

## **2.**

### **Subjectivity, Power, Discourse,**

#### **2.1.**

##### **Introduction**

This chapter has two main objectives. Theoretically, it aims to explain how subjectivities emerge out of discourses. Methodologically, it intends to suggest a way of perceiving this process. The core of the chapter is dedicated to Foucault's analytics of power and his rendering of power as productive, in contrast to the juridico-discursive representation of power. The chapter argues that discourses are traversed by productive power, and are, for this reason, producers of subjectivities. Hence its title: power, discourse, and subjectivity.

The presentation is divided in four parts. After illustrating how mainstream theories of international relations reify the State as the dominant form of subjectivity, I present the power ontology shared by critics of this mode of representation. In my view, this conception of power explains why critical theorists have a broader perspective on issues of subjectivity. In the second part, I present this ontology through a reading of Foucault's analytics of power. Then, the juridico-discursive representation of power, which I attribute to mainstream scholars, is opposed to the power-as-productive representation, which I believe critical theorists share. Afterward, I attempt to show how the power-as-productive representation can be deployed to destabilize the juridico-discursive one. The third part addresses the relation between power and discourse and offers a spatial reading of discourse as a one way of locating "the place" where subjectivity is produced. The relation among critical, genealogical and archaeological methodologies in Foucault's

discursive analysis is discussed. The fourth part describes how I apply all of the findings of the previous sections to a discursive analysis of sovietologism.

Before proceeding, a cautionary note is required. Although I have written this chapter based on the works of scholars who are familiar with Foucault's text, I have sometimes abandoned their interpretations and tried to advance my own. When this has happened, it was not because I was aiming at originality, but just because I sought inspiration from the free interplay between these texts and Foucault's writings. Moved by my personal bias, as well as by the need to fit the theoretical-methodological discussions to my concern with the emergence of the sovietologist discourse and its consequent representations of the Soviet Union, I carried this intellectual (im)posture through the writing of the whole chapter.

This chapter is organized as follows. In Section Two, I deal with the construction of subjectivity that is dominant in international relations and its critics. In Section Three, the new reading of power and its relation to the production of subjectivities is addressed. Section Four considers the relation between power and discourses, and methods of locating the production of subjectivities in the latter. A final section explains how this theoretical-methodological apparatus will be deployed in the rest of the dissertation.

## **2.2. Problematizing Subjectivities**

Traditionally, the definition of the modern political subject operates in the spatial dimension due to the importance conferred to its territorial borders in the demarcation of its sovereign political authority. Even though sovereignty, territory and the State have different meanings, they conflate to denote the existence of a center of authority that regulates the life of the political community. This happens because the Weberian definition of the State is taken for granted: the State represents the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in a certain territory. According to Bierstecker (2005), Weber's definition "(...) has been widely utilized throughout the scholarship of international relations, either explicitly or implicitly" (p.159), due to the positivist attractiveness of generalization offered by this rendering. In this

sense, the author laments that despite the diversity of forms of organizing political communities in history, the States are treated as “like-units.” Indeed, this is the predominant view in IR: “(...) the tendency to treat states as fundamentally similar unities across time and place is by no means restricted to neorealist analysis. It is also commonly found among neoliberals (...) and even among some constructivists (...)” (Bierstecker, 2005: 158). Due to the way International Relations scholars appropriate it, this rendering gives birth to the imaginary of units interacting in an anarchic international realm. This inside/outside dichotomy limits the analyst’s capacity to imagine different ways of organizing the political life. As a consequence, the State’s traditional definition perpetuates itself in the discursive economy of international relations (Walker, 1993).

Dissident scholars have noticed that fact and have launched vigorous attacks on this predominant conception of subjectivity. Cox (1986) criticizes traditional scholars’ ahistorical use of the concept of the State, and argues that, if one wants to understand how the concept has changed its meaning through time and space, then historical materialism should be brought to the analysis. He contends that the concept of the State represents a specific configuration of the relations among elements that constitute historical structures (ideas, material capabilities and institutions) and that, depending their relationship, the State may even be substituted by different forms of political organization. Ashley (1989) holds that the definition of subjectivity is an effect of a modern discourse’s structural logocentrism. A logocentric structure is one in which a first term is defined through relation to its opposite and both are hierarchically arranged such that the former is portrayed as superior to the latter. Such a strategy is deployed to hide the process of the subject delimitation’s lack of foundation. This is so because the disjunction between subject and the social practices that demarcate it stabilizes their meaning and helps to fix its sovereign presence. Consequently, the denial of its historicity produces a center of authority that serves as a foundation for its own identity. Ashley points out that this strategy was deployed during the transition to modernity: a universal and absolute Reason was sustained in opposition to its historicity through the

introduction of narratives that disqualified what was not “Rational,” and this opposition was then used to naturalize Reason as epistemology’s only secure foundation. The outcome of this process is what Ashley (1989) terms the paradigm of sovereign man.

Campbell (1996a) sees the same movement applied to collective aggregates informed by the sovereignty problematic: a meta-narrative of subjectivity, which confers to the subject the capacity to shift its interaction to objects, other subjects and its own body, a process which, in a reified phenomenon, is indeterminate and fluid. Those who deploy this logic in international relations emphasize sovereignty as the defining attribute of the subject, and the way that they assure its legitimacy follows the very well known practice of disqualifying its opposite, anarchy; hence, a recurrence of dichotomies associated with both terms (order/disorder, security/insecurity, liberty/violence, etc.) ensues as a way to fix its meaning (Ashley, 1988, 1989; Campbell, 1998; Walker, 1993). Imbued with critical purpose, many authors have criticized the implications of such practices. Walker (1997) warns that the sovereign state is reproduced by practices of exclusion of other identities (class, race, gender, humanity) and questions the extent to which such practices debilitate our ability to think of alternatives to security problems. Doty (1997) stresses that the the agent-structure debate is limited because of how the sovereignty problematic informs it— the reification of agency which is needed to oppose it to structure diminishes the importance of social practices, and hinders alternatives that might help scholars escape this false dichotomy. Campbell (1996b) cautions that, when the definition of subjectivity is taken for granted, both problems of identity and violent efforts to solve them are neglected.

Although these critiques have intrinsic value just by showing the consequences of accepting the State as the main subject of international relations, their most important contribution is bringing to the fore a conception of power as “productive,” in opposition to the mainstream treatment of power as “juridico-discursive.” That is why, for instance, they do not get stuck in the inside/outside dichotomy that mainstream scholars pose, and can denounce the ethical implications of its adoption. In my view, they

are able to avoid the inside/outside dichotomy and construct critical international relations theories because the productive quality of power opens up space for new theorizing about the emergence of subjectivities through the exploration of the power-knowledge nexus. In the next section, I turn to Foucault's analytics of power to explain the differences between these two representations of power and present alternative ways of treating subjectivities that critical scholars advance.

### 2.3.

#### **Foucault's analytics of power and the emergence of subjectivities**

According to Foucault (1990), a certain representation of power is deeply rooted in the history of the West which limits the analysis of power. Foucault formulates this account while apposing two renderings of the relation between sexual desire and power. The first supposed that power represses desire. In this case, the only alternative to power would be its negation, and the consequent liberation of sexual drives. The second supposed that power and desire are mutually constitutive; thus, the existence of desire is, per se, the affirmation of power. Foucault recognizes that although the renderings differ in the way they conceive the dynamics between sexual drives and power, they both operate by basing their representations of power on negations: there is a rule that regulates sexual practices, that prohibits certain practices, that censors what can be said or done, and that endlessly reproduces these mechanisms by trespassing all levels of social life. He calls this the juridico-discursive representation of power: "It is defined in a strangely restrictive way (...), it is the power that only has the force of the negative on its side, a power to say no (...), it is a power whose model is essentially juridical, centered on nothing more than the statement of the law and the operations of taboos" (Foucault, 1990, p. 85).

The historical origins of such representation are found in the monarchy and State apparatus. During the transition from the middle ages, these institutions of power developed as regulators of other institutions, and gained legitimacy by imposing order on them. The moment when one center

of authority was imposed over the others marked the formation of a unitary regime, the identification of this center with the law, and the authorization of interdiction and sanction. Such concentration is more than a pre-condition for the emergence of law as the only way to exercise power in western societies; “(...) it is the code according to which power presents itself and prescribes that we conceive of it” (Foucault, 1990, p. 88). In fact, the critiques against power were addressed at the monarchy or at the aristocracy, and not at the juridico-discursive representation that emerged with them. It is exactly this universalizing feature that makes this form of representing power conform with general statements such as, “power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself,” or “its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms.” The permanence of the juridico-discursive representation of power then seems obvious: “would they accept it if they did not see it as a mere limit placed on their desire, leaving a measure of freedom - however slight - intact? Power as a pure limit set on freedom is, at least in our society, the general form of its acceptability” (Foucault, 1990, p. 86).

But Foucault tracks shifts in the operation of power from the eighteenth century on. Indeed, power radically altered how it masked itself. In contrast to the juridico-discursive representation, he can note the emergence of “new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus” (Foucault, 1990, p. 89). This new development of methods that go “beyond” the State is the backdrop for Foucault’s (1990, p. 89) famous remark that “in political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king.” The statement warns that the old representation of power as juridico-discursive still persists despite all the above-mentioned changes of modernity; and it is exactly this continuity that his analytics of power, “the definition of the specific domain formed by relations of power, and towards a determination that will make possible its analysis,” allows him to uncover (Foucault, 1990, p. 82).

Foucault describes these power operations to disclose a new ontology

that will allow the effects of power to be addressed theoretically. This new conception of power

“must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique source of sovereignty from which secondary and descendent forms would emanate; it is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power” (Foucault, 1990, p. 93).

There is no power, but states of power which are fluid because they originate from a multiplicity of force relations that are spread everywhere. Hence, power is omnipresent not because it controls space, but because it emerges from all over it. Moreover, power is not acquired; it is exercised in manifold relations of force coming from below, not concentrated in one center. In turn, this implies that power and resistance are inseparable. Foucault's (1990, p. 93) famous remark that “politics is war pursued by other means” should be understood within this context.

These transformations are associated with the emergence of bio-power; the entry of life into history. As Foucault explains, due to “the development of different fields of knowledge concerned with life in general, the improvement of agricultural techniques, and the observations and measures relative to man's life and survival” a “relative control over life averted some of the imminent risks of death” (Foucault, 1990, p. 142). The major difference between the juridico-discursive and bio-power representations is that the latter takes the form of an affirmation of life, while the former is based on its denial, with the ever-present threat of death as a result of the Sovereign's will. Bio-power, then, is “what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life” (Foucault, 1990, p. 143). However, instead of relaxing the control power exerts, the affirmation of life tightens its grip over man by creating a normalizing society.

This normalizing effect is the consequence of relative control over life achieved through knowledge about man. In fact, the power-knowledge nexus is made explicit when one considers that the condition of emergence of bio-power is the new relation between history and life, “in this dual condition of

life that placed it (man) at the same time outside history, in its biological environment, and inside human historicity, penetrated by the latter's techniques of knowledge and power" (Foucault, 1990, p. 143). Power assumes, in this rendering, a productive capacity that is alien to the juridico-discursive representation, exactly because bio-power's ontology considers power to be ubiquitous, both spatially and discursively, and not concentrated in one central point. The following passage summarizes this view of power as productive:

"Relations of power are not in a position of exteriority with respect to other types of relationships (economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations), but are immanent in the latter; they are the immediate effects of the divisions, inequalities and disequilibriums which occur in the latter, and conversely they are the internal conditions of these differentiations; relations of power are not in superstructural positions, with merely a role of prohibition or accompaniment; they have a direct productive role, wherever they come into play" (Foucault, 1990, p. 94, *my italics*).

This productive role has a consequence for the study of the subject: bio-power produces subjectivities through social practices that are embedded in processes of power-knowledge. Knowledge of man subjects man to a discourse that is aimed at protecting life, but also regulates what life is supposed to be — this is man's condition as subject. The same holds true for collective aggregates: "the analysis, made in terms of power, must not assume that the sovereignty of the State, the form of the law, or the overall unity of a domination are given at the outset; rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes (Foucault, 1990, p. 92). The inclusion of Foucault's cautionary prescription ("rule of immanence") that "between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no exteriority" (Foucault, 1990, p. 98) leads to the conclusion that any study of subjectivity that does not consider the constitutive role performed by power-knowledge is doomed to fail.

This Foucauldian perspective on power has important implications. The first is that studies that take this ontology seriously will yield questions about subjectivity when they focus on power-knowledge, and vice-versa. It is

impossible to treat them as independent spheres, attached to different objects of inquiry. The reason has already been stated: understanding the qualities of one will presuppose acknowledgement of the other; it is a process that works both ways. The second important consequence is that both power-knowledge relations and subjectivities belong to the discursive realm. Of course, there might be “local centers,” in opposition to a “central point,” where power-knowledge materializes. Foucault mentions, for instance, the body of the child, “under surveillance, surrounded in his cradle, his bed, or his room by an entire watch-crew of parents, nurses servants, educators, and the doctors, all attentive to the least manifestations of his sex” (Foucault, 1990, p. 98). But these local centers symbolize one power-knowledge discourse that engenders in itself a discourse of subjectivities: the child gains its subjectivity by being subjected to a discourse on sexuality that demarcates what is normal and what is pathological. The third consequence is that these two features, the connectedness of power-knowledge with subjectivity and their discursive nature, are valid both to individual and collective subjects. For instance, the discourse on sex puts the individual subject (the child) in a subjected position in relation to the collective subject, i.e. the State, from which regulations about right and wrong emanate. Consequently, the juridico-discursive representation of power produces both individual and collective subjects.

This third point deserves to be further qualified by the distinction between “tactics” and “strategy.” According to Foucault (1990, p. 95), “the rationality of power is characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level where they are inscribed” and end up “forming comprehensive systems.” But these systems find “their base of support and their condition elsewhere,” in strategy, which coordinates tactics in an unspoken manner: “the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them.” Foucault warns that one must resist the invitation to treat the relationship between these two dimensions as an opposition between the microscopic and the macroscopic levels, which could result in an erroneous reproduction of levels of analysis that are derived

from the juridico-discursive representation of power, and thus to an arbitrary spatial-splitting of individuals and collective subjectivities. Indeed, separating these two dimensions in spatial categories would suggest that micro-politics is based on power as productive, while macro-politics is attached to power as juridico-discursive though, in fact, power is productive everywhere. That is why “one must conceive the double conditioning of a strategy by the specificity of possible tactics, and of tactics by the strategic envelope that makes than work” (Foucault, 1990, p. 100).

In fact, when these findings are applied to the study of subjectivities derived from the juridico-discursive figuration, they are acts of confrontation that aim to correct the disjunction that Foucault’s analytics of power unveils. Roughly, the work of critical theorists can be divided into two categories according to their reliance on “tactical” or “strategic” dimensions of analysis. One category privileges the analysis of individual subjectivities as a way to criticize collective subjects. The focus is on social practices that belong to the dimension of “tactics.” The other emphasizes the contingent nature of power-knowledge discourses that underpin collective subjectivities. Because their emphasis relies more on power-knowledge discourses than on the “local centers” where they materialize, the analysis belongs to the “strategic” dimension. They aim to destabilize the juridico-discursive representation of power by stressing the arbitrary nature of these power-knowledge discourses.

The work of Philip Darby exemplifies emphasis on the tactical level. Darby (1998) attempts to reveal the productive dimension of power through analysis of fictional literature. He argues that this genre provides a privileged glimpse of constructions of narratives, and because narratives are used both in fiction and reality, studying fiction can bring the same benefits of studying reality. Because reality is understood in a multifaceted way, there is a need to organize its infinitude through a narrative that has the subject as a point of departure. If he is correct, then the narratives built about the “lives” of protagonists of literary fiction and the narratives built by scholars inside a specific disciplinary field about a scientific object are at the same time arbitrary, real and fictional.

Darby's (1998) makes his productive conception of power explicit when he contends that literary narratives could be even more real than those that scholars employ. In fact, he argues, the analysis informed by fiction is more realist than the realist fiction that dominates international relations theory, for the central concepts of this traditional approach (power politics and economic issues) arise from individual social practices, and not vice-versa. Moreover, collective aggregates contribute to the depoliticization of political analysis, because they are merely labels imposed on diversity to simplify very complex realities and solve tensions among different perspectives merely for the sake of parsimony. Darby (1998) argues that politicization of international relations requires one to personalize its subject; which is a further step that literature can achieve, because fictional literature privileges the construction of narratives from the experiences of individual subjects, not collective aggregates.

What Darby terms politicization, can be easily identified with the "cutting off of the King's head" that Foucault defends. This measure is needed to demonstrate the inadequate sovereign figure portrayed by the juridico-discursive representation of power, and to reveal the risks that it engenders. Freedom from this representation, for instance, ceases reproduction of the public/private divide, which works as a foundation of aggregate agents such as the State. Consequently, critical scholars become free to address gender issues. Questions about how race issues affect people's life may be explored in novels dealing with interracial relationships. Problems of cultural difference can be tackled as well, since it is through individual interactions that appraisals of these problems are changed or maintained. In summary, politicization implies that subjectivity does not derive from a Sovereign center of authority marked by well-defined boundaries demarcated through difference-subduing academic or political practices (in Foucauldian terms, the power-knowledge nexus that sustains the juridico-discursive representation and its associate subjectivity). The boundaries of power are fluid, loose and overlapping (Darby, 1998).

Darby's (1998) analysis benefits from the encounter of literature and post-colonial studies. Postcolonialism is an approach concerned with the

effects of difference on postcolonial realities. It is based on condemnation of the ways that Europeans involved non-Europeans in processes of acculturation. However, this process is not viewed from the perspective of collective aggregates, for from that perspective, there is only one legitimate aggregate, the European state, which interacts with a myriad of others which have their values as aggregates denied. Additionally, at the aggregate level, it is impossible to contest practices of colonial dominance, because the predominant discourse is one rooted in the success of the colonial enterprise: colonizers dominate the colonized, and constitute legitimate aggregates by imposing their political organizations; consequently, these aggregates are, well suited to their “civilizing project”. Literature offers an escape route from this trap. Because of its personalized nature, the narrative of a novel is constructed according to an inside-out logic, which locates agency at the individual level and constructs narratives according to what is experienced there. This inside-out logic allows the analyst to find fissures in the collective aggregate discourse by distinguishing between what happens at its level, and what happens at the individual one (Darby, 1998).

The sexuality question provides a good case for comparison. At the aggregate level, the imperialist discourse was based on a hierarchy of masculinity over femininity. Africa, for instance, was compared to a virgin continent that Europeans were meant to penetrate. In India, the Hindi population was considered effeminate because they did not resist British colonialism. At first sight, many imperialist fictions portrayed the same colonial subject. However, through careful reading of literary texts, one can see that the successful colonial enterprise was a discourse based on the public sphere. In the private sphere, the colonial project was traversed by ambiguity and insecurity. Consider two examples that undermine the dominant imperialist discourse and its associated subjectivities: 1) A white female’s sexual attraction to a black slave intensifies violent practices of domination for she cannot possibly satisfy her desires, and 2) cases of anxious homosexual relations between colonial soldiers and natives. Both, in a Foucauldian sense, exemplify how power and resistance are interconnected. The power of such individual narratives is denied though,

because they expose the absurdity of the dividing principle that authorizes Europeans to subsume difference. Those particular narratives approximate difference, and by reading difference, it is possible to realize that non-Europeans are as human as the Europeans (Darby, 1998).

Edward Said gives a good example on how to focus on the strategic, power-knowledge discursive dimension. Said (2003) is concerned with a kind of Western imaginative geography that represents the Arabic-Muslim world in a way that he suspects does not conform with “reality.” The author locates the source of this disjunction in what he calls orientalist discourse: a mode of representing the East based on a Western perspective. In a way that explicitly shows his indebtedness to Foucault’s elaborations of the power-knowledge-subjectivity nexus, he states that orientalist discourse has its origins in the Western will to know the East in order to dominate it. “Orientalism can thus be regarded as a manner of regularized (or Orientalized) writing, vision, and study, dominated by imperatives, perspectives, and ideological biases ostensibly suited to the Orient. The Orient is taught, researched, administered, and pronounced upon in certain discrete ways” (Said, 2003, p. 202). The enmeshed relation between power-knowledge and subjectivity becomes evident in this reading, because the Orient for Orientalism “is a system of representations framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western learning, Western consciousness, and later, Western empire. (...) Orientalism was itself a product of certain political forces and activities” (Said, 2003, p. 203).

Said (2003) clearly intends to deal with power-knowledge discourses rather than with the “local centers” in which they materialize. In asking about the sources of Orientalism’s intellectual authority, he states that his main methodological approaches to the issue “are what can be called strategic location, which is a way of describing the author’s position in a text with regard to the Oriental material he writes about, and strategic formation, which is a way of analyzing the relationship between texts and the way in which groups of texts, types of texts, even textual genres, acquire mass, density, and referential power among themselves and thereafter in the culture at large” (Said, 2003, p. 20). In a very similar fashion to Foucault’s

understanding of strategy, he explains that the term strategy serves “simply to identify the problem every writer on the Orient has faced: how to get hold of it, how to approach it, how not to be defeated or overwhelmed by its sublimity, its scope, its awful dimensions” (Said, 2003, p. 20). Strategy and authority are intermingled when it comes to Orientalism:

“Every writer on the Orient (and this is true even of Homer) assumes some Oriental precedent, some previous knowledge of the Orient, to which he refers and on which he relies. Additionally, each work on the Orient affiliates itself with other works, with audiences, with institutions, with the Orient itself. The ensemble of relationships between works, audiences, and some particular aspects of the Orient therefore constitutes an analyzable formation—for example, that of philological studies, of anthologies of extracts from Oriental literature, of travel books, of Oriental fantasies—whose presence in time, in discourse, in institutions (schools, libraries, foreign services) gives it strength and authority” (Said, 2003, p. 20).

On the basis of these contributions, he develops the notion of “orientalist stage” as “a system of moral and epistemological rigor” (Said, 2003, p. 67). He contends that this stage is the place where intellectuals, politicians, artists, diplomats, scholars, and others perform the already-given roles between East and West. This predetermination of roles is due to the operation of the orientalist discourse in its latent and manifest forms. Said (2003, p. 206) explains the difference between these two types by noting that “in the nineteenth-century writers (...) the differences in their ideas about the Orient can be characterized as exclusively manifest differences, differences in form and personal style, rarely in basic content.” He then states that the basic content was “the separateness of the Orient, its eccentricity, its backwardness, its silent indifference, its feminine penetrability, its supine malleability.” Hence, latent orientalism is a kind of ontological prejudice that subsumes the oriental object by keeping it always at a distance and in a position of inferiority in relation to the West, while manifest orientalism includes variations inside this purview, usually in accordance with the stage of institutionalized knowledge about the Orient. Since its inception, then, the production of knowledge has rested on power relations and has resulted in the production of a certain Oriental subject. Contemporary variations of the

scientific content of manifest orientalism follow the positivist rationale of humanities and social sciences in the subfield of “orientalist studies.”

In sum, Darby (1998) and Said (2003) take different routes to reach the same destination. Though both want to undermine the subjectivities attached to the juridico-discursive representation of power, the former launches his attack from the tactical dimension, whereas the latter operates in the strategic one. However, because these two dimensions rest on the representation of power as productive, both authors achieve the same objective. This is important, for it shows that this new ontology of power is the source of contestation of subjectivities inscribed in the juridico-discursive representation, whether they be individual or collective. Because power-knowledge discourses are spread everywhere in this new ontology, potential subjectivities are spread everywhere as well. Some authors call this the “decentralizing of the modern subject,” and associate this movement with “bringing the political back in” to political analysis (Edkins, 1999). Thus, even if Said (2003) does not focus his analysis on “local centers” of resistant subjectivities as Darby (1998) does, and instead tends to demonstrate the continuity of a discourse formation and the subjectivities that it engenders, it is still a critical enterprise, due to the nature of the ontology of power from which he departs.

#### **2.4.**

#### **Discourse, Subjectivities and Methodology**

So far I have tried to demonstrate that the traditional subject in mainstream international relations theory can be denaturalized and disrupted by substituting the juridico-discursive representation that supports it with the power-as-productive figuration. Although the examples that I have used to illustrate the relation between subjectivity and power-knowledge have rested on the category of discourse, I have neither offered a theoretical description of the term, nor dealt with the methodologies that can be deployed to address it. In this section, I intend to fill that gap. My starting point will be a cautionary remark: Foucault attended more to how discourse operated than to its definition. Hence, it will be more adequate to first

present the major aspects of discursive analysis, and then infer from them what a discourse is and what methodologies can be applied to analyze it, rather than the other way around.

For Foucault (1984), the first step toward a discursive critique is to analyze the systems of exclusion and control that make a discourse possible. In a certain sense, the systems of exclusion are external to discourse, while those of control are internal. Concerning the former, Foucault points to three varieties: prohibition, or the impossibility of saying whatever when one wishes, the opposition between reason and madness, and the division between true and false. Of all three, it is the last that exerts its effects over all of the others; paradoxically, it is also the system of exclusion that is barely noted. The distinction between true and false is based on what Foucault calls "will to truth," and has its origins in Greece, through a process culminating in the displacement of the truth of a statement from the enunciation act (rituals in which truth depended on the authority of the one who proclaimed it), in a movement that severed, or masked, the clear linkage between truth and power. Historically, mutations of the principles that keep the true apart from the false are manifestations of new forms of "will to truth," and are reinforced by institutions — pedagogical practices, books, libraries, etc. — as well as by the social value attributed to the knowledge that rests on it (Foucault, 1984, pp. 118-119).

Although they are also systems of exclusion, principles of rarefaction exert their effects internally, and may be thought of as performing a function of control. Foucault points to three: the commentary, the author, and the discipline. The commentary is a secondary text that reinforces the primary one. Its function is to reaffirm it without citing it. In turn, the author performs a controlling function insofar as he/she reproduces the role that a specific field of knowledge attributes to him/her, notwithstanding whether the role conferred to him/her in a historical epoch is one of more or less authorship. Finally, it is the discipline that creates the space of truth (in the true), which limits the discursive manifestations accepted inside it by delimiting, a priori, what statements are true or false. In this way, the discipline exerts its function of control in discursive production and demarcates the boundaries

that assure a discursive identity to a specific field of knowledge (Foucault, 1984, pp. 116-117).

This rich description of how discourses operate can be spatially figured. For Deleuze (1988), discourses constitute spaces of rarity in which statements and their relational status take form only as a function of their concrete existence, not of their potential or possibility. That is why “not only few things are said, but few things can be said” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 3). Hence, discourses are spaces that delimitate what can and cannot be said and the reproduction of these limits depends on the concrete relations between the statements that constitute it. In a detailed way, the discursive formation rests upon three spatial dimensions. In collateral space,

“(e)ach statement is inseparable via certain rules of change (...) a statement, a family of statements, or a discursive formation is first of all defined for Foucault by certain inherent lines of variation or by a field of vectors which cut through the associate (collateral) space: the statement therefore exists as a primitive function, or as the first meaning of the term 'regularity'” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 6).

In turn, correlative space deals with the relationship among statements, subjects, objects, and concepts that constitute it. They

“are merely functions derived from the primitive function or from the statement. As a result, the correlative space is the discursive order of places or positions occupied by subjects, objects and concepts in a family of statements. This is the second sense of 'regularity', for these different places represent particular points” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 9).

Finally, there is complimentary space, which is characterized by its non-discursive formations:

“(...) statements refer back to an institutional milieu which is necessary for the formation both of the objects which arise in such examples of the statement and of the subject who speaks from this position (for example the position of the writer in society, the position of the doctor in the hospital or at his surgery, in any given period, together with the new emergence of objects)” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 9).

In the same vein, Shapiro (1992, p. 5) believes that “a politics of discourse is inextricably tied to a politics of space.” But he qualifies his perspective by assuring his readers that “because ‘space’ is constituted by the way locations are imagined or given meaning, it is always already a largely discursive phenomenon,” and suggesting that “for this reason the domains or spaces within which conversations take place can be thought of (...) as ‘protoconversations,’ for they amount to the already established, if now silent, conversations that shape the voluble ones taking place.” Appropriation of this insight allows me to suggest that these protoconversations take place in a spatial category that regroups the three dimensions identified by Deleuze (1988). Drawing freely from Shapiro’s texts I will call this category intertextual space.

Following Shapiro’s (1989, p. 11) elaboration of intertextuality, the intertextual space can be understood through a comparison of social analysis and literature. “The social world given to us by the modern novel, for example, results from characteristic ways of representing gender, family, and social relations, and these novelistic representational practices are governed to a large extent by the evolving rules of representation characteristic of the novelistic genre.” The same logic holds for social analysis, because “insofar as ‘social reality’ emerges in various writing genres, investigations of how the world is apprehended require inquiries into various pre-texts of apprehension, for the meaning and value imposed on the world is structured not by one’s immediate consciousness but by the various reality-making scripts one inherits or acquires from one’s surrounding cultural linguistic condition.” Moreover, “the pre-text of apprehension is (...) largely institutionalized and is reflected in the ready-to-hand language practices, the historically produced styles-grammars, rhetorics, and narrative structures — through which the familiar world is continuously interpreted and reproduced.” The violent nature of this pre-text is ever-present, because “meaning is always imposed, not discovered, for the familiar world cannot be separated from the interpretive practices through which it is made.”

This framing of discursive formations in intertextual space opens up the possibility of another comparison, between language and discourse, to

define the latter. Shapiro (1989, p. 14) writes that, “poststructuralist modes of analysis emphasize ‘discourse’ rather than language because the concept of discourse implies a concern with the meaning - and value-producing practices in language rather than simply the relationship between utterances and their referents.” He proceeds to affirm that “in the more familiar approaches to political phenomena (including the empiricist and phenomenological), language is treated as a transparent tool; it is to serve as an unobtrusive conduit between thoughts or concepts and things,” while a “a discourse approach treats language as opaque and encourages an analysis of both the linguistic practices within which various phenomena (...) are embedded and of the language of inquiry itself.” Hence, the rendering of language as transparent gives place to an interpretation that considers language opaque, a discourse, because it exerts effects rather than just reflecting some reality (Foucault, 1972, pp. 138-139; Shapiro, 1989).

Carrying the spatial figuration further, the opaque quality of language can be found in the pre-texts of apprehension that inhabit the intertextual space. It is at this point that the representation of power as productive that Foucault’s analytics unveils can be applied to discourses. The reason is clear. Power is spread all over the space, and discourse, as a spatial category, is traversed by power. Thus, discourses are homologous to power in their productive quality, which is why power and discourse are used as synonyms, as the recurring expression “power-knowledge discourse” denotes. In this context, the interconnection between discourses and subjectivities is also revealed: insofar as power constitutes discourses, discourses constitute subjectivities. The production of subjectivity “takes place” in the intertextual space, and it is in “this locus” that the productive quality of discourse resides. To put it differently, it is from intertextual space that discourses exert effects over reality. Consequently, studying the emergence of subjectivities presupposes an emphasis on the intertextual space as “the place” where power-knowledge produces them.

How to gain access to the intertextual space to describe the emergence of subjectivities? As a good starting point, Foucault (1984) provides four methodological remarks to serve as regulating principles of

analysis. The first is the principle of reversal. “Where tradition sees the source of discourses (...) in those figures which seem to play a positive role, e.g., those of the author, the discipline, the will to truth, we must rather recognize the negative action of a cutting-up and a rarefaction of discourse” (Foucault, 1984, p. 126). The second is called the principle of discontinuity, according to which “discourses must be treated as discontinuous practices, which cross each other, are sometimes juxtaposed with one another, but can just as well exclude or be unaware of each other” (Foucault, 1984, p. 127). The third principle is the one of specificity, which emphasizes that meanings are given by regularities, not by the discovery of any pre-discursive original world. “We must conceive discourse as a violence which we do to things, or in any case as a practice which we impose on them; and it is in this practice that the events of discourse find the principle of their regularity” (Foucault, 1984, p. 127). The fourth is the principle of exteriority. “We must not go from discourse towards its interior, hidden nucleus (...); but, on the basis of discourse itself, its appearance and its regularity, go towards its external conditions of possibility, towards what gives rise to the aleatory series of these events, and fixes its limits” (Foucault, 1984, p. 127).

Foucault has formulated these principles to dislodge his method of analysis from the traditional way of conceiving the history of ideas. As he has stated in another text, the history of ideas was contaminated by a “transcendental narcissism” that imposed a form on discourses based on principles opposed to those mentioned above (creation, unity, originality, signification); hence, he wanted to “free the history of thought from its subjection to transcendence” (Foucault, 1972, p. 203). Indeed, the subjection to transcendence is a consequence of the transcendence of the subject, for continuity in the history of ideas guarantees that

“everything that has eluded him, may be restored to him; the certainty that time will disperse nothing without restoring it in a reconstituted unity; the promise that one day the subject – in the form of historical consciousness – will once again be able to appropriate (...) all those things that are kept at a distance by difference. (...) Continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the founding function of the subject” (Foucault, 1972, p. 12).

It is against this transcendental subject marked by the universal presence of “Reason” that Foucault formulates the principles of reversal, discontinuity, specificity and exteriority to study the various fields of science, or the spaces where “Reason” supposedly unfolds. Although the transcendental subject’s emergence could be easily related to the power productive representation of power, it is not clear to what extent this transcendental subject could be associated with the subjectivities that emanate from the juridico-discursive representations. I have two reasons to believe that such correlation is unwarranted. First, they emerged in different historical periods: the juridico-discursive by the end of the middle ages, the productive representation of power in the eighteenth century, and the philosophies of history based on a transcendental subject in the nineteenth century. The second reason follows from the relation between subjectivities, power and discourse: if Foucault’s target of criticism, the transcendental subject, appeared only in philosophies of history of the nineteenth century, its association with the juridico-discursive formation must be due to the projection of this specific subject to the past. In fact, Bartelson (2001) describes this projection. According to him, due to the transcendental character of philosophies of history that viewed the State as the only possibility of order, political thought reproduced political conservatism in a way that political knowledge was used to maintain political order in that period. This authorizes me to suggest that the transcendental subject did not belong to discursive formations operating when the juridico-discursive figuration emerged.

These two remarks are important because many critical authors who, following Said’s (2003) steps, have chosen to attack the juridico-discursive representation of power from the strategic dimension have been misunderstood. This is the case, for instance, with Milliken’s (1999) critique of some critical theorists’ use of Foucault’s discursive analysis. She targets the supposed quasi-structuralism present in some renderings of “generalized inflations,” such as Campbell’s (1998) emphasis of the continuity of US foreign policy, Neumann’s (1999) identification of Russia as Europe’s other,

Bartelson's (1995) attribution of permanence to the concept of sovereignty since the Renaissance, and so on. Milliken (1999) objects that these investigations are "not so much about how discourses of International Relations have been discontinuous, with heterogeneous conditions of emergence and spaces for dissent, but how dominating discourses have been largely continuous" (Milliken, 1999, p. 246). Consequently, she claims, such analyses undermine the purpose of the critical enterprise: "discourse scholars presumably seek to help people find potentialities for contemporary change. A person's ability to do this is unlikely to be encouraged by repeated demonstrations of structural quasi-permanence" (Milliken, 1999, p. 248).

Milliken (1999) clearly misses the mark. She takes the four principles that Foucault uses to attack the transcendental subject and deploys them against authors who share the same ontology of power as productive and who seek to undermine the subjectivities associated with the juridico-discursive representation of power. These "discontinuous, heterogeneous conditions of emergence and space for dissent" are already in their ontology, and it is exactly because of their inclusion that they criticize, focusing on power-knowledge discourses, the imposition of one type of subjectivity over the others. This is the goal, for instance, in analyses that show how the dominant discourse in the United States strategically ignores the indigenous extermination at the beginning of the country's historical narrative (Shapiro, 1997); or in States' attempts to rewrite their biographies to "preserve" internal uniformity and avoid difference inside the political community (Shapiro, 2000); or in the development of practices of cultural governance, of "a management of the dispositions and meanings of citizen bodies, aimed at making territorial and national/cultural boundaries coextensive (...) aided and abetted by academic discourses on state sovereignty, which reify sovereignty, turning it into a unproblematic expression of modern politics" (Shapiro, 2004, p. 31).

Milliken's (1999) approach, in fact, is very different from genealogy. Shapiro (1988) offers his rendering of genealogy by comparing it with hermeneutics. According to him, a hermeneutical movement seeks to transform the familiar into the exotic so that it becomes possible to

reinterpret the meaning of the interpreter's culture. In turn, the genealogical method questions the existence of something like the interpreter's culture by focusing on the conditions of existence that allow social practices to be treated as social. Hence, the problem is not how to better interpret, but how understanding of one kind of order is imposed on practices that had no prior ordering. It seems clear that the genealogical method presupposes the description of this ordering, for this is exactly what the critical theorists Milliken criticizes do. For them, discontinuities are already there, but remain unperceived because the juridico-discursive representation imposes one form of subjectivity. Milliken (1999) reverses this methodology: she takes the juridico-discursive representation of power as the reality and, based on her reading of Foucault's methodology, tries to reinterpret that reality by looking for discontinuities. She forces a change in ontology through the imposition of a misunderstood methodology.

Indeed, Foucault defines genealogy as the methodological treatment dispensed to the principles of discontinuity, specificity and exteriority. According to him, genealogy is concerned with "how did series of discourses come to be formed (...); what was the specific norm of each one, and what were their conditions of appearance, growth, variation" (Foucault, 1984, p. 130). Genealogy is meant to grasp discourse's power of affirmation, "the power to constitute domains of objects (Foucault refers to them as positivities), in respect of which one can affirm or deny true or false propositions" (Foucault, 1984, p. 133). In this regard, the remaining principle of reversion was to be dealt with by a different methodology that he named critical. This methodology tries "to grasp the forms of exclusion, of limitation, of appropriation (...) showing how they are formed, in response to what needs, how they have been modified and displaced, what constraints they have effectively exerted, to what extent they have been evaded (Foucault, 1984, p. 130).

These genealogical and critical approaches should complement each other. As he explains, "the difference between the critical and the genealogical enterprise is not so much a difference of object or domain, but of point of attack, perspective, and delimitation (Foucault, 1984, p. 132); they

“must alternate, and complement each other, each supporting the other by turns.” Their complementary character is possible because of the opacity of discourse.

“Discourse analysis understood like this does not reveal the universality of a meaning, but brings to light the action of imposed scarcity, with a fundamental power of affirmation. Scarcity and affirmation; ultimately, scarcity of affirmation, and not the continuous generosity of meaning, and not the monarchy of the signifier” (Foucault, 1984, p. 133).

The passage from scarcity and affirmation, to scarcity of affirmation is the key movement for understanding how critical and genealogical methodologies are bounded.

Curiously, when Foucault compares archaeology with the history of ideas, he defines this approach through four principles of analysis that, if they are not the same, are very similar to the principles of reversion, discontinuity, specificity and exteriority (see Foucault, 1972, pp. 138-140). This juxtaposition allows consideration of the relation between archaeology and genealogy in a way that is remarkably at odds with some contributions on Foucault’s methodology. Following two steps, a very well known rendering qualifies these relations as complementary, but different. First, it locates two periods in Foucault’s works, the archaeological being “structuralist” and the genealogical being “centered on power.” In this rendering, “archaeology is seen as an analysis of discursive systems in themselves, genealogy as examining social practices as a whole, not the discursive realm alone, and specifically as being concerned with the role of power in the production of subjects” (Edkins, 1999, p. 42). The second step presupposes that “archaeology serves genealogy” as a technique: “as a method of isolating discourse objects, it serves to distance and defamiliarize the serious discourse of the human sciences. This, in turn, enables Foucault to raise the genealogical questions: How are these discourses used? What role do they play in society?” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. XXV).

Although this position has the merit of turning Foucault’s rather difficult methodological texts into easy readings, its acceptance risks an over-

simplification that runs against the discursive analysis he proposes. For the sake of categorization, it commits the ontological violence of detaching Foucault's notion of discourse from its relation with power-knowledge. If power-as-productive is really located at the intertextual space of discursive formations, as suggested above, affirmations like "archaeology is an analysis of discursive systems in themselves" have no meaning at all.

Moreover, the disjunction between archaeology and genealogy hides the fact that genealogy is also a hermeneutic enterprise. As Shapiro (1988, p. 20) remarks, "genealogy reveals the process by which humans invest in the world with value; but as soon as we assume that we are already in a kind of world, we begin to ask value questions about it, and this kind of question about value is an hermeneutically inspired kind of question." Shapiro (1988) contends that, in this sense, Foucault is also a hermeneutist, given that value questions about the costs of a disciplined society motivate his concern about pre-ordainment. That's why, according to Foucault & Rabinow (1984, p.86),

“(...) if interpretation is the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning, in order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game, and to subject it to secondary rules, then the development of humanity is a series of interpretations. *The role of genealogy is to record its history.*”

To make things more complicated, one can wonder whether this “interpretative ordering” could be described both by archaeology and genealogy. If it could, then it would be better to approach Foucault's methodology through these four dimensions: the critical, the archaeological, the genealogical and the hermeneutical.

## 2.5

### **Towards the analysis of sovietologism ...**

In the previous sections I have presented a case that, to escape the reification of one subject in international relations theory and the consequences it engenders, it is necessary to destabilize the juridico-discursive representation of power that buttresses it through analysis that

focuses on the representation of power-as-productive. According to this view, subjectivities are produced by discourses, because discourses are laden with power-productivity. Moreover, the power-as-productive figuration stresses the importance of knowledge. Hence, the production of discourses “takes place” in a discursive space where power and knowledge meet. I have borrowed freely from other contributions and termed this “place” intertextual space. Consequently, accessing intertextual space is of the utmost importance for a discursive analysis that seeks the subject’s production. In terms of methodology, I have suggested that the best way to address this issue is through the conjoint use of critical, genealogical, archaeological and hermeneutical insights.

In a very summary fashion, this is the theoretico-methodological approach I deploy to answer the following question: how did the Soviet Union emerge as a subject during the 1950’s? In trying to answer it, the two objects that first come to my mind are the Cold War (power) and sovietology (Knowledge). While the Cold War phenomenon was the broad context in which engagement between the West and the Soviet Union occurred, sovietology was a new subfield of the international relations discipline that congregated diplomats, anthropologists, psychoanalysts, economists, military officers, and others interested in studying the Soviet Union. In fact, the term sovietology emerged during the 1950’s. The first register I have encountered is in Deutscher’s (1955, p. 348) review of Edward Cars’ fourth volume of the *History of Soviet Union*, which appeared in the journal *Soviet Studies*, in 1955. He uses the word “sovietologists” to refer to Soviet Union specialists. According to Unger (1998), the word “soviétologie” was applied to designate this area of studies in the review of a book on the Soviet Union written by a French scholar in 1956. Two years later, the London weekly *The Spectator* also used the word in a very similar way. Thus, the obvious association between the Cold War and sovietology was the point of departure for this dissertation’s research.

Bearing in mind the importance of knowledge in the production of subjectivities, I tried to find texts treating sovietology as a subfield of international relations in its own right. I expected to find a great amount of

publications on the specificities of sovietology, on how sovietologists shared the same ontological presuppositions about the Soviet subject, on how the subfield evolved until the end of the Soviet Union, on what happened after the Cold War, and so on. Intriguingly, after looking for works on “sovietology” on many different databases, I came across only the already mentioned paper written by Unger (1998) and a chapter in a book written by Cushman (1995).

Unger (1998) presents a case urging for a better definition of sovietology so as to improve sovietologist knowledge about the Soviet Union. As he states,

“if Western scholarship in the Soviet Union (or the Communist area) is to be subject to scrutiny, as it certainly should, the boundaries of the field must be clearly stipulated. ‘Sovietology’ has been with us for well over three decades and it is probably too late to banish it from our vocabulary. But it is not too late to clarify its usage. We may even find that we can do without ‘post-Sovietology’. (Unger, 1998, p. 24 *my italics*)

His contribution is not critical in any sense. He treats language as if it were transparent and hopes to refine the linguistic treatment of the Soviet object in order to advance the knowledge about it.

In a sociology-of-knowledge inspired fashion, Cushman (1995) asserts that the appeal of truth in sovietological studies comes from legitimizing sources that are external to its “object.” By comparing representations of the USSR with obituaries of the sovietologists responsible for creating those representations, the author concludes that the authority of sovietologists was based in their historical-affective record in relation to USSR. In their individual trajectories, those sovietologists fulfilled at least one of the following conditions: they were ex-communists who realized how bad the regime was and managed to escape to the West, or they suffered forced migrations and forced labor in the USSR. Many of them, of course, fulfilled both of these conditions. For Cushman (1995) these findings show that the sovietologists’ knowledge-producer reputation among his/her colleagues, most of the time associated with his/her personal trajectory (marked by ingredients like courage, determination, resolution, etc.), conferred

legitimacy to their representations of the USSR, rather than any correspondence between their representations and “reality.” Although Cushman's (1995) analysis represents a definite move towards a critical treatment of sovietology, his over reliance on the external context to determine the value of utterances in sovietology prevents him from perceiving what is specific about this discursive formation.

In search of the “discursive density” of sovietology, I then started to read some descriptions of the Soviet Union offered by international relations scholars during the period of sovietology's emergence. Some author's from the second half of the 1940's could even be called proto-sovietologists, given that the issues they emphasized in their texts pervaded the sovietologists' descriptions throughout the 1950's. Amongst them, the first text that deserves attention is Morgenthau's (1954) *Magnus Opus*, *Politics among Nations*. When he considers national character as one of the factors that determine the “power” of a country, he asserts that his argument is based on

“the fact — contested but (it seems to us) incontestable, *specially in view of the anthropological concept of the ‘cultural pattern’* — that certain qualities of the intellect and character occur more frequently and are more highly valued in one nation than in another. These qualities set one nation apart from others, and they show a high degree of resilience to change.” (Morgenthau, 1954, p. 118; the first edition, from 1948, did not come with the passage in italics)

Following the assertion, Morgenthau mentions the Russian National Character. According to him, the Russians are persistent, they blindly obey their superiors, and are militarists. He sketches this profile on the basis of a compilation of materials: reports of American diplomats from the middle of the nineteenth century, some anecdotal passages from Bismarck's memories, and a New York Times article from 1947. The wide period that the examples encompass reassure him that “even so thorough a change in the social and economic structure, in political leadership and institutions, in the ways of life and thought has not been able to affect the ‘elementary force and persistence’ of the Russian character” (Morgenthau, 1954, p. 121).

Another description of the USSR is provided by Kennan, in his famous article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," published in 1947. The author develops his Russian/Soviet profile by assuming the incommensurability of the Western world, associated with the Anglo-Saxon tradition of compromise, and the Russian-Asiatic world, marked by fanaticism about its superiority in terms of political institutions and skepticism about possible pacific coexistence. The lack of frankness, ambiguity, and excessive mistrust during diplomatic negotiations could only be understood from this perspective, since these attitudes were necessary to advance the Russian-Asiatic mode of being over the Anglo-Saxon one. That is why Kennan recommends a "vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies" (X, 1947, p. 575). According to Herz (1994, p. 33), "these goals were primarily established by the content of Marxist-Leninist ideological premises" in a way that "in spite of taking into account the elements of Russian history which reinforce the feelings of hostility towards the outside world, the author fastened on the link between ideology and aggressiveness and expansionism."

In 1946, Isaiah Berlin used a psychological lexicon to address the same issue during a speech at the Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs in London, immediately after his return from the British embassy in Moscow. Berlin again mentioned Russia/USSR's feelings of distrust toward the West. However, instead of locating its causes in Soviet fanaticism about the supposed superiority of its mode of life and the inexorable fall of capitalism, the author suggested that an inferiority complex — a permanent Russian neurosis — was behind the posture. This reading of the Soviets authorized comparison of the USSR to a big school. To him, Russians were like boys in a school whose main objective was to reduce the gap between the West and Russia. According to him, Russian state officials were aware that "the Russians are half barbarian, and they have to be made conscious of Western civilization and civilized values" (Berlin & Hardy, 2004, p. 93). Even a bit of violence could be tolerated to educate them, for maintaining order at a school of more than 200 million students would demand it. The same interpretation of the Russian character would be published by Berlin in many journals and

seems to have been marked by a sense of the totalitarian omnipotence of the Russian State (Berlin & Hardy, 2004).

In the 1950's, Dicks (1952, 1960) explored the unconscious aspects of the Russian national character. Based on interviews with émigrés from the USSR, the author attempted to sketch the average Russian national character to uncover the motivations behind the Bolsheviks' actions. He focused mainly on the structure of authority in Russian family life. He believed that these structures were reproduced on more abstract levels and became the foundations of power relations inside the USSR. The authoritarian behavior of Russian fathers caused Russian children to need to respect authority because they feared it, and not because they wished to do so. On the other hand, the benevolence of the subjugated mother originated a kind of utopian thought of fighting for liberty against the father's oppression. Because of this dichotomy, the characteristic trace of Russian national character was an ambivalent attitude toward satisfaction and deprivation. According to Dicks, the recurrence of parricides in Russian literature illustrates this tension. And he related this ambivalence to a Russian incapacity to overcome the oral phase, in which children do not distinguish between the Ego and external objects and attribute uncontrollable forces of affection and destruction either to the Ego, or to those objects. That is why Russians fed their fantasy of omnipotence internally, and emphasized constant external threats.

The backward stage of Russian national character found its counterpart in Western maturity, in which the Ego is able to control its impulses through the use of reason. Cognizant of that, Russian elites strived "to educate and force this modal-character structure toward a higher level of mastery over primitive impulses, to catch up with the West" (Dicks, 1960, p. 562). This attempt is illustrated by the idea of "New Men" in soviet psychology, of men capable of controlling their impulses to follow the party's directions. Because it reinforces the distinction between mass and elite, this posture feeds the ambivalence of the Russian national character even more. "This is the sacrifice of modal Russian character which a man who climbs the party ladder to success has to make. This, indeed, is what I (Dicks) have

called in psychoanalytic terms the oral-anal conflict in the Russian character” (Dicks, 1960, p. 562).

In a broad review of the literature concerning different approaches to Soviet behavior, Bell (1958) presented two descriptions of the USSR grounded on psychoanalytic notions. One builds its explanation onto the famous swaddling hypothesis: due to the force applied by mothers of peasant families in wrapping their babies, Russians developed an expansionist will in later adulthood as a manifestation of the unconscious desire to free themselves. That is why Russia is expansionist in geopolitical terms. The second is more intriguing. Developed by Nathan Leites of the RAND Corporation, this representation contends that the two major motivations behind Soviet attitudes were fear of death and repressed homosexuality. The fear of death could be noticed in Bolsheviks’ devotion to work and in the way they put the party as the sole foundation for life. As Bell (1958, p. 342) has it, these behaviors “express a kind of personal omnipotence through the dissolution of the self into the all-embracing, undying party”. The evidence of repressed homosexuality could be gathered in the homo-affective language used by Lenin when referring to his adversaries. For instance, if someone left the Bolshevik side and allied to an enemy, Lenin used to say that this man was “kissing” his old adversary. The many cases of Lenin’s masculine friendships that were broken up in extreme ways reinforced this hypothesis. Accordingly, these motivations compelled the soviets to act with cynicism, coldness and violence in pursuit of their goals. Leites (1951) later published a book based on these assumptions that helped American diplomats to decode the behavior of soviet leaders during negotiations to end the Korean War.

The richness of these contributions revealed an unexpected “discursive density.” At once, many different discourses, from the most disparate fields of knowledge — anthropology, psychoanalysis, political science, social psychology, sociology, history, etc. — were deployed with the same objective of describing the Soviet Union’s subjectivity. Additionally, they were all united by the repetition of the same modes of description: inferiority, expansionism, and contradiction traversed the majority of these renderings that attributed to the Soviet subject an ontological difference with

the West, and imprisoned the Soviet Union in an unchanging otherness. Due to all these features, Said's (2003) description of orientalism as a discursive formation that constitutes the Orient from a Western perspective came to the fore, and the idea that these “sovietological” descriptions consisted of a Western representation of the USSR emerged spontaneously. That is how sovietology became sovietologism (or the sovietologist discourse).

The comparison between orientalism and sovietologism proposed here goes beyond the simple act of naming one after the other. Indeed, all the elements described that supported the reading of orientalism offered in the previous sections should be applied to sovietologism. It implies that the sovietologist discourse is opaque, not transparent; that it has a intertextual space where subjectivities, in this case of the USSR and Soviet individuals, are produced; that the subjectivities that emanate from sovietologism are juridico-discursive; that analysis intended to destabilize these subjectivities will be based on the strategic dimension, i.e, will focus on the power-knowledge discourses, not on tactical “local centers,” although this could be an alternative way to tackle the issue; and so on.... In sum, this comparison implies the Soviet Union described in sovietologism is a Western representation imposed through operations of power at the discursive level.

The practical starting point for this discursive analysis on sovietologism is the perception that the Soviet Union’s subjectivity described as inferior, expansionist, and contradictory (Chapter 6) found its conditions of emergence in the complex interplay among: a) a specific notion of culture as a “pattern of culture” (Chapter 3); b) a specific notion of the State as a “totalitarian State” (Chapter 4); and c) a specific notion of personality as a kind of “collective personality” of the USSR (Chapter 5); as well as by d) the effects of the “Cold War *epistème*” on the production of knowledge about the USSR in the 1950’s (Chapter 7). These four aspects conjoined to form the intertextual space of the sovietologist discourse. To access it, the discursive analysis in each one of these chapters is informed by critical, genealogical, archaeological and hermeneutical, insights, although I refer to it mainly in archaeological jargon. It is up to the reader to judge where the emphasis relies.

## **PART II - Culture, the State and Personality**