effects of conflicts on women.

National security's conceptions that consider the state itself its main priority are also to be criticized. The definition to what constitutes security determines how security is analyzed and implemented. Although security is context-specific, security and development are seen as interdependent concepts. Since development tends to be regarded as an economic process, equal distribution of resources and the existence of formal political institutions are vital to establish long-term peace, hence, security.

To examine the way women's security and economic opportunities are constricted, it must be questioned whether and how gender inequalities shape the understandings and practices of international relations. In such a manner, this research intends to provide evidence to further the claim that international politics' practices are gendered and that they have gendered consequences. To comprehend international political processes, gender as a concept and women as actors must be made part of the analytical

frameworks.

Gender is a fundamental part of identity-formation dynamics that influence economic processes. This research considers gender as both an empirical and analytical category. Its empirical investigative component is represented by biological binary sex variables for men and women. Its analytical component derives from asserting that masculinity and femininity constitute a social governing code, meaning that subjective categories have material implications.

Gender inequality itself underlies large gendered economic structures before, during and after militarized processes. Gender, therefore, must always be a category for economic analyzes, preferably using observable and measurable variables, as is the case of labor force participation.

Women and men influence and are differently influenced by the economy, during war and during peace. Symbolic meanings of gender have material expressions that are reflected by daily performances of masculinity and femininity in the private and public sphere, specifically in the formal economy, our research interest.

To sum up, it is argued that gender structures the relations between the state and the military, in addition to how they define security. Economic processes are fundamental to establish peace, hence, security. Gender, therefore legitimates a social order that links security to development, resolving conflicts with peace operations that can present unintended consequences, such as the surge of peacekeeping economies and consequent changes in labor market.

This thesis consists of three chapters. The first chapter outlines a literature review of the main works in International Relations regarding gender analysis and economic approaches toward conflict studies, within a security-development framework. The second chapter is methodological, presenting the dataset that was created, the econometric model to be estimated and its application for the selected sample. The third chapter displays the obtained results of the regressions and examines the empirical findings. Finally, conclusions are presented.

1. Theoretical Framework

This chapter presents the research qualitative analysis, delineating the theoretical path that structures the econometric model to be formulated. Given that the main interest of this study is in the gendered outcomes of peacekeeping economies, the conflict and peace literature make of for the greater part of this chapter.

First, a brief evolution of security studies inside the field of International Relations is outlined – what constitutes security is fundamental to determine the transition from traditional state views to constructivist approaches that include the individual's perspectives. Most importantly to this thesis are the approaches that include gender perspectives, given that security is gendered, as are economic processes.

Next, security is problematized with regard to (under)development. During or after conflicts, the nexus between security and development is related to the emergence of peacekeeping economies and to changing patterns in the labor force. Links among these themes build the theoretical framework upon which the gendered structures of labor markets shall be analyzed.

1.1 Security Studies

There is no consensus among International Relations theorists about what the main focus of Security Studies should be. During the Cold War, the subject was centered on the state and mostly based on militarized notions of national security. Realists dominated the main theoretical frameworks, focusing exclusively on states, which were considered to be the agents and referent objects of security in international politics.

According to realism, international anarchy allows for wars to happen because there is no central authority to control the behavior of states. Sovereign states, in order to defend their sovereignty, develop offensive capabilities. Therefore, states seek to achieve their security at the expense of others'. In this scenario, although peace is not a possibility, states try to maintain a balance of power that will prevent one of them to be hegemonic.

In his *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz (1979) contends that systems are composed of a structure and their interacting units. Political structures present an ordering principle (anarchic or hierarchical), functionally alike or differentiated units and the distribution of capabilities. According to Waltz (1979, p.98), only the distribution of capabilities varies over time. The anarchic ordering principle and the unit governing principle of self-help are constants.

In John Mearsheimer's theory there is also a structural explanation for great wars, suggesting their main causes are related to the architecture of the international system, which depends on the number of existing great powers and how much power each of them holds. In *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Mearsheimer (2001, p. 35) argues that, facing international uncertainty, states might use their power to harm each other. Hence, relative capabilities are crucial to security: states ought to acquire as much power compared to other states as possible. In this sense, national security or insecurity depends on the structure of the international system.

Fear is another key variable in this scenario: the security of competition is directly proportional to the fear of a State regarding others. Fear results from the fact that offensive potential is always present and that international anarchy represents no restriction to the use of that offensive potential. Power to Mearsheimer means military power: the main instrument in territorial control, which is the primary objective of political power. In the face of fear, security relates to the territorial conquest with use of military power, the subordination of one State to another's political power (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 43).

Nonetheless, a challenge to realism came from neoliberal institutionalists, for whom international institutions play a fundamental role in security issues, especially regarding conflicts. To Robert Keohane (1984, p. 85), world politics is similar to an imperfect market with institutional deficiencies that hinder mutually advantageous cooperation. It is argued that institutions, such as the UN, may redefine state roles and act as mediators in state disputes. Although international institutions do not solve international anarchy, they can affect state preferences and behavior and transform the international system.

Constructivist institutionalism, on the other hand, conceptualizes institutions as a set of norms and rules rather than as a formal structure. Constructivists focus on the central role of ideology, rules and norms that institutions diffuse to constitute agents. While preferences are exogenous data to neorrealists, identity and interest formation is crucial for constructivists when explaining international phenomena.

For constructivists, in turn, the world is socially constructed through intersubjective interaction: agents and structures are mutually constituted. Political dynamics in general are based on ideational factors such as norms, identity and ideas. In this scenario, the constructivist approach to security is that security is a social construction. More specifically, security is a context-specific social construction that is given meaning through interaction.

To define anarchy and security, Wendt (1999) affirms meanings are not inherent, but a result of interactions process. Actors act based on the meanings that objects and other actors provide for them. Thus, Wendt opposes Waltz in the analysis of how process and structure are connected. Anarchy ought not to be a necessary consequence of the self-help system, but an institution developed and supported by the relationship among states. In this sense, sovereignty is also a social construct, a status conferred upon a state by other states.

Tickner (2001, p. 63) claims that the modern state and the international system have created and been created by a historical process of structural inequalities that generates individual insecurity, because international security firstly protects sovereignty.

However, the research angle of this thesis is the individual. Duffield (2001, p. 257) argues that the state power has been changed due to the strong influences of the non-state and non-territorial relations of globalization. The paradox of the nation state is that it can mobilize societies for total war while it can also enforce total peace.

The beginning and the end of the 20th century have witnessed two main different types of warfare, broadly and respectively defined as interstate and civil conflicts. According to Kaldor (1999, p. 97), the contemporary forms of war, the new wars, are globalized, based on decentralizing processes of the state, especially its disintegration of formal

security capacities.

A further distinguishing feature of these new conflicts is their effect on civilian populations. Civil conflicts usually present a multiplicity of warring parties that lack institutional legitimacy and violence is most commonly directed against civilians. In those scenarios, the role of regular armed forces is taken by foreign troops operating under international organizations (Idem, p. 99-101).

Related to traditional liberation struggles, warring parties in the new wars are often regarded as pursuing sectarian economic or ethnic interests. In this scenario, widespread human rights abuse is common and that includes the lack of economic rights, which directly influences the conditions for undervelopment.

Duffield (2001, p.13) argues that the international responses to the new wars structure the emerging relations between governments, NGOs, militaries and the business sector. Among other things, to define conflict as a social problem, meaning that underdevelopment is dangerous, allows all kinds of networks to be mobilized in the cause of security.

If conflicts are considered a development issue involving a political and institutional breakdown, as such, it shall require help to protect civilians and to restore development patterns. That is, security professionals are required to conjoin and work together for peace (Idem, p.45).

United Nations peace operations are the most representative example of the international professional endeavors seeking to protect development. Peace operations assist countries affected by conflict to establish immediate and long-term peace, providing support in difficult environments. Bellamy & Williams (2011, p. 18) define peace operations as “one general type of activity that can be used to prevent, limit and manage violent conflict as well as rebuild in its aftermath”.

Although the United Nations have not clearly established the concept of a peace operation, the Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) presents the following definitions:

> Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from

> escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. Peacekeeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.
> …peacebuilding is action to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peacebuilding, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. 5, paragraphs 20 and 21).

During the Cold War, it was not common for the UN to intervene in ongoing conflicts; instead, the action would be to police ceasefires already agreed between warring parties. After the Cold War, however, the number, size and capacities of peace operations have expanded significantly.

The transformations in the international context have led the United Nations to modify peacekeeping as well. Peace operations in general have experienced conceptual and practical changes in their mandates and activities, becoming more complex over the years (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fetherson, 1994).

Although some peace operations are solely based on military deployment to assure ceasefire, there are a growing number of operations that include non-military activities. The so-called multidimensional missions are consent-based and consist of both military and civilian components working together to implement a comprehensive peace settlement. To Doyle and Sambanis (2000, p. 791), multidimensional peacekeeping consists of ‘‘missions with extensive civilian functions, including economic reconstruction, institutional reform, and election oversight’’.

To be included in this thesis' analysis[2], all United Nations peace operations from 1990 to 2012 must have presented in their mandates any of the following goals: economic development; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; organizing elections; performing human rights training and monitoring; police reforming; and general institution-building.

Aoi, Thakur & de Coning (2007, p. 5) discuss the challenges that come from the broad range of activities that peace operations may encompass. Instead of solely maintaining a peaceful status quo, multidimensional peace operations also manage basic transformations. Therefore, this widening in the role and scope of peace operations exposes them to an array of unintended consequences.

The main goal of peacekeeping operations is to foster conditions for lasting peace. But when the UN deploys peacekeeping operations in conflict zones, the initial goals of stopping battles, reconstructing the host state's institutions and promoting general development may be achieved or not; and if they are, this may happen in a different manner from what was originally planned.

Bellamy & Williams state that peace operations may not always improve the lives of those they affect. There is a "contradiction at the heart of most peace operations: they are conducted by soldiers trained in the art of war" (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 363). Peace operations are different from war fighting, given that it requires attributes that are not essential in military training, such as sensitivity and empathy.

Moreover, the civilian tasks of multidimensional peacekeeping are complex. As Fortna (2008, p. 102) points out, Western democracies took centuries to build stable state institutions whereas peace operations seek to follow a rushed mimetic process in months, given institutions are crucial to establishing a system in which political conflict can be managed peacefully.

The rushed mimetic process is even more problematic because it is hindered by a sluggish economic development. In situations of conflict, growth is harmed by a deteriorating quality of human capital, due to the high

[2] Countries considered for the analysis are listed in the Appendix.

number of deaths and probable harm in the educational attainment of young generations; in addition to high transaction costs, given the insecure environment that prevents any kind of business or investments to flourish.

Besides, economic opportunities in this context might be structured on the basis of criminal acts. Therefore, a lack of state capacity as manifested in weak states is one of the greatest impediments to a long-term pattern of development. Besley & Persson (2010, p. 27) have shown that low legal capacity can lead to low economic growth or might contribute, through wages, to the likelihood of civil war, and that lack of fiscal capacity can yield low income, through production distortions.

Although it is inevitable that complex operations present unintended consequences, they may be positive, such as voluntary blood donations. The negatives ones, however, can indeed be damaging in several respects and provoke suffering. Unintended consequences have been generally related to human trafficking, to the spread of AIDS, to corruption, to changes in the demand and supply of illicit goods and of prostitution and to general distortions on the host economy.

To Doyle & Sambanis (2006, p. 131), the likelihood of peacebuilding success depends on international capacities, on the local capacity – usually mired in an underdeveloped and undiversified economy – and on local hostility, measured in terms of casualties, refugees, number of factions, type of war, and ethnic divisions.

Meharg (2009, p. 5) believes that "when it comes to international interventions, we are able to identify what does not work much more easily than what does work". Critical theory authors, such as Pugh (2005) and Richmond (2010), discuss the mentioned grassroots problems regarding peace operations.

It is argued that the missions, particularly peacebuilding endeavors, are based on the hegemonic concept of "liberal peace". In this sense, peacebuilding promotes market democracies embedded in neoliberal assumptions, imposing norms of western governance that tends to aggravate populations' vulnerabilities, instead of establishing a secure environment.

According to Duffield (2001), the liberal peace is a political project that responds to specific needs and reflects an international responsibility of

social transformation, changing war-affected countries into stable societies, more specifically:

> Liberal peace embodies a new or political humanitarianism that lays emphasis on such things as conflict resolution and prevention, reconstructing social networks, strengthening civil and representative institutions, promoting the rule of law, and security sector reform in the context of a functioning market economy (Duffield, 2001, p.11).

Following the constructivist approach, ideas of what forms security frameworks, a strong state or a strong economy are subjective categories that have material implications. Also, the material process of institution-building is a subjective reconstruction of the state and of its social dimensions.

The identity of individuals is a narrative, a way to construct meaning to their own experiences. And the identity of citizens and the various practices in which they engage are intrinsically related to the existence of the state. Although not limited by it, the state and gender are interrelated narratives that structure the formation of individual and collective identities.

The inclusion of gender in the field study of international relations in the post-Cold War was the starting point for the emergence of a number of feminist approaches in the discipline. In common, they all search the institutions and norms of the international system for explanations for the asymmetry in gender relations and the construction of identities based on this category.

1.1.2 Gendering Security

The term gender is not the same as the term women or the term sex. To take them as synonyms ignores crucial dynamics of gender relations. Men and the structures of gendered inequalities must be considered in gender analysis. Goldstein (2003, p. 2) uses gender to refer to masculine and feminine bodies and roles, covering biological and cultural structures and

scripts relating to each broad gender group. This interpretation best fits this research.

Combining quantitative analysis based on sex-disaggregated data to process oriented arguments of gender is fundamental in this thesis. In this sense, this section's goal is to make gender the main operative discussion, because the empirical results further presented reflect performances of this subjective category.

Gender is a relational division concerning social assumptions that constitute the differences between men and women and how they make sense of the world. Scott (1986, p. 1067) establishes that gender works based on the individual subject's relation to social organization, articulating the nature of the interrelationships. Gender, therefore, is a constitutive element of social interactions based on perceived differences between the sexes, being a primary form of signifying relationships of power.

Gender attributes, classifies and symbolizes power, hierarchically structuring relationships among different activities and categories of people symbolically associated with masculinity or femininity. Therefore, "gender is a structural power relation" (Cohn, 2013, pp. 3-4). To Bourdieu (1997, p. 128) it is the combination between subjective categories and objective reality that produces the circle of social reproduction, which is part of the process of naturalizing subjective categories.

Given that gender is relational, it is impossible to value masculinity without consequently devaluating femininity. The devaluation is simultaneously ideological and discursive but also material, reflected in economic structures. Besides, it normalizes marginalization, because invoking the natural inferiority of the feminine legitimizes hierarchies (Peterson, 2010, p. 18-19).

Higate & Henry (2004, p. 482) state that gendered relations can be defined as "interactions between and among women and men that are characterized by negotiation, bargaining and exchange between different actors with different access to economic and social power".

It is acknowledged that power relationships are not unidirectional and that both categories of men and women are the result of historic transformations that create exclusion spaces within the field of gender

studies itself. Race, class, sexuality and culture are undoubtedly fundamental aspects of identity-formation processes that influence the economy and the dynamics of conflict and of peace operations.

However, feminists have long drawn attention to the fact that although women's status is not a universal homogeneous given, "power differences based on gender justify hierarchical social structures" (Peterson & Runyan, 1999, p. 34) and that "women are disproportionately situated at the bottom of the socioeconomic scale in all societies" (Tickner, 2001, p. 7).

Women's socialization processes are based on subjectivities and roles that feature dependence, lack of autonomy and implied consent to male domination. Men's socialization processes are based on subjectivities that feature aggression, power and control. Thus, men display a sense of entitlement over femininity. That legitimates enduring stereotypes of female dependence, the embodiment of sex differences and the objectification of women as sexual targets. Hence, gender coding naturalizes and depoliticizes the creation of inequalities and violence (Peterson, 2010, p. 27-28).

However, quantitative studies and measuring exercises that use sex-disaggregated data, such as this thesis, give visibility to naturalized inequalities and to the way they further structure social hierarchies that oppress women and that may bring general violence about.

In Mazurana, Raven-Roberts & Parpart (2005, p. 281-282), patriarchy is considered to be the main reason why violent conflicts happen and why the international community is not able to establish long-term pacific solutions to them. That leads to questioning how deeply can public and private male privilege impact social, political, cultural and economic structures relating to the outbreak of conflicts.

Gender is defined by mutual exclusion: practices, institutions and individuals are considered as masculine by not identifying to feminine traits. In this sense, mutual exclusion is a political construct for shaping power and authority in favor of masculinity (Peterson & Runyan, 1999, p. 3).

The binary relation between productive and reproductive labor is one of the many explanations for femininity to be devalued. Gender dichotomies and narratives corroborate with hierarchical structures that constitute political priorities and interests. Most importantly, individual identities are

bound to State identity, its war and citizenship dynamics.

Tickner (2001, p. 15) points out that the way States behave comply with hegemonic masculinity, an ideal type of masculinity, embedded in characteristics defined as masculine. Connell created the concept of hegemonic masculinity as a culturally dominant type of masculinity. It is a socially constructed cultural ideal that actually does not match the characteristics of most men, but "sustains patriarchal authority and legitimizes a patriarchal political and social order" (Connell, 1995, *apud* Tickner, 1992, p. 6).

In the book *Women and War* (1987), Elshtain describes how war stories carry ideas that structure gender arrangements and inequalities in the name of the State. Her concept of civic virtue relates to soldiers' symbolic dimension as the ideal citizen, representing individual commitment to the formation of the State. Primarily, masculinity and femininity are respectively represented by the figures of the Just Warrior and the Beautiful Soul. Collective enthusiasm and political patterns of mobilization in the name of the State created people's identification with it.

Women, as the metaphorical mothers of the nation, are themselves not citizens, but the terrain for citizenship (Elshtain, 1987, p. 69). The Beautiful Soul, in wartime, is positioned as mourning for the war and as a maintainer of non-belligerent values, representing simultaneously what men need, seek and despise (Idem, p. 152).

Deeply gendered constructions have permeated the historical development of state sovereignty and state identity. Beyond the State and hegemonic masculinity, nationalism relies on both male and female embodiments. Moreover, family representations portray the importance of community – "images of motherland, fatherlands and homelands evoke a shared sense of purpose" (Tickner, 2001, p. 54).

Although women are often not involved in direct combat, they are part of war causes and outcomes. The work of men as life-takers creates perpetual work for women as life-givers. (Peterson & Runyan, 1999, p. 82). Female representations are the counterpart of the just warrior identity. They mirror masculine honor especially as mothers who produce fighters for the State. (Elshtain, 1987, p. 121). Female bodies personify noncombatants:

"women are designated as non-combatants because of their role in the reproductive process; because women were symbolically linked to images of non-violent rescue" (Idem, p. 138).

Elshtain argues that Machiavelli equates a warrior who is willing to defend the Republic to a citizen, separating the public and private spheres and, consequently, excluding women of civic virtue (Idem, p.58). The civic virtue constructs individual and collective narratives on war and peace, relating gender to the social structures of morality and state policies. Morally formed civic character, based on established political identities, is crucial for just war as civic virtue (Idem, p. 222).

In abstract form, the State is often imagined as male and the nation as female, whose honor must be fought for. Women's symbolic nationalist significance tends to make them more vulnerable to violence. Men are seen as agents of nationalism whereas women as national possessions. In this sense, the symbolic use of women and their role as mothers represent policing the female body and behavior, especially during wartime, when identity conflicts are involved (Baylis, J., Smith, S., & Owens, 2006, p. 679).

Metaphors represent the roles men and women are supposed to play in the private and public spheres. Individual actions, therefore, are the symbolic expression of social expectations that legitimate a social order based on behavioral differences that structure power inequalities.

Binary opposition and the social dynamics of gender constitute power itself according to Scott (1986, p. 1073). To legitimate war, risking life to defend the state, appeals to various ways of manhood are made: vulnerable individuals such as women must be protected; it is the male duty to serve their leaders and fulfill the existent associations between masculinity and national strength.

Goldstein (2003, p.57) affirms that war is deeply rooted in the human experience and that gender war roles are permanent, part of society's readiness for war. Zarkov (2006, p. 6) stresses that gender must be used regarding women's and men's social places. It ought to indicate the processes that shape how masculinities and femininities are performed. Development policies and violent dynamics of armed conflicts are usually structured on strict assumptions of the binary order: men are soldiers while

women are caretakers. Men hold power while women are vulnerable.

As mentioned, gender is a social construct based on various dichotomies that legitimate a social order. To Cohn (2013, p. 7), the interactions between women and men are formed by the imputed power, characteristics and skills that are socially designed for each group. In this sense, the intersection of various social arrangements will shape women's and men's social experiences, during peace or during conflict.

In her concluding chapter, Elshtain (1987, p. 245) calls upon contemporary citizens to be neither warriors nor victims and to seek instead an image of civic life that links men and women alike to the social and political world, narrowing the gaps between them. However, ten years onward, Elshtain affirms that, to discuss political identities during war, the classic level-of-analysis must be transgressed and again writes urging for the creation of more flexible individual and civic identities and virtues:

> The individual, the State and the anarchical international arena comprise three different levels of explanation. Thinking about men, women and war implicates one necessarily in the politics of representation and of identity, and such considerations, in turn, force one to cut through and across the level-of-analysis framework (Elshtain, 1998, p. 449).

1.1.2.1 Gendering conflict and peace operations

Gender divisions of social roles, of labor and of access to resources, including power and decision-making, make men and women experience conflict differently. Therefore, engaging in conflict situations, reconstruction and development always means engaging with gendered processes and with their gendered consequences.

To Jennings (2011, p. 3), statebuilding is systemized from a "default male" perspective. It usually ignores women's viewpoints and experiences, being dismissive of issues that constitute long-term dynamics of gender equality.

Gender issues are already present in armed conflict and a peacekeeping operation is likely to affect these developments, whether or not the United Nations is gender aware (Mazurana, Raven-Roberts & Parpart, 2005, p. 168). However, the United Nations risks increasing gender inequality if it does not analyze and adjust its mission to the actual context of local gender structure (Idem, p. 180).

Peksen (2012, p. 568) states it is crucial, when examining military efficiency during interventions, to analyze the possibility of different effects it can cause on human rights issues. In addition to causing suffering, a negative impact on human rights might also interfere with the interests of intervener states and their neighbor allies, creating regional complications.

Besides, the end of a conflict does not only mean a ceasefire. According to Gizelis (2009, p. 507), for a conflict to end, there must be economic reconstruction in addition to the socialization of former combatants into political and civilian life, so that the likelihood of future violence decreases.

Peacebuilding efforts depend on a society's domestic capacity and social capital. Gizelis (2009, p. 521) defends that greater local female empowerment can enhance the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations. But, sometimes opportunities to promote gender equality are just wasted because of inaction: disregarding women`s opinions or not employing them in professional positions.

According to Rehn & Johnson Sirleaf (2002, p. 61), there is also frustration from the few senior women working in peace operations. "They complained of limited opportunities for advancement, insufficient authority and resources to carry out their responsibilities, lack of support from headquarters and even sexual harassment".

In relation to mainstreaming gender in UN peacekeeping training, Mackay states that the biggest challenge is the nature of the military itself. The contradiction between the warrior soldier, trained to kill, and the peacekeeper, trained to negotiate and protect, is not the sole problem. Peacekeepers need to figure out how to help victims who are at the same time active agents to work and consult with. Peacekeepers are asked to enforce human rights they do not know much about. They are asked to be

sensitive and culturally-aware while they are inserted in one of the most masculinized professional cultures there is (Mazurana, Raven-Roberts & Parpart, 2005, p. 278).

There are indications that locals perceive female peacekeepers as more accessible and easier to talk to (Hendricks and Hutton, 2008, p. 4). DeGroot (2001, p. 35) affirms that young men might want to join the armed forces because the idea of combat is attractive to them. To be working for a peace operation, therefore, is insulting to their manhood.

In this sense, women may not be welcomed in peacekeeping missions because of soldiers' mixed feelings concerning the gendered aspects of peace missions. Hence, although peacekeeping is supposed to be a different military model, it reproduces the same traditionally gendered framework, privileging a conventional combat-oriented mindset (Liora, 2008, p. 563).

In general the proportion of women soldiers in the military component of peace operations is much lower than their representation in the respective national armed force (Carreiras, 2010 p. 478). Although peacekeeping training is supposed to be gender-neutral, male soldiers' experiences are taken as the standard to be followed and the difficulties that women face during peace missions are usually not addressed (Liora, 2008, p. 581).

Carreiras (2010, p. 474) indicate that there is a tendency in the military to eliminate discrimination against women. However, occupational restrictions persist and women are not allowed in combat-related functions. Following the same trend, women are under-represented in international peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the increase in female military participation has not followed a linear pattern, presenting expansion and contraction periods.

Military personnel can make individuals feel both secure and insecure. According to Higate & Henry (2004, p. 482), security is a gendered affair that may be impacted differently according to the varied performances of masculinity and femininity. Peacekeepers and local women represent different subject positions, their experiences of insecurity and security are variable and militarized masculinities and femininities are multiple and sometimes paradoxical, representing different experiences of security.

Militarization affect day-to-day actions and in conflict scenarios, it constructs social identities and shapes diverse ways of enacting femininity and masculinity. Within this context, peacekeeping economies, a concept that will be further explained in detail, are a byproduct of a greater configuration of inequalities (social, economic and political) that constitute male and female contrasting experiences and opportunities.

For Harris (2011, p. 15), internationals may have the misperception that the activities encompassed in a peacekeeping economy are ordinary economic characteristics of the given location, as though the presence of peace operations was not creating distortions on local culture. Consequently, the performances of masculinity and femininity and the interactions between locals and foreigners are naturalized by the former.

Jennings (2014, p. 2) adds complexity to the issue by pointing out that peacekeepers are usually afraid to be tricked and extorted by locals, offering an analytical context where the peacekeeper plays a vulnerable role. It is affirmed, "there is an institutionally endorsed and disseminated view of locals as sources of threat to peacekeepers" (Idem, p.9). However, the gendered analysis of this scenario is not simply dichotomous.

Whitworth (2004, p.184) defends the idea that, instead of creating a secure environment, militarized peacekeeping can bring insecurity, because soldiering is so deeply bound to traits of belligerence and aggression. Therefore, having the military act to establish peace is paradoxical and may lead peacekeepers to experience "implosions of hypermasculinity", meaning they take what are considered masculine characteristics, such as force, to a violent deviant extreme.

Women experience violence not only during conflicts, because its long-term effects reinforce female vulnerability within a culture of violence. Therefore, feminist research ought to worry about domestic violence and "analyze how the boundaries between public and private, domestic and international, political and economic, are permeable and interrelated" (Tickner, 1992, p. 15).

Due to a weakened institutional scenario and fragile legal foundation, female sense of security is threatened in the public and private spheres, because they are susceptible "to the rule of aggression rather than the rule of

law" (Rehn & Johnson Sirleaf, 2002, p. 1).

Lock (2005, p. 3) defends it is important to consider that the number of victims caused by armed violence in conflict scenarios represents not only war-related victims, but also victims of all kinds of violence. This reflects the fact that lasting conflicts destroy social cohesion and weakens accepted social norms, creating an environment that allows for diverse expressions of violence.

"Peacekeepers and police units must consider physical, political and economic violence against women as a crime and as a human rights abuse" (Mazurana, Raven-Roberts & Parpart, 2005, P. 193). Although international peacekeepers might be unlikely to foster pro-women policing, they ought to provide an enabling scenario for gendered policing practices to be promoted locally (Idem, p. 197).

Domestic violence, although happening during peacetime, tends to increase during or after conflict. A series of factors related to conflicts may contribute to the increase in domestic violence: the availability of weapons, the lack of basic services, economic difficulties and the violent situations men have experienced that make aggression a legitimate solution for problems. Therefore, domestic violence must be perceived as regular and widespread in conflict and post-conflict situations (Rehn & Johnson Sirleaf, 2002, p. 177).

Post conflict periods are favorable to reframe domestic norms, institutions and practices, especially those regarding internal security and policing. However, domestic violence and sexual harassment may increase in post conflict periods because returning soldiers, mostly men, redirect their aggression to their household. More broadly, gender-based crimes are defined as

> crimes committed against persons because of their socially constructed roles as women, girls, men and boys. Gender-based crimes include crimes of sexual violence, such as rape and sexual slavery, but are not restricted to these crimes. Gender-based crimes also include non-sexual crimes, such as the killing of boys because they are perceived as potential soldiers, or the capture of women and girls to wash and cook

> for fighting forces (Mazurana, Raven-Roberts & Parpart, 2005, p. 80).

The legal regime for crimes against civilians during peace operations is based on the responsibility of the peacekeeper's home country to prosecute offenders. This regime derives from trilateral agreements between the United Nations, the troop contributing state and the host state. However, victims have no legal recourses in that scenario, resulting in frequent impunity (Mazurana, Raven-Roberts & Parpart, 2005, p. 84).

It is argued that the military is improper for prosecuting cases of violence against women, because it is deeply rooted in masculinity. Carreiras (2010, p. 472) points out that the military's organizational structure is gendered both in terms of opportunity and hierarchical power and in terms of occupational structure, regarding sexual division of labor. Besides, it is male dominated in terms of numeric representation, especially in prestigious functions.

The military is a source of normative concepts of gender, amplifying dominant cultural patterns while participating in their production and reproduction. Enloe (2000, p. 3) describes militarization as "a step-by-step process by which a person or thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well being on militaristic ideas". The power of militarization can be seen when militaristic needs and assumptions are socially valued and naturalized. Hence, "militarization involves cultural as well as institutional, ideological and economic transformations" (Idem, p. 291).

In that way, militarization codifies everyday community life. In conflict situations, the institutional framework is fragile and the military is often the only organizational setting in the conflict context, regulating local politics and economy through interconnected social systems (Raven-Roberts, 2013, p. 49).

Militarization depends upon male and female acquiescence, but it privileges masculinity (Enloe, 2000, p. 4). Militarization privileges masculinity but it does so by maneuvering notions of both femininity and masculinity (Idem, p. 289). As Peterson & Runyan (1999, p. 193) put it, "the

male nationalist hero undervalues and is dependent on the female reproductive work".

The invisibility of women, common basis of militarism, minimizes the extent to which the armed forces have depended on women to administer their military operations and to preserve military legitimacy (Mazurana, Raven-Roberts & Parpart, 2005, p. 36). Militaristic policies constantly rely on various groups of women and on the very notion of femininity, performing subtle daily processes of gendered militarization.

Military policymakers have needed women to play all sorts of roles: to boost morale, to provide comfort, to reproduce next generations of soldiers, to symbolize homeland, to replace men when convenient. If the military has enough control over women, all the needed support for service is to be provided by women. For that control to exist, however, it is fundamental to define women as negligible to the military's core identity (Enloe, 2000, p. 44-45).

Carreiras (2010, p. 475) paints a different picture, defending that the current increase in women's military roles has challenged the masculine supremacy in the army. She argues that inside the military nowadays different types of masculinities coexist with the ideal warrior symbol, such as the scholarly soldier and the statesmen.

It is also emphasized that the impacts of peace operations on military professional identities and their gendered expression must be observed. Contrasting warrior and humanitarian strategy opens the concept of security to redefinition, in addition to affecting the military identity itself as well as the underlying models of military professionalism (Idem, p. 476).

Although humanitarian work is dependent on military work, "the militarization and masculinization of peace, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding, development and humanitarianism should not be viewed as natural or inevitable" (Mazurana, Raven-Roberts & Parpart, 2005, p. 38).

Whitworth (2004, p. 172) states that militarized masculinity presents several social outcomes. Military men have the sense they are allowed to sexually abuse and exploit women and girls when deployed in peace operations. Smith & Miller de la Cuesta (2011, p. 290) also affirm "military

presence should result in an increase in demand for prostitution relative to the period before its introduction".

The military and the State relate in a circular process between the construction and protection of national security and social order, structured upon gender assumptions. Gender discrimination can distort employment patterns in the civilian economy and intensify the militarization of female labor, leading women to the prostitution industry (Enloe, 2000, p. 46-47). The same can happen during peace operations, because even in international peacekeeping, soldiers are not exempt from the sexism that has always incited military prostitution (Idem, p. 101).

It must be stressed that one of the most critical impacts of conflicts and of peacekeeping economies is women`s sexual vulnerability. Economic inequality between peacekeepers and the locals is one, but not the only, factor that is conducive to a booming sex trade. To Aning & Fiifi (2013, p. 23), male peacekeepers` wealth in contrast with the limited economic opportunities available to locals contributes to the engagement of some peacekeepers with multiple sex partners and on sexual exploitation in return for basic supplies or the possibility of a job opportunity.

Raven-Roberts (2013, p. 45) defends that in a war context there is a commodization process of women as resources to be exploited and even trafficked. It is affirmed, however, that women being vulnerable to this kind of commodization is not a natural matter, but a social one, deeply entrenched in the gendered economic and social structures that have been present even before the conflict itself, as well as in the gendered ideologies that militarization carries.

Women's multiple relationships to militaristic practices and to the military itself are the outcomes of social, cultural and historical processes, not the consequence of specific decisions. To naturalize women's militarization is to disregard the seriousness of gendered militarization (Mazurana, Raven-Roberts & Parpart, 2005, p. 34). Complementarily, as in the case of military prostitution, cases of rape are the result of military strategies. Political choices are being made in these kinds of episodes and responsibility must be taken. Soldiers' behavior is political and so is war rape (Enloe, 2000, p. 127).

Although in very important ways the widespread violence against women during armed conflict demands attention, exclusive focus on sexual abuses during war obscures a number of important issues. In regards to analyzing the gendered impact of conflicts, the United Nations has mainly focused on sexual violence while it should also examine the economic, social and political effects of conflicts on women (Mazurana, Raven-Roberts & Parpart, 2005, p.5). It is not unusual for international legal frameworks to disregard female agency.

The final document of the Fourth World Conference on Women, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action states that "while entire communities suffer the consequences of armed conflict and terrorism, women and girls are particularly affected because of their status in society as well as their sex" (United Nations, 1995).

On October 2000, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1325, a document urging countries to defend gender perspectives and support women's rights during and after conflicts. On 2008, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820 was approved in order to condemn the use of sexual abuse as a war instrument (United Nations, 2000, 2008).

However, both resolutions are prone to criticism. Heathcote (2011, p. 35-38) argues that both resolutions ignore female agency and focus exclusively on women's sexual vulnerability Resolution 1820 assimilates "victim essentialism" to female experiences in conflict situations. The resolution is said to give excessive attention to the possibilities of sexual violence against women and girls and to the need for their protection, which tends to constrain women's participation in post-conflict processes.

For women to actively engage with reconstruction and development processes, peace operations' goals, practices and discourses must challenge conventional gendered militarization. Policy papers and field implementation cannot be contradictory. Besides, they must always be scrutinized on whether socially and operationally they are subverting or reproducing traditional gender relations (Carreiras, 2010, p. 477).

War legitimates male association with violence (Tickner, 1992, p. 15). To go beyond Elshtain's binary of the male Just Warrior and the female

Beautiful Soul is in the direction to change how military power and performance is gendered. Elshtain (1998, p. 454) questions whether the images used to guarantee and maintain the notions of women as non-combatants and men as soldier-citizens are still symbolic determinants nowadays. How far do they impact the contemporary individual?

"Feminists investigate how the intersection of gender and other hierarchical social structures at the global level affect, and are affected by, social life within and between individuals and states" (Tickner, 2001, p. 132). To examine the way women's security and economic opportunities are constricted, it must be questioned whether and how gender inequalities shape the understandings and practices of international relations.

1.2 Security and Development

As mentioned, gender is a social construct based on various dichotomies that legitimate a social order. Therefore, security and development are gendered concepts. Moreover, the notions of new wars and liberal peace have established a particular landscape when studying the relations between security and development. It is not possible for development to occur without stability and, at the same time, security is not guaranteed without development.

The commitment to conflict resolution and the reconstruction of societies in such a way as to avoid future wars resets the paradigms of security and represents a crucial point for the politics of development. It is not only about the specificities of policies; it has profound political and structural implications (Duffield, 2001, p. 15-16).

Contemporary writers, such as Buzan (1983), argue that security should not be focused on states or on the military but on human collectivities. Security to Buzan is military (in relation to strategic studies), but also social (identities), political (state stability), environmental (maintenance of the biosphere) and economic (revolved around access to the resources and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare).

Duffield (2001, p. 2) argues that the contemporary security framework encompasses terrorism, criminal activities and all sorts of

conflicts, not only interstate wars. Within this framework, underdevelopment is seen as dangerous. In the same direction, Sambanis (2002, p. 217) calls attention to the fact that conflicts disrupt social norms and threaten regional and international security systems.

To reset the concept of security in terms of development, defining underdevelopment as dangerous justifies and legitimates an agenda of social transformation. "A new security framework has emerged in which stability is now regarded as unfeasible without development, while development is non-sustainable without stability" (Duffield, 2001. p. 259).

In this sense, underdevelopment facilitates the occurrence of conflict, which, in turn, hinders development itself, representing the issue of endogeneity, a loop of causality. Miguel (2004, p. 746) emphasizes that economic factors are potentially endogenous on the cross-country empirical literature of civil wars.

Conflict studies usually show that development, mostly measured by GDP per capita or energy consumption per capita, is among the most robust predictors of civil war (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004, p. 574). Conflicts impact development possibilities and development levels may increase the chances of conflict.

Duffield (2001, p. 37) emphasizes that fostering development has become intrinsically related with fostering security. Simultaneously, security is crucial for development. Poverty and underdevelopment are associated with conflict whilst conflict itself worsens poverty and deepens underdevelopment. Conflicts affect an important economic mechanism: resource allocation. During violent conflict, different patterns of resource allocation take place, diverging funds from productive activities to military ones. Consequently, the increase of military expenditures diminishes the availability of funds for public health, education and poverty alleviation policies.

To top it all, resources that do get allocated to public health are not spent efficiently. Ghobarah et al. (2003, p. 193) show for example that "wartime destruction and disruption of the transportation infrastructure (roads, bridges, railroad systems, communications, and electricity) weakens the ability to distribute clean water, food, medicine, and relief supplies, both

to refugees and to others who stay in place".

The widespread destruction of infrastructure and national assets generates loss of capital stock. Foreign investment rates decrease due to the insecure environment. Without peace, there is no incentive to undertake productive investments in the legal economy, as the likelihood of investment return is minimal.

Moreover, mortality rates increase dramatically, due to deaths caused both direct and indirectly by conflict. Epidemiological research shows that diseases present a greater effect on mortality rates than direct battle deaths. Degomme and Guha-Sapir (2010, p. 297) study Darfur and show that "more than 80% of excess deaths were not a result of violence." Such excess deaths in this case are the result of an increased spread of disease that occurs due to the lack of public health services.

High mortality rates bring about demographic changes that usually lead to an increased number of female-headed households and to a reallocation of the labor force. Households usually adjust with changes in marriage and fertility, migration, investments in children's health and schooling. Households headed by widows may be especially vulnerable to intergenerational poverty. However, the absence of men allows women economic and political opportunities. Hence, it is defended that conflict can present heterogeneous impacts, either increasing or decreasing preexisting gender inequalities (Buvinic et al., 2013, p. 1).

Regarding the economic effects war can have on gender, Acemoglu & Lyle (2004, p. 499) point out that World War II (WWII) was a source of exogenous variation in the female labor supply, as a consequence of the military mobilization of males. Based on the growth of female labor force participation rate from 28% in 1940 to 34% in 1945 in the United States and the fact that a substantial number of women have remained in employment, it is affirmed that WWII brought change to women's preferences and opportunities.

The present study follows a similar idea in the sense that women are expected to enter the workforce when men are at war. Besides, as an unintended consequence of peace operations, the presence of international

personnel creates demands that affect the host country's economy during or after conflict.

Particularly, they boost the service industry and its supply of jobs. Presuming men are combatants, women are then likely to be the ones hired where multidimensional peace operations are deployed, establishing a peacekeeping economy, a central concept for this thesis.

1.2.1 Peacekeeping Economies

The economic impacts of the deployment of a large well-remunerated foreign force are understudied (Smith & Miller de la Cuesta, 2011, p. 289). However, it is known that peace operations have economic, cultural and social impacts on host communities.

While peacekeepers may stop aggression through military means, the effects of their presence and actions change the economic and political incentives host-country populations face. According to Fortna (2008, p. 176), altering economic incentives can be crucial to maintaining stable peace.

Peace operations, although not specifically designed to interfere in the host-state's economy, do impact the economic environment where they are deployed. Usually, recovering basic security is associated with the rise of economic activities and the presence of international interventions may bring new economic opportunities. To Doyle and Sambanis (2000, p. 782), "international economic relief and productive jobs are the first signs of peace that can persuade rival factions to disarm and take a chance on peaceful politics".

Peace operations make incidental cash injections in the local economy through three main channels: living allowances paid in cash for experts and volunteers; the salaries paid to locally-hired mission staff; and the local content of mission procurement, the goods and services originating in the host-state (Durch, 2009, p. 158).

All studies concerning the economic impact of peacekeeping, such as Carnahan, Durch and Gilmore (2006, 2007) and Durch (2009), confirm that spending from international staff allowances, local procurement and on

national staff wages stimulate the local economy.

Spending on locally procured goods and services impacts on the development of the construction and contracting industries, generating both business income and jobs, in addition to bringing construction and contracting to the formal sector of the economy. As for hiring national staff, it allows locals to receive training in English and computing, preparing them for future jobs. It provides support not only to the employee but also to his or her extended family.

Price rises occur in parts of the economy servicing internationals, and wages for scarce skilled labor increase. Moreover, missions tend to escalate prices specially in housing markets and restaurants catering to international standards and tastes.

Carnahan, Durch and Gilmore, S. (2006, p.15), based on macroeconomics' principles and the Keynesian multiplier, calculated a multiplier effect for mission spending to estimate how many times mission expenditures may have circulated around in the economy. They found a final multiplier result of 1.5, meaning that each dollar of mission spending locally is expected to generate $1.50 additional gross domestic product (GDP).

Complex peace operations have a need for services, goods and facilities, but the impact of this demand on the host economy is mixed (Ammitzboell, 2007, pp. 76-81). In general, national salary levels become inflated by international assistance. For one, the local staff working for internationals receives significantly higher salaries than other locals, resulting in a price increase for standard commodities, in addition to an artificial rise in rental costs and property prices.

Inflationary pressures on wages are caused because the United Nations pays significantly more than local employers. There is a drain of talented people away from national jobs to work on positions that may even be below their qualification levels. The wages set by the peace operations affects both public sector and private sector wages, becoming the wage floor on which donors and NGOs base their own wages, increasing the upward pressure on wages rates (Carnahan, Durch & Gilmore, 2007, p. 395).

Although also contributing to an increase in the general price level, the arrival of peace operations provides economic opportunities for income

generation. In particular, in the reconstruction process, military and humanitarian organizations mobilize the support of locals, creating opportunities for small businesses to attend to the demands of international personnel.

According to Aning & Fiifi (2013, p. 29), the presence of peacekeepers along with the magnitude of financial expenses may create dual economies in post-conflict countries. An important macroeconomic consequence of peace operations relates to the fact that potentially viable sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, construction, forestry and mining, are immobilized by the surge of the service sector that attends to the demands of international personnel, relating unintended consequences to the rise of a peacekeeping economy.

In this regard, the definition of peacekeeping economies is presented as follows:

> Young women are likely to become involved in and affected by what are known as 'peacekeeping economies' – industries and services such as bars and hotels that are created with the arrival of large, foreign, comparatively well-paid peacekeeping personnel. Many women find work in support positions for the mission, as secretaries and language assistants; very few women or men are hired locally as professionals (Rehn & Johnson Sirleaf, 2002, p. 62).

Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf (2002) therefore refer to peacekeeping economies as the formal economic activities that arise when international personnel arrive in a conflict zone, providing jobs for locals. However, Jennings & Nikolić-Ristanović (2009) widen the concept to:

> …encompass to peacekeeping economies the skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled jobs available to local staff in UN offices or the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that set up shop in the wake of the UN presence (usually secretarial or translation-based, as well as cleaning, cooking, driving, guarding, etc); unskilled and mainly informal work such as housecleaning, laundering, cooking, running errands, etc for international staff; and "voluntary" or "forced" participation in the sex industry,

> whether independently or mediated through a third party. This expanded concept captures a wider impact of peacekeeping economies, encompassing those employed – whether formally or informally – by the mission or mission personnel, but also including those whose livelihoods depend on the presence of a large cadre of international personnel, but are not directly employed or contracted by them (Jennings & Nikolić-Ristanović , 2009, p. 4).

The economic stimulus that peace operations provide is vital to building a strong local economy and developing national security. Paradoxically, however, economic growth may depend on the instability caused by conflict, requiring an extended presence of the mission and its resources.

Peacekeeping inducements in terms of commerce, employment, infrastructure, development and training tend to be unsustainable in the long-term. According to Aning & Fiifi (2013, p. 29), for sustainable growth to be generated, a balance between short-term economic growth, sustained by the presence of peacekeepers, and long-term sustainable development must be achieved.

The service industry is traditionally identified as being at risk of a boom-bust cycle. However, many restaurants, hotels and shops do not close when international personel leave; rather they operate at a lower scale and possibly transition towards the tourist market. Catering to the operation's demands can lay the necessary infrastructure for a viable tourism sector (Carnahan, Durch and Gilmore, 2006, p. 20-21).

Jennings & Nikolić-Ristanović (2009, p. 3) suggest that the existence and potential long-term perpetuation of gendered peacekeeping economies risks undermining the goals and objectives related to gender roles and relations that are generally part, explicitly or not, of peacekeeping operations with multidimensional mandates.

Nonetheless, the income-generating possibilities created by peace operations in a conflict scenario are neither stable nor consistent, driving local women and men to look for work in both the informal and the formal economies (Higate & Henry, 2004, p. 485).

Although peacekeeping economies drive infrastructure investments, such as housing stock and the service industry, especially commercial establishments, Jennings & Nikolić-Ristanović (2009, p. 5) argue that it is debatable how much peace operations may contribute to a comprehensive and long-term economic development.

The economic security of those employed by the incoming organizations is limited, because missions are finite. Moreover, in response to the presence of well-remunerated UN staff, local suppliers of food and housing may raise their prices to levels that are out of the reach for locals.

Peacekeepers' spending boosts the peacekeeping economy, which leads to raises in the prices of goods and services, in import prices and to a devaluation of the local currency. Aning & Fiifi (2013, p. 22) suggest that the growth of the service sector created by the new circulation of US dollars is artificial.

In the Final Report for the UN DPKO Best Practices Section (2006), the main problematic areas concerning UN operations and their possible negative outcomes for the development of local economies are:

> (1) the relationship between the United Nations and the host government, particularly the taxation arrangements; (2) the way in which a mission can establish expectations for both professional working environments and personal living standards that cannot be affordably sustained by a developing country; (3) mission policy decisions that have unappreciated economic consequences; and (4) the planning horizons with which the mission operates (Carnahan, Durch & Gilmore, 2006, p. 39).

First, there is a set of immunities to the United Nations and its staff. Most importantly, the United Nations is exempt from all direct taxes. Secondly, locals take a different perspective on what work conditions must be. Third, the missions are not trained to perform impact assessment evaluations of policy-making. Finally, peace operations are usually of short formal duration. Hence, important decisions are constrained by the structure of mission funding (Idem, p. 39-42).

Higate & Henry (2004, p. 486) affirm that most locals will be in touch with peacekeepers during the intervention solely in the economic context. Generally, peacekeepers have access to resources that the population does not. Housing, food and means of transport are made available for them. Although, the status of peacekeepers does equip them to intervene positively in the region where the mission operates, all interventions that happen are shaped by the ideologies and social backgrounds that peacekeepers bring with them.

According to Jennings & Nikolić-Ristanović (2009, p. 2), "the distortions and excesses of peacekeeping economies, and the services and activities they encompass, help shape local perceptions of the mission (and vice versa), and of the roles, relations, and status of local citizens vis-à-vis international personnel". Consequently, it is likely that peacekeeping economies have gendered effects and impact on the social roles and behaviors of women and men.

In this sense, peacekeeping economies do not present equal effects for everyone. Peacekeeping economies, and women and men's participation in them, are highly gendered, being structured along a series of inequalities – concerning income, exploitation, degree of informality in the labor force, corruption and criminality (Idem, p. 6).

Generally, armed conflict implicates in the loss of men to the battlefront, leaving women responsible for domestic chores and also for securing a source of income. To Raven-Roberts (2013, p. 43), however, this kind of transformation in once rigid divisions of labor may bring advantages for women. They can access resources, jobs and social spaces that were not previously available to them as women.

The fact that peacekeeping economies are gendered does not mean that they are harmful to all individuals involved in it nor does it mean that they are essentially sexual. The job opportunities and overall income they generate can be beneficial. Jennings (2010, p. 232) points out that "the impact of a peacekeeping economy on individuals is separable from the wider impact experienced by a community or particular group of people".

Peacekeeping economies have affected the new roles that women have assumed as primary earners and heads of households, resulting from

two interlinked dynamics, according to Aning & Fiifi (2013, p. 27). “First, the multiple acts of engagement and negotiations that women go through to maintain their families intact during conflict periods contribute to making them independent. Second, emerging peacekeeping economies create new opportunities for women”.

In this thesis, national macroeconomic data is used, making it impossible to control for the quality of individual working conditions. However, literature investigation indicates that women tend to face difficulties when looking for a decent paying job, especially in conflict scenarios where the economy is weakened and the number of female-headed households is growing, intensifying women’s need to generate income (Harris, 2011, p. 15).

1.3 Development and the Labor Market

Regarding the liberal peace concept previously mentioned, conflict resolution and prevention depends on thriving social networks and strong mechanisms that promote the rule of law in a market economy context. Since development tends to be seen as an economic process, equal distribution of resources and the existence of formal political institutions are vital to establish long-term peace, hence, security.

Identity and norms are seen as central to the study of security, as agents and structures are mutually constituted. Men and women, or their gendered individual identities in the post conflict context, shape the new institutional settings that define security and development.

The fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of their meanings. Adler (1997, p. 323) points out that constructivism can illuminate important features of international politics and have crucial practical implications for international theory and empirical research.

According to Caprioli (2004, p. 253-257), empiricism can be consistent with constructivist feminist inquiries. Feminist International Relations scholars should be expected to support all research that broadens the understanding of International Relations. In general, sex-disaggregated

indicators may present how differently women and men are affected.

Conflict analysis are usually "gender-neutral" and do not focus on people – conflict is a matter between states or armed groups. Works examining gender and armed conflict, such as this one, take a liberal feminist position to document the differential impact of armed conflict on women as compared to men.

The emergence of liberal feminism relates to the bourgeois liberal revolutions of the eighteenth century that aimed to extend to women the equal rights, civil and political, formerly exclusive to men. Female oppression is a function of barriers that prevent the realization women's individual rights. Liberal feminists argue that reversing inequalities and hierarchies is much more practical than theoretical. Without the presence of women in the public sphere, mainly through economic and political representation, traditional patriarchal institutions go unchallenged.

Following Peterson (2010, p. 18), this thesis considers gender as both an empirical and analytical category. Its empirical investigative component is represented by biological binary sex variables for men and women. Its analytical component derives from asserting that masculinity and femininity constitute a social governing code, meaning that subjective categories have material implications.

In such a manner, this thesis intends to provide evidence to further the claim that international politics' practices are gendered and that they have gendered consequences. Gender inequality itself underlies large gendered economic structures before, during and after militarized processes. Gender, therefore, must always be a category for economic analyzes, preferably using observable and measurable variables, as is the case of labor force participation.

Following the seminal work of Becker (1965, 1971, 1981) on the family, mainstream economists have explained the gender division of labor as the outcome of a coordination game where a more or less complete division of labor is the efficient solution due to increasing returns to human capital.

However, although the efficiency model captures some important aspects of the heteronormative family and individual behaviors, it does not

account for the existent differences in female labor force participation rates across economies at comparable levels of development.

Psacharopoulos & Tzannatos (1989, p. 196) affirm "the patterns of female labor force participation are the complex outcome of a variety of economic and noneconomic factors". It is crucial to acknowledge that modifications in labor force participation rates should be attributed not only to changes in economic variables.

Cultural and political factors may impact the institutional structure upon which labor supply decisions are defined. The general hypothesis in this study is that the occurrence of armed conflict and the deployment of multidimensional peace operations are part of these factors.

The evolution of labor force participation rates has been a critical feature of the development process since the Industrial Revolution. However, literature investigation does not allow defining the relationship between labor force participation and economic progress as straightforward.

It is possible to affirm that the access to better jobs brings the advantage of new labor market opportunities that arise as a country grows and contribute to the development process itself. According to the economic literature, a range of multidimensional variables, including education, fertility rates, social norms, legal settings, economic growth and the nature of job creation, drives employment trends.

The interpretation of labor force participation is the percentage of the population that works or is willing to work, measuring the proportion of a country's working-age population that engages actively in the labor market, and providing an indication of the size of the labor supply available.

Breaking down the labor force by sex and age group portraits the distribution of the economically active population within a country. This is appropriate for studies concerned with the utilization of labor in the economy. However, it only represents the formal economy, meaning that informal jobs are not part of labor force participation rates.

According to the International Labor Organization, informal employment includes all non-remunerative work undertaken in all income-producing enterprises and all remunerative work, both self-employment and wage-employment, that is not recognized, regulated or protected by legal or

regulatory frameworks.

Liberal feminists privilege notions of equality and focus on issues of women's representation within the public sphere, such as the formal economy. However, a range of gender inequalities pervades labor markets. Female employment tends to be concentrated in informal markets where pay and work conditions are usually worse than in formal ones. Gender inequality in employment violates women's right to work and is costly for women and for men.

Therefore, for this study, labor force participation rate is a proxy in gender theory terms for an inequality index. As Ross (2012, p. 113) points out, jobs outside agriculture and in the formal sector seem to have the most powerful outcomes for gender equality.

Following the strand of liberal feminism, labor force participation rates represent quantitatively how unequal is women's and men's participation in the labor market. Mammen & Paxson (2000, p.141) affirm "women's labor force status relative to that of men is an important benchmark of their status in society".

The relations gender establishes are based on mutual exclusivity. Hence, practices, institutions, perspectives and individuals that are defined as male cannot be female. Masculinity is the denial of femininity. This hierarchy and mutual exclusivity are political constructs, because they shape power, authority and allocation of resources as to favor men - women's access to resources, power and authority is therefore uneven and underprivileged (Peterson & Runyan, 1999, p. 31).

The present study is interested in relating gender to the outcomes of the economic recovery post-conflict. Duffield (2001, p.34) affirm "the ultimate goal of liberal peace is stability". In this sense, to establish functioning market economies and to strength the host-state's economy through employment is an important part of the recovery process.

Jobs generate income that can be the basis for future investments. At the same time, an increased number of workers in the formal labor force raise the overall level of national labor productivity, an important factor for broad economic development. However, this process is not gender neutral.

Men and women are affected differently by changes in the

economy, caused by conflict and by peace operations. However, the existing literature on the economic impacts of peace operations does not consider gender as an analytical tool of study. Further, the conflict studies literature that presents gender concerns remains largely conceptual and does not rely on economic variables for empirical research.

Hence, performing economic evaluations through a gendered perspective is important to understanding peacekeeping operations effects more comprehensively. Considering the complex social scenarios that are usual to conflict situations, it is fundamental to measure and track operations' outcomes in order to develop an understanding of their intended and unintended consequences.

Although not intended as development efforts, the unintended consequences of the deployment of multidimensional peace operations are usually gendered byproducts of the new economic scenarios created by the very presence of international personnel.

The literature on the gendered outcomes of peacekeeping economies has been restricted to qualitative case studies. This thesis expands the current research field by creating a dataset and modeling data that allows for an empirical overview of how conflicts and peace operations impact economies and therefore the men and women that participate in them.

2. Methodology

This chapter outlines the methodological procedures involved in the formulation and estimation of the econometric regressions. As previously mentioned, this thesis presents a gendered perspective based in sex-disaggregated data to explore the implications of peacekeeping economies.

The dependent variable to be examined is the labor force participation rate of men and women[3] in a fixed effects panel data regression model that presents how much of labor changes can be explained by the presence of peacekeeping operations.

Focusing on the labor market and combining the previous investigation of the relevant literature with econometric analysis, the issue this thesis seeks to address is whether and how peace operations with multidimensional mandates generally impact the rates of female and male participation rates in the labor force. Therefore, the model represents if the gendered structure of labor markets is affected in conflict scenarios by the deployment of peace operations.

The control variables in the model are countries' income, population's expected years of schooling and women's fertility rate. The data were retrieved from the World Bank electronic database. Besides, the model presents dummy variables for the event of conflict and for peacekeeping operations. The data sources respectively are the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Examining peacekeeping economies through a gendered perspective using an econometric model will show the variables' possible significance to explaining changes in the dependent variable. That is, the model will evaluate to what extent peacekeeping operations can impact the gender structure of labor markets. As the labor market may be affected by a series of factors, the presence of peacekeeping operations may be one of them in

[3] World Bank data on employment in the service sector (% of female and male total employments) were tested as the dependent variables on the same panel-data regression model. However, there were too many missing values for the sample selection and time frame of the analysis. In addition, for many sample countries, agriculture remains a major source of income, being the main sector for labor-absorption in the national economy.

conflict zones.

Peacekeeping operations tend to create new economic opportunities that might not have existed had the operation not taken place. Using the present model, it should be possible to see if peacekeeping operations have a positive impact on female participation in the formal economy or if they do not show any impact on the global tendencies of the labor market.

It must be emphasized that this is not a causal model. It is not possible to elaborate tests for examining conflict outcomes on randomly assigned individuals in conflict situations. Moreover, United Nations peace operations are not applied randomly to conflict cases. Thus, without the condition of random assignment, the regression estimates cannot present a causal interpretation.

Based on a review of the existing literature and considering the existence of peacekeeping economies and their expected gender effects, the following hypotheses are proposed and will be empirically tested in the next sections:

- H_1: Conflict and peace operations affect men and women differently in the formal economy.
- H_2: Conflict and peace operations are significant to the labor market with regard to labor force participation.
- H_3: The deployment of peace operations positively impact women's labor force participation rate.

2.1 Data

The collection and availability of rigorous sex-disaggregated data during conflict and in the post-conflict period is rare. To our analysis, a new dataset had to be put together merging various data sources. Sample countries were extracted from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (version 4-2014), developed by the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo and the University of Uppsala.

In this dataset an armed conflict is defined as follows: "An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or

territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths."

This database includes data on interstate and intrastate conflicts[4] from 1946 to 2013. There are 76 listed countries where conflict has taken place from 1990 to 2012. All country-year observations with at least 25 battle deaths per year in our model are coded as ones, and other observations are coded as zeros.

The sample consists of 74 countries because there is no available labor data for Myanmar (Burma) and South Sudan. Besides, some observations had to be adjusted in time for cases such as East Timor and former Yugoslav republics. All sample countries are listed in the Appendix. They are geographically distributed as shown in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Countries where conflict has taken place from 1990 to 2012.

In contrast, Figure 2 presents the geographical location of sample countries where United Nations peace operations with multidimensional mandates have been deployed from 1990 to 2012.

[4] Interstate means conflict happened between two or more states and intrastate means conflict happened between the government of a state and internal opposition groups.

Figure 2: Countries where peace operations have taken place from 1990 to 2012.

Following the World Factbook (CIA, 2013), the sample countries present a myriad of religious faiths, by population majority. One is Jewish, two are Hindu, three present indigenous beliefs, four are Buddhists, seven are Orthodox Christians, another seven are Protestant Christians, eighteen are Catholic and thirty-one are Muslim-majority countries[5]. Making up for almost 42% of total sample, Muslim countries appear to merit special attention in the analysis. Hence, a dummy variable is created to distinguish whether a country is Muslim or not.

It is assumed individuals are in the labor market pursuing income. Hence, the decision to work depends on the remuneration from work (the wage rate), other possible sources of income and preferences. The higher the wage rate, the more interested in work the individual is likely to become.

For those not in the labor force, a higher wage rate is an incentive to work, thus, higher wages induce higher participation. For those already working, a higher wage rate makes work more attractive than leisure, but it also makes additional work less desirable, since the same level of income can be achieved with less work.

[5] The majority of the Chinese population is said to be religious without affiliations. Therefore, China is not included.

Therefore the effect of higher wages on the duration of work and on labor force participation rates is not necessarily linear and differs from case to case according to preferences, that is, to the value placed on more work relative to higher earnings.

In this sense, it is fundamental to note that wage rates are fundamental to explaining fluctuations in labor force participation rates. Salaries' magnitude is an important incentive to allocate more or less time for domestic work and that is represented by the fact that female labor supply elasticity is higher than male elasticity worldwide (Borjas, 2012, p. 58).

Unfortunately, however, international wage data is mostly available for OECD countries, leaving out a significant part of our sample. Thus, wage is not part of the analysis. Table 1 below summarizes the variables that shall be used in the econometric estimations for labor markets in conflict countries.

Table 1: Variables

Variable	Definition	Source
LFPRF Labor force participation rate, female (modeled ILO estimate)	% of female population that is economically active, ages 15-64	Gender Statistics - The World Bank
LFPRM Labor force participation rate, male (modeled ILO estimate)	% of male population that is economically active, ages 15-64	Gender Statistics - The World Bank
CONFLI Occurrence of conflict	Dummy variable coded as 0 if there is no conflict in a given year or coded as 1 in the presence of conflict.	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
PKO United Nations Peace Operation	Dummy variable coded as 1 if peace operations occur in a given year; coded as 0 if not.	UN DPKO
GDP GDP per capita in current US$	Gross domestic product divided by midyear population.	World Development Indicators (WDI) - The World Bank
FERT Fertility rate	Births per woman.	Gender Statistics - The World Bank
EYSF Expected years of schooling, female	The number of years a girl of school entrance age is expected to spend at school and university.	Gender Statistics - The World Bank
EYSM Expected years of schooling, male	The number of years a boy of school entrance age is expected to spend at school and university.	Gender Statistics - The World Bank
ISLAM Muslim country	Dummy variable coded as 1 if more than 50% of the population follows Islam; coded as 0 if not.	The World Factbook - CIA

2.1.1 Variables' representativeness

The labor force participation rate, as the dependent variable in the model, is to be investigated. It is used as a measure of labor supply, representing the pool of individuals that are the current productive potential of an economy. It broadly represents the share of productive potential in the working-age population, that is, the proportion of the population that represents possible economic production.

A major development in the global labor force has been the incorporation of women's work into the formal economy. An equitable labor participation between men and women ideally promotes a redistribution of rights and responsibilities in the household and in the public sphere. The progress, or lack thereof, towards gender equality depends on equal economic opportunities.

Engagement in the labor force is expected to bring social gains such as poverty reduction, higher educational attainment for future generations and the spread of reproductive rights, fostering social norms that are more prone to gender equality. In this sense, the control variables for explaining labor force participation rates in conflict-affected countries are described as follows.

The occurrence of armed conflict disrupts economic growth while underdevelopment itself increases the possibility of conflict. Lack of investment, the destruction of infrastructure and higher rates of direct and indirect deaths impact the labor market. Hence, the conflict variable is expected to have a negative relationship to female and male labor force participation rates.

Peace operations may affect the labor market through two channels. The institutional reconstruction of a country as an intended consequence of their deployment, but also through demand shocks that take place in the host-state's economy as unintended consequences. Either way, peace operations are expected to present a positive relationship to the labor market.

GDP is an aggregate indicator of production that measures the economic performance of a country, specifically the monetary value of all its goods and services. It is assumed the GDP relation to the labor market is

positive. Citizens are to benefit from increased economic production for it leads to higher employment and consumption opportunities.

Regarding fertility, a positive or negative relationship to labor can be expected. It depends on the general established level of economic development to determine how population growth is related to economic growth. More specifically, how population growth affects family dynamics. The number of children in the household determines how monetary and human resources are allocated, which is suggestive of female relative unpaid work burden.

Educational attainment is expected to be positive. A more educated society shows a stronger tendency to remain economically active. The time and monetary investment for education provide incentives for the population to be formally employed. Additionally, those with higher levels of education are less likely to become unemployed or discouraged and drop from the workforce.

Finally, patriarchal interpretations of Islam have historically worked to Muslim women's disadvantage in the public sphere. Empirical studies commonly use religion, especially Islam, as a way to measure how patriarchal institutions interfere on the economic environment.

2.1.2 Descriptive statistics

Table 2 presents the statistical features of the variables for the whole sample. Afterwards, table 3 and table 4 present the descriptive statistics for two different sample groups: countries where no peace operations have been deployed and countries where peace operations have been deployed.

Table 2: General descriptive statistics (N=74)

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum values	Maximum values
Female labor force participation rate	52.39	20.16	10.1	91.9
Male labor force participation rate	79.29	7.20	47.4	93.2
Gross domestic	3206.19	6814.90	64.81	51755.21

product per capita				
Fertility rate	4.12	1.88	1.16	8.67
Expected years of schooling - women	10.03	3.93	1.49	17.73
Expected years of schooling - men	10.64	3.11	2.72	16.98

The total sample is very diverse, encompassing countries with contrasting socio-economic profiles, which can be seen by the high standard deviation of GDP per capita. On average, male labor force participation rate is 33% higher than the female one.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics for countries without peace operations (N=47)

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum values	Maximum values
Female labor force participation rate	49.77	19.23	10.1	84.8
Male labor force participation rate	79.56	6.65	47.4	93.2
Gross domestic product per capita	4135.01	8070.28	153.08	51755.21
Fertility rate	3.66	1.73	1.16	8.67
Expected years of schooling - women	10.59	3.91	1.49	17.73
Expected years of schooling - men	11.03	3.12	2.8	16.98

For conflict countries where no peace operations have been deployed, on average, male labor force participation rate is 37% higher than the female one.

Table 4: Descriptive statistics for countries with peace operations (N=27)

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum values	Maximum values
Female labor force participation rate	56.95	20.92	13.7	91.9
Male labor force participation rate	78.83	8.04	51.9	92.6

Gross domestic product per capita	1427.06	2424.01	64.81	15853.46
Fertility rate	4.94	1.88	1.2	7.87
Expected years of schooling - women	8.63	3.63	1.81	16.58
Expected years of schooling - men	9.69	2.88	2.72	15.87

For conflict countries where peace operations have been deployed, on average, male labor force participation rate is 27% higher than the female one.

No variable relations can be established by these tables, but it is interesting to note that countries where peace operations were present, on average, show higher labor force participation rates for women (around 14%), considerably lower GDP per capita, higher fertility rates and lower expected years of schooling for both men and women.

Next, table 5 and table 6 present the descriptive statistics for two other different sample groups: Muslim-majority countries and non-Islamic countries.

Table 5: Descriptive statistics for Islamic countries (N=31)

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum values	Maximum values
Female labor force participation rate	38.36	18.59	10.1	69.6
Male labor force participation rate	77.69	6.68	58.5	93.2
Gross domestic product per capita	1564.93	2185.14	115.31	15853.46
Fertility rate	4.61	1.86	1.2	8.67
Expected years of schooling - women	8.39	3.67	1.49	16.58
Expected years of schooling - men	9.64	3.18	2.8	15.87

The levels of education, fertility and GDP per capita of Islamic countries are similar to the ones of countries where peace operations have

been deployed, although the male rate in the labor force is, on average, twice as much as the female rate.

Table 6: Descriptive statistics for non-Islamic countries (N=43)

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum values	Maximum values
Female labor force participation rate	61.95	14.91	25.3	91.9
Male labor force participation rate	80.39	7.33	47.4	92.6
Gross domestic product per capita	4255.01	8383.17	64.81	51755.21
Fertility rate	3.79	1.83	1.16	7.54
Expected years of schooling - women	11.06	3.74	1.81	17.73
Expected years of schooling - men	11.28	2.91	2.72	16.98

For non-Islamic countries, on average, male labor force participation rate is 29% higher than the female one. Women, on average, have fewer children and longer schooling years in non-Islamic countries than in the Islamic ones.

2.2 Model Specification

The underlying idea in the econometric estimation is to compare how men and women are affected differently by conflict and by peace operations. Therefore, all econometric tests are run for two different equations: one for women and one for men, to observe how female and male statuses evolve separately from one another.

The variables constitute a strongly balanced panel for 74 countries over 23 years (1990-2012). One-year lag tendency is applied on the conflict, peace operation and fertility variables, assuming their effects are not felt the same year they were computed. Therefore, CONFLI becomes CONFLI_1,

PKO becomes PKO_1 and FERT is FERT_1. Given its high standard deviation, the GDP per capita variable is logged, becoming LNGDP.

To control for year-specific effects, year dummies were run. Moreover, to investigate the possibility of peace operations occurring during conflict to impact labor force, there is the inclusion of an interaction variable ($\text{CONFLI\_1}_{\text{it}}\text{PKO\_1}_{\text{it}}$) in all scenarios.

First, pooled ordinary least squares estimations are run for grouped data. Pooled regressions for the econometric model are estimated according to the following equations:

I. $$LFPRF_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CONFLI\_1_{it} + \beta_2 PKO\_1_{it} + \beta_3 LNGDP_{it} + \\ + \beta_4 FERT\_1_{it} + \beta_5 EYSF_{it} + \beta_6 ISLAM_{it} + U_{it}$$

II. $$LFPRM_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CONFLI\_1_{it} + \beta_2 PKO\_1_{it} + \beta_3 LNGDP_{it} + \\ + \beta_4 EYSM_{it} + \beta_5 ISLAM_{it} + U_{it}$$

III. $$LFPRF_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CONFLI\_1_{it} + \beta_2 PKO\_1_{it} + \beta_3 LNGDP_{it} + \\ + \beta_4 FERT\_1_{it} + \beta_5 EYSF_{it} + \beta_6 ISLAM_{it} + \\ \beta_7 CONFLI\_1_{it} PKO\_1_{it} + U_{it}$$

IV. $$LFPRM_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CONFLI\_1_{it} + \beta_2 PKO\_1_{it} + \beta_3 LNGDP_{it} + \\ + \beta_4 EYSM_{it} + \beta_5 ISLAM_{it} + \beta_6 CONFLI\_1_{it} PKO\_1_{it} + U_{it}$$

The subscript *t* refers to the observed year *t*=1990, 1991, 1992,…, 2012 for each country *i, i*=1, 2, 3,…, 74.

A linktest is performed to test the specification of the variables. We find that hatsq is not significant. Therefore, the hypothesis that there is no error in the model specification is accepted. Table 7 below shows the model for both men and women are correctly specified.

Table 7: Linktest

	LFPRF	LFPRM
	P>|t|	P>|t|
_hat	0.008	0.077
_hatsq	0.536	0.181
_cons	0.552	0.197

Next, the Breusch-Pagan test is used to evaluate possible heteroscedasticity in the model. That is, to observe whether the estimated variance of the residuals is dependent on the values of the independent variables. The null hypothesis is that residuals are homoscedastic. We fail to reject the null at 95% and conclude that residuals are homogeneous. Table 8 shows that the error is homoscedastic.

Table 8: Breusch-Pagan test

	LFPRF	LFPRM
Chi-square	13.09	2.44
Prob>chi-square	0.0003	0.0184

Pooled regressions, however, do not control for unobserved heterogeneity when heterogeneity is constant over time. For consistency of the dataset in the shape of cross-national time-series panel data, we are going to use fixed-effects regression models. Fixed-effects focus on within-country impacts and do not account for between-countries' differences in the outcome variables, over-protecting against omitted-variable bias.

It is important to note that countries that have had conflicts consistently over the whole timeframe (1990-2012) will not contribute much to the estimated effect of conflict on the labor market, because conflict is considered largely part of the fixed effect itself. Therefore, the fixed-effects model may yield conservative estimates, which are more likely not to find an effect of conflict on the labor market. The other national control variables, however, are not affected, meaning that the size of the analyzed sample remains the same.

Finally, the model to be run is fixed-effects panel data following the equations below and the results are presented in the next section:

I. $$LFPRF_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CONFLI\_1_{it} + \beta_2 PKO\_1_{it} + \beta_3 LNGDP_{it} + \\ + \beta_4 FERT\_1_{it} + \beta_5 EYSF_{it} + \gamma_t + C_i + U_{it}$$

II. $$LFPRM_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CONFLI\_1_{it} + \beta_2 PKO\_1_{it} + \beta_3 LNGDP_{it} + \\ + \beta_4 EYSM_{it} + \gamma_t + C_i + U_{it}$$

III. $$LFPRF_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CONFLI\_1_{it} + \beta_2 PKO\_1_{it} + \beta_3 LNGDP_{it} + \\ + \beta_4 FERT\_1_{it} + \beta_5 EYSF_{it} + \beta_6 CONFLI\_1_{it} PKO\_1_{it} + \gamma_t + C_i + U_{it}$$

IV. $$LFPRM_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CONFLI_{1_{it}} + \beta_2 PKO_{1_{it}} + \beta_3 LNGDP_{it} + \\ + \beta_4 EYSM_{it} + \beta_5 CONFLI_{1_{it}} PKO_{1_{it}} + \gamma_t + C_i + U_{it}$$

3. Findings and Analysis

This chapter presents the results for men and women in five different scenarios: pooled regressions; fixed-effects for the total sample (N=74); fixed-effects for a subsample of Islamic countries (N=31); fixed-effects for a subsample of non-Islamic countries (N=43); and fixed-effects for total sample after the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 1325.

This chapter seeks to explain the different interpretations that the three previously proposed hypothesis in chapter 2 might have depending on the five different analyzed scenarios in which they were tested and relate the empirical findings to the works previously discussed in chapter 1.

3.1 Pooled regression results

Table 9 shows that GDP per capita, fertility rate and the fact that the country is Islamic are all highly significant for the female labor force participation rate. For males, the Islam variable is also highly significant although the coefficient (-3.08) is much smaller than the female one (-27.47).

The conflict and peace operations variables are significant for the male labor force, respectively at 99% and 95% levels, but they are not significant for women. Regarding peace operations, the coefficient is negatively related to the male labor force.

Table 9: Pooled Regressions

VARIABLES	(1) Female Labor Force Participation Rate	(2) Male Labor Force Participation Rate	(3) Female Labor Force Participation Rate	(4) Male Labor Force Participation Rate
Conflict	-0.0140	1.7273***	-0.5735	1.4463**
	(1.1623)	(0.5619)	(1.2017)	(0.5817)
Peace Operation	-0.4983	-2.4394**	-5.4907	-4.9166***
	(2.4024)	(1.1605)	(3.6793)	(1.7853)
Fertility	2.2365***		2.1969***	
	(0.5477)		(0.5472)	
Gross Domestic Product	4.4744***	0.7178**	4.4867***	0.6997**

	(0.6988)	(0.3127)	(0.6976)	(0.3123)
Expected years of schooling (Female)	0.8134**		0.8173**	
	(0.3418)		(0.3412)	
Islam	-27.4799***	-3.0883***	-27.5983***	-3.1576***
	(1.2469)	(0.5814)	(1.2465)	(0.5816)
Expected years of schooling (Male)		-0.2954*		-0.2974*
		(0.1556)		(0.1553)
Interaction (CONFLI.PKO)			8.4322*	4.1659*
			(4.7128)	(2.2844)
Constant	79.2811***	89.1507***	79.7568***	89.1681***
	(6.6105)	(2.1864)	(6.6045)	(2.1824)
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	668	668	668	668
R-squared	0.502	0.099	0.504	0.104

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

For pooled regressions, conflict impact men positively whereas peace operations are negatively related to the male and female labor force. Both conflict and peace operations are only significant for the male labor force participation rate. In this sense, H_1 is confirmed and H_2 is partially confirmed, because peace operations are significant for the male labor market. As for H_3, it is rejected because the peace operations' variable is not significant for women.

3.2 Fixed-effects results for total sample

Table 10 shows that when controlling the regressions with fixed-effects, GDP per capita and fertility rate are still highly significant for women. For men, both GDP per capita and expected years of schooling are highly significant while peace operations are significant at a 90% level without the interaction variable.

At a 95% level, the conflict variable is significant for female labor force participation rate and the relation between the variables is negative as

expected. However, we find no impact of conflict on the male labor force participation rate with the fixed-effects model.

Table 10: Fixed-Effects for total sample

VARIABLES	(1) Female Labor Force Participation Rate	(2) Male Labor Force Participation Rate	(3) Female Labor Force Participation Rate	(4) Male Labor Force Participation Rate
Conflict	-0.7279**	-0.0167	-0.7462*	-0.0586
	(0.3695)	(0.2642)	(0.3854)	(0.2758)
Peace Operation	0.7798	-0.8091*	0.6670	-1.0684
	(0.6336)	(0.4489)	(0.9249)	(0.6609)
Fertility	2.7405***		2.7447***	
	(0.4864)		(0.4874)	
Gross Domestic Product	1.9846***	1.3513***	1.9865***	1.3543***
	(0.5305)	(0.3773)	(0.5310)	(0.3776)
Expected years of schooling (Female)	-0.1019		-0.1038	
	(0.1765)		(0.1770)	
Expected years of schooling (Male)		0.7287***		0.7204***
		(0.1258)		(0.1269)
Interaction (CONFLI.PKO)			0.1967	0.4510
			(1.1739)	(0.8435)
Constant	54.4977***	82.9233***	54.5159***	83.0348***
	(4.3282)	(2.8610)	(4.3332)	(2.8704)
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	668	668	668	668
R-squared	0.172	0.133	0.172	0.134

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In the fixed-effects model, conflict affects men and women negatively, but it is only significant for the female labor force participation rate, at a 95% level. Peace operations are positively related to the female labor force but negatively to male and significant at 90%, which again partially confirms that peace operations are significant for the labor market. H_3 is also rejected in this scenario, because peace operations are not

significant for women.

3.3 Fixed-effects results for Islamic countries

Table 11 presents the results of the fixed-effects model run for Islamic countries only. For women, fertility is only significant at a 90% level and GDP per capita at 95%. For men, GDP per capita and expected years of schooling are significant at 99%. Conflict and peace operations variables are not significant for the labor force participation rates.

Table 11: Fixed-Effects for Islamic countries

VARIABLES	(1) Female Labor Force Participation Rate	(2) Male Labor Force Participation Rate	(3) Female Labor Force Participation Rate	(4) Male Labor Force Participation Rate
Conflict	-0.3078	0.0939	-0.2452	0.1056
	(0.4047)	(0.3674)	(0.4119)	(0.3745)
Peace Operation	-0.0151	-0.9642	1.7820	-0.6241
	(0.9287)	(0.8404)	(2.3502)	(2.1490)
Fertility	1.1521*		1.1042*	
	(0.6462)		(0.6492)	
Gross Domestic Product	1.2157**	1.6798***	1.1385**	1.6663***
	(0.5459)	(0.4884)	(0.5541)	(0.4958)
Expected years of schooling (Female)	-0.3617*		-0.3562	
	(0.2168)		(0.2170)	
Expected years of schooling (Male)		0.6338***		0.6358***
		(0.1954)		(0.1963)
Interaction (CONFLI.PKO)			-2.1205	-0.3998
			(2.5470)	(2.3238)
Constant	42.0729***	84.5237***	41.7551***	84.4172***
	(4.5125)	(3.7970)	(4.5320)	(3.8562)
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	253	253	253	253
R-squared	0.341	0.169	0.343	0.170

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In the fixed-effects model for Islamic countries only, conflict and peace operations do not present any significance for the labor market, regarding labor force participation rates. Therefore, H_2 is rejected. H_3 is also rejected in this scenario, because peace operations are not significant for women and its coefficient is considerably low (0.015).

Muslim-majority countries are diverse in terms of the practice and interpretation of Islam, as well as the role of Islam in legal institutions. It must be noted that the degree to which governments of Muslim-majority countries identify as religious differs greatly. There is not a clear separation between religion and the state among many of the countries.

Besides the applications of Islamic legal codes, Muslim countries also differ in terms of their historical experiences, including the form and degree to which they were affected by colonialism, the Cold War and neoliberal structural adjustments, influential factors in the gendering of their economies.

However, one possible explanation for the lack of statistical significance of the variables is that Islamic countries do have gendered cultural norms that are deeply entrenched in institutional settings. Gender inequality seems to be a rigid structural element of the labor market, making for a general lack of opportunity to women in the formal economy regardless of conflict occurrence.

Ross (2012, p. 119) points out that women may not be in the labor force due to social discrimination, officially enforced through legal mechanisms or informally by cultural standards. Muslim-majority countries are cited as having legal restrictions on the types of jobs that women are allowed to be employed in; they are often frowned up to take jobs that involve contact with men and/or public activities.

Countries with the lowest participation rates are those with strong religious views about women in society, in general, and in the economy, in particular. A regression of the female participation rate on religion explains more than a third of the difference in the female participation in ninety countries, according to Psacharopoulos & Tzannatos (1989, p. 194).

Sidani (2005, p. 507-508) points out that Arab activism is much more

complex than simply opposing religious-based views against secular feminist movements. It is also discussed the fact that women's independence is mostly an economic issue. In this sense, it is debated whether, beyond general capitalist exploitation problems, Islamic societies have developed institutions that restrain women.

However, Syed (2010) defends that originally protective provisions for women in Islamic principles were gradually changed in time into strict patriarchal institutions of female seclusion and gender segregation. Specifically, the concept of Islamic modesty poses historical and socio-cultural challenges for working women.

Syed (2010, p. 159) points out that a sexist interpretation of the Quran has resulted in a widespread exclusion of Muslim women from public domains. The customary practices of modesty, which should be an interaction protocol for both genders, is mostly restrictive to women and prevent them from acting in the public sphere, including employment in the formal sector of economy.

The UNDP's (2008) Human Development Report also suggests that despite the official ratification of several international instruments on gender equality and human rights, major barriers continue to restrict female employment in Muslim-majority countries.

3.4 Fixed-effects results for non-Islamic countries

Table 12 presents the results of the fixed-effects model run for countries that are not Islamic. GDP per capita and fertility rate are highly significant for women, but not expected years of schooling. For men, both GDP per capita and expected years of schooling are highly significant.

Table 12: Fixed-Effects for non-Islamic countries

VARIABLES	(1) Female Labor Force Participation Rate	(2) Male Labor Force Participation Rate	(3) Female Labor Force Participation Rate	(4) Male Labor Force Participation Rate
Conflict	-1.3771**	-0.2710	-1.3886**	-0.3527

	(0.5762)	(0.3823)	(0.6147)	(0.4087)
Peace Operation	0.8609	-0.9764*	0.8209	-1.2562*
	(0.8502)	(0.5574)	(1.1261)	(0.7436)
Fertility	4.1900***		4.1914***	
	(0.6972)		(0.6987)	
Gross Domestic Product	3.7621***	1.6801***	3.7572***	1.6443***
	(0.8933)	(0.5848)	(0.8991)	(0.5887)
Expected years of schooling (Female)	0.3055		0.3034	
	(0.2666)		(0.2698)	
Expected years of schooling (Male)		0.7098***		0.6904***
		(0.1694)		(0.1729)
Interaction (CONFLI.PKO)			0.0830	0.5829
			(1.5306)	(1.0240)
Constant	68.6626***	86.3706***	68.6458***	86.3319***
	(6.9416)	(4.3242)	(6.9586)	(4.3289)
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	415	415	415	415
R-squared	0.201	0.198	0.201	0.198

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

When restricting the fixed-effects model for non-Islamic countries, there are not many changes from the total sample scenario. Conflict continues to affect men and women negatively, although it is only significant for women. Peace operations are positively related to the female labor force but negatively to the male and significant at 90%, which again partially confirms that peace operations are significant for the labor market. H_3 is also rejected in this scenario, because peace operations are not significant for women.

Informality ought to be mentioned when interpreting the model. Informal work shapes the resource-pooling and survival strategies of many households. Therefore, it is significant not only economically, but also politically and analytically. Informalization is crucial for the intersectionality of structural inequalities, such as foundational gender dichotomies, representing how power operates (Peterson, 2013, p. 55-58).

The negative coefficient relating the male labor force and the conflict variable has potential fit with the analytical framework proposed by Collier and Hoeffler (1998). Rebellion is presented as a consequence of rational decision-making based on the comparison between different labor markets. They point out to the fact that young men tend to take up arms if their expected gains as a fighter exceed their gains in the formal economy. In this sense, a cost-benefit analysis of violence ends up driving the economy.

For women, the negative relation between conflict and labor force also derive from the idea that other markets offer more benefits. It is likely that women seek work in informal sectors. Besides, there probably is a higher supply of "hard" jobs in the formal economy during conflicts, such as positions at the armed forces and the police, for example. These are usually considered masculine and not often available to women.

3.5 Fixed-effects results after UNSC Resolution 1325

Table 13 presents the results of the fixed-effects model considering the time frame from 2001 to 2012. GDP per capita is the only significant variable to female labor force participation rate. For men, both GDP per capita and expected years of schooling are highly significant. Conflict and peace operations variables are not significant for the labor force participation rates.

Table 13: Fixed-Effects after 2000

VARIABLES	(1) Female Labor Force Participation Rate	(2) Male Labor Force Participation Rate	(3) Female Labor Force Participation Rate	(4) Male Labor Force Participation Rate
Conflict	-0.0484	0.0587	-0.0751	0.0678
	(0.3238)	(0.2395)	(0.3371)	(0.2495)
Peace Operation	0.2231	-0.2566	-0.0732	-0.1562
	(0.7306)	(0.5425)	(1.2626)	(0.9346)
Fertility	0.6402		0.6476	
	(0.5956)		(0.5969)	
Gross Domestic Product	4.0853***	1.1435***	4.0918***	1.1417***

	(0.5972)	(0.4350)	(0.5983)	(0.4358)
Expected years of schooling (Female)	0.2275		0.2281	
	(0.1830)		(0.1833)	
Expected years of schooling (Male)		0.4010***		0.4015***
		(0.1507)		(0.1509)
Interaction (CONFLI.PKO)			0.3688	-0.1250
			(1.2808)	(0.9470)
Constant	77.6745***	83.4305***	77.6949***	83.4096***
	(4.7556)	(3.2790)	(4.7618)	(3.2871)
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	464	464	464	464
R-squared	0.152	0.063	0.152	0.063

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

When examining the years that followed UNSC 1325, results do not show any changes on the situation of women in relation to the whole time period previously analyzed. It was expected that at least in this scenario the peace operations' variable would be significant for the female labor force participation rates, but it is not. H_2 and H_3 are rejected.

The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 in October 2000 on 'Women, Peace and Security' – a resolution which noted both that women and girls are affected by armed conflict in ways that differ from the impact on men and boys, and the importance of incorporating a 'gender perspective' into peace operations. This kind of acknowledgement underscores the feminist observation that gender permeates all aspects of international peace and security.

The United Nations is supposed to act towards including women, especially during peace processes. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 issued in 2000 includes among its objectives the need to address women and girls' specific needs, and to reinforce women's capacities to act as agents in relief and recovery processes, in conflict and post-conflict situations.

Although subsequent Resolutions have highlighted the role of women as key actors in economic recovery, social cohesion and political legitimacy,

Heathcote (2011, p. 35) believes the United Nations Security Council Resolutions still present operative paragraphs that focus on women's sexual vulnerability more often than on women's autonomy, ignoring their participation in social transformations.

The document *Tracking Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325/2000* (UN WOMEN) lists a series of indicators on women and peace, ranging from the prevention of sexual violence to female representation in peace negotiations. However, regarding economic human rights, there is no specific indicator to assess women's economic safety or their inclusion in the recovery process of the economy. There is no mention of monitoring national labor legislation, prevalence of decent wages nor of tracking labor indicators such as labor force participation rates.

3.6 Final Remarks

GDP per capita presents a positive relation to labor force participation rates in all the analysis made. In poor countries with deficient local capacities, job opportunities are scarce. Conflict presents low opportunity costs and high private gains. Hence, low levels of economic development can turn actors prone to violence and informalization, away from the formal labor market.

Psacharopoulos & Tzannatos (1989, p. 195) state that the impact of education on women's participation in the labor force is ambiguous. Women may decide to work before or after acquiring education. Most importantly, education and labor force participation both relate to the country's economic and general development.

Interestingly, when fixed-effects were used, female education was only significant for Islamic countries, at a 90% level. The relationship is negative, meaning that well-educated women most likely will not join the workforce. Meanwhile, the expected years of schooling for men relate positively to the labor market and were significant at a 99% level in all scenarios, which shows that men take full advantage of economic development.

Mammen & Paxson (2000, p.162) state that women's education

levels are important determinants of women's labor market activities, but education had a bigger impact on men than women in our model. It is argued that, despite great variation across countries and regions, both cross-country and individual-level data indicate that female labor force first declines and then rises with development; women tend to move from informal to formal work; fertility declines with income; and gender educational gaps narrow with development.

Psacharopoulos & Tzannatos (1989, p. 193) point out that the pattern of age-specific female participation rates in Western economies is that women's participation in the labor force during child-bearing age is lower than that of women outside this age.

However, for the sample countries, the fertility coefficients showed a positive relation to the labor force in all scenarios. Although issues of endogeneity complicate the fertility variable analysis, the positive coefficients might indicate that, in conflict contexts, women with more children are in households with greater need of income.

Most importantly, the fact that none of the scenarios showed that peace operations were significant to female labor force participation rates should matter to the issue of further involving women in peace and economic processes in post-conflict contexts.

Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that some measurement difficulties must be taken into account. Both conflicts and peace operations take place mostly at a regional level, potentially obfuscating their full effects when national data is analyzed. Besides, the model would greatly benefit from the inclusion of omitted variables such as wage rates and government institutional quality.

It must be stressed that the economic impacts of peace operations are not limited to the formal economy or the labor market alone. However, data availability did not allow for a wider and holistic analytical approach that also includes social norms' changes or informal economies in the empirical evaluation.

Well-grounded empirical field-level applied research must be fostered by international organizations and academia, mainly concerning the

recognition of the differentiated impact of violent conflict on men and women and the importance of economic recovery for sustainable peace.

As Carnahan; Durch & Gilmore (2006, p. 29) point out, peace operations affect local employment levels in various ways, but verifying the overall employment impact of a mission is very complex. The poor level of available data, particularly labor market data, hampers any analysis of local employment in mission environments. It is usually not possible to get know wage rates, the size of the labor force, or a breakdown of this labor force between the formal and informal sectors.

Labor force participation rates are an important indicator for framing the size of the female labor potential, especially in comparison to that of men, but it is acknowledged that rates do not provide a comprehensive picture of whether there have been gains in female well-being.

The present work lacked reliable labor microdata, in addition to microdata revealing of household composition. However, this thesis does spur further discussions based on national aggregate indicators. This has been an attempt to identify general trends on the impact of violent conflict and the deployment of peace operations on women's economic participation, based on systematic empirical evidence for a wide range of countries.

The database should have included natural resource variables such as oil sales. Given service and industry are the sectors that tend to draw women to the workforce, future research should take into account that economic growth due to the sale of natural resources, such as oil and gas, does not usually foster new jobs for women and can even be an impediment towards women's rights (Ross, 2012, p. 110).

The database should be further advanced with wage rates. The positive relation between GDP per capita and labor force participation rates found in this study must be seen with caution. Generally, countries' income is expected to have a U-shaped relationship with female labor force participation rate due to the opposing effects of rising female wages and unearned household income. Future research is also encouraged on the microeconomic analyzes of wage structures and the relation between conflict and feminization of poverty, with a focus on the unequal burden of unpaid work and women's (lack of) access to and control over economic resources.

Conclusion

This thesis fills the gap in the literature of peacekeeping economies. The uniqueness of this research consists on its merging characteristic of seemly distinct fields: economic research on the impacts of conflict and qualitative research that considers gender as part of its analytical framework.

This study has been able to converge both approaches and does so by portraying a general picture of the unintended consequences that conflict and peace operations can have in the formal economy, especially on the labor market.

Modifications in labor force participation rates, however, cannot be attributed only to changes in economic variables. They also derive from cultural and political factors that may impact the institutional structure upon which labor supply decisions are defined.

The main hypothesis in this study is that the occurrence of armed conflict and the deployment of multidimensional peace operations were part of these factors. Conflict is found to be a much more influencing variable to labor force than peace operations, at least for women.

A fuller treatment of this important question, however, depends on more precise region-specific data on the location of the deployment of peace operations and on the conflict's magnitude with details on the relative size of the affected territory and population.

To empirically research conflict situations is inherently difficult. Conflict itself is not easy to measure and it usually occurs in poor countries with weak institutions and infrastructure where there is little data-gathering capacity and skimpy statistics.

This thesis illustrates the complexity of analyzing the intersection between conflict, peace operations, economics, gender and religion, particularly when it comes to deepening feminists' understanding of International Relations. All the variables involved provide nuanced analyses that indicate how various institutions reinforce, or not, gender inequalities.

Although the United Nations have shown concern for gender issues during and after conflict, many international actions still need to be enforced

and implemented in order for the United Nations Security Council resolutions to be structured on operative paragraphs that prioritize women's agency and autonomy.

Female representation in the public sphere is key for women to be engaged in social transformations. Therefore, the participation of women in the political and economic spheres must integrate post-conflict analysis. Regarding economic human rights, the United Nations does not mention any specific indicator to assess women's economic safety or their inclusion in the economic post-conflict recovery.

Moreover, United Nations documents on gender and conflict do not mention sex-disaggregated economic indicators. There is also no mention of monitoring national labor legislation, the prevalence of decent wages nor of tracking labor indicators such as labor force participation rates.

Focusing on the public sphere, specifically on the formal economy, gives paid employment a chance to be seen as crucial for individual financial independence and as a proxy for equality in ideal terms of such. However, it can also contribute to the exploitation experienced by women. Therefore, in this thesis, we refrain from using terms such as empowerment, usually filled with ethnocentric and class-biased understandings.

It is acknowledged that the quality of employment opportunities for better jobs is unequally distributed between men and women. Generally, women tend to earn less, to work in less productive jobs and to be overrepresented in unpaid work. Engaging in employment that is vulnerable is likely to be a reflection of the subordinate position that women usually hold.

During conflict or not, the labor market is outlined by a multiplicity of variables and by a multiplicity of factors that define actors' decisions, including, besides gender, class, age, ethnicity and a myriad of personal reasons for entry into paid employment. Besides covering cross-country differences, country-level trends and a 23-year timespan, this study is informative while going beyond the "hard" nature of labor force participation rates.

As empirically shown, the participation in the labor force is affected by the level, pattern, and trends of the size and structure of the economy, of

education, fertility, religion, and other demographic and sociopolitical characteristics.

In this sense, Islam alone is not a defining variable for female labor force participation rates. For one, the status of women in Muslim countries is not uniform. Moreover, factors such as geography, history and religion practices shape regional, national and international inequalities, creating various intersectionalities that must be taken into account when analyzing economic variables, such as labor force participation rates.

The presence of women in the public sphere is crucial for social norms to change in time, reshaping female roles in the household and in society, weakening patriarchy and patriarchal institutions. The state is an institution that feminists should engage with, despite its patriarchal influences that are imposed through both religious and secular means.

Women's engagement to the state, to its militaristic arrangements and economic practices is the outcome of social, cultural and historical processes outlined by patriarchy. The military and the state relate in a circular process between the construction and protection of national security and social order, structured upon gender assumptions.

In addition, militarization affect day-to-day actions and constructs social identities, shaping opposing ways of enacting femininity and masculinity that affect the economic roles played by the individuals. Within this context, peacekeeping economies are a byproduct of a greater configuration of inequalities (social, economic and political) that constitute male and female contrasting experiences and opportunities.

The intersection of various social arrangements defines women's and men's social experiences, during peace or during conflict. Hence, individual identity defines how men and women act in every social dimension, including the economic. Peacekeepers and local women, for example, represent different subject positions, along with their distinct experiences of insecurity and security, based on militarized masculinities and femininities.

The identity of individuals is a narrative, a way to construct meaning to their own experiences. And the identity of citizens and the various practices in which they engage, including the economic, are intrinsically

related to the existence of the state. Although not limited by it, the state and gender are interrelated narratives that structure the formation of individual and collective identities.

Deeply gendered constructions have permeated the historical development of state sovereignty and state identity. In this thesis, ideas of what forms security frameworks, a strong state or a strong economy are subjective categories that have material implications. Also, the material process of institution-building devised by peace operations is a subjective reconstruction of the state and of its social-economic dimensions.

To encompass such a multifaceted issue, this thesis made use of a combination of multiple analytical approaches. It is argued that by discussing the consequences of security definitions and their gendered materialization, it is possible for structural power relations and inequalities to be made visible, which reflects the importance of quantitative methodology to social sciences.

Tickner (2001, p. 136) perfectly describes one of the biggest difficulties empirical feminist studies face: how to construct knowledge that acknowledges difference but also produces general conclusions – "(…) to construct knowledge that is sensitive to difference but that recognizes that there are structures and processes that contribute to various forms of subordination is important, given that feminism is an emancipatory political project as well as a form of knowledge construction".

Bibliography

ACEMOGLU, D. & LYLE, D.. 2004. Women, war, and wages: The effect of female labor supply on the wage structure at midcentury. **Journal of Political Economy**, 112, 3, 497-551.

ADLER, E. 1997. Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics. **European Journal of International Relations**, 3, 3, 319-363.

ANING, K. & FIIFI, E-A.. 2013. Unintended Impacts and the Gendered Consequences of Peacekeeping Economies in Liberia. **International Peacekeeping** 20,1,17-32.

AOI, C.; THAKUR, R. & de CONING, C.H. (eds) .2007. **Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping**. New York: United Nations University Press.

BAYLIS, J., SMITH, S., & OWENS, P. (Eds.). 2006. **The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations.** Oxford: Oxford University Press.

BECKER, G. 1965. A Theory of the Allocation of Time. **Economic Journal** 75, 299, 493–517.

_____. 1971. **The Economics of Discrimination.** Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

_____. 1981. **A Treatise on the Family**. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

BESLEY,T. & PERSSON, T.. 2010. State Capacity, Conflict and Development. **Econometrica** 78, 1, 1–34.

BELLAMY, A. & WILLIAMS, P.. 2011. **Understanding Peacekeeping**.

Cambridge: Polity Press.

BORJAS, G.. 2012. **Economia do Trabalho**. 5ª ed. McGraw Hill Brasil.

BOURDIEU, P. 1997. **Razões Práticas – Sobre a Teoria da Ação.** São Paulo: Papirus Editora.

BOUTROS-GHALI, B.. 1992. **An Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary General,** UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111

BUVINIC, M., GUPTA, M. D., CASABONNE, U., & VERWIMP, P.. 2013. Violent Conflict and Gender Inequality: An Overview. **The World Bank Research Observer**, 28, 1, 110-138.

BUZAN, B. 1983. **People, states, and fear: the national security in international relations.** Wheatsheaf Books.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. **The World Factbook 2013-14.** Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html Access on August, 22nd, 2014.

CAPRIOLI, M.. 2004. Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis. **International Studies Review** 6, 2, 253-269.

CARNAHAN, M.; DURCH, W. & GILMORE, S.. 2006. **Economic Impact of Peacekeeping**. Final Report for the UN DPKO Best Practices Section (PBPS). New York, NY.

_____. 2007. New Data on the Economic Impact of UN Peacekeeping. **International peacekeeping** 14, 3, 384-402.

CARREIRAS, H. 2010. Gendered culture in peacekeeping operations. **International Peacekeeping**, 17, 4, 471-485.

COHN, C.. 2013. **Women and Wars**. Cambridge: Polity Press.

COLLIER, P. & HOEFFLER, A.. 1998. On Economic Causes of Civil War. **Oxford Economic Papers** 50 (October), 563–73.

_____. 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. **Oxford economic papers**, 56, 4, 563-595.

CRAMER, C.. 2008. **From Waging War to Peace Work: Labour and Labour Markets.** In: Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding, pp. 123-140.

DEGOMME, O., & GUHA-SAPIR, D.. 2010. Patterns of Mortality Rates in Darfur Conflict. **The Lancet** 375, 9711, 294-300.

DEGROOT, G. J. 2001. A Few Good Women: Gender stereotypes, the military and peacekeeping. **International Peacekeeping**, 8, 2, 23-38.

DOYLE, M. W., & N. SAMBANIS. 2000. International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis. **American Political Science Review** 94, 4, 779–802.

DOYLE, M. & SAMBANIS, N.. 2006. **Making War & Building Peace**. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

DUFFIELD, M. R. 2001. **Global Governance and the New Wars: the Merging of Development and Security.** London: Zed books.

DURCH, W.. 2009. **The Economic Impact of Peacekeeping: An Update.** Available at http://www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/eco_impacts_04_eco_impact_an_update_durch.pdf Access on May, 22nd , 2014.

ENLOE, C. H.. 2000. **Maneuvers: The international politics of**

militarizing women's lives. Berkeley: University of California Press.

ELSHTAIN, J. 1987. **Women and War.** Chicago: University Press.

_____. 1998. Women and War: Ten Years On. **Review of International Studies** 24, 04, 447-460.

FETHERSTON, A. B.. 1994. **Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping.** New York: St. Martin's Press.

FORTNA, V.. 2008. **Does Peacekeeping Work?** New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

GHOBARAH, H. A., HUTH, P., & RUSSETT, B.. 2003. Civil Wars Kill and Maim People — Long After the Shooting Stops. **American Political Science Review** 97, 02, 189-202.

GIZELIS, T-I.. 2009. Gender Empowerment and United Nations Peacebuilding. **Journal of Peace Research** 46, 4, 505-523.

GOLDSTEIN, J. S. 2003. **War and gender: How gender shapes the war system and vice versa.** Cambridge University Press.

HEATHCOTE, G.. 2011. Feminist Politics and the Use of Force: Theorising Feminist Action and Security Council Resolution 1325. **Social-Legal Rev.** 7, 23-44.

HARRIS, C., 2011. **What Can Applying a Gender Lens Contribute to Conflict Studies? A review of selected MICROCON working papers**. MICROCON Research Working Paper 41, Brighton: MICROCON

HENDRICKS, C., & HUTTON, L. 2008. **Defense reform and gender**. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

HIGATE, P. & HENRY, M.. 2004. Engendering (In)security in Peace Support Operations. **Security Dialogue** 35, 4, 481-498. Special Issue on Gender and Security.

ILO. 2010. **Women in Labor Markets: Measuring Progress and Identifying Challenges**. Geneva: International Labor Office.

JENNINGS, K.. 2011. **Gender and Post-Conflict StateBuilding**. Available at http://statesandsecurity.org/_pdfs/Jennings.pdf Access on May, 2nd , 2014.

_____. 2014. **Service, sex and security: Gendered peacekeeping economies in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.** Available at http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/06/26/0967010614537330 Access on October, 2nd, 2014.

KALDOR, M.. 1999. **New and Old Wars: The Globalized War Economy.** California: Stanford University Press.

KEOHANE, R. O. 2005. **After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.** Princeton University Press.

LOCK, P.. 2005. **War Economies and the Shadow of Globalisation**. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

MAMMEN, K., & PAXSON, C. 2000. Women's Work and Economic Development. **The Journal of Economic Perspectives**, 14, 4, 141-164.

MAZURANA, D., RAVEN-ROBERTS, A., & PARPART, J. (Eds.). 2005. **Gender, Conflict and Peacekeeping.** Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

MEARSHEIMER, J. J. 2001. **The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.** WW

Norton & Company.

MEHARG, S. J.. 2009. **Measuring What Matters in Peace Operations and Crisis Management**. Montreal and Kingston: Pearson Peacekeeping Centre.

MIGUEL, E., SATYANATH, S., & SERGENTI, E.. 2004. Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach. **Journal of Political Economy**, 112, 4, 725-753.

PEKSEN, D.. 2012. Does Foreign Military Intervention Help Human Rights? **Political Research Quarterly**, 65, 3, 558-571.

PETERSON, V. S. & RUNYAN, A. S. 1999. **Global Gender Issues: Dilemmas in World Politics.** Colorado: Westview Press.

PETERSON, S. V. 2005. How (the meaning of) gender matters in political economy. **New Political Economy**, 10, 4, 499-521.

_____. 2010. Gendered identities, ideologies and practices in the context of war and militarism. **Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives**, p. 17-29.

_____. 2013. **Gendering Insecurities, Informalization, and War Economies.** In: Gender, Violence, and Human Security: Critical Feminist Perspectives.

PSACHAROPOULOS, G., & TZANNATOS, Z. 1989. Female Labor Force Participation: an International Perspective. **The World Bank Research Observer**, 4, 2, 187-201.

PUGH, M.. 2005. The Political Economy of Peace: a Critical Theory Perspective. **International Journal of Peace Studies**, 10, 2, 23-42.

RAVEN-ROBERTS, A.. 2013. Women and the Political Economy of War. **Women and Wars**, p. 36-53.

REHN, E. and JOHNSON SIRLEAF, E.. 2002**. Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peace-building.** New York: UNIFEM.

RICHMOND, O. P.. 2010. Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace. **Millennium Journal of International Studies**, 38,3, 665-692.

ROSS, M. 2012. **The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations.** Princeton University Press.

SAMBANIS. 2002. A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War. **Defence and Peace Economics** 13, 3, 215–243.

SCOTT, J.. 1986. Gender: a useful category of historical analysis. **American Historical Review***,* 91, 5, 1053-1075.

SIDANI, Y.. 2005. Women, Work, and Islam in Arab Societies. **Women in Management Review**, 20, 7, 498-512.

SION, L. 2008. Peacekeeping and the Gender Regime: Dutch Female Peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo. **Journal of Contemporary Ethnography**, 37, 5, 561-585.

SMITH, C. A., & MILLER DE LA CUESTA, B.. 2011. Human Trafficking in Conflict Zones: the Role of Peacekeepers in the Formation of Networks. **Human Rights Review**, 12, 3, 287-299.

SYED, J.. 2010. An Historical Perspective on Islamic Modesty and its Implications for Female Employment. **Equality, Diversity and Inclusion: An International Journal** 29, 2, 150-166.

TICKNER, J. Ann. 1992. **Gender in International Relations: Feminist**

Perspectives in Achieving Global Security. New York: Columbia University Press.

_____. 2001. **Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post- Cold War Era.** New York: Columbia University Press.

UNITED NATIONS. 1995. **Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action**. Available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA_E.pdf Access on May, 10th, 2014.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. **Resolution 1325**, UN Doc. S/RES/1325 (October 31, 2000).

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. **Resolution 1820**, UN Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008).

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING. **Peace Operations.** Available at: https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/ Access on August, 10th, 2014.

UN WOMEN.**Tracking Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000).** Available at: http://www.unwomen.org/~/media/Headquarters/Media/Publications/en/02ATrackingImplementationofSecurityCouncilRe.pdf Access on Semptember, 4th, 2014.

UPPSALA UNIVERSITY & PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OSLO. **UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2013, 1946 – 2012.** Available at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/ Access on August, 10th, 2014.

WALTZ, K. N. 2010. **Theory of International Politics**. Waveland Press.

WENDT, A. 1999. **Social Theory of International Politics**. Cambridge University Press.

WHITWORTH, S.. 2004. **Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: a Gendered Analysis.** New York: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

WORLD BANK. **Gender Statistics**. Available at: http://databank.worldbank.org/Data/Views/VariableSelection/SelectVariables.aspx?source=Gender%20Statistics Access on August, 10th, 2014.

ZARKOV, D.. 2006. **On Militarism, Economy and Gender: Working in a Global Context.** Available at: http://www.glow-boell.de/media/de/txt_rubrik_2/DubravkaZarkov_FGmai06.pdf Access on May, 2nd , 2014.

Appendix

The sample extracted from UCDP/PRIO for the years 1990-2012 consists of the following countries:

Afghanistan
Algeria
Angola
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia
Djibouti
DR Congo
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Georgia
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Laos
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Macedonia
Mali
Mauritania
Mexico

Moldova
Mozambique
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Peru
Philippines
Russia
Rwanda
Senegal
Serbia
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Syria
Tajikistan
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Timor
Turkey
Uganda
United Kingdom
United States of America
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Yemen

Countries with multidimensional peace operations are:

Afghanistan
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Burundi
Central African Republic
Cambodia
Chad
Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia
DR Congo
El Salvador
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Guatemala
Haiti
Liberia

Libya
Macedonia
Mozambique
Rwanda
Serbia
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Syria
Tajikistan
Timor
Uganda