The general aim of this work is to propose an interpretation of David Hume s theories of causality and values (moral and aesthetic), which I call sceptical quasi-realism. In this respect, I try to confront several analysis developed in secondary litterature about the philosopher – which have been sistematically and openly separated. To achieve this aim, I begin by introducing some presuppositions which are important for the purposes of this work (chapter 1). Then, I try to identify and develop some determinant features of Hume s theory of causality and values (moral and aesthetic) for the discussion, subdivided in features which I call metaphysic, epistemic and semantic (chapters 2 and 3). Finally, I attempt to justify the interpretation regarding each of this considered features, composing the set of features of what I call sceptical quasi-realism – mainly inspired in Angela Coventrys contributions (which, in turn, is inspired in Simon Blackburns quasi-realism), adding a sceptical element to it (chapter 4).