The aim of this study is to develop an essentialist theory without possible worlds. We claim that ordinary objects are complex entities composed of entities that are more basic like pieces of matter and instantiated properties. The possible constituents are determined by reality and mind- and language-independent, the constitution, however, is conventional dependent on our conceptual scheme and our naming practices. In consequence, we develop an Aristotelian theory of ordinary objects as complexes of their essences and the matter which instantiates these essences. We apply this conception of objects in order to modify the direct reference theory. In the resulting theory, the meanings of proper names are the essences of the bearers of the names. The theoretical frame of our investigation consists in a Platonist theory of properties according to which properties are integral parts of a complex reality connected with its concrete partand in which some properties can participate in causal relations. In accordance with this view, we present an actualist conception of modalities in which modalities obtain in virtue of second order relations between properties, in case of de re modalities in virtue of second order relations between objects essences and other properties.