The problem which guides the development of this research inquires about the spectator s place in contemporary art considering his or her limits and critical possibilities. Marcel Duchamp illustrates the question by declaring in the opening sentence of his text The Creative Act, Let us consider two important factors, the two poles of the creation of art: the artist on one hand, and on the other the spectator who later becomes the posterity. It is with this double polarity that this thesis occupies itself. More specifically, it occupies itself, as a principle, with the possibility of recognizing in the judging public of aesthetic phenomena an effective place as a safeguard of works of art. In that sense, it would fall to the public-spectator to protect, preserve and assure the integrity and perenniality of works of art. From this research s standpoint it is through the human power of judgment that this safeguarding would be accomplished. In fact, the exercise of judgment is a first fundamental condition for the fulfillment of the safeguarding, followed, however, by a second condition: that the judgment be made public or, in other words, that it be made shareable. Although inserted in a web of relations which includes the artist, the work of art and its place of exhibition, among other components, the spectator has traditionally played an accessory role or one of permanent subordination in his relations with the world of art. Somewhat excluded from the plane of arts, it seems to fall to the spectator (de facto but not de jure) to make timid, peripheral, somewhat guided interventions, impregnated with a suspicion of aesthetic inoperability and ill-preparedness as translator or counter-translator of artistic phenomena. In the thesis, I propose that the relation between spectator and work be treated with Kantian patterns. Naturally, given the dominion of these relations, the artistic dominion, I refer to judging or judgment when understood in their reflective function. Questions linked to contemplation, production of ideas, communicability and sociability, as well as to the subject s action in the world and to the characteristic diversity of discourse and judgment are called into question here. And not exactly as an unfolding, but as something intrinsic, perhaps prior to all these questions, the place occupied by the judgment s subject from a political standpoint is also called into question. As we are reminded by Hannah Arendt, whenever the relevance of the discourse (of judgment, in this case) comes into play, the question becomes political by definition, because discourse turns man into a political being. In the thesis, the spectator is proposed as the judgment s subject and judgment as the place of safeguard, this safeguarding being accomplished on condition of the public and shared promulgation of judgment. In this context, the spectator is always, in his singularity, plural, diverse, not necessarily conformist and adherent to intersubjective relations. In its turn, judgment is public, manifest, shareable, available to any other and carries a creative dimension which reconstructs the meaning of a work of art through its testimony. By extension, the public and plural condition of judgment s enunciation reveals the political importance of the aesthetic judgment.